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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

Open323Completed525All848
Operations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Platform Preannouncement Strategies: The Strategic Role of Information in Two-Sided Markets Competition: Formal preannouncement under strong taste preferencesResearch Paper

A platform release can attract both customers and developers. A customer's valuation depends on the number of other customers and the available applications, while a developer values access to customers. Before adoption, those numbers are expectations. Announcing features can influence these expectations, but communicating information costs money and also…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Duopoly Competition with Network Effects in Discrete Choice Models: Exactly two asymmetric equilibriaResearch Paper

Network effects make a product more attractive when other customers use it. In a market with two otherwise identical products, that feedback raises a concrete question: must an equilibrium still exist in which the firms attract equal market shares? Chen and Chen's Proposition 4 identifies a regime in which the answer is negative. At sufficiently low common…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions: Allocate Splits the Target Bundle into Demanded Bundles within |J|·C(n+1,2) IterationsResearch Paper

The product-mix auction was developed in 2007–8 for the Bank of England (Klemperer 2010) to sell many differentiated goods (loans against different qualities of collateral) in a single round. Each bidder submits a list of simple bids, each naming a price for every good and a quantity, and the auctioneer chooses prices and allocations that respect every bid.…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions: At Symmetric System Equilibria, Reserve Pricing Earns at Least the Profit of Thresholding, and Thresholding at Least That of Bid ShadingResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms sell impressions through repeated auctions, and advertisers typically buy them under a budget: a cap on what they spend over a campaign. Because the advertisers cannot re-optimize their bids in every auction, the platform usually manages their budgets for them, adjusting how each advertiser participates so that spending tracks…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algebraic TopologyCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Envy-Free Division of Multilayered Cakes: For a Prime-Power Number q of Groups with m ≤ q ≤ n, a Feasible Contiguous Group-Birthday Envy-Free Multi-Division by q − 1 Long Knives ExistsResearch Paper

Envy-free cake cutting asks for a division of a divisible resource, modelled as the interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], among agents with individual preferences so that no agent prefers another agent's share to its own. For a single cake and contiguous pieces, the existence of envy-free divisions goes back to Stromquist (1980) and to Su's Sperner-lemma proof (1999).

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Coordinating Project Outsourcing Through Bilateral Contract Negotiations: Bargaining Powers Under Which Each Contract Form Coordinates a Single-Task ProjectResearch Paper

Large projects such as buildings, infrastructure and software systems are routinely outsourced. The client who owns the project pays a subcontractor to execute it, and the subcontractor privately chooses how hard to work. Faster work costs him more, while the benefit of early completion goes mainly to the client. The paper notes that the fixed-price and cost…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Linear OptimizationMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms: The STP Mechanism Is Subgame-Perfect Incentive Compatible, Welfare-Optimal, Envy-Free and Core-Selecting from Any HistoryResearch Paper

Ridesharing platforms set prices and dispatch drivers over a road network whose demand changes within minutes: a stadium empties, rush hour starts, a neighbourhood goes quiet. Drivers are not employees. They may decline a dispatch, drive somewhere else, or stop working, and the platform pays no one in advance for staying in place. Prices that look only at…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Greedy Adversarial Equilibrium: An Efficient Alternative to Nonconvex–Nonconcave Min-Max Optimization: Every Bounded Function with Lipschitz Hessian Has a Greedy Adversarial EquilibriumResearch Paper

Min-max problems min⁡xmax⁡yf(x,y)\min_x\max_y f(x,y)minx​maxy​f(x,y) model two-player zero-sum games and appear across machine learning and operations research: adversarial training of classifiers, generative adversarial networks, and robust optimization against an adversarial perturbation. When fff is convex in xxx and concave in yyy, von Neumann's minimax theorem gives a saddle point, and…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Pure Nash Equilibria and Best-Response Dynamics in Random Games: Best-Response Dynamics Reaches a Pure Nash Equilibrium for All Large N When the Tie Probability Is SmallResearch Paper

A pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) of a game is a strategy profile from which no player gains by a unilateral deviation. Unlike mixed equilibria, pure equilibria need not exist, and even when they do they can be hard to find: computing an equilibrium is PPAD-complete in general (Daskalakis, Goldberg & Papadimitriou 2009). The simplest learning procedure that…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Tractable Equilibria in Sponsored Search with Endogenous Budgets: bidding valuations shaded by 1 + r_j with slack budgets is an ε-approximate equilibrium in large marketsResearch Paper

Sponsored-search platforms sell ad impressions through auctions in which advertisers submit both per-impression bids and a budget that caps their total spend. The platform then decides which auctions to run, subject to everybody's budget. Most auction theory treats budgets as exogenous constraints. In practice an advertiser chooses the budget, and…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements: Every Additive Instance Has an Allocation Giving Each Agent max{3/5, 1/(2−b_i)} of Her AnyPrice ShareResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods asks how to split a set of items among agents who value them differently, with no money changing hands. Many allocation problems are not symmetric: partners in a venture hold different stakes, heirs inherit different fractions of an estate, and countries or departments receive budgets in proportion to size. Such settings…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Investment in the Common Good: Free Rider Effect and the Stability of Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Mixed Strategy Two-Stage Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Survives Moderate AsymmetryResearch Paper

Many goods are maintained by several parties at once: a shared infrastructure, a fishery, an industry's reputation, a public research base. Each party bears the full cost of its own investment while every party enjoys the benefit, so each prefers that someone else pay. This free rider problem is classically studied as a war of attrition, and continuous-time…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Asset Dissemination through Dealer Markets: The Strategies Built from the Collected Demand Function Form a Rank-Free EquilibriumResearch Paper

Many assets, such as corporate and municipal bonds, securitized products and new issues, trade over the counter: there is no central exchange, and an asset reaches its final buyers through a sequence of bilateral trades between dealers. Empirical work on these markets documents intermediation chains, in which a block of securities passes through several…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algebraic GeometryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Nash Equilibrium Problems of Polynomials: For Generic Polynomial Data the KKT-Cut Algorithm Terminates Finitely, Finding a Nash Equilibrium or Certifying That None ExistsResearch Paper

A Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) asks for strategies of several players such that no player can lower its own cost by deviating while the others keep theirs fixed. NEPs model competition in electricity markets, environmental agreements, and the training of generative adversarial networks. When the players' problems are nonconvex, an equilibrium requires…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Square Root Agreement Rule for Incentivizing Truthful Feedback on Online Platforms: Strict Truthful Equilibrium Approximately Payoff-Dominating All Symmetric Equilibria for Many TasksResearch Paper

Online platforms (labor marketplaces, review sites, crowdsourcing services) rely on feedback from their users: did the plumber arrive on time, is this image labelled correctly. The answers cannot be checked against ground truth, so a platform that rewards feedback must reward it by comparing it with other users' answers. This is the problem of peer…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Towards a Functional Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies: Truthful Bidding Is Not Dominant, but the Expected Gain from Strategic Bidding Converges to 0 as the Number of Users DivergesResearch Paper

A cryptocurrency user can attach a fee to a transaction, and a miner can choose which waiting transactions enter the next block. When the most valuable waiting transactions compete for a limited number of places, the fee rule affects both the user's bid and the amount the user expects to pay. Basu, Easley, O'Hara and Sirer study a protocol that charges…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Testing, Voluntary Social Distancing, and the Spread of an Infection: Greater Testing Raises the Equilibrium Infection Probability of the Type That Mixes Its Social ActivityResearch Paper

Testing makes an infected person less likely to pass an infection to someone else. In a society whose contacts depend on voluntary social activity, that direct benefit changes behavior: an agent who expects fewer infections may choose more contacts. The central question is whether the added contacts can outweigh the direct benefit of testing in equilibrium.…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets: An Incentive-Compatible, Individually Rational, Budget-Balanced, Pareto-Optimal Mechanism ExistsResearch Paper

Auctions in which bidders face budget constraints do not fit the classical quasi-linear theory: a bidder cannot pay more than a fixed amount, however much the goods are worth to him. For a single divisible good, Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan showed that the adaptive clinching auction of Ausubel is incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal,…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategic Inventories under Supply Chain Competition: Under Fierce Chain-to-Chain Competition, Strategic Inventories Leave All Manufacturers and Retailers Strictly Worse OffResearch Paper

A manufacturer that sells through an independent retailer charges a wholesale price above cost, and the retailer then adds its own margin: the double marginalization problem of vertical contracting. Anand, Anupindi and Bassok (Management Science 2008) showed that in a two-period monopoly chain the retailer can blunt this by buying more than it sells in the…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynkin Games with Incomplete and Asymmetric Information: With Linear Payoffs, a Threshold Stop and a Belief-Reflecting Randomised Stop Form a Saddle PointResearch Paper

An optimal stopping game asks two players to choose when to stop a shared process. The first player receives one payoff if they stop first and another if the second player stops first. Such a game changes when one player knows a parameter that the other can only infer from observations. The informed player can reveal information through the timing of a…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algebraic TopologyTopology·Captain: mikedeng1

Equipartition of a Segment: Every Continuous Function on Subsegments of [0, 1] Vanishing on Degenerate Segments Takes Equal Values on Some Partition of [0, 1] into m SegmentsResearch Paper

In fair division, a value may be assigned to each interval that a cut produces. If the value is continuous in the interval's endpoints, an equal-value partition is a natural target. Some valuations are nonnegative and additive, but a difference of competing measures or a signed utility need have neither property. Avvakumov and Karasev establish equal-value…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Games and Mean-Field Games with Impulse Controls: A Regular Solution of the N-Player Quasi-Variational Inequalities Gives a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

An impulse control changes a system's state at a chosen instant, rather than continuously adjusting its drift. When several decision makers can intervene in the same state process, an intervention changes both the acting player's future cost and every opponent's. This makes the equilibrium question different from separate single-player control problems.…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchPartial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Finite State Mean Field Games with Wright–Fisher Common Noise as Limits of N-Player Weighted Games: Normalized N-Player Equilibrium Values Converge to the Master Equation at a Polynomial RateResearch Paper

Mean field games describe Nash equilibria of games with very many symmetric players by a single limiting object. Whether, and how fast, the equilibria of the NNN-player game converge to that limit is the convergence problem. For games with common noise, a source of randomness shared by all players, the standard route goes through the master equation, a PDE on…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program Does Not Provide the Right Incentives: Issues and Remedies: Under HRRP-I a Symmetric Equilibrium Exists and Every One Over-Invests in Readmission ReductionResearch Paper

The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), created by the US Affordable Care Act and run by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services since 2012, cuts the Medicare payments of hospitals whose 30-day readmission rates exceed a benchmark computed from other hospitals. It is a form of yardstick competition in the sense of Shleifer (1985): a…

14 thms2 active users
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Game of Variable Contributions to the Common Good Under Uncertainty: The Symmetric Game Has a Regular Control Markov Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

Many shared assets deteriorate unless someone pays to maintain them: a public infrastructure stock, a jointly used ecosystem, a joint venture's capital, a common research base. When several parties benefit from the same stock and each pays for its own contributions, every party is tempted to wait for the others to pay. Kwon (arXiv:1904.00500, published in Op…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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