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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: iris

Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price MechanismResearch Paper

A broker stands between a seller and a buyer who hold private valuations. It posts a price to each side, and trade happens only if both accept. Posted prices are the standard mechanism when the parties cannot be asked to report their valuations: they are simple, strategy-proof, and individually rational. When the same kind of trade repeats, the broker must…

28 thms8 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

APX-Hardness of Maximizing Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items: Via 3-Regular Vertex Cover, Nash Social Welfare Is NP-Hard to Approximate Within µ = (2(1+α)/3)^(−γ/2.5) > 1Research Paper

Allocating indivisible goods among agents is a basic problem of fair division, and the Nash social welfare — the geometric mean of the agents' utilities — is a standard objective for it. It sits between the utilitarian objective (the arithmetic mean, easy to maximize) and the egalitarian objective (the minimum utility, the Santa Claus problem), and it is…

25 thms8 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Anyone but Him: The Complexity of Precluding an Alternative: Control by Partition of Voters Is Vulnerable or NP-Complete for Plurality, Condorcet and Approval Voting, Depending on Tie-HandlingResearch Paper

An election is run by someone — a chair, a committee, an organiser — who can shape it without touching a single ballot: by deciding which candidates appear, which voters are registered, or how the electorate is split into bodies that pre-select nominees. Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick (1992) proposed to measure how well a voting rule protects itself against…

50 thms8 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchTopology·Captain: mikedeng1

A Generalization of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem: An Upper Semi-Continuous Map with Nonempty Closed Convex Values on a Bounded Closed Convex Set in Euclidean Space Has a Fixed PointResearch Paper

Brouwer's fixed point theorem says that a continuous map of a closed simplex into itself has a fixed point. Many existence questions in game theory and mathematical economics produce instead a point-to-set mapping: to each point xxx it assigns a whole set Φ(x)\Phi(x)Φ(x) of admissible responses, for instance the set of best replies of a player to the others'…

15 thms8 active usersReviewed
Complexity Theory·Captain: iris

Competitive Equilibrium for Linear Chores is CLS-completeResearch Paper

A Fisher market sells divisible items to agents who each hold a budget; a competitive equilibrium (CE) is a price vector at which every agent buys a best bundle she can afford and every item is sold. When the items are goods with linear utilities, equilibria are the optimal solutions of the convex Eisenberg–Gale program and can be computed in polynomial…

41 thms7 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Best-of-Many-Worlds MMS Allocation for Chores with Sublinear DisposalsResearch Paper

Dividing undesirable tasks gives a cost to every recipient. A person asked to divide all tasks into equal shares may still be unable to find a share she considers acceptable once other people's preferences must also be respected. This tension matters in fair division: a benchmark based only on each person's own costs need not be simultaneously achievable by…

27 thms6 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Online Learning via Offline Greedy Algorithms: Applications in Market Design and Optimization: Robust, Blackwell-Reducible Greedy Algorithms Yield Online γ\gammaγ-Regret O(D(p)NδTlog⁡d)O(D(p)N\delta\sqrt{T\log d})O(D(p)NδTlogd​)Research Paper

Many combinatorial and continuous optimization problems in revenue management and machine learning are NP-hard but admit a simple greedy γ\gammaγ-approximation: build the solution in NNN stages, and in each stage take the locally best step. Submodular maximization (Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher, 1978), product ranking and reserve-price optimization are examples.…

33 thms6 active usersReviewed
Functional AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Side-Constrained Dynamic Traffic Equilibria: Under Edge-Load Capacities, Strong Dynamic Larsson-Patriksson and Marcotte-Nguyen-Schoeb Equilibria Exist (Departure-Time Choice)Research Paper

Dynamic traffic assignment predicts how travellers choose routes and departure times when travel times depend on the traffic itself. Its central solution concept, the dynamic user equilibrium, asks that no particle of flow can lower its cost by switching to another route or departure time. Existence of such equilibria in continuous time is classical: Friesz…

13 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach: Every Chain-Stable Outcome Is Supported by Competitive Equilibrium PricesResearch Paper

Markets in which goods pass through intermediaries (supply chains, interbank lending, procurement networks) do not fit the two-sided buyer–seller models of matching theory: one firm can buy inputs on some trades and sell outputs on others. Trading networks model such markets as a directed graph of possible bilateral trades. Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor,…

12 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games: Binary Search Finds a Nash Equilibrium of a Rank-1 Game in Polynomial TimeResearch Paper

A Nash equilibrium of a two-player game is a pair of choices from which neither player can improve by changing their own choice alone. Computing one equilibrium is a central task in algorithmic game theory. For unrestricted bimatrix games, their payoff tables may encode difficult equilibrium computations. The structure of a rank-one bimatrix game gives a…

21 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games II: If Every Player Runs Optimistic FTRL with Step Size (n−1)^{−1/2}T^{−1/4}, Each Player's Regret Is at Most (R+4)√(n−1)·T^{1/4}Research Paper

When every participant in a repeated game runs a no-regret learning algorithm, the time-averaged play converges to a coarse correlated equilibrium, and in smooth games the average welfare approaches the price-of-anarchy guarantee. These facts are a standard justification for equilibrium predictions in auctions, routing and markets, where agents learn rather…

15 thms6 active users
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points 3: In Every Nash Equilibrium of Bubelis's Gadget the Primary Player Plays 0 with Probability α, the Unique Root of f in [0, 1]Research Paper

For games with three or more players, Nash equilibria can be irrational, so they cannot in general be computed exactly. Bubelis made this precise: any real root of any univariate polynomial arises as the probability of a particular strategy, or the payoff of a particular player, in a Nash equilibrium of a three-player game whose payoffs depend on the…

11 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 3: In Every Harmonic Game the Uniformly Mixed Strategy Profile Is a Mixed Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Finite games in strategic form are the basic model of strategic interaction in economics, engineering and computer science. Potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, DOI 10.1006/game.1996.0044) are the class with the most tractable equilibrium behaviour: every finite potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium, and simple learning dynamics converge to one.

13 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Equilibria II: On Two Links with Speeds s₁ ≤ s₂ ≤ φs₁ Some Nash Equilibrium Has Expected Makespan 1 + s₂/(s₁ + s₂) Times the Optimum, Reaching φ at s₂ = φs₁Research Paper

When many independent users share a network, each routes its own traffic to minimize its own delay, and nobody optimizes the system as a whole. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou asked how much this lack of coordination can cost: how far the social cost of a Nash equilibrium can be from the social optimum, in the worst case. Their paper Worst-case equilibria (STA…

11 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play IV: Almost Sure Convergence in Supermodular Games with a Unique Rest PointResearch Paper

Fictitious play is the oldest model of learning in games: each player repeatedly best-responds to the empirical frequencies of the opponents' past play. Stochastic fictitious play adds random payoff disturbances before each choice, so that players choose smoothed ("perturbed") best responses. It is a standard model in economics and in the study of learning…

19 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Cores of Convex Games: The Core of a Convex Game Is Its Unique von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable SetResearch Paper

A cooperative game with transferable utility assigns to every coalition of players the total payoff the coalition can secure on its own. Two solution concepts for such games go back to the foundations of game theory: the core, the set of payoff divisions no coalition can improve upon, and the stable set (von Neumann–Morgenstern solution), a set of divisions…

20 thms6 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Minimax Realized Full Swap Regret on the Euclidean DiskResearch Paper

In online linear optimization a learner repeatedly picks a point of a convex set and then pays a linear loss chosen by an adversary. External regret compares the learner with the best single fixed point in hindsight. Swap regret is stronger: every action value the learner actually played may be replaced, in hindsight, by its own substitute. Low swap regret…

24 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Toward Constant-Factor Maximin Share Guarantees for Subadditive ValuationsResearch Paper

A group of nnn agents must divide mmm indivisible goods, and each agent values bundles of goods differently. The maximin share (MMS) of an agent is the best value she could guarantee herself by splitting all goods into nnn bundles and receiving the bundle she likes least (Budish 2011). Allocations giving every agent her full maximin share need not exist even for…

28 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Combinatorics·Captain: Shuze Chen

From multi-allocations to allocations, with subadditive valuations: a d-multi-allocation (d a power of 2) yields an allocation giving each agent v_i(A_i)/d − ((d−1)/d)·δ_iResearch Paper

In fair division of indivisible items, a central open question is how large a fraction ρ\rhoρ of the maximin share (MMS) can be guaranteed to every agent when valuations are subadditive. Lower bounds on this fraction have repeatedly been obtained in two steps: first build a ddd-multi-allocation, in which every item may be given to up to ddd agents at once and…

14 thms5 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

An O(loglogn) Upper Bound on the Price of Stability for Undirected Multicast Shapley GamesResearch Paper

In a network design game each user must connect a source to a destination in a shared network, and the cost of every link that is built is split among the users who route through it. A central planner would pick the routing of least total cost; the users instead pick routes that minimize their own payment, and the two goals can disagree. The price of…

31 thms5 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

On the Impossibility of Convergence of Mixed Strategies with Optimal No-Regret Learning: Mean-Based Monotonic Play Cannot Converge Almost Surely to the Nash Equilibrium of a Competitive 2×2 GameResearch Paper

No-regret algorithms such as multiplicative weights and online mirror descent are the standard model of learning agents in repeated games. A classical fact is that when two such agents play a zero-sum game, the time-average of their mixed strategies converges to a Nash equilibrium (Freund and Schapire, 1999), and in general games the average play converges…

18 thms5 active usersReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsConvex Optimization·Captain: iris

Doubly Optimal No-Regret Online Learning in Strongly Monotone Games with Bandit Feedback: Barrier Bandit Mirror Descent Reaches the Nash Equilibrium at Last-Iterate Rate O~(nT−1/2)\tilde O(nT^{-1/2})O~(nT−1/2)Research Paper

In many operations problems several decision makers act repeatedly on a shared system and see only the payoff they receive: firms setting quantities in a Cournot market observe the market price, sellers in a pricing game observe their revenue, bidders in a Kelly auction observe their allocation. None of them knows the reward functions or their gradients. Ban…

18 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: iris

Solving Optimization Problems with Blackwell Approachability: CBA+ Has θ-Weighted Average Regret at Most 2κL(θ_T/ω_T)√(Σω_t²)/Σθ_t Whenever θ_{t+1}/θ_t ≥ ω_{t+1}/ω_tResearch Paper

Large convex–concave saddle-point problems min⁡x∈Xmax⁡y∈YF(x,y)\min_{x\in\mathcal X}\max_{y\in\mathcal Y}F(x,y)minx∈X​maxy∈Y​F(x,y) arise in matrix games, extensive-form games, distributionally robust optimization and many convex programs written in min–max form. A standard way to solve them is the repeated game framework: two regret minimizers, one per player, play against each other, and the…

24 thms5 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing: For Fixed nnn, Sharing-Minimal Fair fPO Allocations Are Computable in O(3n(n−1)Dv/2mn(n−1)/2+2)O(3^{n(n-1)D_v/2} m^{n(n-1)/2+2})O(3n(n−1)Dv​/2mn(n−1)/2+2) Operations and NP-Hard at Polynomial DegeneracyResearch Paper

Fair division of divisible resources is usually solved by convex optimization or market equilibrium, and the resulting allocations typically split many objects among several agents. In practice splitting is costly: a house, a car or a work shift is shared only by co-ownership or time-sharing. Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi (arXiv:1908.01669v3, Operations…

22 thms5 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability: Finding an Envy-Free and Pareto-Optimal Lottery Is PPAD-HardResearch Paper

Allocating indivisible goods without money (school seats, dormitory rooms, course slots, organ-transplant priority) is a central problem of market design. When agents report cardinal utilities rather than rankings, the classical answer is the mechanism of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979): give every agent one unit of fake money, find market-clearing prices for…

31 thms5 active usersReviewed
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