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Control Theory

214 missions · 87 completed

Missions

Open127Completed87All214
Algorithmic Game TheoryMarkov ChainStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Strong and Weak Equilibria for Time-Inconsistent Stochastic Control in Continuous Time 1: Weak and Strong Equilibria Exist When the Admissible Generator Rows Form Convex Compact SetsResearch Paper

An agent whose preferences change over time cannot simply optimize. Under non-exponential discounting, for instance hyperbolic or pseudo-exponential discount functions, a plan that is optimal today stops being optimal tomorrow, and a later self deviates from it. Strotz (1955) proposed that a sophisticated agent treat future selves as players in a game and…

17 thms5 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Strong and Weak Equilibria for Time-Inconsistent Stochastic Control in Continuous Time 3: Discrete-Time Equilibria Exist on an Infinite Horizon for Closed Convex Admissible Transition RowsResearch Paper

In many dynamic decision problems the criterion an agent uses today is not the one it will use tomorrow. The standard example is non-exponential discounting: if a payoff received ttt periods from now is weighted by δ(t)\delta(t)δ(t) and δ\deltaδ is not geometric, then the plan that is optimal from today's point of view will be abandoned by the agent's future selves.…

11 thms5 active usersReviewed
Dynamical SystemsGraph TheoryLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

Synchronization via Pinning Control on General Complex Networks I: A Kronecker LMI Weighted by the Positive Left Null Vector of G Globally Synchronizes a Pinned Strongly Connected NetworkResearch Paper

Many engineered and natural systems are networks of identical dynamical units coupled through a directed interaction graph: arrays of oscillators, power grids, sensor and multi-agent networks, gene regulatory circuits. A basic control question for such a network is how to force every unit onto a prescribed reference trajectory (an equilibrium, a periodic…

10 thms5 active users
Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks IV: The Energy-Constrained Control AlgorithmTextbook

Battery-powered and energy-harvesting wireless devices cannot treat transmission power as free: a control algorithm that maximizes throughput without regard to energy will drain a device long before the network's other resources are exhausted. Chapter 6 of Georgiadis, Neely & Tassiulas's survey Resource Allocation and Cross-Layer Control in Wireless Networks…

15 thms5 active users
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbabilityReinforcement Learning+1·Captain: iris

Exploration Noise for Learning Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games: With Common Noise, the Tilted Geometric Fictitious Play Converges to the Equilibrium at Rate ϖ−nexp⁡(C/ε2)\varpi^{-n}\exp(C/\varepsilon^2)ϖ−nexp(C/ε2)Research Paper

A mean field game (MFG) describes a continuum of identical players, each controlling its own state and paying a cost that depends on the statistical distribution of the population. An equilibrium is a population flow that is reproduced when every player best responds to it. Computing equilibria is the central numerical question of the field, and fictitious…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Stationary Discounted and Ergodic Mean Field Games with Singular Controls: The Discounted Equilibria and Their Rescaled Values Converge to the Ergodic Equilibrium as the Discount Rate VanishesResearch Paper

Firms invest to raise their productivity, investment is irreversible, and the return on productivity depends on what the rest of the market does. Cao, Dianetti and Ferrari model this as a stationary mean field game (MFG) of singular control: a representative firm controls a one-dimensional diffusion through a nondecreasing investment process. Its running…

19 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

On System-Wide Safety Staffing of Large-Scale Parallel Server Networks: Positive SWSS Makes the Limiting Diffusion Exponentially Ergodic, Negative SWSS Makes It Transient Under Every Markov ControlResearch Paper

Large service systems such as call centres, hospital wards and cloud server farms route several customer classes to several server pools, with each pool trained for only some of the classes. Staffing such a network sits between two failure modes: too few servers make queues explode, and too many waste capacity. In the Halfin–Whitt (quality-and-efficiency-dri…

26 thms4 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case VIII: The Infinite-Horizon Borel Models — the Optimality Equation J* = T(J*) under (P), (N), (D)Textbook

Infinite horizon dynamic programming asks for the least expected cost of controlling a stochastic system forever, and for a policy attaining it. On finite or countable state spaces the theory has been classical since Bellman, Blackwell (1965) and Strauch (1966). Many models in operations research, inventory control, queueing and economics have continuous…

23 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

The Exact Online Threshold for the Asymmetric Binary PerceptronResearch Paper

The asymmetric binary perceptron (ABP) is a random constraint satisfaction problem. Given a matrix G∈RM×NG\in\mathbb R^{M\times N}G∈RM×N with independent standard Gaussian entries and a margin κ∈R\kappa\in\mathbb Rκ∈R, one asks for a sign vector σ∈{±1}N\sigma\in\{\pm1\}^Nσ∈{±1}N with Gσ/N≥κ1MG\sigma/\sqrt N\ge\kappa\mathbf 1_MGσ/N​≥κ1M​ coordinatewise. When M/N→αM/N\to\alphaM/N→α, the largest density at which a…

36 thms3 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Condition-Based Production for Stochastically Deteriorating Systems: Optimal Policies and Learning: The Optimal Production Rate Decreases in Deterioration, Time to Maintenance and Base RateResearch Paper

Production systems such as wind turbines and assembly equipment can often be run faster or slower, and running faster usually wears them out faster. Between scheduled maintenance visits, an operator can therefore trade revenue now against deterioration later. Condition-based production, a term coined by Uit het Broek et al. (2020), makes this trade-off…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Managing Customer Churn via Service Mode Control: A Myopic-or-Sandwich Interval Policy Is Optimal Among All Admissible Service-Mode ControlsResearch Paper

Subscription businesses, online platforms and service providers lose revenue when customers leave, and the marketing literature models churn as a hazard driven by the customer's state, for instance through logit hazard functions (Rust, Lemon and Zeithaml, Return on marketing: Using customer equity to focus marketing strategy, Journal of Marketing 68(1),…

25 thms3 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: iris

Sales Effort Management Under All-or-Nothing Constraint: The Optimal Sales Rate Has a Watershed Structure in the Time-to-Go, With a Cutoff Strictly Increasing in the Sales Still NeededResearch Paper

Sales targets with a bonus are a standard incentive in practice: a car dealership earns a manufacturer bonus only if it sells a quota of vehicles in a quarter, and a salesperson earns a lump sum only when a quota is met. Contracts of this all-or-nothing type pay nothing below the target and a bonus plus a per-unit commission above it. They raise a dynamic…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: iris

Quantitative Convergence for Displacement Monotone Mean Field Games with Controlled Volatility: Open-Loop Nash Equilibria Converge to the Mean Field Equilibrium at Rate 1/NResearch Paper

Mean field games describe Nash equilibria of stochastic differential games with very many symmetric players, each of whom interacts with the others only through the empirical distribution of their states. The limiting model, introduced by Lasry and Lions and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines, replaces the population by a measure flow and the NNN-player equilibrium…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Indefinite Linear-Quadratic Partially Observed Mean-Field Game: With a Relaxed Compensator, the Decentralized Strategies Form an O(1/√N)-Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Mean-field games model a large population of agents in which each agent's dynamics and cost depend on the others only through population averages. In the linear-quadratic (LQ) case the agents' states follow linear stochastic differential equations and costs are quadratic, so the equilibrium can be computed from Riccati equations. A standard way to use the…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Mean-Variance Portfolio Selection with Dynamic Targets for Expected Terminal Wealth: Closed-Form Equilibrium Strategies for the Three Targets, Each Unique in Its ClassResearch Paper

Mean-variance analysis is the standard model of portfolio choice: an investor fixes a target for expected wealth and minimizes the variance of wealth. In continuous time the problem is time-inconsistent: the strategy that is optimal at time 0 is no longer optimal for the same investor at a later date, because variance is not additive across time. Dynamic…

43 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

A Mean-Field Control Problem of Optimal Portfolio Liquidation with Semimartingale Strategies: The Value Function Is Linear-Quadratic in the State's Law and the Optimal Strategy Jumps Only at t and TResearch Paper

A large investor who must sell a position of x0x_0x0​ shares by a deadline TTT moves the price against their own position: every sale depresses the price, and the depression decays only gradually. Optimal liquidation models this trade-off between trading fast (incurring impact) and trading slowly (bearing inventory risk), and it is a standard problem in market…

24 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Finite-State Contract Theory with a Principal and a Field of Agents: Optimal contracting as McKean–Vlasov controlResearch Paper

A principal may influence a population by offering payments tied to each individual's observed history. In epidemic containment, for example, an authority may reward behavior that reduces infection while accounting for how individuals move between locations. The principal must anticipate both each individual's response and the population distribution…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Optimizing Free-to-Play Multiplayer Games with Premium Subscription: Optimal advertising and subscription pricingResearch Paper

A free-to-play multiplayer game earns subscription revenue only if players value the premium experience enough to pay for it. Yet converting free players into premium players also changes the experience of everyone else. Premium players may enjoy owning items that others lack, while free players may dislike comparisons with premium players. Advertising…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationPartial Differential Equations·Captain: mikedeng1

Hamilton-Jacobi Equations with Semilinear Costs and State Constraints, with Applications to Large Deviations in Games: Verification Theorem for the State-Constrained Target ProblemResearch Paper

Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics model a population of NNN agents who occasionally revise their actions by a noisy best-response rule with noise level η>0\eta>0η>0. As η→0\eta\to0η→0, the population spends long periods near Nash equilibria and occasionally transits between them; the exponential rates of these transitions, and hence which equilibrium is stochastically…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
Dynamical SystemsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Control of an Epidemic through Social Distancing: Under Limited Capacity Effects Every Optimal Policy Is Single-Peaked and Infections Are Log-Concave While Measures EscalateResearch Paper

During the Covid-19 epidemic, governments had to decide not only whether to impose social distancing but how to schedule it over time: when to escalate, when to relax, and whether a relaxation might later have to be reversed. Epidemiology supplies the dynamics (the SIR model of Kermack and McKendrick, 1927), and optimal control supplies the language for…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Infinite Horizon Stochastic Impulse Control with Delay and Random Coefficients: The Strategy Built from Iterated Snell Envelopes Is Optimal over All Admissible Delayed Impulse StrategiesResearch Paper

Impulse control models a decision maker who acts on a system by discrete interventions rather than continuously: a central bank adjusting a rate, a firm switching production capacity, a portfolio manager rebalancing with fixed transaction costs. Each intervention has a fixed cost, so the controller chooses both when to act and how much. In many applications…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Contracting with Unobservable Managerial Hedging: The Principal's Value Solves a Concave Free-Boundary HJB Problem and the Contract Reflected at the Payment Boundary Is OptimalResearch Paper

A manager can influence a project's output through effort, but the owner observes output rather than effort. When the manager can also trade privately in a financial market, a contract based on output and market returns changes both effort incentives and the manager's ability to hedge risk. The owner must decide what the contract pays, how sensitive it is…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Credit, Business Cycle, and Portfolio Selection: Under Limited Commitment the Credit Limit Is a Closed-Form Multiple m* of Income, and Below It the Household Defaults at OnceResearch Paper

A household can borrow against expected future income only while repayment remains preferable to default. In the baseline model of Choi, Koo, Lim and Yoo, this choice is imposed through a participation condition at every date: the household's remaining utility from its planned consumption must be at least its remaining utility after default. The constraint…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Equilibrium Portfolio Selection for Smooth Ambiguity Preferences: The Closed-Form Equilibrium Strategy under a Gaussian PriorResearch Paper

An investor who does not know the expected return of a stock faces two kinds of uncertainty: risk (the randomness of returns given the model) and ambiguity (uncertainty about which model is true). The smooth ambiguity criterion of Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (Econometrica 2005) separates the two: the investor first computes the expected utility …

24 thms3 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Strong and Weak Equilibria for Time-Inconsistent Stochastic Control in Continuous Time 4: Limits of Equilibria of the Time-Discretized Problems Are Weak Equilibria in Continuous TimeResearch Paper

A decision maker is time-inconsistent when the plan that is optimal today stops being optimal tomorrow. The standard source is non-exponential discounting: a reward ttt units of time ahead is weighted by δ(t)\delta(t)δ(t), and unless δ\deltaδ is exponential the relative weight of two future dates changes as time passes. Hyperbolic and pseudo-exponential discount…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
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