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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equilibria: In Single-Sink Networks the Makespan and Total-Travel-Time Prices of Anarchy Are O(Uτ)O(U\tau)O(Uτ)Research Paper

Navigation devices let drivers react to the traffic they see now, not to the traffic that will exist when they reach a road. Dynamic traffic models capture this with the instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE): at every node and every moment, a flow particle only enters edges on a currently shortest path to its destination, where length is physical travel…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round: Oblivious Rounding Turns a (λ,μ)(\lambda, \mu)(λ,μ)-Smooth Exact Relaxation into a (λ/(2α),μ)(\lambda/(2\alpha), \mu)(λ/(2α),μ)-Smooth MechanismResearch Paper

Many welfare-maximization problems in mechanism design are NP-hard: combinatorial auctions, packing integer programs, unsplittable flow, maximum traveling salesman. The standard algorithmic answer is relax-and-round: solve a fractional relaxation exactly, then round the fractional solution to a feasible one. Turning such an algorithm into a mechanism is the…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance: The Rai Algorithm Has O(√(T log T)) Regret with High ProbabilityResearch Paper

In Bayesian persuasion a sender who observes a random state commits to a rule that maps states to recommendations, and a receiver who knows the state distribution follows a recommendation only when it is optimal given what it reveals (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011; Bergemann and Morris 2019). When the distribution is known, the sender's best rule solves a…

33 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Convergence of a Packet Routing Model to Flows over Time: Packet Arrival Times and Cumulative Flows Converge to Those of the Flow over Time as α→0\alpha \to 0α→0 and β/α→0\beta/\alpha \to 0β/α→0Research Paper

Large-scale traffic simulators such as MATSim move vehicles through a road network in discrete time steps and in discrete units: a link holds a queue of vehicles, a vehicle may leave after a free-flow travel time, and the number of vehicles leaving per step is limited by the link capacity. Dynamic traffic theory, on the other hand, studies flows over time in…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

A Label-State Formulation of Stochastic Graphon Games and Approximate Equilibria on Large Networks: Graphon Equilibrium Controls Give n-Player ε-Nash Equilibria With Average Error → 0Research Paper

Large games on networks arise whenever many agents interact only with their neighbors: firms in a supply network, banks linked by exposures, users of a congested service, or individuals in an epidemic. A Nash equilibrium of an nnn-player stochastic differential game with heterogeneous interactions is a fixed point over nnn coupled control problems, and…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

Adaptive, Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Strongly Monotone and Exp-Concave Games with Gradient Feedback: MA-AdaOGD Converges to the Nash Equilibrium at Last-Iterate Rate O(log⁡3T/T)O(\log^3 T/T)O(log3T/T)Research Paper

When several agents repeatedly choose actions and pay costs that depend on everyone's choices, each agent faces an online learning problem whose environment is the other agents. Online gradient descent (OGD) is the standard learner in this setting. It is doubly optimal under strong convexity: a single agent facing arbitrary strongly convex costs has …

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: iris

A Stable-Set Bound and Maximal Numbers of Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games: Every Non-Degenerate 5×55 \times 55×5 Bimatrix Game Has at Most 31 Nash EquilibriaResearch Paper

A bimatrix game is a two-player game in strategic form, given by two payoff matrices. Its central solution concept is Nash equilibrium, a pair of randomized strategies that are optimal against each other (Nash 1951). How many Nash equilibria a game can have matters for algorithms that find one or all of them, and for the combinatorics of the polytopes that…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: iris

On a Network Centrality Maximization Game: Best Responses Do Not Depend on the Intrinsic Centrality and Link Only Within Incoming Distance did_idi​Research Paper

PageRank centrality (Brin–Page 1998) scores the nodes of a directed graph by the long-run frequency with which a random surfer visits them. In citation networks, the Web and social networks, each node controls where its own out-links point and has an interest in being visible. Earlier work asked how adding a link changes PageRank (Avrachenkov–Litvak 2006)…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: iris

A Theory of Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of School Quality: Strategy-Proofness for Schools Implies the First-Choice Design Extracts a Random AssignmentResearch Paper

Many school districts assign seats through a centralized mechanism that breaks priority ties with lotteries, and a large empirical literature uses that randomness to estimate the effect of attending a school on test scores, college attendance and earnings. The first-choice research design has been applied to data from the Charlotte mechanism and from DA…

36 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

The Basic Core of a Parallel Machines Scheduling Game: The PMS Game Under Job Splitting Is Totally BalancedResearch Paper

Manufacturers who own production capacity and jobs to process can pool their machines. If jobs may be split, meaning processed simultaneously on several machines, a group of manufacturers behaves like a single machine whose speed is the total speed of the group's machines. Pooling then lowers the group's total completion time, and the question is how to…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Optimal Electricity Imbalance Pricing for the Emerging Penetration of Renewable and Low-Cost Generators: Optimal Pricing Makes Full Commitment an Equilibrium with Minimum Expected Deadweight LossResearch Paper

Electricity is traded in two stages. In a day-ahead market generators commit quantities for a delivery period; at delivery, deviations between committed and actual production are settled in a real-time imbalance market at an imbalance price. As the share of wind and solar grows, the generators with the lowest marginal cost are also those with the largest…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Coordination Games on Weighted Directed Graphs: on an open chain of m cycles of v nodes, improvement paths of length at most 3vm³ reach a Nash equilibrium from every joint strategyResearch Paper

In a coordination game on a graph, every player is a node and chooses a colour, and a node is rewarded for agreeing with its neighbours. These games model the adoption of a common standard, clustering, and the stabilisation of distributed protocols. When the graph is directed, the dynamics change sharply. A node is paid only by its in-neighbours and pays…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Blockchain Adoption in a Supply Chain with Manufacturer Market Power: the manufacturer's incremental welfare is strictly positive, and all parties adopt whenever the cost does not exceed itResearch Paper

A manufacturer that sources from several suppliers faces a recall problem. When a defect is reported and the source cannot be traced, every unit on the shelf is recalled, including goods from suppliers who did nothing wrong. A shared ledger that records provenance changes this: only the defective batch needs to be recalled. A Walmart case study reports…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication: in symmetric instances some optimal k-signal scheme has a sender-optimal s-Pareto collection of recommendation pointsResearch Paper

Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) studies a sender who knows the state of the world and commits to a randomized signaling policy before a receiver acts. In the classical model the sender may send as many distinct messages as the receiver has actions, and by the revelation principle an optimal policy simply recommends an action. In many…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Non-Truthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification: The α-GSP Mechanism Has an Efficient Nash Equilibrium Whenever the α-VCG Mechanism DoesResearch Paper

Search engines sell the ad slots next to their results in position auctions: advertisers bid, the highest bidder gets the top slot, the second highest the next one, and so on. A slot higher on the page is clicked more often, and the ratio of click rates between slots is described by a vector of relative position values. The textbook truthful mechanism,…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Pick-an-Object Mechanisms: an individually rational rule is pick-an-object implementable in perfect ex-post equilibrium iff it is strategy-proof and monotonically discoverableResearch Paper

Many allocation procedures used in practice — school choice, university admissions, course allocation — are run as one-shot direct mechanisms: every participant submits a full ranking, and an algorithm such as deferred acceptance or top trading cycles computes the assignment. Sequential alternatives, in which participants repeatedly pick one option from a…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Educational Inequality and Reservation Policy in Developing Markets: the inequality-eliminating seat transfer has a closed form and strictly exceeds the welfare-maximizing transferResearch Paper

Many developing countries reserve college seats for disadvantaged students, and how large the reservation should be is a live policy question: in 1993 the Supreme Court of India capped reservations at 50% of seats. Bao, Ni and Singh (SSRN 3772113, version of May 30, 2023; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.00249) build an equilibrium…

56 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings: the unique legal set of assignments is the set of stable assignments of a subinstanceResearch Paper

Stable assignments are the standard output of centralized school choice, but insisting on stability can leave many students worse off than necessary (Faenza–Zhang, §1). Morrill (2016) proposed legality as a relaxation motivated by legal standing: a student who forms a blocking pair has a complaint only if the remedy, the assignment of that student to that…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Algorithmic Transparency with Strategic Users: when a firm strictly prefers a transparent hiring algorithm, region by region in the agents' cost planeResearch Paper

Firms increasingly screen job applicants, borrowers and customers with algorithms built on observable features. Regulators and the public ask for these algorithms to be made transparent, and firms often resist, arguing that agents who know the algorithm will game it. Wang, Huang, Jasin and Singh (arXiv:2008.09283, 2020; published in Management Science,…

38 thms2 active usersReviewed
Economics·Captain: iris

Commitment Against Front-Running Attacks: the commit-reveal protocol has an equilibrium without front running iff βπ ≤ c, and otherwise every equilibrium carries a front-running threatResearch Paper

On public blockchains, pending transactions wait in a public mempool before a block includes them. Anyone who sees a profitable transaction there can send a competing one with a higher fee and have it executed first. This is front running. It is a large, measured source of losses on decentralized exchanges and in other smart contracts (Daian et al., 2020).…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Capacity Games with Supply Function Competition: under submodularity, at-cost bids with marginal-contribution margins are a supply-chain-optimal Nash equilibriumResearch Paper

A buyer facing uncertain demand often secures supply in two stages: it first reserves capacity from several suppliers, and after demand is observed it decides how much of the reserved capacity to use. Electricity procurement (reserve markets), contract manufacturing and logistics all have this shape. In practice each supplier quotes a reservation price for…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation: every k-ticket lottery equilibrium allocation is (2 − 1/k)-trade efficientResearch Paper

Alaska allocates scarce big-game hunting permits through a draw in which each applicant may buy up to six tickets and spread them across the permit lotteries of her choice; an applicant drawn in several lotteries keeps the permit she ranks highest. Designs of this kind, parallel lotteries, are simple to run and give applicants freedom to express intensity…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

A Mean Field Games Model for Cryptocurrency Mining: With Exponential Utility the Equilibrium Is Unique and Explicit, Every Miner Hashing at the Constant Rate KMw(r;γ)/(c(1+M)²)Research Paper

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin pay a reward to whoever first solves a hashing puzzle. The protocol adjusts the difficulty so that rewards arrive at a roughly constant rate for the system as a whole, about one every ten minutes, and a miner's chance of winning the next reward is proportional to its share of the total hash rate. Mining is costly…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains: every DACC algorithm stops at a stable matching, and every stable matching is the outcome of some DACC algorithmResearch Paper

The deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) finds a stable matching in a two-sided market, but only one side proposes, and the result is the stable matching that side likes best. Other stable matchings, such as the median stable matchings of a market, are out of its reach. A decentralized process in which both men and women make offers, in…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals: a 0.337-competitive prophet inequality for online weighted matching with edge arrivals in general graphsResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees random values one at a time and must accept or reject each irrevocably, with a "prophet" who sees all values in advance. The classical single-item version (Krengel–Sucheston, Samuel-Cahn) guarantees half of the prophet's expected value. Since the work of Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg and Sandholm…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
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