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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning: The Personalized Buy/Wait/No Mechanism Is Optimal and Strictly Beats Public SignalingResearch Paper

A seller who sells over two periods, at a full price now and a discount later, loses revenue to strategic customers who wait for the discount. Waiting is costly to the customer only through availability risk: if inventory is scarce, the product may be gone by the second period. Inventory is usually known to the firm and not to its customers, so the firm can…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets and Tractable Fair Division 3: The Quasilinear Eisenberg–Gale Programs Attain Their Optima and Characterize Quasilinear EquilibriaResearch Paper

A Fisher market allocates a common supply of items among buyers with separate budgets. When the items form a continuum, such as positions in a measurable interval, a buyer's valuation and the market price are functions rather than finite lists. This is a useful model for divisible resources and for settings in which an allocation can be described as a…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 3: Pacing-Based Equilibria Have Liquid Welfare Price of Anarchy at Least 1/2Research Paper

Advertising platforms repeatedly sell opportunities to show an advertisement. The opportunity's features, such as audience and placement, affect each advertiser differently, while advertisers limit their average spending. This makes the efficiency of an auction a question about both heterogeneous values and budgets. The paper by Balseiro, Kroer, and Kumar st…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores 2: Indivisible Chores Always Admit a Pareto Optimal Allocation That Is Both Weighted-EF^1_1 and Weighted-Prop1Research Paper

Many allocation problems distribute chores: tasks, shifts, teaching duties or cleaning rotas that every recipient would rather avoid. Agents often have unequal obligations, for example a full-time and a part-time worker, and a fair division should respect these entitlements. When the tasks can be split (time shares, probabilities), the competitive rule of…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Outpatient Service with Strategic Walk-ins II: The Triage Model Costs Less When C_L/C_O ≤ α̲ and the Strategic Model Costs Less When C_L/C_O ≥ ᾱResearch Paper

Many outpatient clinics offer two ways in: an appointment booked online, and walk-in hours on the day. Some patients have no choice (acute cases arrive as walk-ins), but many can pick either channel, and they pick the one that costs them less: a long appointment delay pushes them into the walk-in room, a crowded walk-in room pushes them to book or to give…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithms for Competitive Division of Chores 1: At Most min{(2m−1)^{n(n−1)/2}, (2n−1)^{m(m−1)/2}} Competitive Utility Profiles and Pareto-Frontier Faces Meeting the Negative OrthantResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide work, not goods: shifts among employees, teaching loads among faculty, cleaning duties among housemates, maintenance tasks among the owners of a shared resource. For divisible goods the standard fair and efficient solution is the competitive rule (competitive equilibrium from budgets): give every agent a budget, find prices…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences 1: Kuhn's Divide & Choose Rule Guarantees Every Agent Her minMax Utility for Continuous Non-Atomic PreferencesResearch Paper

Fair division asks how to share a resource among nnn agents with different preferences so that each agent can be promised a minimum level of welfare, whatever the preferences of the others. Classical cake cutting treats a good cake, valued additively or at least monotonically. Many real problems mix goods and bads: a plot of land with both fertile and…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Retention or Acquisition? Behavior-Based Quality Disclosure II: Behavior-Based Disclosure Raises Total Two-Period Profits Exactly When the Disclosure Cost Exceeds a CutoffResearch Paper

Firms that sell to the same customers over time learn who bought from whom. Behavior-based pricing (BBP) — charging a firm's own past customers one price and the rival's past customers another — has been studied since Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Villas-Boas (1999). A second instrument is the disclosure of product quality: free samples, demonstrations…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Correlated Equilibria for Mean Field Games with Progressive Strategies: Correlated MFG Solutions Yield ε_N-Correlated Equilibria of the N-Player Game Against Progressive Deviations, ε_N → 0Research Paper

A correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) is an equilibrium of a game with a mediator: the mediator draws a profile of recommendations from a known distribution and tells each player privately what to play. The distribution is an equilibrium if no player gains by deviating from the recommendation they receive. Correlated equilibria can give higher payoffs…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies 1: A Nonincreasing Blind Strategy Earns at Least 0.669 of the Prophet's Expected Maximum When Values Arrive in Uniformly Random OrderResearch Paper

In the prophet inequality a gambler observes independent nonnegative random values V1,…,VnV_1,\dots,V_nV1​,…,Vn​ with known laws one at a time and must decide irrevocably, after seeing each one, whether to stop and keep it. Her expected reward is compared with that of a prophet who knows all realizations and earns E(max⁡iVi)\mathbb E(\max_i V_i)E(maxi​Vi​). When the values arrive in a fixed…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Case Study on Stochastic Games on Large Graphs in Mean Field and Sparse Regimes I: An Explicit Markovian Nash Equilibrium on Every Finite Transitive GraphResearch Paper

Mean field games describe Nash equilibria of large populations in which every player interacts with every other player symmetrically, through the empirical distribution of all states. Many systems of interest are not of this kind: agents in a network interact only with their neighbours, and the interaction structure is a graph rather than a complete graph.…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 1: Under Pre-Announced Pricing, Social Learning Raises Optimal Expected Profit When Consumers Are Impatient or PatientResearch Paper

Online reviews let consumers learn about a new product from the experience of earlier buyers. For a firm selling to strategic consumers, who time their purchases, this social learning (SL) cuts two ways. Reviews reveal quality, which can raise second-period demand; but a consumer who expects reviews also has a new reason to wait, and every consumer who…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Algorithms for Aggregative Games on Graphs III: Equal-Stepsize Gossip under Strong Monotonicity, limsup E‖x^k − x*‖² ≤ (α/μ)(2C²N + BC√(2nN)/(1 − √λ))Research Paper

In an aggregative game, each player's decision affects a common quantity, such as total production or total demand. An agent may be able to calculate its own preferred response while lacking direct access to that aggregate. Koshal, Nedić, and Shanbhag study how agents can estimate it by exchanging information only with neighbours on a communication graph.…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Algorithms for Aggregative Games on Graphs II: The Gossip Algorithm with Stepsizes 1/Γ_k(i) Converges Almost Surely to the Unique EquilibriumResearch Paper

In an aggregative game, each player's cost depends on its own decision and on the sum of all players' decisions. That form appears in resource sharing, production, and network games: a player may know its own choice while lacking a central feed of the aggregate. A distributed algorithm therefore has to estimate the aggregate through local communication as…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets 1: Two Additive Agents with Almost Equal but Unequal Budgets Have a Competitive Equilibrium Giving Each Agent Her Truncated ShareResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide indivisible goods among agents who are entitled to different shares but cannot pay with real money: course seats among students, shifts among workers, inherited items among heirs. A standard mechanism gives each agent a budget of artificial currency and lets a market run. When budgets are equal this is the competitive…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Mean Field Game of Optimal Portfolio Liquidation 3: The Mean-Field Equilibrium Strategies Form an O(1/√N)-Nash Equilibrium of the N-Player Liquidation GameResearch Paper

A trader who must sell a large position within a fixed horizon faces a trade-off: selling fast moves the price against her (temporary price impact), selling slowly exposes her to price risk. Since Almgren and Chriss, this optimal liquidation problem has been studied as a stochastic control problem with a terminal state constraint: the remaining position…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Probabilistic Weak Formulation of Mean Field Games and Applications 2: Under Unique Hamiltonian Maximizers and Lasry–Lions Monotonicity, the Mean Field Game Has at Most One SolutionResearch Paper

Mean field games, introduced independently by Lasry and Lions (Mean field games, Jpn. J. Math. 2007) and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines (2006), describe the Nash equilibria of games with a very large number of symmetric players, each of whom reacts only to the empirical distribution of the others. In the limit, an equilibrium is a fixed point: a flow of…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Probabilistic Weak Formulation of Mean Field Games and Applications 1: When the Hamiltonian's Maximizer Sets Are Convex, the Mean Field Game in Weak Formulation Has a SolutionResearch Paper

Mean field games (MFGs) describe Nash equilibria of stochastic differential games with a very large number of symmetric players, each of whom interacts with the others only through the empirical distribution of their states (and, in this paper, of their controls). They were introduced independently by Lasry and Lions and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines around…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium 1: Under Regret-Matching (2.2), the Empirical Distributions of Play Converge Almost Surely to the Set of Correlated EquilibriaResearch Paper

A correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) is a probability distribution over strategy profiles of a game such that no player gains by deviating from a recommended strategy, given the recommendation. It is the solution concept of choice when players can condition on common signals, and its set is a convex polytope defined by linear inequalities, which makes it…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Markov ChainProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Evolution of Conventions III: In 2 × 2 Games with Two Strict Equilibria, the Generically Stable Equilibria of Adaptive Play Are the Weakly Risk Dominant OnesResearch Paper

Many games have several strict Nash equilibria, and equilibrium analysis alone does not say which one a population will settle on. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) proposed risk dominance as a selection criterion for 2×22\times22×2 games: of two strict equilibria, select the one whose basin is "larger" in a precise payoff sense. That criterion is axiomatic. H. Peyton…

45 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Impulse Controls: A Verification Theorem with Applications 1: Regular Solutions of the Quasi-Variational Inequalities Give Nash Equilibrium PayoffsResearch Paper

Many economic and engineering systems are steered by agents who act at discrete instants rather than continuously: a central bank intervenes on an exchange rate, two energy producers adjust a shared stock, a firm rebalances inventory. Each action has a fixed cost, so continuous control is not realistic. The mathematical model is impulse control: the state…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy Iteration Is Strongly Polynomial for 2-Player Turn-Based Stochastic Games with a Constant Discount Factor: Explicit Iteration Bound for Strategy IterationResearch Paper

Two-player turn-based stochastic games (2TBSGs) model a zero-sum contest on a finite graph with random transitions: in each state one player chooses an action, pays its cost, and a lottery chooses the next state. The minimizer and the maximizer both evaluate the total discounted cost. The model contains Markov decision processes (one player), simple…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks 2: No Strategyproof Randomized Mechanism Beats 2 - o(1) on TreesResearch Paper

A public facility (a fire station, a hospital, a server) is to be placed on a road network, and the people it serves report their own locations. When the planner wants to minimise the distance to the farthest user (the minimax or egalitarian objective, in the sense of Rawls), each user has an incentive to misreport so as to pull the facility towards…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks 1: A Strategyproof 3/2-Approximation Mechanism on the CircleResearch Paper

A facility — a fire station, a server, a meeting point — must be placed on a network, and every user of the network reports where they are. When the planner cares about the worst-off user, the objective is the minimax: minimize the largest distance from the facility to a user. The reports are private information, so a user may misreport a location to pull…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games II: Equilibrium Adoption Rates of Information Systems Are the Minimizers of the Equilibrium PotentialResearch Paper

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers private, noisy signals about the state of the road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, their subscribers act on different information, and the congestion each population experiences depends on how all of them route. A question then arises for…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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