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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: iris

Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price MechanismResearch Paper

A broker stands between a seller and a buyer who hold private valuations. It posts a price to each side, and trade happens only if both accept. Posted prices are the standard mechanism when the parties cannot be asked to report their valuations: they are simple, strategy-proof, and individually rational. When the same kind of trade repeats, the broker must…

28 thms8 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

APX-Hardness of Maximizing Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items: Via 3-Regular Vertex Cover, Nash Social Welfare Is NP-Hard to Approximate Within µ = (2(1+α)/3)^(−γ/2.5) > 1Research Paper

Allocating indivisible goods among agents is a basic problem of fair division, and the Nash social welfare — the geometric mean of the agents' utilities — is a standard objective for it. It sits between the utilitarian objective (the arithmetic mean, easy to maximize) and the egalitarian objective (the minimum utility, the Santa Claus problem), and it is…

25 thms8 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchTopology·Captain: mikedeng1

A Generalization of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem: An Upper Semi-Continuous Map with Nonempty Closed Convex Values on a Bounded Closed Convex Set in Euclidean Space Has a Fixed PointResearch Paper

Brouwer's fixed point theorem says that a continuous map of a closed simplex into itself has a fixed point. Many existence questions in game theory and mathematical economics produce instead a point-to-set mapping: to each point xxx it assigns a whole set Φ(x)\Phi(x)Φ(x) of admissible responses, for instance the set of best replies of a player to the others'…

15 thms8 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium and Trading Networks: A Network Flow Approach: Every Chain-Stable Outcome Is Supported by Competitive Equilibrium PricesResearch Paper

Markets in which goods pass through intermediaries (supply chains, interbank lending, procurement networks) do not fit the two-sided buyer–seller models of matching theory: one firm can buy inputs on some trades and sell outputs on others. Trading networks model such markets as a directed graph of possible bilateral trades. Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor,…

12 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games: Binary Search Finds a Nash Equilibrium of a Rank-1 Game in Polynomial TimeResearch Paper

A Nash equilibrium of a two-player game is a pair of choices from which neither player can improve by changing their own choice alone. Computing one equilibrium is a central task in algorithmic game theory. For unrestricted bimatrix games, their payoff tables may encode difficult equilibrium computations. The structure of a rank-one bimatrix game gives a…

21 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games II: If Every Player Runs Optimistic FTRL with Step Size (n−1)^{−1/2}T^{−1/4}, Each Player's Regret Is at Most (R+4)√(n−1)·T^{1/4}Research Paper

When every participant in a repeated game runs a no-regret learning algorithm, the time-averaged play converges to a coarse correlated equilibrium, and in smooth games the average welfare approaches the price-of-anarchy guarantee. These facts are a standard justification for equilibrium predictions in auctions, routing and markets, where agents learn rather…

15 thms6 active users
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points 3: In Every Nash Equilibrium of Bubelis's Gadget the Primary Player Plays 0 with Probability α, the Unique Root of f in [0, 1]Research Paper

For games with three or more players, Nash equilibria can be irrational, so they cannot in general be computed exactly. Bubelis made this precise: any real root of any univariate polynomial arises as the probability of a particular strategy, or the payoff of a particular player, in a Nash equilibrium of a three-player game whose payoffs depend on the…

11 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 3: In Every Harmonic Game the Uniformly Mixed Strategy Profile Is a Mixed Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Finite games in strategic form are the basic model of strategic interaction in economics, engineering and computer science. Potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, DOI 10.1006/game.1996.0044) are the class with the most tractable equilibrium behaviour: every finite potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium, and simple learning dynamics converge to one.

13 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Equilibria II: On Two Links with Speeds s₁ ≤ s₂ ≤ φs₁ Some Nash Equilibrium Has Expected Makespan 1 + s₂/(s₁ + s₂) Times the Optimum, Reaching φ at s₂ = φs₁Research Paper

When many independent users share a network, each routes its own traffic to minimize its own delay, and nobody optimizes the system as a whole. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou asked how much this lack of coordination can cost: how far the social cost of a Nash equilibrium can be from the social optimum, in the worst case. Their paper Worst-case equilibria (STA…

11 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play IV: Almost Sure Convergence in Supermodular Games with a Unique Rest PointResearch Paper

Fictitious play is the oldest model of learning in games: each player repeatedly best-responds to the empirical frequencies of the opponents' past play. Stochastic fictitious play adds random payoff disturbances before each choice, so that players choose smoothed ("perturbed") best responses. It is a standard model in economics and in the study of learning…

19 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Cores of Convex Games: The Core of a Convex Game Is Its Unique von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable SetResearch Paper

A cooperative game with transferable utility assigns to every coalition of players the total payoff the coalition can secure on its own. Two solution concepts for such games go back to the foundations of game theory: the core, the set of payoff divisions no coalition can improve upon, and the stable set (von Neumann–Morgenstern solution), a set of divisions…

20 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Toward Constant-Factor Maximin Share Guarantees for Subadditive ValuationsResearch Paper

A group of nnn agents must divide mmm indivisible goods, and each agent values bundles of goods differently. The maximin share (MMS) of an agent is the best value she could guarantee herself by splitting all goods into nnn bundles and receiving the bundle she likes least (Budish 2011). Allocations giving every agent her full maximin share need not exist even for…

28 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Combinatorics·Captain: Shuze Chen

From multi-allocations to allocations, with subadditive valuations: a d-multi-allocation (d a power of 2) yields an allocation giving each agent v_i(A_i)/d − ((d−1)/d)·δ_iResearch Paper

In fair division of indivisible items, a central open question is how large a fraction ρ\rhoρ of the maximin share (MMS) can be guaranteed to every agent when valuations are subadditive. Lower bounds on this fraction have repeatedly been obtained in two steps: first build a ddd-multi-allocation, in which every item may be given to up to ddd agents at once and…

14 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: iris

Solving Optimization Problems with Blackwell Approachability: CBA+ Has θ-Weighted Average Regret at Most 2κL(θ_T/ω_T)√(Σω_t²)/Σθ_t Whenever θ_{t+1}/θ_t ≥ ω_{t+1}/ω_tResearch Paper

Large convex–concave saddle-point problems min⁡x∈Xmax⁡y∈YF(x,y)\min_{x\in\mathcal X}\max_{y\in\mathcal Y}F(x,y)minx∈X​maxy∈Y​F(x,y) arise in matrix games, extensive-form games, distributionally robust optimization and many convex programs written in min–max form. A standard way to solve them is the repeated game framework: two regret minimizers, one per player, play against each other, and the…

24 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Equilibria and Systemic Risk in Saturated Networks: necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of saturated network equilibria, class by class, when the spectral radius is at most oneResearch Paper

Many models of contagion in networks reduce to the same fixed-point equation: each node receives a linear combination of the states of its in-neighbours plus an exogenous term, and its own state is that inflow clipped to an interval. In the interbank clearing model of Eisenberg and Noe (Management Science, 2001) the states are payments capped by…

17 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Selfishness Need Not Be Bad: In Every Nonatomic Congestion Game with Regularly Varying Cost Functions the Price of Anarchy Tends to 1 Along Every Unbounded Demand SequenceResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) measures how much selfish routing costs compared with a coordinated optimum: it is the ratio of the cost of a Wardrop equilibrium to the minimum social cost. Worst-case bounds on this ratio are classical (Roughgarden and Tardos, JACM 2002; Correa, Schulz and Stier-Moses, Math. Oper. Res. 2004), and for polynomial costs of degree …

17 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentives and Gaming in Collaborative Projects Under Risk-Sharing Partnerships: Exact Conditions Under Which Information Asymmetry Shortens the Project with Time-Dependent Delay PenaltiesResearch Paper

Collaborative projects often assign different tasks to different firms while making each firm bear part of the cost of a late project. A supplier's decision to spend more time on its task can therefore impose delay costs on a manufacturer, and the manufacturer's own schedule can impose costs on the supplier. The incentives differ from those of one firm…

14 thms5 active users
🏆Completed
Functional AnalysisMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 1: A Value Pacing-Based Symmetric First Price Equilibrium ExistsResearch Paper

Most online advertising is sold by auction, one impression at a time, to advertisers who manage a budget over many auctions rather than a value for a single one. Since 2019 the major ad exchanges have moved from second price to first price auctions, in which the winner pays its own bid. A budget-constrained advertiser in a first price auction must therefore…

20 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 1: The Price of Anarchy Is Hölder Continuous with Exponent 1/2 at Every Game with Costs Lipschitz on [0, T(d)]Research Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game is the ratio of the total cost of a Wardrop equilibrium to the minimum possible total cost. It quantifies how much selfish routing loses compared with central coordination, and it has been studied intensively since Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) and Roughgarden and Tardos (2002), mostly through…

14 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability II: Banks Take More Risk in the Least Equilibrium of a Complete Network than of a Ring NetworkResearch Paper

Banks lend to one another, and the shape of the resulting network decides how a loss at one bank reaches the others. A long line of work, starting with Allen and Gale (2000) and continued by Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), compares the ring network, where each bank is owed money by one neighbour, with the complete network, where every bank…

15 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Imperfect Targeting and Advertising Strategies: With Costless Advertising and A < 1/4, Equilibrium Industry Profit Falls as Targeting Improves, Jumps Up at α̂₂(A), Then Stays ConstantResearch Paper

Online advertising lets a firm aim its messages at the consumers most likely to want its product, but the data behind that aim is noisy: a platform's prediction of who belongs to a demographic or interest segment is right only with some probability. A natural expectation is that sharper targeting raises firms' profits, since fewer messages are wasted. Karle…

10 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization 2: Under Regularized Reinforcement Learning, Every Strict Nash Equilibrium Is Asymptotically StableResearch Paper

In a repeated game, players who do not know the payoff structure can still learn by reinforcement: each player keeps a running score for every action, the cumulative payoff that action would have earned, and plays a mixed strategy that favours actions with high scores. Turning scores into mixed strategies through a regularized best response (maximize score…

12 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization 3: In 2-Player Zero-Sum Games with an Interior Equilibrium, Time-Averaged Play Converges to the Nash SetResearch Paper

Learning dynamics in games describe how players who repeatedly interact adjust their strategies from observed payoffs. A central question is whether such dynamics lead to Nash equilibrium. For the replicator dynamics, the canonical model of evolutionary game theory, the answer is negative in general: in Matching Pennies and in generic zero-sum games with a…

10 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Algorithms for Aggregative Games on Graphs I: Synchronous Aggregate-Tracking Projected Gradients on Time-Varying Graphs Converge to the Unique EquilibriumResearch Paper

In an aggregative game, a player's cost depends on its own decision and on a summary of all players' decisions. An electricity producer, for example, may choose its output while the market price depends on total output. When players communicate only with neighbours, each player must estimate the aggregate before making an update. Koshal, Nedić, and Shanbhag…

14 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games III: In a (λ,µ)-Smooth Cost Game, First-Order Regret Bounds Make the Average Cost at Most λ(1+µ)/(µ(1−µ))·OPT′ + A·n log d/TResearch Paper

When independent players repeatedly choose actions, a low-regret guarantee controls each player's performance against a fixed alternative. It does not directly control the social cost, the sum of all players' costs. For a class of games satisfying smoothness, however, the individual comparisons can imply a bound on the cost of the joint play. This…

8 thms5 active usersReviewed
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