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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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Complexity TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Anyone but Him: The Complexity of Precluding an Alternative: Control by Partition of Voters Is Vulnerable or NP-Complete for Plurality, Condorcet and Approval Voting, Depending on Tie-HandlingResearch Paper

An election is run by someone — a chair, a committee, an organiser — who can shape it without touching a single ballot: by deciding which candidates appear, which voters are registered, or how the electorate is split into bodies that pre-select nominees. Bartholdi, Tovey and Trick (1992) proposed to measure how well a voting rule protects itself against…

50 thms8 active usersReviewed
Complexity Theory·Captain: iris

Competitive Equilibrium for Linear Chores is CLS-completeResearch Paper

A Fisher market sells divisible items to agents who each hold a budget; a competitive equilibrium (CE) is a price vector at which every agent buys a best bundle she can afford and every item is sold. When the items are goods with linear utilities, equilibria are the optimal solutions of the convex Eisenberg–Gale program and can be computed in polynomial…

41 thms7 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Best-of-Many-Worlds MMS Allocation for Chores with Sublinear DisposalsResearch Paper

Dividing undesirable tasks gives a cost to every recipient. A person asked to divide all tasks into equal shares may still be unable to find a share she considers acceptable once other people's preferences must also be respected. This tension matters in fair division: a benchmark based only on each person's own costs need not be simultaneously achievable by…

27 thms6 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Online Learning via Offline Greedy Algorithms: Applications in Market Design and Optimization: Robust, Blackwell-Reducible Greedy Algorithms Yield Online γ\gammaγ-Regret O(D(p)NδTlog⁡d)O(D(p)N\delta\sqrt{T\log d})O(D(p)NδTlogd​)Research Paper

Many combinatorial and continuous optimization problems in revenue management and machine learning are NP-hard but admit a simple greedy γ\gammaγ-approximation: build the solution in NNN stages, and in each stage take the locally best step. Submodular maximization (Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher, 1978), product ranking and reserve-price optimization are examples.…

33 thms6 active usersReviewed
Functional AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Side-Constrained Dynamic Traffic Equilibria: Under Edge-Load Capacities, Strong Dynamic Larsson-Patriksson and Marcotte-Nguyen-Schoeb Equilibria Exist (Departure-Time Choice)Research Paper

Dynamic traffic assignment predicts how travellers choose routes and departure times when travel times depend on the traffic itself. Its central solution concept, the dynamic user equilibrium, asks that no particle of flow can lower its cost by switching to another route or departure time. Existence of such equilibria in continuous time is classical: Friesz…

13 thms6 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Minimax Realized Full Swap Regret on the Euclidean DiskResearch Paper

In online linear optimization a learner repeatedly picks a point of a convex set and then pays a linear loss chosen by an adversary. External regret compares the learner with the best single fixed point in hindsight. Swap regret is stronger: every action value the learner actually played may be replaced, in hindsight, by its own substitute. Low swap regret…

24 thms5 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

An O(loglogn) Upper Bound on the Price of Stability for Undirected Multicast Shapley GamesResearch Paper

In a network design game each user must connect a source to a destination in a shared network, and the cost of every link that is built is split among the users who route through it. A central planner would pick the routing of least total cost; the users instead pick routes that minimize their own payment, and the two goals can disagree. The price of…

31 thms5 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

On the Impossibility of Convergence of Mixed Strategies with Optimal No-Regret Learning: Mean-Based Monotonic Play Cannot Converge Almost Surely to the Nash Equilibrium of a Competitive 2×2 GameResearch Paper

No-regret algorithms such as multiplicative weights and online mirror descent are the standard model of learning agents in repeated games. A classical fact is that when two such agents play a zero-sum game, the time-average of their mixed strategies converges to a Nash equilibrium (Freund and Schapire, 1999), and in general games the average play converges…

18 thms5 active usersReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsConvex Optimization·Captain: iris

Doubly Optimal No-Regret Online Learning in Strongly Monotone Games with Bandit Feedback: Barrier Bandit Mirror Descent Reaches the Nash Equilibrium at Last-Iterate Rate O~(nT−1/2)\tilde O(nT^{-1/2})O~(nT−1/2)Research Paper

In many operations problems several decision makers act repeatedly on a shared system and see only the payoff they receive: firms setting quantities in a Cournot market observe the market price, sellers in a pricing game observe their revenue, bidders in a Kelly auction observe their allocation. None of them knows the reward functions or their gradients. Ban…

18 thms5 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing: For Fixed nnn, Sharing-Minimal Fair fPO Allocations Are Computable in O(3n(n−1)Dv/2mn(n−1)/2+2)O(3^{n(n-1)D_v/2} m^{n(n-1)/2+2})O(3n(n−1)Dv​/2mn(n−1)/2+2) Operations and NP-Hard at Polynomial DegeneracyResearch Paper

Fair division of divisible resources is usually solved by convex optimization or market equilibrium, and the resulting allocations typically split many objects among several agents. In practice splitting is costly: a house, a car or a work shift is shared only by co-ownership or time-sharing. Sandomirskiy and Segal-Halevi (arXiv:1908.01669v3, Operations…

22 thms5 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability: Finding an Envy-Free and Pareto-Optimal Lottery Is PPAD-HardResearch Paper

Allocating indivisible goods without money (school seats, dormitory rooms, course slots, organ-transplant priority) is a central problem of market design. When agents report cardinal utilities rather than rankings, the classical answer is the mechanism of Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979): give every agent one unit of fake money, find market-clearing prices for…

31 thms5 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: deferred acceptance is the only mechanism that is minimal-access stable, strategy-proof and minimal-access monotonicResearch Paper

In many school choice systems a school's priority over applicants has two layers: an absolute priority (an exam score, a grade point average, a lottery number) and a set of minimal-access rights (a sibling at the school, living in its walk zone). The standard practice is to merge the two into adjusted priorities: at each school, every student holding a…

21 thms5 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryMarkov ChainStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Strong and Weak Equilibria for Time-Inconsistent Stochastic Control in Continuous Time 1: Weak and Strong Equilibria Exist When the Admissible Generator Rows Form Convex Compact SetsResearch Paper

An agent whose preferences change over time cannot simply optimize. Under non-exponential discounting, for instance hyperbolic or pseudo-exponential discount functions, a plan that is optimal today stops being optimal tomorrow, and a later self deviates from it. Strotz (1955) proposed that a sophisticated agent treat future selves as players in a game and…

17 thms5 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsComputational Complexity·Captain: Shuze Chen

Necklace Splitting with Ten Beads per Colour is PPAD-HardResearch Paper

A necklace is a sequence of beads, each of one of nnn colours, where colour ccc occurs 2bc2b_c2bc​ times. Two thieves want to share it fairly: cut it at some positions, hand the pieces out alternately, and each thief must receive exactly bcb_cbc​ beads of every colour. Goldberg–West and Alon–West proved that nnn cuts always suffice, by a topological argument, and the search…

25 thms4 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Role of Geometry in Solving Variational InequalitiesResearch Paper

A variational inequality (VI) asks for a point of a convex set at which an operator points "outward": it unifies constrained optimization, Nash equilibria of continuous games and complementarity problems. For general continuous operators, finding an approximate VI solution is a total search problem in PPAD, the class of fixed-point problems that contains…

35 thms4 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsInformation Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Switching and Entropy Bounds for Stable MatchingsResearch Paper

A market can have several stable outcomes even when every participant has a strict preference list. Finding one outcome answers a different question from counting all of them. The extremal stable-matching count asks how many stable outcomes one market can admit in the worst case. It measures the possible size of the entire solution set, without selecting an…

34 thms4 active usersReviewed
Computational Complexity·Captain: Shuze Chen

Complexity of Autobidding Equilibria in GSP Sponsored ShoppingResearch Paper

Most advertising auctions are no longer bid in by hand: an autobidder chooses one multiplier per advertiser and bids that multiple of the value of every ad, subject to a budget or to a return-on-investment (ROI) target. In sponsored shopping, one advertiser can place many products in a single ranked list, so one multiplier moves several items at once, and…

36 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Price of Ignorance in Pairwise-Independent Prophet InequalitiesResearch Paper

In the prophet inequality a gambler observes nonnegative values V1,…,VnV_1,\dots,V_nV1​,…,Vn​ one at a time, where ViV_iVi​ has a known law DiD_iDi​. After seeing each value the gambler must decide irrevocably whether to stop and keep it, or discard it and continue. The gambler is compared with a prophet who sees all values in advance and takes max⁡iVi\max_i V_imaxi​Vi​. When the values are…

24 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

A Constant-Factor Approximation to Multidimensional Consumer UtilityResearch Paper

In many allocation problems the designer cares about the welfare of the participants, not revenue: public housing, school seats, medical resources, or platforms that screen users through effort or waiting rather than money. Payments in these settings are "burned": they screen buyers but reach nobody. The designer then maximizes consumer utility, also called …

17 thms4 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

A Sub-3n3^n3n Upper Bound on the Number of Stable MatchingsResearch Paper

A stable matching instance has nnn men and nnn women, and each person strictly ranks every member of the other side. A perfect matching is stable if no man and woman both prefer each other to their partners. Gale and Shapley showed that a stable matching always exists (GS62). An instance can have many stable matchings, however, and Knuth asked how many it can…

29 thms4 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityMachine Learning·Captain: iris

On the Complexity of Infinite Zero-Sum GamesResearch Paper

Zero-sum games whose players choose among infinitely many strategies arise when the strategies are learning machines: each player may train any model, and the natural way to access such a game is through best responses, computed by training against a mixture of the opponent's models (empirical risk minimization), as in the double-oracle method of McMahan,…

46 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity Theory·Captain: iris

Sources of Complexity in Multi-Agent Combinatorial ContractsResearch Paper

In multi-agent contract design, a principal delegates a project to a team of agents whose actions she cannot observe, and pays each agent a share of the reward on success. The multi-agent combinatorial-action model of Dütting, Ezra, Feldman and Kesselheim (Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts, SODA 2025, pp.1857–1891), building on their Multi-Agent Contracts…

39 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Bayesian Optimal Stopping: Invincible Prophets and Achievable PhilosophersResearch Paper

In a prophet inequality a decision-maker sees rewards X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ one at a time, must accept or reject each on arrival, and may accept only one. The classical theory assumes the distributions are known and compares an online rule with the offline maximum OFF=E[max⁡tXt]\mathrm{OFF}=\mathbb E[\max_tX_t]OFF=E[maxt​Xt​] (Samuel-Cahn 1984, Correa et al. 2017). In many applications the…

19 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Nash Equilibrium in Network Congestion and Coordination GamesResearch Paper

Algorithmic game theory studies how to find stable outcomes when several decision makers interact. A Nash equilibrium is a profile of independent randomized choices in which no player can improve by changing their own choice. Network congestion games model players selecting routes whose costs increase with traffic. Network coordination games describe…

29 thms4 active usersReviewed
Computational Complexity·Captain: mikedeng1

PPAD-Completeness of Contiguous Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

Dividing land, a time interval, or another ordered resource can require each recipient's share to be connected. Envy-freeness asks that every agent value its own share at least as highly as anyone else's. Requiring connected shares makes the computational question different from unconstrained cake division: both the cuts and the assignment of the resulting…

25 thms4 active usersReviewed
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