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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies II: Subjective Events Let Both Zero-Sum Players Beat the ValueResearch Paper

In a two-person zero-sum game with objective randomization, whatever one player gains the other loses: the value vvv of the game is the most player 1 can guarantee and the least player 2 can hold him to, and no arrangement between the players can give player 1 more than vvv and player 2 more than −v-v−v at the same time. Aumann's 1974 paper (doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Linear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear, Concave Utilities I: Fisher Markets with an Equilibrium Have Rational Equilibrium Prices of Polynomial Bit SizeResearch Paper

A Fisher market is the simplest model of a market in which prices are set by supply and demand: buyers bring money, sellers bring goods, and a price vector is an equilibrium when every buyer, spending her money optimally at those prices, leaves every good exactly sold out. Computing equilibria is one of the central questions of algorithmic game theory,…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

The Limits of Posted Prices in Random-Order Combinatorial AuctionsResearch Paper

In a combinatorial auction a seller allocates mmm items M=[m]M=[m]M=[m] among nnn bidders, bidder iii holding a private valuation vi:2M→R+v_i:2^M\to\mathbb R_+vi​:2M→R+​, and wants an allocation (S1,…,Sn)(S_1,\dots,S_n)(S1​,…,Sn​) of pairwise disjoint bundles with large welfare ∑ivi(Si)\sum_i v_i(S_i)∑i​vi​(Si​). Truthful mechanisms that need little communication are a central topic at the boundary of economics and computing.…

26 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

One Trap Is Enough: The Structure and Complexity of Robust Contracts for Sequential SearchResearch Paper

In research and development, procurement and delegated experimentation, an agent tries costly options with random outcomes one at a time, keeps the best outcome found, and decides when to stop; the principal sees only the outcome that is finally submitted and pays a wage that depends on it. Without an incentive problem this is Pandora's box problem (Weitzman…

19 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Order-selection Prophet Inequality (Almost) Goes I.I.D.Research Paper

In the prophet inequality a gambler sees independent nonnegative values V1,…,VnV_1,\dots,V_nV1​,…,Vn​ with known distributions one at a time and may accept at most one, irrevocably, when it is revealed; the benchmark is the prophet's E[max⁡iVi]\mathbb E[\max_i V_i]E[maxi​Vi​]. In an adversarial order the best ratio is 1/21/21/2 (Krengel–Sucheston 1977; Samuel-Cahn 1984). In the order-selection varian…

22 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Lotteries Protect Single-Item Sellers from Monopolist IntermediariesResearch Paper

A publisher can own an advertising impression while an exchange controls which advertiser reaches the publisher. A blockchain application can face a similar separation between the party selling an opportunity and the party selecting participating users. In such settings, optimizing an auction for direct interaction with buyers does not settle the seller's…

25 thms1 active userReviewed
Complexity TheoryStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

The Computational Complexity of Concurrent Stochastic Games: Exact Value and ApproximationResearch Paper

A concurrent stochastic game (CSG) is played by two players on a finite graph of states. At every stage both players choose an action simultaneously and independently, and the pair of actions together with the current state determines a probability distribution over the next state. CSGs are the standard model of two-agent interaction under uncertainty with…

30 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and Implications for Blockchain Mechanism DesignResearch Paper

An automated market maker (AMM) is a pool of two tokens XXX and YYY that trades against users along a fixed reserve curve y=φ(x)y=\varphi(x)y=φ(x). On a blockchain, orders are collected into a batch by a block builder, and the batch is then executed against the pool. Executing orders one at a time in builder-chosen order exposes users to front-running and sandwich attacks.…

80 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Santa Claus and Weighted Nash Social Welfare with Subadditive ValuationsResearch Paper

In max-min allocation, also called the Santa Claus problem, nnn agents share mmm indivisible items and the aim is to make the worst-off agent as well off as possible. It is the egalitarian counterpart of welfare maximization and a basic model of fair division; with identical valuations its optimum is the maximin share of the agents. The problem is NP-hard even…

22 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

RARE: Response-Aware Rational Equilibrium in Budget-Constrained Pricing GamesResearch Paper

Sellers of digital and physical goods set prices in competition for the same pool of buyer money. When buyers have hard budgets rather than quasilinear utilities, the sellers' revenues are coupled through those budgets: a price change by one seller moves money to or from every other seller. The textbook equilibrium notion for such a pricing game is the Nash…

14 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Fair and Efficient Balanced Allocations for Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible items among agents with additive valuations is the core model of fair division, with applications from inheritance and divorce settlements to course allocation and shift scheduling. The standard fairness relaxation is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and the standard efficiency notion is Pareto optimality (PO), strengthened to fraction…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
CombinatoricsOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Single-Sample Prophet Inequalities: A Combinatorial to Single-Item ReductionResearch Paper

In an online allocation problem, buyers arrive one at a time and each must be served irrevocably on arrival; the benchmark is the prophet, who sees all valuations in advance and allocates optimally. When the valuations are random with known distributions, guarantees of this kind are prophet inequalities. A much weaker information model gives the algorithm…

39 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Identifying Minimax Payoffs from Bounded InterventionsResearch Paper

A service choosing a randomized action to minimize its largest group loss solves a finite minimax problem. A user who can change row priorities and action prices can observe a sequence of such decisions without seeing the underlying losses. The identification question is whether those observations determine the payoff table. It matters for interpreting what…

28 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

An Efficient 1/4-Competitive Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial AllocationsResearch Paper

A seller with several distinct items must often decide whom to serve before knowing the demand of later buyers. Waiting for every valuation would permit a welfare maximizing allocation in hindsight, but an online allocation must commit items as buyers arrive. This creates a quantitative question: how much welfare can a causal algorithm preserve when it…

22 thms1 active userReviewed
CombinatoricsEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Existence of the Core in Approval-Based Committee ElectionsResearch Paper

In an approval-based committee election, each of nnn voters reports the set of candidates she approves, and a committee of kkk candidates must be chosen. Proportional representation asks that every group of voters large enough to "deserve" some seats, and united enough to agree on candidates, gets them. The strongest standard axiom of this kind is the core: no…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Decentralized Dynamic Stable MatchingResearch Paper

Two-sided matching markets with stable outcomes — students and schools, workers and firms, users and servers — are classically solved by a central clearinghouse running deferred acceptance (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Many markets have no such clearinghouse: participants act on local information, and the population changes over time without announcement. A…

31 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

From Bilateral Trade to Matching Markets: Sharp Gains from TradeResearch Paper

In a matching market, unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers with privately known values and costs are connected by a compatibility graph, and a platform or market maker must decide who trades with whom and at what prices. Myerson and Satterthwaite (MS83) showed that incentive compatibility, voluntary participation and budget balance already rule out…

38 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market Maker via Surplus RedistributionResearch Paper

An automated market maker (AMM) is a smart contract that holds reserves of two tokens XXX and YYY and trades with anyone along a fixed pricing curve. On a blockchain the trades of one block are sequenced by a builder, who may also insert trades of its own. Ordering power yields maximal extractable value (MEV): in a sandwich attack the builder buys before a…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

The Price of Anarchy in Markets for LemonsResearch Paper

Trade in a market for lemons can fail even when trade is efficient: when the seller knows more than the buyer about the quality of the good, a price at which the seller is willing to sell signals bad news to the buyer, and adverse selection can unravel the market (Akerlof 1970). Securities markets, used-asset markets and insurance all share this structure.…

19 thms1 active userReviewed
Graph TheoryMechanism DesignTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Pairwise Exchanges of Freely Replicable Goods with Negative ExternalitiesResearch Paper

Datasets, software and patents are freely replicable: giving a copy costs the giver nothing directly. Firms that hold such goods are often competitors, so each one gains from acquiring a good and loses when a rival acquires one. Data consortia and patent pools face this tension: every member wants access to the others' goods, and no member wants its rivals…

30 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Multitask Contracts: Realizing the Value of BundlingResearch Paper

Delegating many tasks to one agent is the norm in practice: a contractor builds several components of a project, a crowd worker labels a batch of items, a manager runs several business lines. The principal cannot observe effort, only which tasks succeed, so she must pay for outcomes. A natural design question in the multitask principal–agent model of Zhao…

32 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Search and Verification for Strategyproof Facility Location on Metric GraphsResearch Paper

In facility location without money, each of nnn agents has a private ideal location on a shared space and a planner places one facility from the agents' reports. An agent's cost is its distance to the facility, and a mechanism is strategyproof (SP) when no agent can lower its cost by misreporting. On networks such as road or communication graphs the space is…

20 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

How Many Votes Is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through Resource AugmentationResearch Paper

By the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975), every non-dictatorial voting rule with at least three possible winners can be manipulated: some voter, at some profile, obtains a strictly better winner by misreporting her ranking. The theorem says that manipulation is possible, but not how much it is worth. Berker, Conitzer, Hartman,…

54 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Power of Simple Mechanisms: A Tight eee-Approximation for Gains from Trade in Matching MarketsResearch Paper

A two-sided market brings together buyers who value an item and sellers who hold it at a cost. The first-best gains from trade (GFT) match each trade whose value exceeds its cost. The Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem says that no incentive-compatible, individually rational and budget-balanced mechanism attains this benchmark, even in bilateral trade. So the…

23 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

A Bulow–Klemperer Theorem for Bundling and Improved Approximation Bounds for Simple AuctionsResearch Paper

A seller with several distinct items must decide both what to offer and how to price it. Even when there is only one buyer and the buyer values a collection by adding its item values, the seller can offer lotteries as well as deterministic bundles. The benchmark of an optimal truthful auction therefore includes many more choices than posting one price for…

25 thms1 active userReviewed
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