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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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Mechanism DesignTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Lipschitz Stable Combinatorial AuctionsResearch Paper

Welfare-maximizing auctions are discontinuous. With two bidders and one item, the values (1+δ,1)(1+\delta,1)(1+δ,1) send the item to the first bidder and the values (1,1+δ)(1,1+\delta)(1,1+δ) send it to the second, however small δ\deltaδ is. Reports are often estimates, and sellers and buyers act on the probabilities of an allocation before it is realized, so such a jump makes plans…

57 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Single-or-Sample: Online Fair Allocation for Combinatorial AgentsResearch Paper

Consider a relief center that hands out indivisible supplies to people arriving over time, each with different needs. Everything handed out is gone, and nothing is known about who comes next. Maximin share (MMS) fairness, introduced by Budish 2011, measures an agent's share using only that agent's own valuation: the value the agent could guarantee by…

32 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Price of Anarchy of Draft AuctionsResearch Paper

The draft auction of Devanur, Morgenstern and Syrgkanis (arXiv:1311.2820) sells mmm items in rounds. In each round every bidder names one per-item price and a set of remaining items, and the highest bidder takes her set at her price. It sits between two simple formats: the single-bid auction of Devanur, Morgenstern, Syrgkanis and Weinberg (doi:10.1145/2764468.…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design, RevisitedResearch Paper

In a combinatorial auction, mmm items are allocated among nnn bidders, each holding a private valuation of bundles, and the goal is high welfare ∑ivi(Si)\sum_i v_i(S_i)∑i​vi​(Si​). Two obstacles interact: the bidders must communicate for a good allocation to be found, and they may manipulate the protocol. A mechanism is truthful when following the prescribed strategy is an…

29 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Effective Horizons for Prophet Inequalities with Discounted I.I.D. RewardsResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares a gambler, who sees rewards one at a time and must accept or reject each irrevocably, with a prophet who knows all rewards in advance. For nnn i.i.d. rewards, a threshold rule with per-stage acceptance probability about 1/n1/n1/n guarantees a fraction 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e of the prophet's expected reward, and for independent non-identical rewards the…

47 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOptimization·Captain: iris

Optimistic Hedge in General-Sum Games: Fundamental Limits and Regret Bounds via Temporal ApproximationResearch Paper

When every player of a game has regret o(T)o(T)o(T), the empirical distribution of play converges to the set of coarse correlated equilibria, at a rate governed by the largest average regret. This link is why the dependence of regret on the horizon TTT has been studied closely. Against an adversary the rate Tlog⁡n\sqrt{T\log n}Tlogn​ cannot be improved, but a player in a game…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: iris

Near-Optimal K\sqrt{K}K​-Regret for Online Learning in Uninformed Markov GamesResearch Paper

A learner repeatedly plays an episodic two-player Markov game against an opponent it cannot see. It observes its own actions, its losses and the states, but not the opponent's actions, its policy or even its action set. This uninformed setting models online decision making against other agents whose behaviour is hidden, for example a market participant…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Sharp Bounds for Truthful-in-Expectation SchedulingResearch Paper

In scheduling on unrelated machines, each of mmm indivisible jobs takes a possibly different processing time on each of nnn machines, and the goal is to minimize the makespan, the largest machine load. When the processing times are known, Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos give a polynomial-time 2-approximation. Nisan and Ronen (NR01) introduced the strategic version:…

48 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Optimal Auctions for Anchored Bidders under a Rational Revenue GuaranteeResearch Paper

Auctions are increasingly run on behalf of users by automated agents. Some of these agents behave like textbook rational bidders and play a Bayes–Nash equilibrium; others are anchored: they submit their user's value as the bid, whatever the mechanism. A seller facing both populations wants a mechanism that earns as much as possible from anchored bidders…

68 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Planning Against a Prophet: A Graph-Theoretic Framework for Making Sequential Decisions: On a DAG Covered by k Paths with at Most d Labels per Edge, an Online Policy Earns 1/(k(d+2)) of the ProphetResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares a decision-maker who sees random values one at a time and must commit as they go with a prophet who sees every value in advance. The classic result of Krengel and Sucheston (1978) says that for independent non-negative values X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​, an online rule that stops once can collect at least half of E[max⁡iXi]\mathbb E[\max_i X_i]E[maxi​Xi​], and…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions: γ-Competitive Buyers in First-Price Auctions Get Liquid Welfare ≥ (LW* − O(n)(Reg+1))/(γ + 1/2 + O(1/γ))Research Paper

Most online advertising is sold through sequential auctions: one impression at a time, millions of times a day, and since 2019 increasingly by first-price rules (Won21). The advertisers who bid are budget-constrained, and they do not compute equilibria; their bids are set by learning algorithms that adjust a shading or pacing multiplier from round to round.…

27 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: iris

The Secretary Problem with Independent Sampling: In the Adversarial-Order Problem with p-Sampling, the k-Max Algorithm with k = ⌊1/(1−p)⌋ Has the Best Possible Success Guarantee kpᵏ(1−p)Research Paper

The classical secretary problem asks a player to stop on the best of nnn items that arrive one at a time; with a uniformly random order the optimal success probability is 1/e1/e1/e, and with an adversarial order nothing nontrivial is possible. Much recent work in online algorithms and mechanism design asks how much prior information restores good guarantees.…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing up Your Home?: The Core Respects Improvement, and an Allocation Proving It Is Found in Linear TimeResearch Paper

In a housing market, introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J. Math. Econ. 1974), every agent owns one indivisible good and the agents reallocate the goods among themselves. The model underlies kidney exchange programmes, where a patient–donor pair "owns" its donor and pairs exchange donors along cycles (Roth, Sönmez, Ünver, QJE 2004). A natural design…

23 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Learning to collude in a pricing duopoly: under self-play, Composite SPSA prices converge to the global optimal price and relative regret vanishes at rate T^(-1/5)Research Paper

Firms increasingly delegate pricing to learning algorithms, and regulators ask whether such algorithms can raise prices without any agreement between the firms. Meylahn and den Boer (SSRN:3741385, MSOM, doi:10.1287/msom.2021.1074) answer with a concrete construction: a data-driven policy which, when both duopolists use it, reaches the joint-revenue maximum…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation: The Logit Transaction Fee Mechanism Is U-BNIC and 1-SCP, and UIR, Budget Feasible and Sybil-Proof for n ≥ λ₀kResearch Paper

A blockchain confirms a limited number of transactions per block. Users attach fees (bids) to their transactions; the block producer (the miner) chooses which transactions to include and collects some of the fees. The rule that maps bids to confirmations, payments and miner revenue is a transaction fee mechanism (TFM). Because the miner is itself a…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: iris

Multi-Agent Online Learning in Time-Varying Games: Mirror Descent Converges Almost Surely to the Nash Equilibrium of a Strictly Monotone Limit GameResearch Paper

Many systems in which several agents repeatedly make continuous decisions are modelled as games whose rules drift over time: bidders in repeated Kelly auctions whose valuations change with traffic, wireless users whose channel gains fluctuate, firms in Cournot markets with shifting demand. In such settings agents rarely know the game they are playing; they…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

S-Convexity and Gross Substitutability: A Usc, Coercive, Continuously Differentiable, Strictly Concave Function with Open Domain Is a Proper GS-Function If and Only If It Is S-ConcaveResearch Paper

Gross substitutability (GS) is the condition under which competitive prices behave well: if the prices of some goods rise and the others stay fixed, demand for the unchanged goods does not fall. Kelso and Crawford (1982) introduced it for job matching, and Gul and Stacchetti (1999) showed that for indivisible goods it is the condition under which a…

26 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Ordinary and Prophet Planning under Uncertainty in Bernoulli Congestion Games: The Worst-Case Prophet Price of Anarchy Equals the Optimal (λ,μ,q)(\lambda,\mu,q)(λ,μ,q)-Smoothness Bound γpr(C,q)\gamma_{pr}(C,q)γpr​(C,q)Research Paper

Atomic congestion games model players who share resources, such as links of a network, servers or road segments, and whose cost on a resource grows with the number of its users. The price of anarchy measures how much worse a selfish equilibrium is than the best outcome. The inefficiency of these games is well understood when the set of players is fixed:…

32 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Satiation in Fisher Markets and Approximation of Nash Social Welfare: Rounding a Market Equilibrium Is a 2e1/(2e)2e^{1/(2e)}2e1/(2e)-Approximation for Budget-Additive Nash Social WelfareResearch Paper

The Nash social welfare of an allocation of indivisible items is the geometric mean of the agents' valuations. Nash proposed it for the bargaining problem as the objective characterized by a set of natural axioms, and it has since become a standard objective in fair division because it balances efficiency against fairness. Maximizing it exactly is NP-hard,…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored Products: The Prior-Independent Competitive Ratio of Truthful Deterministic Mechanisms Is 1/nResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon, Walmart and Alibaba let sellers pay to have their products shown in sponsored slots. The platform decides which assortment of sellers to display to an arriving consumer, and the consumer then chooses among the displayed products. Unlike a standard ad auction, a seller's value from being shown depends on who else is shown:…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Policy Learning with Competing Agents: The Finite-Agent Stochastic Threshold Iteration Reaches a λ-Neighborhood of the Mean-Field Equilibrium Threshold with Probability at Least 1 − δResearch Paper

A decision maker with limited capacity (a college admitting students, a lender approving loans) treats only the 1−q1-q1−q fraction of applicants with the highest score βTX\beta^TXβTX. The applicants know the rule and invest effort to change their covariates XXX, so the score distribution, and hence the admission threshold, depends on the rule itself. When the rule is…

20 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Online Advertising: Auction-Adjusted Greedy Deals Earn a Third of the Optimal Revenue, a Half Under Independent Valuations, at Non-Increasing PricesResearch Paper

Online publishers sell display-ad impressions in two ways: by real-time auction, and by preferred deals, contracts that give a buyer first look at impressions at a fixed price. Google's Preferred Deals service (Google Ad Exchange) is the model: a buyer who joins a deal may buy an impression at the agreed price before it reaches the open auction, and is…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

An Equivalence Between Wagering and Fair-Division Mechanisms: Allocation Mechanisms Are Exactly Weakly Budget-Balanced Wagering Mechanisms, with IC, Proportionality and Pareto Optimality PreservedResearch Paper

Two literatures study how to split a resource among agents who report private information. Fair division of divisible goods asks for allocations that are proportional, efficient and resistant to misreporting (Steinhaus 1948; Cole, Gkatzelis and Goel 2013). Wagering mechanisms let bettors with subjective beliefs about a future event bet against each other,…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities: A Strongly Budget-Balanced, Truthful, Individually Rational 1/3-Approximation for Matroid Double AuctionsResearch Paper

A two-sided market has sellers who hold goods and buyers who want them, each with a private value. A mechanism that reallocates the goods should be truthful (no agent gains by misreporting her value), individually rational (no agent is worse off for participating) and budget-balanced (the mechanism neither injects nor keeps money). Myerson and Satterthwaite…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Better Regularization for Sequential Decision Spaces: The Dilatable Global Entropy Is a (1/MQ)(1/M_Q)(1/MQ​)-Strongly Convex DGF on the Sequence-Form Polytope with Range at Most MQ2max⁡jlog⁡∣Aj∣M_Q^2 \max_j \log|A_j|MQ2​maxj​log∣Aj​∣Research Paper

Two-player zero-sum extensive-form games (poker, negotiation, security games) are solved at scale by first-order methods. Writing each player's strategy in sequence form turns the computation of a Nash equilibrium into a bilinear saddle-point problem min⁡x∈Xmax⁡y∈Yx⊤Ay\min_{x\in\mathcal X}\max_{y\in\mathcal Y}x^\top Ayminx∈X​maxy∈Y​x⊤Ay over two polytopes, and methods such as Nesterov's…

20 thms2 active usersReviewed
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