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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning vs. Optimizing Players in Budgeted AuctionsResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms run enormous numbers of auctions, and most advertisers delegate bidding to an algorithm that spends a fixed budget over time. A standard choice is pacing: bid a multiple of the value and adjust that multiple according to spending. When one bidder uses such a rule, a competing bidder can observe it and exploit it. In games…

16 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

At What Cost? (In)efficiency in First-Price Procurement AuctionsResearch Paper

A first-price procurement auction purchases one good or service by asking suppliers to submit prices simultaneously. The supplier quoting the lowest price wins and receives that price. A buyer concerned with productive efficiency cares about the selected supplier's actual cost, rather than the payment alone. The two can differ because suppliers bid…

13 thms1 active userReviewed
Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Cutting a Cake For Human Consumption: An Elementary nnn-agent Cake Cutting ProtocolResearch Paper

Envy-free cake cutting asks how to divide a divisible resource among nnn agents with different preferences so that no agent prefers another agent's share to her own. It is one of the founding problems of fair division, and its query complexity is a standard benchmark for the theory of fair-division protocols.

27 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignProbability·Captain: iris

The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided MarketsResearch Paper

A two-sided market has mmm unit-demand buyers and nnn unit-supply sellers. The quantity of interest is the Gains From Trade (GFT): the total value of the buyers who receive an item minus the total cost of the sellers who give one up. Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that already with one buyer and one seller no incentive-compatible, individually rational and…

30 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Tight Approximation Bounds for Clock AuctionsResearch Paper

A clock auction serves a feasible set of single-parameter bidders while learning about them only through rising prices. Each bidder faces a weakly increasing sequence of personal prices; she stays while she accepts and leaves for good at her first rejection, and the auction serves a feasible set of the bidders still active. Clock auctions were introduced by…

85 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Fair and Strategyproof Facility Location in Euclidean SpaceResearch Paper

Strategyproof facility location is a basic problem of approximate mechanism design without money (Procaccia and Tennenholtz 2009). Agents report locations, a mechanism places one facility, and every agent wants the facility close to her true location. A mechanism is strategyproof if no agent can move the facility closer to herself by misreporting. Since the…

47 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

Second-Best Bilateral Trade is 1/21/21/2 EfficientResearch Paper

In bilateral trade a seller owns one indivisible good and a buyer may acquire it. Each holds a private, nonnegative value, sss and bbb, drawn independently from publicly known priors FSF_SFS​ and FBF_BFB​. Trading creates the surplus b−sb-sb−s, and the first-best gains from trade FB=E[(b−s)+]\mathrm{FB}=\mathbb E[(b-s)^+]FB=E[(b−s)+] are obtained by trading exactly when b>sb>sb>s. The Myerson–Satterthwaite…

63 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

The Exact Welfare Guarantee of Fixed-Price Bilateral TradeResearch Paper

A seller owns one item and a buyer may want it; their values are private and independent. Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that no mechanism is at once efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced (MS83). The simplest mechanism that keeps every property but efficiency is a fixed price: post one price, and trade happens if both…

27 thms1 active userReviewed
OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Arbitrarily Slow Polynomial Convergence of Fictitious PlayResearch Paper

Fictitious play (Brown, 1951) is one of the oldest dynamics for computing a Nash equilibrium of a two-player zero-sum game: at each step, each player best responds to the empirical distribution of the opponent's past actions. Robinson (1951) proved that the empirical strategies converge to the equilibrium set, and Shapiro (1958) extracted the upper bound …

31 thms1 active userReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Gross Substitutes Welfare in Random OrderResearch Paper

In the secretary problem a decision maker sees items one at a time in uniformly random order and must accept or reject each on arrival, irrevocably. Dynkin's rule (observe until a 1/e1/e1/e fraction has passed, then take the first record) selects the best of nnn items with probability 1/e1/e1/e, and no rule does better as n→∞n\to\inftyn→∞. The matroid secretary problem of…

27 thms1 active userReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Optimal Regret for Profit Maximization in Bilateral TradeResearch Paper

In bilateral trade, a seller and a buyer with private valuations meet an intermediary who posts a purchase price to the seller and a sale price to the buyer. Trade happens only if both accept, and the intermediary keeps the difference. The Myerson–Satterthwaite impossibility theorem makes this setting a central one in mechanism design, and its online…

32 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

On Competing Sellers with Substitutable GoodsResearch Paper

When two sellers offer substitutable goods to the same buyer, classical Bertrand competition with posted prices drives the weaker seller's revenue to zero and leaves the stronger one only the value gap: if the buyer values Alice's good at aaa and Bob's at bbb, Alice earns (a−b)+(a-b)^+(a−b)+. Sellers in practice are not restricted to posted prices. They can offer menus of…

39 thms1 active userReviewed
AnalysisMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

Tight bounds for fractional and randomized truthful schedulingResearch Paper

In scheduling on unrelated machines, mmm tasks are assigned to nnn machines, machine iii needs time tijt_{ij}tij​ for task jjj, and the goal is to minimize the makespan, the largest total processing time of a machine. Nisan and Ronen proposed this as the canonical problem of algorithmic mechanism design (NR01): each machine privately knows its row tit_iti​ and is paid by the…

36 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Tight Analysis of Randomized Truthful Scheduling: An (m+1)/2(m+1)/2(m+1)/2 Lower BoundResearch Paper

Truthful scheduling on unrelated machines is the problem with which Nisan and Ronen started algorithmic mechanism design (NR99). A set of jobs has to be assigned to mmm machines; machine iii needs pijp_{ij}pij​ time units for job jjj, and only machine iii knows its row pip_ipi​. A mechanism asks the machines for their rows, assigns the jobs and pays the machines. It should…

26 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Convergence and Stability of Coupled Belief–Strategy Learning Dynamics in Continuous Games: Beliefs and Strategies Converge Almost Surely to a Payoff-Consistent Equilibrium Fixed PointResearch Paper

Many strategic systems learn two things at once. Travellers on a road network, firms in a market or bidders in an auction adjust their strategies to each other, and an information platform (a navigation service, a market maker, a public agency) estimates an unknown parameter of the environment from the payoffs those strategies produce. The payoffs are…

22 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Strategy-Proof Multi-Issue Mediation: An Application to Online Dispute Resolution: A Mediation Rule Is Efficient, Individually Rational and Strategy-Proof Iff It Is an Adjacent RuleResearch Paper

Mediation is a dispute resolution method in which a neutral third party helps disputants reach a voluntary agreement short of litigation. Courts in all US states offer some form of it, and online platforms use automated mechanisms to resolve large numbers of small disputes (Kesten and Özyurt, 2018, p.2). A mediator who proposes an outcome from the parties'…

19 thms1 active userReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions: A Deterministic Single-Price Clock Auction Achieves an O(log⁡log⁡k)O(\log\log k)O(loglogk)-Approximation to the Expected Optimal WelfareResearch Paper

A seller offers a service to a set of buyers, each with a private value, and a feasibility constraint limits which sets of buyers can be served together. This is the basic single-parameter problem of mechanism design. Milgrom and Segal proposed clock auctions for it, and designed one for reallocating radio frequency licenses (Milgrom and Segal 2020). In a…

21 thms1 active userReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningMechanism Design+1·Captain: iris

Bilateral Trade: A Regret Minimization Perspective: Under Realistic Feedback and Independent Bounded-Density Valuations, Scouting Bandits Has Regret O(MT^{2/3}) via an Explicit Bound in T₀, K and αResearch Paper

In bilateral trade a seller and a buyer each hold a private valuation for one good, and an intermediary (a platform or broker) decides at which price the good changes hands. Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that no mechanism can be at once efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced (Myerson–Satterthwaite 1983). Among…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Mean Field Contest with Singularity: the stopping contest has a unique mean field equilibrium, given in closed formResearch Paper

Rank-based rewards are the standard incentive in sales tournaments, research prizes and promotion contests. Seel and Strack (Gambling in contests, J. Econ. Theory 2013) showed that such contests can be analysed as games of risk taking, in which each player chooses when to stop a privately observed diffusion. Nutz and Zhang (Reward design in risk-taking…

17 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: iris

A Complementary Pivot Algorithm for Competitive Allocation of a Mixed Manna: Lemke's Algorithm Terminates at a Competitive Equilibrium under SPLC UtilitiesResearch Paper

Fair division of divisible items usually assumes that everything being shared is desirable. Many allocation problems also involve bads (chores): tasks, liabilities or emissions cuts that some or all participants would rather avoid. A mixed manna contains both. The competitive equilibrium is the standard fair and efficient solution concept for goods: it is…

24 thms1 active userReviewed
Graph TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Continuous Patrolling Games: On Every Network, Attacks No Longer Than the Generalized Girth Have Value α/(μ + lα/2), Attained by the Leaf-Pausing Double Tour and the Independent AttackResearch Paper

A security agency guards a network of roads, pipelines or corridors against an infiltrator who needs a fixed amount of uninterrupted time at one spot to do damage. The agency moves a single patroller at bounded speed and wants to maximize the probability of catching the attack in progress. Patrolling games model this as a zero-sum game between a Patroller…

27 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Percolation Games: in i.i.d. oriented percolation games the nnn-stage value converges almost surely to a constant, with sub-Gaussian deviations at rate (ln⁡n/n)1/2(\ln n/n)^{1/2}(lnn/n)1/2Research Paper

Percolation games were introduced by Garnier and Ziliotto (arXiv:2110.12227, published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2022) as discrete toy models for the stochastic homogenization of non-convex Hamilton–Jacobi equations. In homogenization one asks whether a control or game problem in a random, spatially varying environment behaves, over long…

13 thms1 active userReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Fair Exploration via Axiomatic Bargaining: PF-UCB Attains the Nash Social Welfare Upper Bound Y*(I) in Every Grouped K-Armed BanditResearch Paper

Many learning systems serve several populations at once: a recommender serves user segments, a clinical dosing rule serves patient subgroups, an online marketplace serves customer types. When these populations share the same unknown options, the exploration one population performs also informs the others. A policy that minimizes total regret decides who…

21 thms1 active userReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Random Perfect Information Games: The Distribution Function of the Value Is the Smallest Fixed Point of the Value Generating FunctionResearch Paper

The extinction probability of a branching process is the smallest fixed point of its offspring generating function, a classical result in the theory of branching processes (Athreya and Ney, 1972). Flesch, Predtetchinski and Suomala (arXiv:2104.10528) ask what becomes of this fact when the tree is contested. Two players choose the path through a random tree,…

13 thms1 active userReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

How to De-Reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India: DA-BT is the unique individually rational, meritocratic, non-wasteful, open-first and incentive-compatible mechanismResearch Paper

Admissions to the Indian Institutes of Technology and other centrally funded technical institutions run through a single clearinghouse that allocates tens of thousands of seats each year. Seats at each program are reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC); the rest are open-category seats…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
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