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Operations Research

889 missions · 497 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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CombinatoricsOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Scheduling of a Single Machine to Minimize Total Weighted Completion Time: Delayed SWPT Has Competitive Ratio 2Research Paper

Motivation

A single machine must process nnn jobs that arrive over time. Job jjj is released at time rjr_jrj​, needs pjp_jpj​ units of uninterrupted processing, and has weight wj>0w_j > 0wj​>0; the goal is to minimize the total weighted completion time ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_j C_j∑j​wj​Cj​. Offline, with all release dates equal to zero, Smith's rule (sequence by nondecreasing pj/wjp_j/w_jpj​/wj​) is optimal (Smith 1956); with arbitrary release dates the problem 1 ∣ rj ∣ ∑wjCj1\,|\,r_j\,|\,\sum w_j C_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​ is strongly NP-hard (Lenstra, Rinnooy Kan and Brucker 1977).

In the online version the scheduler learns of job jjj only at time rjr_jrj​, and at each moment must either start a released job or keep the machine idle. Its quality is measured by its competitive ratio: the worst case, over all instances, of the ratio between the online schedule's cost and the offline optimum. Release-date scheduling is one of the basic test cases of online optimization.

Timeline:

  • 1996. Hoogeveen and Vestjens show that no online algorithm has competitive ratio below 2, even with equal weights, and give the 2-competitive algorithm Delayed SPT for equal weights.
  • 1997. Hall, Schulz, Shmoys and Wein give a (3+ε)(3+\varepsilon)(3+ε)-competitive algorithm for arbitrary weights, based on geometric intervals and linear programming.
  • 1998. Phillips, Stein and Wein give another 2-competitive algorithm for equal weights, which does not extend to arbitrary weights.
  • 2002. Goemans, Queyranne, Schulz, Skutella and Wang obtain a (1+2)(1+\sqrt2)(1+2​)-competitive deterministic algorithm from an LP relaxation.
  • 2004. Anderson and Potts show that Delayed SWPT has competitive ratio exactly 2 for arbitrary positive weights, matching the lower bound.

Setting

An instance has jobs j∈J={1,…,n}j \in J = \{1,\dots,n\}j∈J={1,…,n} with integer release dates rj≥0r_j \ge 0rj​≥0, integer processing times pj≥1p_j \ge 1pj​≥1 and real weights wj>0w_j > 0wj​>0. A schedule assigns each job an integer start time SjS_jSj​. It is feasible if Sj≥rjS_j \ge r_jSj​≥rj​ for every jjj and no two intervals [Sj,Sj+pj)[S_j, S_j + p_j)[Sj​,Sj​+pj​) overlap; idle time is allowed. Its cost is C(S)=∑jwj(Sj+pj)C(S) = \sum_j w_j (S_j + p_j)C(S)=∑j​wj​(Sj​+pj​).

Delayed SWPT runs over unit time slots [t,t+1)[t, t+1)[t,t+1). When the machine is available at time ttt, it looks at the jobs released by ttt and not yet started, and selects one with the smallest ratio pj/wjp_j/w_jpj​/wj​. Ties go to the smaller pjp_jpj​, then to the smaller index. If pj≤tp_j \le tpj​≤t, it starts jjj at ttt and the machine is busy until t+pjt + p_jt+pj​. Otherwise the machine stays idle and the rule is applied again at t+1t+1t+1. The resulting schedule is written π\piπ, or dswpt I in Lean. In particular no job starts before time pjp_jpj​.

The proof uses three auxiliary problems:

  • the doubled problem (2P), with data (2rj,2pj,wj)(2r_j, 2p_j, w_j)(2rj​,2pj​,wj​);
  • the extended problem (E), with release dates rj′=max⁡{pj,f(rj)}r'_j = \max\{p_j, f(r_j)\}rj′​=max{pj​,f(rj​)}, where f(t)f(t)f(t) is the first time at or after ttt at which π\piπ leaves the machine free;
  • one unit-length gap job gtg_tgt​ for each slot [t,t+1)[t,t+1)[t,t+1) in which Delayed SWPT idles although a job jjj is available. The gap job has release date f(rj)f(r_j)f(rj​) and weight wj/pjw_j/p_jwj​/pj​.

The schedule πE\pi_EπE​ of (E) runs the original jobs as in π\piπ and each gtg_tgt​ in [t,t+1)[t,t+1)[t,t+1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8

min⁡{ρ  :  ∑jwjCj(π)≤ρ∑jwjCj(S) for every instance and every feasible schedule S}=2.\min\Bigl\{\rho \;:\; \sum_j w_j C_j(\pi) \le \rho \sum_j w_j C_j(S)\ \text{for every instance and every feasible schedule } S\Bigr\} = 2.min{ρ:j∑​wj​Cj​(π)≤ρj∑​wj​Cj​(S) for every instance and every feasible schedule S}=2.

Lean: IsLeast {ρ | ∀ n I S, IsFeasible I.r I.p S → cost I.w I.p (dswpt I) ≤ ρ * cost I.w I.p S} 2. Both halves are required: the upper bound 222 and the fact that no smaller constant is valid for this algorithm.

Milestones

  1. πj≥pj\pi_j \ge p_jπj​≥pj​ for every job (§2) and rj′≤max⁡{2rj,pj}r'_j \le \max\{2r_j, p_j\}rj′​≤max{2rj​,pj​} (§3.2).
  2. πE\pi_EπE​ is feasible for (E) (§3.2).
  3. Lemma 1. If π∗\pi^*π∗ and μ∗\mu^*μ∗ are optimal for (P) and (2P), then C(μ∗)=2 C(π∗)C(\mu^*) = 2\,C(\pi^*)C(μ∗)=2C(π∗).
  4. Lemma 2. πE\pi_EπE​ is optimal for (E).
  5. Lemma 3. If μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is optimal for (2P) and a feasible σE\sigma_EσE​ for (E) satisfies
∑j∈JwjCj(σE)+∑g∈GwgCg(σE)≤∑j∈JwjCj(μ∗)+∑g∈GwgCg(πE),(1)\sum_{j\in J} w_j C_j(\sigma_E) + \sum_{g\in G} w_g C_g(\sigma_E) \le \sum_{j\in J} w_j C_j(\mu^*) + \sum_{g\in G} w_g C_g(\pi_E), \tag{1}j∈J∑​wj​Cj​(σE​)+g∈G∑​wg​Cg​(σE​)≤j∈J∑​wj​Cj​(μ∗)+g∈G∑​wg​Cg​(πE​),(1)

then C(π)≤2 C(S)C(\pi) \le 2\,C(S)C(π)≤2C(S) for every feasible SSS. 6. Inequality (1) holds for some feasible σE\sigma_EσE​, for every optimal μ∗\mu^*μ∗ of (2P) (§§3.4–3.6).

Significance

The theorem shows that a deterministic online algorithm can match the lower bound of Hoogeveen and Vestjens for arbitrary positive weights. This settles the best competitive ratio for deterministic online algorithms for 1 ∣ rj ∣ ∑wjCj1\,|\,r_j\,|\,\sum w_j C_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​. The algorithm needs no linear program. The analysis also does not compare the algorithm with a lower bound on the optimum. Instead it shows that the online schedule is optimal for a modified problem (E), and it converts an optimal schedule of (2P) into a schedule of (E).

The result was proved on paper in 2004. Neither Mathlib nor the Prove2Me catalog contains a machine-checked proof of it, or of any competitive ratio for online scheduling with release dates. This mission provides several reusable pieces:

  • an executable, verified-terminating definition of an online scheduling rule;
  • the doubling lemma for release-date problems;
  • the optimality criterion behind Lemma 2;
  • the block-by-block exchange argument of §§3.3–3.6.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at Lemma 2. Delayed SWPT is far from optimal for (P) itself, and its idle time is unbounded in relative terms. The proof therefore has to show that the inserted gap jobs make every idle slot "justified", so that a preemptive best-available argument becomes valid for (E). That argument rests on an optimality criterion of Belouadah, Posner and Potts (1992), which is not in Mathlib.

The second difficulty is inequality (1). Once μ∗\mu^*μ∗ is doubled and the gap jobs are inserted, nongap jobs must be shifted, and the gain of each gap-generating job must be charged against the delay of the gap jobs in its block. That accounting (Lemmas 4–7 of the paper) is an induction over blocks with signed differences of completion times.

The natural first idea, plain online SWPT (start the available job with the smallest pj/wjp_j/w_jpj​/wj​ whenever the machine is free), has no finite competitive ratio (Example 1 of the paper), so the delay πj≥pj\pi_j \ge p_jπj​≥pj​ is essential to the bound and must be tracked through the whole argument.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in Lean:

  • Data. Jobs are Fin n (0-based, so "smallest index" is the order of Fin n). Times are natural numbers, the paper's standing integer-data assumption (p. 688), and weights are real. Every instance carries pj≥1p_j \ge 1pj​≥1 and wj>0w_j > 0wj​>0.
  • Schedules and optimality. Schedules are integer start times. Feasibility, cost and optimality are defined for any finite job type, so (E), with job type Fin n ⊕ gapTimes I, uses the same notions. "Optimal" means optimal among all feasible nonpreemptive schedules with integer start times.
  • The algorithm. Delayed SWPT is a def: a unit-time simulation that compares ratios by cross-multiplication and re-applies the rule at every slot. It runs to the horizon ∑j(rj+2pj)+1\sum_j (r_j + 2p_j) + 1∑j​(rj​+2pj​)+1. A sorry-free check (not uploaded) shows that every job has started by then, and that the simulation reproduces Examples 3 and 4 of the paper, including the gap times 0,2,3,4,5,60,2,3,4,5,60,2,3,4,5,6 of Table 2.
  • Completion times. In (2P) the completion time is μj∗+2pj\mu^*_j + 2p_jμj∗​+2pj​, and gap jobs have unit length.

The goal quantifies over every feasible schedule of every instance. It cannot be met by restricting the competitor to schedules without idle time or to list schedules, by dropping release-date feasibility, or by leaving jobs unscheduled.

Out of scope:

  • The general lower bound "no online algorithm beats 2" (Example 2 of the paper, due to Hoogeveen and Vestjens) is not part of the mission. The lower half of the goal concerns Delayed SWPT only.
  • The Belouadah–Posner–Potts optimality criterion is an external ingredient of Lemma 2. Solvers may formalize it as a supporting theorem.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs:

  • simulation invariants for the algorithm;
  • exchange and left-shift arguments for single-machine schedules;
  • the job-splitting relaxation behind the best-available criterion.

The schedule vocabulary and the criterion are reusable for other release-date scheduling results. Contributions toward the block lemmas of §§3.3–3.6 (Lemmas 4–7, the bound (9)) are welcome as supporting theorems.

Selected references

  • E. J. Anderson and C. N. Potts, Online Scheduling of a Single Machine to Minimize Total Weighted Completion Time, Mathematics of Operations Research 29(3), 686–697, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0092
  • J. A. Hoogeveen and A. P. A. Vestjens, Optimal On-Line Algorithms for Single-Machine Scheduling, IPCO 1996, LNCS 1084, 404–414. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-61310-2_30
  • L. A. Hall, A. S. Schulz, D. B. Shmoys and J. Wein, Scheduling to Minimize Average Completion Time: Off-line and On-line Approximation Algorithms, Mathematics of Operations Research 22(3), 513–544, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.3.513
  • C. Phillips, C. Stein and J. Wein, Minimizing Average Completion Time in the Presence of Release Dates, Mathematical Programming 82, 199–223, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585872
  • M. X. Goemans, M. Queyranne, A. S. Schulz, M. Skutella and Y. Wang, Single Machine Scheduling with Release Dates, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 15(2), 165–192, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1137/S089548019936223X
  • H. Belouadah, M. E. Posner and C. N. Potts, Scheduling with Release Dates on a Single Machine to Minimize Total Weighted Completion Time, Discrete Applied Mathematics 36(3), 213–231, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(92)90255-9
  • J. K. Lenstra, A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan and P. Brucker, Complexity of Machine Scheduling Problems, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 1, 343–362, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70743-X
  • W. E. Smith, Various Optimizers for Single-Stage Production, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3, 59–66, 1956. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800030106
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryMechanism DesignStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives 2: The Producer's First-Best Value in Closed FormResearch Paper

Motivation

Electricity demand response asks consumers to lower their consumption during price events, when generation is expensive or scarce. Field trials such as the Low Carbon London experiment showed that consumers do react to price signals, but that the reaction is erratic: the average consumption falls while its variability stays high, and a producer that has to follow the load curve in real time pays for that variability. Aïd, Possamaï and Touzi (arXiv:1810.09063; Math. Oper. Res. 2022, doi:10.1287/moor.2021.1201) model this as a continuous-time principal–agent problem in which the consumer (the agent) controls both the level and the volatility of consumption, and the producer (the principal) designs a payment that rewards both.

The paper compares two benchmarks. In the second best, the producer observes only the consumption path and the consumer responds optimally to the contract; this is the subject of the companion mission of this series. In the first best, the producer dictates both the contract and the consumer's effort, subject only to the consumer's participation. The first best is the reference point against which the cost of moral hazard, the information rent, is measured. This mission formalizes the first-best value in closed form, Proposition 3.1 (i) of the paper.

The methodology follows the continuous-time principal–agent literature: Holmström and Milgrom (1987) for exponential utilities and linear contracts, Sannikov (2008) for the dynamic-programming view of the agent's continuation value, and Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi (2018) for contracts indexed on both the output and its quadratic variation.

Setting

Fix integers N,d≥0N,d\ge0N,d≥0 (usages for the mean effort and for the volatility effort), cost parameters μ∈(0,∞)N\mu\in(0,\infty)^Nμ∈(0,∞)N, λ∈(0,∞)d\lambda\in(0,\infty)^dλ∈(0,∞)d, nominal volatilities σ∈(0,∞)d\sigma\in(0,\infty)^dσ∈(0,∞)d, effort bounds Amax⁡>0A_{\max}>0Amax​>0 and 0<ε≤10<\varepsilon\le10<ε≤1, risk aversions r,p>0r,p>0r,p>0, a marginal volatility cost h>0h>0h>0, slopes κ,θ∈R\kappa,\theta\in\mathbb Rκ,θ∈R, a horizon T>0T>0T>0, an initial consumption X0∈RX_0\in\mathbb RX0​∈R and a reservation utility R0<0R_0<0R0​<0.

The consumer chooses a mean effort α\alphaα with values in A=∏i[0,μiAmax⁡]A=\prod_i[0,\mu_iA_{\max}]A=∏i​[0,μi​Amax​] and a responsiveness effort β\betaβ with values in B=[ε,1]dB=[\varepsilon,1]^dB=[ε,1]d, at cost

c(α,β)=c1(α)+12c2(β),c1(a)=12∑iai2μi,c2(b)=∑jσj2λj(bj−1−1).c(\alpha,\beta)=c_1(\alpha)+\tfrac12c_2(\beta),\qquad c_1(a)=\tfrac12\sum_i\frac{a_i^2}{\mu_i},\qquad c_2(b)=\sum_j\frac{\sigma_j^2}{\lambda_j}\big(b_j^{-1}-1\big).c(α,β)=c1​(α)+21​c2​(β),c1​(a)=21​i∑​μi​ai2​​,c2​(b)=j∑​λj​σj2​​(bj−1​−1).

The consumption XXX follows Xt=X0−∫0tαs⋅1 ds+∫0tσ(βs)⋅dWsX_t=X_0-\int_0^t\alpha_s\cdot\mathbf 1\,ds+\int_0^t\sigma(\beta_s)\cdot dW_sXt​=X0​−∫0t​αs​⋅1ds+∫0t​σ(βs​)⋅dWs​ with σ(b)=(σ1b1,…,σdbd)\sigma(b)=(\sigma_1\sqrt{b_1},\dots,\sigma_d\sqrt{b_d})σ(b)=(σ1​b1​​,…,σd​bd​​), in the weak sense: XXX is the canonical process on C([0,T],R)C([0,T],\mathbb R)C([0,T],R), and an admissible pair (ν,P)(\nu,\mathbb P)(ν,P) is a progressively measurable control ν=(α,β)\nu=(\alpha,\beta)ν=(α,β) with a probability measure under which XXX starts at X0X_0X0​ and solves the associated martingale problem.

The consumer values consumption by f(x)=κxf(x)=\kappa xf(x)=κx and the producer bears the generation cost g(x)=θxg(x)=\theta xg(x)=θx; write δ=κ−θ\delta=\kappa-\thetaδ=κ−θ. For a payment ξ\xiξ made at time TTT, the consumer's and the producer's criteria are

JA=EP[−e−r(ξ+∫0T(κXs−c(νs))ds)],JP=EP[−e−p(−ξ−∫0TθXsds−h2⟨X⟩T)].J_A=\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}\Big[-e^{-r\left(\xi+\int_0^T(\kappa X_s-c(\nu_s))ds\right)}\Big],\qquad J_P=\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}\Big[-e^{-p\left(-\xi-\int_0^T\theta X_sds-\frac h2\langle X\rangle_T\right)}\Big].JA​=EP[−e−r(ξ+∫0T​(κXs​−c(νs​))ds)],JP​=EP[−e−p(−ξ−∫0T​θXs​ds−2h​⟨X⟩T​)].

A contract is an FT\mathcal F_TFT​-measurable ξ\xiξ with uniform exponential moments (2.5). The first-best value is

VFB=sup⁡{JP(ξ,ν,P): ξ a contract, (ν,P) admissible, JA(ξ,ν,P)≥R0}.V^{FB}=\sup\big\{J_P(\xi,\nu,\mathbb P):\ \xi\text{ a contract},\ (\nu,\mathbb P)\text{ admissible},\ J_A(\xi,\nu,\mathbb P)\ge R_0\big\}.VFB=sup{JP​(ξ,ν,P): ξ a contract, (ν,P) admissible, JA​(ξ,ν,P)≥R0​}.

The consumer's Hamiltonians are Hm(z)=−inf⁡a∈A{a⋅1 z+c1(a)}H_m(z)=-\inf_{a\in A}\{a\cdot\mathbf 1\,z+c_1(a)\}Hm​(z)=−infa∈A​{a⋅1z+c1​(a)} and Hv(γ)=−12inf⁡b∈B{c2(b)−γ∣σ(b)∣2}H_v(\gamma)=-\frac12\inf_{b\in B}\{c_2(b)-\gamma|\sigma(b)|^2\}Hv​(γ)=−21​infb∈B​{c2​(b)−γ∣σ(b)∣2}. Finally ρ=rpr+p\rho=\frac{rp}{r+p}ρ=r+prp​, L0=−1rlog⁡(−R0)L_0=-\frac1r\log(-R_0)L0​=−r1​log(−R0​), U(x)=−e−pxU(x)=-e^{-px}U(x)=−e−px, μˉ=∑iμi\bar\mu=\sum_i\mu_iμˉ​=∑i​μi​ and x−=max⁡(0,−x)x^-=\max(0,-x)x−=max(0,−x).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.1 (i)

Assume δ−T≤Amax⁡\delta^-T\le A_{\max}δ−T≤Amax​. Then

VFB=U(vˉ(0,X0)−L0),vˉ(0,X0)=δTX0+∫0T(12μˉ(δ−)2(T−t)2+Hv(−h−ρδ2(T−t)2))dt.V^{FB}=U\big(\bar v(0,X_0)-L_0\big),\quad \bar v(0,X_0)=\delta TX_0+\int_0^T\Big(\tfrac12\bar\mu(\delta^-)^2(T-t)^2+H_v\big(-h-\rho\delta^2(T-t)^2\big)\Big)dt.VFB=U(vˉ(0,X0​)−L0​),vˉ(0,X0​)=δTX0​+∫0T​(21​μˉ​(δ−)2(T−t)2+Hv​(−h−ρδ2(T−t)2))dt.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.1. The best responses a^(z)\hat a(z)a^(z), b^(γ)\hat b(\gamma)b^(γ) attain the infima defining HmH_mHm​, HvH_vHv​, and these Hamiltonians have explicit closed forms.
  2. (A.5). The auxiliary value Vˉ=sup⁡(ν,P)EP[−e−ρ(∫0T(δXt−c(νt))dt−h2⟨X⟩T)]\bar V=\sup_{(\nu,\mathbb P)}\mathbb E^{\mathbb P}\big[-e^{-\rho(\int_0^T(\delta X_t-c(\nu_t))dt-\frac h2\langle X\rangle_T)}\big]Vˉ=sup(ν,P)​EP[−e−ρ(∫0T​(δXt​−c(νt​))dt−2h​⟨X⟩T​)] is finite and negative, and VFB=R0(Vˉ/R0)1+p/rV^{FB}=R_0(\bar V/R_0)^{1+p/r}VFB=R0​(Vˉ/R0​)1+p/r.
  3. Proposition A.3 (i), with the explicit solution of p. 28.
Vˉ=−e−ρ(δTX0+∫0Tmˉ(t)dt),mˉ(t)=Hm(δ(T−t))+Hv(−h−ρδ2(T−t)2).\bar V=-e^{-\rho\left(\delta TX_0+\int_0^T\bar m(t)dt\right)},\qquad \bar m(t)=H_m(\delta(T-t))+H_v\big(-h-\rho\delta^2(T-t)^2\big).Vˉ=−e−ρ(δTX0​+∫0T​mˉ(t)dt),mˉ(t)=Hm​(δ(T−t))+Hv​(−h−ρδ2(T−t)2).

Significance

The closed form shows how the first-best value depends on each parameter: on the energy value discrepancy δ\deltaδ through the mean-effort term, on the volatility cost hhh and the effective risk aversion ρ\rhoρ through the volatility Hamiltonian, and on the reservation utility only through the shift by L0L_0L0​. It is one half of the paper's information rent (Proposition 3.4), the gap between the first- and second-best values, and it is the benchmark against which the calibrated contracts of the paper's Section 4 are judged.

The result is proved in the paper, partly by appeal to standard stochastic control arguments. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. A formal proof requires a verification theorem for an exponential-utility control problem in the weak formulation, and a risk-sharing argument with a pathwise quadratic-variation term in the contract; both are reusable beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The deterministic parts, Proposition 2.1 and the algebra that turns (A.5) and the value of Vˉ\bar VVˉ into the goal, are calculus. The difficulty lies in the two stochastic steps. In (A.5), the producer's optimal payment for a given effort depends on ⟨X⟩T\langle X\rangle_T⟨X⟩T​; it must be realised as a measurable function of the path that is a contract in the sense of (2.5), uniformly over all admissible laws, and the participation constraint must be shown to bind. In Proposition A.3 (i), the upper bound on Vˉ\bar VVˉ must hold for every progressively measurable, path-dependent control, not only for Markov feedback controls; the paper invokes "standard stochastic control theory", which has to be made precise for controls of the volatility under a martingale-problem formulation, where no Brownian motion is given in advance.

Formalization scope

The canonical space is C([0,T],R)C([0,T],\mathbb R)C([0,T],R) with the coordinate σ-algebra and the canonical filtration; processes are indexed by [0,T][0,T][0,T]. Admissible pairs are given by a martingale problem: X0=X0X_0=X_0X0​=X0​ almost surely, and both Xt−X0+∫0tαs⋅1 dsX_t-X_0+\int_0^t\alpha_s\cdot\mathbf 1\,dsXt​−X0​+∫0t​αs​⋅1ds and its square minus ∫0t∣σ(βs)∣2ds\int_0^t|\sigma(\beta_s)|^2ds∫0t​∣σ(βs​)∣2ds are martingales. In the criteria, ⟨X⟩T\langle X\rangle_T⟨X⟩T​ is replaced by its almost-sure value ∫0T∣σ(βs)∣2ds\int_0^T|\sigma(\beta_s)|^2ds∫0T​∣σ(βs​)∣2ds; a contract remains any FT\mathcal F_TFT​-measurable function of the path. Expectations of utilities are negated lower Lebesgue integrals of exponentials in [−∞,0][-\infty,0][−∞,0], and every value is an extended-real supremum with sup⁡∅=−∞\sup\emptyset=-\inftysup∅=−∞. BBB is read as [ε,1]d[\varepsilon,1]^d[ε,1]d, with indices in Fin N and Fin d.

The Hamiltonians are defined by their infima, never by their closed forms, so that Proposition 2.1 is not true by definition, and the first-best value is a supremum over the model's own objects, not a variable pinned by hypotheses. Three hypotheses are added to the page: ε≤1\varepsilon\le1ε≤1 (so B≠∅B\ne\emptysetB=∅), R0<0R_0<0R0​<0 (so L0L_0L0​ is defined), and, for the goal only, δ−T≤Amax⁡\delta^-T\le A_{\max}δ−T≤Amax​, without which the printed 12μˉ(δ−)2(T−t)2\frac12\bar\mu(\delta^-)^2(T-t)^221​μˉ​(δ−)2(T−t)2 exceeds Hm(δ(T−t))H_m(\delta(T-t))Hm​(δ(T−t)) and contradicts the paper's own proof. Misprints corrected and disclosed in the items: the closed form of HmH_mHm​ in Proposition 2.1 is false for z−>Amax⁡z^->A_{\max}z−>Amax​ and is replaced by μˉ(mz−−m2/2)\bar\mu(m z^--m^2/2)μˉ​(mz−−m2/2) with m=z−∧Amax⁡m=z^-\wedge A_{\max}m=z−∧Amax​; the index range of b^\hat bb^ is j=1,…,dj=1,\dots,dj=1,…,d; on p. 28, ∫0tmˉ\int_0^t\bar m∫0t​mˉ is ∫tTmˉ\int_t^T\bar m∫tT​mˉ and "(A.11)" is (A.6).

The parts (ii)–(iii) of Proposition 3.1, the optimal efforts and the optimal contract, are not stated. Contributions welcome: a verification theorem for controlled martingale problems with bounded coefficients, exponential moment bounds uniform over admissible laws, and a pathwise quadratic variation on the canonical space.

Selected references

  • R. Aïd, D. Possamaï, N. Touzi, Optimal electricity demand response contracting with responsiveness incentives, arXiv:1810.09063v3, 2019; Math. Oper. Res. 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.09063
  • J. Cvitanić, D. Possamaï, N. Touzi, Dynamic programming approach to principal–agent problems, Finance Stoch. 22, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.07111
  • B. Holmström, P. Milgrom, Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives, Econometrica 55, 1987. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913238
  • Y. Sannikov, A continuous-time version of the principal–agent problem, Rev. Econ. Stud. 75, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00463.x
  • I. Karatzas, S. Shreve, Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus, Springer, 1991, §5.4 (martingale problems and weak solutions). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0949-2
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Control TheoryMechanism DesignStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives 1: The Producer's Second-Best Value in Closed FormResearch Paper

Motivation

Demand response asks electricity consumers to lower or smooth their consumption when generation is expensive, in exchange for payments. Field trials such as Low Carbon London showed two effects of such incentives: consumers reduce their average consumption, and the variability of their response depends on how much effort they put into it. A producer who cannot observe the consumer's individual usages, only the aggregate consumption path, faces a moral hazard problem: the payment can depend only on what is observed.

Aïd, Possamaï and Touzi (arXiv:1810.09063v3, 2019; Math. Oper. Res. 2022) cast this as a continuous-time principal–agent problem in which the consumer controls both the drift and the volatility of his consumption, and the producer pays for reductions in both. The volatility channel is what makes the problem new: the classical Holmström–Milgrom model (Econometrica 1987) controls only the drift. The paper uses the general reduction of Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi (Finance Stoch. 2018) to optimal contracts with volatility control, and obtains the producer's value in closed form up to a scalar minimisation. This mission formalizes that closed form.

Setting

Fix integers N,d≥0N,d\ge0N,d≥0, cost parameters μ∈(0,∞)N\mu\in(0,\infty)^Nμ∈(0,∞)N and λ∈(0,∞)d\lambda\in(0,\infty)^dλ∈(0,∞)d, nominal volatilities σ∈(0,∞)d\sigma\in(0,\infty)^dσ∈(0,∞)d, effort bounds Amax⁡>0A_{\max}>0Amax​>0 and ε∈(0,1]\varepsilon\in(0,1]ε∈(0,1], risk aversions r,p>0r,p>0r,p>0, a marginal cost of volatility h>0h>0h>0, marginal energy value κ\kappaκ and cost θ\thetaθ with δ:=κ−θ\delta:=\kappa-\thetaδ:=κ−θ, a horizon T>0T>0T>0, an initial consumption X0X_0X0​ and a reservation utility R0<0R_0<0R0​<0. Write μˉ:=∑iμi\bar\mu:=\sum_i\mu_iμˉ​:=∑i​μi​ and x−:=max⁡(0,−x)x^-:=\max(0,-x)x−:=max(0,−x).

Consumption. XXX is the canonical process on Ω=C([0,T],R)\Omega=C([0,T],\mathbb R)Ω=C([0,T],R) with its natural filtration F\mathbb FF. A control ν=(α,β)\nu=(\alpha,\beta)ν=(α,β) is progressively measurable, with αt∈A:=∏i[0,μiAmax⁡]\alpha_t\in A:=\prod_i[0,\mu_iA_{\max}]αt​∈A:=∏i​[0,μi​Amax​] (effort to reduce consumption) and βt∈B:=[ε,1]d\beta_t\in B:=[\varepsilon,1]^dβt​∈B:=[ε,1]d (effort to reduce volatility). Under ν\nuν the consumption follows, in the weak sense,

Xt=X0−∫0tαs⋅1 ds+∫0tσ(βs)⋅dWs,∣σ(b)∣2=∑jσj2bj.X_t=X_0-\int_0^t\alpha_s\cdot\mathbf 1\,ds+\int_0^t\sigma(\beta_s)\cdot dW_s,\qquad |\sigma(b)|^2=\sum_j\sigma_j^2b_j .Xt​=X0​−∫0t​αs​⋅1ds+∫0t​σ(βs​)⋅dWs​,∣σ(b)∣2=j∑​σj2​bj​.

Effort costs c(ν)=c1(α)+12c2(β)c(\nu)=c_1(\alpha)+\frac12c_2(\beta)c(ν)=c1​(α)+21​c2​(β) per unit time, with c1(a)=12∑iai2/μic_1(a)=\frac12\sum_ia_i^2/\mu_ic1​(a)=21​∑i​ai2​/μi​ and c2(b)=∑jσj2λj(bj−1−1)c_2(b)=\sum_j\frac{\sigma_j^2}{\lambda_j}(b_j^{-1}-1)c2​(b)=∑j​λj​σj2​​(bj−1​−1).

Criteria. For a payment ξ\xiξ at time TTT, the consumer's criterion is JA=E[−e−r(ξ+∫0T(κXs−c(νs))ds)]J_A=\mathbb E[-e^{-r(\xi+\int_0^T(\kappa X_s-c(\nu_s))ds)}]JA​=E[−e−r(ξ+∫0T​(κXs​−c(νs​))ds)] and the producer's is JP=E[U(−ξ−∫0TθXsds−h2⟨X⟩T)]J_P=\mathbb E[U(-\xi-\int_0^T\theta X_sds-\frac h2\langle X\rangle_T)]JP​=E[U(−ξ−∫0T​θXs​ds−2h​⟨X⟩T​)] with U(x)=−e−pxU(x)=-e^{-px}U(x)=−e−px. Contracts C\mathcal CC are the FT\mathcal F_TFT​-measurable ξ\xiξ with exponential moments of order m>1m>1m>1 uniformly over the consumer's responses (2.5). The consumer's value is VA(ξ)=sup⁡JAV_A(\xi)=\sup J_AVA​(ξ)=supJA​, and P⋆(ξ)\mathcal P^\star(\xi)P⋆(ξ) is the set of his optimal responses.

Second best. The producer offers ξ\xiξ, the consumer responds optimally, ties are broken in the producer's favour, and participation requires VA(ξ)≥R0V_A(\xi)\ge R_0VA​(ξ)≥R0​:

VSB:=sup⁡ξ∈C, VA(ξ)≥R0 sup⁡P⋆(ξ)JP(ξ,⋅),sup⁡∅=−∞.V^{SB}:=\sup_{\xi\in\mathcal C,\ V_A(\xi)\ge R_0}\ \sup_{\mathcal P^\star(\xi)}J_P(\xi,\cdot),\qquad\sup\emptyset=-\infty .VSB:=ξ∈C, VA​(ξ)≥R0​sup​ P⋆(ξ)sup​JP​(ξ,⋅),sup∅=−∞.

Hamiltonians. Hm(z)=−inf⁡a∈A{a⋅1 z+c1(a)}H_m(z)=-\inf_{a\in A}\{a\cdot\mathbf 1\,z+c_1(a)\}Hm​(z)=−infa∈A​{a⋅1z+c1​(a)} and Hv(γ)=−12inf⁡b∈B{c2(b)−γ∣σ(b)∣2}H_v(\gamma)=-\frac12\inf_{b\in B}\{c_2(b)-\gamma|\sigma(b)|^2\}Hv​(γ)=−21​infb∈B​{c2​(b)−γ∣σ(b)∣2}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.2 (i)

Assume δ−T≤Amax⁡\delta^-T\le A_{\max}δ−T≤Amax​. With qt(z)=h+rz2+p(z−δ(T−t))2q_t(z)=h+rz^2+p(z-\delta(T-t))^2qt​(z)=h+rz2+p(z−δ(T−t))2, L0=−1rlog⁡(−R0)L_0=-\frac1r\log(-R_0)L0​=−r1​log(−R0​),

mSB(t)=12μˉδ2(T−t)2−12inf⁡z∈R{μˉ(z−+δ(T−t))2−2Hv(−qt(z))},m_{SB}(t)=\frac12\bar\mu\delta^2(T-t)^2-\frac12\inf_{z\in\mathbb R}\Big\{\bar\mu\big(z^-+\delta(T-t)\big)^2-2H_v\big(-q_t(z)\big)\Big\},mSB​(t)=21​μˉ​δ2(T−t)2−21​z∈Rinf​{μˉ​(z−+δ(T−t))2−2Hv​(−qt​(z))}, VSB=U(v(0,X0)−L0),v(0,X0)=δTX0+∫0TmSB(s) ds.V^{SB}=U\big(v(0,X_0)-L_0\big),\qquad v(0,X_0)=\delta TX_0+\int_0^Tm_{SB}(s)\,ds .VSB=U(v(0,X0​)−L0​),v(0,X0​)=δTX0​+∫0T​mSB​(s)ds.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.1. The consumer's best responses a^i(z)=μi(z−∧Amax⁡)\hat a_i(z)=\mu_i(z^-\wedge A_{\max})a^i​(z)=μi​(z−∧Amax​) and b^j(γ)=(1∧(λjγ−)−1/2)∨ε\hat b_j(\gamma)=(1\wedge(\lambda_j\gamma^-)^{-1/2})\vee\varepsilonb^j​(γ)=(1∧(λj​γ−)−1/2)∨ε attain the infima defining HmH_mHm​ and HvH_vHv​, and
Hm(z)=μˉ(mz−−m22), m=z−∧Amax⁡;Hv(γ)=−12(c^2(γ)−γ∣σ^(γ)∣2).H_m(z)=\bar\mu\big(m z^--\tfrac{m^2}2\big),\ m=z^-\wedge A_{\max};\qquad H_v(\gamma)=-\tfrac12\big(\hat c_2(\gamma)-\gamma|\hat\sigma(\gamma)|^2\big).Hm​(z)=μˉ​(mz−−2m2​), m=z−∧Amax​;Hv​(γ)=−21​(c^2​(γ)−γ∣σ^(γ)∣2).
  1. Lemma A.1. With f0(q,γ)=q∣σ^(γ)∣2+c^2(γ)f_0(q,\gamma)=q|\hat\sigma(\gamma)|^2+\hat c_2(\gamma)f0​(q,γ)=q∣σ^(γ)∣2+c^2​(γ), F0(q):=inf⁡γ≤0f0(q,γ)=f0(q,−q)=−2Hv(−q)F_0(q):=\inf_{\gamma\le0}f_0(q,\gamma)=f_0(q,-q)=-2H_v(-q)F0​(q):=infγ≤0​f0​(q,γ)=f0​(q,−q)=−2Hv​(−q), and F0F_0F0​ is non-decreasing.
  2. Proposition A.4 (ii). A minimiser of z↦F0(h−k+rz2+p(z−y)2)+μˉ(z−+y)2z\mapsto F_0(h-k+rz^2+p(z-y)^2)+\bar\mu(z^-+y)^2z↦F0​(h−k+rz2+p(z−y)2)+μˉ​(z−+y)2 is pr+py\frac p{r+p}yr+pp​y when y≥0y\ge0y≥0, and lies in [y,pr+py][y,\frac p{r+p}y][y,r+pp​y] when y≤0y\le0y≤0.

A companion statement, Corollary 3.1 (i), gives the explicit off-peak payment rates zSB(t)=pr+pδ(T−t)z_{SB}(t)=\frac p{r+p}\delta(T-t)zSB​(t)=r+pp​δ(T−t) and γSB(t)=−h−rpr+pδ2(T−t)2\gamma_{SB}(t)=-h-\frac{rp}{r+p}\delta^2(T-t)^2γSB​(t)=−h−r+prp​δ2(T−t)2 when δ≥0\delta\ge0δ≥0.

Significance

The closed form reduces an infinite-dimensional contracting problem, a supremum over all path-dependent payments and all consumer responses, to a deterministic one-dimensional minimisation at each time. It is the basis of the paper's comparisons: with the first-best value it measures the cost of moral hazard, and its minimiser gives the price of energy and of responsiveness that the optimal contract charges, which the paper calibrates on Low Carbon London data.

The result is proved on paper. No part of it is machine-checked. A complete formalization would give a checked instance of a continuous-time principal–agent theorem with volatility control. It would also fix, in exact terms, the conventions the paper leaves implicit (weak solutions, the effort cap), and the printed misprints that this mission corrects.

Difficulty

The deterministic milestones are calculus on boxes. The goal is not. The upper bound VSB≤U(v(0,X0)−L0)V^{SB}\le U(v(0,X_0)-L_0)VSB≤U(v(0,X0​)−L0​) must hold for every FT\mathcal F_TFT​-measurable contract, not only for contracts of a convenient form. The step that fails in a direct attempt is the representation of an arbitrary contract: one needs that every ξ∈C\xi\in\mathcal Cξ∈C inducing an optimal response can be written as YTy0,Z,ΓY_T^{y_0,Z,\Gamma}YTy0​,Z,Γ​, an integral against dXdXdX and d⟨X⟩d\langle X\rangled⟨X⟩ driven by the consumer's continuation certainty equivalent. This is the main theorem of Cvitanić–Possamaï–Touzi (2018) and rests on second-order backward SDEs; it has no counterpart in Mathlib. Restricting the supremum to linear or representable contracts at the outset would assume exactly that theorem. The lower bound needs, for the candidate contract, existence of the consumer's optimal response as a weak solution and a verification argument for the producer's HJB equation.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace DemandResponse.SecondBest, and all hypotheses are fields of a structure Params. Conventions:

  • Weak formulation. An admissible pair (ν,P)(\nu,\mathbb P)(ν,P) is a control and a probability measure on C([0,T],R)C([0,T],\mathbb R)C([0,T],R) with X0=X0X_0=X_0X0​=X0​ a.s., under which Xt−X0+∫0tαs⋅1 dsX_t-X_0+\int_0^t\alpha_s\cdot\mathbf 1\,dsXt​−X0​+∫0t​αs​⋅1ds and its square minus ∫0t∣σ(βs)∣2ds\int_0^t|\sigma(\beta_s)|^2ds∫0t​∣σ(βs​)∣2ds are F\mathbb FF-martingales. This is the martingale problem equivalent to weak solutions of (2.1); the paper deliberately leaves weak solutions informal (footnote 2). The pair, not the law alone, is the admissible object, because the cost depends on ν\nuν.
  • Quadratic variation. ⟨X⟩T\langle X\rangle_T⟨X⟩T​ in JPJ_PJP​ is its almost-sure value ∫0T∣σ(βs)∣2ds\int_0^T|\sigma(\beta_s)|^2ds∫0T​∣σ(βs​)∣2ds.
  • Values. Expected utilities are negated lower Lebesgue integrals, in [−∞,0][-\infty,0][−∞,0]; all suprema are in the extended reals, so the empty supremum is −∞-\infty−∞, as on p. 9.
  • Hamiltonians are defined by their infima, not by the closed forms of Proposition 2.1.
  • Indices are Fin N, Fin d; N=0N=0N=0, d=0d=0d=0 are allowed. b^j(γ)=1\hat b_j(\gamma)=1b^j​(γ)=1 when λjγ−≤1\lambda_j\gamma^-\le1λj​γ−≤1 (the paper's 0−1/2=+∞0^{-1/2}=+\infty0−1/2=+∞).
  • Added hypotheses. ε≤1\varepsilon\le1ε≤1 (B≠∅B\neq\emptysetB=∅), R0<0R_0<0R0​<0 (log⁡(−R0)\log(-R_0)log(−R0​) defined), and for the goal δ−T≤Amax⁡\delta^-T\le A_{\max}δ−T≤Amax​. The paper's closed form is computed with the effort cap removed ("ηA→0\eta_A\to0ηA​→0 as A↗∞A\nearrow\inftyA↗∞", p. 30), and with the capped effort of the model it is correct exactly under this hypothesis.
  • Corrected misprints. −2Hm(−q(z))-2H_m(-q(z))−2Hm​(−q(z)) in mSBm_{SB}mSB​ is read as −2Hv(−q(z))-2H_v(-q(z))−2Hv​(−q(z)); with HmH_mHm​ the infimum is −∞-\infty−∞. The printed Hm(z)=12μˉ(z−∧Amax⁡)2H_m(z)=\frac12\bar\mu(z^-\wedge A_{\max})^2Hm​(z)=21​μˉ​(z−∧Amax​)2 is false for z−>Amax⁡z^->A_{\max}z−>Amax​ and is corrected. "j=1,…,Nj=1,\dots,Nj=1,…,N" for b^\hat bb^ means j=1,…,dj=1,\dots,dj=1,…,d. In Proposition A.4 (ii) the open interval becomes closed, and "for large AAA" is read as ηA≡0\eta_A\equiv0ηA​≡0.

The goal is an equality of extended reals between VSBV^{SB}VSB, defined from the model, and an explicit real number. A formalization that defines VSBV^{SB}VSB over a restricted class of contracts, or with a real-valued supremum that returns 000 on unbounded sets, would trivialize or change it and is not the goal.

Needed infrastructure: continuous-time martingales on the canonical path space (Mathlib has Martingale and progressive measurability), existence of weak solutions with bounded coefficients, a representation theorem for contracts (Cvitanić–Possamaï–Touzi), and a verification theorem for the producer's HJB equation. The weak-formulation layer and the contract representation are reusable for any continuous-time principal–agent model with drift and volatility control. Contributions of any of these pieces, and proofs of the deterministic milestones, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. Aïd, D. Possamaï, N. Touzi, Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives, arXiv:1810.09063v3, 2019; Mathematics of Operations Research 47 (2022). https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.09063v3
  • J. Cvitanić, D. Possamaï, N. Touzi, Dynamic programming approach to principal–agent problems, Finance and Stochastics 22 (2018) 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00780-017-0344-4
  • B. Holmström, P. Milgrom, Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives, Econometrica 55 (1987) 303–328. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913238
  • Y. Sannikov, A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem, Review of Economic Studies 75 (2008) 957–984. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00486.x
  • I. Karatzas, S. Shreve, Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus, 2nd ed., Springer 1991, §5.4 (martingale problem and weak solutions). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-0949-2
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis of Thompson Sampling for the Multi-armed Bandit Problem 1: Logarithmic Regret for Two ArmsResearch Paper

Motivation

Thompson Sampling (TS) is the oldest heuristic for the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem: it was proposed by Thompson in 1933 (Biometrika 25) and is used in practice for online advertising and recommendation, where it often performs as well as or better than upper-confidence-bound methods (Chapelle and Li, NIPS 2011; Scott 2010). Until 2012 its theoretical guarantees for the frequentist regret were weak: earlier analyses gave only o(T)o(T)o(T) regret in time TTT (Granmo 2010; May, Korda, Lee and Leslie 2011).

Agrawal and Goyal, Analysis of Thompson Sampling for the Multi-armed Bandit Problem (arXiv:1111.1797v3, COLT 2012), gave the first logarithmic finite-time bound on the expected regret of TS. This mission formalizes their two-armed result, Theorem 1. A companion mission covers the NNN-armed bound, Theorem 2.

Timeline. Lai and Robbins (1985) proved that every consistent algorithm has regret at least [∑iΔi/D(μi∥μ∗)+o(1)]ln⁡T\big[\sum_i \Delta_i/D(\mu_i\|\mu^*)+o(1)\big]\ln T[∑i​Δi​/D(μi​∥μ∗)+o(1)]lnT. Auer, Cesa-Bianchi and Fischer (2002) gave UCB1 with an O(∑iln⁡T/Δi)O(\sum_i \ln T/\Delta_i)O(∑i​lnT/Δi​) finite-time bound. Agrawal and Goyal (2012) proved O(ln⁡T/Δ+1/Δ3)O(\ln T/\Delta+1/\Delta^3)O(lnT/Δ+1/Δ3) for two-armed TS. Kaufmann, Korda and Munos (ALT 2012) and Agrawal and Goyal (AISTATS 2013) later proved asymptotically optimal bounds for Bernoulli TS.

Setting

There are two arms. Arm i∈{1,2}i\in\{1,2\}i∈{1,2} has a fixed, unknown reward distribution DiD_iDi​ supported in [0,1][0,1][0,1], with mean μi\mu_iμi​. Plays of an arm give i.i.d. rewards, independent of the other arm. Arm 1 is the unique optimal arm, μ1>μ2\mu_1>\mu_2μ1​>μ2​, and Δ=μ1−μ2\Delta=\mu_1-\mu_2Δ=μ1​−μ2​ is the gap.

Thompson Sampling for general stochastic bandits (Algorithm 2 of the paper) keeps, for each arm iii, a success count SiS_iSi​ and a failure count FiF_iFi​, both starting at 000. In each round t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,… it

  1. samples, independently for each arm, θi(t)∼Beta(Si+1,Fi+1)\theta_i(t)\sim\mathrm{Beta}(S_i+1,F_i+1)θi​(t)∼Beta(Si​+1,Fi​+1);
  2. plays i(t)=arg⁡max⁡iθi(t)i(t)=\arg\max_i\theta_i(t)i(t)=argmaxi​θi​(t) and observes a reward r~t∼Di(t)\tilde r_t\sim D_{i(t)}r~t​∼Di(t)​;
  3. performs a Bernoulli trial with success probability r~t\tilde r_tr~t​, with outcome rt∈{0,1}r_t\in\{0,1\}rt​∈{0,1};
  4. increments Si(t)S_{i(t)}Si(t)​ if rt=1r_t=1rt​=1 and Fi(t)F_{i(t)}Fi(t)​ otherwise.

ki(t)k_i(t)ki​(t) is the number of plays of arm iii before round ttt. The expected regret in time TTT is

E[R(T)]=E[∑t=1T(μ1−μi(t))],\mathbb E[\mathcal R(T)]=\mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^T(\mu_1-\mu_{i(t)})\Big],E[R(T)]=E[t=1∑T​(μ1​−μi(t)​)],

the expectation being over the rewards and the algorithm's randomness.

The analysis uses the Beta cdf Fα,βbetaF^{beta}_{\alpha,\beta}Fα,βbeta​, the binomial cdf Fn,pBF^B_{n,p}Fn,pB​, and the random variable X(j,s,y)X(j,s,y)X(j,s,y): the number of independent Beta(s+1,j−s+1)\mathrm{Beta}(s+1,j-s+1)Beta(s+1,j−s+1) draws made before one exceeds yyy.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 3)

There is an absolute constant C>0C>0C>0 such that for every two-armed instance with rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1] and μ1>μ2\mu_1>\mu_2μ1​>μ2​, and every T≥2T\ge 2T≥2,

E[R(T)]≤C(ln⁡TΔ+1Δ3).\mathbb E[\mathcal R(T)]\le C\Big(\frac{\ln T}{\Delta}+\frac1{\Delta^3}\Big).E[R(T)]≤C(ΔlnT​+Δ31​).

The constant is not fixed numerically: the paper states the theorem in O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) form (footnote 1), and the explicit display it reports on p. 8, 40ln⁡T/Δ+48/Δ3+18Δ40\ln T/\Delta+48/\Delta^3+18\Delta40lnT/Δ+48/Δ3+18Δ, is not the formal claim.

Milestones

  • Fact 1 (p. 12): Fα,βbeta(y)=1−Fα+β−1,yB(α−1)F^{beta}_{\alpha,\beta}(y)=1-F^B_{\alpha+\beta-1,y}(\alpha-1)Fα,βbeta​(y)=1−Fα+β−1,yB​(α−1) for positive integers α,β\alpha,\betaα,β.
  • Lemma 1 (p. 6): E[X(j,s,y)]=1/Fj+1,yB(s)−1\mathbb E[X(j,s,y)]=1/F^B_{j+1,y}(s)-1E[X(j,s,y)]=1/Fj+1,yB​(s)−1.
  • Lemma 6 (p. 13): Hoeffding-type bounds (10)–(11) on binomial cdfs.
  • Fact 2 (p. 13): every median of Binomial(n,p)\mathrm{Binomial}(n,p)Binomial(n,p) is ⌊np⌋\lfloor np\rfloor⌊np⌋ or ⌈np⌉\lceil np\rceil⌈np⌉.
  • Lemma 2 (p. 7): Pr⁡(E2(t))≥1−2/T2\Pr(E_2(t))\ge 1-2/T^2Pr(E2​(t))≥1−2/T2, where E2(t)={θ2(t)≤μ2+Δ/2 or k2(t)<24ln⁡T/Δ2}E_2(t)=\{\theta_2(t)\le\mu_2+\Delta/2\ \text{or}\ k_2(t)<24\ln T/\Delta^2\}E2​(t)={θ2​(t)≤μ2​+Δ/2 or k2​(t)<24lnT/Δ2}.
  • Lemma 3 (p. 7): a three-case bound on E[E[min⁡{X(j,s(j),y),T}∣s(j)]]\mathbb E\big[\mathbb E[\min\{X(j,s(j),y),T\}\mid s(j)]\big]E[E[min{X(j,s(j),y),T}∣s(j)]] for s(j)∼Binomial(j,μ1)s(j)\sim\mathrm{Binomial}(j,\mu_1)s(j)∼Binomial(j,μ1​).
  • Eq. (1) (p. 7): E[k2(T)]≤C(ln⁡T/Δ2+1/Δ4)\mathbb E[k_2(T)]\le C(\ln T/\Delta^2+1/\Delta^4)E[k2​(T)]≤C(lnT/Δ2+1/Δ4).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 shows that TS, a randomized Bayesian heuristic with no explicit confidence bonus, has regret logarithmic in TTT on every two-armed instance, matching the order in TTT of the Lai–Robbins lower bound. The proof introduced a way to control the optimal arm's waiting time between plays through the Beta–Binomial duality, and later analyses of TS reuse that device.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper and has no machine-checked proof that we know of. The platform's existing TS results concern Gaussian TS (Lattimore and Szepesvári, Ch. 36) and Bayesian regret, which are different algorithms or regret notions. A formalization adds a reusable Lean model of Algorithm 2 on [0,1][0,1][0,1]-valued rewards, Beta–Binomial facts (Fact 1, Lemma 1), a binomial-median theorem, and binomial Hoeffding bounds. It also produces a proof with a constant that has been checked, since the printed constants contain an arithmetic slip.

Difficulty

The standard UCB argument does not transfer to TS. For UCB, the optimal arm's index exceeds its mean with high probability however often the arm has been played, because the exploration bonus is deterministic; the analysis then only has to count plays of the suboptimal arm until its own index concentrates, after Θ(ln⁡T/Δ2)\Theta(\ln T/\Delta^2)Θ(lnT/Δ2) plays. Under TS the optimal arm's sample θ1(t)\theta_1(t)θ1​(t) is random and, if the arm has been played rarely or its early rewards were poor, it falls below μ2\mu_2μ2​ with constant probability. The optimal arm may then wait a long, random time between plays, and the length of that wait depends on the arm's posterior, which in turn depends on how long it has waited. Counting plays of the suboptimal arm with a union bound over rounds, under the assumption that the optimal arm is already concentrated, therefore does not work; controlling these waiting times is the central difficulty and is where the 1/Δ31/\Delta^31/Δ3 dependence enters.

Formalization scope

  • Model. The instance is the platform's StochasticBandit 2 (a probability measure on R\mathbb RR per arm, mean banditArmMean), with the hypothesis that each reward law gives mass 111 to [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Lean arm 0 is the paper's arm 1 and Lean arm 1 the paper's arm 2. Lean rounds are indexed from 000.
  • Algorithm. Algorithm 2 is realized on one probability space with three independent i.i.d. tables: Beta draws W(i,t,a,b)∼Beta(a+1,b+1)W(i,t,a,b)\sim\mathrm{Beta}(a+1,b+1)W(i,t,a,b)∼Beta(a+1,b+1), rewards X(i,t)∼DiX(i,t)\sim D_iX(i,t)∼Di​, and uniforms V(i,t)V(i,t)V(i,t). Round ttt uses θi(t)=W(i,t,Si(t),Fi(t))\theta_i(t)=W(i,t,S_i(t),F_i(t))θi​(t)=W(i,t,Si​(t),Fi​(t)), r~t=X(i(t),t)\tilde r_t=X(i(t),t)r~t​=X(i(t),t) and rt=1{V(i(t),t)<r~t}r_t=\mathbf 1\{V(i(t),t)<\tilde r_t\}rt​=1{V(i(t),t)<r~t​}. Ties in the arg max go to the smaller index (a null event).
  • Values. Regret and expectations are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. X(j,s,y)X(j,s,y)X(j,s,y) is N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞}-valued, so Lemma 1 at y=1y=1y=1 reads ∞=∞\infty=\infty∞=∞, as in the paper.
  • O(·). The paper's O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) (footnote 1: f≤cgf\le cgf≤cg for n≥n0n\ge n_0n≥n0​) is stated with one universal constant C>0C>0C>0, quantified before the instance, the means and the horizon, for all T≥2T\ge 2T≥2. Eq. (1) is stated the same way, without its printed numerals.
  • Not trivial. The goal is about Algorithm 2 itself, with fresh Beta samples, fresh rewards and the Bernoulli coin. A statement about "any policy satisfying Lemma 2's event bound", or one whose constant depends on Δ\DeltaΔ, the reward laws or TTT, would not be Theorem 1.
  • Edge cases. μ1<1\mu_1<1μ1​<1 is assumed only in Lemma 3, where the paper's RRR and DDD require it. It is not a hypothesis of the goal.
  • Infrastructure. A complete proof needs: inverse-transform or order-statistics facts for Beta laws (Fact 1); geometric expectations; Hoeffding's inequality for sums of Bernoulli variables (Mathlib has Hoeffding/Azuma); the binomial median theorem (Jogdeo–Samuels; Kaas–Buhrman); and the coupling from the reward tables to the per-arm i.i.d. output stacks the paper reasons with. Fact 1, Lemma 6 and Fact 2 are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome, and so is a direct proof of the regret bound with an explicit constant.

Selected references

  • S. Agrawal and N. Goyal, Analysis of Thompson Sampling for the Multi-armed Bandit Problem, COLT 2012; arXiv:1111.1797v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1111.1797
  • W. R. Thompson, On the likelihood that one unknown probability exceeds another in view of the evidence of two samples, Biometrika 25 (1933) 285–294. https://doi.org/10.2307/2332286
  • T. L. Lai and H. Robbins, Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules, Advances in Applied Mathematics 6 (1985) 4–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
  • P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi and P. Fischer, Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem, Machine Learning 47 (2002) 235–256. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013689704352
  • K. Jogdeo and S. M. Samuels, Monotone convergence of binomial probabilities and a generalization of Ramanujan's equation, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 39 (1968) 1191–1195. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177698243
  • R. Kaas and J. M. Buhrman, Mean, median and mode in binomial distributions, Statistica Neerlandica 34 (1980) 13–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9574.1980.tb00681.x
  • O. Chapelle and L. Li, An empirical evaluation of Thompson Sampling, NIPS 2011. https://papers.nips.cc/paper/4321-an-empirical-evaluation-of-thompson-sampling
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources IX: Deciding Feasibility with Cumulative Resources Is NP-Complete Even for Acyclic Project NetworksTextbook

Motivation

Project scheduling with cumulative resources models production and logistics projects in which activities fill and empty storage: an activity withdraws material from an inventory when it starts and deposits its output when it completes, and every inventory must stay between a safety stock and a storage capacity. Neumann, Schwindt and Zimmermann treat this model in §2.12 of Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources (2nd ed., Springer 2003, doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24800-2) and use it in their process-industry applications.

Before any optimization, a scheduler must know whether a feasible schedule exists at all. Theorem 2.12.1 of the book answers the complexity of this question: it is NP-complete, and it stays NP-complete when the project network has no cycles. The contrast with renewable resources (machines, workers) is the point of the theorem: with renewable resources, the feasibility problem is NP-complete as well (Theorem 2.3.13, after Bartusch, Möhring and Radermacher, 1988), but an acyclic network always admits a feasible schedule when every requirement is within capacity.

The mission also collects the two other reductions the book proves in full: Proposition 2.5.4 (recognizing whether an activity lies in some minimal delaying alternative, the branching object of the book's branch-and-bound procedures, is NP-complete) and Proposition 3.4.2 (maximizing weighted start-time deviations, a resource-levelling objective, is NP-hard without any resource constraints).

Setting

A project has activities V={0,1,…,n+1}V=\{0,1,\dots,n+1\}V={0,1,…,n+1} with n≥1n\ge1n≥1; activity 000 is the project beginning and n+1n+1n+1 the project completion. Activity iii has a duration pi∈Np_i\in\mathbb Npi​∈N, with p0=pn+1=0p_0=p_{n+1}=0p0​=pn+1​=0. The project network NNN has arc set EEE; an arc ⟨i,j⟩\langle i,j\rangle⟨i,j⟩ with integer weight δij\delta_{ij}δij​ imposes the temporal constraint Sj−Si≥δijS_j-S_i\ge\delta_{ij}Sj​−Si​≥δij​ on the start times. A schedule is a real vector S=(Si)i∈VS=(S_i)_{i\in V}S=(Si​)i∈V​ with S0=0S_0=0S0​=0 and Si≥0S_i\ge0Si​≥0; it is time-feasible if it meets every temporal constraint.

Cumulative resources k∈Rγk\in\mathcal R^\gammak∈Rγ carry integer demands rikr_{ik}rik​: rik<0r_{ik}<0rik​<0 depletes −rik-r_{ik}−rik​ units at the start SiS_iSi​, rik>0r_{ik}>0rik​>0 replenishes rikr_{ik}rik​ units at the completion Si+piS_i+p_iSi​+pi​, and r0kr_{0k}r0k​ is the initial stock. The inventory at time ttt is

rk(S,t)=∑i: rik<0, Si≤trik+∑i: rik>0, Si+pi≤trik.r_k(S,t)=\sum_{i:\ r_{ik}<0,\ S_i\le t} r_{ik}+\sum_{i:\ r_{ik}>0,\ S_i+p_i\le t} r_{ik}.rk​(S,t)=i: rik​<0, Si​≤t∑​rik​+i: rik​>0, Si​+pi​≤t∑​rik​.

With safety stock R‾k\underline R_kR​k​ and storage capacity R‾k\overline R_kRk​ (integers, R‾k≤∑i∈Vrik≤R‾k\underline R_k\le\sum_{i\in V}r_{ik}\le\overline R_kR​k​≤∑i∈V​rik​≤Rk​ by (2.12.1)), SSS is feasible if it is time-feasible and R‾k≤rk(S,t)≤R‾k\underline R_k\le r_k(S,t)\le\overline R_kR​k​≤rk​(S,t)≤Rk​ for every kkk and every t≥0t\ge0t≥0. The decision problem of PSc∣temp∣Cmax⁡PSc|temp|C_{\max}PSc∣temp∣Cmax​ asks whether a feasible schedule exists.

For renewable resources k∈Rk\in\mathcal Rk∈R with capacities RkR_kRk​ and requirements rik∈Nr_{ik}\in\mathbb Nrik​∈N, a set F⊆VF\subseteq VF⊆V is forbidden if ∑i∈Frik>Rk\sum_{i\in F}r_{ik}>R_k∑i∈F​rik​>Rk​ for some kkk. A delaying alternative for FFF is a set B⊆FB\subseteq FB⊆F such that F∖BF\setminus BF∖B is not forbidden; it is minimal if no proper subset of BBB is one.

In PS∞∣temp,dˉ∣fPS\infty|temp,\bar d|fPS∞∣temp,dˉ∣f there are no resources, schedules must also satisfy Sn+1≤dˉS_{n+1}\le\bar dSn+1​≤dˉ, and the objective here is f(S)=−∑i∈V∑j>iwij∣Sj−Si∣f(S)=-\sum_{i\in V}\sum_{j>i}w_{ij}|S_j-S_i|f(S)=−∑i∈V​∑j>i​wij​∣Sj​−Si​∣ with weights wij≥0w_{ij}\ge0wij​≥0.

NP and NP-completeness are taken in the sense of Cook's Turing-machine formulation, with instances written in binary.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.12.1

Assuming PARTITION is NP-complete,

L={codes of instances of PSc∣temp∣Cmax⁡ with a feasible schedule}  and  Lacyc=L∩{N acyclic}L=\{\text{codes of instances of }PSc|temp|C_{\max}\text{ with a feasible schedule}\}\ \text{ and }\ L_{\mathrm{acyc}}=L\cap\{N\text{ acyclic}\}L={codes of instances of PSc∣temp∣Cmax​ with a feasible schedule}  and  Lacyc​=L∩{N acyclic}

are both NP-complete.

Milestones

  1. Membership (proof of Theorem 2.12.1): L∈NPL\in\mathrm{NP}L∈NP and Lacyc∈NPL_{\mathrm{acyc}}\in\mathrm{NP}Lacyc​∈NP.
  2. Reduction correctness (proof of Theorem 2.12.1): for sizes s(1),…,s(ν)s(1),\dots,s(\nu)s(1),…,s(ν) with even sum, the project with r0=rn+1=−∑s(i)/2r_0=r_{n+1}=-\sum s(i)/2r0​=rn+1​=−∑s(i)/2, ri=s(i)r_i=s(i)ri​=s(i), R‾=R‾=0\underline R=\overline R=0R​=R=0, d0,n+1min⁡=1d^{\min}_{0,n+1}=1d0,n+1min​=1 has an acyclic network, and it has a feasible schedule iff the sizes split into two parts of equal sum.
  3. Polynomial transformation: PARTITION≤pLacyc\mathrm{PARTITION}\le_p L_{\mathrm{acyc}}PARTITION≤p​Lacyc​.
  4. Proof of Proposition 2.5.4, one resource: for j∗∈B⊆Fj^*\in B\subseteq Fj∗∈B⊆F, BBB is a minimal delaying alternative iff R−min⁡j∈Brj<∑i∈F∖Bri≤RR-\min_{j\in B}r_j<\sum_{i\in F\setminus B}r_i\le RR−minj∈B​rj​<∑i∈F∖B​ri​≤R.
  5. Proof of Proposition 2.5.4, with rj∗=1r_{j^*}=1rj∗​=1: a minimal delaying alternative contains j∗j^*j∗ iff some A⊆F∖{j∗}A\subseteq F\setminus\{j^*\}A⊆F∖{j∗} has ∑i∈Ari=R\sum_{i\in A}r_i=R∑i∈A​ri​=R.
  6. Proposition 2.5.4: assuming SUBSET SUM is NP-complete, deciding whether some minimal delaying alternative for a forbidden set FFF contains j∗∈Fj^*\in Fj∗∈F is NP-complete.
  7. Proof of Proposition 3.4.2: a graph has a cut of at least MMM edges iff the constructed instance has a schedule with Si∈{0,1}S_i\in\{0,1\}Si​∈{0,1} and ∑i<jwij∣Sj−Si∣≥M\sum_{i<j}w_{ij}|S_j-S_i|\ge M∑i<j​wij​∣Sj​−Si​∣≥M.
  8. Proposition 3.4.2: assuming SIMPLE MAX CUT is NP-complete, the decision version of PS∞∣temp,dˉ∣−∑∑wij∣Sj−Si∣PS\infty|temp,\bar d|-\sum\sum w_{ij}|S_j-S_i|PS∞∣temp,dˉ∣−∑∑wij​∣Sj​−Si​∣ is NP-hard.

The goal follows from milestones 1 and 3 together with the transfer of NP-completeness along ≤p\le_p≤p​ (on the platform as CookPvsNP.npComplete_of_polyReducible).

Significance

The result. Theorem 2.12.1 explains why the book's methods for cumulative resources enumerate precedence relations between depleting and replenishing activities (minimal surplus and shortage sets, Theorem 2.12.4) instead of relying on a constructive feasibility test: unless P = NP, no polynomial algorithm decides feasibility, even for acyclic networks, where the renewable-resource case is trivial. Proposition 2.5.4 does the same for the branching scheme of §2.5, and Proposition 3.4.2 places the resource-levelling objectives of Chapter 3 among the hard ones.

Formalizing it. The three results are proved in the book, as short reductions whose delicate steps are left implicit: the polynomial size of a certificate for real-valued schedules, the handling of instances outside the construction (odd sums, empty index sets, oversized items), and the passage from an optimization problem to its decision version. None of the three reductions is machine-checked anywhere known. The mission states them against a single Turing-machine model and a single binary encoding, reusing the published definitions CookPvsNP_defs, so that the reductions compose with the Cook–Levin development already on the platform.

Difficulty

The mathematical content of the reductions is short; the difficulty is in the complexity-theoretic layer. Two steps resist the obvious argument.

First, NP membership. The book's certificate is a schedule, and a schedule is a real vector: it is not a string. A verifier needs a finite certificate of polynomial length, and it is not immediate that a feasible instance has a feasible schedule with small rational (or integer) start times, since the inventory constraints involve strict orderings between event times.

Second, polynomial-time computability in a concrete Turing-machine model. The transformation must compute, on a one-tape machine, binary codes of sums and halves of the input sizes, an arc list of quadratic length, and must map malformed strings to fixed no-instances. Informal "clearly polynomial" arguments have to become explicit machine constructions or a reusable library of closure properties.

Formalization scope

The Lean development fixes the following conventions.

  • Activities are Fin (n + 2), with the completion Fin.last (n + 1); resources are Fin m. Start times are real.
  • The inventory constraints hold for every t≥0t\ge0t≥0, not only for 0≤t≤dˉ0\le t\le\bar d0≤t≤dˉ as (2.12.2) is printed; the book's proofs use this reading.
  • Real activities may have duration 000 in PSc∣temp∣Cmax⁡PSc|temp|C_{\max}PSc∣temp∣Cmax​: the reduction of Theorem 2.12.1 uses only such activities.
  • Instances are coded as lists of integers written in binary over the alphabet {0,1,−,#}\{0,1,-,\#\}{0,1,−,#}; arc weights are listed for every ordered pair of activities together with an arc indicator. Well-formedness (standing assumptions such as n≥1n\ge1n≥1, p0=pn+1=0p_0=p_{n+1}=0p0​=pn+1​=0, no loops, (2.12.1), rik≤Rkr_{ik}\le R_krik​≤Rk​) is part of each language.
  • "Acyclic" means the nodes admit a numbering increasing along every arc.
  • The NP-completeness of PARTITION, SUBSET SUM and SIMPLE MAX CUT (Karp, 1972) enters as a hypothesis of the corresponding theorem; these are not results of the book.
  • Proposition 3.4.2 is stated for the decision version of the optimization problem, with natural-number weights and threshold.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the languages contain only codes of well-formed instances, the encoding is injective, and the hypotheses on the source problems are true theorems, so the goal cannot hold vacuously or by a degenerate encoding.

A complete development needs closure properties of polynomial-time computable functions in Cook's model (composition, binary arithmetic, list manipulation), transitivity of ≤p\le_p≤p​, and a small-certificate lemma for systems of difference constraints with strict and non-strict inequalities. These are reusable for every NP-hardness proof stated in the same framework. Contributions to any of them, to the instance-level milestones 2, 4, 5 and 7, or to the NP-completeness of PARTITION, SUBSET SUM and SIMPLE MAX CUT in this model, are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Neumann, C. Schwindt, J. Zimmermann, Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-24800-2
  • M. Bartusch, R. H. Möhring, F. J. Radermacher, Scheduling project networks with resource constraints and time windows, Annals of Operations Research 16, 1988.
  • M. R. Garey, D. S. Johnson, Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness, W. H. Freeman, 1979.
  • R. M. Karp, Reducibility among combinatorial problems, in Complexity of Computer Computations, Plenum, 1972. doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-2001-2_9
  • S. Cook, The P versus NP Problem, Clay Mathematics Institute problem description. claymath.org
14 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources V: A Schedule Is Inventory-Feasible iff It Resolves Every Minimal Surplus and Shortage SetTextbook

Motivation

In make-to-order production, chemical process industries and other manufacturing settings modelled as projects, activities do not only occupy machines for a while: they also consume intermediate products at their start and deposit products into storage facilities at their completion. Storage is bounded above by a tank or warehouse capacity and below by a safety stock. Resources of this kind are called cumulative resources (or inventory resources, reservoirs in the constraint-programming literature). They were introduced into resource-constrained project scheduling by Neumann and Schwindt (2002), and Chapter 2 of Neumann, Schwindt and Zimmermann, Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources (2nd ed., Springer 2003), develops their theory in §2.12.

A scheduler handling cumulative resources needs a finite combinatorial description of which schedules respect the inventory bounds at every instant, because the time axis is continuous and cannot be checked point by point in a search procedure. Theorem 2.12.4 of the book gives such a description, and it is the basis of the branch-and-bound procedure of Neumann and Schwindt for the problem PSc∣temp∣Cmax⁡PSc|temp|C_{\max}PSc∣temp∣Cmax​.

Setting

A project consists of activities V={0,1,…,n+1}V=\{0,1,\dots,n+1\}V={0,1,…,n+1} with n≥1n\ge 1n≥1, where 000 is the project beginning and n+1n+1n+1 the project completion. Activity iii has an integer duration pi≥0p_i\ge 0pi​≥0, with p0=pn+1=0p_0=p_{n+1}=0p0​=pn+1​=0 and pi>0p_i>0pi​>0 for the real activities.

For each cumulative resource kkk in a set Rγ\mathcal R^\gammaRγ, every activity iii has an integer demand rikr_{ik}rik​. If rik<0r_{ik}<0rik​<0, activity iii withdraws −rik-r_{ik}−rik​ units of kkk at its start; if rik>0r_{ik}>0rik​>0, it deposits rikr_{ik}rik​ units at its completion; rik=0r_{ik}=0rik​=0 means kkk is not used. The demand r0kr_{0k}r0k​ of the project beginning is the initial stock. Write Vk−={i∣rik<0}V_k^-=\{i\mid r_{ik}<0\}Vk−​={i∣rik​<0} and Vk+={i∣rik>0}V_k^+=\{i\mid r_{ik}>0\}Vk+​={i∣rik​>0}. Each resource has a safety stock R‾k∈Z\underline R_k\in\mathbb ZR​k​∈Z and a storage capacity R‾k∈Z\overline R_k\in\mathbb ZRk​∈Z.

A schedule is a vector S=(Si)i∈VS=(S_i)_{i\in V}S=(Si​)i∈V​ of real start times with S0=0S_0=0S0​=0 and Si≥0S_i\ge 0Si​≥0. The active set and the inventory of kkk at time t≥0t\ge 0t≥0 are

Ak(S,t)={i∈Vk−∣Si≤t}∪{i∈Vk+∣Si+pi≤t},rk(S,t)=∑i∈Ak(S,t)rik.\mathcal A_k(S,t)=\{i\in V_k^-\mid S_i\le t\}\cup\{i\in V_k^+\mid S_i+p_i\le t\},\qquad r_k(S,t)=\sum_{i\in\mathcal A_k(S,t)} r_{ik}.Ak​(S,t)={i∈Vk−​∣Si​≤t}∪{i∈Vk+​∣Si​+pi​≤t},rk​(S,t)=i∈Ak​(S,t)∑​rik​.

The schedule is inventory-feasible if R‾k≤rk(S,t)≤R‾k\underline R_k\le r_k(S,t)\le\overline R_kR​k​≤rk​(S,t)≤Rk​ for all kkk and all t≥0t\ge 0t≥0.

Two standing assumptions of the section are used throughout: (2.12.1) R‾k≤∑i∈Vrik≤R‾k\underline R_k\le\sum_{i\in V}r_{ik}\le\overline R_kR​k​≤∑i∈V​rik​≤Rk​, so the final inventory is admissible; and Remark 2.12.2, R‾k≤0≤R‾k\underline R_k\le 0\le\overline R_kR​k​≤0≤Rk​.

A nonempty F⊆VF\subseteq VF⊆V is a kkk-surplus set if ∑i∈Frik>R‾k\sum_{i\in F}r_{ik}>\overline R_k∑i∈F​rik​>Rk​, and a kkk-shortage set if ∑i∈Frik<R‾k\sum_{i\in F}r_{ik}<\underline R_k∑i∈F​rik​<R​k​. A kkk-surplus set FFF is minimal if no kkk-surplus set arises from FFF by removing a nonempty set of replenishing activities, and none arises by adding a nonempty set of depleting activities. Minimal kkk-shortage sets are defined with the roles of replenishing and depleting activities exchanged. Fk+\mathcal F_k^+Fk+​ and Fk−\mathcal F_k^-Fk−​ denote the minimal kkk-surplus and kkk-shortage sets.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.12.4

A schedule SSS is inventory-feasible if and only if

∀k, ∀F∈Fk+ ∃j∈F, i∉F: rjk>0, rik<0, Sj+pj≥Si,\forall k,\ \forall F\in\mathcal F_k^+\ \exists j\in F,\ i\notin F:\ r_{jk}>0,\ r_{ik}<0,\ S_j+p_j\ge S_i,∀k, ∀F∈Fk+​ ∃j∈F, i∈/F: rjk​>0, rik​<0, Sj​+pj​≥Si​, ∀k, ∀F∈Fk− ∃j∈F, i∉F: rjk<0, rik>0, Sj≥Si+pi.\forall k,\ \forall F\in\mathcal F_k^-\ \exists j\in F,\ i\notin F:\ r_{jk}<0,\ r_{ik}>0,\ S_j\ge S_i+p_i.∀k, ∀F∈Fk−​ ∃j∈F, i∈/F: rjk​<0, rik​>0, Sj​≥Si​+pi​.

Milestones

  1. The invariance claim after Remark 2.12.2 (p. 131): adding the same integer aka_kak​ to r0kr_{0k}r0k​, R‾k\underline R_kR​k​ and R‾k\overline R_kRk​ does not change the set of inventory-feasible schedules.
  2. Lemma 2.12.3 (a): for every kkk-surplus set FFF there is a minimal kkk-surplus set F′F'F′ with ∅≠F′∩Vk+⊆F∩Vk+\emptyset\ne F'\cap V_k^+\subseteq F\cap V_k^+∅=F′∩Vk+​⊆F∩Vk+​ and F′∩Vk−⊇F∩Vk−F'\cap V_k^-\supseteq F\cap V_k^-F′∩Vk−​⊇F∩Vk−​.
  3. Lemma 2.12.3 (b): the shortage counterpart.
  4. Theorem 2.12.4 (a) on its own: the upper constraints rk(S,t)≤R‾kr_k(S,t)\le\overline R_krk​(S,t)≤Rk​ hold for all t≥0t\ge 0t≥0 iff condition (a) holds.
  5. Theorem 2.12.4 (b) on its own: the lower constraints hold for all t≥0t\ge 0t≥0 iff condition (b) holds.

Significance

The theorem turns a constraint over a continuum of time points into finitely many disjunctions, each a choice among precedence relations. An inventory excess caused by a minimal surplus set is removed by a start-to-completion relation Sj+pj≥SiS_j+p_j\ge S_iSj​+pj​≥Si​ (a replenishment is postponed until after a withdrawal starts, equivalently a maximum time lag), and a shortage by a completion-to-start relation Sj≥Si+piS_j\ge S_i+p_iSj​≥Si​+pi​. Consequences stated in the book: the feasible region of PSc∣temp∣Cmax⁡PSc|temp|C_{\max}PSc∣temp∣Cmax​ is a finite union of polyhedra; branching on these relations, organized as pairs of strict orders and reflexive relations, is a complete search scheme; and minimal delaying alternatives for surplus and shortage sets can be enumerated. Because every problem with renewable resources can be rewritten as one with cumulative resources (p. 130), the book also concludes that this union of polyhedra is in general disconnected.

The result is proved in the book (and in Neumann and Schwindt, 2002). To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. This mission produces a Lean formalization of the model, of the one-sided minimality notion, and of the two-sided characterization with its supporting lemma.

Difficulty

The combinatorial core is simple to state but easy to state wrongly. The natural first idea, to use inclusion-minimal surplus sets as for renewable resources, gives a different family Fk+\mathcal F_k^+Fk+​ and a false theorem: the book's minimality allows removing only replenishing activities and adding only depleting ones. The existence lemma needs Remark 2.12.2 to keep at least one replenishing activity in the minimal set, and the sufficiency direction needs (2.12.1) to guarantee a depleting activity outside the minimal set. Both membership conditions of the active set are closed at ttt, so activities that deplete or replenish exactly at the critical instant must be counted on the correct side; a half-open reading changes which schedules are feasible. The initial stock r0kr_{0k}r0k​ is handled by the same active-set rule as any other demand, which matters for the invariance claim.

Formalization scope

  • Activities are Fin (n + 2), activity n+1n+1n+1 is Fin.last (n + 1); resources are an arbitrary type K. Demands, safety stocks and capacities are integers (ℤ); start times are reals (ℝ); durations are natural numbers cast to ℝ.
  • The inventory constraints are required for every t≥0t\ge 0t≥0. The book prints (2.12.2) for 0≤t≤dˉ0\le t\le\bar d0≤t≤dˉ, but its proof of Theorem 2.12.4 works with an arbitrary t≥0t\ge 0t≥0 (the necessity half uses the last completion time of a replenishing activity, which need not be at most dˉ\bar ddˉ). The two readings coincide for schedules with Sn+1≤dˉS_{n+1}\le\bar dSn+1​≤dˉ whose activities all finish by Sn+1S_{n+1}Sn+1​.
  • A schedule satisfies S0=0S_0=0S0​=0 and Si≥0S_i\ge 0Si​≥0 and is not required to be time-feasible; time lags play no role in this section's results and are not part of the model.
  • (2.12.1) and Remark 2.12.2 are explicit hypotheses (TotalDemandWithinBounds, BoundsStraddleZero) wherever the book's proofs use them. Surplus and shortage sets are nonempty by definition, and minimality uses proper inclusions.
  • A formalization in which Fk+\mathcal F_k^+Fk+​ is empty or trivial (for instance, minimality with non-strict inclusions, which no set satisfies) makes condition (a) vacuous; the definitions here follow p. 131 exactly, and a concrete instance with a nonempty Fk+\mathcal F_k^+Fk+​ has been checked locally.

Reusable parts: the cumulative-resource model and inventory profile, which later missions on continuous cumulative resources (§2.12.2) or on the NP-completeness of PSc∣temp∣Cmax⁡PSc|temp|C_{\max}PSc∣temp∣Cmax​ (Theorem 2.12.1) can build on. Contributions welcome: proofs of the lemmas, of either half of the theorem, and finite-sum lemmas about Finset.filter that the proofs need.

Selected references

  • K. Neumann, C. Schwindt, J. Zimmermann, Project Scheduling with Time Windows and Scarce Resources, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003, §2.12.1, pp. 128–135. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24800-2
  • K. Neumann, C. Schwindt, Project scheduling with inventory constraints, Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 56 (2003) 513–533 (cited in the book as 2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001860200251
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Linear OptimizationOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Understanding and Using Linear Programming III: The Simplex Method with Bland's Rule Never CyclesTextbook

Motivation

The simplex method, introduced by G. B. Dantzig in 1947, is the standard algorithm for linear programming and remains the core of commercial solvers. It moves from one basic feasible solution to another by pivot steps, and at each step a pivot rule chooses which variable enters and which leaves the basis. For several natural rules, including Dantzig's original largest-coefficient rule, the method can cycle: on a degenerate linear program it can return to a basis it has already visited and repeat forever without improving the objective. Hoffman (1953) and Beale (1955) gave cycling examples.

R. G. Bland (New finite pivoting rules for the simplex method, Mathematics of Operations Research 2(2), 1977) showed that a simple combinatorial rule, choosing the smallest eligible index for both the entering and the leaving variable, never cycles. This makes the simplex method a finite algorithm on every linear program in equational form, and it gives an algorithmic proof of the duality theorem. Chapter 5 of J. Matoušek and B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming (Springer, 2007, DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4), develops the general theory of simplex tableaus and proves Bland's theorem as Theorem 5.8.1. This mission is the third of a series formalizing that book.

Setting

A linear program in equational form is

maximize cTxsubject toAx=b, x≥0,\text{maximize } c^{T}x \quad\text{subject to}\quad Ax=b,\ x\ge 0,maximize cTxsubject toAx=b, x≥0,

with AAA a real m×nm\times nm×n matrix, b∈Rmb\in\mathbb{R}^mb∈Rm, c∈Rnc\in\mathbb{R}^nc∈Rn. Following §4.2 of the book, AAA has n≥mn\ge mn≥m columns and rank mmm. For an mmm-element set B={k1<⋯<km}⊆{1,…,n}B=\{k_1<\dots<k_m\}\subseteq\{1,\dots,n\}B={k1​<⋯<km​}⊆{1,…,n} let N={ℓ1<⋯<ℓn−m}N=\{\ell_1<\dots<\ell_{n-m}\}N={ℓ1​<⋯<ℓn−m​} be its complement, and ABA_BAB​, ANA_NAN​ the matrices of the columns of AAA indexed by BBB and NNN. BBB is a feasible basis if ABA_BAB​ is nonsingular and AB−1b≥0A_B^{-1}b\ge0AB−1​b≥0; its basic feasible solution is the unique xxx with Ax=bAx=bAx=b and xj=0x_j=0xj​=0 for j∉Bj\notin Bj∈/B.

A simplex tableau T(B)T(B)T(B) is a system

xB=p+Q xN,z=z0+rTxNx_B=p+Q\,x_N,\qquad z=z_0+r^{T}x_NxB​=p+QxN​,z=z0​+rTxN​

in the variables x1,…,xn,zx_1,\dots,x_n,zx1​,…,xn​,z with the same solutions as Ax=bAx=bAx=b, z=cTxz=c^Txz=cTx. A nonbasic variable xvx_vxv​, v=ℓβv=\ell_\betav=ℓβ​, may enter if rβ>0r_\beta>0rβ​>0; a basic variable xux_uxu​, u=kαu=k_\alphau=kα​, may then leave if

qαβ<0and−pαqαβ=min⁡{−piqiβ:qiβ<0}.(5.3)q_{\alpha\beta}<0\quad\text{and}\quad-\frac{p_\alpha}{q_{\alpha\beta}}=\min\Bigl\{-\frac{p_i}{q_{i\beta}}: q_{i\beta}<0\Bigr\}.\tag{5.3}qαβ​<0and−qαβ​pα​​=min{−qiβ​pi​​:qiβ​<0}.(5.3)

The pivot step replaces BBB by B′=(B∖{u})∪{v}B'=(B\setminus\{u\})\cup\{v\}B′=(B∖{u})∪{v}. Bland's rule takes the entering variable of smallest index among those with rβ>0r_\beta>0rβ​>0, and the leaving variable of smallest index among those satisfying (5.3).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.8.1 (p. 73)

There is no infinite sequence of bases

B0→B1→B2→⋯B_0\to B_1\to B_2\to\cdotsB0​→B1​→B2​→⋯

in which each Bt+1B_{t+1}Bt+1​ is obtained from the feasible basis BtB_tBt​ by a pivot step obeying Bland's rule. Since there are finitely many bases and a Bland step is determined by its starting basis, this is the book's "always finite; i.e., cycling is impossible".

Milestones

  1. Lemma 5.5.1 (p. 66): a feasible basis has exactly one simplex tableau, with Q=−AB−1ANQ=-A_B^{-1}A_NQ=−AB−1​AN​, p=AB−1bp=A_B^{-1}bp=AB−1​b, z0=cBTAB−1bz_0=c_B^TA_B^{-1}bz0​=cBT​AB−1​b, r=cN−(cBTAB−1AN)Tr=c_N-(c_B^TA_B^{-1}A_N)^Tr=cN​−(cBT​AB−1​AN​)T.
  2. Optimality criterion (§5.6, p. 67): if r≤0r\le0r≤0, the basic feasible solution of BBB is optimal.
  3. Lemma 5.6.1 (p. 68): a pivot step leads to a feasible basis; if no leaving variable exists, the program is unbounded along an explicit ray.
  4. Claim in the proof of Theorem 5.8.1 (p. 73): for any pivot rule, all bases of a cycle have the same basic feasible solution, and every variable that enters during the cycle is 000 in it.

Significance

With the optimality criterion and Lemma 5.6.1, Theorem 5.8.1 turns the simplex method into an algorithm: started from any feasible basis, it stops after finitely many pivot steps at an optimal basic feasible solution or with a ray certifying unboundedness. Combined with the auxiliary program of §5.6 for finding a first feasible basis, this yields a constructive proof that every feasible, bounded linear program has an optimal basic feasible solution, and the book remarks that the duality theorem follows easily. Bland's rule is also the model for later combinatorial anticycling rules in oriented matroid programming.

The theorem is classical and fully proved in the book. What the mission adds is a machine-checked version stated in the book's own tableau notation. On Prove2Me the simplex method is formalized in the Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis series (Introduction to Linear Optimization IV), for minimization with reduced costs, with termination proved under nondegeneracy and for the lexicographic rule; Bland's rule is not formalized there.

Difficulty

The obvious termination argument is that the objective value strictly increases at each step, so no basis repeats. That argument fails exactly at degenerate pivot steps, where the minimum in (5.3) is 000: the basis changes, the basic feasible solution and the objective value do not. Along a degenerate stretch the objective gives no progress measure, and for general pivot rules the method does cycle there. Any proof must therefore use the specific tie-breaking of Bland's rule, which is a statement about indices, not about values, and relate the tableaus of two different bases in the cycle to each other. Counting bases or tracking the objective value alone does not suffice.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ and the book's indices 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n become 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1. Bases are Finset (Fin n); the sorted enumerations k1<⋯<kmk_1<\dots<k_mk1​<⋯<km​ and ℓ1<⋯<ℓn−m\ell_1<\dots<\ell_{n-m}ℓ1​<⋯<ℓn−m​ are Finset.orderEmbOfFin, tableau rows are indexed by Fin m and nonbasic columns by Fin (n - m). Nonsingularity of ABA_BAB​ is IsUnit A_B.det, so the Mathlib inverse is the true inverse wherever it appears. The tableau parameters used by the pivot rules are the explicit formulas of Lemma 5.5.1; the tableau itself is also defined as in the book (same solution set) so that Lemma 5.5.1 is a genuine statement. "Smallest index" compares variable indices, not row positions. Optimality and unboundedness are stated against feasible points, not through a supremum. Every theorem assumes n≥mn\ge mn≥m and rank⁡A=m\operatorname{rank}A=mrankA=m, the standing assumption of §4.2.

A formalization in which any improving variable may enter proves a different, false statement, since cycling examples exist for such rules; the step relation here fixes both choices by Bland's rule. The step relation is not empty: it holds whenever the current tableau has a positive last-row coefficient and a negative entry in the entering column, so the goal is not vacuous.

The development needs basic linear algebra over Matrix, the uniqueness of basic feasible solutions, and bookkeeping for sorted index enumerations. Lemma 5.5.1 and Lemma 5.6.1 are reusable for any later formalization of the simplex method in this notation. Contributions are welcome for each milestone, for the cycle-form corollary, and for a sorry-free proof of the goal.

Selected references

  • J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer Universitext, 2007, Chapter 5. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
  • R. G. Bland, New finite pivoting rules for the simplex method, Mathematics of Operations Research 2(2):103–107, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2.2.103
  • E. M. L. Beale, Cycling in the dual simplex algorithm, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 2(4):269–275, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800020407
  • D. Bertsimas, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997, Chapter 3.
7 thms2 active usersReviewed
Markov ChainNumerical AnalysisProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory X: Uniformization of Continuous-Time Markov ChainsTextbook

Motivation

Most Markovian queueing models have no closed-form transient solution. The M/M/1 queue already needs modified Bessel functions (Chapter 2 of the book), and a finite-capacity or multi-class model with state-dependent rates has no closed form at all. What an analyst can always write down is the system of forward equations p′(t)=p(t)Qp'(t)=p(t)Qp′(t)=p(t)Q for the state probabilities. Chapter 8 of Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory (4th ed., Wiley 2008, DOI 10.1002/9781118625651), presents two numerical techniques that turn such models into numbers: the randomization (or uniformization) method for the transient distribution of a finite continuous-time Markov chain, and the Fourier-series method for inverting a Laplace transform, as needed for the M/G/1 waiting-time transform (5.33) and the busy-period transform (5.37).

Uniformization goes back to Jensen (1953) and is the standard transient solver in performance-evaluation and reliability tools. Its appeal is that it replaces a matrix exponential, which is numerically delicate, by powers of a stochastic matrix weighted by Poisson probabilities, with an error bound that can be fixed before the computation starts (Grassmann 1977; Gross and Miller 1984). The Fourier-series method with Euler summation is due to Abate and Whitt (Abate and Whitt 1992; Abate, Choudhury and Whitt 1999).

Setting

A continuous-time Markov chain X(t)X(t)X(t) on the states {0,1,…,N}\{0,1,\dots,N\}{0,1,…,N} is described by its infinitesimal generator Q=(qij)Q=(q_{ij})Q=(qij​): for i≠ji\ne ji=j, qij≥0q_{ij}\ge0qij​≥0 is the rate of jumps from iii to jjj, and the diagonal entry is −qi-q_i−qi​ with

qi=∑j≠iqij,i=0,1,…,N.q_i=\sum_{j\ne i}q_{ij},\qquad i=0,1,\dots,N.qi​=j=i∑​qij​,i=0,1,…,N.

The transient state-probability vector p(t)=(p0(t),…,pN(t))p(t)=(p_0(t),\dots,p_N(t))p(t)=(p0​(t),…,pN​(t)), pn(t)=Pr⁡{X(t)=n}p_n(t)=\Pr\{X(t)=n\}pn​(t)=Pr{X(t)=n}, is the solution of the forward equations

p′(t)=p(t)Q(t≥0),p'(t)=p(t)Q\quad(t\ge0),p′(t)=p(t)Q(t≥0),

started from a given probability vector p(0)p(0)p(0). Fix a constant Λ>0\Lambda>0Λ>0 with Λ≥qi\Lambda\ge q_iΛ≥qi​ for every iii (the book takes Λ=max⁡iqi\Lambda=\max_i q_iΛ=maxi​qi​) and define the uniformized matrix

P~=QΛ+I,p~in={qin/Λ(i≠n),1−qi/Λ(i=n).\tilde P=\frac{Q}{\Lambda}+I,\qquad \tilde p_{in}=\begin{cases}q_{in}/\Lambda&(i\ne n),\\1-q_i/\Lambda&(i=n).\end{cases}P~=ΛQ​+I,p~​in​={qin​/Λ1−qi​/Λ​(i=n),(i=n).​

It is the transition matrix of a discrete-time chain YkY_kYk​: the state of XXX after the kkk-th event of a Poisson process of rate Λ\LambdaΛ that has been thinned. Write ϕ(k)=p(0)P~k\phi^{(k)}=p(0)\tilde P^{k}ϕ(k)=p(0)P~k for its distribution after kkk steps.

For the second half of the chapter, the Laplace transform of a real function fff on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) is fˉ(s)=∫0∞e−stf(t) dt\bar f(s)=\int_0^\infty e^{-st}f(t)\,dtfˉ​(s)=∫0∞​e−stf(t)dt, and the Fourier-series approximant with parameter AAA is

fA,n(t)=eA/22t[fˉ(A2t)+2∑k=1n(−1)k Re fˉ(A+2kπi2t)],f_{A,n}(t)=\frac{e^{A/2}}{2t}\Big[\bar f\Big(\frac{A}{2t}\Big)+2\sum_{k=1}^{n}(-1)^k\,\mathrm{Re}\,\bar f\Big(\frac{A+2k\pi i}{2t}\Big)\Big],fA,n​(t)=2teA/2​[fˉ​(2tA​)+2k=1∑n​(−1)kRefˉ​(2tA+2kπi​)],

with fA(t)=lim⁡n→∞fA,n(t)f_A(t)=\lim_{n\to\infty}f_{A,n}(t)fA​(t)=limn→∞​fA,n​(t).

Formalization targets

Goal: the randomization formula with its truncation bound (Eqs. (8.9)–(8.12))

The forward equations have a solution, and every solution satisfies, for all t≥0t\ge0t≥0,

p(t)=∑k=0∞p(0)P~(k) e−Λt(Λt)kk!,p(t)=\sum_{k=0}^{\infty}p(0)\tilde P^{(k)}\,\frac{e^{-\Lambda t}(\Lambda t)^k}{k!},p(t)=k=0∑∞​p(0)P~(k)k!e−Λt(Λt)k​,

and whenever ∑k=0Te−Λt(Λt)k/k!>1−ϵ\sum_{k=0}^{T}e^{-\Lambda t}(\Lambda t)^k/k!>1-\epsilon∑k=0T​e−Λt(Λt)k/k!>1−ϵ, every component of the sum truncated at k=Tk=Tk=T is within ϵ\epsilonϵ of pn(t)p_n(t)pn​(t).

Milestones

  1. Eq. (8.12): P~\tilde PP~ has the entries above and is a stochastic matrix.
  2. Eqs. (8.13)–(8.14): ϕ(k)=ϕ(k−1)P~\phi^{(k)}=\phi^{(k-1)}\tilde Pϕ(k)=ϕ(k−1)P~ and each ϕ(k)\phi^{(k)}ϕ(k) is a probability vector.
  3. p.385: ϕ=ϕP~  ⟺  0=ϕQ\phi=\phi\tilde P\iff0=\phi Qϕ=ϕP~⟺0=ϕQ.
  4. Eqs. (8.27)–(8.28): for bounded Lipschitz fff, A>0A>0A>0 and t>0t>0t>0,
fA(t)−f(t)=∑k=1∞e−kAf((2k+1)t),∣fA(t)−f(t)∣≤Ce−A1−e−A  if ∣f(x)∣≤C for x>3t.f_A(t)-f(t)=\sum_{k=1}^{\infty}e^{-kA}f\big((2k+1)t\big),\qquad |f_A(t)-f(t)|\le\frac{Ce^{-A}}{1-e^{-A}}\ \text{ if } |f(x)|\le C \text{ for } x>3t.fA​(t)−f(t)=k=1∑∞​e−kAf((2k+1)t),∣fA​(t)−f(t)∣≤1−e−ACe−A​  if ∣f(x)∣≤C for x>3t.

The mission also contains Eqs. (8.7)–(8.8) as a further theorem, outside the milestone list: the transition probabilities satisfy pin(t)=∑kp~in(k)e−Λt(Λt)k/k!p_{in}(t)=\sum_k\tilde p^{(k)}_{in}e^{-\Lambda t}(\Lambda t)^k/k!pin​(t)=∑k​p~​in(k)​e−Λt(Λt)k/k!, and pn(t)=∑ipi(0)pin(t)p_n(t)=\sum_i p_i(0)p_{in}(t)pn​(t)=∑i​pi​(0)pin​(t).

Significance

The randomization formula reduces the transient analysis of any finite Markovian queue (finite-buffer, multi-server, with balking, reneging or state-dependent rates) to repeated vector–matrix products with a sparse stochastic matrix. The truncation point is chosen from a Poisson tail alone, independently of QQQ. Milestone 3 shows that the same matrix gives the stationary equations, so one iteration serves both transient and steady-state computation. The discretization identity (8.27) is what justifies the parameter choice in Algorithm 8.1: the error decays like e−Ae^{-A}e−A.

All of these results are classical and proved in the literature. None of them is formalized in Lean or Mathlib as far as a search of the platform and Mathlib shows. Mathlib has the matrix exponential and Poisson summation under decay hypotheses, but no continuous-time Markov chain generators, no uniformization, and no Laplace transform. This mission would add the finite-state link between generators, stochastic matrices and matrix exponentials that later chapters of queueing and reliability theory use, and a verified error formula for a numerical inversion method in wide use.

Difficulty

The book's derivation is probabilistic: it conditions on the number of events of the Poisson(Λ\LambdaΛ) process and thins them. A formal statement cannot rest on that picture, because p(t)p(t)p(t) is defined analytically, by the forward equations. The goal therefore contains a uniqueness statement for a linear ODE on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with one-sided derivative at 000, which the book never mentions. The componentwise bound then needs P~\tilde PP~ to be stochastic, so that every ϕn(k)\phi^{(k)}_nϕn(k)​ lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. That is exactly where Λ≥max⁡iqi\Lambda\ge\max_i q_iΛ≥maxi​qi​ is used; with a smaller Λ\LambdaΛ the matrix P~\tilde PP~ has negative diagonal entries and the bound fails.

For (8.27), the book gives no proof. The identity is an aliasing (Poisson-summation) formula for a periodic function assembled from the values of fff at all odd multiples of ttt. The convergence of the conditionally summed series (8.24) is the delicate point: continuity of fff at ttt, the book's only hypothesis, does not guarantee convergence of a Fourier series. Mathlib's Poisson summation theorems require decay of the Fourier transform that the damped, reflected function built from fff does not have.

Formalization scope

  • States are Fin (N+1); a row vector is Fin (N+1) → ℝ; pQpQpQ is vecMul. A generator is a real matrix with nonnegative off-diagonal entries and diagonal −∑j≠iqij-\sum_{j\ne i}q_{ij}−∑j=i​qij​.
  • p(t)p(t)p(t) is not defined as the series. It is any function with p(0)=p0p(0)=p_0p(0)=p0​ and one-sided derivative p(t)Qp(t)Qp(t)Q within [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) at every t≥0t\ge0t≥0. The goal also asserts that such a function exists, so it cannot hold vacuously, and it asserts the series identity for every solution. Defining p(t)p(t)p(t) as the series (8.9) would make the goal a tautology and is ruled out.
  • Λ\LambdaΛ is any real with Λ>0\Lambda>0Λ>0 and Λ≥qi\Lambda\ge q_iΛ≥qi​ for all iii (the book takes equality with max⁡iqi\max_i q_imaxi​qi​).
  • The truncation bound is stated componentwise, as on p.384 ("an error bound on pn(t)p_n(t)pn​(t) of ϵ\epsilonϵ"), for an arbitrary real ϵ\epsilonϵ and truncation point TTT.
  • The series (8.8), (8.9) are stated with HasSum, so convergence is part of the claim.
  • The Laplace transform is the Lebesgue integral over (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) at a complex argument. fA(t)f_A(t)fA​(t) is the limit of the partial sums fA,n(t)f_{A,n}(t)fA,n​(t), and the convergence is part of milestone 4.
  • Strengthened hypotheses in milestone 4: fff bounded and Lipschitz on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) replaces "ttt is a continuity point of fff", which is not sufficient for convergence.
  • Corrected misprints: e−λte^{-\lambda t}e−λt in (8.9) is e−Λte^{-\Lambda t}e−Λt; qij/Λq_{ij}/\Lambdaqij​/Λ in (8.12) is qin/Λq_{in}/\Lambdaqin​/Λ; ϕ(Q/Λ−I)\phi(Q/\Lambda-I)ϕ(Q/Λ−I) on p.385 is ϕ(Q/Λ+I)\phi(Q/\Lambda+I)ϕ(Q/Λ+I).
  • Not formalized: Theorem 8.1 (Bromwich inversion) and the real form (8.21), which the book states without hypotheses on fff; the limit claim lim⁡kϕ(k)=lim⁡tp(t)\lim_k\phi^{(k)}=\lim_t p(t)limk​ϕ(k)=limt​p(t) on p.385, which fails when P~\tilde PP~ is periodic; the Euler-summation approximation (8.26) and the round-off discussion, which are stated with "≈".

Useful infrastructure: the matrix exponential and its derivative (Matrix, NormedSpace.exp), uniqueness for linear ODEs (Grönwall), Fourier series on the circle, and a reusable Laplace transform file. Contributions of general lemmas on generators and stochastic matrices are welcome, as they apply to every finite Markovian model in the series.

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008, §§8.1.2–8.2. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • A. Jensen, "Markoff chains as an aid in the study of Markoff processes", Skandinavisk Aktuarietidskrift 36 (1953) 87–91.
  • W. K. Grassmann, "Transient solutions in Markovian queueing systems", Computers & Operations Research 4 (1977) 47–53.
  • D. Gross, D. R. Miller, "The randomization technique as a modeling tool and solution procedure for transient Markov processes", Operations Research 32 (1984) 343–361. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.2.343
  • J. Abate, W. Whitt, "The Fourier-series method for inverting transforms of probability distributions", Queueing Systems 10 (1992) 5–87. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01158520
  • J. Abate, G. L. Choudhury, W. Whitt, "An introduction to numerical transform inversion and its application to probability models", in W. Grassmann (ed.), Computational Probability, Kluwer, 1999, 257–323.
8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization IV: Nonstationary Optimization and a Convergence Criterion for Nonmonotone SequencesTextbook

Motivation

Many stochastic and nondifferentiable optimization problems are not solved by minimizing their true objective f0f^0f0 directly: f0f^0f0 may be nonsmooth, an expectation that cannot be evaluated, or only approximately known. A standard remedy replaces f0f^0f0 by a sequence of "good" approximations F0(⋅,s)F^0(\cdot, s)F0(⋅,s) (smoothed versions, sample averages, perturbations) that converge to f0f^0f0, and runs one step of a descent method on the current approximation at every iteration. Approximation and optimization then proceed simultaneously. More generally, in nonstationary optimization the objective F0(⋅,s)F^0(\cdot, s)F0(⋅,s) and the feasible set XsX_sXs​ change with the iteration number sss, and the iterates xsx^sxs are required to follow the time path of the optimal solutions,

lim⁡s→∞[F0(xs,s)−min⁡{F0(x,s)∣x∈Xs}]=0.\lim_{s\to\infty}\bigl[F^0(x^s, s) - \min\{F^0(x, s) \mid x \in X_s\}\bigr] = 0 .s→∞lim​[F0(xs,s)−min{F0(x,s)∣x∈Xs​}]=0.

Such procedures are essentially nonmonotone: a step on F0(⋅,s)F^0(\cdot, s)F0(⋅,s) gives no guarantee of decrease of F0(⋅,t)F^0(\cdot, t)F0(⋅,t) for t≥s+1t \ge s+1t≥s+1, nor of f0f^0f0. Their convergence therefore cannot be proved by the usual monotone Lyapunov argument. Section 6.4 of Yu. Ermoliev's chapter "Stochastic Quasigradient Methods" in Ermoliev & Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization (Springer 1988), gives the basic deterministic convergence theorem for this setting (Theorem 6.3) and the convergence criterion for nonmonotone sequences on which its proof rests (Theorem 6.4, taken from Ermoliev's 1976 monograph; the chapter compares its conditions with Zangwill's necessary and sufficient convergence conditions).

Timeline, as recorded in the chapter's bibliography (pp. 180–181): Ermoliev and Nurminski introduced limit extremal problems, in which F0(⋅,s)F^0(\cdot, s)F0(⋅,s) and XsX_sXs​ both converge ("Limit extremal problems", Kibernetika 1973, [14]); Nurminski gave convergence conditions for stochastic programming algorithms (Kibernetika 1973, [11]); Gupal treated time-varying functions (Kibernetika 1974, [15]); Ermoliev's monograph Stochastic Programming Methods (Nauka, 1976, [5]) contains the criterion stated here as Theorem 6.4 (p. 181); Nurminski formulated the general problem of nonstationary optimization (Kibernetika 1977, [16]); and Gaivoronski proved convergence of stochastic nonstationary procedures (Kibernetika 1978, [19]), the source of the chapter's Theorem 6.5.

Setting

Throughout, points are vectors of Rn\mathbb R^nRn with the Euclidean norm ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥ and inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩.

  • The projection onto a nonempty closed convex set X⊆RnX \subseteq \mathbb R^nX⊆Rn is πX(y)=arg⁡min⁡{∥y−x∥2:x∈X}\pi_X(y) = \arg\min\{\|y - x\|^2 : x \in X\}πX​(y)=argmin{∥y−x∥2:x∈X}, the unique nearest point of XXX to yyy.
  • A subgradient of a convex function F:Rn→RF : \mathbb R^n \to \mathbb RF:Rn→R at xxx is a vector ggg with F(y)≥F(x)+⟨g,y−x⟩F(y) \ge F(x) + \langle g, y - x\rangleF(y)≥F(x)+⟨g,y−x⟩ for all yyy. The book writes Fx0(x,s)F^0_x(x, s)Fx0​(x,s) for a subgradient of F0(⋅,s)F^0(\cdot, s)F0(⋅,s) at xxx.
  • The nonstationary projected subgradient method (6.41) starts from any x0∈Rnx^0 \in \mathbb R^nx0∈Rn and sets
xs+1=πX[xs−ρsgs],gs a subgradient of F0(⋅,s) at xs,s=0,1,…x^{s+1} = \pi_X\bigl[x^s - \rho_s g_s\bigr], \qquad g_s \text{ a subgradient of } F^0(\cdot, s) \text{ at } x^s,\quad s = 0, 1, \dotsxs+1=πX​[xs−ρs​gs​],gs​ a subgradient of F0(⋅,s) at xs,s=0,1,…

with step sizes ρs≥0\rho_s \ge 0ρs​≥0.

  • For a closed set X∗X^*X∗ (in the application, the set of minimizers of f0f^0f0 on XXX) and a sequence (xs)(x^s)(xs), the exit time from the ε\varepsilonε-ball around xskx^{s_k}xsk​ is τk=min⁡{s≥sk:∥xs−xsk∥>ε}\tau_k = \min\{s \ge s_k : \|x^s - x^{s_k}\| > \varepsilon\}τk​=min{s≥sk​:∥xs−xsk​∥>ε}.
  • The Lyapunov function of the proof is V(x)=min⁡x∗∈X∗∥x∗−x∥2V(x) = \min_{x^* \in X^*}\|x^* - x\|^2V(x)=minx∗∈X∗​∥x∗−x∥2, the squared distance to X∗X^*X∗.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.3 (pp. 153–154)

Let F0(⋅,s)F^0(\cdot, s)F0(⋅,s) and f0f^0f0 be convex continuous on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, XXX a nonempty convex compact set, F0(⋅,s)→f0F^0(\cdot, s) \to f^0F0(⋅,s)→f0 uniformly on XXX, ∥gs∥≤C\|g_s\| \le C∥gs​∥≤C, ρs≥0\rho_s \ge 0ρs​≥0, ρs→0\rho_s \to 0ρs​→0 and ∑sρs=∞\sum_s \rho_s = \infty∑s​ρs​=∞. Then the iterates of (6.41) satisfy

F0(xs,s)⟶min⁡{f0(x)∣x∈X}(s→∞).F^0(x^s, s) \longrightarrow \min\{f^0(x) \mid x \in X\} \qquad (s \to \infty).F0(xs,s)⟶min{f0(x)∣x∈X}(s→∞).

The statement fixes no rate and no constant: only the qualitative limit, which is what the book proves.

Milestones

  1. p. 155 — the one-step recursion V(xs+1)≤V(xs)+2ρs⟨gs,x∗(s)−xs⟩+ρs2∥gs∥2V(x^{s+1}) \le V(x^s) + 2\rho_s\langle g_s, x^*(s) - x^s\rangle + \rho_s^2\|g_s\|^2V(xs+1)≤V(xs)+2ρs​⟨gs​,x∗(s)−xs⟩+ρs2​∥gs​∥2, with x∗(s)x^*(s)x∗(s) a point of X∗X^*X∗ nearest to xsx^sxs.
  2. p. 156 — the travel bound ∥xb−xa∥≤∑s=ab−1∥xs+1−xs∥≤C∑s=ab−1ρs\|x^b - x^a\| \le \sum_{s=a}^{b-1}\|x^{s+1} - x^s\| \le C\sum_{s=a}^{b-1}\rho_s∥xb−xa∥≤∑s=ab−1​∥xs+1−xs∥≤C∑s=ab−1​ρs​ along (6.41) once xa∈Xx^a \in Xxa∈X.
  3. p. 155 — conditions (1) and (2)(a) of Theorem 6.4 for (6.41): the iterates stay in a compact set and ∥xs+1−xs∥→0\|x^{s+1} - x^s\| \to 0∥xs+1−xs∥→0.
  4. Theorem 6.4 (p. 155) — if X∗X^*X∗ is closed, (xs)(x^s)(xs) lies in a compact set, steps vanish along subsequences converging into X∗X^*X∗, the sequence leaves every small ball around a subsequential limit outside X∗X^*X∗, and it leaves with a strictly lower value of a continuous VVV that takes countably many values on X∗X^*X∗, then V(xs)V(x^s)V(xs) converges and all accumulation points lie in X∗X^*X∗.
  5. pp. 155–156 — conditions (2)(b) and (3) of Theorem 6.4 for (6.41) with X∗=arg⁡min⁡Xf0X^* = \arg\min_X f^0X∗=argminX​f0 and V=dist⁡(⋅,X∗)2V = \operatorname{dist}(\cdot, X^*)^2V=dist(⋅,X∗)2:
lim sup⁡k→∞V(xτk)<lim⁡k→∞V(xsk).\limsup_{k\to\infty} V(x^{\tau_k}) < \lim_{k\to\infty} V(x^{s_k}).k→∞limsup​V(xτk​)<k→∞lim​V(xsk​).

Significance

Theorem 6.3 is the prototype of the convergence results for simultaneous optimization and approximation. It covers smoothing schemes in which f0f^0f0 is replaced by F0(x,s)=Ef0(x+h(s))F^0(x, s) = \mathbb E f^0(x + h(s))F0(x,s)=Ef0(x+h(s)) with a vanishing perturbation h(s)h(s)h(s) (the chapter's (6.39)–(6.40)), penalty and regularization sequences, and the deterministic skeleton of stochastic nonstationary methods such as Theorem 6.5. Theorem 6.4 is reusable well beyond this mission: it is a general tool for proving that accumulation points of a nonmonotone algorithm are solutions; the chapter introduces it as the tool for "essentially nonmonotonic solution procedures" in general.

Both results are classical and proved (Theorem 6.3 in the chapter itself, Theorem 6.4 in Ermoliev's 1976 monograph, whose proof the chapter cites but does not reproduce). No machine-checked proof of either is known to the platform's catalogue (searches for nonstationary optimization, Zangwill-type criteria and nonmonotone convergence return no match). The formalization adds a Lean statement and proof of a nonmonotone convergence criterion, a Lean proof of convergence for projected subgradient steps on a changing objective, and reusable facts about Euclidean projection onto a convex compact set.

Difficulty

The obvious argument for projected subgradient methods tracks V(xs)=dist⁡(xs,X∗)2V(x^s) = \operatorname{dist}(x^s, X^*)^2V(xs)=dist(xs,X∗)2 and shows that it decreases whenever xsx^sxs is far from X∗X^*X∗. Here that argument fails at two points. First, the subgradient is taken on F0(⋅,s)F^0(\cdot, s)F0(⋅,s), not on f0f^0f0, so the decrease of VVV holds only up to an error controlled by sup⁡X∣F0(⋅,s)−f0∣\sup_X|F^0(\cdot, s) - f^0|supX​∣F0(⋅,s)−f0∣, and only while the iterate stays away from X∗X^*X∗; near X∗X^*X∗, VVV may increase. Second, a decrease of VVV over each excursion does not by itself exclude "cycling": the sequence may visit every neighbourhood of a point x′∉X∗x' \notin X^*x′∈/X∗ infinitely often. Theorem 6.4 is formulated in terms of exit times and subsequences rather than single steps for this reason, and its hypothesis that VVV takes only countably many values on X∗X^*X∗ is what separates it from a monotone-descent statement.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); sequences are indexed by ℕ from s=0s = 0s=0 as in the book. The iteration (6.41) is a hypothesis on a given sequence, x (s+1) = projX X (x s - ρ s • g s), with a given selection of subgradients g s; the subgradient inequality is required on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn, and F0(⋅,s)F^0(\cdot, s)F0(⋅,s), f0f^0f0 are convex and continuous on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn.
  • projX X y is a minimizer of ∥y−x∥2\|y - x\|^2∥y−x∥2 over XXX (junk value yyy when none exists; every statement assumes XXX nonempty, closed and convex). optimalSet f X is the set of minimizers of fff on XXX; VVV is Metric.infDist · X* ^ 2.
  • Added hypotheses the page does not print: ρs≥0\rho_s \ge 0ρs​≥0 (step sizes are nonnegative throughout the chapter) and X≠∅X \ne \varnothingX=∅ (the minimum over XXX must exist). The limit min⁡Xf0\min_X f^0minX​f0 is written sInf (f '' X); ∑sρs=∞\sum_s\rho_s = \infty∑s​ρs​=∞ is divergence of the partial sums.
  • Constants. The only unspecified constant is the CCC of the travel bound on p. 156 ("where CCC is a constant"); the proof yields CCC = the bound of hypothesis (d), ∥gs∥≤C\|g_s\| \le C∥gs​∥≤C, and that is the constant in milestone 2. All other results are qualitative.
  • Corrections of the page. (i) Theorem 6.4 (2)(b) is printed as "τk=min⁡{s∣s≥sk,∥xsk−xs∥<ε}>∞\tau_k = \min\{s \mid s \ge s_k, \|x^{s_k} - x^s\| < \varepsilon\} > \inftyτk​=min{s∣s≥sk​,∥xsk​−xs∥<ε}>∞", which no sequence satisfies; following the proof of Theorem 6.3 it is read as: τk=min⁡{s≥sk:∥xs−xsk∥>ε}\tau_k = \min\{s \ge s_k : \|x^s - x^{s_k}\| > \varepsilon\}τk​=min{s≥sk​:∥xs−xsk​∥>ε} is finite. "For ε\varepsilonε sufficiently small and for any sks_ksk​" is read as "there is ε0>0\varepsilon_0 > 0ε0​>0 such that for all ε∈(0,ε0)\varepsilon \in (0,\varepsilon_0)ε∈(0,ε0​) and all kkk", and condition (3) is imposed for the same ε\varepsilonε. (ii) The left limit in (3) is read as lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup (the proof prints lim⁡‾\overline{\lim}lim); the right limit is V(x′)V(x')V(x′). (iii) The display on p. 155 prints "===" where the projection gives "≤\le≤". (iv) The proof on p. 155 prints "xsk→x′∈X∗x^{s_k} \to x' \in X^*xsk​→x′∈X∗" where x′∉X∗x' \notin X^*x′∈/X∗ is meant.
  • Theorem 6.5 (the stochastic version, p. 156) is not formalized: the chapter states it without proof, citing [19], its moment hypothesis E∥ξ0(s)∥<constE\|\xi^0(s)\| < \mathrm{const}E∥ξ0(s)∥<const and the measurability of the random step sizes ρs\rho_sρs​ are not pinned down on the page, and it is not used by Theorem 6.3.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal is about the iteration (6.41) itself, not a statement that assumes xs→X∗x^s \to X^*xs→X∗ and derives the limit of the values, and no hypothesis forces the sequence or the functions to be constant.
  • Contributions welcome: properties of projX (existence, uniqueness, nonexpansiveness, the obtuse-angle characterization), a proof of Theorem 6.4, and the two proof steps on pp. 155–156.

Selected references

  • Yu. Ermoliev, "Stochastic Quasigradient Methods", in Yu. Ermoliev and R. J-B Wets (eds.), Numerical Techniques for Stochastic Optimization, Springer Series in Computational Mathematics 10, Springer 1988, Ch. 6, pp. 141–185 (§6.4, pp. 152–156). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61370-8
  • Yu. M. Ermoliev, Stochastic Programming Methods (in Russian), Nauka, Moscow, 1976 (the chapter's [5]; Theorem 6.4 is on p. 181).
  • Yu. M. Ermoliev and E. A. Nurminski, "Limit extremal problems", Kibernetika 1 (1973) (the chapter's [14]).
  • E. A. Nurminski, "Convergence conditions of algorithms of stochastic programming", Kibernetika 3 (1973) (the chapter's [11]).
  • E. A. Nurminski, "The problem of nonstationary optimization", Kibernetika 2 (1977) (the chapter's [16]).
  • A. A. Gaivoronski, "Nonstationary stochastic programming problems", Kibernetika 4 (1978) (the chapter's [19]).
  • W. I. Zangwill, Nonlinear Programming: A Unified Approach, Prentice-Hall, 1969.
8 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsLinear OptimizationOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Understanding and Using Linear Programming VII: LP Rounding Schedules Unrelated Machines Within Twice the Optimal MakespanTextbook

Motivation

Scheduling indivisible jobs on parallel machines to finish all of them as early as possible is a basic problem in operations research and in the theory of algorithms. In the unrelated machines model each job may take a different time on each machine, with no relation between the rows of the time table, as when machines of different types (black-and-white, duplex, colour copiers in the book's example) handle jobs of different kinds. Minimizing the makespan in this model is NP-hard, so the question is how close to the optimum a polynomial-time algorithm can get.

  • 1990. Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos (Math. Programming 46, 259–271) give a polynomial-time algorithm that rounds a basic optimal solution of a linear programming relaxation and returns a schedule of makespan at most 2 topt2\,t_{\mathrm{opt}}2topt​. The same paper shows that approximating the optimum makespan within a factor less than 3/23/23/2 is NP-hard.
  • 2007. Matoušek and Gärtner present the algorithm in §8.3 of Understanding and Using Linear Programming in a simplified, somewhat less efficient form: minimize t∗(T)+Tt^*(T) + Tt∗(T)+T over the thresholds TTT rather than binary-searching for the smallest TTT with t∗(T)≤Tt^*(T) \le Tt∗(T)≤T. This mission follows the book's presentation.

The gap between 3/23/23/2 and 222 for the general unrelated-machines problem has remained open since 1990; it is the standard example of LP rounding driven by the sparsity of basic solutions.

Setting

There are mmm machines MMM and nnn jobs JJJ; dij>0d_{ij} > 0dij​>0 is the running time of job jjj on machine iii. A schedule is a map σ:J→M\sigma : J \to Mσ:J→M assigning each job to one machine. The load of machine iii is ∑j:σ(j)=idij\sum_{j:\sigma(j)=i} d_{ij}∑j:σ(j)=i​dij​, the makespan of σ\sigmaσ is the largest load, and toptt_{\mathrm{opt}}topt​ is the makespan of an optimal schedule, one whose makespan is at most that of every schedule.

For a real threshold TTT, the linear program LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) in the variables ttt and xijx_{ij}xij​ is

minimize  tsubject to  ∑i∈Mxij=1  (j∈J),∑j∈Jdijxij≤t  (i∈M),xij≥0,xij=0  whenever dij>T.\begin{aligned} \text{minimize } \ & t \\ \text{subject to } \ & \textstyle\sum_{i \in M} x_{ij} = 1 \ \ (j \in J), \qquad \textstyle\sum_{j \in J} d_{ij} x_{ij} \le t \ \ (i \in M),\\ & x_{ij} \ge 0, \qquad x_{ij} = 0 \ \text{ whenever } d_{ij} > T . \end{aligned}minimize  subject to  ​t∑i∈M​xij​=1  (j∈J),∑j∈J​dij​xij​≤t  (i∈M),xij​≥0,xij​=0  whenever dij​>T.​

Its optimal value is t∗(T)t^*(T)t∗(T), with t∗(T)=∞t^*(T) = \inftyt∗(T)=∞ when LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) is infeasible. The constraint matrix AAA has one row per machine, one per job and one per pair with dij>Td_{ij} > Tdij​>T; the column of xijx_{ij}xij​ carries dijd_{ij}dij​ in the row of machine iii, 111 in the row of job jjj, and 111 in the row of the constraint xij=0x_{ij} = 0xij​=0 if present. Assumption 8.3.1 on a solution x∗x^*x∗ is that the columns of AAA belonging to its nonzero variables are linearly independent; basic feasible solutions satisfy it. The support graph of x∗x^*x∗ is the bipartite graph G=(M∪J,E)G = (M \cup J, E)G=(M∪J,E) with E={{i,j}:xij∗>0}E = \{\{i,j\} : x^*_{ij} > 0\}E={{i,j}:xij∗​>0}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.3.4

Let T∗T^*T∗ minimize t∗(T)+Tt^*(T) + Tt∗(T)+T over all real TTT and let (t∗,x∗)(t^*, x^*)(t∗,x∗) be an optimal solution of LPR(T∗)\mathrm{LPR}(T^*)LPR(T∗) satisfying Assumption 8.3.1. Then there is a schedule σ\sigmaσ with xσ(j)j∗>0x^*_{\sigma(j) j} > 0xσ(j)j∗​>0 for every job jjj and

max⁡i∈M∑j:σ(j)=idij  ≤  2 topt.\max_{i \in M} \sum_{j : \sigma(j) = i} d_{ij} \;\le\; 2\, t_{\mathrm{opt}} .i∈Mmax​j:σ(j)=i∑​dij​≤2topt​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 8.3.2. Every subgraph of the support graph GGG has at most as many edges as vertices: ∣E′∣≤∣M′∣+∣J′∣|E'| \le |M'| + |J'|∣E′∣≤∣M′∣+∣J′∣.
  2. Lemma 8.3.3. For T≥0T \ge 0T≥0 and an optimal solution (t∗,x∗)(t^*, x^*)(t∗,x∗) of LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) satisfying Assumption 8.3.1, some schedule along the edges of GGG has makespan at most t∗+Tt^* + Tt∗+T.
  3. Proof of Theorem 8.3.4, first step. LPR(topt)\mathrm{LPR}(t_{\mathrm{opt}})LPR(topt​) is feasible and t∗(topt)≤toptt^*(t_{\mathrm{opt}}) \le t_{\mathrm{opt}}t∗(topt​)≤topt​.
  4. Proof of Theorem 8.3.4, second step. t∗(T∗)+T∗≤2 toptt^*(T^*) + T^* \le 2\,t_{\mathrm{opt}}t∗(T∗)+T∗≤2topt​.

Significance

The theorem gives a polynomial-time 2-approximation for an NP-hard problem, and its proof isolates a reusable principle: a basic solution of an assignment-type LP has a support graph in which every subgraph has at most as many edges as vertices (a pseudoforest), so all but a matching's worth of the fractional assignment is already integral. The same sparsity argument underlies rounding results for the generalized assignment problem and for many later scheduling and allocation relaxations.

The result has been proved since 1990 and is textbook material. It is not formalized on Prove2Me or, to the maintainers' knowledge, in Mathlib. This mission produces a machine-checked version of the rounding theorem together with the counting lemma on basic solutions, the relaxation inequality t∗(topt)≤toptt^*(t_{\mathrm{opt}}) \le t_{\mathrm{opt}}t∗(topt​)≤topt​, and the bound on the chosen threshold, each stated on shared definitions of the scheduling LP.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, rounding every job to the machine carrying the largest fraction of it, can overload a machine by many jobs at once and gives no constant factor. The bound t∗+Tt^* + Tt∗+T needs two facts that are not visible from the LP value alone: that the support of a basic solution is sparse in the precise sense of Lemma 8.3.2, which has to be read off the linear independence of columns of the constraint matrix after deleting rows; and that the jobs left fractional can be matched injectively to machines, which requires a Hall-type condition derived from that sparsity. Relating linear independence of real column vectors to an edge count in a bipartite graph, and then producing a matching, is where the formal work lies.

A second subtlety is the threshold TTT: the bound t∗+T≤2toptt^* + T \le 2 t_{\mathrm{opt}}t∗+T≤2topt​ holds only because T∗T^*T∗ is chosen by minimizing over thresholds, and the relaxation at T=toptT = t_{\mathrm{opt}}T=topt​ must be compared with the one at T∗T^*T∗ through optimal solutions of different linear programs.

Formalization scope

Machines are Fin m, jobs are Fin n (0-based; the book's machines 1,…,m1,\dots,m1,…,m and jobs m+1,…,m+nm+1,\dots,m+nm+1,…,m+n are disjoint index sets), running times form d : Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, and the standing hypothesis dij>0d_{ij} > 0dij​>0 of §8.3 appears in every theorem. A schedule is a function Fin n → Fin m; the makespan is the supremum of the loads over the finite type Fin m, which is the maximum for m≥1m \ge 1m≥1. The optimum toptt_{\mathrm{opt}}topt​ is the makespan of a schedule assumed optimal, never an infimum.

Optimal values of LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) are never written as sInf: statements quantify over optimal solutions, i.e. feasible (t,x)(t, x)(t,x) with t≤t′t \le t't≤t′ for every feasible (t′,x′)(t', x')(t′,x′). The book's convention t∗(T)=∞t^*(T) = \inftyt∗(T)=∞ for infeasible LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) is encoded by letting thresholds without an optimal solution impose no condition in the minimality hypothesis on T∗T^*T∗, which reads t∗+T∗≤t+Tt^* + T^* \le t + Tt∗+T∗≤t+T for every real TTT and every optimal solution (t,x)(t, x)(t,x) of LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T). The constraint matrix used in Assumption 8.3.1 has rows indexed by Fin m ⊕ Fin n ⊕ {(i, j) // T < d i j} and excludes the column of ttt, as on p. 151.

"Efficiently construct" in Lemma 8.3.3 and "computes" in Theorem 8.3.4 are formalized by the property of the constructed schedule, not by its running time: every job goes to a machine iii with xij∗>0x^*_{ij} > 0xij∗​>0. This constraint is what rules out the trivializing formalization — "some schedule has makespan at most 2topt2 t_{\mathrm{opt}}2topt​" is true of the optimal schedule itself and says nothing about the rounding.

A complete development needs: finite linear algebra (a linearly independent family of vectors supported on kkk coordinates has at most kkk members), Hall's marriage theorem (available in Mathlib as Finset.all_card_le_biUnion_card_iff_exists_injective), and the existence of an optimal solution of a feasible, bounded linear program (used to apply the minimality of T∗T^*T∗ at T=toptT = t_{\mathrm{opt}}T=topt​). The counting lemma for basic solutions and the definitions of LPR(T)\mathrm{LPR}(T)LPR(T) are reusable for other assignment relaxations. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of Lemma 8.3.3 by the direct pseudoforest argument of p. 153–154, are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer Universitext, 2007, §8.3, pp. 148–156. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
  • J. K. Lenstra, D. B. Shmoys, É. Tardos, Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines, Mathematical Programming 46 (1990), 259–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01585745
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryLinear Optimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Understanding and Using Linear Programming I: Integral Bipartite Matchings, Total Unimodularity and König's TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Many combinatorial optimization problems are integer programs: linear objectives and linear constraints, with the extra requirement that the variables be integers. Dropping that requirement gives the LP relaxation, which is solvable efficiently but in general only bounds the integer optimum. For a small but important class of problems the relaxation loses nothing: its optimum is attained at an integral point, so linear programming solves the combinatorial problem exactly. Bipartite matching is the standard example, and the job-assignment problem that opens Chapter 3 of Matoušek and Gärtner's Understanding and Using Linear Programming (Springer 2007) is a maximum-weight perfect matching problem in a bipartite graph.

The same phenomenon, combined with linear programming duality, produces combinatorial min–max theorems. The oldest of them is König's theorem (1931) on matchings and vertex covers in bipartite graphs; Hall's marriage theorem (1935) follows from it. This mission formalizes the book's treatment of both strands: the integrality of the bipartite matching LP (Section 3.2), total unimodularity and König's theorem (Section 8.2), and, on the same objects for general graphs, the LP-rounding 2-approximation for vertex cover (Section 3.3).

Setting

Let G=(V,E)G = (V, E)G=(V,E) be a finite simple graph. A bipartition of GGG is a pair of disjoint sets X,YX, YX,Y with X∪Y=VX \cup Y = VX∪Y=V such that every edge joins a vertex of XXX to a vertex of YYY; GGG is bipartite if it has one. A matching is a set M⊆EM \subseteq EM⊆E in which each vertex is incident to at most one edge; a vertex cover is a set C⊆VC \subseteq VC⊆V containing at least one end-vertex of every edge. A matching is maximum if no matching has more edges; a vertex cover is minimum if no vertex cover has fewer vertices.

The incidence matrix of GGG has a row for each vertex and a column for each edge, with entry 111 when the vertex lies on the edge and 000 otherwise. A real matrix is totally unimodular if every square submatrix, obtained by deleting some rows and some columns, has determinant 000, 111 or −1-1−1.

Given real edge weights wew_ewe​, the integer program (3.1) maximizes ∑ewexe\sum_{e} w_e x_e∑e​we​xe​ subject to ∑e∋vxe=1\sum_{e \ni v} x_e = 1∑e∋v​xe​=1 for every vertex vvv and xe∈{0,1}x_e \in \{0,1\}xe​∈{0,1}; its 0/1 solutions are the perfect matchings. Its LP relaxation replaces xe∈{0,1}x_e \in \{0,1\}xe​∈{0,1} by 0≤xe≤10 \le x_e \le 10≤xe​≤1. The vertex-cover relaxation (3.3) minimizes ∑vxv\sum_v x_v∑v​xv​ subject to xu+xv≥1x_u + x_v \ge 1xu​+xv​≥1 for every edge {u,v}\{u,v\}{u,v} and 0≤xv≤10 \le x_v \le 10≤xv​≤1.

Formalization targets

Goal: König's theorem (Theorem 8.2.2)

For every finite bipartite graph GGG,

max⁡{∣M∣:M a matching of G}  =  min⁡{∣C∣:C a vertex cover of G}.\max\{|M| : M \text{ a matching of } G\} \;=\; \min\{|C| : C \text{ a vertex cover of } G\}.max{∣M∣:M a matching of G}=min{∣C∣:C a vertex cover of G}.

Total unimodularity (Lemmas 8.2.3–8.2.5)

A TU  ⇒  (A∣ei) TU;A TU, b∈Zm, max⁡{cTx:Ax≤b, x≥0} attained  ⇒  attained at some x∗∈Zn;A \text{ TU} \;\Rightarrow\; (A \mid e_i) \text{ TU}; \qquad A \text{ TU},\ b \in \mathbb{Z}^m,\ \max\{c^Tx : Ax \le b,\ x \ge 0\} \text{ attained} \;\Rightarrow\; \text{attained at some } x^* \in \mathbb{Z}^n;A TU⇒(A∣ei​) TU;A TU, b∈Zm, max{cTx:Ax≤b, x≥0} attained⇒attained at some x∗∈Zn;

and the incidence matrix of a bipartite graph is totally unimodular.

Integrality of the perfect-matching relaxation (Theorem 3.2.1)

If the LP relaxation of (3.1) for a bipartite graph with real weights is feasible, it has an optimal solution with all xe∈{0,1}x_e \in \{0,1\}xe​∈{0,1}, which is also optimal for (3.1).

Consequences on the same objects

Hall's theorem (Theorem 8.2.1): if ∣N(T)∣≥∣T∣|N(T)| \ge |T|∣N(T)∣≥∣T∣ for every T⊆XT \subseteq XT⊆X, where N(T)⊆YN(T) \subseteq YN(T)⊆Y is the set of neighbours of TTT, then some matching covers every vertex of XXX. And for an arbitrary graph, with x∗x^*x∗ optimal for (3.3), SLP={v:xv∗≥12}S_{LP} = \{v : x^*_v \ge \tfrac12\}SLP​={v:xv∗​≥21​} and SOPTS_{OPT}SOPT​ a minimum vertex cover (§3.3, p. 38):

SLP is a vertex cover and ∣SLP∣≤2 ∣SOPT∣.S_{LP} \text{ is a vertex cover and } |S_{LP}| \le 2\,|S_{OPT}| .SLP​ is a vertex cover and ∣SLP​∣≤2∣SOPT​∣.

Significance

König's theorem says that for bipartite graphs the two natural certificates, a matching (a lower bound on any vertex cover) and a vertex cover (an upper bound on any matching), always meet. It makes maximum matchings and minimum vertex covers computable by linear programming, whereas minimum vertex cover in general graphs is NP-hard; Section 3.3's rounding bound quantifies what the LP still gives in that general case. Lemma 8.2.4 is the general tool behind this and behind the max-flow min-cut theorem that the book mentions on p. 148: any integer program with a totally unimodular constraint matrix and integral right-hand side can be solved as a linear program.

All results here are classical and proved. The formalization work is to connect them: Mathlib already has the definition of total unimodularity (Matrix.IsTotallyUnimodular), closure under appending unit-like rows, and Hall's theorem in the form of Finset.all_card_le_biUnion_card_iff_exists_injective. To the best of the drafting survey, neither König's theorem nor the total unimodularity of bipartite incidence matrices nor the integrality lemma 8.2.4 is in Mathlib, and no König statement was found among the platform's missions. The mission produces these in a form that later chapters on network flows and combinatorial duality can import.

Difficulty

The inequality "maximum matching ≤\le≤ minimum vertex cover" is immediate, since each edge of a matching needs its own cover vertex. The difficulty is the reverse inequality, and it is exactly where bipartiteness is needed: the triangle has maximum matching 111 and minimum vertex cover 222. Along the book's route, the obstacle is that LP duality equates the optima of the two relaxations, which are real numbers; one must show that both relaxations already have integral optimal solutions, which is the content of total unimodularity and Lemma 8.2.4. Theorem 3.2.1 is a separate integrality statement with equality constraints and weights of arbitrary sign; it is not a consequence of the Birkhoff–von Neumann theorem unless the graph is complete bipartite with equal sides.

Formalization scope

Graphs are SimpleGraph V on a Fintype vertex type with decidable equality; edges are elements of Sym2 V, and a matching is a Finset (Sym2 V) of edges. Bipartiteness is the existence of finite sets X,YX, YX,Y forming a bipartition; the empty graph and the empty vertex type are allowed and the statements remain the book's there. Vertex covers are Mathlib's SimpleGraph.IsVertexCover. Matrices are real; LP vectors are Fin n → ℝ (0-based indices) or indexed by the edge set or the vertices. An "optimal solution" is always a feasible point that is at least as good as every feasible point: no supremum or infimum over a possibly empty or unbounded set is used, and König's theorem asserts that both a maximum matching and a minimum vertex cover exist and have equal size. Lemma 8.2.4 takes b∈Zmb \in \mathbb{Z}^mb∈Zm and allows real ccc; its conclusion is an integral optimal solution, not merely an integral feasible one. Theorem 3.2.1 is the perfect-matching version with equality constraints, not the "≤1\le 1≤1" matching version discussed in the book's remarks.

A formalization in which König's theorem compares a supremum and an infimum of possibly empty sets, or in which "optimal" is not tied to feasibility, would be trivializing and is ruled out by these conventions.

Useful infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission: Laplace expansion arguments for totally unimodular matrices, the equivalence of the inequality form with the equational form, existence of optimal basic feasible solutions, and LP duality in inequality form (the platform's LinearOptimization.lp_strong_duality states duality for a general-form LP). Combinatorial proofs of König and Hall are equally welcome; only the statements are fixed.

Selected references

  • J. Matoušek, B. Gärtner, Understanding and Using Linear Programming, Springer Universitext, 2007, §3.2–3.3 and §8.2. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30717-4
  • D. Kőnig, "Gráfok és mátrixok", Matematikai és Fizikai Lapok 38 (1931), 116–119.
  • P. Hall, "On representatives of subsets", Journal of the London Mathematical Society 10 (1935), 26–30. https://doi.org/10.1112/jlms/s1-10.37.26
  • A. J. Hoffman, J. B. Kruskal, "Integral boundary points of convex polyhedra", in Linear Inequalities and Related Systems, Annals of Mathematics Studies 38, Princeton, 1956, 223–246. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881987-014
  • A. Schrijver, Theory of Linear and Integer Programming, Wiley, 1986, Chapter 19.
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Fundamentals of Queueing Theory II: Erlang's Formulas and the Halfin–Whitt Square-Root Staffing LawTextbook

Why birth–death queues and Erlang's formulas

Every call center, hospital ward, cloud server pool and telephone exchange that is sized by formula is sized by one of a handful of explicit expressions from Markovian queueing theory. The two oldest are A. K. Erlang's: the Erlang-B (loss) formula of 1917, which gives the fraction of calls lost when ccc trunks carry an offered load of rrr erlangs, and the Erlang-C formula, which gives the probability that a customer of a ccc-server queue must wait. Both are still the default dimensioning rules of telecommunications and call-center workforce management (Gans, Koole & Mandelbaum 2003).

This mission formalizes Chapter 2, §§2.1–2.10, of Gross, Shortle, Thompson and Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed. (Wiley 2008), which derives these formulas from a single result about birth–death processes and closes with the modern answer to the staffing question.

Timeline. Erlang (1917) obtained the loss formula; Vaulot (1927), Pollaczek (1932), Palm (1938) and Kosten (1948) completed its proof for general service times. Halfin and Whitt (1981) showed that in the M/M/nM/M/nM/M/n queue the delay probability converges to a limit strictly between 000 and 111 exactly when the number of servers exceeds the offered load by an amount of order n\sqrt nn​. This is the quality-and-efficiency-driven (QED) regime on which square-root staffing rests.

Setting

A birth–death process is a continuous-time Markov chain on the states n∈{0,1,2,… }n \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}n∈{0,1,2,…} that moves from nnn to n+1n+1n+1 at rate λn≥0\lambda_n \ge 0λn​≥0 (a birth, or arrival) and, for n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, from nnn to n−1n-1n−1 at rate μn>0\mu_n > 0μn​>0 (a death, or departure). A steady-state solution is a probability sequence {pn}\{p_n\}{pn​} (pn≥0p_n \ge 0pn​≥0, ∑npn=1\sum_n p_n = 1∑n​pn​=1) solving the global balance equations (2.1):

(λn+μn)pn=λn−1pn−1+μn+1pn+1 (n≥1),λ0p0=μ1p1.(\lambda_n + \mu_n)p_n = \lambda_{n-1}p_{n-1} + \mu_{n+1}p_{n+1}\ (n \ge 1), \qquad \lambda_0 p_0 = \mu_1 p_1.(λn​+μn​)pn​=λn−1​pn−1​+μn+1​pn+1​ (n≥1),λ0​p0​=μ1​p1​.

The queues of the chapter are birth–death processes with particular rates. The M/M/1M/M/1M/M/1 queue has λn=λ\lambda_n = \lambdaλn​=λ, μn=μ\mu_n = \muμn​=μ and traffic intensity ρ=λ/μ\rho = \lambda/\muρ=λ/μ. The M/M/cM/M/cM/M/c queue has λn=λ\lambda_n = \lambdaλn​=λ, μn=min⁡(n,c)μ\mu_n = \min(n, c)\muμn​=min(n,c)μ (2.30), offered load r=λ/μr = \lambda/\mur=λ/μ and ρ=r/c\rho = r/cρ=r/c. The M/M/c/cM/M/c/cM/M/c/c loss system is the same with λn=0\lambda_n = 0λn​=0 for n≥cn \ge cn≥c. The M/M/∞M/M/\inftyM/M/∞ queue has μn=nμ\mu_n = n\muμn​=nμ.

The explicit functions are the Erlang-B formula

B(c,r)=rc/c!∑i=0cri/i!,B(c, r) = \frac{r^c/c!}{\sum_{i=0}^{c} r^i/i!},B(c,r)=∑i=0c​ri/i!rc/c!​,

the Erlang-C formula, defined for ρ=r/c<1\rho = r/c < 1ρ=r/c<1,

C(c,r)=rc/(c!(1−ρ))rc/(c!(1−ρ))+∑n=0c−1rn/n!,C(c, r) = \frac{r^c/(c!(1-\rho))}{r^c/(c!(1-\rho)) + \sum_{n=0}^{c-1} r^n/n!},C(c,r)=rc/(c!(1−ρ))+∑n=0c−1​rn/n!rc/(c!(1−ρ))​,

and, with ϕ\phiϕ, Φ\PhiΦ the standard normal density and distribution function,

α(β)=ϕ(β)ϕ(β)+βΦ(β).\alpha(\beta) = \frac{\phi(\beta)}{\phi(\beta) + \beta\Phi(\beta)}.α(β)=ϕ(β)+βΦ(β)ϕ(β)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Halfin–Whitt theorem (§2.4, p.75)

For offered loads 0<rn<n0 < r_n < n0<rn​<n,

lim⁡n→∞C(n,rn)=α∈(0,1)  ⟺  lim⁡n→∞n−rnn=β>0,α=α(β).\lim_{n\to\infty} C(n, r_n) = \alpha \in (0,1) \iff \lim_{n\to\infty} \frac{n - r_n}{\sqrt n} = \beta > 0, \qquad \alpha = \alpha(\beta).n→∞lim​C(n,rn​)=α∈(0,1)⟺n→∞lim​n​n−rn​​=β>0,α=α(β).

It is stated as three facts: α\alphaα maps (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞) into (0,1)(0, 1)(0,1); each α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0, 1)α∈(0,1) has exactly one preimage β>0\beta > 0β>0; and for every β>0\beta > 0β>0 the two limits are equivalent.

Milestones

  1. (2.3)–(2.4): the steady-state solution of a general birth–death process, pn=p0∏i=1nλi−1/μip_n = p_0\prod_{i=1}^n \lambda_{i-1}/\mu_ipn​=p0​∏i=1n​λi−1​/μi​, and its existence if and only if 1+∑n≥1∏i=1nλi−1/μi<∞1 + \sum_{n\ge1}\prod_{i=1}^n \lambda_{i-1}/\mu_i < \infty1+∑n≥1​∏i=1n​λi−1​/μi​<∞.
  2. (2.9): M/M/1M/M/1M/M/1, pn=(1−ρ)ρnp_n = (1-\rho)\rho^npn​=(1−ρ)ρn, existing iff ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1.
  3. (2.31)–(2.32): the M/M/cM/M/cM/M/c law, existing iff λ/(cμ)<1\lambda/(c\mu) < 1λ/(cμ)<1.
  4. (2.33): Lq=rcρ p0/(c!(1−ρ)2)L_q = r^c\rho\,p_0/(c!(1-\rho)^2)Lq​=rcρp0​/(c!(1−ρ)2).
  5. (2.37)–(2.38): 1−∑n<cpn=C(c,r)1 - \sum_{n<c} p_n = C(c, r)1−∑n<c​pn​=C(c,r).
  6. (2.52)–(2.53): the M/M/c/cM/M/c/cM/M/c/c law and pc=B(c,r)p_c = B(c, r)pc​=B(c,r).
  7. (2.54): B(c,r)=rB(c−1,r)/(c+rB(c−1,r))B(c, r) = rB(c-1, r)/(c + rB(c-1, r))B(c,r)=rB(c−1,r)/(c+rB(c−1,r)), B(0,r)=1B(0, r) = 1B(0,r)=1.
  8. (2.55): C(c,r)=cB(c,r)/(c−r+rB(c,r))C(c, r) = cB(c, r)/(c - r + rB(c, r))C(c,r)=cB(c,r)/(c−r+rB(c,r)).
  9. (2.57): M/M/∞M/M/\inftyM/M/∞, pn=rne−r/n!p_n = r^n e^{-r}/n!pn​=rne−r/n!.

Significance

The results. Items 1–9 are the working formulas of Markovian capacity planning: a stationary law for each basic model and the measures read off from it. (2.54) and (2.55) are how BBB and CCC are computed in practice, since the factorials of the closed forms overflow for c>170c > 170c>170. The Halfin–Whitt theorem is the reason the rule c≈r+βrc \approx r + \beta\sqrt rc≈r+βr​ holds a fixed service level, and it is the entry point to the QED heavy-traffic literature (diffusion limits of many-server queues, Garnett–Mandelbaum–Reiman, Gamarnik–Momčilović).

Formalizing them. All results are classical and proved in the literature. The book states the Halfin–Whitt theorem without proof, and (2.54)–(2.55) are left to exercises. The formalization would supply machine-checked versions of the Erlang identities and of the Halfin–Whitt limit theorem. No Lean development of either was found on the platform when this mission was drafted. A related Erlang-B statement from Kelly and Yudovina is on the platform, stated with detailed balance on a finite state space.

Difficulty

The stationary laws are induction plus geometric and exponential series, and the Erlang identities are finite algebra. The difficulty is concentrated in the goal. C(n,rn)C(n, r_n)C(n,rn​) is a ratio of a Poisson-type tail to a truncated exponential sum in which both nnn and rnr_nrn​ grow. The naive route, substituting Stirling's formula term by term, fails: the sums have Θ(n)\Theta(\sqrt n)Θ(n​) significant terms, each of relative size exp⁡(−k2/2n)\exp(-k^2/2n)exp(−k2/2n), and the error has to be controlled uniformly over them. The converse direction also requires showing that α(⋅)\alpha(\cdot)α(⋅) is strictly monotone. Without that, convergence of C(n,rn)C(n, r_n)C(n,rn​) does not force convergence of (n−rn)/n(n - r_n)/\sqrt n(n−rn​)/n​.

Formalization scope

Rates are real sequences indexed by N\mathbb NN, and a steady-state solution is a real sequence with HasSum p 1, nonnegative entries, and the balance equations (2.1) exactly as printed (global balance, not detailed balance). Every "the steady-state solution is X" is stated in both halves: X is a steady-state solution, and every steady-state solution equals X; the book's existence conditions (ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1, λ/(cμ)<1\lambda/(c\mu) < 1λ/(cμ)<1, convergence of the series) are part of the statements. The M/M/c/cM/M/c/cM/M/c/c system is the N\mathbb NN-indexed process with λn=0\lambda_n = 0λn​=0 for n≥cn \ge cn≥c, as §2.5 sets it up; the statement records that states above ccc carry no mass.

The closed forms that are fixed in Lean: ∏i=1nλi−1/μi\prod_{i=1}^n \lambda_{i-1}/\mu_i∏i=1n​λi−1​/μi​ over Finset.Icc 1 n; B(c,r)B(c, r)B(c,r) and C(c,r)C(c, r)C(c,r) exactly as displayed above; ϕ\phiϕ = gaussianPDFReal 0 1, Φ\PhiΦ = the CDF of gaussianReal 0 1; Wq(0)=∑n=0c−1pnW_q(0) = \sum_{n=0}^{c-1} p_nWq​(0)=∑n=0c−1​pn​, as evaluated on p.69; Lq=∑n>c(n−c)pnL_q = \sum_{n > c}(n - c)p_nLq​=∑n>c​(n−c)pn​ as a convergent series.

C(c,r)C(c, r)C(c,r) is a total function in Lean, but its value for r≥cr \ge cr≥c carries no meaning. The goal assumes 0<rn<n0 < r_n < n0<rn​<n for n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, the book's standing condition ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1. A statement about some other function with the same limiting behaviour, or with BBB and CCC left abstract, would not be this mission. Neither would one-directional or existence-only versions of the stationary laws.

Not included: the waiting-time distributions (2.28) and (2.39), which need an FCFS waiting-time model with arrival-point probabilities; the M/M/c/KM/M/c/KM/M/c/K measures (2.45)–(2.48); finite-source and state-dependent models (§§2.8–2.10). Useful contributions beyond the milestones are Poisson tail estimates at the n\sqrt nn​ scale and monotonicity of α(β)\alpha(\beta)α(β). Both are reusable in other many-server heavy-traffic statements.

Selected references

  • D. Gross, J. F. Shortle, J. M. Thompson, C. M. Harris, Fundamentals of Queueing Theory, 4th ed., Wiley, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118625651
  • S. Halfin, W. Whitt, Heavy-traffic limits for queues with many exponential servers, Operations Research 29(3), 567–588, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.3.567
  • N. Gans, G. Koole, A. Mandelbaum, Telephone call centers: tutorial, review, and research prospects, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 5(2), 79–141, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.5.2.79.16071
  • A. K. Erlang, Solution of some problems in the theory of probabilities of significance in automatic telephone exchanges, Elektroteknikeren 13, 1917 (English translation in The Life and Works of A. K. Erlang, 1948).
  • F. P. Kelly, E. Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565363
12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationMechanism Design+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design VII: Crémer–McLean Full Surplus Extraction with Correlated TypesTextbook

Motivation

Bayesian mechanism design asks which collective decisions and payments a designer can implement when every agent holds private information, the type, drawn from a commonly known prior. Most of the classical theory (Myerson's optimal auction, the Myerson–Satterthwaite impossibility, the public goods results) assumes that types are independent. Once types are correlated, as they are when bidders' values share a common component, the theory changes in a way that is best read as a paradox: Crémer and McLean (Econometrica 1988) showed that a designer can then extract the entire surplus, leaving agents no information rents. This mission formalizes Chapter 6 of Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press 2015), which sets up Bayesian mechanism design in general, treats independent types, and proves the Crémer–McLean theorem, together with the one numbered result of Chapter 9, the impossibility theorem of Jehiel and Moldovanu for interdependent values.

Timeline of the results formalized here:

  • Rochet (1987) characterized implementable decision rules by cyclical monotonicity; Proposition 6.1 is its interim version for independent types.
  • Crémer and McLean (1988): under their condition on the prior, every direct mechanism can be made Bayesian incentive-compatible without changing its decision rule or interim payments (Proposition 6.4).
  • Krishna and Maenner (2001): revenue equivalence for convex type sets and convex utilities (Proposition 6.2).
  • Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001): with interdependent values, efficient decisions are generically not Bayesian implementable (Proposition 9.1).
  • Kosenok and Severinov (2008): an identifiability condition added to Crémer–McLean gives ex post budget balance as well (Proposition 6.6).

Setting

There are finitely many agents i∈Ii \in Ii∈I and a set AAA of alternatives. Agent iii has a type θi∈Θi\theta_i \in \Theta_iθi​∈Θi​ and utility ui(a,θi)−tiu_i(a,\theta_i) - t_iui​(a,θi​)−ti​ from alternative aaa and payment tit_iti​. Types θ=(θ1,…,θN)∈Θ=∏iΘi\theta = (\theta_1,\dots,\theta_N) \in \Theta = \prod_i \Theta_iθ=(θ1​,…,θN​)∈Θ=∏i​Θi​ are drawn from a common prior μ\muμ; μ(⋅∣θi)\mu(\cdot\mid\theta_i)μ(⋅∣θi​) is the conditional distribution of the others' types θ−i\theta_{-i}θ−i​ given θi\theta_iθi​. Types are independent if μ(⋅∣θi)\mu(\cdot\mid\theta_i)μ(⋅∣θi​) does not depend on θi\theta_iθi​.

A direct mechanism (q,t1,…,tN)(q, t_1,\dots,t_N)(q,t1​,…,tN​) is a decision rule q:Θ→Aq:\Theta\to Aq:Θ→A and payment rules ti:Θ→Rt_i:\Theta\to\mathbb Rti​:Θ→R. It is Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) if for every iii and all θi,θi′\theta_i,\theta_i'θi​,θi′​,

∫Θ−iui(q(θi,θ−i),θi)−ti(θi,θ−i) dμ(θ−i∣θi) ≥ ∫Θ−iui(q(θi′,θ−i),θi)−ti(θi′,θ−i) dμ(θ−i∣θi).\int_{\Theta_{-i}} u_i(q(\theta_i,\theta_{-i}),\theta_i) - t_i(\theta_i,\theta_{-i})\,d\mu(\theta_{-i}\mid\theta_i) \ \ge\ \int_{\Theta_{-i}} u_i(q(\theta_i',\theta_{-i}),\theta_i) - t_i(\theta_i',\theta_{-i})\,d\mu(\theta_{-i}\mid\theta_i).∫Θ−i​​ui​(q(θi​,θ−i​),θi​)−ti​(θi​,θ−i​)dμ(θ−i​∣θi​) ≥ ∫Θ−i​​ui​(q(θi′​,θ−i​),θi​)−ti​(θi′​,θ−i​)dμ(θ−i​∣θi​).

The interim decision rule Qi(θi)Q_i(\theta_i)Qi​(θi​) is the distribution of q(θi,θ−i)q(\theta_i,\theta_{-i})q(θi​,θ−i​) given θi\theta_iθi​, and the interim expected payment is Ti(θi)=∫ti(θi,θ−i) dμ(θ−i∣θi)T_i(\theta_i) = \int t_i(\theta_i,\theta_{-i})\,d\mu(\theta_{-i}\mid\theta_i)Ti​(θi​)=∫ti​(θi​,θ−i​)dμ(θ−i​∣θi​). A mechanism is ex post budget balanced if ∑iti(θ)=0\sum_i t_i(\theta) = 0∑i​ti​(θ)=0 for every θ\thetaθ, and ex ante budget balanced if ∫Θ∑iti dμ=0\int_\Theta \sum_i t_i\,d\mu = 0∫Θ​∑i​ti​dμ=0.

In §6.4 every Θi\Theta_iΘi​ is finite and μ(θ)>0\mu(\theta) > 0μ(θ)>0 for every θ\thetaθ. The prior satisfies the Crémer–McLean condition if for no agent iii and type θi\theta_iθi​ there are weights λ≥0\lambda \ge 0λ≥0 on Θi∖{θi}\Theta_i\setminus\{\theta_i\}Θi​∖{θi​} with

μ(θ−i∣θi)=∑θi′≠θiλ(θi′) μ(θ−i∣θi′)for all θ−i.\mu(\theta_{-i}\mid\theta_i) = \sum_{\theta_i'\ne\theta_i}\lambda(\theta_i')\,\mu(\theta_{-i}\mid\theta_i')\quad\text{for all }\theta_{-i}.μ(θ−i​∣θi​)=θi′​=θi​∑​λ(θi′​)μ(θ−i​∣θi′​)for all θ−i​.

Identifiability requires that for every full-support distribution ν≠μ\nu\ne\muν=μ some agent's type θi\theta_iθi​ has a belief ν(⋅∣θi)\nu(\cdot\mid\theta_i)ν(⋅∣θi​) that is not a nonnegative combination of the beliefs μ(⋅∣θi′)\mu(\cdot\mid\theta_i')μ(⋅∣θi′​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Crémer–McLean (Proposition 6.4)

If μ\muμ satisfies the Crémer–McLean condition, then for every direct mechanism (q,t)(q,t)(q,t) there is a BIC direct mechanism (q,t′)(q,t')(q,t′) with

∑θ−iti(θi,θ−i) μ(θ−i∣θi)=∑θ−iti′(θi,θ−i) μ(θ−i∣θi)for all i,θi.\sum_{\theta_{-i}} t_i(\theta_i,\theta_{-i})\,\mu(\theta_{-i}\mid\theta_i) = \sum_{\theta_{-i}} t_i'(\theta_i,\theta_{-i})\,\mu(\theta_{-i}\mid\theta_i)\quad\text{for all } i,\theta_i.θ−i​∑​ti​(θi​,θ−i​)μ(θ−i​∣θi​)=θ−i​∑​ti′​(θi​,θ−i​)μ(θ−i​∣θi​)for all i,θi​.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 6.1 (independent types): qqq is part of a BIC mechanism iff it is interim cyclically monotone, ∑κ=1k−1(∫Aui(a,θiκ+1) dQi(θiκ)−∫Aui(a,θiκ) dQi(θiκ))≤0\sum_{\kappa=1}^{k-1}\big(\int_A u_i(a,\theta_i^{\kappa+1})\,dQ_i(\theta_i^\kappa) - \int_A u_i(a,\theta_i^\kappa)\,dQ_i(\theta_i^\kappa)\big)\le 0∑κ=1k−1​(∫A​ui​(a,θiκ+1​)dQi​(θiκ​)−∫A​ui​(a,θiκ​)dQi​(θiκ​))≤0 for every cycle θik=θi1\theta_i^k = \theta_i^1θik​=θi1​.
  2. Proposition 6.2 (independent types, convex type sets, convex utilities): two BIC mechanisms with Qi′=QiQ_i' = Q_iQi′​=Qi​ have Ti′=Ti+τiT_i' = T_i + \tau_iTi′​=Ti​+τi​.
  3. Proposition 6.3 (independent types): every ex ante budget balanced mechanism has an equivalent ex post budget balanced one.
  4. Proposition 6.5 (Farkas's alternative), already proved on the platform as Polyhedral.farkas_lemma.
  5. Proposition 6.6 (Kosenok–Severinov): under Crémer–McLean and identifiability, every ex ante budget balanced mechanism has an equivalent BIC and ex post budget balanced one.
  6. Proposition 9.1 (Jehiel–Moldovanu): in the linear interdependent-values model, under a regularity condition on first best rules and the weight condition αaii/αbii≠∑jαaji/∑jαbji\alpha^i_{ai}/\alpha^i_{bi}\ne\sum_j\alpha^i_{aj}/\sum_j\alpha^i_{bj}αaii​/αbii​=∑j​αaji​/∑j​αbji​ for some i,a,bi,a,bi,a,b, no first best direct mechanism is BIC. It uses its own model (§9.3) and is not on the goal's proof path.

Significance

The Crémer–McLean theorem says that, with correlated finite types, incentive compatibility imposes essentially no constraint: every decision rule and every interim payment rule can be implemented. In a single-unit auction this gives full surplus extraction. The result is the benchmark against which the literature on risk aversion, limited liability, collusion and the genericity of priors (Robert 1991, Laffont–Martimort 2000, Heifetz–Neeman 2006) measures its departures, and Proposition 6.6 extends it to budget-balanced mechanisms, which is what bilateral trade and public goods applications need. Propositions 6.1–6.3 are the independent-types counterpart that the correlated case breaks: they show why revenue equivalence and the ex ante/ex post budget-balance equivalence hold there and fail here. Proposition 9.1 shows the opposite failure, for interdependent values, where efficient decisions cannot be implemented even without participation or budget constraints.

All results are proved in the literature (Kosenok–Severinov's proof is omitted in the book). Apart from Farkas's alternative (Proposition 6.5), which is proved on the platform, none of them is formalized in Mathlib or on the platform; the platform's other mechanism design results (dominant-strategy results in a valuation model, revenue equivalence for symmetric independent auctions) do not cover correlated types.

Difficulty

For the goal the difficulty is the uniformity of the construction: a single payment adjustment must make truth-telling optimal against every possible deviation of every type of every agent, while leaving each type's expected payment unchanged. The obvious scoring-rule adjustment, charging −ln⁡μ(θ−i∣θi′)-\ln\mu(\theta_{-i}\mid\theta_i')−lnμ(θ−i​∣θi′​), changes interim payments, and removing that change is where the Crémer–McLean condition enters. For Proposition 6.2 the envelope argument must handle convex type sets that are not open and utilities that are only convex, not differentiable. For Proposition 9.1 the obvious argument differentiates interim utility twice; the proposition does not assume that interim utility is twice differentiable, so that regularity has to be derived from the hypotheses on the interim probabilities.

Formalization scope

Three definition files carry the three models. Independent types (§6.2–6.3): type sets are arbitrary measurable spaces, the prior is the product of probability measures ρi\rho_iρi​, and interim quantities are integrals against it. Finite correlated types (§6.4): finite type sets, a prior μ:Θ→R\mu:\Theta\to\mathbb Rμ:Θ→R with μ(θ)>0\mu(\theta)>0μ(θ)>0 and ∑θμ(θ)=1\sum_\theta\mu(\theta)=1∑θ​μ(θ)=1, and conditional beliefs μ(θ−i∣θi)=μ(θ)/μ(θi)\mu(\theta_{-i}\mid\theta_i) = \mu(\theta)/\mu(\theta_i)μ(θ−i​∣θi​)=μ(θ)/μ(θi​); the alternative set AAA is arbitrary. Interdependent values (§9.3): finite AAA, signals in [0,1]A[0,1]^A[0,1]A with positive densities, independent across agents, linear utilities with nonzero weights αaij\alpha^j_{ai}αaij​.

Committed conventions and explicit formulas:

  • The Crémer–McLean condition uses nonnegative weights without a sum-to-one constraint, as Definition 6.7 prints it.
  • "Equivalent" in Propositions 6.4 and 6.6 means the same decision rule and the same interim expected payments at truthful reports, as Proposition 6.4 states; in Proposition 6.3 it is the report-by-report notion, which under independence is equality of the interim payment rules TiT_iTi​.
  • Proposition 6.2 adds continuity of ui(a,⋅)u_i(a,\cdot)ui​(a,⋅) on Θi\Theta_iΘi​, and Proposition 6.3 adds at least two agents; without them the printed statements are false.
  • Measurability, which the book omits throughout, is made explicit: decision rules are measurable, and the payment sections and utilities are integrable against the relevant interim distributions.
  • In Proposition 9.1 the partial derivatives are derivatives within the closed cube [0,1]K[0,1]^K[0,1]K, and the weight condition is the displayed ratio inequality.

A trivializing formalization of the goal, one that proves it only for mechanisms that are already incentive compatible, or with a payment rule that is not a function of the reported type profile, or with "equivalent" weakened to "some BIC mechanism exists", is ruled out: the statement quantifies over every direct mechanism and fixes both the decision rule and every interim payment.

Reusable infrastructure: finite conditional expectations under a full-support prior, the Crémer–McLean and identifiability conditions, and the interim model with product priors. Proofs of any milestone and of the goal, including via the Farkas reference, are welcome.

Selected references

  • T. Börgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
  • J. Crémer and R. P. McLean, "Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions", Econometrica 56(6), 1988. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913096
  • G. Kosenok and S. Severinov, "Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus", Journal of Economic Theory 140(1), 2008.
  • P. Jehiel and B. Moldovanu, "Efficient design with interdependent valuations", Econometrica 69(5), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00237
  • V. Krishna and E. Maenner, "Convex potentials with an application to mechanism design", Econometrica 69(4), 2001. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00225
  • J.-C. Rochet, "A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context", Journal of Mathematical Economics 16(2), 1987. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90007-3
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Bellman's Dynamic Programming VIII: Multi-Stage Games, Games of Survival and the Extended Min-Max TheoremTextbook

Why multi-stage games

Chapter X of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks edition 2010, DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f) carries the functional-equation method of the earlier chapters from one-player decision processes to two-player zero-sum games that are played over many stages. At each stage the two players make simultaneous choices, and those choices change the state in which the next stage is played. Games of survival are the standard example. They generalize the gambler's ruin: two players with finite resources play until one of them is ruined. The same framework is the discrete-time form of what Shapley (1953) called stochastic games. It underlies pursuit games, attrition models and the later theory of dynamic games in operations research and economics.

The chapter builds on von Neumann's min-max theorem (1928), which Bellman assumes without proof (§ 3, Eq. (3.4)). It proves three kinds of result: existence and uniqueness for the general multi-stage game equation (§§ 11–16), existence and uniqueness for games of survival with integer payoffs (§ 19), and an extended min-max theorem for ratios of bilinear forms (§ 23). Bellman proposes the ratio as a criterion for non-zero-sum games.

Setting

A matrix game is given by a real M×NM\times NM×N matrix A=(aij)A=(a_{ij})A=(aij​). Player AAA chooses row iii with probability pip_ipi​ and player BBB chooses column jjj with probability qjq_jqj​; ppp and qqq are distribution vectors (points of the standard simplex). The expected return to AAA is

EA(p,q)=∑i,jaij pi qj.E_A(p,q)=\sum_{i,j}a_{ij}\,p_i\,q_j .EA​(p,q)=i,j∑​aij​pi​qj​.

The game has value vvv when max⁡pmin⁡qEA=v=min⁡qmax⁡pEA\max_p\min_q E_A=v=\min_q\max_p E_Amaxp​minq​EA​=v=minq​maxp​EA​, all extrema attained. In the Lean development this is IsMaxMinMinMaxValue, and the bilinear form is bilin.

In the general multi-stage game (§ 12) the state is a pair of vectors P∈D⊆RnP\in D\subseteq\mathbb R^nP∈D⊆Rn, P′∈D′⊆Rn′P'\in D'\subseteq\mathbb R^{n'}P′∈D′⊆Rn′ with norms ∥P∥=∑i∣Pi∣\|P\|=\sum_i|P_i|∥P∥=∑i​∣Pi​∣. In state (P,P′)(P,P')(P,P′), AAA chooses uuu in a choice domain S(P,P′)S(P,P')S(P,P′) and BBB chooses vvv in S′(P,P′)S'(P,P')S′(P,P′). AAA receives R(u,v)R(u,v)R(u,v), and play continues from the state T(P,P′;u,v)T(P,P';u,v)T(P,P′;u,v), T′(P,P′;u,v)T'(P,P';u,v)T′(P,P′;u,v) with weight h(P,P′;u,v)h(P,P';u,v)h(P,P′;u,v). Mixed strategies GGG, G′G'G′ are probability measures on the choice domains. The multi-stage game equation is

f(P,P′)=max⁡Gmin⁡G′∬[R(u,v)+h(P,P′;u,v) f(T,T′)] dG(u) dG′(v)=min⁡G′max⁡G[ ⋯ ].f(P,P')=\max_G\min_{G'}\iint\big[R(u,v)+h(P,P';u,v)\,f(T,T')\big]\,dG(u)\,dG'(v)=\min_{G'}\max_G[\ \cdots\ ].f(P,P′)=Gmax​G′min​∬[R(u,v)+h(P,P′;u,v)f(T,T′)]dG(u)dG′(v)=G′min​Gmax​[ ⋯ ].

A game of survival with integer payoffs (§ 19) has one integer state xxx, the resources of AAA out of a fixed total ddd. AAA is ruined at x≤0x\le0x≤0 and wins at x≥dx\ge dx≥d. At each stage the players play the 2×22\times22×2 game with matrix (−1ac−b)\begin{pmatrix}-1&a\\c&-b\end{pmatrix}(−1c​a−b​), whose entries are the transfers to AAA.

Formalization targets

Goal: the extended min-max theorem (Chapter X, Theorem 7)

For real matrices A=(aij)A=(a_{ij})A=(aij​), B=(bij)B=(b_{ij})B=(bij​) with ∑i,jbijpiqj≥d>0\sum_{i,j}b_{ij}p_iq_j\ge d>0∑i,j​bij​pi​qj​≥d>0 for all distribution vectors p,qp,qp,q,

max⁡pmin⁡q∑i,jaijpiqj∑i,jbijpiqj=min⁡qmax⁡p∑i,jaijpiqj∑i,jbijpiqj.\max_p\min_q\frac{\sum_{i,j}a_{ij}p_iq_j}{\sum_{i,j}b_{ij}p_iq_j}=\min_q\max_p\frac{\sum_{i,j}a_{ij}p_iq_j}{\sum_{i,j}b_{ij}p_iq_j}.pmax​qmin​∑i,j​bij​pi​qj​∑i,j​aij​pi​qj​​=qmin​pmax​∑i,j​bij​pi​qj​∑i,j​aij​pi​qj​​.

It is the chapter's final result, and its statement involves only finite matrices.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (3.4), von Neumann's theorem VA=VBV_A=V_BVA​=VB​. It is already on the platform as AGT.zero_sum_minimax (existence of a saddle point) and enters as a reference.
  2. Lemma 1: the value of a one-stage game moves by at most the largest change of its kernel, ∣L(f)−L1(F)∣≤max⁡u,v [ ∣R−R1∣+∣h∣ ∣f(T,T′)−F(T,T′)∣ ]|L(f)-L_1(F)|\le\max_{u,v}\,[\,|R-R_1|+|h|\,|f(T,T')-F(T,T')|\,]∣L(f)−L1​(F)∣≤maxu,v​[∣R−R1​∣+∣h∣∣f(T,T′)−F(T,T′)∣].
  3. Theorem 1: under hypotheses (4a)–(4e), the multi-stage game equation has a unique solution among functions continuous on D×D′D\times D'D×D′ that vanish at the origin, and it is the uniform limit on bounded regions of the successive approximations.
  4. Theorem 3: the successive approximations converge from any admissible initial function.
  5. Theorem 4: stability, ∣f(P,P′)−F(P,P′)∣≤∑n≥0Δ(knc)|f(P,P')-F(P,P')|\le\sum_{n\ge0}\Delta(k^nc)∣f(P,P′)−F(P,P′)∣≤∑n≥0​Δ(knc).
  6. Theorem 5: the game of survival equation with boundary values 000 and 111 has a unique solution with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1].

Significance

Theorem 7 gives a value for ratio games, the games in which a player maximizes a return per unit of a resource consumed. Bellman uses it to give a rationale for the play of non-zero-sum games (§ 24) and to derive the approximate equation (22.4) for non-zero-sum games of survival. Chapter XI, Theorem 5 generalizes it to Markovian decision processes. Theorem 1 is the existence and uniqueness result that justifies replacing an infinite game by its functional equation, and Theorems 3 and 4 make that equation usable for computation and perturbation. Theorem 5 is an early uniqueness theorem for a discrete stochastic game with absorbing boundaries.

None of these statements is formalized on the platform. Von Neumann's theorem is (AGT.zero_sum_minimax, and Sion's theorem as FamousTheorems.sion_minimax_theorem). Theorem 7 is a classical result: with a positive denominator the ratio is quasiconcave in ppp and quasiconvex in qqq. This mission asks for a machine-checked proof of the book's statement, by Bellman's route or by any other. Theorems 1, 3 and 4 need a formal theory of games whose mixed strategies are probability measures on moving compact choice domains. No such theory is on the platform yet.

Difficulty

The ratio in Theorem 7 is not bilinear, and in general it is neither concave in ppp nor convex in qqq, so neither von Neumann's theorem nor a concave-convex min-max theorem applies to it directly. For Theorem 1, the contraction argument needs each one-stage game to have a value and the value to depend continuously on the state. That requires a min-max theorem for continuous games on compact sets, together with continuity of the value when the choice domains move. In Theorem 5, existence follows from monotone iteration. The uniqueness step is the hard part: the operator is not a contraction in the sup norm, and a second solution must be ruled out even at states where the optimal mixed strategies are degenerate.

Formalization scope

  • Distribution vectors are points of stdSimplex ℝ ι for nonempty finite types. "Max-min equals min-max" always asserts attainment (IsGreatest/IsLeast) and never uses sSup/sInf, which return 000 on empty or unbounded sets. Theorem 7 must not assume a saddle point; its only hypothesis is the bound on the denominator.
  • States are Fin n → ℝ with the ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1 norm of Eq. (12.1). Choice domains are nonempty compact sets (NonemptyCompacts), and mixed strategies are probability measures of full mass on them. "Vary continuously" in (4b), which the book does not define, is read as continuity in Mathlib's topology on nonempty compact sets (for a metric space, the topology of the Hausdorff distance).
  • The maxima w(c)w(c)w(c) of (4d) and Δ(c)\Delta(c)Δ(c) of Theorem 4 are expressed through majorants, which is equivalent to the book's condition. k≥0k\ge0k≥0 is stated explicitly. In Lemma 1 the kernels are assumed measurable and bounded on S×S′S\times S'S×S′ so that the integrals exist, and each game having a value is a hypothesis, as in Bellman's footnote 4.
  • Theorem 3's "converges" is stated as uniform convergence on bounded regions, the mode of Theorem 1, whose proof Theorem 3 repeats. Theorem 4's unspecified ccc is any c≥∥P∥+∥P′∥c\ge\|P\|+\|P'\|c≥∥P∥+∥P′∥. The book's p. 301 prints the first min-max of Theorem 4 with the subscripts GGG, G′G'G′ interchanged; the equation used is that of Theorem 1.
  • Theorem 5 adds the implicit d≥1d\ge1d≥1: for d≤0d\le0d≤0 the boundary conditions contradict each other. The state is an integer and f:Z→Rf:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb Rf:Z→R.
  • Taking the choice domains constant would trivialize Theorem 1: condition (4d) would then force R≡0R\equiv0R≡0 on them. The choice domains therefore depend on the state.
  • Not included: Theorem 2 (optimal strategies of the infinite game, which needs a model of the game's plays), Theorem 6 (non-zero-sum survival; the boundary conditions (21.3) do not cover all states, see the moderation notes).

Contributions of reusable infrastructure are welcome: the min-max theorem for continuous games on compact sets (Eq. (4.2)), continuity of the value in the choice domains, and value iteration for contracting game operators.

Selected references

  • R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics, 2010. DOI 10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • J. von Neumann, Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele, Mathematische Annalen 100, 1928. DOI 10.1007/BF01448847
  • L. S. Shapley, Stochastic games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 39, 1953. DOI 10.1073/pnas.39.10.1095
  • M. Sion, On general minimax theorems, Pacific Journal of Mathematics 8, 1958. DOI 10.2140/pjm.1958.8.171
  • I. L. Glicksberg, A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point theorem, with application to Nash equilibrium points, Proceedings of the AMS 3, 1952. DOI 10.1090/S0002-9939-1952-0046638-5
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Bellman's Dynamic Programming III: Index Rules for the Stochastic Gold-Mining ProcessTextbook

Motivation

Chapter II of Richard Bellman's Dynamic Programming (Princeton University Press, 1957) treats the stochastic gold-mining process, the first stochastic multi-stage decision process of the book whose optimal policy can be written down in closed form. There Bellman introduces decision regions, the sets of states at which a given first choice is optimal, and where he obtains an index rule: at every state, compute one number per alternative and choose the largest. The same kind of rule was later developed in general form as the Gittins index for multi-armed bandits (Gittins 1979), and the gold-mining process is an early instance of what that literature calls a deteriorating bandit, in which each alternative's index can only decrease when it is used.

Bellman first described the process in his 1954 survey The theory of dynamic programming, with the two-mine index rule stated as Eq. (8.3), and it appears on Prove2Me in a mission on that paper. The book gives the full chapter: existence and uniqueness, the rule for two mines, its extension to several outcomes per use and to any number of mines, the finite-horizon process, and a stability estimate.

Setting

Two mines, Anaconda and Bonanza, hold amounts of gold x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 and y≥0y \ge 0y≥0. A single machine is used in one mine at a time. Used in Anaconda, it mines the fraction r1r_1r1​ of the gold there and stays in working order with probability p1p_1p1​, or is destroyed without mining anything with probability 1−p11 - p_11−p1​. Bonanza has the corresponding data p2p_2p2​ and r2r_2r2​. Before each use the operator chooses a mine (choice A or B), and the process stops when the machine is destroyed. The aim is to maximize the expected total amount of gold mined.

The expected return f(x,y)f(x, y)f(x,y) under an optimal policy satisfies the functional equation

f(x,y)=max⁡[ Af(x,y),  Bf(x,y) ],x,y≥0,(5.1)f(x,y) = \max\Big[\,A_f(x,y),\; B_f(x,y)\,\Big], \qquad x, y \ge 0, \tag{5.1}f(x,y)=max[Af​(x,y),Bf​(x,y)],x,y≥0,(5.1)

where Af(x,y)=p1[r1x+f((1−r1)x, y)]A_f(x,y) = p_1\big[r_1x + f((1-r_1)x,\,y)\big]Af​(x,y)=p1​[r1​x+f((1−r1​)x,y)] is the return of an A-choice followed by optimal continuation and Bf(x,y)=p2[r2y+f(x, (1−r2)y)]B_f(x,y) = p_2\big[r_2y + f(x,\,(1-r_2)y)\big]Bf​(x,y)=p2​[r2​y+f(x,(1−r2​)y)] that of a B-choice. The NNN-stage returns are f1(x,y)=max⁡(p1r1x, p2r2y)f_1(x,y) = \max(p_1r_1x,\ p_2r_2y)f1​(x,y)=max(p1​r1​x, p2​r2​y) and fN+1=max⁡(AfN,BfN)f_{N+1} = \max(A_{f_N}, B_{f_N})fN+1​=max(AfN​​,BfN​​). The A-region of a value function is the set of points of the closed quadrant where the A-branch attains the maximum; the B-region is defined in the same way.

In the generalization, a use of mine iii has KKK outcomes: outcome kkk occurs with probability pikp_{ik}pik​, yields cikxic_{ik}x_icik​xi​ and leaves cik′xi=(1−cik)xic'_{ik}x_i = (1-c_{ik})x_icik′​xi​=(1−cik​)xi​ in the mine, and 1−∑kpik1 - \sum_k p_{ik}1−∑k​pik​ is the probability that the machine is destroyed. With nnn mines the equation is

f(x1,…,xn)=max⁡i∑k=1Kpik[cikxi+f(x1,…,cik′xi,…,xn)].(4)f(x_1,\dots,x_n) = \max_i \sum_{k=1}^{K} p_{ik}\big[c_{ik}x_i + f(x_1,\dots,c'_{ik}x_i,\dots,x_n)\big]. \tag{4}f(x1​,…,xn​)=imax​k=1∑K​pik​[cik​xi​+f(x1​,…,cik′​xi​,…,xn​)].(4)

"The solution" of an equation always means its unique solution in the class of functions bounded in every rectangle 0≤x≤Xˉ0 \le x \le \bar X0≤x≤Xˉ, 0≤y≤Yˉ0 \le y \le \bar Y0≤y≤Yˉ (or every box 0≤xi≤Xˉi0 \le x_i \le \bar X_i0≤xi​≤Xˉi​), per Bellman's footnote 7.

Formalization targets

Goal: Chapter II, Theorem 4 (the index rule for nnn mines)

Under pik≥0p_{ik} \ge 0pik​≥0, ∑kpik<1\sum_k p_{ik} < 1∑k​pik​<1, 0≤cik≤10 \le c_{ik} \le 10≤cik​≤1, cik+cik′=1c_{ik} + c'_{ik} = 1cik​+cik′​=1, equation (4) has a unique solution bounded on boxes, and at every state xxx any index maximizing

Di(x)=∑kpikcik1−∑kpik  xiD_i(x) = \frac{\sum_{k} p_{ik}c_{ik}}{1-\sum_{k} p_{ik}}\;x_iDi​(x)=1−∑k​pik​∑k​pik​cik​​xi​

attains the maximum in (4). Ties among the maximizers may be broken arbitrarily.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1: for ∣pi∣<1|p_i| < 1∣pi​∣<1 and 0≤ri<10 \le r_i < 10≤ri​<1, (5.1) has a unique solution bounded in every rectangle, and it is continuous on the closed quadrant.
  2. Theorem 2: for 0≤pi<10 \le p_i < 10≤pi​<1, 0≤ri≤10 \le r_i \le 10≤ri​≤1, the solution takes the A-branch when p1r1x/(1−p1)>p2r2y/(1−p2)p_1r_1x/(1-p_1) > p_2r_2y/(1-p_2)p1​r1​x/(1−p1​)>p2​r2​y/(1−p2​), the B-branch when the reverse inequality holds, and both on equality.
  3. Theorem 3: the same rule for two mines with KKK outcomes per use.
  4. Theorem 5: for each NNN, the NNN-stage process has exactly two decision regions: a sector along the xxx-axis where A is optimal and a sector along the yyy-axis where B is optimal, separated by a ray through the origin.
  5. Theorem 6: as NNN grows, the regions of fNf_NfN​ move monotonically, and from some N0N_0N0​ on they coincide with those of fff.
  6. Theorem 7: if ggg solves (5.1) with an added term hhh, then ∣f−g∣≤max⁡R∣h∣/q|f - g| \le \max_R|h|/q∣f−g∣≤maxR​∣h∣/q on every rectangle RRR, where q=min⁡(1−p1,1−p2)q = \min(1-p_1, 1-p_2)q=min(1−p1​,1−p2​).

Significance

The index rule reduces the choice among nnn mines to computing nnn numbers. Each one depends only on its own mine, as the ratio of immediate expected gain to immediate expected loss. Without the theorem, an optimal policy for the NNN-stage process is a word in nnn letters whose number of candidates grows like nNn^NnN. The finite-horizon theorems show that the same rule is exactly optimal for every horizon beyond a finite N0N_0N0​, and the stability theorem bounds how much the solution moves when the equation is perturbed.

Theorem 2's content is also the target of the 1954-paper mission, where it is stated for the supremum of expected returns over choice sequences. Those statements (BellmanTheoryDP.GoldMining.gold_mining_decision_rule, …optimal_return_functional_equation) are included here as reference items. They concern a different object: the book's theorems are about the unique bounded solution of (5.1), and the two coincide once (5.1) is known to characterize the optimal return. None of the chapter's results has a machine-checked proof on the platform yet. The nnn-mine rule (Theorem 4) and the finite-horizon results (Theorems 5 and 6) are not stated anywhere on the platform.

Difficulty

The equation for the boundary between the regions involves the unknown function fff, so equating the two branches of (5.1) does not by itself locate the boundary. Comparing the orders "A then B" and "B then A" determines the index line, but only on the assumption that there are just two regions. Bellman's Figure 1 shows why that assumption carries real content: homogeneity alone only makes the regions unions of sectors, which could alternate. The assumption is not automatic either. In § 13 a third, compromise choice is added, and a counterexample shows that the three-choice problem need not have the analogous three-sector structure. For the finite-horizon process the boundary ray of fNf_NfN​ generally differs from the index line, and Theorems 5 and 6 are statements about how it differs.

Formalization scope

Namespace BellmanDP.GoldMining. Values are real functions ℝ → ℝ → ℝ (two mines) or (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ (n mines); equations are imposed only on the closed quadrant or orthant, and uniqueness means agreement there. Mines are Fin n with n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 added (with no mine the maximum in (4) is empty). Outcomes are Fin K (Theorem 3's NNN). A maximum over two branches is max, and a maximum over mines is encoded as "every alternative is at most f(x)f(x)f(x) and one equals it". The class "bounded in any rectangle" is BoundedOnRectangles, and for nnn mines it is BoundedOnBoxes. The NNN-stage returns are goldIter N, with goldIter 0 = 0 so that goldIter 1 is the book's f1f_1f1​.

Choices made explicit:

  • Theorem 1 keeps the book's signed range ∣pi∣<1|p_i| < 1∣pi​∣<1 (footnote 2), while Theorems 2, 5, 6 and 7 use the range of § 8 and Theorem 2, 0≤pi<10 \le p_i < 10≤pi​<1, 0≤ri≤10 \le r_i \le 10≤ri​≤1.
  • The goal asserts existence and uniqueness of the bounded solution of (4) together with the index rule. This is how "the solution" is meant in the book; the extension of Theorem 1 to (4) is not a separate numbered result.
  • The goal's conclusion is the book's: a maximizer of DDD is optimal. It does not also assert that the other indices are suboptimal.
  • Theorem 5's printed statement is only "there are two decision regions". It is formalized as the ray-separation statement its proof establishes, and is titled as the precise reading. Theorem 6's "converge in a monotone fashion" is formalized as monotonicity of the regions as sets, in one of the two directions.
  • Theorem 7 adds the hypothesis that hhh is bounded in every rectangle, which is what gives the perturbed equation a solution in the class. max⁡R∣h∣\max_R|h|maxR​∣h∣ is expressed through any bound MMM of ∣h∣|h|∣h∣ on RRR.

A statement of the index rule that assumes the index policy's return satisfies (5.1) and calls it "the solution" without the bounded-class uniqueness would prove nothing about optimality. Here every theorem is about solutions in the bounded class, whose uniqueness is Theorem 1 (and part of the goal).

Contraction estimates on rectangles (Theorems 1 and 7) are reusable across the other functional-equation chapters of this series. Proofs of the goal via general index theory are welcome, provided they discharge the statements as written.

Selected references

  • Richard Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957; Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics ed., 2010, Chapter II, pp. 61–80. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nxcw0f
  • Richard Bellman, The theory of dynamic programming, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 60 (1954), 503–515. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9904-1954-09848-8
  • J. C. Gittins, Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 41 (1979), 148–177. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1979.tb01068.x
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VIII: Bounds on Optimal Stock AllocationsTextbook

Motivation

Military and commercial service parts systems keep repairable parts at a central depot warehouse and at a set of operating bases. Chapter 10 of Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) turns from the planning models of the earlier chapters to execution. Each period, the stock that is at the depot or arriving there must be divided among the bases. The planner knows what is already in the pipeline and faces random demand at each base. The chapter's models are solved in a rolling-horizon manner. Each period's decisions are the first step of an optimal plan over a short horizon. That plan has to be computable at scale, for thousands of items and dozens of bases.

What makes this possible is a structural fact. In an optimal allocation, the cumulative stock sent to a base never exceeds what a single-period newsvendor problem at that base would ask for. This bound shrinks the allocation integer programs to linear programs of manageable size. This mission formalizes that bound and the facts it rests on.

Setting

Fix one item. Time is counted in whole periods t=0,1,2,…t = 0, 1, 2, \dotst=0,1,2,…, and JJJ is the finite set of bases. For each base jjj:

  • Ti0T_{i0}Ti0​ is the repair lead time, so shipments are decided in periods t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​;
  • TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ and TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ are the regular and expedited transportation times from the depot to base jjj, integers with 1≤Tije<Tijr1 \le T^e_{ij} < T^r_{ij}1≤Tije​<Tijr​;
  • S~i0t\tilde S_{i0t}S~i0t​ is the known cumulative supply at the depot through period ttt (stock on hand plus arrivals already in the pipeline), and S~ijt\tilde S_{ijt}S~ijt​ the known cumulative supply at base jjj. The latter is constant for t≥Tijrt \ge T^r_{ij}t≥Tijr​, since nothing not yet shipped can arrive earlier than TijrT^r_{ij}Tijr​ by regular transport;
  • XijtX_{ijt}Xijt​ is the cumulative demand at base jjj through period ttt, a nonnegative integer random variable, nondecreasing in ttt, with finite mean;
  • hij>0h_{ij} > 0hij​>0, bij>0b_{ij} > 0bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0 are the incremental holding, shortage and expediting costs.

If SijtS_{ijt}Sijt​ units have arrived at base jjj by period ttt, the expected cost of that period is

Gijt(S)=hij E[S−Xijt]++bij E[Xijt−S]+,G_{ijt}(S) = h_{ij}\,E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ + b_{ij}\,E[X_{ijt} - S]^+,Gijt​(S)=hij​E[S−Xijt​]++bij​E[Xijt​−S]+,

and stock left at the end of the horizon costs

Qij(S)=hij∑t>Tijr+Ti0E[S−Xijt]+.Q_{ij}(S) = h_{ij}\sum_{t > T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}} E[S - X_{ijt}]^+ .Qij​(S)=hij​t>Tijr​+Ti0​∑​E[S−Xijt​]+.

The stock allocation model SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ chooses nonnegative integer regular shipments yijtry^r_{ijt}yijtr​, t=0,…,Ti0t = 0, \dots, T_{i0}t=0,…,Ti0​, with cumulative shipments never exceeding cumulative depot supply. The cumulative stock at base jjj is Sijt=S~ij(Tijr−1)+∑t′≤t−Tijryijt′rS_{ijt} = \tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} + \sum_{t' \le t - T^r_{ij}} y^r_{ijt'}Sijt​=S~ij(Tijr​−1)​+∑t′≤t−Tijr​​yijt′r​, and the model minimizes ∑j{∑t=TijrTijr+Ti0Gijt(Sijt)+Qij(Sij(Tijr+Ti0))}\sum_j \{\sum_{t=T^r_{ij}}^{T^r_{ij}+T_{i0}} G_{ijt}(S_{ijt}) + Q_{ij}(S_{ij(T^r_{ij}+T_{i0})})\}∑j​{∑t=Tijr​Tijr​+Ti0​​Gijt​(Sijt​)+Qij​(Sij(Tijr​+Ti0​)​)}. The extended model ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ adds expedited shipments yijtey^e_{ijt}yijte​, which arrive after TijeT^e_{ij}Tije​ periods at an extra cost eije_{ij}eij​ per unit.

The constrained newsvendor problem CNijt\mathrm{CN}_{ijt}CNijt​ minimizes Gijt(S)G_{ijt}(S)Gijt​(S) over integers S≥S~ijtS \ge \tilde S_{ijt}S≥S~ijt​. Its largest optimal solution is written S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 15 (p. 237)

In every optimal solution of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​, for every base jjj and every t∈[Tijr,Tijr+Ti0]t \in [T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}]t∈[Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​],

S~ij(Tijr−1)  ≤  Sijt∗  ≤  S^ijt.\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)} \;\le\; S^*_{ijt} \;\le\; \hat S_{ijt}.S~ij(Tijr​−1)​≤Sijt∗​≤S^ijt​.

The bound is uniform over optimal solutions and uses nothing but the single-period problems.

Milestones

  1. Separability (Section 10.4.1, p. 236). The multi-item problem SAM\mathrm{SAM}SAM splits into the SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​: its optimal solutions are exactly the tuples of optimal item solutions, and Z∗=∑iZi∗Z^* = \sum_i Z^*_iZ∗=∑i​Zi∗​.
  2. Convexity of QijQ_{ij}Qij​ (p. 234) and of GijtG_{ijt}Gijt​ (p. 237), in the discrete sense of nondecreasing first differences on Z\mathbb ZZ.
  3. The newsvendor solution (10.19). S^ijt=max⁡(S~ijt,s0)\hat S_{ijt} = \max(\tilde S_{ijt}, s^0)S^ijt​=max(S~ijt​,s0) with s0s^0s0 the least integer such that P(Xijt≤s0)>bij/(bij+hij)P(X_{ijt} \le s^0) > b_{ij}/(b_{ij}+h_{ij})P(Xijt​≤s0)>bij​/(bij​+hij​).
  4. Monotonicity (10.20). S^ij(t−1)≤S^ijt\hat S_{ij(t-1)} \le \hat S_{ijt}S^ij(t−1)​≤S^ijt​ on [Tijr,Tijr+Ti0][T^r_{ij}, T^r_{ij} + T_{i0}][Tijr​,Tijr​+Ti0​].
  5. Theorem 16, corrected (p. 244). In every optimal solution of ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​, S~ijt≤Sijt∗\tilde S_{ijt} \le S^*_{ijt}S~ijt​≤Sijt∗​. Writing Mjt=max⁡k∈[Tije,t](S^ijk−S~ijk)M_{jt} = \max_{k \in [T^e_{ij}, t]}(\hat S_{ijk} - \tilde S_{ijk})Mjt​=maxk∈[Tije​,t]​(S^ijk​−S~ijk​), also Sijt∗≤S~ijt+MjtS^*_{ijt} \le \tilde S_{ijt} + M_{jt}Sijt∗​≤S~ijt​+Mjt​, provided Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​.

Two supporting items state that SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ have optimal solutions. A third, theorem16_counterexample, exhibits an instance in which Theorem 16's upper bound, as printed, fails.

Significance

Theorem 15 is what allows the book (pp. 238–239) to rewrite SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ with 0–1 variables δijtk\delta_{ijtk}δijtk​ indicating Sijt=kS_{ijt} = kSijt​=k. Only kkk between S~ij(Tijr−1)\tilde S_{ij(T^r_{ij}-1)}S~ij(Tijr​−1)​ and S^ijt\hat S_{ijt}S^ijt​ is needed, so the number of variables is governed by the newsvendor quantities rather than by the total depot supply. Theorem 16 plays the same role for the model with expediting. Both bounds also justify the greedy heuristics of Sections 10.4.3 and 10.5.3. Those heuristics never raise a base's stock above its newsvendor level.

The book proves both theorems in half a page each by an exchange argument. This mission produces machine-checked versions and, in doing so, settles the exact scope of Theorem 16. As printed it is false. With Tijr≥Tije+2T^r_{ij} \ge T^e_{ij} + 2Tijr​≥Tije​+2, an expedited shipment in the last decision period can be the only way to cover a later period's demand, and the optimal plan then overstocks an earlier period. The mission states the corrected theorem and the counterexample; the counterexample was checked in Lean during drafting. None of the chapter's results has been formalized before, as far as the platform's catalogue shows.

Difficulty

The central step is the exchange. Take the first period kkk in which an optimal plan overshoots its bound, and delay by one period one unit that arrives at kkk. This must be shown feasible, to change only SijkS_{ijk}Sijk​, and to lower the objective strictly. That in turn needs strict decrease of a convex function to the right of its largest minimizer, and an argument for the last period, where there is no later period to delay into. The indexing is heavy: two lead times, truncated sums min⁡(t−Tije,Ti0)\min(t - T^e_{ij}, T_{i0})min(t−Tije​,Ti0​), and cumulative constraints across bases.

The first idea, that a plan above the newsvendor level can always be improved by shipping less, fails. Shipping less changes the stock in every later period too, and later periods may need the unit. The bound follows only from a delay that affects exactly one period. For ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ even such a delay is sometimes unavailable, which is where the book's Theorem 16 breaks.

Formalization scope

  • One item at a time: ItemModel J Ω P bundles the data of one item with the cumulative demands on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), [IsProbabilityMeasure P]. Bases form a Fintype. Periods are ℕ. Stock levels and supplies are ℤ, since net inventory may be negative. Shipments are functions J → ℕ → ℕ, so nonnegativity and integrality are built in. Costs are in ℝ.
  • GGG and QQQ are defined from the demand as in the book: Bochner integrals of (S−X)+(S - X)^+(S−X)+ and (X−S)+(X - S)^+(X−S)+, and a tsum for QQQ. The item model requires finite means and convergence of the series for QQQ at every stock level, so that no integral or sum takes Lean's junk value 000.
  • "The largest optimal solution" is the predicate IsLargestCNSolution (feasible, minimizing, and above every feasible minimizer). Theorems take S^\hat SS^ as a function satisfying it. Milestone (10.19) shows it exists.
  • "An optimal solution" means a feasible plan with objective at most that of every feasible plan. The theorems hold for every optimal plan.
  • Pinned conventions and additions. The following are not written in the book: hij,bij>0h_{ij}, b_{ij} > 0hij​,bij​>0 and eij≥0e_{ij} \ge 0eij​≥0; nonnegative, nondecreasing depot supply; nondecreasing base supply (used in the book's proof of Theorem 16); finite mean demand; convergence of QQQ's series. (10.19) is read with the critical fractile "least sss with F(s)>b/(b+h)F(s) > b/(b+h)F(s)>b/(b+h)", the book's ⌈F−1⌉\lceil F^{-1}\rceil⌈F−1⌉/⌊F−1⌋\lfloor F^{-1}\rfloor⌊F−1⌋ with ties broken upward. Theorem 16 carries the proviso "Tijr=Tije+1T^r_{ij} = T^e_{ij} + 1Tijr​=Tije​+1 or t<Tije+Ti0t < T^e_{ij} + T_{i0}t<Tije​+Ti0​". Separability is stated both for optimal plans and for optimal values.
  • Ruled out. The feasible sets of SAMi\mathrm{SAM}_iSAMi​ and ESAMi\mathrm{ESAM}_iESAMi​ impose no upper bound on the cumulative stock, and S^\hat SS^ is defined from GGG alone, never from the allocation problem. The bounds are therefore not true by definition.
  • Omitted. The LP reformulations (10.22)–(10.28) and (10.45)–(10.52) and the integrality of their relaxations, which the book asserts with a reference to [68]; the greedy algorithms and their optimality conditions (asserted); the book's claim that QijQ_{ij}Qij​ is strictly increasing (p. 238), which fails when P(Xijt≤S)=0P(X_{ijt} \le S) = 0P(Xijt​≤S)=0 beyond the horizon and is not needed; the dynamic program of Section 10.3 and the repair model of Section 10.6.
  • The discrete-convexity and newsvendor facts are reusable for any single-location inventory model on Z\mathbb ZZ. Contributions are welcome on the convexity lemmas, the critical-fractile characterization, and a reusable exchange lemma for cumulative-shipment models.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, Springer, 2005, Chapter 10, pp. 225–246. DOI 10.1007/b138879
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris, J. Marschak, "Optimal inventory policy", Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272 (the newsvendor critical fractile). DOI 10.2307/1906813
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains VI: The Shortfall Distribution of Capacity-Limited SystemsTextbook

Motivation

Service parts supply chains are often limited by a capacitated resource, such as a production line or a repair shop, instead of by lead times alone. Once capacity binds, the classical tools for setting stock levels (Palm's theorem and the Poisson distribution of units in resupply) no longer apply, and the quantity that determines how much stock is needed is the shortfall: the amount by which the end-of-period inventory falls below its target because capacity was insufficient. Chapter 8 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) builds its tactical planning models for capacity-limited systems on the distribution of this random variable, and on a continuous-time repair queue in which item counts are geometric.

The shortfall recursion is the Lindley recursion of queueing theory (Lindley 1952), so its stationary law is the law of the maximum of a random walk with negative drift. The exponential tail of that maximum goes back to Cramér's work on ruin probabilities; for capacitated production–inventory systems it was stated by Glasserman (1997), whose theorem the book quotes as Theorem 11. Glasserman and Tayur (1995) used the shortfall to optimize base-stock levels in multi-echelon capacitated systems, and Roundy and Muckstadt (2000) studied the mass-exponential approximation that the theorem motivates.

Setting

A single item is produced in periods n=1,2,…n = 1, 2, \dotsn=1,2,… of an infinite horizon; at most ccc units can be produced per period. The demand of period nnn is DnD_nDn​; the demands are nonnegative, independent and identically distributed, with generic demand DDD and E[D]<cE[D] < cE[D]<c (the standing assumption of Section 8.1.1).

Under the modified (s−1,s)(s-1, s)(s−1,s) policy with target level sss, the facility observes DnD_nDn​ and produces min⁡{c,s−In−1+Dn}\min\{c, s - I_{n-1} + D_n\}min{c,s−In−1​+Dn​} units, where InI_nIn​ is the end-of-period net inventory and I0=sI_0 = sI0​=s. The shortfall Vn=s−InV_n = s - I_nVn​=s−In​ satisfies V0=0V_0 = 0V0​=0 and

Vn=[Vn−1+Dn−c]+.(8.1)V_n = \left[V_{n-1} + D_n - c\right]^+ . \tag{8.1}Vn​=[Vn−1​+Dn​−c]+.(8.1)

With the random walk Sn=∑k=1n(Dk−c)S_n = \sum_{k=1}^{n} (D_k - c)Sn​=∑k=1n​(Dk​−c) (S0=0S_0 = 0S0​=0), the stationary shortfall is

V=sup⁡n≥0Sn.V = \sup_{n \ge 0} S_n .V=n≥0sup​Sn​.

A law on R\mathbb RR is lattice if it is concentrated on a progression a+dZa + d\mathbb Za+dZ with d>0d > 0d>0.

In the discrete case (ccc and DDD integer valued) (Vn)(V_n)(Vn​) is a Markov chain on {0,1,2,… }\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}{0,1,2,…} with transition probabilities pijp_{ij}pij​ (p. 185). In the repair model of Section 8.3.1, reparable units of item iii arrive at rate λi\lambda_iλi​, λ=∑iλi\lambda = \sum_i \lambda_iλ=∑i​λi​, a single exponential server repairs at rate μ>λ\mu > \lambdaμ>λ, NNN is the number of units in repair and NiN_iNi​ the number of item-iii units, and ηi=λi/(μ−λ+λi)\eta_i = \lambda_i/(\mu - \lambda + \lambda_i)ηi​=λi​/(μ−λ+λi​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 11, corrected (p. 191)

Assume E[eαD]<∞E[e^{\alpha D}] < \inftyE[eαD]<∞ for all α<δ\alpha < \deltaα<δ, with δ>0\delta > 0δ>0; P[D>c]>0P[D > c] > 0P[D>c]>0; the law of DDD is non-lattice; and E[e−α(c−D)]=1E[e^{-\alpha(c-D)}] = 1E[e−α(c−D)]=1 has a root in (0,δ)(0, \delta)(0,δ). Then there are β>0\beta > 0β>0 and α>0\alpha > 0α>0 with

P{V>v}βe−αv→1(v→∞),α the unique positive root of E[e−α(c−D)]=1.\frac{P\{V > v\}}{\beta e^{-\alpha v}} \to 1 \quad (v \to \infty), \qquad \alpha \text{ the unique positive root of } E\left[e^{-\alpha(c - D)}\right] = 1 .βe−αvP{V>v}​→1(v→∞),α the unique positive root of E[e−α(c−D)]=1.

The constant β\betaβ is left unspecified, as in the book.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Eq. (8.1): under the modified policy, s−In=Vns - I_n = V_ns−In​=Vn​ for every nnn, independently of sss.
  2. Section 8.1.1: V<∞V < \inftyV<∞ almost surely, P{Vn>v}→P{V>v}P\{V_n > v\} \to P\{V > v\}P{Vn​>v}→P{V>v} for every vvv, and the law of VVV is stationary for (8.1).
  3. Eq. (8.2): for v>0v > 0v>0, P{Vn>v}=P{Dn>v+c}+ED[1(d≤v+c) P{Vn−1>v+c−d}]P\{V_n > v\} = P\{D_n > v + c\} + E_D[1(d \le v + c)\, P\{V_{n-1} > v + c - d\}]P{Vn​>v}=P{Dn​>v+c}+ED​[1(d≤v+c)P{Vn−1​>v+c−d}].
  4. Theorem 11, second sentence: E[e−α(c−D)]=1E[e^{-\alpha(c-D)}] = 1E[e−α(c−D)]=1 has at most one positive root.
  5. Section 8.1.2: with integer demand, (Vn)(V_n)(Vn​) is a Markov chain with transition probabilities pijp_{ij}pij​.
  6. Section 8.1.2: πi=lim⁡nP{Vn=i}\pi_i = \lim_n P\{V_n = i\}πi​=limn​P{Vn​=i} exists and solves πP=π\pi\mathcal P = \piπP=π, ∑iπi=1\sum_i \pi_i = 1∑i​πi​=1, πi≥0\pi_i \ge 0πi​≥0.
  7. Section 8.3.1: if NNN is geometric with parameter λ/μ\lambda/\muλ/μ and NiN_iNi​ given N=jN = jN=j is binomial(j,λi/λ)(j, \lambda_i/\lambda)(j,λi​/λ), then P[Ni=j]=(1−ηi)ηijP[N_i = j] = (1 - \eta_i)\eta_i^jP[Ni​=j]=(1−ηi​)ηij​.
  8. Section 8.3.1: ∑j>spi(j)=ηis+1\sum_{j > s} p_i(j) = \eta_i^{s+1}∑j>s​pi​(j)=ηis+1​, and the smallest cost-minimising stock level is the smallest sss with ηis+1≤hi/(hi+b)\eta_i^{s+1} \le h_i/(h_i + b)ηis+1​≤hi​/(hi​+b).

Significance

The exponential tail is the justification the book gives for approximating the shortfall by a mass-exponential law (an atom at zero plus an exponential tail), from which target stock levels and fill rates are computed in closed form. The decay rate α\alphaα depends only on the demand law and the capacity, so the theorem also says how the stock needed for a given service level grows as utilization approaches one. The discrete-chain milestones justify the exact computation of the shortfall distribution behind the book's Table 8.1 and Figures 8.3–8.8. The geometric law of NiN_iNi​ reduces the multi-item repair problem to independent newsvendor problems with an explicit solution.

The asymptotics of the random-walk maximum are proved in the literature (Cramér–Lundberg theory, Feller Vol. II, XII.5; Asmussen, Applied Probability and Queues, XIII.5); no machine-checked proof is known to exist. Mathlib has neither the Lindley recursion, nor ladder-height decompositions, nor the key renewal theorem for non-lattice laws. The printed Theorem 11 is not correct as stated (see Formalization scope), so the mission also records a corrected statement.

Difficulty

The central step of the goal is the passage from the random walk to an exact asymptotic. An exponential change of measure (Esscher tilt) with the root α\alphaα turns P{V>v}P\{V > v\}P{V>v} into an expectation under a law with positive drift, but it only yields the upper bound P{V>v}≤e−αvP\{V > v\} \le e^{-\alpha v}P{V>v}≤e−αv (Lundberg's inequality); it does not show that eαvP{V>v}e^{\alpha v}P\{V > v\}eαvP{V>v} converges, nor that the limit is positive. Convergence needs a renewal theorem for the overshoot of the tilted walk, which fails for lattice laws. That is why the non-lattice hypothesis cannot be dropped. For the milestones, the existence of the stationary law needs the reversal argument that identifies the law of VnV_nVn​ with that of max⁡k≤nSk\max_{k \le n} S_kmaxk≤n​Sk​, plus the strong law of large numbers to show V<∞V < \inftyV<∞ from E[D]<cE[D] < cE[D]<c.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Demands are real, nonnegative, measurable, i.i.d. (iIndepFun plus IdentDistrib with D1D_1D1​), integrable, with E[D]<cE[D] < cE[D]<c; these are fields of ShortfallModel. Periods are numbered from 111 as in the book (demand 0 is an unused i.i.d. copy). The discrete case is a separate structure with N\mathbb NN-valued demand and capacity.
  • Stationary shortfall. The book's "stationary distribution ... Let VVV represent this random variable" is pinned to V=sup⁡n≥0SnV = \sup_{n \ge 0} S_nV=supn≥0​Sn​, taken in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞] and converted to a real number; milestone 2 proves that it is the limit law of VnV_nVn​ from V0=0V_0 = 0V0​=0 and a stationary law of (8.1). The discrete πi\pi_iπi​ is pinned to lim⁡nP{Vn=i}\lim_n P\{V_n = i\}limn​P{Vn​=i}.
  • Corrections to Theorem 11. The printed theorem is false. For integer demand P{V>v}P\{V > v\}P{V>v} is a step function, and no βe−αv\beta e^{-\alpha v}βe−αv is asymptotic to it. If E[eαD]E[e^{\alpha D}]E[eαD] is finite only for α<δ\alpha < \deltaα<δ, the equation E[e−α(c−D)]=1E[e^{-\alpha(c-D)}] = 1E[e−α(c−D)]=1 may have no root in (0,δ)(0,\delta)(0,δ). The goal therefore adds two labelled hypotheses: a non-lattice demand law, and a root in (0,δ)(0, \delta)(0,δ). The mass-exponential demand of Section 8.1.3 (an atom at 000 plus a density) is non-lattice. The approximation β≈e−2(.583)(c−E(D))/σ\beta \approx e^{-2(.583)(c-E(D))/\sigma}β≈e−2(.583)(c−E(D))/σ is not stated.
  • Repair model. The M/M/1 queue is not built. The geometric law of NNN (asserted on p. 202) and the binomial split of NNN (quoted from Chapter 3) enter milestone 7 as hypotheses, exactly as the page's proof uses them. The stability condition λ<μ\lambda < \muλ<μ, not written on the page, is a hypothesis. "The optimal sis_isi​" is read as the smallest minimiser of the cost.
  • Ruled out. Stating Theorem 11 with α\alphaα or β\betaβ allowed to depend on vvv, with β=0\beta = 0β=0 (the ratio would be a division by zero, which Lean evaluates to 000), or for a VVV postulated to have an exponential tail proves nothing. Here β,α\beta, \alphaβ,α are quantified before vvv, both are asserted positive, and VVV is constructed from the demands.
  • Not formalized. The mass-exponential approximations (8.3)–(8.4), the Roundy–Muckstadt refinement, the fill-rate formula η(s)\eta(s)η(s) (a definition, whose steady-state identity needs uniform integrability the book does not discuss), the random-capacity chain on p. 186, and the monotonicity of sis_isi​ in μ\muμ.
  • Reusable infrastructure. Welcome: the Lindley recursion and its reversal identity, the Loynes existence theorem, Lundberg's inequality, and a non-lattice renewal theorem. All of these are needed well beyond this mission, in queueing (GI/G/1 waiting times) and ruin theory.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer, 2005, Chapter 8. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • P. Glasserman, Bounds and asymptotics for planning critical safety stocks, Operations Research 45(2), 244–257, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.2.244
  • P. Glasserman and S. Tayur, Sensitivity analysis for base-stock levels in multiechelon production-inventory systems, Management Science 41(2), 263–281, 1995 (the book's reference [97]). https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.2.263
  • R. O. Roundy and J. A. Muckstadt, Heuristic computation of periodic-review base stock inventory policies, Management Science 46(1), 104–109, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.1.104.15131
  • D. V. Lindley, The theory of queues with a single server, Mathematical Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 48(2), 277–289, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305004100027638
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1971, Chapter XII.
  • S. Asmussen, Applied Probability and Queues, 2nd ed., Springer, 2003, Chapter XIII. https://doi.org/10.1007/b97236
12 thms2 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains III: Palm's Theorem for (s–1, s) PoliciesTextbook

Motivation

Service parts (spare engines, avionics modules, repairable components) are usually managed one unit at a time: whenever a customer order removes a unit from stock, a replacement is ordered at once, from a repair shop or an outside supplier. This is the (s–1, s) policy, under which the inventory position (on hand plus on order minus backorders) stays constant at the stock level sss. Every performance measure of such a system (fill rate, expected backorders, availability) is a function of one random variable: the number of units in resupply, i.e. ordered but not yet returned. Chapter 3 of Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005) computes its distribution, and the rest of the book (the METRIC-type multi-echelon models of Chapters 4 and 5, the stock-level optimization of Section 3.4) is built on that computation.

Timeline. C. Palm (1938) showed, in the setting of telephone traffic, that in an infinite-server system with Poisson arrivals the number of busy servers has, in steady state, a Poisson law whose mean is the arrival rate times the mean service time, whatever the service-time distribution. Feeney and Sherbrooke (1966) carried the result to (s–1, s) inventory systems with compound Poisson demand, and treated the lost-sales case. Sherbrooke's METRIC model (1968) made the Poisson law of units in resupply the basis of multi-echelon spare-parts planning.

Setting

A single item is stocked at one location. Customer orders arrive at epochs T0<T1<⋯T_0 < T_1 < \cdotsT0​<T1​<⋯ of a Poisson process with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, started empty at time 000: the interarrival times AkA_kAk​ are independent and exponential with rate λ\lambdaλ, and Tk=A0+⋯+AkT_k = A_0 + \cdots + A_kTk​=A0​+⋯+Ak​. The kkk-th order triggers a resupply order with resupply time Lk≥0L_k \ge 0Lk​≥0. The resupply times are independent and identically distributed, independent of the arrival process, with a density ggg, distribution function G(u)=P[L≤u]G(u) = P[L \le u]G(u)=P[L≤u] and finite mean

τˉ=E[L]=∫0∞[1−G(u)] du.\bar\tau = E[L] = \int_0^\infty [1 - G(u)]\,du .τˉ=E[L]=∫0∞​[1−G(u)]du.

With backorders allowed, the number of units in resupply at time ttt is

X(t)=#{k:Tk≤t<Tk+Lk},X(t) = \#\{k : T_k \le t < T_k + L_k\},X(t)=#{k:Tk​≤t<Tk​+Lk​},

and N(t)=#{k:Tk≤t}N(t) = \#\{k : T_k \le t\}N(t)=#{k:Tk​≤t} counts the orders placed in [0,t][0,t][0,t]. On-hand stock and backorders at time ttt are (s−X(t))+(s - X(t))^+(s−X(t))+ and (X(t)−s)+(X(t) - s)^+(X(t)−s)+.

In the compound Poisson version the kkk-th order asks for Xk≥1X_k \ge 1Xk​≥1 units, the sizes are i.i.d. with uj=P[Xk=j]u_j = P[X_k = j]uj​=P[Xk​=j], independent of arrivals and resupply times, and all units of one order share its resupply time LkL_kLk​. The units in resupply are Y(t)=∑k:Tk≤t<Tk+LkXkY(t) = \sum_{k : T_k \le t < T_k + L_k} X_kY(t)=∑k:Tk​≤t<Tk​+Lk​​Xk​. Writing un(y)u^{(y)}_nun(y)​ for the probability that yyy orders ask for nnn units in total, the compound Poisson probabilities with parameter μ\muμ are

p(n∣μ)=∑y=0nμye−μy! un(y).p(n \mid \mu) = \sum_{y=0}^{n} \frac{\mu^y e^{-\mu}}{y!}\,u^{(y)}_n .p(n∣μ)=y=0∑n​y!μye−μ​un(y)​.

In the lost-sales version an order that finds no stock on hand is lost, so at most sss units are ever in resupply.

Formalization targets

Goal: Palm's theorem (Theorem 6, p. 39)

For every x≥0x \ge 0x≥0,

lim⁡t→∞P[X(t)=x]=e−λτˉ(λτˉ)xx!.\lim_{t\to\infty} P[X(t) = x] = e^{-\lambda\bar\tau}\frac{(\lambda\bar\tau)^x}{x!}.t→∞lim​P[X(t)=x]=e−λτˉx!(λτˉ)x​.

The resupply-time law enters only through its mean. This is the statement the book's proof establishes and every later chapter uses.

The proof's milestones (pp. 38–41)

  1. Eq. (3.5): P[N(t)=n]=e−λt(λt)n/n!P[N(t) = n] = e^{-\lambda t}(\lambda t)^n/n!P[N(t)=n]=e−λt(λt)n/n!.
  2. Eq. (3.3): given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, the epochs (T0,…,Tn−1)(T_0, \dots, T_{n-1})(T0​,…,Tn−1​) have density n!/tnn!/t^nn!/tn on 0<t1<⋯<tn<t0 < t_1 < \cdots < t_n < t0<t1​<⋯<tn​<t.
  3. Eq. (3.7): given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, X(t)X(t)X(t) is binomial with parameters nnn and p=1t∫0t[1−G(u)] dup = \frac1t\int_0^t[1-G(u)]\,dup=t1​∫0t​[1−G(u)]du.
  4. Eq. (3.8): for every t>0t > 0t>0, X(t)X(t)X(t) is Poisson with mean λ∫0t[1−G(u)] du\lambda\int_0^t[1-G(u)]\,duλ∫0t​[1−G(u)]du.
  5. Eq. (3.10): ∫0t[1−G(u)] du→τˉ\int_0^t[1-G(u)]\,du \to \bar\tau∫0t​[1−G(u)]du→τˉ.

Extensions in Section 3.1

  1. Theorem 7 (pp. 43–44): with compound Poisson demand, lim⁡t→∞P[Y(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉ)\lim_{t\to\infty}P[Y(t) = n] = p(n \mid \lambda\bar\tau)limt→∞​P[Y(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉ).
  2. Theorem 8 (p. 44): in the lost-sales system with exponential resupply times of rate β\betaβ, the probability vectors solving the balance equations are exactly the truncated Poisson law πx∝(λ/β)x/x!\pi_x \propto (\lambda/\beta)^x/x!πx​∝(λ/β)x/x!, 0≤x≤s0 \le x \le s0≤x≤s.
  3. Theorem 9 (pp. 46–47): for a due-date delay T≥0T \ge 0T≥0, the units in resupply that have been there for at least TTT satisfy lim⁡t→∞P[YT(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉα)\lim_{t\to\infty}P[Y_T(t) = n] = p(n \mid \lambda\bar\tau\alpha)limt→∞​P[YT​(t)=n]=p(n∣λτˉα) with α=1τˉ∫T∞[1−G(t)] dt\alpha = \frac1{\bar\tau}\int_T^\infty[1-G(t)]\,dtα=τˉ1​∫T∞​[1−G(t)]dt.

Significance

The result. Palm's theorem turns an infinite-dimensional object (the whole resupply-time distribution) into one number, τˉ\bar\tauτˉ. This insensitivity is what makes spare-parts planning computable: the expected backorders at stock level sss are ∑x>s(x−s) p(x∣λτˉ)\sum_{x > s}(x - s)\,p(x \mid \lambda\bar\tau)∑x>s​(x−s)p(x∣λτˉ), the fill rate is P[X≤s−1]P[X \le s - 1]P[X≤s−1], and both can be optimized over sss with only the demand rate and mean repair time as data. Theorem 7 extends this to batch demand, Theorem 9 to systems allowed a response time, and Theorem 8 gives the exact law when shortages are lost instead of backordered.

Formalizing it. All of these results are classical and proved. None of them is formalized on the platform, and Mathlib has Poisson and exponential distributions but no Poisson process, no thinning theorem and no infinite-server queue. The mission produces a Poisson arrival stream built from i.i.d. exponential gaps, the conditional-uniformity property of its epochs, independent thinning, and the M/G/∞ transient law, all reusable in queueing and inventory missions.

Difficulty

The algebra of the proof (summing the binomial against the Poisson law of N(t)N(t)N(t)) is short. The work is in the probabilistic step the book treats in a sentence: that, given N(t)=nN(t) = nN(t)=n, the nnn orders behave like independent uniform epochs, each of which independently is still in resupply at time ttt with the same probability ppp. This needs the joint law of the partial sums of exponential variables (Eq. (3.3)), and then a symmetrization argument, since the epochs are ordered while the resupply times are attached to order indices. The naive route of computing P[X(t)=x]P[X(t) = x]P[X(t)=x] by conditioning on individual epochs does not go through without that exchangeability step. The limit t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ is then elementary; stating a stationary version directly is not a substitute, since the book's "steady state" is exactly this limit.

Formalization scope

The model is a structure on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P): exponential interarrival times with rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, nonnegative resupply times with a density and an integrable first coordinate, and mutual independence of the whole family. Orders are indexed from 000, so the book's X1,…,XnX_1, \dots, X_nX1​,…,Xn​ are T0,…,Tn−1T_0, \dots, T_{n-1}T0​,…,Tn−1​. Counts are cardinalities of sets of order indices, with value 000 on the probability-zero event where infinitely many orders fall in a bounded interval.

Commitments and pinnings:

  • "Steady state probability" (Theorems 6, 7, 9) is lim⁡t→∞P[⋅(t)=x]\lim_{t\to\infty}P[\cdot(t) = x]limt→∞​P[⋅(t)=x] for the system empty at time 000, which is what the proofs compute via (3.8)–(3.11).
  • Independence of resupply times from arrivals is not written in Theorem 6 but is used on p. 40; it is part of the model.
  • The stock level sss does not enter the backorder model; it matters only in Theorem 8.
  • Theorem 8 is stated algebraically: a vector on {0,…,s}\{0, \dots, s\}{0,…,s} solves the balance equations (3.26), (3.25) for 0<j<s0 < j < s0<j<s and (3.32), and sums to one, if and only if it is the truncated Poisson law. The book obtains these equations by letting t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ in the forward equations under the unproved assumption Pj′(t)→0P_j'(t) \to 0Pj′​(t)→0. The book writes (3.25) "for 0≤j≤s0 \le j \le s0≤j≤s", which at j=sj = sj=s contradicts its own (3.32); the boundary equation (3.32) is used. The sentence on p. 46 extending Theorem 8 to arbitrary resupply densities is asserted without proof and is not stated.
  • Theorem 7 identifies the limit law by its probabilities (3.22)–(3.23); its mean λτˉuˉ\lambda\bar\tau\bar uλτˉuˉ is a property of that law. Theorem 9 is stated for compound demand as the book states it, although the book's proof covers only the Poisson case.

A model in which X(t)X(t)X(t) is postulated through its law, or in which resupply times may depend on the arrival epochs, makes the goal empty or false; here X(t)X(t)X(t) is computed from the primitive arrival and resupply times, whose joint law is fully specified.

Welcome contributions: a general Poisson-process library (construction from exponential gaps, Poisson marginals, order-statistics property), independent thinning, and proofs of the milestones in the listed order.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2005, Chapter 3. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • C. Palm, "Analysis of the Erlang traffic formula for busy-signal arrangements", Ericsson Technics 5, 1938, 39–58.
  • G. J. Feeney and C. C. Sherbrooke, "The (s–1, s) inventory policy under compound Poisson demand", Management Science 12(5), 1966, 391–411. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.5.391
  • C. C. Sherbrooke, "METRIC: A multi-echelon technique for recoverable item control", Operations Research 16(1), 1968, 122–141. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.16.1.122
  • S. M. Ross, Stochastic Processes, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1996, Section 2.3 (conditional distribution of arrival times) and Section 2.4 (the M/G/∞ queue).
12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains I: Optimality of Order-Up-To Policies by Dynamic ProgrammingTextbook

Motivation

A stocking point that reviews its inventory once per period and must decide how much to order is the basic unit of every service parts supply chain: each warehouse, each repair depot and each forward location in the networks studied later in Muckstadt's Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains (Springer 2005, DOI 10.1007/b138879) faces this decision for thousands of items. The practical rule used everywhere is the order-up-to (base-stock) rule: bring the inventory position up to a fixed target level whenever it falls below it, and order nothing otherwise. Chapter 2 of the book justifies this rule for a single item with linear costs, following the dynamic-programming argument of Karlin and Scarf, and the rest of the book takes the rule as given.

Timeline. Arrow, Harris and Marschak posed the periodic-review inventory problem as a dynamic program in 1951 (Econometrica). Bellman, Glicksberg and Gross showed in 1955 that with linear ordering cost and convex expected holding and shortage costs the optimal policy has a critical-number form (Management Science). Karlin and Scarf (1958) extended the analysis to a positive lead time, the setting of the book's Theorems 1–3. Veinott (1965) gave conditions under which a base-stock policy is optimal in multi-product, nonstationary models (Management Science).

Setting

One item is stocked at one location. At the start of each period the inventory position yyy is observed and a quantity u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 is ordered; with lead time one period it arrives at the start of the next period. Demand in each period is independent of other periods and has a density ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) that is positive and continuous. Unmet demand is backordered. Costs are linear: ccc per unit ordered, hhh per unit on hand at the end of a period, bbb per unit backordered at the end of a period, and future costs are discounted by α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1). The one-period cost is

L(y)={h∫0y(y−x)g(x) dx+b∫y∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y>0,b∫0∞(x−y)g(x) dx,y≤0.L(y) = \begin{cases} h\displaystyle\int_0^y (y-x)g(x)\,dx + b\int_y^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y > 0,\\[1mm] b\displaystyle\int_0^\infty (x-y)g(x)\,dx, & y \le 0. \end{cases}L(y)=⎩⎨⎧​h∫0y​(y−x)g(x)dx+b∫y∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,b∫0∞​(x−y)g(x)dx,​y>0,y≤0.​

The book assumes throughout that b>1−αα cb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\,cb>α1−α​c: the backorder cost outweighs the saving from deferring a purchase.

The nnn-period value functions are f1=Lf_1 = Lf1​=L and, for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2,

fn(y)=min⁡u≥0{c u+L(y)+α∫0∞fn−1(y+u−x) g(x) dx}.f_n(y) = \min_{u \ge 0}\Big\{ c\,u + L(y) + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}(y+u-x)\,g(x)\,dx \Big\}.fn​(y)=u≥0min​{cu+L(y)+α∫0∞​fn−1​(y+u−x)g(x)dx}.

An order uuu is optimal at yyy if it attains this minimum over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0. The order-up-to rule with level sss orders u(y)=max⁡{0,s−y}u(y) = \max\{0, s-y\}u(y)=max{0,s−y}. The marginal function of eq. (2.8) is Fn(w)=c+α∫0∞fn′(w−x) g(x) dxF_n(w) = c + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_n'(w-x)\,g(x)\,dxFn​(w)=c+α∫0∞​fn′​(w−x)g(x)dx. In Lean these are Model, Model.L, Model.f, Model.IsOptimalOrder, Model.IsOrderUpToOptimal and Model.F in the namespace ServiceParts.BaseStock.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 18) in its nnn-period form

For every horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, either there is a real level sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ with

un∗(y)=max⁡{0, sn∗−y} optimal for every y,u_n^*(y) = \max\{0,\ s_n^* - y\} \ \text{optimal for every } y,un∗​(y)=max{0, sn∗​−y} optimal for every y,

or ordering nothing is optimal for every yyy (level −∞-\infty−∞); and there is N≥2N \ge 2N≥2 such that the level is real for all n≥Nn \ge Nn≥N. No value of sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is fixed: the goal asserts the shape of the optimal policy only.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. LLL is convex (p. 21).
  2. Every fnf_nfn​, n≥1n \ge 1n≥1, is convex (p. 19, property (c)).
  3. Every fnf_nfn​ is differentiable with −(c+b)≤fn′≤h/(1−α)-(c+b) \le f_n' \le h/(1-\alpha)−(c+b)≤fn′​≤h/(1−α) (p. 20).
  4. Property (b): given an optimal real level sss for horizon n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, fn′=−c+L′f_n' = -c + L'fn′​=−c+L′ below sss and fn′=L′+α∫0∞fn−1′(⋅−x)g(x) dxf_n' = L' + \alpha\int_0^\infty f_{n-1}'(\cdot - x)g(x)\,dxfn′​=L′+α∫0∞​fn−1′​(⋅−x)g(x)dx from sss on (p. 19).
  5. Given such a level, Fn(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0F_n(w) \to (1-\alpha)c - b\alpha < 0Fn​(w)→(1−α)c−bα<0 as w→−∞w \to -\inftyw→−∞ (p. 19).
  6. Property (a): optimal real levels are nondecreasing in the horizon, sn∗≤sn+1∗s_n^* \le s_{n+1}^*sn∗​≤sn+1∗​ (p. 18).

Significance

The theorem reduces an infinite-dimensional control problem, a choice of order quantity for every possible inventory position, to one number per period. Every later chapter of the book (Palm's theorem for (s−1,s)(s-1,s)(s−1,s) policies, METRIC-type stock level optimization, allocation in multi-echelon systems) parameterizes policies by such stock levels; this is where the book justifies that parameterization.

The result is classical and proved in many texts. On Prove2Me the mission produces a machine-checked finite-horizon version with a continuous demand density, including the calculus the proof needs: convexity of an expected cost defined by integrals against a density, differentiation under the integral sign in the recursion, and the one-sided behaviour of the value function at the order-up-to level. Existing platform results on base-stock optimality (Veinott's multi-product model, advance demand information) use different models and different arguments; none covers this recursion.

Difficulty

The argument is an induction on nnn whose hypothesis carries convexity, the derivative formula (b), and bounds on fn′f_n'fn′​. The delicate step is the existence of a finite root of FnF_nFn​: its limit at −∞-\infty−∞ depends on whether the previous level was finite. For n=1n = 1n=1 nothing is ordered and the limit is c−bαc - b\alphac−bα, which the assumption b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c does not make negative. The book's base case ("left to the reader") therefore fails when c>αbc > \alpha bc>αb: with α=12\alpha = \tfrac12α=21​, c=1c = 1c=1, b=32b = \tfrac32b=23​ the two-period problem never orders. The goal is corrected accordingly.

Two properties the book's induction also carries are not usable as printed. Property (d), fn′≤fn−1′f_n' \le f_{n-1}'fn′​≤fn−1′​, is false: for large yyy, fn′(y)f_n'(y)fn′​(y) approaches h(1+α+⋯+αn−1)h(1 + \alpha + \dots + \alpha^{n-1})h(1+α+⋯+αn−1), which increases with nnn. The second-derivative clause of property (c) fails at y=0y = 0y=0 whenever g(0+)>0g(0^+) > 0g(0+)>0. A solver cannot follow the printed induction step for step; property (a), which the book derives from (d), is true and is a milestone in its own right.

Formalization scope

  • Horizon. The book states Theorem 2 for "the optimal policy" without a horizon. Its proof is an induction on a finite horizon, and the passage n→∞n \to \inftyn→∞ is left as a conjecture (p. 21). The goal is the finite-horizon theorem; no infinite-horizon value function is constructed.
  • Lead time. The proof sets τ=1\tau = 1τ=1 "to simplify notation"; so does the formalization. Theorem 1 (dependence on the inventory position only) and Theorem 3 (general τ\tauτ, whose level equation is the conjectured infinite-horizon one) are not stated.
  • Level −∞-\infty−∞. The goal allows "never order" as the order-up-to rule with level −∞-\infty−∞ and adds eventual finiteness; see Difficulty.
  • Added hypotheses. c≥0c \ge 0c≥0, h>0h > 0h>0 (the book uses lim⁡w→∞fn′(w−x)>0\lim_{w\to\infty} f_n'(w - x) > 0limw→∞​fn′​(w−x)>0), 0<α0 < \alpha0<α (the book divides by α\alphaα), and a finite mean ∫0∞x g(x) dx<∞\int_0^\infty x\,g(x)\,dx < \infty∫0∞​xg(x)dx<∞ (without it LLL is infinite). All are fields of Model, together with positivity and continuity of ggg on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), ∫0∞g=1\int_0^\infty g = 1∫0∞​g=1, and b>1−ααcb > \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}cb>α1−α​c.
  • Minimum and derivatives. fnf_nfn​ is defined with the infimum over u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 of a nonnegative quantity; optimality is always against every u′≥0u' \ge 0u′≥0. Statements about fn′f_n'fn′​ assert differentiability (Differentiable, HasDerivAt) and do not read deriv as evidence of it.
  • Levels. The book's sn∗s_n^*sn∗​ is "the unique solution of (2.6)"; milestones take any real level at which the order-up-to rule is optimal.

A recursion in which ordering is restricted to order-up-to rules, or in which fnf_nfn​ is defined through sn∗s_n^*sn∗​, would make the goal a tautology; here fnf_nfn​ is defined by minimization over all u≥0u \ge 0u≥0 and optimality is checked against all orders.

Needed infrastructure: convexity and differentiation of parametric integrals against a density on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), and minimization of a differentiable convex function over a half-line. Both are reusable for the other stochastic inventory missions on the platform. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • J. A. Muckstadt, Analysis and Algorithms for Service Parts Supply Chains, Springer Series in Operations Research and Financial Engineering, 2005, Chapter 2, Section 2.1. https://doi.org/10.1007/b138879
  • S. Karlin and H. Scarf, Inventory models of the Arrow–Harris–Marschak type with time lag, in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin and H. Scarf (eds.), Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production, Stanford University Press, 1958 (no DOI).
  • K. J. Arrow, T. Harris and J. Marschak, Optimal inventory policy, Econometrica 19(3), 1951, 250–272. https://doi.org/10.2307/1906814
  • R. Bellman, I. Glicksberg and O. Gross, On the optimal inventory equation, Management Science 2(1), 1955, 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2.1.83
  • A. F. Veinott Jr., Optimal policy for a multi-product, dynamic, nonstationary inventory problem, Management Science 12(3), 1965, 206–222. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.12.3.206
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to the Scenario Approach V: Support Sets Certify the Violation of Nonconvex Scenario SolutionsTextbook

Why certify nonconvex scenario solutions

The scenario approach replaces an optimization problem with uncertain constraints θ∈Θδ\theta\in\Theta_\deltaθ∈Θδ​, δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, by the program that enforces only NNN constraints Θδ1,…,ΘδN\Theta_{\delta_1},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_N}Θδ1​​,…,ΘδN​​ drawn at random from the distribution P\mathbb PP of the uncertainty. Its solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is then judged by its violation, the probability that a new instance δ\deltaδ is not satisfied. For convex programs in Rd\mathbb R^dRd the violation is controlled by the dimension ddd alone (Calafiore and Campi 2006; Campi and Garatti 2008), because a convex program has at most ddd support constraints. Many problems where the scenario approach is used in practice are not convex: control with quantized inputs, mixed-integer design, classification with nonconvex losses, and decisions over infinite-dimensional or unstructured sets. For those programs no a priori bound on the number of constraints that determine the solution exists.

Timeline, as recorded in Chapter 8 of Campi and Garatti's textbook:

  • 2006–2008: the violation of convex scenario solutions is bounded, and then characterized exactly, in terms of ddd.
  • 2018: the wait-and-judge theory (Campi and Garatti, Math. Programming 2018) evaluates the violation from the number of support constraints counted after solving the program; it extends to nonconvex programs but requires a nondegeneracy assumption.
  • 2018: Campi, Garatti and Ramponi (IEEE TAC 2018) prove a bound in terms of the size of any support set, with no convexity and no nondegeneracy assumption. This is the result formalized here, stated in the book as Eq. (8.15).

Setting

Let Θ\ThetaΘ be a generic set; it may be an infinite-dimensional space or a set with no algebraic structure. Let f:Θ→Rf:\Theta\to\mathbb Rf:Θ→R be a cost and Θδ⊆Θ\Theta_\delta\subseteq\ThetaΘδ​⊆Θ constraint sets indexed by δ∈Δ\delta\in\Deltaδ∈Δ, where Δ\DeltaΔ carries a probability P\mathbb PP. Neither fff nor the Θδ\Theta_\deltaΘδ​ is required to be convex. With a sample δ1,…,δN\delta_1,\dots,\delta_Nδ1​,…,δN​ drawn independently from P\mathbb PP, the scenario program is

min⁡θ∈Θf(θ)subject toθ∈⋂i=1,…,NΘδi,(8.12)\min_{\theta\in\Theta} f(\theta)\quad\text{subject to}\quad \theta\in\bigcap_{i=1,\dots,N}\Theta_{\delta_i},\tag{8.12}θ∈Θmin​f(θ)subject toθ∈i=1,…,N⋂​Θδi​​,(8.12)

and θ∗\theta^*θ∗ denotes its solution, assumed to exist and be unique for every sample.

The violation of a decision is V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∉Θδ}V(\theta)=\mathbb P\{\delta\in\Delta:\theta\notin\Theta_\delta\}V(θ)=P{δ∈Δ:θ∈/Θδ​} (Definition 3.1).

A support set (Definition 8.8) is a subset {Θδi1,…,Θδik}\{\Theta_{\delta_{i_1}},\dots,\Theta_{\delta_{i_k}}\}{Θδi1​​​,…,Θδik​​​} of the constraints such that the program with only these constraints in place has the same solution θ∗\theta^*θ∗ as the program with all constraints. The full set of constraints is always a support set; a support set need not be minimal (of smallest cardinality) or irreducible (with no removable element). Let σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ be the cardinality of the support set returned, for every sample, by some fixed algorithm.

Formalization targets

Goal: the support-set bound, Eq. (8.15)

For every function ϵ:{0,1,…,N}→[0,1]\epsilon:\{0,1,\dots,N\}\to[0,1]ϵ:{0,1,…,N}→[0,1] with ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1,

PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤∑k=0N−1(Nk) (1−ϵ(k))N−k.\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\epsilon(\sigma^*)\}\le\sum_{k=0}^{N-1}\binom Nk\,(1-\epsilon(k))^{N-k}.PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤k=0∑N−1​(kN​)(1−ϵ(k))N−k.

The level function ϵ\epsilonϵ is free: the statement is one inequality per admissible ϵ\epsilonϵ, and it holds for any algorithm producing support sets. This is the weakest form that carries the whole result.

Milestone: the level function for a confidence β\betaβ, Eq. (8.16)

For β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1] let

ϵ(k)={1k=N,1−βN(Nk)N−kotherwise.\epsilon(k)=\begin{cases}1 & k=N,\\ 1-\sqrt[N-k]{\dfrac{\beta}{N\binom Nk}} & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}ϵ(k)=⎩⎨⎧​11−N−kN(kN​)β​​​k=N,otherwise.​

The arithmetic half states that ϵ\epsilonϵ maps {0,…,N}\{0,\dots,N\}{0,…,N} into [0,1][0,1][0,1], ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1, and the right-hand side of (8.15) equals β\betaβ (for N≥1N\ge1N≥1). The probabilistic half states PN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤β\mathbb P^N\{V(\theta^*)>\epsilon(\sigma^*)\}\le\betaPN{V(θ∗)>ϵ(σ∗)}≤β.

Significance

The result turns the size of a support set, a quantity observed after the program is solved, into a certificate on the violation of the solution, for any optimization or decision problem whose solution is determined by a subset of the data. With the choice (8.16), a user who finds a support set of size σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ can assert V(θ∗)≤ϵ(σ∗)V(\theta^*)\le\epsilon(\sigma^*)V(θ∗)≤ϵ(σ∗) with confidence 1−β1-\beta1−β. The book's Figure 8.12 shows that ϵ(k)\epsilon(k)ϵ(k) for β=10−6\beta=10^{-6}β=10−6 remains well below 111 for kkk up to a sizeable fraction of NNN. Because the algorithm that finds the support set is arbitrary, cheap heuristics that return non-minimal support sets still give valid, if weaker, guarantees. The result does not recover the tight convex bound (3.4); for convex programs the Chapter 3 theory remains sharper.

The statement is proved in [31] and is the probabilistic core of the sample-compression arguments of learning theory (Floyd and Warmuth 1995) in the form used by the scenario approach. To the best of available knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The platform's UnderstandingML.compression_bound proves a sample-compression bound for a fixed compression size with a different constant; it does not cover a data-dependent size σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ or an arbitrary level function. A formal proof here provides a reusable bound for data-dependent support sets over arbitrary decision sets.

Difficulty

The natural first step is: condition on the support set being a particular index set III with ∣I∣=k|I|=k∣I∣=k, and argue that the solution is then a function of the kkk sampled constraints in III alone, while the other N−kN-kN−k samples are independent of it and must all be satisfied. The difficulty is that the event "the algorithm returns III" depends on all NNN samples, and the solution of the reduced program on III is defined only where that program has a unique solution; the decomposition of the probability therefore has to be carried out on sections of the product space, with a measurability argument for each piece. A second point is that σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ is random and data-dependent: a bound for each fixed kkk does not directly give a bound at the random level ϵ(σ∗)\epsilon(\sigma^*)ϵ(σ∗), and the role of the condition ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1 must be accounted for at k=Nk=Nk=N.

Formalization scope

Lean representation and committed conventions:

  • Θ\ThetaΘ and Δ\DeltaΔ are arbitrary types with measurable structures; P\mathbb PP is a probability measure on Δ\DeltaΔ; a sample is ω : Fin N → Δ with law Measure.pi (fun _ : Fin N => P); indices run over 0,…,N−10,\dots,N-10,…,N−1.
  • A subset of constraints is a Finset (Fin N); the reduced program with index set III has feasible set ⋂i∈IΘδi\bigcap_{i\in I}\Theta_{\delta_i}⋂i∈I​Θδi​​ (all of Θ\ThetaΘ for I=∅I=\emptysetI=∅).
  • The solution map θ∗\theta^*θ∗ is a parameter with the hypothesis that θ∗(ω)\theta^*(\omega)θ∗(ω) is the unique solution of the full program for every sample.
  • "Has the same solution" in Definition 8.8 means: the reduced program has a unique solution and it equals the unique solution of the full program. Existence of solutions is not assumed for reduced programs in general, only for those that are support sets.
  • The algorithm is an arbitrary map alg : (Fin N → Δ) → Finset (Fin N) returning a support set for every sample; σ∗\sigma^*σ∗ is the cardinality of its output. The goal is universal over such maps.
  • ϵ\epsilonϵ is a real function on N\mathbb NN with ϵ(k)∈[0,1]\epsilon(k)\in[0,1]ϵ(k)∈[0,1] for k≤Nk\le Nk≤N and ϵ(N)=1\epsilon(N)=1ϵ(N)=1.
  • The violation is real-valued in [0,1][0,1][0,1]; the probability of the event is compared in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] with ENNReal.ofReal of the real right-hand side.

Implicit hypotheses of the page, made explicit (the book states on p. 33 that measurability issues are glossed over): the constraint relation {(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ}\{(\theta,\delta):\theta\in\Theta_\delta\}{(θ,δ):θ∈Θδ​} is measurable in Θ×Δ\Theta\times\DeltaΘ×Δ; the solution map is measurable; each event {ω:the algorithm returns J}\{\omega:\text{the algorithm returns }J\}{ω:the algorithm returns J} is measurable; θ∗\theta^*θ∗ exists and is unique for every sample; N≥1N\ge1N≥1 in the arithmetic half of (8.16).

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the algorithm is not existentially quantified and is not the minimal support set, the reduced programs are not all assumed solvable (which would be unsatisfiable when fff has no unconstrained minimizer), and the support-set property requires uniqueness of the reduced solution, without which the bound is false.

Needed infrastructure: product measures on Fin N → Δ, splitting of such products along a subset of coordinates, and Fubini/Tonelli for sections. These pieces are reusable for other compression-type bounds. Contributions welcome: proofs of the two milestones and of the goal, and lemmas on splitting Measure.pi over a Finset of coordinates.

Selected references

  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Introduction to the Scenario Approach, MOS-SIAM Series on Optimization 26, SIAM/MOS, 2018, §8.6, pp. 101–105. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975444
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, F. A. Ramponi, A general scenario theory for nonconvex optimization and decision making, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2018.2808446
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, Wait-and-judge scenario optimization, Mathematical Programming, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-1056-9
  • G. C. Calafiore, M. C. Campi, The scenario approach to robust control design, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2006.875041
  • M. C. Campi, S. Garatti, The exact feasibility of randomized solutions of uncertain convex programs, SIAM Journal on Optimization, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/07069821X
  • S. Floyd, M. Warmuth, Sample compression, learnability, and the Vapnik–Chervonenkis dimension, Machine Learning, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993593
7 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer 2: Under Production Economy the Retailer Earns Weakly More from Sequential Information Contracting and the Manufacturers from ConcurrentResearch Paper

Motivation

Large retailers hold point-of-sale and loyalty-card data that their suppliers cannot observe, and many of them sell access to it through data-sharing programs; others share the same data for free, or with only some suppliers (Shang, Ha & Tong 2016, §1). When two competing manufacturers sell through one common retailer, sharing a demand signal with a manufacturer changes how he sets his wholesale price, which in turn changes the retailer's margins and the rival's demand. Whether the retailer wants to share, with how many manufacturers, and at what price, is therefore a question about a multistage game with incomplete information.

Shang, Ha and Tong answer it for linear demand, a linear-expectation signal and quadratic production costs, under two contracting protocols. This mission covers the production economy case (marginal cost decreasing in volume, §6 of the paper), in which the retailer may have an incentive to share information even without payment. A companion mission covers production diseconomy (§5).

Setting

Two manufacturers i∈{0,1}i \in \{0,1\}i∈{0,1} sell substitutable products through a common retailer. Demand for product iii is

qi=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi+ϕpj,q_i = a + \theta - (1+\phi)p_i + \phi p_j ,qi​=a+θ−(1+ϕ)pi​+ϕpj​,

where pip_ipi​ is the retail price, ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 measures competition intensity and θ\thetaθ is a demand shock with mean 000 and variance σ2>0\sigma^2 > 0σ2>0. The retailer observes a demand signal YYY with E[Y∣θ]=θE[Y \mid \theta] = \thetaE[Y∣θ]=θ and a linear-expectation structure E[θ∣Y]=βYE[\theta \mid Y] = \beta YE[θ∣Y]=βY, where β=β(t,σ)\beta = \beta(t,\sigma)β=β(t,σ) is the signal weight. Producing qqq units costs bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2 with ce>0c_e > 0ce​>0; the paper writes c=−cec = -c_ec=−ce​ and assumes ce<2/(1+ϕ)c_e < 2/(1+\phi)ce​<2/(1+ϕ) (the Assumption, p. 251). Retailing is costless.

The game has three stages.

  1. Information contracting. Under concurrent contracting the retailer offers both manufacturers the same payment T≥0T \ge 0T≥0 for the signal; they decide simultaneously and play a Pareto-optimal pure equilibrium. Under sequential contracting she offers a payment TfT_fTf​ to a first manufacturer kkk and, after his decision, a payment TsT_sTs​ to the other; the outcome is a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). The retailer commits not to share for free after a rejection (§6.2).
  2. Pricing. Given the information statuses Xi∈{I,U}X_i \in \{I, U\}Xi​∈{I,U}, each manufacturer sets a wholesale price wiw_iwi​ (a function of YYY if informed, a constant otherwise), then the retailer sets retail prices; the solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
  3. Demand realizes and profits are collected.

The ex ante profits of the pricing equilibrium are denoted πM(0)\pi_M(0)πM​(0), πMU(1)\pi_M^U(1)πMU​(1), πMI(1)\pi_M^I(1)πMI​(1), πM(2)\pi_M(2)πM​(2) for a manufacturer and πR(n)\pi_R(n)πR​(n) for the retailer, nnn the number of informed manufacturers. neNn_e^NneN​, neCn_e^CneC​, neSn_e^SneS​ denote the equilibrium number of informed manufacturers without contracting, under concurrent and under sequential contracting.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 8(d)

For every ϕ>0\phi > 0ϕ>0 and 0<ce<2/(1+ϕ)0 < c_e < 2/(1+\phi)0<ce​<2/(1+ϕ), pricing equilibria exist, concurrent outcomes and sequential SPEs exist, and for every concurrent outcome and every SPE (either first mover)

ΠRC≤ΠRS,ΠMS≤ΠMC,\Pi_R^C \le \Pi_R^S, \qquad \Pi_M^S \le \Pi_M^C ,ΠRC​≤ΠRS​,ΠMS​≤ΠMC​,

where ΠR\Pi_RΠR​ is the retailer's profit after side payments and ΠM\Pi_MΠM​ the manufacturers' total profit net of them. The second inequality is asserted for all cec_ece​ except at most two values depending only on ϕ\phiϕ. The comparisons about every pricing equilibrium family exclude the single value ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)] (see Formalization scope). The paper says "higher"; the inequalities are weak because both sides coincide on intervals of positive length.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: the pricing equilibrium exists and, for ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​, is unique and linear in YYY with explicit coefficients.
  2. §4.2: the ex ante profits πM(⋅)\pi_M(\cdot)πM​(⋅) and πR(⋅)\pi_R(\cdot)πR​(⋅) in closed form.
  3. Lemma 5(a)–(c) and Lemma 5(d): sign comparisons of these profits in cec_ece​, with thresholds 1/(1+ϕ)1/(1+\phi)1/(1+ϕ), (4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)](4+5\phi)/[(2+3\phi)(1+\phi)](4+5ϕ)/[(2+3ϕ)(1+ϕ)], ceac_e^acea​ and ceNc_e^NceN​.
  4. Proposition 7: thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ such that
neZ=0 for ce<11+ϕ,neZ=2 for 11+ϕ≤ce<ceZ,neZ=1 for ceZ≤ce<21+ϕ.n_e^Z = 0 \text{ for } c_e < \tfrac{1}{1+\phi}, \quad n_e^Z = 2 \text{ for } \tfrac{1}{1+\phi} \le c_e < c_e^Z, \quad n_e^Z = 1 \text{ for } c_e^Z \le c_e < \tfrac{2}{1+\phi}.neZ​=0 for ce​<1+ϕ1​,neZ​=2 for 1+ϕ1​≤ce​<ceZ​,neZ​=1 for ceZ​≤ce​<1+ϕ2​.
  1. Proposition 6(b): the same structure for neNn_e^NneN​ with a threshold ceNc_e^NceN​.
  2. Proposition 8(a): ceN<ceS≤ceCc_e^N < c_e^S \le c_e^CceN​<ceS​≤ceC​.

Significance

Proposition 8(d) says that a common retailer who sells information prefers to sell it sequentially, and that the manufacturers bear the cost: sequential offers let her extract a larger payment from the first manufacturer, because his outside option depends on what she will do with the second. Together with Propositions 6 and 7 it explains why retailers under production economy share with only a subset of suppliers once economies of scale or competition are strong, and why a retailer may share data for free, a practice the diseconomy model cannot produce.

The results are proved in the paper, partly by "it is straightforward" arguments (the proofs of Lemmas 2–5 are omitted). No part of the paper is formalized. A formalization adds a machine-checked account of the equilibrium selection at the boundary payments, where the paper's case analysis is informal, and of the points at which the retailer is indifferent between outcomes.

Difficulty

The pricing stage is a Bayesian game with a continuum of strategies: an informed manufacturer's strategy is an arbitrary square-integrable function of the signal. Lemma 1's uniqueness needs the Assumption (without it the manufacturer's problem is not concave) and a conditional-expectation argument, not a finite-dimensional computation. The comparisons of Lemma 5 are sign conditions on rational functions of (ce,ϕ)(c_e, \phi)(ce​,ϕ) whose thresholds ceac_e^acea​, ceNc_e^NceN​ are implicit roots. The contracting stage is where the naive argument fails: at the boundary payments several equilibria give the retailer the same payoff but the manufacturers different payoffs, so "the" outcome is not well defined there, and a direct comparison of closed-form profits at the paper's selected equilibria does not cover every equilibrium.

Formalization scope

Lean represents manufacturers by Fin 2, statuses by an inductive type with informed and uninformed, and a pricing strategy by a function of the signal value. The committed conventions are these.

  1. Admissible strategies are measurable with square-integrable wi(Y)w_i(Y)wi​(Y), and constant for an uninformed manufacturer; ex ante optimality over them is the Bayesian equilibrium condition.
  2. The retailer's rule is a best response for every wholesale price pair and signal value, off path included.
  3. The production cost is the uncapped quadratic bq−ceq2bq - c_e q^2bq−ce​q2. The paper caps the quantity at qˉ=b/(2ce)\bar q = b/(2c_e)qˉ​=b/(2ce​) but assumes the cap is reached with negligible probability (footnote 11, p. 251) and computes every result of §4.2 and §6 without it. The condition b<ab < ab<a of that footnote is not imposed.
  4. Contracting uses pure strategies, nonnegative payments, and no free-sharing move after a rejection.
  5. A concurrent outcome is a payment and a pure equilibrium whose retailer payoff equals the supremum of her payoffs over Pareto-optimal equilibria. The supremum is not always attained: for large cec_ece​ the paper's optimal payment πMI(1)−πM(0)\pi_M^I(1) - \pi_M(0)πMI​(1)−πM​(0) makes (U,U)(U,U)(U,U) an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the one-informed outcome it selects.
  6. Threshold statements take the two-clause form: the stated value of nnn is attained on each region with its printed endpoints, and is the only value on the region's interior. Thresholds depend only on ϕ\phiϕ and are quantified before all other parameters.
  7. The manufacturers' comparison in the goal excludes at most two values of cec_ece​. At the thresholds ceCc_e^CceC​, ceSc_e^SceS​ outcomes with different manufacturer totals coexist, and the universal comparison fails.
  8. A correction of the paper. At ce∗=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)]c_e^* = (2+3\phi)/[(1+2\phi)(1+\phi)]ce∗​=(2+3ϕ)/[(1+2ϕ)(1+ϕ)], which lies in (1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ))(1/(1+\phi), 2/(1+\phi))(1/(1+ϕ),2/(1+ϕ)), the slope of the best-response wholesale price (2) is exactly −1-1−1. The equations wi=w^i(wj)w_i = \hat w_i(w_j)wi​=w^i​(wj​) are then singular, and every status profile has a continuum of pricing equilibria (for n=0n = 0n=0, w1,2=wˉ±tw_{1,2} = \bar w \pm tw1,2​=wˉ±t for every ttt) whose ex ante profits differ. Lemma 1's uniqueness claim fails there, so do the §4.2 identities for every equilibrium family, and so does every statement built on them. Each statement that quantifies over all pricing equilibria therefore assumes ce≠ce∗c_e \ne c_e^*ce​=ce∗​; existence is still asserted at ce∗c_e^*ce∗​.

The ex ante profits in every statement are those of an equilibrium of the pricing game on the signal model, not the §4.2 closed forms; a formalization that defined them by the closed forms would reduce the goal to algebra and a 2×22 \times 22×2 game, and is ruled out. The model layer (signal model, pricing equilibrium, payoff table, both contracting games) is shared, name for name, with the production diseconomy mission. Contributions are welcome on each milestone, and on reusable pieces: linear-expectation signals, and pointwise optimization under conditional expectation.

Selected references

  • Shang W., Ha A. Y., Tong S., Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer, Management Science 62(1):245–263, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2127
  • Ericson W. A., A note on the posterior mean of a population mean, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B 31(2):332–334, 1969 (cited for the formula of β(t,σ)\beta(t,\sigma)β(t,σ), which this mission does not use).
  • Vives X., Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools, MIT Press, 1999, §2.7.2.
  • Li L., Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition, Management Science 48(9):1196–1212, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.9.1196.177
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Global Convergence of Splitting Methods for Nonconvex Composite Optimization III: For Semi-Algebraic Problems the ADMM Sequence Converges and Has Finite LengthResearch Paper

Motivation

The alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) is a standard method for problems of the form min⁡xh(x)+P(Mx)\min_x h(x)+P(\mathcal Mx)minx​h(x)+P(Mx), in which a smooth loss hhh is composed with a structured, possibly nonsmooth regularizer PPP through a linear map M\mathcal MM. Its convergence theory was developed for convex problems, yet it is routinely run on nonconvex ones: sparse recovery with the ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ constraint, low-rank matrix problems, and total-variation-type models with nonconvex penalties. For such problems a practitioner wants a guarantee about the iterates actually produced, not only about the existence of good subsequences.

Li and Pong (arXiv:1407.0753v6, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4), 2015) gave the first such guarantee for the classical ADMM on nonconvex composite problems with a surjective M\mathcal MM. Their Theorem 1 shows that cluster points of the (proximal) ADMM are stationary; their Theorem 3, the subject of this mission, shows that for semi-algebraic data the whole sequence converges. The argument adapts the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz (KL) framework of Attouch, Bolte and Svaiter (Math. Program. 137, 2013) to a setting where the ADMM only decreases its merit function in the xxx-block.

Setting

Fix M:Rn→Rm\mathcal M:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^mM:Rn→Rm linear, h:Rn→Rh:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rh:Rn→R twice continuously differentiable with bounded Hessian, and P:Rm→(−∞,+∞]P:\mathbb R^m\to(-\infty,+\infty]P:Rm→(−∞,+∞] proper (finite somewhere) and closed (lower semicontinuous). For β>0\beta>0β>0 the augmented Lagrangian is

Lβ(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)−⟨z,Mx−y⟩+β2∥Mx−y∥2.L_\beta(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)-\langle z,\mathcal Mx-y\rangle+\tfrac\beta2\|\mathcal Mx-y\|^2 .Lβ​(x,y,z)=h(x)+P(y)−⟨z,Mx−y⟩+2β​∥Mx−y∥2.

The ADMM produces (xt,yt,zt)t≥0(x^t,y^t,z^t)_{t\ge0}(xt,yt,zt)t≥0​ from arbitrary (x0,z0)(x^0,z^0)(x0,z0) by

yt+1∈Arg min⁡yLβ(xt,y,zt),xt+1∈Arg min⁡xLβ(x,yt+1,zt),zt+1=zt−β(Mxt+1−yt+1).y^{t+1}\in\operatorname*{Arg\,min}_y L_\beta(x^t,y,z^t),\quad x^{t+1}\in\operatorname*{Arg\,min}_x L_\beta(x,y^{t+1},z^t),\quad z^{t+1}=z^t-\beta(\mathcal Mx^{t+1}-y^{t+1}).yt+1∈yArgmin​Lβ​(xt,y,zt),xt+1∈xArgmin​Lβ​(x,yt+1,zt),zt+1=zt−β(Mxt+1−yt+1).

Assumption 1 with T1=0\mathcal T_1=0T1​=0 asks for σ,δ>0\sigma,\delta>0σ,δ>0, γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) and symmetric maps Q1,Q2,Q3\mathcal Q_1,\mathcal Q_2,\mathcal Q_3Q1​,Q2​,Q3​ with MM∗⪰σI\mathcal M\mathcal M^*\succeq\sigma\mathcal IMM∗⪰σI, Q1⪰∇2h(x)⪰Q2\mathcal Q_1\succeq\nabla^2h(x)\succeq\mathcal Q_2Q1​⪰∇2h(x)⪰Q2​ and Q3⪰[∇2h(x)]2\mathcal Q_3\succeq[\nabla^2h(x)]^2Q3​⪰[∇2h(x)]2 for all xxx, Q2+βM∗M⪰δI\mathcal Q_2+\beta\mathcal M^*\mathcal M\succeq\delta\mathcal IQ2​+βM∗M⪰δI, and δI≻2σβγQ3\delta\mathcal I\succ\frac{2}{\sigma\beta\gamma}\mathcal Q_3δI≻σβγ2​Q3​.

The limiting subdifferential ∂f(x)\partial f(x)∂f(x) of fff consists of limits vvv of regular subgradients vtv^tvt at points xt→xx^t\to xxt→x with f(xt)→f(x)f(x^t)\to f(x)f(xt)→f(x). A point xxx is stationary if 0∈∇h(x)+M∗∂P(Mx)0\in\nabla h(x)+\mathcal M^*\partial P(\mathcal Mx)0∈∇h(x)+M∗∂P(Mx).

A set in RN\mathbb R^NRN is semi-algebraic if it is a finite union of sets cut out by finitely many polynomial equations pi=0p_i=0pi​=0 and strict inequalities gj<0g_j<0gj​<0; a function is semi-algebraic if its graph is. A proper fff has the KL property at x^∈dom⁡∂f\hat x\in\operatorname{dom}\partial fx^∈dom∂f if there are η>0\eta>0η>0, a neighbourhood VVV of x^\hat xx^ and a continuous concave φ:[0,η)→R+\varphi:[0,\eta)\to\mathbb R_+φ:[0,η)→R+​ with φ(0)=0\varphi(0)=0φ(0)=0, φ∈C1(0,η)\varphi\in C^1(0,\eta)φ∈C1(0,η), φ′>0\varphi'>0φ′>0, such that φ′(f(x)−f(x^)) dist⁡(0,∂f(x))≥1\varphi'(f(x)-f(\hat x))\,\operatorname{dist}(0,\partial f(x))\ge1φ′(f(x)−f(x^))dist(0,∂f(x))≥1 whenever x∈Vx\in Vx∈V and f(x^)<f(x)<f(x^)+ηf(\hat x)<f(x)<f(\hat x)+\etaf(x^)<f(x)<f(x^)+η. A KL function is proper, closed, and KL at every point of dom⁡∂f\operatorname{dom}\partial fdom∂f.

In the Lean development LβL_\betaLβ​ is augLag h P M β x y z, and also augLagX h P M β as a single function on the triple space Rn×Rm×Rm\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^m\times\mathbb R^mRn×Rm×Rm with the Euclidean inner product.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 13)

Under the standing assumptions and Assumption 1 with T1=0\mathcal T_1=0T1​=0, if hhh and PPP are semi-algebraic and the ADMM sequence has a cluster point (x∗,y∗,z∗)(x^*,y^*,z^*)(x∗,y∗,z∗), then

(xt,yt,zt)→(x∗,y∗,z∗),0∈∇h(x∗)+M∗∂P(Mx∗),∑t∥xt+1−xt∥<∞.(x^t,y^t,z^t)\to(x^*,y^*,z^*),\qquad 0\in\nabla h(x^*)+\mathcal M^*\partial P(\mathcal Mx^*),\qquad \sum_{t}\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|<\infty .(xt,yt,zt)→(x∗,y∗,z∗),0∈∇h(x∗)+M∗∂P(Mx∗),t∑​∥xt+1−xt∥<∞.

No constants are fixed: every parameter is quantified exactly as in the paper.

Milestones

  1. (35): some w∈∂Lβ(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1)w\in\partial L_\beta(x^{t+1},y^{t+1},z^{t+1})w∈∂Lβ​(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1) has ∥w∥≤C∥xt+1−xt∥\|w\|\le C\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|∥w∥≤C∥xt+1−xt∥ for t≥1t\ge1t≥1.
  2. (36): Lβ(xt,yt,zt)−Lβ(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1)≥D∥xt+1−xt∥2L_\beta(x^t,y^t,z^t)-L_\beta(x^{t+1},y^{t+1},z^{t+1})\ge D\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|^2Lβ​(xt,yt,zt)−Lβ​(xt+1,yt+1,zt+1)≥D∥xt+1−xt∥2 for t≥1t\ge1t≥1.
  3. (39): Lβ(xt,yt,zt)→Lβ(x∗,y∗,z∗)L_\beta(x^t,y^t,z^t)\to L_\beta(x^*,y^*,z^*)Lβ​(xt,yt,zt)→Lβ​(x∗,y∗,z∗).
  4. Finite termination when LβL_\betaLβ​ reaches its limit value.
  5. (41): the one-step KL estimate.
  6. Remark 4(1): the goal with "LβL_\betaLβ​ is a KL function" in place of semi-algebraicity.
  7. LβL_\betaLβ​ is semi-algebraic when hhh and PPP are.
  8. Proper closed semi-algebraic functions are KL functions, with φ(s)=cs1−θ\varphi(s)=cs^{1-\theta}φ(s)=cs1−θ.

Milestones 6, 7 and 8 together imply the goal.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 upgrades subsequential convergence to convergence of the whole iterate sequence, with finite length of the xxx-trajectory, for a nonconvex ADMM without any convexity of hhh or PPP. Semi-algebraicity covers the paper's applications: polynomial losses, the ℓ0\ell_0ℓ0​ constraint, and indicators of polyhedral or algebraic sets. Remark 4(1) isolates the only property actually used, the KL property of LβL_\betaLβ​, so the result extends to any class of functions for which that property is known (for instance, globally subanalytic or o-minimal definable data).

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper and, as far as is known, formalized nowhere. The mission produces a machine-checked version of the paper's convergence argument, a Lean definition of the KL property with the correct convention for empty subdifferentials, and a semi-algebraic set predicate over MvPolynomial. Milestone 8 is a published theorem of real algebraic geometry and nonsmooth analysis (Bolte–Daniilidis–Lewis 2007) that the paper quotes without proof; it is part of what a complete development of the goal requires.

Difficulty

The obvious route is to invoke the abstract convergence theorem of Attouch–Bolte–Svaiter for descent methods. It does not apply: its sufficient-decrease hypothesis requires LβL_\betaLβ​ to drop by a multiple of ∥xt+1−xt∥2+∥yt+1−yt∥2+∥zt+1−zt∥2\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|^2+\|y^{t+1}-y^t\|^2+\|z^{t+1}-z^t\|^2∥xt+1−xt∥2+∥yt+1−yt∥2+∥zt+1−zt∥2, while the ADMM only guarantees a drop proportional to ∥xt+1−xt∥2\|x^{t+1}-x^t\|^2∥xt+1−xt∥2 (Remark 4(2)). The relative-error bound (35) is likewise in terms of the xxx-step alone, and relating the yyy- and zzz-blocks back to the xxx-block uses the surjectivity of M\mathcal MM and the specific structure of the multiplier update. The neighbourhood on which the KL inequality holds is a neighbourhood of the full triple, whereas the trajectory is controlled only in xxx.

The semi-algebraic part has a separate difficulty: showing that LβL_\betaLβ​ is semi-algebraic needs closure of semi-algebraic sets under projection (the Tarski–Seidenberg theorem), and the KL property of semi-algebraic functions needs the Łojasiewicz inequality for subanalytic or semi-algebraic functions. Mathlib has neither.

Formalization scope

Spaces are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n); M\mathcal MM is a continuous linear map and M∗\mathcal M^*M∗ its adjoint. PPP and LβL_\betaLβ​ take values in EReal, never passed through toReal except where the value is provably finite. ⪰\succeq⪰ is Mathlib's Loewner order on self-maps; the Hessian is fderiv ℝ (gradient h). The ADMM is the proximal-ADMM relation with ϕ=0\phi=0ϕ=0; argmin steps are "value at most the value anywhere", with no uniqueness; y0y^0y0 is unconstrained. The triple space is the nested L2L^2L2 product, so its inner product is the sum of the block inner products.

The KL inequality is stated for every v∈∂f(x)v\in\partial f(x)v∈∂f(x), which encodes dist⁡(0,∅)=+∞\operatorname{dist}(0,\emptyset)=+\inftydist(0,∅)=+∞. Writing it with Metric.infDist 0 (∂f x) would give dist⁡(0,∅)=0\operatorname{dist}(0,\emptyset)=0dist(0,∅)=0 and make the KL property fail at every point with empty subdifferential, so that "semi-algebraic implies KL" becomes false and the goal becomes a statement about a different notion. The KL property is required only at points of dom⁡∂f\operatorname{dom}\partial fdom∂f, only on a neighbourhood and only for values in (f(x^),f(x^)+η)(f(\hat x),f(\hat x)+\eta)(f(x^),f(x^)+η); φ\varphiφ is differentiable only on the open interval. Semi-algebraicity of an extended-valued function is that of its graph over its real values. η\etaη is a positive real, which is equivalent to the paper's η∈(0,∞]\eta\in(0,\infty]η∈(0,∞].

The hypotheses ϕ=0\phi=0ϕ=0 and T1=0\mathcal T_1=0T1​=0 are part of the theorem, not a simplification: the analogous statement for the proximal ADMM is open (Remark 4(3)). The cluster point is assumed, not derived.

Needed infrastructure: calculus of the limiting subdifferential (a smooth-plus-separable sum rule), the Tarski–Seidenberg theorem, and the Łojasiewicz/KL inequality for semi-algebraic functions. The last two are reusable far beyond this mission; contributions toward them, and toward the analytic core (milestones 1–6), are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Li, T. K. Pong, Global convergence of splitting methods for nonconvex composite optimization, SIAM J. Optim. 25(4), 2015. https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.0753 (v6 is the cited version)
  • H. Attouch, J. Bolte, P. Redont, A. Soubeyran, Proximal alternating minimization and projection methods for nonconvex problems: an approach based on the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz inequality, Math. Oper. Res. 35(2), 2010. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0449
  • H. Attouch, J. Bolte, B. F. Svaiter, Convergence of descent methods for semi-algebraic and tame problems, Math. Program. 137, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-011-0484-9
  • J. Bolte, A. Daniilidis, A. Lewis, The Łojasiewicz inequality for nonsmooth subanalytic functions with applications to subgradient dynamical systems, SIAM J. Optim. 17(4), 2007. https://doi.org/10.1137/050644641
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games II: Equilibrium Adoption Rates of Information Systems Are the Minimizers of the Equilibrium PotentialResearch Paper

Motivation

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers private, noisy signals about the state of the road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, their subscribers act on different information, and the congestion each population experiences depends on how all of them route. A question then arises for transport planners and for the information providers themselves: if travelers are free to choose which system to subscribe to, which market shares of the competing systems are stable?

Wu, Amin and Ozdaglar (Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021; preprint arXiv:1808.10590) model this situation as a Bayesian routing game with heterogeneous information and answer the question exactly: the equilibrium adoption rates are the minimizers of a convex function of the population sizes, the equilibrium value of a weighted potential. This mission formalizes that characterization (Theorem 4 of the paper) together with the results its proof rests on. A companion mission (Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I) formalizes the paper's other main result, the sign and monotonicity of the relative value of information between two populations.

Setting

A Bayesian routing game Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ) has a single origin–destination pair, a finite set of edges E\mathcal EE and a finite nonempty set of routes R\mathcal RR (each route a set of edges), and a finite set of network states S\mathcal SS. Travelers of total demand D>0D>0D>0 are split into populations i∈Ii\in\mathcal Ii∈I, one per TIS; population iii has size λiD\lambda^iDλiD, where the size vector λ\lambdaλ lies in the simplex Δ={λ:λi≥0, ∑iλi=1}\Delta=\{\lambda:\lambda^i\ge0,\ \sum_i\lambda^i=1\}Δ={λ:λi≥0, ∑i​λi=1}. Each population receives a signal (its type) tit^iti from a finite set Ti\mathcal T^iTi; states and type profiles t=(ti)it=(t^i)_it=(ti)i​ are drawn from a common prior π∈Δ(S×T)\pi\in\Delta(\mathcal S\times\mathcal T)π∈Δ(S×T). Edge eee in state sss has cost ces(w)c^s_e(w)ces​(w) at load www, positive, strictly increasing and differentiable.

A strategy profile qqq assigns to each population and type a split qri(ti)≥0q^i_r(t^i)\ge0qri​(ti)≥0 of its demand over routes, with ∑rqri(ti)=λiD\sum_rq^i_r(t^i)=\lambda^iD∑r​qri​(ti)=λiD; these form the polytope Q(λ)\mathcal Q(\lambda)Q(λ). It induces route flows fr(t)=∑iqri(ti)f_r(t)=\sum_iq^i_r(t^i)fr​(t)=∑i​qri​(ti) and edge loads we(t)=∑r∋efr(t)w_e(t)=\sum_{r\ni e}f_r(t)we​(t)=∑r∋e​fr​(t). A traveler of population iii with signal tit^iti forms the belief βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr⁡(ti)\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)=\pi(s,t^i,t^{-i})/\Pr(t^i)βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr(ti) and evaluates the expected route cost E[cr(q)∣ti]=∑s,t−i∑e∈rβi(s,t−i∣ti) ces(we(t))\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]=\sum_{s,t^{-i}}\sum_{e\in r}\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)\,c^s_e(w_e(t))E[cr​(q)∣ti]=∑s,t−i​∑e∈r​βi(s,t−i∣ti)ces​(we​(t)). A Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium (BWE) is a q∈Q(λ)q\in\mathcal Q(\lambda)q∈Q(λ) in which every type uses only routes of minimal expected cost. The equilibrium population cost is

Ci∗(λ)=∑ti∈TiPr⁡(ti)min⁡r∈RE[cr(q∗)∣ti].C^{i*}(\lambda)=\sum_{t^i\in\mathcal T^i}\Pr(t^i)\min_{r\in\mathcal R}\mathbb E[c_r(q^*)\mid t^i].Ci∗(λ)=ti∈Ti∑​Pr(ti)r∈Rmin​E[cr​(q∗)∣ti].

The weighted potential is Φ(q)=∑s,e,tπ(s,t)∫0we(t)ces(z) dz\Phi(q)=\sum_{s,e,t}\pi(s,t)\int_0^{w_e(t)}c^s_e(z)\,dzΦ(q)=∑s,e,t​π(s,t)∫0we​(t)​ces​(z)dz, and Ψ(λ)=min⁡q∈Q(λ)Φ(q)\Psi(\lambda)=\min_{q\in\mathcal Q(\lambda)}\Phi(q)Ψ(λ)=minq∈Q(λ)​Φ(q) is its equilibrium value. In route-flow form, Φ^(f)\widehat\Phi(f)Φ(f) is the same expression in terms of fff; route flows satisfy linear constraints (14a)–(14c) (a separability condition across populations, total demand DDD, nonnegativity) and one information impact constraint per population, J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD, where J^i(f)=D−∑rmin⁡tifr(ti,t^−i)\widehat J^i(f)=D-\sum_r\min_{t^i}f_r(t^i,\widehat t^{-i})Ji(f)=D−∑r​minti​fr​(ti,t−i) measures how much of the demand reacts to population iii's signal. Let F†\mathcal F^\daggerF† be the set of minimizers of Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ subject to (14a)–(14c) only, and

Λ†={λ∈Δ: ∃f†∈F†, J^i(f†)≤λiD  ∀i}.\Lambda^\dagger=\{\lambda\in\Delta:\ \exists f^\dagger\in\mathcal F^\dagger,\ \widehat J^i(f^\dagger)\le\lambda^iD\ \ \forall i\}.Λ†={λ∈Δ: ∃f†∈F†, Ji(f†)≤λiD  ∀i}.

In the two-stage game, travelers first choose a TIS, inducing λ\lambdaλ, and then play Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ). A size vector is a vector of equilibrium adoption rates if no traveler gains by switching TIS:

λi>0 ⟹ Ci∗(λ)=min⁡j∈ICj∗(λ)∀i∈I.(31)\lambda^i>0\ \Longrightarrow\ C^{i*}(\lambda)=\min_{j\in\mathcal I}C^{j*}(\lambda)\qquad\forall i\in\mathcal I.\tag{31}λi>0 ⟹ Ci∗(λ)=j∈Imin​Cj∗(λ)∀i∈I.(31)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

For every λ∈Δ\lambda\in\Deltaλ∈Δ and every BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ),

(31) holds  ⟺  λ∈Λ†.(31)\ \text{holds}\iff\lambda\in\Lambda^\dagger .(31) holds⟺λ∈Λ†.

With the existence of a BWE for every λ∈Δ\lambda\in\Deltaλ∈Δ, this is the paper's statement that the set of equilibrium adoption rates is Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ†.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 1. qqq is a BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ) iff qqq minimizes Φ\PhiΦ over Q(λ)\mathcal Q(\lambda)Q(λ); the equilibrium edge load w∗(λ)w^*(\lambda)w∗(λ) is unique.
  2. Proposition 2. A route flow in the flow polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ) ((14a)–(14c) plus all information impact constraints) is an equilibrium flow iff it minimizes Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ over F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ).
  3. Lemma 5. Ψ\PsiΨ is convex on Δ\DeltaΔ, and with zij=ei−ejz^{ij}=e_i-e_jzij=ei​−ej​ and Vij∗=Cj∗−Ci∗V^{ij*}=C^{j*}-C^{i*}Vij∗=Cj∗−Ci∗,
lim⁡ϵ→0+Ψ(λ+ϵzij)−Ψ(λ)ϵ=−D Vij∗(λ).\lim_{\epsilon\to0^+}\frac{\Psi(\lambda+\epsilon z^{ij})-\Psi(\lambda)}{\epsilon}=-D\,V^{ij*}(\lambda).ϵ→0+lim​ϵΨ(λ+ϵzij)−Ψ(λ)​=−DVij∗(λ).
  1. Proposition 5. Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ† is convex, Λ†=argmin⁡λ∈ΔΨ(λ)\Lambda^\dagger=\operatorname{argmin}_{\lambda\in\Delta}\Psi(\lambda)Λ†=argminλ∈Δ​Ψ(λ), and the equilibrium edge load equals the size-independent load w†w^\daggerw† of F†\mathcal F^\daggerF† iff λ∈Λ†\lambda\in\Lambda^\daggerλ∈Λ†.

A separate item states the existence of a BWE for every λ∈Δ\lambda\in\Deltaλ∈Δ.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 reduces a question about a two-stage game with a continuum of travelers and private signals to the minimization of one convex function over a simplex. It shows that the stable market shares form a convex set, generally not a single point, so each system's equilibrium adoption rate ranges over an interval; and that this set is determined by the joint information environment of all systems, not by each system's signal alone. On ˆ\Lambda^\daggerˆ the equilibrium edge load does not depend on the shares at all, which identifies when changes in market shares leave congestion unchanged.

Formalizing it. The proofs of Theorem 1, Proposition 2 and Proposition 5 are in the paper's online e-companion, and Lemma 5 relies on sensitivity results for parametric convex programs cited from the literature. No part of this development has, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A complete formalization would produce a verified potential-game characterization of Bayesian Wardrop equilibria with heterogeneous information and a verified directional-derivative formula for the optimal value of a parametric convex program; nothing comparable is currently on the platform (the existing Wardrop development covers complete information only).

Difficulty

The direction "λ∈Λ†\lambda\in\Lambda^\daggerλ∈Λ† implies (31)" is not a pointwise statement about costs: it follows from Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ† being the argmin of Ψ\PsiΨ together with the formula linking directional derivatives of Ψ\PsiΨ to cost differences. Both are hard. The derivative formula (26) is a statement about the optimal value of a convex program whose feasible set moves with λ\lambdaλ; its standard proofs pass through uniqueness of Lagrange multipliers, which fails exactly at the degenerate size vectors (λi=0\lambda^i=0λi=0) that Theorem 4 must cover, since an unused TIS is a legitimate outcome. The identity Λ†=argmin⁡Ψ\Lambda^\dagger=\operatorname{argmin}\PsiΛ†=argminΨ needs the route-flow reformulation (Proposition 2), in which the size vector enters only through the information impact constraints, and the uniqueness of the minimizing edge load. The natural first idea, comparing population costs directly at a given equilibrium, gives no handle on which size vectors make them equal.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace BayesRouting.Adoption. Populations, types, states, edges and routes are finite types; type spaces and the route set are nonempty; routes are edge sets. The game is a structure whose fields include the paper's standing assumptions: the prior is a probability distribution, D>0D>0D>0, and each cost is positive on nonnegative loads, strictly increasing and differentiable (on all of R\mathbb RR, which loses no generality). One assumption is added: every type profile has positive probability. Without it the equilibrium edge load need not be unique and the beliefs can be undefined; it excludes the paper's Example 2(i) (perfectly correlated signals).

Conventions: size vectors range over the probability simplex; Ψ\PsiΨ is the infimum of Φ\PhiΦ over Q(λ)\mathcal Q(\lambda)Q(λ) and is only compared at points of the simplex (outside it the feasible set can be empty and the value is a default); Ci∗C^{i*}Ci∗ is the last form of the paper's (7), well defined when λi=0\lambda^i=0λi=0; J^i\widehat J^iJi is the maximum over reference profiles, which equals the paper's value on flows satisfying (14a); equilibrium statements are made for every BWE rather than for "the" equilibrium; F†\mathcal F^\daggerF† and similar sets are argmin sets. Lemma 5 is stated for the directions zijz^{ij}zij with λj>0\lambda^j>0λj>0 (otherwise λ+ϵzij\lambda+\epsilon z^{ij}λ+ϵzij leaves the simplex); λi=0\lambda^i=0λi=0 is allowed.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the existence of a BWE is its own item, so "for every BWE" is not vacuous, and Λ†\Lambda^\daggerΛ† is defined by (30) from the flow problem (28), not as the argmin of Ψ\PsiΨ, so the goal is not a restatement of Proposition 5.

Infrastructure a complete development needs: KKT conditions for convex programs with linear constraints, convexity of integrals of increasing functions, compactness arguments for existence of minimizers, and one-sided directional derivatives of optimal-value functions. The last two are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any item, and of auxiliary lemmas such as Proposition 1 of the paper (feasible route flows form the polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. Wu, S. Amin, A. E. Ozdaglar, Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1999 (preprint: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.10590)
  • W. H. Sandholm, Potential games with continuous player sets, Journal of Economic Theory 97(1):81–108, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2696
  • A. V. Fiacco, J. Kyparisis, Convexity and concavity properties of the optimal value function in parametric nonlinear programming, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 48(1):95–126, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00938592
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Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games I: Sign and Monotonicity of the Relative Value of Information Across Size RegimesResearch Paper

Motivation

Traffic information systems (TIS) such as navigation apps send drivers noisy signals about the state of a road network: incidents, weather, closures. When several such systems coexist, each with its own subscriber base and its own information, a natural question for operators and regulators is whether subscribing to one system rather than another actually lowers a driver's expected travel cost in equilibrium, and how this advantage depends on how many drivers use each system. More information for one population also changes the congestion everybody else faces, so the answer is not simply "more information is better".

Wu, Amin and Ozdaglar (Operations Research 69(1), 2021) answer this question for nonatomic routing games with heterogeneous, possibly correlated information. Their model builds on the weighted potential game framework of Sandholm (2001) and on sensitivity analysis of convex programs. This mission formalizes their Section 5 result: for any two populations the sign of the relative value of information is determined by which of three explicitly computable size regimes the population sizes lie in, and the relative value decreases as one population grows at the expense of the other.

Setting

A Bayesian routing game has a finite set of populations I\mathcal II, one per TIS, a finite set of network states S\mathcal SS, and for each population iii a finite nonempty type space Ti\mathcal T^iTi of signals. A common prior π\piπ is a probability distribution on S×T\mathcal S\times\mathcal TS×T, T=∏iTi\mathcal T=\prod_i\mathcal T^iT=∏i​Ti. A network with a single origin–destination pair has edges E\mathcal EE and a finite nonempty set of routes R\mathcal RR; each edge has a state-dependent cost cesc^s_eces​ that is positive, strictly increasing and differentiable. The total demand is D>0D>0D>0, and population iii carries the fraction λi\lambda^iλi of it, with λi≥0\lambda^i\ge0λi≥0 and ∑iλi=1\sum_i\lambda^i=1∑i​λi=1.

A strategy profile qqq assigns to each population iii and type tit^iti a split qri(ti)≥0q^i_r(t^i)\ge0qri​(ti)≥0 of its demand λiD\lambda^iDλiD over routes. It induces the route flow fr(t)=∑iqri(ti)f_r(t)=\sum_iq^i_r(t^i)fr​(t)=∑i​qri​(ti) and the edge load we(t)=∑r∋efr(t)w_e(t)=\sum_{r\ni e}f_r(t)we​(t)=∑r∋e​fr​(t). With the belief βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr⁡(ti)\beta^i(s,t^{-i}\mid t^i)=\pi(s,t^i,t^{-i})/\Pr(t^i)βi(s,t−i∣ti)=π(s,ti,t−i)/Pr(ti), type tit^iti evaluates route rrr by its expected cost E[cr(q)∣ti]\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]E[cr​(q)∣ti]. A Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium (BWE) is a feasible qqq in which every type uses only routes of minimal expected cost. The equilibrium population cost is Ci∗(λ)=∑tiPr⁡(ti)min⁡rE[cr(q)∣ti]C^{i*}(\lambda)=\sum_{t^i}\Pr(t^i)\min_r\mathbb E[c_r(q)\mid t^i]Ci∗(λ)=∑ti​Pr(ti)minr​E[cr​(q)∣ti] at a BWE qqq.

The game has a weighted potential Φ(q)=∑s,e,tπ(s,t)∫0we(t)ces(z) dz\Phi(q)=\sum_{s,e,t}\pi(s,t)\int_0^{w_e(t)}c^s_e(z)\,dzΦ(q)=∑s,e,t​π(s,t)∫0we​(t)​ces​(z)dz; its minimum over feasible profiles is the equilibrium potential value Ψ(λ)\Psi(\lambda)Ψ(λ). For two populations i≠ji\ne ji=j, the direction zijz^{ij}zij moves demand share from jjj to iii, and ∣λ−ij∣|\lambda^{-ij}|∣λ−ij∣ is the total share of the other populations. The impact of information J^i(f)\widehat J^i(f)Ji(f) measures how much of population iii's demand is moved by its signal. Two thresholds λ‾i≤λ‾i\underline\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^iλ​i≤λi are computed from the optimal set Fij,†\mathcal F^{ij,\dagger}Fij,† of an auxiliary convex program over route flows in which the separate information constraints of iii and jjj are merged. They define three regimes: Λ1ij\Lambda^{ij}_1Λ1ij​ (λi<λ‾i\lambda^i<\underline\lambda^iλi<λ​i), Λ2ij\Lambda^{ij}_2Λ2ij​ (λ‾i≤λi≤λ‾i\underline\lambda^i\le\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^iλ​i≤λi≤λi) and Λ3ij\Lambda^{ij}_3Λ3ij​ (λi>λ‾i\lambda^i>\overline\lambda^iλi>λi). The relative value of information is Vij∗(λ)=Cj∗(λ)−Ci∗(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda)=C^{j*}(\lambda)-C^{i*}(\lambda)Vij∗(λ)=Cj∗(λ)−Ci∗(λ).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

For i≠ji\ne ji=j and admissible λ\lambdaλ (in the simplex with λi,λj>0\lambda^i,\lambda^j>0λi,λj>0), and every BWE of Γ(λ)\Gamma(\lambda)Γ(λ),

Vij∗(λ)>0 on Λ1ij,Vij∗(λ)=0 on Λ2ij,Vij∗(λ)<0 on Λ3ij,V^{ij*}(\lambda)>0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_1,\qquad V^{ij*}(\lambda)=0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_2,\qquad V^{ij*}(\lambda)<0 \text{ on } \Lambda^{ij}_3,Vij∗(λ)>0 on Λ1ij​,Vij∗(λ)=0 on Λ2ij​,Vij∗(λ)<0 on Λ3ij​,

and Vij∗V^{ij*}Vij∗ is nonincreasing along zijz^{ij}zij: Vij∗(λ+εzij)≤Vij∗(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda+\varepsilon z^{ij})\le V^{ij*}(\lambda)Vij∗(λ+εzij)≤Vij∗(λ) for ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 with both endpoints admissible.

Milestones

The route to the goal follows the paper: Lemma 1 (weighted potential), Lemma 2 (strict convexity of the edge-load potential), Theorem 1 (equilibria are the minimizers of Φ\PhiΦ; unique edge load), Lemma 3 (unique Lagrange multipliers), Proposition 1 (the feasible route flows form a polytope F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), Proposition 2 (equilibrium route flows minimize Φ^\widehat\PhiΦ over F(λ)\mathcal F(\lambda)F(λ)), Lemma 4 (0≤λ‾i≤λ‾i≤1−∣λ−ij∣0\le\underline\lambda^i\le\overline\lambda^i\le1-|\lambda^{-ij}|0≤λ​i≤λi≤1−∣λ−ij∣), Theorem 2 (equilibrium flows in each regime), Proposition 3 (Ψ\PsiΨ decreases, stays constant, increases along zijz^{ij}zij in the three regimes) and Lemma 5 (Ψ\PsiΨ is convex and directionally differentiable, and Vij∗(λ)=−1D∇zijΨ(λ)V^{ij*}(\lambda)=-\frac1D\nabla_{z^{ij}}\Psi(\lambda)Vij∗(λ)=−D1​∇zij​Ψ(λ)).

Significance

Theorem 3 says that a population has an advantage over another exactly when it is the minor population of the pair, relative to thresholds that depend only on the other populations' sizes. Both populations face the same equilibrium cost in the middle regime. It gives a procedure for comparing two information systems without computing equilibria for each size vector: solve one convex program, read off two thresholds, and locate λi\lambda^iλi. The paper's Section 6 uses the same machinery, through Lemma 5, to characterize the equilibrium adoption rates of information systems.

The paper proves these results with the main proofs in the article and the sensitivity-analysis lemmas (Lemmas EC.1–EC.4) in its e-companion. None of them has a machine-checked proof. The formalization requires a Lean account of Bayesian Wardrop equilibria, of the equivalence between equilibria and a convex program, and of directional derivatives of the optimal value of a parametric convex program. Parts of this are reusable for any nonatomic routing or congestion game.

Difficulty

The equilibrium strategy profile is not unique and changes discontinuously with λ\lambdaλ. Differentiating equilibrium costs in λ\lambdaλ directly therefore fails. The paper instead works with the optimal value Ψ(λ)\Psi(\lambda)Ψ(λ), whose one-sided directional derivative is expressed through Lagrange multipliers. That requires a sensitivity theorem for convex programs whose constraints depend affinely on the parameter, together with uniqueness of multipliers, which fails for populations of size zero. The regime analysis also needs a characterization of the route flows that are induced by feasible strategy profiles. That set is described by the nonlinear-looking constraint J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD, a minimum over types inside a sum over routes. Strict monotonicity of Ψ\PsiΨ in the side regimes needs the tightness of an information constraint at every equilibrium, not only at one.

Formalization scope

The model is a Lean structure BayesRouting.VOI.Game over finite types of populations, type spaces, states, edges and routes. Routes are given by their edge sets, and the directed-graph structure is not used. Type spaces and the route set are nonempty. The prior is a probability distribution, D>0D>0D>0, and costs are positive on nonnegative loads, strictly increasing and differentiable on R\mathbb RR. One assumption is added: every type profile has positive probability. It makes beliefs well defined and the equilibrium edge load unique, and it excludes perfectly correlated signals.

Conventions: Ci∗C^{i*}Ci∗ is the last form of eq. (7), which does not divide by λiD\lambda^iDλiD. J^i\widehat J^iJi is the maximum of eq. (16) over the reference profile, so that J^i(f)≤λiD\widehat J^i(f)\le\lambda^iDJi(f)≤λiD is exactly (14d). Ψ\PsiΨ and the thresholds are sInf/sSup over sets that are nonempty and compact for size vectors in the simplex, and every statement keeps size vectors there. Statements about "the" equilibrium are stated for every BWE, and existence of a BWE is a separate item, so they are not vacuous. The thresholds are defined from the optimal set of the auxiliary program, not assumed as parameters. Taking them as parameters constrained only by Lemma 4 would give a different theorem.

Disclosed deviations: Lemma 2's C2C^2C2 clause assumes C1C^1C1 costs; Lemma 3 is stated for populations of positive size; Lemma 5 assumes λj>0\lambda^j>0λj>0; Proposition 3 is stated with strict monotonicity in the side regimes, as used in the proof of Theorem 3. Contributions of reusable infrastructure are welcome: interval-integral potentials of monotone costs, KKT theory for polyhedral constraints, and directional derivatives of parametric optimal values.

Selected references

  • M. Wu, S. Amin, A. Ozdaglar, Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Operations Research 69(1):148–163, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.1999
  • W. H. Sandholm, Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets, Journal of Economic Theory 97(1):81–108, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2696
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Directional Differentiability of the Optimal Value Function in a Nonlinear Programming Problem, in Sensitivity, Stability and Parametric Analysis (Mathematical Programming Studies 21), Springer, 1984, pp. 213–226.
  • A. V. Fiacco, J. Kyparisis, Convexity and Concavity Properties of the Optimal Value Function in Parametric Nonlinear Programming, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 48(1):95–126, 1986.
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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies III: Selecting an (s, S) Policy That Is Optimal for Every Starting StockResearch Paper

Motivation

The periodic-review inventory model with a fixed ordering cost is one of the basic models of operations research. When every order incurs a set-up cost KKK in addition to holding and shortage costs, the optimal replenishment rule over an infinite horizon is, under standard convexity assumptions, a stationary (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy: whenever the stock falls below the reorder point sss, order up to the level SSS. Existence of such an optimal policy goes back to Scarf (1960) and Iglehart (1963). Knowing that an optimal (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy exists does not say how to find one, and the average cost of an (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is neither convex nor unimodal in (s,S)(s, S)(s,S).

Veinott and Wagner (Management Science 11 (1965) 525–552) gave an exact algorithm. It proceeds in three steps: (i) compute integers s‾≤sˉ≤S‾≤Sˉ\underline{s} \le \bar{s} \le \underline{S} \le \bar{S}s​≤sˉ≤S​≤Sˉ bounding an optimal policy; (ii) find the set S\mathcal SS of all policies within those bounds that minimize the cost for starting stocks below s‾\underline{s}s​; (iii) choose from S\mathcal SS a policy that is optimal for every starting stock. This mission formalizes the theory behind Step iii. It is the third mission of a series on the paper: mission I treats the renewal closed form of the discounted cost, mission II the bounds of Step i.

Setting

Demands ξ1,ξ2,…\xi_1, \xi_2, \dotsξ1​,ξ2​,… are independent non-negative integer random variables with common distribution φ\varphiφ and finite mean. Following the paper's Eq. (2), the unit purchase cost and the holding and penalty costs are combined into a single function Gα:Z→RG_\alpha : \mathbb Z \to \mathbb RGα​:Z→R, assumed convex with Gα(y)→∞G_\alpha(y) \to \inftyGα​(y)→∞ as ∣y∣→∞|y| \to \infty∣y∣→∞; the set-up cost is K≥0K \ge 0K≥0 and α\alphaα is the discount factor.

A stationary (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy, with integers s≤Ss \le Ss≤S, sets the stock after ordering to

Yt=S if Xt<s,Yt=Xt if Xt≥s,Y_t = S \text{ if } X_t < s, \qquad Y_t = X_t \text{ if } X_t \ge s,Yt​=S if Xt​<s,Yt​=Xt​ if Xt​≥s,

and the stock evolves as Xt+1=Yt−ξtX_{t+1} = Y_t - \xi_tXt+1​=Yt​−ξt​ from X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x. Its discounted cost is

f(x∣s,S)=∑t≥1αt−1E[Kδ(Yt−Xt)+Gα(Yt)],f(x \mid s, S) = \sum_{t \ge 1} \alpha^{t-1} E\bigl[K\delta(Y_t - X_t) + G_\alpha(Y_t)\bigr],f(x∣s,S)=t≥1∑​αt−1E[Kδ(Yt​−Xt​)+Gα​(Yt​)],

where δ(z)=1\delta(z) = 1δ(z)=1 for z>0z > 0z>0 and δ(0)=0\delta(0) = 0δ(0)=0, and its equivalent average cost is aα(x∣s,S)=(1−α)f(x∣s,S)a_\alpha(x \mid s, S) = (1-\alpha) f(x \mid s, S)aα​(x∣s,S)=(1−α)f(x∣s,S).

A policy (s′,S′)(s', S')(s′,S′) is optimal for a set X\mathfrak XX of integers if, for each x∈Xx \in \mathfrak Xx∈X, it minimizes aα(x∣s,S)a_\alpha(x \mid s, S)aα​(x∣s,S) over all (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies; it is optimal if it is optimal for every integer xxx. Under a fixed policy, x′x'x′ is accessible from X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x if Pr⁡(Xt=x′∣X1=x)>0\Pr(X_t = x' \mid X_1 = x) > 0Pr(Xt​=x′∣X1​=x)>0 for some t>1t > 1t>1.

Below the reorder point the cost does not depend on the starting stock; its value is written Lα(S,D)\mathcal L_\alpha(S, D)Lα​(S,D) with D=S−sD = S - sD=S−s. The bounds are: S‾\underline{S}S​ the smallest minimizer of GαG_\alphaGα​; Sˉ\bar{S}Sˉ the smallest integer ≥S‾\ge \underline{S}≥S​ with Gα(Sˉ+1)≥Gα(S‾)+αKG_\alpha(\bar{S}+1) \ge G_\alpha(\underline{S}) + \alpha KGα​(Sˉ+1)≥Gα​(S​)+αK (21); s‾\underline{s}s​ the smallest integer with Gα(s‾)≤Gα(S‾)+KG_\alpha(\underline{s}) \le G_\alpha(\underline{S}) + KGα​(s​)≤Gα​(S​)+K (22); sˉ\bar{s}sˉ the smallest integer with Gα(sˉ)≤Gα(S‾)+(1−α)KG_\alpha(\bar{s}) \le G_\alpha(\underline{S}) + (1-\alpha)KGα​(sˉ)≤Gα​(S​)+(1−α)K (23). The candidate set S\mathcal SS consists of the policies with s‾≤s≤sˉ\underline{s} \le s \le \bar{s}s​≤s≤sˉ, S‾≤S≤Sˉ\underline{S} \le S \le \bar{S}S​≤S≤Sˉ that minimize Lα(S,S−s)\mathcal L_\alpha(S, S-s)Lα​(S,S−s) among such policies.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 543)

For 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1 and (si,Si),(sj,Sj)∈S(s^i, S^i), (s^j, S^j) \in \mathcal S(si,Si),(sj,Sj)∈S: if (si,Si)(s^i, S^i)(si,Si) is optimal and every x′x'x′ with

min⁡(si,sj)≤x′<max⁡(si,sj)\min(s^i, s^j) \le x' < \max(s^i, s^j)min(si,sj)≤x′<max(si,sj)

is accessible from SjS^jSj under (sj,Sj)(s^j, S^j)(sj,Sj), then (sj,Sj)(s^j, S^j)(sj,Sj) is optimal.

Milestones

  1. §3, p. 533. For x<sx < sx<s, f(x∣s,S)=K+f(S∣s,S)f(x \mid s, S) = K + f(S \mid s, S)f(x∣s,S)=K+f(S∣s,S).
  2. Theorem 1, p. 542. For 0≤α<10 \le \alpha < 10≤α<1 and s≤s′s \le s's≤s′: if aα(x∣s,S)=aα(x∣s′,S′)a_\alpha(x \mid s, S) = a_\alpha(x \mid s', S')aα​(x∣s,S)=aα​(x∣s′,S′) for all x<s′x < s'x<s′, then equality holds for all xxx.
  3. Lemma 1, p. 543. For 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1: if (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) is optimal for X1=xX_1 = xX1​=x, it is optimal for every x′x'x′ accessible from xxx.

Significance

Theorem 2 turns the final selection step of the algorithm into a reachability check on the demand distribution: a policy of S\mathcal SS is certified optimal without comparing average costs at every starting stock. Its corollaries give checkable sufficient conditions; for example (Corollary 2.2) if φ(k)>0\varphi(k) > 0φ(k)>0 for k=1,…,sn−s1k = 1, \dots, s^n - s^1k=1,…,sn−s1, the policy of S\mathcal SS with the largest reorder point is optimal, which covers Poisson and negative binomial demand. Theorem 1 separately reduces the comparison of two policies to finitely many starting stocks.

The results are proved in the paper (Section 4 and Appendix §3). No machine-checked version is known: the platform has no discrete (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) inventory chain, no discounted cost of a stationary policy on Z\mathbb ZZ, and no accessibility notion for such a chain. The mission produces these objects together with the paper's selection theory on top of them.

Difficulty

Theorem 1 needs a renewal decomposition at the first passage of the stock below s′s's′, carried out for expectations over an unbounded integer state space with a discounted infinite sum. Lemma 1 is the delicate step. The paper's argument compares the (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy with a hybrid policy that follows (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) until the stock first reaches x′x'x′ and then switches to an optimal policy; the inequality "the hybrid cannot be better than the optimal policy" requires that some stationary (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy is optimal among all ordering policies, including non-stationary ones. That existence result is cited by the paper (Section 2), not proved there. A proof of Lemma 1 within the class of (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies alone does not go through, because the hybrid policy is not an (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace VeinottWagnerSS.Selection. The model is the structure Model: the demand distribution φ : PMF ℕ with finite mean, K ≥ 0, and G : ℤ → ℝ convex (non-decreasing forward differences) and tending to +∞+\infty+∞ at both ends. The unit cost ccc, the function LLL and the lead time λ\lambdaλ do not appear (the paper's own reduction, Eq. (2), p. 529). Stock levels are integers. stateLaw is the law of Xt+1X_{t+1}Xt+1​, obtained by iterated PMF.bind; fCost is the expected discounted cost of that chain as a real series, which converges absolutely for 0≤α<10 \le \alpha < 10≤α<1 because every YtY_tYt​ lies in [s,max⁡(x,S)][s, \max(x, S)][s,max(x,S)]. aCost is (1−α)(1-\alpha)(1−α) times fCost. Accessible uses the law of XtX_tXt​ with t>1t > 1t>1 strictly. Optimality is among (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policies (p. 536); the class of general ordering policies is not formalized.

The bounds s‾,sˉ,S‾,Sˉ\underline{s}, \bar{s}, \underline{S}, \bar{S}s​,sˉ,S​,Sˉ are infima of sets of integers; under the standing assumptions and α<1\alpha < 1α<1 these sets are nonempty and bounded below, so each bound is the least integer the paper describes. Lα(S,D)\mathcal L_\alpha(S, D)Lα​(S,D) is defined as aα(S−D−1∣S−D,S)a_\alpha(S - D - 1 \mid S - D, S)aα​(S−D−1∣S−D,S), the cost at the starting stock just below sss; that this is the common value for every x<sx < sx<s is milestone 1.

The standing assumptions are kept in every statement, including Theorem 1 and milestone 1, which do not need them; Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 are true only because of them. No printed slip was found in the three results.

Trivializing formalizations are excluded: fff is the expected cost of the stock process, not a closed formula or a fixed point of a recursion, so milestone 1 is not definitional; the bounds are the least integers of (21)–(23), not arbitrary integers, so S\mathcal SS is determined by the data; the goal does not assume that (sj,Sj)(s^j, S^j)(sj,Sj) is optimal below max⁡(si,sj)\max(s^i, s^j)max(si,sj), and Lemma 1 assumes optimality only at the single starting stock xxx.

Useful contributions beyond the milestones: summability lemmas for fCost, the Markov (one-step) equation for fCost, the first-passage decomposition, and, for Lemma 1, a formalization of general ordering policies with the existence of an optimal stationary (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) policy. The chain and cost definitions are reusable for other (s,S)(s, S)(s,S) results of the paper (Theorem 3, Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2).

Selected references

  • A. F. Veinott, Jr. and H. M. Wagner, Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies, Management Science 11(5), 525–552, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.5.525
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
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