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Operations Research

889 missions · 495 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov Chain·Captain: mikedeng1

Discrete Dynamic Programming 1: Every Finite Markov Decision Problem Has a Stationary Policy That Is Optimal for All Discount Factors Sufficiently Near 1Research Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision problem models a system that is observed once per period and controlled by choosing an action: the action earns an immediate income and determines the probabilities of the next state. Inventory control, machine replacement, queue admission and many reinforcement-learning benchmarks are of this form. With future income discounted by a factor β<1\beta<1β<1, Howard (Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, 1960) showed how to compute an optimal policy by policy improvement. The undiscounted problem (β=1\beta=1β=1) is harder, because total income is typically infinite.

David Blackwell's Discrete Dynamic Programming (Ann. Math. Statist. 33 (1962) 719–726) treats β=1\beta=1β=1 as a limit of β<1\beta<1β<1. Its Theorem 5 shows that some stationary policy is optimal simultaneously for all discount factors sufficiently close to 111. Such policies are now called Blackwell optimal, and the result is the base of sensitive discount optimality (Veinott, 1969) and of the standard textbook treatment of average-reward problems (Puterman, Markov Decision Processes, 1994, Ch. 10).

Timeline. Howard (1960): policy iteration for discounted and average-reward finite problems. Blackwell (1962): Theorem 5 (Blackwell optimal stationary policies exist) and the characterization of nearly optimal stationary policies (Theorem 4, the subject of the companion mission). Miller and Veinott (Ann. Math. Statist. 40 (1969) 366–370), Veinott (Ann. Math. Statist. 40 (1969) 1635–1660): Laurent expansions of VβV_\betaVβ​ in 1−β1-\beta1−β and nnn-discount optimality.

Setting

There are finitely many states sss and a finite set AAA of actions, every action available in every state. In state sss, action aaa yields income i(s,a)∈Ri(s,a)\in\mathbb Ri(s,a)∈R (any sign) and moves the system to state s′s's′ with probability q(s′∣s,a)q(s'\mid s,a)q(s′∣s,a); each q(⋅∣s,a)q(\cdot\mid s,a)q(⋅∣s,a) is a probability vector.

A decision rule is a function fff from states to actions; FFF is the finite set of decision rules. A policy is a sequence π={fn, n=1,2,… }\pi=\{f_n,\ n=1,2,\dots\}π={fn​, n=1,2,…} in FFF: on day nnn, in state sss, action fn(s)f_n(s)fn​(s) is used. Policies are deterministic and Markov but may change with time. The policy (f,π)(f,\pi)(f,π) uses fff on day 111 and then follows π\piπ; f(∞)f^{(\infty)}f(∞) uses fff every day and is called stationary.

For f∈Ff\in Ff∈F, r(f)r(f)r(f) is the vector (i(s,f(s)))s(i(s,f(s)))_s(i(s,f(s)))s​ and Q(f)Q(f)Q(f) the Markov matrix (q(s′∣s,f(s)))s,s′(q(s'\mid s,f(s)))_{s,s'}(q(s′∣s,f(s)))s,s′​. With Q0(π)=IQ_0(\pi)=IQ0​(π)=I and Qn(π)=Q(f1)⋯Q(fn)Q_n(\pi)=Q(f_1)\cdots Q(f_n)Qn​(π)=Q(f1​)⋯Q(fn​), the return of π\piπ at discount factor 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1 is

Vβ(π)=∑n=0∞βn Qn(π) r(fn+1),V_\beta(\pi)=\sum_{n=0}^\infty \beta^n\,Q_n(\pi)\,r(f_{n+1}),Vβ​(π)=n=0∑∞​βnQn​(π)r(fn+1​),

a vector indexed by the initial state. Vectors are compared coordinatewise; w1>w2w_1>w_2w1​>w2​ means w1≥w2w_1\ge w_2w1​≥w2​ and w1≠w2w_1\ne w_2w1​=w2​.

A policy π∗\pi^*π∗ is β\betaβ-optimal if Vβ(π∗)≥Vβ(π)V_\beta(\pi^*)\ge V_\beta(\pi)Vβ​(π∗)≥Vβ​(π) for every policy π\piπ. Following §4 of the paper, a policy is optimal if it is β\betaβ-optimal for all β\betaβ sufficiently near 111.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

There exist a decision rule fff and β0<1\beta_0<1β0​<1 such that

Vβ(f(∞)) ≥ Vβ(π)for all β∈(β0,1) and all policies π.V_\beta(f^{(\infty)})\ \ge\ V_\beta(\pi)\qquad\text{for all }\beta\in(\beta_0,1)\text{ and all policies }\pi.Vβ​(f(∞)) ≥ Vβ​(π)for all β∈(β0​,1) and all policies π.

One fff and one β0\beta_0β0​ serve every competing policy and every β∈(β0,1)\beta\in(\beta_0,1)β∈(β0​,1).

Milestones

  1. The composition rule Vβ(f,π)=L(f)Vβ(π)V_\beta(f,\pi)=L(f)V_\beta(\pi)Vβ​(f,π)=L(f)Vβ​(π), with L(f)w=r(f)+βQ(f)wL(f)w=r(f)+\beta Q(f)wL(f)w=r(f)+βQ(f)w, and its NNN-fold version (§2).
  2. Theorem 1: if Vβ(f,π∗)≤Vβ(π∗)V_\beta(f,\pi^*)\le V_\beta(\pi^*)Vβ​(f,π∗)≤Vβ​(π∗) for all f∈Ff\in Ff∈F, then π∗\pi^*π∗ is β\betaβ-optimal.
  3. Theorem 2: if Vβ(f,π)>Vβ(π)V_\beta(f,\pi)>V_\beta(\pi)Vβ​(f,π)>Vβ​(π) then Vβ(f(∞))>Vβ(π)V_\beta(f^{(\infty)})>V_\beta(\pi)Vβ​(f(∞))>Vβ​(π).
  4. Theorem 3 (policy improvement): if no action improves f(∞)f^{(\infty)}f(∞) by one step, f(∞)f^{(\infty)}f(∞) is β\betaβ-optimal; otherwise switching to improving actions gives g(∞)>f(∞)g^{(\infty)}>f^{(\infty)}g(∞)>f(∞).
  5. Corollary: for each fixed β∈[0,1)\beta\in[0,1)β∈[0,1) some stationary policy is β\betaβ-optimal.
  6. Each coordinate of Vβ(f(∞))V_\beta(f^{(\infty)})Vβ​(f(∞)) is a rational function of β\betaβ on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1) with nonvanishing denominator.
  7. Some f∗f^*f∗ is β\betaβ-optimal for a set of β\betaβ's having 111 as a limit point.
  8. If Vβ(f∗(∞))≥Vβ(g(∞))V_\beta(f^{*(\infty)})\ge V_\beta(g^{(\infty)})Vβ​(f∗(∞))≥Vβ​(g(∞)) for a set of β\betaβ's accumulating at 111, then it holds for all β\betaβ near 111.

Significance

The result. Theorem 5 shows that the infinitely many discounted problems near β=1\beta=1β=1 share a common optimal stationary policy. Such a policy is also optimal for the long-run average criterion, which settles the existence of average-optimal stationary policies in finite models without any recurrence assumption. It also justifies computing undiscounted solutions as limits of discounted ones, and it is the first case of the sensitive optimality criteria developed later.

Formalizing it. The theorem is classical and proved in the paper and in the textbooks; there is no machine-checked proof of it in Blackwell's model on the platform. A related open item, SennottDP.AvgFinite.prop_6_2_3_blackwell_optimal, states the textbook version for nonnegative costs and randomized history-dependent policies; the present mission is Blackwell's own formulation with incomes of either sign and deterministic Markov policies. A complete development also yields a verified policy improvement theorem (Theorem 3) and the rationality of discounted values in β\betaβ, both reusable for any finite-state discounted model.

Difficulty

The Corollary gives, for each β\betaβ, some optimal stationary policy, and FFF is finite, so one f∗f^*f∗ is β\betaβ-optimal for infinitely many β\betaβ accumulating at 111. The obvious argument stops there: optimality on a sequence of β\betaβ's says nothing about the β\betaβ's in between, and a pointwise limit argument cannot produce a whole interval (β0,1)(\beta_0,1)(β0​,1). The step that fails is passing from "frequently" to "eventually", and it needs structural information about how VβV_\betaVβ​ depends on β\betaβ, not just continuity. A second difficulty is the comparison class: optimality must hold against all time-dependent policies, not only the finitely many stationary ones, so the final step has to bring the Corollary back in for every β\betaβ near 111.

Formalization scope

States and actions are finite nonempty Lean types St, Act; decision rules are functions St → Act and policies are sequences ℕ → St → Act, indexed from 000 (π 0 is Blackwell's f1f_1f1​). Incomes are real-valued with no sign restriction. The law of motion law s a s' =q(s′∣s,a)=q(s'\mid s,a)=q(s′∣s,a) satisfies the published predicate IsTransitionKernel. Qn(π)Q_n(\pi)Qn​(π) is the ordered matrix product and Vβ(π)V_\beta(\pi)Vβ​(π) is the tsum of the series, which converges absolutely for 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1; every statement at a fixed β\betaβ assumes 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1, and nothing is stated for β≥1\beta\ge1β≥1. Vector inequalities are coordinatewise, and the strict order is "≥\ge≥ and ≠\ne=", not coordinatewise strict. "β\betaβ sufficiently near 111" is "there is β0<1\beta_0<1β0​<1 such that for every β∈(β0,1)\beta\in(\beta_0,1)β∈(β0​,1)". The paper's §4 phrase Vβ(π)=U(β)V_\beta(\pi)=U(\beta)Vβ​(π)=U(β) is encoded as β\betaβ-optimality, so no supremum over policies appears.

The word "optimal" has two meanings in the paper: at one fixed β\betaβ (§3, the Corollary) and for all β\betaβ near 111 (§4, Theorem 5). The Lean development keeps them apart as IsBetaOptimal β and IsOptimal. A statement of Theorem 5 at a single β\betaβ, with "there exists β\betaβ", for a set of β\betaβ's accumulating at 111, or against stationary policies only would be a different and weaker theorem; the goal rules all of these out.

Needed infrastructure: summation and shifting of the discounted series, Neumann series (I−βQ)−1=∑nβnQn(I-\beta Q)^{-1}=\sum_n\beta^nQ^n(I−βQ)−1=∑n​βnQn for stochastic QQQ, Cramer's rule to express (I−βQ)−1r(I-\beta Q)^{-1}r(I−βQ)−1r as a ratio of polynomials in β\betaβ, and the fact that a nonzero polynomial has finitely many roots. The policy improvement theorem and the rationality lemma are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • D. Blackwell, Discrete Dynamic Programming, Ann. Math. Statist. 33(2):719–726, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177704593
  • R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, Technology Press and Wiley, 1960.
  • A. F. Veinott Jr., Discrete Dynamic Programming with Sensitive Discount Optimality Criteria, Ann. Math. Statist. 40(5):1635–1660, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177697379
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999 (Proposition 6.2.3, Blackwell optimality for finite models). https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationFunctional AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Douglas–Rachford Splitting Method and the Proximal Point Algorithm for Maximal Monotone Operators: Generalized Douglas–Rachford Splitting Converges Weakly if A+B Has a Zero, Else Is UnboundedResearch Paper

Motivation

Many problems in convex optimization, variational inequalities and equilibrium modelling reduce to finding a point xxx with 0∈Ax+Bx0 \in A x + B x0∈Ax+Bx, where AAA and BBB are maximal monotone operators on a real Hilbert space H\mathcal HH: for example, minimizing f+gf + gf+g for closed proper convex f,gf, gf,g is the case A=∂fA = \partial fA=∂f, B=∂gB = \partial gB=∂g. When the resolvent of A+BA + BA+B is hard to evaluate but the resolvents of AAA and BBB separately are easy, one uses a splitting method. Douglas–Rachford splitting, introduced for monotone operators by Lions and Mercier (1979) after an alternating-direction scheme of Douglas and Rachford (1956) for the heat equation, is the most widely used one; through its dual form it underlies the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) used throughout large-scale optimization and statistics.

Eckstein and Bertsekas (MIT report LIDS-P-1919, 1989; Mathematical Programming 55, 1992) showed that Douglas–Rachford splitting is a special case of the proximal point algorithm applied to a single derived operator, the splitting operator Sλ,A,BS_{\lambda,A,B}Sλ,A,B​. This identification lets the convergence theory of the proximal point algorithm transfer to splitting, and yields a generalized method with inexact resolvent evaluations and relaxation.

Timeline.

  • Minty (1962): a monotone TTT is maximal iff I+TI + TI+T is onto.
  • Rockafellar (1976): the proximal point algorithm with variable stepsizes and summable errors converges weakly to a zero.
  • Lions and Mercier (1979): Douglas–Rachford splitting for maximal monotone AAA, BBB; its map Gλ,A,BG_{\lambda,A,B}Gλ,A,B​ is firmly nonexpansive.
  • Gol'shtein and Tret'yakov (1979): relaxed proximal iterations with factors ρk∈(0,2)\rho_k \in (0,2)ρk​∈(0,2), in finite dimension, with a fixed stepsize.
  • Eckstein and Bertsekas (1989/1992): the splitting operator; Douglas–Rachford as a proximal point method; the generalized proximal point algorithm and the generalized Douglas–Rachford method, including the case with no solution.

Setting

An operator on H\mathcal HH is a subset T⊆H×HT \subseteq \mathcal H \times \mathcal HT⊆H×H, with Tx={y∣(x,y)∈T}Tx = \{y \mid (x,y) \in T\}Tx={y∣(x,y)∈T}; it may be multivalued and partially defined. Its domain is dom⁡T={x∣Tx≠∅}\operatorname{dom} T = \{x \mid Tx \ne \emptyset\}domT={x∣Tx=∅}, its image im⁡T\operatorname{im} TimT the projection on the second coordinate, its inverse T−1={(y,x)∣(x,y)∈T}T^{-1} = \{(y,x) \mid (x,y) \in T\}T−1={(y,x)∣(x,y)∈T}. Scaling and sum are cT={(x,cy)}cT = \{(x, cy)\}cT={(x,cy)} and A+B={(x,y+z)∣(x,y)∈A,(x,z)∈B}A + B = \{(x, y+z) \mid (x,y) \in A, (x,z) \in B\}A+B={(x,y+z)∣(x,y)∈A,(x,z)∈B}; III is the identity. TTT is monotone if ⟨x′−x,y′−y⟩≥0\langle x' - x, y' - y\rangle \ge 0⟨x′−x,y′−y⟩≥0 for all (x,y),(x′,y′)∈T(x,y),(x',y') \in T(x,y),(x′,y′)∈T, and maximal monotone if no other monotone operator strictly contains it. The resolvent is JcT=(I+cT)−1J_{cT} = (I + cT)^{-1}JcT​=(I+cT)−1, and zer⁡T={x∣0∈Tx}\operatorname{zer} T = \{x \mid 0 \in Tx\}zerT={x∣0∈Tx}. An operator JJJ is firmly nonexpansive if ∥y′−y∥2≤⟨x′−x,y′−y⟩\|y'-y\|^2 \le \langle x'-x, y'-y\rangle∥y′−y∥2≤⟨x′−x,y′−y⟩ for all (x,y),(x′,y′)∈J(x,y),(x',y') \in J(x,y),(x′,y′)∈J.

For λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 the Douglas–Rachford map is Gλ,A,B=JλA∘(2JλB−I)+(I−JλB)G_{\lambda,A,B} = J_{\lambda A} \circ (2J_{\lambda B} - I) + (I - J_{\lambda B})Gλ,A,B​=JλA​∘(2JλB​−I)+(I−JλB​), and the splitting operator is

Sλ,A,B={(v+λb, u−v)∣(u,b)∈B, (v,a)∈A, v+λa=u−λb}.S_{\lambda,A,B} = \{(v + \lambda b,\ u - v) \mid (u,b) \in B,\ (v,a) \in A,\ v + \lambda a = u - \lambda b\}.Sλ,A,B​={(v+λb, u−v)∣(u,b)∈B, (v,a)∈A, v+λa=u−λb}.

Its zero set is Zλ∗={u+λb∣b∈Bu, −b∈Au}Z^*_\lambda = \{u + \lambda b \mid b \in Bu,\ -b \in Au\}Zλ∗​={u+λb∣b∈Bu, −b∈Au}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7 (generalized Douglas–Rachford splitting)

Let AAA, BBB be maximal monotone, λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, and let {zk},{uk},{vk}⊆H\{z^k\}, \{u^k\}, \{v^k\} \subseteq \mathcal H{zk},{uk},{vk}⊆H, αk,βk≥0\alpha_k, \beta_k \ge 0αk​,βk​≥0 and ρk\rho_kρk​ satisfy

∥uk−JλB(zk)∥≤βk,∥vk+1−JλA(2uk−zk)∥≤αk,zk+1=zk+ρk(vk+1−uk),\|u^k - J_{\lambda B}(z^k)\| \le \beta_k,\quad \|v^{k+1} - J_{\lambda A}(2u^k - z^k)\| \le \alpha_k,\quad z^{k+1} = z^k + \rho_k (v^{k+1} - u^k),∥uk−JλB​(zk)∥≤βk​,∥vk+1−JλA​(2uk−zk)∥≤αk​,zk+1=zk+ρk​(vk+1−uk),

with ∑αk<∞\sum \alpha_k < \infty∑αk​<∞, ∑βk<∞\sum \beta_k < \infty∑βk​<∞ and 0<inf⁡ρk≤sup⁡ρk<20 < \inf \rho_k \le \sup \rho_k < 20<infρk​≤supρk​<2. Then

zer⁡(A+B)≠∅  ⟹  zk⇀z∗ for some z∗∈Zλ∗,zer⁡(A+B)=∅  ⟹  {zk} unbounded.\operatorname{zer}(A+B) \ne \emptyset \implies z^k \rightharpoonup z^* \text{ for some } z^* \in Z^*_\lambda,\qquad \operatorname{zer}(A+B) = \emptyset \implies \{z^k\} \text{ unbounded}.zer(A+B)=∅⟹zk⇀z∗ for some z∗∈Zλ∗​,zer(A+B)=∅⟹{zk} unbounded.

Milestones

In the paper's order: Minty's theorem (Theorem 1); properties of firmly nonexpansive operators (Lemma 1); the monotone / firmly nonexpansive correspondence (Theorem 2, Corollaries 2.1–2.3); zeros as fixed points of resolvents (Lemma 2); the generalized proximal point algorithm (Theorem 3): weak convergence to a zero of TTT under summable errors, relaxation in (0,2)(0,2)(0,2) and stepsizes bounded away from 000, unboundedness when zer⁡T=∅\operatorname{zer} T = \emptysetzerT=∅; (maximal) monotonicity of Sλ,A,BS_{\lambda,A,B}Sλ,A,B​ (Theorem 4) and firm nonexpansiveness of its resolvent (Corollary 4.1); zer⁡Sλ,A,B=Zλ∗\operatorname{zer} S_{\lambda,A,B} = Z^*_\lambdazerSλ,A,B​=Zλ∗​ (Theorem 5); and (I+Sλ,A,B)−1=Gλ,A,B(I + S_{\lambda,A,B})^{-1} = G_{\lambda,A,B}(I+Sλ,A,B​)−1=Gλ,A,B​ (Theorem 6).

Significance

Theorem 7 gives convergence of Douglas–Rachford splitting with both resolvents evaluated inexactly and with over- or under-relaxation, and it characterizes the case without a solution: the iterates are unbounded exactly when A+BA + BA+B has no zero. The relaxed, inexact form is the one implementations actually run, and through Gabay's identification of ADMM with Douglas–Rachford on the dual it is the basis of the paper's Theorem 8, a convergence theorem for a generalized ADMM. Theorem 3, used to prove Theorem 7, is itself a standard reference form of the inexact relaxed proximal point algorithm.

All results here are proved in the paper (one step in the unbounded case of Theorem 3 rests on results of Rockafellar 1969 and 1970 on sums of maximal monotone operators). As of 2026, neither Douglas–Rachford splitting in this generality nor the generalized proximal point algorithm is formalized in Lean or Mathlib. Mathlib has Hilbert spaces, weak topologies and summability, but no theory of maximal monotone operators, Minty's theorem or resolvents. The mission builds that layer and machine-checks the paper's results on it.

Difficulty

The convergence argument cannot be strong: in infinite dimensions the proximal point algorithm need not converge in norm (Güler 1991), so the conclusion is weak convergence, and identifying the weak limit as a zero requires the weak–strong closedness of the graph of a maximal monotone operator. The maximality halves of Theorems 2 and 4 need Minty's theorem, whose proof requires a nontrivial existence argument (all known proofs use Zorn's lemma or an equivalent). The unbounded case of Theorem 3 is a contradiction argument that truncates TTT by the subdifferential of the indicator of a ball and invokes two external facts: maximality of the sum of two maximal monotone operators under an interiority condition (Rockafellar 1970), and existence of zeros for maximal monotone operators with bounded domain (Rockafellar 1969). Neither is available in Lean. The natural first idea for Theorem 7, iterating the firm nonexpansiveness of Gλ,A,BG_{\lambda,A,B}Gλ,A,B​, gives neither the error tolerance on both resolvents nor the unbounded case without the full machinery of Theorem 3.

Formalization scope

  • H\mathcal HH is a real inner product space that is complete ([CompleteSpace H]). An operator is a map H → Set H. Monotonicity, maximal monotonicity, dom⁡\operatorname{dom}dom, zer⁡\operatorname{zer}zer and the function-level resolvent predicate IsResolvent are the published definitions ThreeOpSplitting_Convergence_MonotoneOperators; weak convergence is the published WeakTendsto (⟨zk,y⟩→⟨z∗,y⟩\langle z^k, y\rangle \to \langle z^*, y\rangle⟨zk,y⟩→⟨z∗,y⟩ for every yyy).
  • §2 notions are graph notions (opResolvent, IsFirmlyNonexpansiveOp, ...), so Theorem 2 and Corollary 2.1 can speak of resolvents that are a priori partial or multivalued. In Theorems 3, 6 and 7 the resolvents are maps J:H→HJ : \mathcal H \to \mathcal HJ:H→H with λ−1(x−Jx)∈A(Jx)\lambda^{-1}(x - J x) \in A(Jx)λ−1(x−Jx)∈A(Jx) for all xxx, unique by Corollary 2.2.
  • Sλ,A,BS_{\lambda,A,B}Sλ,A,B​ is defined by its set formula, not as Gλ,A,B−1−IG_{\lambda,A,B}^{-1} - IGλ,A,B−1​−I; with the latter, Theorem 6 and Corollary 4.1 would be unfoldings. Taking free resolvent functions without the IsResolvent hypothesis would make the iteration unrelated to AAA and BBB; the hypothesis is always present.
  • inf⁡ρk>0\inf \rho_k > 0infρk​>0, sup⁡ρk<2\sup \rho_k < 2supρk​<2 are encoded as ∃ ρ1,ρ2\exists\, \rho_1, \rho_2∃ρ1​,ρ2​ with 0<ρ1≤ρk≤ρ2<20 < \rho_1 \le \rho_k \le \rho_2 < 20<ρ1​≤ρk​≤ρ2​<2; inf⁡ck>0\inf c_k > 0infck​>0 as ∃ c0>0\exists\, c_0 > 0∃c0​>0, c0≤ckc_0 \le c_kc0​≤ck​. Summability is Summable with nonnegative terms. Sequences start at k=0k = 0k=0; v0v^0v0 is unused. Unboundedness is ¬ Bornology.IsBounded (Set.range z).
  • Printed slips corrected and disclosed in the items: Theorem 7 states its sequences in Rn\mathbb R^nRn (read H\mathcal HH); Theorem 3 prints (1−ρk)wk(1 - \rho_k) w^k(1−ρk​)wk (read ρkwk\rho_k w^kρk​wk, as on p. 9 and in the proof) and (I+cT)−1(I + cT)^{-1}(I+cT)−1 (read (I+ckT)−1(I + c_k T)^{-1}(I+ck​T)−1).
  • Not included: Corollary 2.4, Corollaries 6.1–6.2 (special cases of Theorem 7), §5 (partial inverses, generalized ADMM). The second sentence of Corollary 6.1 (convergence of JλB(zk)J_{\lambda B}(z^k)JλB​(zk)) is deliberately excluded: its argument does not transfer weak convergence (Svaiter 2011).
  • Welcome contributions: Minty's theorem in Hilbert space, the resolvent calculus of §2, and weak-limit lemmas (Opial-type arguments) are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. Eckstein and D. P. Bertsekas, On the Douglas–Rachford splitting method and the proximal point algorithm for maximal monotone operators, MIT report LIDS-P-1919, 1989; Mathematical Programming 55 (1992) 293–318. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01581204
  • P.-L. Lions and B. Mercier, Splitting algorithms for the sum of two nonlinear operators, SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 16 (1979) 964–979. https://doi.org/10.1137/0716071
  • G. J. Minty, Monotone (nonlinear) operators in Hilbert space, Duke Math. J. 29 (1962) 341–346. https://doi.org/10.1215/S0012-7094-62-02933-2
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Monotone operators and the proximal point algorithm, SIAM J. Control Optim. 14 (1976) 877–898. https://doi.org/10.1137/0314056
  • O. Güler, On the convergence of the proximal point algorithm for convex minimization, SIAM J. Control Optim. 29 (1991) 403–419. https://doi.org/10.1137/0329022
  • B. F. Svaiter, On weak convergence of the Douglas–Rachford method, SIAM J. Control Optim. 49 (2011) 280–287. https://doi.org/10.1137/100788100
17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

An Inventory Model with Limited Production Capacity and Uncertain Demands I. The Average-Cost Criterion: With Finite Storage a Modified Base-Stock Policy Is Strongly Average-Cost OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

A manufacturer that makes one product to stock faces random demand, can produce at most bbb units per period, and can store at most UUU units. The classical result without the production limit is that a base-stock policy is optimal: raise inventory to a fixed level yˉ\bar yyˉ​ each period. With a production limit, the natural modification is to produce up to yˉ\bar yyˉ​ when that is possible and to produce at full capacity otherwise. Federgruen and Zipkin (1986) proved that this modified base-stock (critical-number) policy is optimal under the long-run average-cost criterion, for discrete demand with a general convex cost. Production-capacity models of this type are standard in operations management texts, and the result underlies the computational and comparative-static work that followed, starting with Part II of the same paper, which treats discounted costs.

Timeline.

  • 1950s–60s: optimality of base-stock (critical-number) policies for uncapacitated periodic-review models; see Heyman and Sobel's Stochastic Models in Operations Research, Vol. II (1984).
  • 1986: Federgruen and Zipkin, Part I (average cost, MOR 11(2):193–207) and Part II (discounted cost, MOR 11(2):208–215) establish the capacitated case. Part I handles the unbounded state space with a general average-cost theory for countable-state Markov decision processes by Federgruen, Schweitzer and Tijms (1983).

Setting

Time is divided into periods t=0,1,…t = 0, 1, \dotst=0,1,…. The demands D0,D1,…D_0, D_1, \dotsD0​,D1​,… are independent copies of a random variable DDD with values in {0,1,2,… }\{0, 1, 2, \dots\}{0,1,2,…} and probability mass function p(j)p(j)p(j); write μ=E(D)\mu = E(D)μ=E(D) and P(j)=Pr⁡{D≤j}P(j) = \Pr\{D \le j\}P(j)=Pr{D≤j}. At the start of period ttt the inventory is an integer xtx_txt​ (negative values are backorders). The decision maker raises it to

yt∈Y(xt)={y∈Z:xt≤y≤xt+b, y≤U},y_t \in Y(x_t) = \{y \in \mathbb Z : x_t \le y \le x_t + b,\ y \le U\},yt​∈Y(xt​)={y∈Z:xt​≤y≤xt​+b, y≤U},

pays the expected one-period cost G(yt)G(y_t)G(yt​), and demand is subtracted: xt+1=yt−Dtx_{t+1} = y_t - D_txt+1​=yt​−Dt​. The order cost per unit is set to zero, as in the paper; this loses no generality because every policy with finite average cost has the same average order cost.

The standing assumptions are: G≥0G \ge 0G≥0 is convex and G(y)→∞G(y) \to \inftyG(y)→∞ as ∣y∣→∞|y| \to \infty∣y∣→∞ (Assumption 1); the characteristic function of DDD is analytic at the origin (Assumption 2), and 0<μ0 < \mu0<μ; G(y)≤A+B∣y∣ρG(y) \le A + B|y|^\rhoG(y)≤A+B∣y∣ρ for some positive integer ρ\rhoρ (Assumption 3); b>μb > \mub>μ and P(b)<1P(b) < 1P(b)<1 (Assumption 4). The smallest global minimizer of GGG is yˉ∞\bar y^\inftyyˉ​∞, and U≥yˉ∞U \ge \bar y^\inftyU≥yˉ​∞.

A Markov policy is a sequence π=(π0,π1,… )\pi = (\pi_0, \pi_1, \dots)π=(π0​,π1​,…) of maps with πt(x)∈Y(x)\pi_t(x) \in Y(x)πt​(x)∈Y(x). The critical-number policy with critical number yˉ\bar yyˉ​ is δ[yˉ](x)=max⁡(x,min⁡(yˉ,x+b))\delta[\bar y](x) = \max(x, \min(\bar y, x + b))δ[yˉ​](x)=max(x,min(yˉ​,x+b)). A stationary policy δ\deltaδ is strongly optimal with average cost ggg if, from every initial state x≤Ux \le Ux≤U, its average cost t−1E{∑i<tG(yi)}t^{-1}E\{\sum_{i<t} G(y_i)\}t−1E{∑i<t​G(yi​)} converges to ggg, while every Markov policy has lim-inf average cost at least ggg from every initial state.

The analysis uses the operators Rv(y)=G(y)+E v(y−D)Rv(y) = G(y) + E\,v(y - D)Rv(y)=G(y)+Ev(y−D) and Sv(x)=min⁡y∈Y(x)Rv(y)Sv(x) = \min_{y \in Y(x)} Rv(y)Sv(x)=miny∈Y(x)​Rv(y), and the optimality equation

g+v(x)=Sv(x),x≤U.(6)g + v(x) = Sv(x),\qquad x \le U. \tag{6}g+v(x)=Sv(x),x≤U.(6)

For an interval ι=[l,u]\iota = [l, u]ι=[l,u], Hιv(x)H_\iota v(x)Hι​v(x) is the largest expected sum of v(yt)v(y_t)v(yt​), over policies forced to produce at capacity below lll and to produce nothing above uuu, until the inventory first returns to ι\iotaι.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 202)

There exist g∗g^*g∗, v∗v^*v∗ and y∗≥yˉ∞y^* \ge \bar y^\inftyy∗≥yˉ​∞ such that (g∗,v∗)(g^*, v^*)(g∗,v∗) solves (6), v∗v^*v∗ is convex with global minimizer y∗y^*y∗, and

δ∗=δ[y∗] is strongly optimal with average cost g∗.\delta^* = \delta[y^*] \text{ is strongly optimal with average cost } g^*.δ∗=δ[y∗] is strongly optimal with average cost g∗.

The y∗y^*y∗ in the optimality claim is the minimizer constructed in part (a).

Milestones

  • Lemma 2(a)–(c) (pp. 196–197): a normal-tail inequality and two series estimates.
  • Lemma 3 (p. 198): if v(x)=O(∣x∣q)v(x) = O(|x|^q)v(x)=O(∣x∣q) then Hιv(x)=O(∣x∣q+3)H_\iota v(x) = O(|x|^{q+3})Hι​v(x)=O(∣x∣q+3).
  • Corollary 1 (p. 200): Hι1=O(∣x∣3)H_\iota 1 = O(|x|^3)Hι​1=O(∣x∣3) and HιG=O(∣x∣ρ+3)H_\iota G = O(|x|^{\rho+3})Hι​G=O(∣x∣ρ+3), both finite.
  • Corollary 2 (p. 201): (t+1)−1P[δ0t]⋯P[δtt](Hι1+HιG)(x)→0(t+1)^{-1}P[\delta_{0t}]\cdots P[\delta_{tt}](H_\iota 1 + H_\iota G)(x) \to 0(t+1)−1P[δ0t​]⋯P[δtt​](Hι​1+Hι​G)(x)→0.
  • Lemma 4 (p. 201): reachability of every state in [L,U−D−][L, U - D_-][L,U−D−​] under some policy that produces at capacity below LLL.
  • Lemma 5 (p. 202): SSS and QQQ preserve the class VVV of convex functions of growth O(∣x∣ρ+3)O(|x|^{\rho+3})O(∣x∣ρ+3) that are nonincreasing below yˉ∞\bar y^\inftyyˉ​∞.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 reduces an infinite-state average-cost control problem to a one-parameter search over critical numbers. The paper then evaluates the average cost of δ[yˉ]\delta[\bar y]δ[yˉ​] by a renewal formula, proves it convex in yˉ\bar yyˉ​ (Theorem 2), and in §5 extends optimality to unlimited storage. The strong form of optimality matters: it compares with every Markov policy from every starting state, and it compares lim-infs, not only lim-sups.

Formalizing it. The theorem has a published proof, but no machine-checked one, and its proof relies on external results that are themselves unformalized: the countable-state average-cost theory of Federgruen, Schweitzer and Tijms, a fixed-point theorem on a compact convex subset of a product space, and a large-deviation estimate quoted from Feller. A formal development produces reusable infrastructure: expected first-passage sums for integer-valued random walks with a reflecting control, polynomial moment bounds for them, and the convexity-preservation argument for capacitated value iteration.

Difficulty

The state space is unbounded below, so the finite-state theory of average-cost Markov decision processes does not apply, and the one-period cost is unbounded. The obvious approach, letting the discount factor tend to one in the discounted problem, needs uniform bounds on relative value functions. Those bounds come from the expected cost until the inventory returns to a fixed interval, and with capacity limits that expectation must be controlled with growth O(∣x∣ρ+3)O(|x|^{\rho+3})O(∣x∣ρ+3) uniformly over a class of policies. This is the content of Lemma 3, whose proof combines a large-deviation estimate for the demand sums with a renewal-type recursion. A second obstacle is strong optimality: comparing with policies whose lim-inf average cost is smaller requires that the relative value function grows sublinearly along every admissible trajectory (Corollary 2).

Formalization scope

All objects are in the namespace FedergruenZipkin.AvgCost, defined in one file. States x,yx, yx,y and the capacity UUU are integers; demands are natural numbers with a real probability mass function p; bbb is a positive natural number. Convexity on Z\mathbb ZZ is the second-difference inequality. Expectations of a real function are series ∑jp(j) v(y−j)\sum_j p(j)\,v(y-j)∑j​p(j)v(y−j); expected policy costs and hitting sums are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued and need no integrability side condition. Feasibility and all properties of value functions are required only on states x≤Ux \le Ux≤U, which are the only states visited. Assumption 2 is stated literally, as real-analyticity of θ↦∑jp(j)eiθj\theta \mapsto \sum_j p(j)e^{i\theta j}θ↦∑j​p(j)eiθj at 000. The order cost is zero, as in the paper. yˉ∞\bar y^\inftyyˉ​∞ is a parameter characterised as the least minimizer of GGG, not an infimum.

"Strongly optimal" has no displayed definition in the paper; it is read from eq. (7) in the proof of Theorem 1(b): convergence of the average cost of δ∗\delta^*δ∗ to g∗g^*g∗ from every state, together with a lim-inf lower bound for every Markov (memoryless, possibly nonstationary) policy from every state. The class is neither widened to history-dependent policies nor narrowed to stationary ones. The goal additionally records that E v∗(y−D)E\,v^*(y-D)Ev∗(y−D) converges, that v∗v^*v∗ has growth O(∣x∣ρ+3)O(|x|^{\rho+3})O(∣x∣ρ+3), and that g∗≥0g^* \ge 0g∗≥0; all three follow from the paper's proof.

A trivializing reading is ruled out: the existence of ggg, vvv and y∗y^*y∗ is one existential, so y∗y^*y∗ cannot be decoupled from the solution of (6), and strong optimality includes the convergence of δ∗\delta^*δ∗'s own average cost to g∗g^*g∗, so g=0g = 0g=0 does not satisfy it vacuously.

Not posed: Lemma 1 (quoted from Feller, and replaceable by a Chernoff bound); the renewal formulas (10)–(11) and Theorem 2; and §5 (unlimited storage). Useful contributions include a formal theory of expected hitting sums for skip-free-upward random walks, and a proof of Lemma 3 by any route.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, An Inventory Model with Limited Production Capacity and Uncertain Demands I. The Average-Cost Criterion, Mathematics of Operations Research 11(2):193–207, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.11.2.193
  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, An Inventory Model with Limited Production Capacity and Uncertain Demands II. The Discounted-Cost Criterion, Mathematics of Operations Research 11(2):208–215, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.11.2.208
  • A. Federgruen, P. J. Schweitzer and H. C. Tijms, Denumerable Undiscounted Semi-Markov Decision Processes with Unbounded Rewards, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(2):298–314, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.2.298
  • D. P. Heyman and M. J. Sobel, Stochastic Models in Operations Research, Vol. II, McGraw-Hill, 1984.
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Wiley, 1971.
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Linear OptimizationOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Smoothed Analysis of Algorithms: Why the Simplex Algorithm Usually Takes Polynomial Time 2: The Two-Phase Shadow-Vertex Simplex Method Has Polynomial Smoothed ComplexityResearch Paper

Motivation

The simplex method solves linear programs by moving between vertices of a feasible polyhedron. Its worst-case number of moves can grow exponentially, yet it often performs well on ordinary inputs. Worst-case examples alone therefore give an incomplete account of the method’s behavior. Spielman and Teng introduced smoothed analysis to measure expected performance after small random perturbations of an arbitrary input. Their result for a two-phase shadow-vertex simplex method gives a polynomial bound in the input dimensions and inverse perturbation scale. The pinned preprint is the source for every theorem number and constant in this mission.

The paper separates a geometric result about the expected size of a polytope’s shadow (Theorem 4.0.1) from the algorithmic result here (Theorem 5.0.1). That separation matters: a plane chosen before perturbation and a plane chosen by a running algorithm have different distributions. This mission addresses the latter. It complements the standard-form simplex theorems already formalized in the Introduction to Linear Optimization series and the worst-case Klee–Minty result in the Smale’s Ninth Problem mission; those results concern different algorithms or input models and are context rather than imported statements.

Setting

A linear program is specified by vectors a1,…,an∈Rda_1,\ldots,a_n\in\mathbb R^da1​,…,an​∈Rd, right-hand sides y1,…,yn∈Ry_1,\ldots,y_n\in\mathbb Ry1​,…,yn​∈R, and an objective vector z∈Rdz\in\mathbb R^dz∈Rd:

max⁡x⟨z,x⟩subject to⟨ai,x⟩≤yi(1≤i≤n).\max_x\langle z,x\rangle\quad\text{subject to}\quad \langle a_i,x\rangle\le y_i\qquad(1\le i\le n).xmax​⟨z,x⟩subject to⟨ai​,x⟩≤yi​(1≤i≤n).

The paper’s two-phase shadow-vertex method first draws a collection I\mathcal II of ddd-element subsets of [n][n][n] and chooses one whose constraint matrix AIA_IAI​ has the largest smallest singular value. It sets a power-of-two scale MMM from the input norm and a power-of-two scale κ\kappaκ from that singular value. These determine positive relaxed right-hand sides yi′y'_iyi′​: MMM for i∈Ii\in Ii∈I and dM2/(4κ)\sqrt d M^2/(4\kappa)d​M2/(4κ) otherwise. A coefficient vector α\alphaα is chosen uniformly from A1/d2={α:∑i∈Iαi=1, αi≥1/d2}A_{1/d^2}=\{\alpha:\sum_{i\in I}\alpha_i=1,\ \alpha_i\ge1/d^2\}A1/d2​={α:∑i∈I​αi​=1, αi​≥1/d2}. The first phase solves the relaxed program LP′ from the objective AIαA_I\alphaAI​α.

The second phase uses a lifted program LP⁺ in Rd+1\mathbb R^{d+1}Rd+1. For each original constraint it forms ai+=((yi′−yi)/2,ai)a_i^+=((y'_i-y_i)/2,a_i)ai+​=((yi′​−yi​)/2,ai​) and yi+=(yi′+yi)/2y_i^+=(y'_i+y_i)/2yi+​=(yi′​+yi​)/2, together with two artificial constraints at first coordinates 111 and −1-1−1. LP⁺ connects LP′ to the original program and makes infeasibility detectable. Its shadow is taken in the plane of (0,z)(0,z)(0,z) and z+=(1,0,…,0)z^+=(1,0,\ldots,0)z+=(1,0,…,0).

For positive right-hand sides, an optimal polar simplex is a ddd-subset of constraints whose scaled vectors ai/yia_i/y_iai​/yi​ form a facet of ConvHull⁡(0,a1/y1,…,an/yn)\operatorname{ConvHull}(0,a_1/y_1,\ldots,a_n/y_n)ConvHull(0,a1​/y1​,…,an​/yn​) and whose unscaled cone contains an objective qqq. The shadow for objectives t,zt,zt,z is the union of these simplices over all qqq in Span⁡(t,z)\operatorname{Span}(t,z)Span(t,z). Its size bounds the number of polar pivots. In Section 5 the paper writes Sz′S'_zSz′​ for the first-phase shadow size and Sz+S_z^+Sz+​ for the second-phase shadow size without the two artificial pivots.

The input is perturbed by independent Gaussians: each coordinate of aia_iai​ and each yiy_iyi​ has its prescribed center and common standard deviation σR\sigma RσR, where R=max⁡i∥(yˉi,aˉi)∥2R=\max_i\|(\bar y_i,\bar a_i)\|_2R=maxi​∥(yˉ​i​,aˉi​)∥2​. The algorithm has separate random choices of I\mathcal II and α\alphaα.

Formalization targets

The immediate targets bound the two phases: Lemma 5.2.1 gives an explicit expectation bound for Sz′S'_zSz′​ and Lemma 5.3.1 gives one for Sz+S_z^+Sz+​. Lemma 5.1.1 and its corollaries control the chance that the chosen basis has a very small singular value. Corollary 4.3.3 extends the geometric shadow bound to positive, unequal right-hand sides and general Gaussian covariance. These are the mission’s milestone targets.

The goal is the shape of Theorem 5.0.1. With C(A,y,z)=EI,α(Sz′+Sz++2)C(A,y,z)=\mathbb E_{\mathcal I,\alpha}(S'_z+S_z^++2)C(A,y,z)=EI,α​(Sz′​+Sz+​+2), there are a single polynomial P\mathcal PP and a positive constant σ0\sigma_0σ0​ such that, for all n>d≥3n>d\ge3n>d≥3 and all centers and objectives,

EA,yC(A,y,z)≤min⁡{P(d,n,1min⁡(σ,σ0)),(nd)+(nd+1)+2}.\mathbb E_{A,y}C(A,y,z)\le \min\left\{\mathcal P\left(d,n,\frac1{\min(\sigma,\sigma_0)}\right), \binom nd+\binom n{d+1}+2\right\}.EA,y​C(A,y,z)≤min{P(d,n,min(σ,σ0​)1​),(dn​)+(d+1n​)+2}.

The polynomial is uniform over the dimensions and inputs; its coefficients are not prescribed. The bound on CCC implies the corresponding result for the actual pivot count through the paper’s step-to-shadow comparison. The goal is stated with a positive center scale RRR, the case in which the paper’s Gaussian rescaling applies.

Significance

The theorem places the number of pivots of a complete simplex method under one explicit perturbation model, including the work needed to find a starting feasible basis and handle an arbitrary right-hand side. The trivial binomial bound is retained because it controls rare events in the proof and is part of the stated result. The polynomial bound says that even when the unperturbed LP is adversarial, Gaussian noise of a controlled scale makes the expected shadow-size cost polynomial.

The paper proves the mathematical result. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs of its statement and the listed milestones; the draft Lean declarations are targets with sorry, not completed proofs. The reusable formal infrastructure is the finite polar simplex and shadow construction, product Gaussian input law, smallest-singular-value events for sampled minors, and the uniform truncated-simplex coefficient law. The two shadow-size lemmas also require explicit handling of measurable finite-valued counts and their expectations.

Difficulty

The basic shadow estimate fixes its projection plane before perturbing the constraints. In LP′, the initial objective AIαA_I\alphaAI​α uses a basis selected after the perturbation, so the relevant plane depends on the random LP. The fixed-plane theorem cannot be substituted directly. For LP⁺, the normalized lifted vectors ai+/yi+a_i^+/y_i^+ai+​/yi+​ are nonlinear functions of Gaussian data; they are generally not Gaussian vectors. Thus the same shadow estimate does not apply directly to their law either. A further issue is that a poor sampled basis can make y′y'y′ very large. These are distinct obstacles, reflected in the milestone groups from Sections 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3.

Formalization scope

Vectors are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), constraints are Fin n → EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d), and index families are finite sets of Fin n. The paper’s [n][n][n] starts at one; Fin n starts at zero. The Gaussian constructor receives variance σ2\sigma^2σ2, not standard deviation σ\sigmaσ. The 3ndln⁡n3nd\ln n3ndlnn draws are rounded upward and are independent uniform draws with replacement. Equal singular values are resolved by the first sampled set. The uniform law on AδA_\deltaAδ​ is represented by normalized independent exponential weights followed by the affine shift that imposes αi≥δ\alpha_i\ge\deltaαi​≥δ.

The Lean definition of CCC is exactly the Section 5 shadow-size upper bound E(Sz′+Sz++2)\mathbb E(S'_z+S_z^++2)E(Sz′​+Sz+​+2), computed from the sampled LP data. It is not an arbitrary cost variable. The actual algorithmic step bound needs the paper’s polar algorithm and Lemma 3.3.5. The goal explicitly asks for inner and outer integrability so Lean’s default value for a nonintegrable Bochner integral cannot make the result vacuous. The source’s all-zero center scale is excluded because it gives zero perturbation and defeats the rescaling used in Theorem 5.0.1.

For LP⁺ the vectors live in Rd+1\mathbb R^{d+1}Rd+1, so the two LP⁺ milestone bounds use D(n,d+1,⋅)\mathcal D(n,d+1,\cdot)D(n,d+1,⋅). The preprint prints ddd in those calls even though the preceding extension theorem would be applied in dimension d+1d+1d+1. Lemma 5.2.1 is written as an inequality: its printed equality is stronger than the bound established on page 71. These corrections are visible in the theorem titles and notes. Contributions that prove the exact statements, establish the measurability and Gaussian law facts, or formalize the step-to-shadow comparison are welcome.

Selected references

  • Daniel A. Spielman and Shang-Hua Teng, Smoothed Analysis of Algorithms: Why the Simplex Algorithm Usually Takes Polynomial Time, arXiv:cs/0111050v7, 2003, preprint. The PDF used here is the 96-page version with printed and PDF page numbers aligned.
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Convex OptimizationOptimizationReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Twice Regularized MDPs and the Equivalence Between Robustness and Regularization 1: The Robust Value Function Is the Optimum of a Policy- and Value-Regularized Convex ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

A Markov decision process (MDP) is solved for one model of its dynamics and rewards, but in practice that model is estimated from data, and a policy that is optimal for the estimate can perform poorly on the true system (Mannor et al., 2007). Robust MDPs address this by evaluating a policy against the worst model in an uncertainty set U\mathcal UU (Iyengar, 2005; Nilim and El Ghaoui, 2005; Wiesemann, Kuhn and Rustem, 2013). Robust planning, however, solves an inner optimization over U\mathcal UU at every Bellman update, which is expensive and does not scale to learning settings.

A separate line of work regularizes the policy (entropy, KL, Tsallis penalties) and observes empirically that regularized policies are robust to perturbations (Geist, Scherrer and Pietquin, 2019). Derman, Geist and Mannor (arXiv:2110.06267, NeurIPS 2021) make this precise: for uncertainty sets centred at a nominal model, the robust value function is the solution of a regularized problem posed on the nominal model alone, with a regularizer that is the support function of the uncertainty set. This mission formalizes that equivalence: Proposition 3.1, Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1 of the paper.

Setting

Let S\mathcal SS and A\mathcal AA be finite sets of states and actions, A\mathcal AA nonempty, and X:=S×A\mathcal X := \mathcal S\times\mathcal AX:=S×A. Fix a discount factor γ∈(0,1)\gamma\in(0,1)γ∈(0,1) and a strictly positive initial distribution μ0∈ΔS\mu_0\in\Delta_{\mathcal S}μ0​∈ΔS​. A transition kernel PPP assigns to every pair (s,a)(s,a)(s,a) a probability distribution P(⋅∣s,a)P(\cdot\mid s,a)P(⋅∣s,a) on S\mathcal SS; a reward is r∈RXr\in\mathbb R^{\mathcal X}r∈RX. A policy π∈ΔAS\pi\in\Delta_{\mathcal A}^{\mathcal S}π∈ΔAS​ assigns to every state an action distribution πs\pi_sπs​.

For v∈RSv\in\mathbb R^{\mathcal S}v∈RS write rπ(s)=∑aπs(a)r(s,a)r^\pi(s) = \sum_a\pi_s(a)r(s,a)rπ(s)=∑a​πs​(a)r(s,a), Pπ(s′∣s)=∑aπs(a)P(s′∣s,a)P^\pi(s'\mid s) = \sum_a\pi_s(a)P(s'\mid s,a)Pπ(s′∣s)=∑a​πs​(a)P(s′∣s,a), and define the evaluation Bellman operator

T(P,r)πv:=rπ+γPπv.T^\pi_{(P,r)}v := r^\pi + \gamma P^\pi v .T(P,r)π​v:=rπ+γPπv.

The inner product on RS\mathbb R^{\mathcal S}RS is ⟨v,μ⟩=∑sv(s)μ(s)\langle v,\mu\rangle = \sum_s v(s)\mu(s)⟨v,μ⟩=∑s​v(s)μ(s), and the support function of a set C⊆RιC\subseteq\mathbb R^{\iota}C⊆Rι is σC(y)=max⁡a∈C⟨a,y⟩\sigma_C(y) = \max_{a\in C}\langle a,y\rangleσC​(y)=maxa∈C​⟨a,y⟩.

Given a set U\mathcal UU of models (P,r)(P,r)(P,r), the robust Bellman operator is

[Tπ,Uv](s):=min⁡(P,r)∈UT(P,r)πv(s),[T^{\pi,\mathcal U}v](s) := \min_{(P,r)\in\mathcal U}T^\pi_{(P,r)}v(s),[Tπ,Uv](s):=(P,r)∈Umin​T(P,r)π​v(s),

and the robust value function vπ,Uv^{\pi,\mathcal U}vπ,U is its fixed point. Around a nominal model (P0,r0)(P_0,r_0)(P0​,r0​), an s-rectangular uncertainty set U=(P0+P)×(r0+R)\mathcal U = (P_0+\mathcal P)\times(r_0+\mathcal R)U=(P0​+P)×(r0​+R) is given by sets Ps⊆RX\mathcal P_s\subseteq\mathbb R^{\mathcal X}Ps​⊆RX and Rs⊆RA\mathcal R_s\subseteq\mathbb R^{\mathcal A}Rs​⊆RA, one per state: its models are P(s′∣s,a)=P0(s′∣s,a)+Ps(s′,a)P(s'\mid s,a) = P_0(s'\mid s,a)+P_s(s',a)P(s′∣s,a)=P0​(s′∣s,a)+Ps​(s′,a) and r(s,a)=r0(s,a)+rs(a)r(s,a) = r_0(s,a)+r_s(a)r(s,a)=r0​(s,a)+rs​(a), with Ps∈PsP_s\in\mathcal P_sPs​∈Ps​ and rs∈Rsr_s\in\mathcal R_srs​∈Rs​ chosen independently for each sss. Finally [v⋅πs](s′,a):=v(s′)πs(a)[v\cdot\pi_s](s',a) := v(s')\pi_s(a)[v⋅πs​](s′,a):=v(s′)πs​(a).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1 (general robust MDP)

For U=(P0+P)×(r0+R)\mathcal U = (P_0+\mathcal P)\times(r_0+\mathcal R)U=(P0​+P)×(r0​+R) and every policy π\piπ, Tπ,UT^{\pi,\mathcal U}Tπ,U has a unique fixed point vπ,Uv^{\pi,\mathcal U}vπ,U, and it is the optimal solution of

max⁡v∈RS⟨v,μ0⟩s.t.v(s)≤T(P0,r0)πv(s)−σRs(−πs)−σPs(−γv⋅πs)∀s∈S.(2)\max_{v\in\mathbb R^{\mathcal S}}\langle v,\mu_0\rangle\quad\text{s.t.}\quad v(s)\le T^\pi_{(P_0,r_0)}v(s)-\sigma_{\mathcal R_s}(-\pi_s)-\sigma_{\mathcal P_s}(-\gamma v\cdot\pi_s)\quad\forall s\in\mathcal S. \tag{2}v∈RSmax​⟨v,μ0​⟩s.t.v(s)≤T(P0​,r0​)π​v(s)−σRs​​(−πs​)−σPs​​(−γv⋅πs​)∀s∈S.(2)

Milestones

  1. Proposition 3.1. For any uncertainty set U=P×R\mathcal U = \mathcal P\times\mathcal RU=P×R with P\mathcal PP a nonempty compact set of kernels and R\mathcal RR a nonempty compact set of rewards, vπ,Uv^{\pi,\mathcal U}vπ,U is the optimal solution of the robust program \max_{v}\langle v,\mu_0\rangle\quad\text{s.t.}\quad v\le T^\pi_{(P,r)}v\ \ \forall(P,r)\in\mathcal U. \tag{$P_{\mathcal U}$}
  2. Theorem 3.1. For U={P0}×(r0+R)\mathcal U=\{P_0\}\times(r_0+\mathcal R)U={P0​}×(r0​+R), vπ,Uv^{\pi,\mathcal U}vπ,U is the optimal solution of max⁡v⟨v,μ0⟩\max_v\langle v,\mu_0\ranglemaxv​⟨v,μ0​⟩ s.t. v(s)≤T(P0,r0)πv(s)−σRs(−πs)v(s)\le T^\pi_{(P_0,r_0)}v(s)-\sigma_{\mathcal R_s}(-\pi_s)v(s)≤T(P0​,r0​)π​v(s)−σRs​​(−πs​) for all sss.
  3. Robust counterpart (proof of Theorem 4.1, App. B.1). For every vvv and sss,
max⁡(P,r)∈U{v(s)−rπ(s)−γPπv(s)}=σPs(−γv⋅πs)+σRs(−πs)+v(s)−T(P0,r0)πv(s).\max_{(P,r)\in\mathcal U}\{v(s)-r^\pi(s)-\gamma P^\pi v(s)\} = \sigma_{\mathcal P_s}(-\gamma v\cdot\pi_s)+\sigma_{\mathcal R_s}(-\pi_s)+v(s)-T^\pi_{(P_0,r_0)}v(s).(P,r)∈Umax​{v(s)−rπ(s)−γPπv(s)}=σPs​​(−γv⋅πs​)+σRs​​(−πs​)+v(s)−T(P0​,r0​)π​v(s).

Theorem 3.1 is the special case Ps={0}\mathcal P_s=\{0\}Ps​={0} of the goal; it is listed separately because it is the paper's statement that policy regularization is equivalent to reward uncertainty.

Significance

The goal says that a robust MDP with s-rectangular uncertainty in both reward and transitions is a regularized MDP on the nominal model, with two regularizers: a policy regularizer σRs(−πs)\sigma_{\mathcal R_s}(-\pi_s)σRs​​(−πs​) coming from reward uncertainty, and a regularizer σPs(−γv⋅πs)\sigma_{\mathcal P_s}(-\gamma v\cdot\pi_s)σPs​​(−γv⋅πs​) coming from transition uncertainty that depends on both the policy and the value. For ball-shaped sets these support functions are explicit (αsr∥πs∥\alpha^r_s\|\pi_s\|αsr​∥πs​∥ and αsPγ∥v∥∥πs∥\alpha^P_s\gamma\|v\|\|\pi_s\|αsP​γ∥v∥∥πs​∥, Corollary 4.1 of the paper), which leads to the twice regularized (R²) Bellman operators of Section 5 and to robust planning at the cost of non-robust planning. Theorem 3.1 also explains why standard policy regularizers (negative entropy, KL, Tsallis) yield robustness: each is the support function of a reward uncertainty set.

The results are proved in the paper (appendices A.1, A.2, B.1); none has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces formal statements and proofs of the equivalence, the robust Bellman operator's fixed-point theory for stochastic policies and general compact uncertainty sets, and a closed-form robust counterpart that later R² results can import. The paper's printed proof of Proposition 3.1 treats Tπ,UT^{\pi,\mathcal U}Tπ,U as linear in one step; a formal proof settles the statement independently of that step.

Difficulty

The obvious argument reads Proposition 3.1 as linear-programming duality, as for a single MDP. That fails: Tπ,UT^{\pi,\mathcal U}Tπ,U is a minimum of affine maps, hence concave and not affine, and the feasible set of (PU)(P_{\mathcal U})(PU​) is an intersection of infinitely many half-space systems; the argument has to go through monotonicity and contraction of Tπ,UT^{\pi,\mathcal U}Tπ,U, which in turn requires every model in U\mathcal UU to be a genuine transition kernel. For the goal, the paper invokes Fenchel–Rockafellar duality to evaluate the inner maximum; the work in Lean is to separate the maximum over the product set U\mathcal UU into per-state maxima, which needs the s-rectangular structure and attainment of every maximum (compactness), and to track the index order of the perturbation Ps(s′,a)P_s(s',a)Ps​(s′,a) against the kernel P(s′∣s,a)P(s'\mid s,a)P(s′∣s,a).

Formalization scope

  • States and actions are finite types, A nonempty; values are S → ℝ ordered pointwise; a transition array is P : S → A → S → ℝ with P s a s' =P(s′∣s,a)=P(s'\mid s,a)=P(s′∣s,a), and the kernel property is the published IsTransitionKernel; Pπ(s′∣s)P^\pi(s'\mid s)Pπ(s′∣s) is the published InducedTransition. A policy has π s ∈ stdSimplex ℝ A for every s.
  • Perturbations PsP_sPs​ are functions S × A → ℝ indexed (s′,a)(s',a)(s′,a), as in the paper's RX\mathbb R^{\mathcal X}RX; rewards perturbations are A → ℝ.
  • Minima and maxima (in Tπ,UT^{\pi,\mathcal U}Tπ,U and in σ\sigmaσ) are real sInf/sSup. Every theorem assumes the sets nonempty and compact, so these are attained; nothing is quantified over an unbounded set.
  • The robust value function is encoded as the fixed point of Tπ,UT^{\pi,\mathcal U}Tπ,U, and each theorem asserts its existence and uniqueness. The paper's definition vπ,U(s)=min⁡(P,r)∈Uv(P,r)π(s)v^{\pi,\mathcal U}(s)=\min_{(P,r)\in\mathcal U}v^\pi_{(P,r)}(s)vπ,U(s)=min(P,r)∈U​v(P,r)π​(s) (p. 4) coincides with it for rectangular sets by a cited result; the proofs use only the fixed-point property. For the non-rectangular sets of Proposition 3.1 the pointwise minimum can be strictly larger than the fixed point and is then not the optimum of (PU)(P_{\mathcal U})(PU​), so the fixed point is the object the proposition is true for.
  • "The optimal solution" means: feasible, objective-maximal, and the unique maximizer (uniqueness uses μ0>0\mu_0>0μ0​>0).
  • Disclosed hypotheses: U=P×R\mathcal U=\mathcal P\times\mathcal RU=P×R with P\mathcal PP, R\mathcal RR nonempty and compact and every transition in P\mathcal PP a kernel (Prop. 3.1); Ps\mathcal P_sPs​, Rs\mathcal R_sRs​ nonempty and compact and every perturbed row P0(⋅∣s,a)+Ps(⋅,a)P_0(\cdot\mid s,a)+P_s(\cdot,a)P0​(⋅∣s,a)+Ps​(⋅,a) in ΔS\Delta_{\mathcal S}ΔS​ (Thm 4.1); reward sets rectangular in Thm 3.1, as its proof uses. These are the robust-MDP standing assumptions of p. 4 (P⊆ΔSX\mathcal P\subseteq\Delta^{\mathcal X}_{\mathcal S}P⊆ΔSX​) and what makes "min" and "max" well defined.
  • Not drafted: Corollary 4.1, whose ℓ²-ball Ps\mathcal P_sPs​ contains perturbations that leave the simplex, so P0+PP_0+\mathcal PP0​+P is not a set of kernels; Corollary 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 (consequences after the goal; Prop. 3.2 depends on an unspecified policy parametrization).
  • A formalization that asserts only that the feasible sets of (PU)(P_{\mathcal U})(PU​) and (2) coincide, or that drops the kernel condition or the existence of the fixed point, does not count: the goal names the robust value function and its optimality.
  • "Convex" in the statement of Theorem 4.1 is descriptive and is not part of the formal goal.

Contributions welcome: the monotone-contraction fixed-point lemma for Tπ,UT^{\pi,\mathcal U}Tπ,U and the per-state separation of maxima over rectangular sets are reusable for any robust MDP mission.

Selected references

  • E. Derman, M. Geist, S. Mannor, Twice regularized MDPs and the equivalence between robustness and regularization, NeurIPS 2021. arXiv:2110.06267v1
  • G. N. Iyengar, Robust dynamic programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30(2), 2005. doi:10.1287/moor.1040.0129
  • A. Nilim, L. El Ghaoui, Robust control of Markov decision processes with uncertain transition matrices, Operations Research 53(5), 2005. doi:10.1287/opre.1050.0216
  • W. Wiesemann, D. Kuhn, B. Rustem, Robust Markov decision processes, Mathematics of Operations Research 38(1), 2013. doi:10.1287/moor.1120.0566
  • M. Geist, B. Scherrer, O. Pietquin, A theory of regularized Markov decision processes, ICML 2019. PMLR 97
  • S. Mannor, D. Simester, P. Sun, J. N. Tsitsiklis, Bias and variance approximation in value function estimates, Management Science 53(2), 2007. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0614
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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information 1: Centralizing Demand Information Does Not Eliminate the Bullwhip EffectResearch Paper

Motivation

The bullwhip effect is the observation that the variability of orders increases as one moves up a supply chain, from the retailer towards the manufacturer and its suppliers. It was documented in industry and in classroom experiments such as the Beer Game (Sterman 1989), and analysed by Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (1997), who named demand forecasting, lead times, batch ordering, rationing and price variations as its main causes. A remedy often proposed is to centralize demand information: give every stage of the chain the customer demand data, so that no stage forecasts from the distorted orders of its downstream neighbour.

Chen, Drezner, Ryan and Simchi-Levi (2000) quantified the effect for a retailer that forecasts with a moving average and orders with an order-up-to policy. They gave an explicit lower bound on the ratio of the order variance to the demand variance in terms of the lead time, the forecasting window and the demand autocorrelation. They then showed that in a multistage chain with fully centralized demand information this ratio still grows with the total lead time upstream of each stage. This mission formalizes that result, Theorem 3.1 of the paper, together with the single-stage analysis it rests on.

Setting

Time is indexed by the integers. The customer demands DtD_tDt​ seen by the retailer follow the AR(1) model

Dt=μ+ρDt−1+ϵt,(1)D_t = \mu + \rho D_{t-1} + \epsilon_t, \tag{1}Dt​=μ+ρDt−1​+ϵt​,(1)

where μ≥0\mu \ge 0μ≥0, ∣ρ∣<1|\rho| < 1∣ρ∣<1, and the errors ϵt\epsilon_tϵt​ are independent and identically distributed from a symmetric distribution with mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. The demand is in steady state, so that E(Dt)=μ/(1−ρ)E(D_t) = \mu/(1-\rho)E(Dt​)=μ/(1−ρ) and Var(D)=Var(Dt)=σ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Var}(D) = \mathrm{Var}(D_t) = \sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Var(D)=Var(Dt​)=σ2/(1−ρ2) for every ttt.

The retailer does not know the demand process. With a window of p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 past observations it forms the moving-average estimates

D^tL=L ∑i=1pDt−ip,et=Dt−D^t1,σ^etL=CL,ρ∑i=1pet−i2p,\hat D^L_t = L\,\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}}{p}, \qquad e_t = D_t - \hat D^1_t, \qquad \hat\sigma^L_{et} = C_{L,\rho}\sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^p e_{t-i}^2}{p}},D^tL​=Lp∑i=1p​Dt−i​​,et​=Dt​−D^t1​,σ^etL​=CL,ρ​p∑i=1p​et−i2​​​,

where LLL is the lead-time parameter (L=1L = 1L=1 means an order placed at the end of period ttt arrives at the start of period t+1t+1t+1) and CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​ is a constant the paper leaves unspecified. The order-up-to point is yt=D^tL+z σ^etLy_t = \hat D^L_t + z\,\hat\sigma^L_{et}yt​=D^tL​+zσ^etL​ for a safety factor zzz, and the order placed in period ttt is qt=yt−yt−1+Dt−1q_t = y_t - y_{t-1} + D_{t-1}qt​=yt​−yt−1​+Dt−1​. It may be negative: excess inventory is returned without cost.

In the multistage chain with centralized information, stages k=1,2,…k = 1, 2, \dotsk=1,2,… (stage 111 is the retailer) all observe DtD_tDt​ and use the same estimate D^t=∑i=1pDt−i/p\hat D_t = \sum_{i=1}^p D_{t-i}/pD^t​=∑i=1p​Dt−i​/p. Stage kkk has lead time LkL_kLk​ and safety factor zkz_kzk​ and uses the order-up-to point ytk=LkD^t+zkσ^etLky^k_t = L_k\hat D_t + z_k\hat\sigma^{L_k}_{et}ytk​=Lk​D^t​+zk​σ^etLk​​. Following the paper's sequence of events, stage 111 orders qt1=yt1−yt−11+Dt−1q^1_t = y^1_t - y^1_{t-1} + D_{t-1}qt1​=yt1​−yt−11​+Dt−1​, and stage k≥2k \ge 2k≥2, receiving qtk−1q^{k-1}_tqtk−1​, orders qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_tqtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 441)

For every stage k≥1k \ge 1k≥1 and every period ttt,

Var(qtk)Var(D)≥1+(2∑i=1kLip+2(∑i=1kLi)2p2)(1−ρp),\frac{\mathrm{Var}(q^k_t)}{\mathrm{Var}(D)} \ge 1 + \left(\frac{2\sum_{i=1}^k L_i}{p} + \frac{2\left(\sum_{i=1}^k L_i\right)^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p),Var(D)Var(qtk​)​≥1+​p2∑i=1k​Li​​+p22(∑i=1k​Li​)2​​(1−ρp),

with equality when z1=⋯=zk=0z_1 = \dots = z_k = 0z1​=⋯=zk​=0. The bound holds for every choice of the constants CLk,ρC_{L_k,\rho}CLk​,ρ​ and of the safety factors.

Milestones (p. 438)

  1. The AR(1) moments Var(Dt)=σ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Var}(D_t) = \sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Var(Dt​)=σ2/(1−ρ2) and Cov(Dt−1,Dt−p−1)=ρpσ2/(1−ρ2)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, D_{t-p-1}) = \rho^p\sigma^2/(1-\rho^2)Cov(Dt−1​,Dt−p−1​)=ρpσ2/(1−ρ2).
  2. Eq. (4): qt=(1+L/p)Dt−1−(L/p)Dt−p−1+z(σ^etL−σ^e,t−1L)q_t = (1 + L/p)D_{t-1} - (L/p)D_{t-p-1} + z(\hat\sigma^L_{et} - \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1})qt​=(1+L/p)Dt−1​−(L/p)Dt−p−1​+z(σ^etL​−σ^e,t−1L​) for every outcome.
  3. Lemma 2.1: Cov(Dt−i,σ^etL)=0\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-i}, \hat\sigma^L_{et}) = 0Cov(Dt−i​,σ^etL​)=0 for i=1,…,pi = 1, \dots, pi=1,…,p.
  4. The variance identity after Eq. (4):
Var(qt)=[1+(2Lp+2L2p2)(1−ρp)]Var(D)+2z(1+2Lp)Cov(Dt−1,σ^etL)+z2 Var(σ^etL−σ^e,t−1L).\mathrm{Var}(q_t) = \left[1 + \left(\tfrac{2L}{p} + \tfrac{2L^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p)\right]\mathrm{Var}(D) + 2z\left(1+\tfrac{2L}{p}\right)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{et}) + z^2\,\mathrm{Var}(\hat\sigma^L_{et} - \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1}).Var(qt​)=[1+(p2L​+p22L2​)(1−ρp)]Var(D)+2z(1+p2L​)Cov(Dt−1​,σ^etL​)+z2Var(σ^etL​−σ^e,t−1L​).
  1. Theorem 2.2, the single-stage case:
Var(q)Var(D)≥1+(2Lp+2L2p2)(1−ρp),(5)\frac{\mathrm{Var}(q)}{\mathrm{Var}(D)} \ge 1 + \left(\frac{2L}{p} + \frac{2L^2}{p^2}\right)(1-\rho^p), \tag{5}Var(D)Var(q)​≥1+(p2L​+p22L2​)(1−ρp),(5)

with equality when z=0z = 0z=0.

Significance

Theorem 2.2 shows that forecasting with a positive lead time is enough to make orders more variable than demand, even for independent demands (ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0). It also says how the effect depends on each parameter: the bound decreases in the window ppp and increases in the lead time LLL. Theorem 3.1 is the paper's answer to the centralization remedy. When every stage sees the true customer demand and uses the same forecast and the same policy, the variability of orders at stage kkk is still bounded below by the single-stage expression with the cumulative lead time ∑i≤kLi\sum_{i\le k}L_i∑i≤k​Li​. Centralization reduces the bullwhip effect but does not remove it. The decentralized comparison (Theorem 3.2, where the bound becomes multiplicative across stages) is a separate mission in this series.

On the formalization side, the Gaussian special case of the single-stage results is on the platform. Snyder and Shen's Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory states Theorem 2.2, Lemma 2.1, Eq. (4) and the AR(1) moments for normally distributed errors, as the items SupplyChainTheory.bullwhip_signal_processing, bullwhip_lemma_13_1, bullwhip_order_identity and ar1_moments. This mission states them under the paper's weaker hypothesis of a symmetric error distribution. The multistage Theorem 3.1 has no machine-checked counterpart. The paper proves only Theorem 2.2 in print. For the proofs of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 3.1 it refers to Ryan (1997) and to a working paper, so a formalization supplies arguments the published article does not contain.

Difficulty

Most of the algebra is routine. The difficulty is Lemma 2.1 and the covariances like it. The estimate σ^etL\hat\sigma^L_{et}σ^etL​ is a square root of a quadratic form in past demands, so its covariance with a demand cannot be computed from second moments. Under Gaussian errors one can appeal to properties of Gaussian vectors. With only a symmetric error law, every distributional fact has to come from the symmetry of the errors and from the representation of the steady-state demand as an infinite series in past errors.

The printed derivation also moves faster than a proof. Expanding Var(qt)\mathrm{Var}(q_t)Var(qt​) from Eq. (4) produces the cross terms Cov(Dt−1,σ^e,t−1L)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{e,t-1})Cov(Dt−1​,σ^e,t−1L​) and Cov(Dt−p−1,σ^etL)\mathrm{Cov}(D_{t-p-1}, \hat\sigma^L_{et})Cov(Dt−p−1​,σ^etL​), which lie outside the lags 1,…,p1, \dots, p1,…,p of Lemma 2.1. The display after Eq. (4) does not account for them. A complete proof of milestone 4 must show that these terms vanish too. For the chain, the stage orders are defined by a recursion across stages, and the variance of qtkq^k_tqtk​ involves the estimates σ^etLi\hat\sigma^{L_i}_{et}σ^etLi​​ of all stages i≤ki \le ki≤k.

Formalization scope

Random variables are real functions on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega, P)(Ω,P), and time is Z\mathbb ZZ, so that Dt−p−1D_{t-p-1}Dt−p−1​ exists for every ttt. Variance and covariance are Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.variance and ProbabilityTheory.covariance. The demand structure ChenBullwhip.Centralized.AR1Demand records (1) for every outcome and the paper's error hypotheses: independence, identical distribution, symmetry, mean 000 and variance σ2\sigma^2σ2. It adds four disclosed conditions:

  1. σ>0\sigma > 0σ>0, since the results divide by Var(D)\mathrm{Var}(D)Var(D);
  2. square integrability of errors and demands, since Mathlib's variance of a non-square-integrable function is 000;
  3. a steady-state condition: every DtD_tDt​ is square integrable with the law of D0D_0D0​, which is the stationary solution the paper's moment formulas presuppose;
  4. p≥1p \ge 1p≥1 in every result.

The published Gaussian structure SupplyChainTheory.AR1Demand satisfies these conditions, so this mission generalizes the Snyder–Shen items rather than referencing them. The constants CL,ρC_{L,\rho}CL,ρ​ are free real parameters, and in the chain CLk,ρC_{L_k,\rho}CLk​,ρ​ is C(Lk)C(L_k)C(Lk​) for an arbitrary function CCC. Lead times are natural numbers, L=0L = 0L=0 included. Sums ∑i=1p\sum_{i=1}^p∑i=1p​ and ∑i=1k\sum_{i=1}^k∑i=1k​ run over {1,…,p}\{1,\dots,p\}{1,…,p} and {1,…,k}\{1,\dots,k\}{1,…,k}, and stages are numbered from 111. The order recursion qtk=ytk−yt−1k+qtk−1q^k_t = y^k_t - y^k_{t-1} + q^{k-1}_tqtk​=ytk​−yt−1k​+qtk−1​ is read from the paper's sequence of events, because the paper prints no formula for qtkq^k_tqtk​.

The orders are computed from the demands through the definitions above. They are never arbitrary random variables with assumed moments. "Tight" is formalized as equality, and orders are never truncated at zero. Without the steady-state condition, a process started from an arbitrary D0D_0D0​ satisfies (1) but has time-dependent moments, and the results fail; with σ=0\sigma = 0σ=0 the ratio form would be false. Both cases are excluded by the structure, not by vacuous hypotheses. The structure is satisfiable: i.i.d. standard Gaussian demands on Z→R\mathbb Z \to \mathbb RZ→R form an instance.

A complete development needs: the L2L^2L2 series representation of a stationary AR(1) process; distributional symmetry facts for i.i.d. sequences with a symmetric law; and covariance bookkeeping for finite linear combinations. The first two are reusable for any linear time-series model with symmetric innovations. Contributions to any milestone, and to general lemmas about stationary AR(1) processes, are welcome.

Selected references

  • F. Chen, Z. Drezner, J. K. Ryan, D. Simchi-Levi, Quantifying the Bullwhip Effect in a Simple Supply Chain: The Impact of Forecasting, Lead Times, and Information, Management Science 46(3):436–443, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.3.436.12069
  • H. L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan, S. Whang, Information Distortion in a Supply Chain: The Bullwhip Effect, Management Science 43(4):546–558, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.4.546
  • J. D. Sterman, Modeling Managerial Behavior: Misperceptions of Feedback in a Dynamic Decision Making Experiment, Management Science 35(3):321–339, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.35.3.321
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 13. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
  • J. K. Ryan, Analysis of Inventory Models with Limited Demand Information, Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1997 (cited by the paper for the proofs of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 3.1).
9 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsComplexity TheoryDiscrete Geometry+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Exponential Lower Bounds for Polytopes in Combinatorial Optimization: The TSP Polytope Has Extension Complexity 2^Ω(√n)Research Paper

Motivation

Combinatorial optimization problems are routinely solved by writing the convex hull of their feasible solutions as the feasible region of a linear program. When that convex hull has exponentially many facets, a classical trick is to add auxiliary variables: a polytope with many facets may be the linear projection of a higher-dimensional polyhedron with few. The spanning tree polytope, the permutahedron and the parity polytope all have compact descriptions of this kind. This raises the question of whether every polytope of an NP-hard problem might also have one, which would yield a polynomial-size linear program for that problem.

In the late 1980s several papers claimed polynomial-size linear programs for the traveling salesman problem (TSP). Yannakakis (STOC 1988; JCSS 1991) refuted all such claims at once by showing that every symmetric extended formulation of the TSP polytope has exponential size. He asked whether the symmetry assumption could be removed. Fiorini, Massar, Pokutta, Tiwary and de Wolf (STOC 2012; J. ACM 2015) answered the question: every extended formulation of the TSP polytope, symmetric or not, has 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(\sqrt n)}2Ω(n​) inequalities.

Timeline.

  • 1990: De Simone shows that the correlation polytope is linearly isomorphic to the cut polytope.
  • 1991: Yannakakis proves the factorization theorem (extension complexity equals the nonnegative rank of a slack matrix) and the exponential lower bound for symmetric formulations of the TSP and perfect matching polytopes.
  • 1992: Razborov proves the distributional lower bound for set disjointness.
  • 2003: de Wolf shows that the support of M(n)ab=(1−a⊤b)2M(n)_{ab}=(1-a^\top b)^2M(n)ab​=(1−a⊤b)2 needs 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)}2Ω(n) rectangles to cover.
  • 2012/2015: Fiorini et al. prove xc(CUT(n))=2Ω(n)\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{CUT}(n))=2^{\Omega(n)}xc(CUT(n))=2Ω(n), xc(TSP(n))=2Ω(n)\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{TSP}(n))=2^{\Omega(\sqrt n)}xc(TSP(n))=2Ω(n​), and a 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(\sqrt n)}2Ω(n​) bound for stable set polytopes of some graphs on nnn vertices.
  • 2013: Kaibel and Weltge give a short combinatorial proof of the correlation-polytope bound, with constant C=log⁡2(3/2)C=\log_2(3/2)C=log2​(3/2).
  • 2014: Rothvoss proves 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)}2Ω(n) for the perfect matching polytope.

Setting

Let ι\iotaι be a finite index set. An extended formulation (EF) of a set P⊆RιP\subseteq\mathbb R^{\iota}P⊆Rι is a linear system E=x+F=y=g=E^{=}x+F^{=}y=g^{=}E=x+F=y=g=, E≤x+F≤y≤g≤E^{\le}x+F^{\le}y\le g^{\le}E≤x+F≤y≤g≤ in variables (x,y)∈Rι×Rk(x,y)\in\mathbb R^{\iota}\times\mathbb R^{k}(x,y)∈Rι×Rk such that x∈Px\in Px∈P exactly when some yyy satisfies it. Its size is the number of inequalities. The extension complexity xc(P)\mathrm{xc}(P)xc(P) is the least size of an EF of PPP.

A polytope is the convex hull of finitely many points. A face of PPP is PPP itself or its intersection with a valid hyperplane, and a facet is a maximal proper face. A polytope QQQ is an extension of PPP if π(Q)=P\pi(Q)=Pπ(Q)=P for some linear map π\piπ. Given P={x:Ax≤b}=conv(V)P=\{x : Ax\le b\}=\mathrm{conv}(V)P={x:Ax≤b}=conv(V), the slack matrix has entries Sij=bi−AivjS_{ij}=b_i-A_iv_jSij​=bi​−Ai​vj​. The nonnegative rank rank+(M)\mathrm{rank}_+(M)rank+​(M) is the least rrr with M=TUM=TUM=TU, where T≥0T\ge 0T≥0 has rrr columns and U≥0U\ge 0U≥0 has rrr rows.

For nnn-bit strings a,ba,ba,b, a⊤ba^\top ba⊤b is the number of common ones, and M(n)M(n)M(n) is the 2n×2n2^n\times 2^n2n×2n matrix Mab=(1−a⊤b)2M_{ab}=(1-a^\top b)^2Mab​=(1−a⊤b)2. A 1-monochromatic rectangle cover of its support is a family of products R1×R2R_1\times R_2R1​×R2​, each containing only entries with Mab≠0M_{ab}\ne 0Mab​=0, that together contain all of them.

On the complete graph Kn=(Vn,En)K_n=(V_n,E_n)Kn​=(Vn​,En​), χF∈REn\chi^F\in\mathbb R^{E_n}χF∈REn​ is the characteristic vector of an edge set FFF and δ(X)\delta(X)δ(X) is the cut of X⊆VnX\subseteq V_nX⊆Vn​. The polytopes are

CUT(n)=conv{χδ(X)},COR(n)=conv{bb⊤:b∈{0,1}n}⊆Rn×n,\mathrm{CUT}(n)=\mathrm{conv}\{\chi^{\delta(X)}\},\qquad \mathrm{COR}(n)=\mathrm{conv}\{bb^\top : b\in\{0,1\}^n\}\subseteq\mathbb R^{n\times n},CUT(n)=conv{χδ(X)},COR(n)=conv{bb⊤:b∈{0,1}n}⊆Rn×n, TSP(n)=conv{χF:F⊆En is a tour (Hamiltonian cycle) of Kn}.\mathrm{TSP}(n)=\mathrm{conv}\{\chi^F : F\subseteq E_n \text{ is a tour (Hamiltonian cycle) of } K_n\}.TSP(n)=conv{χF:F⊆En​ is a tour (Hamiltonian cycle) of Kn​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 12

∃ C>0 ∃ N ∀n≥N:xc(TSP(n)) ≥ 2Cn.\exists\,C>0\ \exists\,N\ \forall n\ge N:\qquad \mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{TSP}(n))\ \ge\ 2^{C\sqrt n}.∃C>0 ∃N ∀n≥N:xc(TSP(n)) ≥ 2Cn​.

The constant is left unfixed, so the goal survives any improvement of it.

Milestones, in attack order

  • Razborov's distributional bound (displayed in the proof of Theorem 1) and Theorem 1: every 1-rectangle cover of the support of M(n)M(n)M(n) has 2Ω(n)2^{\Omega(n)}2Ω(n) rectangles.
  • Lemma 2 and Theorem 3 (Yannakakis): rank+(S)≤r\mathrm{rank}_+(S)\le rrank+​(S)≤r   ⟺  \iff⟺ an extension with at most rrr facets   ⟺  \iff⟺ an EF with at most rrr inequalities.
  • Theorem 4: rank+(M)\mathrm{rank}_+(M)rank+​(M) is at least the rectangle covering bound of its support (already proved on the platform, referenced).
  • Theorem 5: COR(n)\mathrm{COR}(n)COR(n) is linearly isomorphic to CUT(n+1)\mathrm{CUT}(n+1)CUT(n+1). Lemma 6: ⟨2 diag(a)−aa⊤,x⟩≤1\langle 2\,\mathrm{diag}(a)-aa^\top,x\rangle\le 1⟨2diag(a)−aa⊤,x⟩≤1 is valid for COR(n)\mathrm{COR}(n)COR(n), with slack MabM_{ab}Mab​ at bb⊤bb^\topbb⊤.
  • Theorem 7: xc(CUT(n+1))=xc(COR(n))≥2Cn\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{CUT}(n+1))=\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{COR}(n))\ge 2^{Cn}xc(CUT(n+1))=xc(COR(n))≥2Cn.
  • Lemma 9: xc\mathrm{xc}xc does not increase under taking faces or linear images. Lemma 11: TSP(q)\mathrm{TSP}(q)TSP(q) with q=O(n2)q=O(n^2)q=O(n2) has a face that is an extension of COR(n)\mathrm{COR}(n)COR(n).
  • Stable sets: Lemma 8 and Theorem 10, xc(STAB(Gn))=2Ω(n)\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{STAB}(G_n))=2^{\Omega(\sqrt n)}xc(STAB(Gn​))=2Ω(n​) for some graph GnG_nGn​ on nnn vertices.

Significance

The theorem rules out every polynomial-size linear programming formulation of the TSP polytope, in any number of auxiliary variables, which settles Yannakakis's question. The cut polytope bound does the same for max-cut, and the stable set bound for the stable set problem on general graphs. The results do not depend on P vs NP: they concern one specific model of computation, linear programs whose feasible region projects onto the polytope. They started a line of work on extension complexity, including perfect matching (Rothvoss), approximate EFs and semidefinite lifts.

Formalizing the result would produce a machine-checked chain from a communication-complexity bound to a polyhedral one. The paper's results are proved; the input of Theorem 1, Razborov's bound, is only cited, and is posed here as a separate target. To our knowledge none of these statements has a formal proof in Lean or another proof assistant. The polyhedral layer (Yannakakis's theorem, faces and extensions) and the matrix layer (nonnegative rank, rectangle covers) can be reused for later extension-complexity results.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, bounding the number of facets of the TSP polytope, does not work: extended formulations exist precisely because a projection can have far more facets than the lifted polyhedron. Any lower bound must cover every lifting at once, which means working with the nonnegative rank of a slack matrix rather than with any concrete formulation. Ordinary rank is no help, because M(n)M(n)M(n) has rank O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2). The step that carries the weight is Razborov's distributional bound for disjointness, a nontrivial piece of communication complexity. On the polyhedral side, Lemma 11 needs a reduction from 3SAT to a directed and then an undirected Hamiltonian cycle problem, realized as a face of TSP(q)\mathrm{TSP}(q)TSP(q) with q=O(n2)q=O(n^2)q=O(n2). Theorem 12 also needs a monotonicity of xc(TSP(n))\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{TSP}(n))xc(TSP(n)) in nnn that the paper only indicates.

Formalization scope

  • Everything is over R\mathbb RR. Points of Rd\mathbb R^dRd are functions ι→R\iota\to\mathbb Rι→R on a finite type. REn\mathbb R^{E_n}REn​ has one coordinate per unordered edge of KnK_nKn​ (non-diagonal elements of Sym2 (Fin n)). Rn×n\mathbb R^{n\times n}Rn×n is indexed by ordered pairs, and the Frobenius product is the dot product over ordered pairs. Bit strings are Fin n → Bool.
  • xc\mathrm{xc}xc and rank+\mathrm{rank}_+rank+​ are natural numbers (sInf of the attainable sizes), never ∞\infty∞, so no lower bound can hold through an infinite value. The size of an EF counts inequalities only.
  • Every 2Ω(f(n))2^{\Omega(f(n))}2Ω(f(n)) is ∃C>0 ∃N ∀n≥N\exists C>0\,\exists N\,\forall n\ge N∃C>0∃N∀n≥N, 2Cf(n)≤⋅2^{Cf(n)}\le\cdot2Cf(n)≤⋅ (real power). Every O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) is a constant ccc with ≤c n2\le c\,n^2≤cn2, uniform in nnn.
  • Theorem 7 and Lemma 11 carry an added n≥1n\ge 1n≥1: at n=0n=0n=0 the printed statements fail, since COR(0)\mathrm{COR}(0)COR(0) is a point with xc=0\mathrm{xc}=0xc=0 and no positive q≤c⋅0q\le c\cdot 0q≤c⋅0 exists.
  • "Linearly isomorphic" in Theorem 5 is an injective linear map carrying CUT(n+1)\mathrm{CUT}(n+1)CUT(n+1) onto COR(n)\mathrm{COR}(n)COR(n), because the two ambient spaces have different dimensions.
  • In Theorem 3, dim⁡P≥1\dim P\ge 1dimP≥1 is "PPP has two distinct points". Faces include ∅\emptyset∅ and PPP, facets are maximal proper faces, and facets are counted with an explicit finite family.
  • Ruled out: a TSP polytope over ordered pairs, all cycles or directed tours, a weakened isomorphism in Theorem 5, and an extension complexity valued in N∪{∞}\mathbb N\cup\{\infty\}N∪{∞} that is infinite on a broken EF definition.
  • Welcome contributions: proofs of any milestone, in particular Lemma 2 and the factorization theorem (reusable for every later extension-complexity result), Theorem 5, and the face construction of Lemma 11; a proof of the monotonicity of xc(TSP(n))\mathrm{xc}(\mathrm{TSP}(n))xc(TSP(n)) in nnn as a supporting lemma.

Selected references

  • S. Fiorini, S. Massar, S. Pokutta, H. R. Tiwary, R. de Wolf, Exponential lower bounds for polytopes in combinatorial optimization, J. ACM 62(2), Art. 17, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1145/2716307
  • M. Yannakakis, Expressing combinatorial optimization problems by linear programs, J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 43(3), 441–466, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0000(91)90024-Y
  • A. A. Razborov, On the distributional complexity of disjointness, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 106(2), 385–390, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3975(92)90260-M
  • R. de Wolf, Nondeterministic quantum query and communication complexities, SIAM J. Comput. 32(3), 681–699, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539702407345
  • C. De Simone, The cut polytope and the Boolean quadric polytope, Discrete Math. 79(1), 71–75, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1016/0012-365X(90)90056-N
  • V. Kaibel, S. Weltge, A short proof that the extension complexity of the correlation polytope grows exponentially, Discrete Comput. Geom. 53, 397–401, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00454-014-9655-9
  • T. Rothvoss, The matching polytope has exponential extension complexity, J. ACM 64(6), Art. 41, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3127497
21 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

A Simple Forward Algorithm to Solve General Dynamic Lot Sizing Models with n Periods in O(n log n) or O(n) Time: Minimal Optimal Predecessor Lists Are Characterized by Strictly Increasing BreakpointsResearch Paper

Motivation

The dynamic lot size model asks when, and how much, to order of a single item over a planning horizon of nnn periods with known, time-varying demands, setup costs, unit order costs and holding costs. It is the textbook model of production planning and the building block of material requirements planning, multi-item scheduling and many decomposition schemes for larger supply-chain problems.

Wagner and Whitin (1958) showed that some optimal policy orders only when inventory is zero, which turns the problem into a shortest-path recursion with O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) running time. For more than thirty years this was the standard algorithm. In 1991 three groups independently reduced the complexity: Federgruen and Tzur (Management Science 37(8), 1991), Wagelmans, van Hoesel and Kolen (Operations Research 40, 1992) and Aggarwal and Park (Operations Research 41, 1993). Each obtained O(nlog⁡n)O(n \log n)O(nlogn) in general and O(n)O(n)O(n) under special cost structures. The Federgruen–Tzur algorithm is a forward algorithm: at iteration jjj it keeps a short list of periods that could still be the best last setup period for some future horizon, and updates it by local tests on neighbouring entries. This mission formalizes the theorem that justifies those tests.

Setting

For periods i=1,2,…i = 1, 2, \dotsi=1,2,… let did_idi​ be the demand, KiK_iKi​ the setup cost, cic_ici​ the variable per unit order cost and hih_ihi​ the cost of carrying a unit of inventory at the end of period iii. Write D(i)=∑k=1idkD(i) = \sum_{k=1}^{i} d_kD(i)=∑k=1i​dk​ and H(i)=∑k=1ihkH(i) = \sum_{k=1}^{i} h_kH(i)=∑k=1i​hk​, so D(0)=H(0)=0D(0) = H(0) = 0D(0)=H(0)=0. For i<ji < ji<j let cij=ci+hi+⋯+hj−1c_{ij} = c_i + h_i + \dots + h_{j-1}cij​=ci​+hi​+⋯+hj−1​, let C~(i)=ci−H(i−1)\tilde C(i) = c_i - H(i-1)C~(i)=ci​−H(i−1), and let

S(i,j)=∑r=ij−1hr (D(j)−D(r))S(i, j) = \sum_{r=i}^{j-1} h_r\,\bigl(D(j) - D(r)\bigr)S(i,j)=r=i∑j−1​hr​(D(j)−D(r))

be the carrying cost of an order placed in period iii that covers the demands of periods i,…,ji, \dots, ji,…,j.

The costs are given by the zero-inventory recursion (2): F(0)=0F(0) = 0F(0)=0 and, for 1≤l≤t1 \le l \le t1≤l≤t,

F(l,t)=F(l−1)+Kl+S(l,t)+cl [D(t)−D(l−1)],F(t)=min⁡1≤l≤tF(l,t).F(l, t) = F(l-1) + K_l + S(l, t) + c_l\,[D(t) - D(l-1)], \qquad F(t) = \min_{1 \le l \le t} F(l, t).F(l,t)=F(l−1)+Kl​+S(l,t)+cl​[D(t)−D(l−1)],F(t)=1≤l≤tmin​F(l,t).

F(l,t)F(l, t)F(l,t) is the cost of the first ttt periods when the last setup is in period lll.

For two periods k<lk < lk<l the difference Δk,l(t)=F(k,t)−F(l,t)\Delta_{k,l}(t) = F(k,t) - F(l,t)Δk,l​(t)=F(k,t)−F(l,t) is affine in D(t)D(t)D(t), with intercept A(k,l)A(k,l)A(k,l) given by (4) and slope ck,l−cl=C~(k)−C~(l)c_{k,l} - c_l = \tilde C(k) - \tilde C(l)ck,l​−cl​=C~(k)−C~(l). Its root G(k,l)G(k,l)G(k,l) is defined by (5): A(k,l)/(C~(l)−C~(k))A(k,l)/(\tilde C(l) - \tilde C(k))A(k,l)/(C~(l)−C~(k)) when the slopes differ, and +∞+\infty+∞ or −∞-\infty−∞ according to the sign of A(k,l)A(k,l)A(k,l) when they agree. It is extended symmetrically, G(l,k)=G(k,l)G(l,k) = G(k,l)G(l,k)=G(k,l).

At iteration jjj the future demands are unknown, so a future horizon has a potential cumulative demand x≥D(j)x \ge D(j)x≥D(j). The jjjth Minimal Optimal Predecessors list Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) is the set of periods l≤jl \le jl≤j that are the lowest-index optimal last setup period, among {1,…,j}\{1, \dots, j\}{1,…,j}, for every potential cumulative demand in some open interval above D(j)D(j)D(j).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1(a)

Let j≥1j \ge 1j≥1 and let S={i1,…,ir}S = \{i_1, \dots, i_r\}S={i1​,…,ir​} with Ω(j)⊆S⊆{1,…,j}\Omega(j) \subseteq S \subseteq \{1, \dots, j\}Ω(j)⊆S⊆{1,…,j}, ranked so that C~(i1)≥⋯≥C~(ir)\tilde C(i_1) \ge \dots \ge \tilde C(i_r)C~(i1​)≥⋯≥C~(ir​), with equal C~\tilde CC~-values in ascending order of index. Put g(1)=D(j)g(1) = D(j)g(1)=D(j) and g(l)=G(il,il−1)g(l) = G(i_l, i_{l-1})g(l)=G(il​,il−1​) for l=2,…,rl = 2, \dots, rl=2,…,r. Then

S=Ω(j)  ⟺  g(1)<g(2)<⋯<g(r)<∞.(6)S = \Omega(j) \iff g(1) < g(2) < \dots < g(r) < \infty. \tag{6}S=Ω(j)⟺g(1)<g(2)<⋯<g(r)<∞.(6)

Milestones

In attack order:

  • identity (1a) for the carrying costs;
  • Lemma 2(a)–(d), the linearity of Δk,l\Delta_{k,l}Δk,l​ and the sign test against its root G(k,l)G(k,l)G(k,l);
  • the claim that Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) contains an optimal last setup period for the horizon jjj;
  • the strict chains (7)–(8) of the Appendix;
  • Theorem 1(b), that under (6) the first entry i1i_1i1​ is an optimal last setup period l(j)l(j)l(j);
  • Theorem 1(c)(i)–(iii), the three elimination rules: g(2)≤D(j)g(2) \le D(j)g(2)≤D(j) removes i1i_1i1​, g(k+1)≤g(k)g(k+1) \le g(k)g(k+1)≤g(k) removes iki_kik​, and g(r)=∞g(r) = \inftyg(r)=∞ removes iri_rir​.

A supporting item potCost_spec certifies that the potential costs used to define Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) agree with the paper's F(l,t)F(l,t)F(l,t), up to a term that does not depend on lll.

Significance

Theorem 1 is what makes the forward algorithm correct. Part (a) reduces the minimality of a candidate list to a condition on consecutive pairs of a sorted list. Part (c) says which entry to delete when the condition fails. Part (b) says where to read off the optimal last setup period. With these, Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) is maintained by deletions at the ends and in the interior of a list ordered by C~\tilde CC~, and each period is inserted and deleted at most once; the O(nlog⁡n)O(n \log n)O(nlogn) bound, and the O(n)O(n)O(n) bound under the paper's special cost structures, follow from this bookkeeping. The same lower-envelope reasoning appears in the other 1991–1993 algorithms and in later extensions to backlogging and capacitated variants.

The result has a complete published proof. To our knowledge there is no machine-checked development of the Wagner–Whitin recursion or of any of the fast lot-sizing algorithms. This mission produces the model, the breakpoints and the Minimal Optimal Predecessors lists as reusable definitions, and a checked proof of the characterization. It also records two small corrections that a formal reading forces on the printed text (see Formalization scope).

Difficulty

Each piece in isolation is elementary algebra on affine functions. The difficulty is in the combinatorics of the lower envelope with ties. The natural argument "consecutive breakpoints increase, so each line owns an interval" must handle three things:

  • equal slopes, where G=±∞G = \pm\inftyG=±∞;
  • several lines meeting at one point;
  • the lowest-index tie-breaking that makes Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) minimal.

The "only if" direction needs every failure of (6) to be traced to an element that is never the unique lowest-index optimum on an interval. Ties are exactly where the printed definition of Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j), read literally at a single demand value, breaks the theorem. A proof that ignores ties proves a statement that is false.

Formalization scope

  • Data and costs. The data are four functions N→R\mathbb N \to \mathbb RN→R bundled in a structure; values at index 000 are unused, and no sign conditions are imposed. FFF is defined by the recursion (2) with F(0)=0F(0) = 0F(0)=0. Its identification with the minimum cost over all feasible policies is the paper's Lemma 1 (Wagner–Whitin), which is not part of this mission. The horizon nnn is not a parameter.
  • Breakpoints. GGG and the critical values g(⋅)g(\cdot)g(⋅) take values in EReal, so ±∞\pm\infty±∞ are kept distinct from every real number. The final "<∞< \infty<∞" of (6) is part of the condition.
  • Ranked lists. A ranked set is a duplicate-free List ℕ. Lean lists are 0-based, so the paper's im+1i_{m+1}im+1​ and g(m+1)g(m+1)g(m+1) are entry mmm and gval j L m.
  • Disclosed change 1, Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j). The page asks for a single potential cumulative demand D≥D(j)D \ge D(j)D≥D(j) at which lll is the lowest-index optimum. With that reading, Theorem 1(a) "only if" and Theorem 1(c) fail when two lines tie exactly at a breakpoint (an explicit five-period instance is in the definition's note). The formalization requires lll to be the lowest-index optimum on a nondegenerate open interval of potential demands above D(j)D(j)D(j). This is the paper's own description of the list on p. 915: "the unique optimal last setup period for any horizon … with potential cumulative demand g(k)<D<g(k+1)g(k) < D < g(k+1)g(k)<D<g(k+1)".
  • Disclosed change 2, Lemma 2(d). The printed hypothesis "ck,l<clc_{k,l} < c_lck,l​<cl​" duplicates part (c) and is read as "ck,l=clc_{k,l} = c_lck,l​=cl​". The equivalence "Δk,l≥0\Delta_{k,l} \ge 0Δk,l​≥0 iff D(t)≥G(k,l)D(t) \ge G(k,l)D(t)≥G(k,l)" is stated under A(k,l)≠0A(k,l) \ne 0A(k,l)=0, since A(k,l)=0A(k,l) = 0A(k,l)=0 gives G=+∞G = +\inftyG=+∞ by (5).
  • Ruling out trivial formalizations. The hypotheses of the goal are satisfiable for every j≥1j \ge 1j≥1: rank {1,…,j}\{1, \dots, j\}{1,…,j} itself. Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) is nonempty (a milestone). F(t)F(t)F(t) for t≥1t \ge 1t≥1 is a minimum over the nonempty set {1,…,t}\{1, \dots, t\}{1,…,t}, never a default value. GGG is never replaced by a real-valued junk value at equal slopes.
  • Out of scope. Lemma 1, Lemma 3, Corollaries 1–5, Theorem 2, the Algorithm's pseudo-code and its complexity analysis, and the submodularity discussion of §5.
  • Reusable infrastructure. The model, the recursion (2), AAA, GGG and Ω(j)\Omega(j)Ω(j) can be reused for the paper's algorithmic results and for related lot-sizing papers. Proofs of the milestones, in any order, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and M. Tzur, A Simple Forward Algorithm to Solve General Dynamic Lot Sizing Models with n Periods in O(n log n) or O(n) Time, Management Science 37(8):909–925, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.37.8.909
  • H. M. Wagner and T. M. Whitin, Dynamic Version of the Economic Lot Size Model, Management Science 5(1):89–96, 1958. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.5.1.89
  • A. Wagelmans, S. van Hoesel and A. Kolen, Economic Lot-Sizing: An O(n log n) Algorithm That Runs in Linear Time in the Wagner-Whitin Case, Operations Research 40(1-supplement-1):S145–S156, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.1.S145
  • A. Aggarwal and J. K. Park, Improved Algorithms for Economic Lot Size Problems, Operations Research 41(3):549–571, 1993. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.41.3.549
16 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems: Algorithm OPT Returns an Optimal Reorder Point and Order QuantityResearch Paper

Motivation

(r, Q) policies are the standard replenishment rule for a single item under continuous review: whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus on order minus backorders) drops to the reorder point rrr, an order of size QQQ is placed. They are known to be optimal in the classical models with Poisson or compound renewal demand, constant or exogenous lead times and full backlogging, and they are used widely in practice and in multi-item and multi-echelon systems where they are applied item by item.

For decades, computing an optimal pair (r,Q)(r, Q)(r,Q) exactly was not routine. The textbook treatment of Hadley and Whitin (1963) gives approximations; as Browne and Zipkin (1991) put it, "until recently, there was no reliable, straightforward method for computing an optimal (r, Q) policy, even in the simple case of Poisson demand processes." Many heuristics were proposed (surveyed by Lee and Nahmias, 1989); the only exact procedure in circulation was in Zipkin's classnotes, based on a result of Sahin (1982).

Federgruen and Zheng (1992) give a short exact algorithm, Algorithm OPT, whose work is linear in the optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗. It rests only on the form of the cost, not on a particular demand model.

Setting

Inventory positions are integers (demand arrives unit by unit). A fixed cost κ>0\kappa>0κ>0 is charged per order, and G:Z→RG:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb RG:Z→R is the expected holding and backlogging cost rate as a function of the inventory position yyy. In all the models of the paper the long-run average cost of the (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) policy, for an integer rrr and an integer Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1, has the form

C(r,Q)=[κ+∑y=r+1r+QG(y)]/Q.(1)C(r,Q)=\Big[\kappa+\sum_{y=r+1}^{r+Q}G(y)\Big]\Big/Q. \tag{1}C(r,Q)=[κ+y=r+1∑r+Q​G(y)]/Q.(1)

The paper's standing assumptions on GGG are:

  1. −G-G−G is unimodal: there is an integer mmm with GGG nonincreasing on {y≤m}\{y\le m\}{y≤m} and nondecreasing on {y≥m}\{y\ge m\}{y≥m} (flat stretches allowed);
  2. lim⁡∣y∣→∞G(y)=∞\lim_{|y|\to\infty}G(y)=\inftylim∣y∣→∞​G(y)=∞.

The sequence yQy_QyQ​. Let y1y_1y1​ be an integer minimizing GGG. Given y1,…,yQy_1,\dots,y_Qy1​,…,yQ​, let L(Q)=min⁡{y1,…,yQ}L(Q)=\min\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}L(Q)=min{y1​,…,yQ​} and R(Q)=max⁡{y1,…,yQ}R(Q)=\max\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}R(Q)=max{y1​,…,yQ​}, and set

yQ+1={L(Q)−1if G(L(Q)−1)≤G(R(Q)+1),R(Q)+1otherwise.y_{Q+1}=\begin{cases}L(Q)-1 & \text{if } G(L(Q)-1)\le G(R(Q)+1),\\ R(Q)+1 & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}yQ+1​={L(Q)−1R(Q)+1​if G(L(Q)−1)≤G(R(Q)+1),otherwise.​

So the window [L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)] grows by one point at a time towards the smaller neighbouring value, ties going left. Write r∗(Q)r^*(Q)r∗(Q) for an optimal reorder point for a given QQQ, and

C∗(Q)=[κ+∑i=1QG(yi)]/Q.C^*(Q)=\Big[\kappa+\sum_{i=1}^{Q}G(y_i)\Big]\Big/Q .C∗(Q)=[κ+i=1∑Q​G(yi​)]/Q.

Algorithm OPT, Step 1. Variables S,Q,C∗,r,RS,Q,C^*,r,RS,Q,C∗,r,R start at S=κ+G(y1)S=\kappa+G(y_1)S=κ+G(y1​), Q=1Q=1Q=1, C∗=SC^*=SC∗=S, r=y1−1r=y_1-1r=y1​−1, R=y1+1R=y_1+1R=y1​+1. Each pass compares G(r)G(r)G(r) and G(R)G(R)G(R); on the smaller side (left on ties) it stops if C∗C^*C∗ is at most that value, and otherwise adds the value to SSS and moves rrr one step left or RRR one step right; then Q:=Q+1Q:=Q+1Q:=Q+1 and C∗:=S/QC^*:=S/QC∗:=S/Q. The output is the final (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

Under the standing assumptions, Step 1 of Algorithm OPT, started from any global minimizer y1y_1y1​ of GGG, stops after finitely many passes, and its output (r,Q)(r,Q)(r,Q) satisfies Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1 and

C(r,Q)≤C(r′,Q′)for all integers r′ and all integers Q′≥1.C(r,Q)\le C(r',Q')\qquad\text{for all integers } r' \text{ and all integers } Q'\ge 1 .C(r,Q)≤C(r′,Q′)for all integers r′ and all integers Q′≥1.

The goal fixes no constants and no demand model: it is a statement about every GGG satisfying the standing assumptions.

Milestones, in proof order

  • §2, p. 811: {y1,…,yQ}\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}{y1​,…,yQ​} is the contiguous block [L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)][L(Q),R(Q)] of QQQ integers and carries the QQQ smallest values of GGG.
  • Figure 1 (p. 809): yQ+1y_{Q+1}yQ+1​ has the least GGG-value outside the window; in particular G(y1)≤G(y2)≤⋯G(y_1)\le G(y_2)\le\cdotsG(y1​)≤G(y2​)≤⋯.
  • Lemma 1: L(Q)−1L(Q)-1L(Q)−1 is an optimal reorder point for QQQ.
  • Corollary 1: r∗(Q)−1≤r∗(Q+1)≤r∗(Q)r^*(Q)-1\le r^*(Q+1)\le r^*(Q)r∗(Q)−1≤r∗(Q+1)≤r∗(Q).
  • Display before (6): min⁡rC(r,Q)=C∗(Q)\min_r C(r,Q)=C^*(Q)minr​C(r,Q)=C∗(Q).
  • (6): C∗(Q+1)=[QC∗(Q)+G(yQ+1)]/(Q+1)C^*(Q+1)=[QC^*(Q)+G(y_{Q+1})]/(Q+1)C∗(Q+1)=[QC∗(Q)+G(yQ+1​)]/(Q+1), and C∗(Q+1)<C∗(Q)C^*(Q+1)<C^*(Q)C∗(Q+1)<C∗(Q) iff G(yQ+1)<C∗(Q)G(y_{Q+1})<C^*(Q)G(yQ+1​)<C∗(Q).
  • Lemma 2: the smallest qqq with C∗(q)≤G(yq+1)C^*(q)\le G(y_{q+1})C∗(q)≤G(yq+1​) exists and is an optimal order size.
  • Step 1 tracks the sequence: from the state (κ+∑i≤QG(yi), Q, C∗(Q), L(Q)−1, R(Q)+1)(\kappa+\sum_{i\le Q}G(y_i),\,Q,\,C^*(Q),\,L(Q)-1,\,R(Q)+1)(κ+∑i≤Q​G(yi​),Q,C∗(Q),L(Q)−1,R(Q)+1) one pass stops with (L(Q)−1,Q)(L(Q)-1,Q)(L(Q)−1,Q) exactly when C∗(Q)≤G(yQ+1)C^*(Q)\le G(y_{Q+1})C∗(Q)≤G(yQ+1​) and otherwise moves to the same state for Q+1Q+1Q+1.

Significance

The result turns the joint minimization of (1) over (r,Q)∈Z×Z≥1(r,Q)\in\mathbb Z\times\mathbb Z_{\ge1}(r,Q)∈Z×Z≥1​, an unbounded two-dimensional integer problem, into a single scan whose length is Q∗Q^*Q∗ plus the distance to the minimizer of GGG. Because it uses only the form (1) and the unimodality of −G-G−G, it applies at once to Poisson and compound Poisson demand, to stochastic lead times with an equilibrium lead-time demand, and to cost structures with stockout penalties; the paper also notes extensions to (r,nQ)(r,nQ)(r,nQ) policies. Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 additionally give the structure of the optimal reorder point as a function of QQQ.

The result has been proved on paper since 1992. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof of the algorithm's correctness for general GGG under exactly the paper's hypotheses. The platform already has the linear-cost special case of the underlying lemmas for one discrete demand model (InventoryControl.rq_discrete_recursion, rq_discrete_joint_optimal), but with C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) and Q∗Q^*Q∗ given as hypotheses and no algorithm; nothing on the platform states the algorithm or treats general unimodal −G-G−G.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says: for fixed QQQ the sum in (1) should cover the QQQ smallest values of GGG, and the greedy window collects exactly those. Both halves need care on the integers with flat stretches of GGG: "the QQQ smallest values" is ambiguous under ties, and the claim that a greedy window holds them relies on y1y_1y1​ being a global minimizer together with the unimodality of −G-G−G, not on convexity.

The stopping rule is the second point. Lemma 2 looks like a first-order condition, but C∗(⋅)C^*(\cdot)C∗(⋅) need not be convex; optimality of the first stopping qqq for all larger QQQ uses that the values G(yi)G(y_i)G(yi​) are nondecreasing along the sequence, which the paper uses without stating. Termination of the algorithm is not discussed on the page; it needs G→∞G\to\inftyG→∞, and fails for constant GGG.

Finally, the goal is about an imperative loop. Connecting its five variables to yQy_QyQ​, C∗(Q)C^*(Q)C∗(Q) and L(Q)L(Q)L(Q) is an invariant argument that has to match the tie-breaking and the non-strict stopping tests exactly.

Formalization scope

  • Types. G:Z→RG:\mathbb Z\to\mathbb RG:Z→R, κ∈R\kappa\in\mathbb Rκ∈R with κ>0\kappa>0κ>0, reorder points in Z\mathbb ZZ, order quantities in N\mathbb NN with Q≥1Q\ge1Q≥1 required wherever a cost appears. Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 makes C(r,0)=0C(r,0)=0C(r,0)=0, so optimality is always quantified over Q′≥1Q'\ge1Q′≥1 and the goal asserts that the returned QQQ is ≥1\ge1≥1.
  • Assumptions. "−G-G−G unimodal" is NegUnimodal G: ∃m\exists m∃m, GGG antitone on (−∞,m](-\infty,m](−∞,m] and monotone on [m,∞)[m,\infty)[m,∞). "lim⁡∣y∣→∞G=∞\lim_{|y|\to\infty}G=\inftylim∣y∣→∞​G=∞" is Coercive G: G→+∞G\to+\inftyG→+∞ along atBot and atTop. Mathlib's QuasiconvexOn ℤ is not used: over Z\mathbb ZZ-weights it holds for every function.
  • The sequence. L(Q),R(Q)L(Q),R(Q)L(Q),R(Q) are defined by recursion on the window, and yyy is 1-based with an unused value at index 0; that L,RL,RL,R are the minimum and maximum of {y1,…,yQ}\{y_1,\dots,y_Q\}{y1​,…,yQ​}, as the paper defines them, is the first milestone.
  • The algorithm. Step 1 is transcribed literally, including G(r)≤G(R)G(r)\le G(R)G(r)≤G(R) → left and the non-strict tests C∗≤G(r)C^*\le G(r)C∗≤G(r), C∗≤G(R)C^*\le G(R)C∗≤G(R); GGG is evaluated directly instead of through the ΔG\Delta GΔG bookkeeping. The loop runs with a pass budget and returns nothing when the budget runs out; the goal states that for every large enough budget it returns an optimal pair.
  • Step 0 is not formalized. It scans L=0,1,…L=0,1,\dotsL=0,1,… for the first LLL with ΔG(L)≥0\Delta G(L)\ge0ΔG(L)≥0, under the paper's simplification y1>0y_1>0y1​>0; under unimodality alone it can stop on a plateau before the minimum. The goal starts Step 1 from a given global minimizer y1y_1y1​, which is the paper's own §2 setup and matches its p. 812 remark that Step 0 may be replaced by a bisection search.
  • Not formalized: Theorem 1's second sentence (the operation count), the derivations of (1) for specific demand models, and (5).
  • Corrected slips. The printed proof of Lemma 2 writes C(Q)−C(Q∗)C(Q)-C(Q^*)C(Q)−C(Q∗) with C∗(Q)C^*(Q)C∗(Q) inside the bracket; the correct identity has C∗(Q)−C∗(Q∗)C^*(Q)-C^*(Q^*)C∗(Q)−C∗(Q∗) and C∗(Q∗)C^*(Q^*)C∗(Q∗). Lemma 2's "Q∗Q^*Q∗" is formalized as existence of the smallest qqq with the property plus its optimality, since minimizers need not be unique; likewise "r∗(Q)=L(Q)−1r^*(Q)=L(Q)-1r∗(Q)=L(Q)−1" means L(Q)−1L(Q)-1L(Q)−1 is an optimal reorder point.
  • Ruled out. Defining the algorithm's output as an argmin of CCC, or by searching for Lemma 2's qqq, would make the goal trivial; the algorithm is defined by its steps. A statement of the form "if the run returns a pair, it is optimal" would be vacuous for a loop that never stops; termination is part of the goal.

Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are general lemmas on windows of unimodal integer sequences, which are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
  • G. Hadley and T. M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • S. Browne and P. Zipkin, Inventory Models with Continuous, Stochastic Demands, Annals of Applied Probability 1(3):419–435, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoap/1177005875
  • H. L. Lee and S. Nahmias, Single-Product, Single-Location Models, in Handbooks in OR & MS vol. 4, 1993 (cited by the paper as a 1989 working paper).
  • I. Sahin, On the Objective Function Behavior in (s, S) Inventory Models, Operations Research 30(4):709–724, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.30.4.709
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 3: Order-Oblivious Posted Prices 2-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Uniform Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson 1981) maximizes a seller's expected revenue when buyers have independent private values, but it is a sealed-bid mechanism: every buyer reports a value, and the allocation and payments are computed from all reports at once. Real sellers more often post prices: buyers arrive, each sees a take-it-or-leave-it price, and buys or leaves. Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (arXiv:0907.2435) ask how much revenue such simple mechanisms lose. Their strongest notion is the order-oblivious posted-price mechanism (OPM): the prices are fixed in advance, and the guarantee must hold whatever order the buyers arrive in, even an adversarial one.

The tool behind the guarantee for sellers of kkk identical units is a prophet inequality. In the single-choice version, a gambler inspects independent random rewards one at a time and must accept or reject each on the spot; Krengel and Sucheston, and Samuel-Cahn (Ann. Probab. 1984), showed that a single fixed threshold earns at least half of what a prophet who sees all rewards earns. The paper extends Samuel-Cahn's threshold rule to kkk choices (Appendix D.2) and turns it into a revenue guarantee (Theorem 10).

Setting

There are nnn agents [n][n][n]. Agent iii's value viv_ivi​ for being served is drawn independently from a distribution FiF_iFi​ with density fif_ifi​; the virtual valuation is ϕi(v)=v−(1−Fi(v))/fi(v)\phi_i(v) = v - (1 - F_i(v))/f_i(v)ϕi​(v)=v−(1−Fi​(v))/fi​(v) (Definition 1), and FiF_iFi​ is regular if ϕi\phi_iϕi​ is non-decreasing (Definition 2). The seller may serve any set of agents in a downward-closed set system J\mathcal JJ; this mission uses the kkk-uniform matroid, where a set is feasible exactly when it has at most kkk members.

A mechanism MMM maps reported values v\mathbf vv to an allocation M(v)∈JM(\mathbf v) \in \mathcal JM(v)∈J and payments πi(v)\pi_i(\mathbf v)πi​(v). It is truthful if reporting the true value is a dominant strategy and no agent ever gets negative utility. Its expected revenue is RM=Ev[∑iπi(v)]\mathcal R^M = \mathbb E_{\mathbf v}[\sum_i \pi_i(\mathbf v)]RM=Ev​[∑i​πi​(v)], and RM\mathcal R^{\mathcal M}RM denotes the revenue of Myerson's mechanism, the largest over truthful mechanisms (Theorem 19).

Given prices p\mathbf pp and values v\mathbf vv, agent iii desires service if vi≥piv_i \ge p_ivi​≥pi​. Let Sv\mathcal S_{\mathbf v}Sv​ be the class of maximal feasible sets of desiring agents. When agents arrive in an arbitrary order and each buys if it desires service and can still be feasibly served, the set of buyers lies in Sv\mathcal S_{\mathbf v}Sv​. The paper's pessimistic revenue estimate is

Rpobl=Ev∼F min⁡S∈Sv∑i∈Spi.\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p} = \mathbb E_{\mathbf v \sim \mathbf F}\ \min_{S \in \mathcal S_{\mathbf v}} \sum_{i \in S} p_i .Rpobl​=Ev∼F​ S∈Sv​min​i∈S∑​pi​.

For the prophet inequality, X1,…,XnX_1, \dots, X_nX1​,…,Xn​ are independent nonnegative random variables with order statistics X(1)≥⋯≥X(n)X_{(1)} \ge \dots \ge X_{(n)}X(1)​≥⋯≥X(n)​, and (x)+=max⁡(0,x)(x)^+ = \max(0, x)(x)+=max(0,x). The threshold rule with threshold ccc picks indices t1(c),…,tk(c)t_1(c), \dots, t_k(c)t1​(c),…,tk​(c), where ti(c)t_i(c)ti​(c) is the lesser of n−k+in-k+in−k+i and the iii-th smallest index jjj with Xj≥cX_j \ge cXj​≥c (or n−k+in - k + in−k+i if there is none). The numbers a∗a^*a∗ and b∗b^*b∗ are the unique solutions of

a=∑i=1kE(X(i)−a/k)+,b=∑i=1nE(Xi−b/k)+.a = \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb E\big(X_{(i)} - a/k\big)^+, \qquad b = \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb E\big(X_i - b/k\big)^+ .a=i=1∑k​E(X(i)​−a/k)+,b=i=1∑n​E(Xi​−b/k)+.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 10 (p. 9)

∃ p  ∀M truthful:RM≤2 Rpobl\exists\, \mathbf p\ \ \forall M \text{ truthful}:\qquad \mathcal R^M \le 2\, \mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}∃p  ∀M truthful:RM≤2Rpobl​

for every instance with regular distributions and a kkk-uniform matroid constraint. The prices are chosen once, before the mechanism it is compared with; this is the paper's "Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ 2-approximates RM\mathcal R^{\mathcal M}RM".

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 5): under regularity, the expected revenue of a truthful mechanism equals its expected virtual surplus E[∑i∈M(v)ϕi(vi)]\mathbb E[\sum_{i \in M(\mathbf v)} \phi_i(v_i)]E[∑i∈M(v)​ϕi​(vi​)] (with the lowest type receiving zero utility).
  2. a∗a^*a∗ and b∗b^*b∗ exist and are unique (App. D.2, p. 18).
  3. The claim a∗≤b∗a^* \le b^*a∗≤b∗ (App. D.2, p. 18).
  4. Theorem 24 (p. 18), the kkk-choice prophet inequality: for a∗≤kc≤b∗a^* \le k c \le b^*a∗≤kc≤b∗,
∑i=1kE[X(i)]≤2∑i=1kE[Xti(c)].\sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb E\big[X_{(i)}\big] \le 2 \sum_{i=1}^k \mathbb E\big[X_{t_i(c)}\big].i=1∑k​E[X(i)​]≤2i=1∑k​E[Xti​(c)​].

Significance

The theorem says that a seller of kkk identical units can fix one price per buyer, ignore the arrival order entirely, and still collect half of the optimal revenue. The factor 2 is tight: Appendix D.2 gives a single-item example with two buyers where no order-oblivious pricing does better. Corollary 11 extends the result to partition matroids, and Theorem 24 is reused for the graphical-matroid result (Theorem 12, App. D.3). Theorem 24 is a statement in optimal stopping independent of mechanism design, and kkk-choice prophet inequalities are now a standard tool for online allocation.

The results are proved in the paper (preprint arXiv:0907.2435v2; a conference version appeared at STOC 2010). To our knowledge none of them, nor any prophet inequality, has a machine-checked proof; Mathlib has independence of random variables but no order statistics, stopping-rule prophet inequalities, or Myerson's revenue characterization in this multi-agent dominant-strategy form. A related single-unit, Bayesian-incentive-compatible form of Proposition 1 exists on the platform (MechanismDesign.Auctions.revenue_eq_virtual_surplus), in a different model.

Difficulty

The threshold rule picks the first values above ccc, not the largest, and its picks are dependent random indices; the expectation E[Xti(c)]\mathbb E[X_{t_i(c)}]E[Xti​(c)​] does not factor. The obvious comparison of the gambler with the prophet term by term fails, because the gambler can exhaust its kkk picks on early, small values. The bound has to balance two events: either at least kkk values reach ccc, or a value is picked whenever it exceeds ccc; independence enters exactly in the second. The rule also has forced picks at the end of the sequence, which must be handled as stated.

On the mechanism side, Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ is a minimum over an adversarially chosen family, not the revenue of one run, so it cannot be read off from a single sequential mechanism. Proposition 1 needs the full revenue-equivalence argument: monotone allocations, the payment identity, and an integration by parts against the density.

Formalization scope

  • Distributions: each FiF_iFi​ has a bounded support [v‾i,v‾i][\underline v_i, \overline v_i][v​i​,vi​] with 0≤v‾i0 \le \underline v_i0≤v​i​, and a measurable density positive on it (a pinned convention; the paper says only "with density fif_ifi​"). Regularity is required on the support. The prior is the product of the marginals.
  • Mechanisms: deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational on the type space, with measurable allocation events and measurable, integrable payments. Payments of unserved agents are not forced to be zero.
  • RM\mathcal R^{\mathcal M}RM is not constructed. The goal is stated against every truthful mechanism, which by Theorem 19 is equivalent. Quantifier order matters: "for every mechanism there are prices" is a weaker statement and is not the goal.
  • Proposition 1 carries the normalization that an agent of the lowest type gets zero utility, which the paper presupposes on p. 12.
  • Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ is a genuine minimum over the finite, nonempty family Sv\mathcal S_{\mathbf v}Sv​; maximality is essential, since without it the empty set makes the estimate 000 and the goal false. Prices are arbitrary reals.
  • a∗a^*a∗ and b∗b^*b∗ are characterised by their equations as hypotheses, not defined by an infimum. Order statistics count multiplicity. Lean indices are 0-based. The threshold rule includes the page's forced picks ti(c)=n−k+it_i(c) = n - k + iti​(c)=n−k+i; it is not replaced by a pure threshold rule. Theorem 24 and the claims about a∗,b∗a^*, b^*a∗,b∗ assume 1≤k≤n1 \le k \le n1≤k≤n; the goal assumes nothing about kkk.
  • Out of scope: non-regular distributions (ironing), Corollary 11, and the p. 19 identity rewriting Rpobl\mathcal R^{\mathrm{obl}}_{\mathbf p}Rpobl​ as a sum of virtual values (a proof step, not a milestone).

Useful reusable infrastructure: order statistics and their measurability, Samuel-Cahn-type threshold rules, and Myerson's payment identity for dominant-strategy mechanisms. Proofs of any milestone, and supporting lemmas on these objects, are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, arXiv:0907.2435v2, 2010 (STOC 2010). https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.2435
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • E. Samuel-Cahn, Comparison of Threshold Stop Rules and Maximum for Independent Nonnegative Random Variables, Annals of Probability 12(4), 1984. https://doi.org/10.1214/aop/1176993150
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 2: Sequential Posted Prices e/(e−1)-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Partition Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who knows the distributions of buyers' values can maximise expected revenue with Myerson's optimal mechanism (Myerson 1981): collect bids, compute virtual values, serve a feasible set of maximum virtual surplus, and charge threshold payments. Real sellers seldom run such auctions. They post prices: a buyer is offered a take-it-or-leave-it price and either accepts or walks away. Posted prices need no bidding, involve no competition between buyers, and are trivially truthful. The question is how much revenue they give up.

Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (arXiv:0907.2435, STOC 2010) answer this for a range of feasibility constraints with a single construction, the sequential posted-price mechanism (SPM) S\mathcal SS. For general matroids it loses at most a factor 222 (Theorem 5). For uniform and partition matroids, that is, multi-unit sales and unions of multi-unit sales, it loses at most a factor e/(e−1)≈1.58e/(e-1)\approx1.58e/(e−1)≈1.58 (Theorem 6), and the paper shows this factor is tight for its mechanism. This mission targets Theorem 6.

Timeline. Myerson (1981) characterised the optimal single-parameter mechanism. Blumrosen and Holenstein (2008) showed that the best single-unit SPM can be a factor π/2\sqrt{\pi/2}π/2​ below Myerson's revenue even with i.i.d. buyers. Chawla, Hartline and Kleinberg (EC 2007) used posted prices to approximate multi-parameter unit-demand pricing. Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (2010) gave the matroid, partition-matroid and matroid-intersection bounds. Yan (SODA 2011) explained the e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) factor through the correlation gap of submodular functions and sharpened it for kkk units to 1−kke−k/k!1-k^ke^{-k}/k!1−kke−k/k!.

Setting

There are nnn agents. Agent iii has a private value viv_ivi​ for being served, drawn independently from a distribution FiF_iFi​ with density fif_ifi​. The virtual value is φi(v)=v−1−Fi(v)fi(v)\varphi_i(v)=v-\frac{1-F_i(v)}{f_i(v)}φi​(v)=v−fi​(v)1−Fi​(v)​, and FiF_iFi​ is regular if φi\varphi_iφi​ is non-decreasing. The seller may serve any set in a downward-closed family J⊆2[n]\mathcal J\subseteq2^{[n]}J⊆2[n].

A partition matroid assigns each agent iii to a part part(i)\mathrm{part}(i)part(i) and each part bbb a capacity cap(b)∈N\mathrm{cap}(b)\in\mathbb Ncap(b)∈N. A set is feasible iff it contains at most cap(b)\mathrm{cap}(b)cap(b) agents of every part bbb. With one part of capacity kkk this is the kkk-uniform matroid: at most kkk agents are served.

A truthful mechanism MMM maps a value vector v\mathbf vv to a feasible set M(v)M(\mathbf v)M(v) and payments πi(v)\pi_i(\mathbf v)πi​(v). It is dominant-strategy incentive compatible and individually rational. Its expected revenue is RM=E[∑iπi(v)]\mathcal R^M=\mathbb E[\sum_i\pi_i(\mathbf v)]RM=E[∑i​πi​(v)], and qiM=Pr⁡[i∈M(v)]q^M_i=\Pr[i\in M(\mathbf v)]qiM​=Pr[i∈M(v)] is its service probability for agent iii.

The sequential posted-price mechanism S\mathcal SS built from MMM sets the price pi=Fi−1(1−qiM)p_i=F_i^{-1}(1-q^M_i)pi​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​) for agent iii, so that agent iii accepts with probability exactly qiMq^M_iqiM​. It approaches the agents one at a time in decreasing order of price (σ\sigmaσ is the ordering). It offers agent iii the price pip_ipi​ if adding iii to the agents already served keeps the set feasible. The agent accepts iff pi≤vip_i\le v_ipi​≤vi​. Its expected revenue is Rpσ\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}Rpσ​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6, partition matroids

For every partition matroid, every truthful MMM, and S\mathcal SS built from MMM as above,

RM≤ee−1 Rpσ.\mathcal R^M\le\frac{e}{e-1}\,\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}.RM≤e−1e​Rpσ​.

Taking MMM to be Myerson's mechanism gives the paper's statement.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2 (regular case): RM≤∑ipiMqiM\mathcal R^M\le\sum_ip^M_iq^M_iRM≤∑i​piM​qiM​ with piM=Fi−1(1−qiM)p^M_i=F_i^{-1}(1-q^M_i)piM​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​).
  2. Rank bound (§4): ∑i∈SqiM≤rank⁡(S)\sum_{i\in S}q^M_i\le\operatorname{rank}(S)∑i∈S​qiM​≤rank(S) for every set SSS; for a part bbb this reads ∑part(i)=bqiM≤cap(b)\sum_{\mathrm{part}(i)=b}q^M_i\le\mathrm{cap}(b)∑part(i)=b​qiM​≤cap(b).
  3. Single-unit revenue formula (App. C.2): RS=∑kckpkqk\mathcal R^{\mathcal S}=\sum_kc_kp_kq_kRS=∑k​ck​pk​qk​ with ck=∏j<k(1−qj)c_k=\prod_{j<k}(1-q_j)ck​=∏j<k​(1−qj​), positions in offer order.
  4. Lemma 20: with ppp defined by ∑kpkqk=p∑kqk\sum_kp_kq_k=p\sum_kq_k∑k​pk​qk​=p∑k​qk​ (equation (2)) and prices decreasing, p∑kckqk≤∑kckpkqkp\sum_kc_kq_k\le\sum_kc_kp_kq_kp∑k​ck​qk​≤∑k​ck​pk​qk​.
  5. Display (3): if ∑kqk=s≤1\sum_kq_k=s\le1∑k​qk​=s≤1, then p∑kckqk=p(1−∏k(1−qk))≥p(1−(1−s/n)n)≥(1−1/e)psp\sum_kc_kq_k=p(1-\prod_k(1-q_k))\ge p(1-(1-s/n)^n)\ge(1-1/e)psp∑k​ck​qk​=p(1−∏k​(1−qk​))≥p(1−(1−s/n)n)≥(1−1/e)ps.
  6. Theorem 21: the goal for the 111-uniform matroid.
  7. Theorem 22: the goal for the kkk-uniform matroid, every kkk.

Significance

The theorem shows that a mechanism with no bidding loses at most about 37%37\%37% of the optimal revenue when the constraint is a union of multi-unit supplies. That covers selling several kinds of goods, each in limited stock, to single-minded buyers. The prices are computed once from the distributions. The order is fixed before any value is seen. No agent's payment depends on another agent's report. The factor is tight for this mechanism (App. C.2), and the same template (prices from service probabilities, decreasing order) gives factor 222 for all matroids and m+1m+1m+1 for intersections of mmm matroids.

On the formal side, the paper's results are proved but none is machine-checked as far as we know. The platform has Myerson-type results for a single unit with Bayesian incentive compatibility and a common support (Börgers), and for i.i.d. buyers with a fixed number of units (Talluri and van Ryzin). Neither covers independent, non-identical buyers under a set-system constraint with dominant-strategy truthfulness. A complete development would include the ex-ante revenue bound of Lemma 2 for regular distributions, which is reusable for any posted-price or prophet-inequality argument, and the 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e correlation-gap inequality.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares S\mathcal SS with Myerson's mechanism one agent at a time. That fails, because S\mathcal SS may stop offering to an agent once the units of its part are gone, and the agents blocked this way can be the ones Myerson's mechanism serves. The loss has to be bounded in aggregate, using only the ex-ante constraint ∑part(i)=bqi≤cap(b)\sum_{\mathrm{part}(i)=b}q_i\le\mathrm{cap}(b)∑part(i)=b​qi​≤cap(b). The single-unit case reduces to an inequality about products ∏(1−qj)\prod(1-q_j)∏(1−qj​). For kkk units, the printed proof (pp. 15–16) is an induction that compares the run with a hypothetical single-unit instance with probabilities qi/kq_i/kqi​/k. Its second case is informal, so a formal proof needs its own argument for the kkk-unit bound. Passing from uniform to partition matroids needs the observation that with a global order the run inside each part depends only on that part's agents. Lemma 2 needs the revenue-curve concavity that regularity gives, stated through densities rather than derivatives.

Formalization scope

  • Values. Each FiF_iFi​ has a density that is measurable and strictly positive on a bounded interval [v‾i,vˉi][\underline v_i,\bar v_i][v​i​,vˉi​] with 0≤v‾i0\le\underline v_i0≤v​i​, integrates to 111 there, and has no mass outside. The paper says only "with density fif_ifi​". This pin rules out point masses, so the randomised-price variant of S\mathcal SS never arises. The prior is the product of these laws.
  • Regularity is φi\varphi_iφi​ non-decreasing on the support, assumed for every agent in the goal, as in the paper's §4 analyses. The non-regular extension (second paragraph of Lemma 2, Appendix E) is out of scope.
  • Truthful means deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible over the support, ex-post individually rational, feasible, with measurable allocations and integrable payments.
  • Prices are arguments tied to MMM by pi∈[v‾i,vˉi]p_i\in[\underline v_i,\bar v_i]pi​∈[v​i​,vˉi​] and Fi(pi)=1−qiMF_i(p_i)=1-q^M_iFi​(pi​)=1−qiM​. No inverse distribution function is defined.
  • Order. The order σ\sigmaσ is a permutation with σ(0)\sigma(0)σ(0) first, decreasing in price, and ties are arbitrary. It is global across parts. Parts of capacity 000 are allowed.
  • Constant. The constant is exactly e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1).
  • No free prices. The theorem is not stated with free or existentially chosen prices. Prices are pinned to MMM's service probabilities, and S\mathcal SS uses the same constraint as MMM. A statement in which the prices could be chosen after the fact, or in which MMM were not required to be individually rational, would be a different or false theorem.
  • Every truthful MMM. The comparison is with every truthful MMM, not with a constructed Myerson mechanism. This form is at least as strong as the paper's, and it is what the paper's proof shows.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the algebraic milestones (Lemma 20, display (3)), the revenue formula, Lemma 2 (reusable payment-identity infrastructure for dominant-strategy mechanisms), and a correlation-gap argument for kkk units.

Selected references

  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. L. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, STOC 2010; arXiv:0907.2435v2, 2010. https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.2435
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • L. Blumrosen, T. Holenstein, Posted Prices vs. Negotiations: An Asymptotic Analysis, ACM EC 2008.
  • Q. Yan, Mechanism Design via Correlation Gap, ACM-SIAM SODA 2011.
12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 1: Sequential Posted Prices 2-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

Why posted prices

A seller who must decide whom to serve among several buyers with private values can, in principle, run Myerson's revenue-optimal mechanism: collect bids, compute virtual values, serve the feasible set of largest virtual surplus, and charge threshold payments (Myerson 1981). In practice sellers rarely do this. Retail, ticketing and online platforms mostly use posted prices: each buyer is offered a take-it-or-leave-it price and accepts if and only if the price does not exceed the buyer's value. Posted prices are simple to explain, are trivially truthful, and do not require buyers to reveal their values.

Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan (arXiv:0907.2435, STOC 2010) asked how much revenue is lost by this simplification, and showed that for a wide range of feasibility constraints a sequential posted-price mechanism recovers a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. The matroid case, a factor of 2, is the first and most widely cited of their results. It is a revenue analogue of the prophet inequality and was one of the starting points of the literature on "simple versus optimal" mechanisms.

Setting

There are nnn single-parameter agents, indexed by [n][n][n], and one seller. Agent iii has a private value viv_ivi​ for being served, drawn independently from a distribution FiF_iFi​ with density fif_ifi​. The virtual valuation of agent iii is

ϕi(vi)=vi−1−Fi(vi)fi(vi),\phi_i(v_i) = v_i - \frac{1 - F_i(v_i)}{f_i(v_i)},ϕi​(vi​)=vi​−fi​(vi​)1−Fi​(vi​)​,

and FiF_iFi​ is regular if ϕi\phi_iϕi​ is non-decreasing.

The seller faces a feasibility constraint: a downward-closed family J\mathcal JJ of subsets of [n][n][n], the sets of agents that can be served together. The rank of a set SSS is rank⁡(S)=max⁡S′⊆S, S′∈J∣S′∣\operatorname{rank}(S) = \max_{S' \subseteq S,\, S' \in \mathcal J} |S'|rank(S)=maxS′⊆S,S′∈J​∣S′∣. The constraint is a matroid if it satisfies the augmentation axiom: whenever A,B∈JA, B \in \mathcal JA,B∈J and ∣A∣>∣B∣|A| > |B|∣A∣>∣B∣, some e∈A∖Be \in A \setminus Be∈A∖B has B∪{e}∈JB \cup \{e\} \in \mathcal JB∪{e}∈J. Examples are kkk identical units (kkk-uniform matroids) and disjoint markets with separate capacities (partition matroids).

A mechanism MMM maps reported values v\mathbf vv to a feasible set M(v)∈JM(\mathbf v) \in \mathcal JM(v)∈J of served agents and a payment πi(v)\pi_i(\mathbf v)πi​(v) for each agent. It is truthful if reporting the true value is a dominant strategy and no agent ends with negative utility. Its expected revenue is RM=E[∑iπi(v)]\mathcal R^M = \mathbb E[\sum_i \pi_i(\mathbf v)]RM=E[∑i​πi​(v)], and qiM=Pr⁡[i∈M(v)]q^M_i = \Pr[i \in M(\mathbf v)]qiM​=Pr[i∈M(v)] is the probability that it serves agent iii.

A sequential posted-price mechanism (SPM) with ordering σ\sigmaσ and prices p\mathbf pp approaches the agents in the order σ\sigmaσ. When agent iii's turn comes, if adding iii to the set AAA of agents served so far keeps AAA feasible, iii is offered price pip_ipi​ and is served (and pays pip_ipi​) if pi≤vip_i \le v_ipi​≤vi​; otherwise iii is blocked. Its expected revenue is Rpσ\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}Rpσ​.

The mechanism S\mathcal SS of the paper sets pi=Fi−1(1−qiM)p_i = F_i^{-1}(1 - q^M_i)pi​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​), so that agent iii accepts an offer with probability exactly qiMq^M_iqiM​, and approaches the agents in decreasing order of price.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5

For regular, independent values and a matroid constraint, for every truthful mechanism MMM and the SPM S\mathcal SS built from its service probabilities,

RM≤2 Rpσ.\mathcal R^M \le 2\, \mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}.RM≤2Rpσ​.

Taking MMM to be Myerson's optimal mechanism gives the paper's statement that S\mathcal SS 2-approximates the optimal revenue.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 1 (p. 5): the expected revenue of a truthful mechanism equals its expected virtual surplus E[∑i∈M(v)ϕi(vi)]\mathbb E[\sum_{i \in M(\mathbf v)} \phi_i(v_i)]E[∑i∈M(v)​ϕi​(vi​)].
  2. Lemma 2 (p. 5): RM≤∑ipiMqiM\mathcal R^M \le \sum_i p^M_i q^M_iRM≤∑i​piM​qiM​ with piM=Fi−1(1−qiM)p^M_i = F_i^{-1}(1 - q^M_i)piM​=Fi−1​(1−qiM​).
  3. Revenue of an SPM (§2.2, p. 4): Rpσ=∑iciqipi\mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p} = \sum_i c_i q_i p_iRpσ​=∑i​ci​qi​pi​, where cic_ici​ is the probability that agent iii is offered service and qi=1−Fi(pi)q_i = 1 - F_i(p_i)qi​=1−Fi​(pi​).
  4. Rank bound (§4, p. 6): ∑i∈SqiM≤rank⁡(S)\sum_{i \in S} q^M_i \le \operatorname{rank}(S)∑i∈S​qiM​≤rank(S) for every set SSS.
  5. Lost revenue (proof of Theorem 5, p. 7): in any run under a matroid, with prices in decreasing order and weights qqq satisfying the rank bound, ∑i blockedpiqi≤∑i servedpi\sum_{i \text{ blocked}} p_i q_i \le \sum_{i \text{ served}} p_i∑i blocked​pi​qi​≤∑i served​pi​.
  6. Half of the benchmark (p. 7): under the same conditions, ∑ipiqi≤2Rpσ\sum_i p_i q_i \le 2 \mathcal R^\sigma_{\mathbf p}∑i​pi​qi​≤2Rpσ​.

Significance

The theorem shows that under a matroid constraint the optimal mechanism's advantage over a single round of posted prices is at most a factor of 2, uniformly over all regular distributions. Prices, rather than an auction, then suffice up to a constant, which justifies posted pricing in settings where an auction is impractical. The same argument, with the matroid replaced by an intersection of mmm matroids, gives the paper's Theorems 7 and 8, and the bound underlies the analysis of VCG with reserve prices (Theorem 32). Lemma 2's benchmark ∑ipiMqiM\sum_i p^M_i q^M_i∑i​piM​qiM​ became a standard tool for "ex ante relaxation" arguments.

The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them requires Myerson's revenue characterization in a multi-agent, dominant-strategy setting with a general feasibility constraint, which Lean's libraries do not have, and a probabilistic analysis of a sequential process over a product measure. Related formalizations exist for narrower models: the single-unit, Bayesian incentive compatible revenue identity MechanismDesign.Auctions.revenue_eq_virtual_surplus (Börgers' textbook, common support) and the i.i.d. multi-unit RevenueManagement.revenue_equivalence. Neither covers per-agent supports, set-system constraints or dominant-strategy truthfulness.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares the SPM with the hypothetical mechanism that ignores the feasibility constraint, whose revenue is exactly ∑ipiqi\sum_i p_i q_i∑i​pi​qi​. The SPM loses the revenue of agents who would have accepted but are blocked. The difficulty is that blocking is correlated with the values of earlier agents, and the lost revenue must be bounded by revenue actually collected. A naive per-agent charge fails in a general matroid, because one served agent can block many others; the bound has to use the matroid's rank structure together with the decreasing price order.

On the mechanism side, Lemma 2 needs the full Myerson theory: monotonicity of truthful allocations, the payment identity, and an optimization over interim allocation rules with a fixed service probability, where regularity is used.

Formalization scope

All objects live in the namespace CHMSPricing.SpmMatroid. Agents are Fin n. The following conventions are fixed.

  • Distributions. Each FiF_iFi​ is given by a measurable density, strictly positive on a bounded interval [v‾i,v‾i][\underline v_i, \overline v_i][v​i​,vi​] with 0≤v‾i<v‾i0 \le \underline v_i < \overline v_i0≤v​i​<vi​, integrating to 111 there, with no mass outside. There are no point masses, so the randomized variant of S\mathcal SS in §4 does not arise. The prior is the product measure.
  • Regularity. Monotone non-decreasing virtual values on the support (Definition 2). All goals assume regular distributions, as the body's analyses do; the non-regular case (the second paragraph of Lemma 2, Appendix E) uses randomized prices and is out of scope.
  • Truthfulness. Deterministic mechanisms, dominant-strategy incentive compatible with deviations within the support, ex-post individually rational, feasible on the type space, with measurable allocation events and measurable integrable payments. Payments of unserved agents are not forced to zero.
  • Benchmark. The goal is stated for every truthful MMM, with S\mathcal SS built from MMM's own service probabilities; this is stronger than comparing with Myerson's mechanism alone and avoids constructing it.
  • Prices. pi=Fi−1(1−qi)p_i = F_i^{-1}(1 - q_i)pi​=Fi−1​(1−qi​) is passed as an argument with the hypotheses pi∈[v‾i,v‾i]p_i \in [\underline v_i, \overline v_i]pi​∈[v​i​,vi​] and Fi(pi)=1−qiF_i(p_i) = 1 - q_iFi​(pi​)=1−qi​, rather than through a generalized inverse.
  • SPM. Positions are 000-based; the price belongs to the agent; acceptance is pi≤vip_i \le v_ipi​≤vi​; ties in the decreasing price order are arbitrary, and the goal holds for every such order.
  • Proposition 1 additionally assumes the normalization that an agent with value v‾i\underline v_iv​i​ has zero utility, which is how the paper's payments are pinned down.

The goal cannot be trivialized by a free choice of prices: the prices are tied to the mechanism's service probabilities, and the SPM uses the same matroid as the mechanism. Individual rationality is essential, since without it a "truthful" mechanism can extract unbounded revenue.

A complete development needs Myerson's lemma for dominant-strategy single-parameter mechanisms, a quantile/revenue-curve argument under regularity, matroid span and rank facts for the paper's finite set systems, and independence arguments for a sequential process on a product measure. The rank bound and the deterministic lost-revenue inequality are independent of the probabilistic parts and are good first contributions; the Myerson-side lemmas are reusable for the other missions of this series.

Selected references

  • S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, D. Malec, B. Sivan, Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing, arXiv:0907.2435v2, 2010; STOC 2010. https://arxiv.org/abs/0907.2435
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1):58–73, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • J. Bulow, J. Roberts, The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions, Journal of Political Economy 97(5):1060–1090, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1086/261643
  • R. Kleinberg, S. M. Weinberg, Matroid Prophet Inequalities, STOC 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1201.4764
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationLinear algebraOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Nonlinear Programming Algorithm for Solving Semidefinite Programs via Low-rank Factorization: A Regular Local Minimum That Stays Locally Minimal After Adding a Zero Column Solves the SDPResearch Paper

Motivation

Semidefinite programs (SDPs) arise as convex relaxations of combinatorial problems such as maximum cut and the Lovász theta function, and in control and eigenvalue optimization. Interior-point methods solve them reliably but manipulate dense n×nn\times nn×n matrices, which limits the size of the instances they can handle. Burer and Monteiro (Math. Program. 95 (2003)) proposed replacing the matrix variable X⪰0X\succeq 0X⪰0 by a factorization X=RRTX=RR^{T}X=RRT with RRR having only rrr columns, and solving the resulting nonconvex program by a first-order augmented Lagrangian method. The approach rests on a theorem of Barvinok (1995) and Pataki (1998): an SDP with mmm linear constraints has an optimal solution of rank rrr with r(r+1)/2≤mr(r+1)/2\le mr(r+1)/2≤m, so a small number of columns suffices.

Because the factorized problem is nonconvex, a local minimum it returns is not automatically a solution of the SDP. Section 2 of the paper gives conditions under which it is. This mission formalizes those conditions, culminating in Proposition 2.5, which justifies the paper's strategy of increasing the rank one column at a time.

Setting

For real p×qp\times qp×q matrices, the trace inner product is A∙B=trace⁡(ATB)A\bullet B=\operatorname{trace}(A^{T}B)A∙B=trace(ATB). The data are symmetric matrices C,A1,…,Am∈SnC, A_1,\dots,A_m\in\mathcal S^nC,A1​,…,Am​∈Sn and a vector b∈Rmb\in\mathbb R^mb∈Rm. The primal SDP and dual SDP are

(1)min⁡{C∙X:Ai∙X=bi, i=1,…,m, X⪰0},(3)max⁡{bTy:S=C−∑i=1myiAi, S⪰0}.\text{(1)}\quad \min\{C\bullet X : A_i\bullet X=b_i,\ i=1,\dots,m,\ X\succeq0\},\qquad \text{(3)}\quad \max\Big\{b^{T}y : S=C-\sum_{i=1}^m y_iA_i,\ S\succeq0\Big\}.(1)min{C∙X:Ai​∙X=bi​, i=1,…,m, X⪰0},(3)max{bTy:S=C−i=1∑m​yi​Ai​, S⪰0}.

The standing assumptions of the paper are that A1,…,AmA_1,\dots,A_mA1​,…,Am​ are linearly independent and that there are feasible X∗X^*X∗ and (S∗,y∗)(S^*,y^*)(S∗,y∗) with C∙X∗=bTy∗C\bullet X^*=b^{T}y^*C∙X∗=bTy∗.

For a positive integer r≤nr\le nr≤n, the low-rank program is

(Nr)min⁡{C∙(RRT):Ai∙(RRT)=bi, i=1,…,m, R∈Rn×r}.(N_r)\qquad \min\{C\bullet(RR^{T}) : A_i\bullet(RR^{T})=b_i,\ i=1,\dots,m,\ R\in\mathbb R^{n\times r}\}.(Nr​)min{C∙(RRT):Ai​∙(RRT)=bi​, i=1,…,m, R∈Rn×r}.

Its Lagrangian is L(R,y)=C∙(RRT)−∑iyi(Ai∙(RRT)−bi)L(R,y)=C\bullet(RR^{T})-\sum_i y_i(A_i\bullet(RR^{T})-b_i)L(R,y)=C∙(RRT)−∑i​yi​(Ai​∙(RRT)−bi​), and S(y)=C−∑iyiAiS(y)=C-\sum_i y_iA_iS(y)=C−∑i​yi​Ai​. A feasible RRR is a local minimum if it minimizes the objective among nearby feasible points; it is a regular point if A1R,…,AmRA_1R,\dots,A_mRA1​R,…,Am​R are linearly independent; it is a stationary point with multiplier yyy if ∇RL(R,y)=0\nabla_RL(R,y)=0∇R​L(R,y)=0. The injection of R∈Rn×rR\in\mathbb R^{n\times r}R∈Rn×r is R^=[ R  0 ]∈Rn×(r+1)\hat R=[\,R\ \ 0\,]\in\mathbb R^{n\times(r+1)}R^=[R  0]∈Rn×(r+1), obtained by appending a zero column.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.5

Let r<nr<nr<n and let R∗R^*R∗ be a regular local minimum of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) with multiplier y∗y^*y∗, S∗=S(y∗)S^*=S(y^*)S∗=S(y∗), S∗R∗=0S^*R^*=0S∗R∗=0. If R^\hat RR^ is a local minimum of (Nr+1)(N_{r+1})(Nr+1​), then

X∗=R∗(R∗)T solves (1)and(S∗,y∗) solves (3).X^*=R^*(R^*)^{T}\ \text{solves (1)}\quad\text{and}\quad (S^*,y^*)\ \text{solves (3)}.X∗=R∗(R∗)T solves (1)and(S∗,y∗) solves (3).

Milestones

  1. The derivative formulas (9): ∇R(Ai∙(RRT)−bi)=2AiR\nabla_R(A_i\bullet(RR^T)-b_i)=2A_iR∇R​(Ai​∙(RRT)−bi​)=2Ai​R, ∇RL(R,y)=2SR\nabla_RL(R,y)=2SR∇R​L(R,y)=2SR, and LRR′′(R,y)[D,D]=2S∙(DDT)L''_{RR}(R,y)[D,D]=2S\bullet(DD^T)LRR′′​(R,y)[D,D]=2S∙(DDT).
  2. Proposition 2.3: at a regular local minimum of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) there is a unique y∗y^*y∗ with S∗R∗=0S^*R^*=0S∗R∗=0, and S∗∙(DDT)≥0S^*\bullet(DD^T)\ge0S∗∙(DDT)≥0 for every DDD with AiR∗∙D=0A_iR^*\bullet D=0Ai​R∗∙D=0 for all iii.
  3. Proposition 2.1: feasible XXX and (S,y)(S,y)(S,y) are simultaneously optimal if and only if X∙S=0X\bullet S=0X∙S=0.
  4. Proposition 2.4: a stationary point of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) whose S∗S^*S∗ is positive semidefinite gives optimal X∗=R∗R∗TX^*=R^*R^{*T}X∗=R∗R∗T and (S∗,y∗)(S^*,y^*)(S∗,y∗).

Significance

Proposition 2.5 is a certificate of global optimality for a nonconvex problem obtained from local information alone. It is the basis of the rank-increase scheme described on p. 8 of the paper: compute a local minimum of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) for a small rrr; if the zero-column extension is still a local minimum of (Nr+1)(N_{r+1})(Nr+1​), the current point solves the SDP; otherwise a better point of (Nr+1)(N_{r+1})(Nr+1​) exists and rrr is increased. Proposition 2.4 gives the companion test, valid for every rrr: positive semidefiniteness of the multiplier matrix at a stationary point. These statements underlie the later convergence analysis of the method (Burer & Monteiro 2005) and the literature on benign landscapes of low-rank SDP formulations (Boumal, Voroninski & Bandeira 2016).

The results are proved in the paper. What this mission adds is a machine-checked version of the full chain from the standard-form SDP to the rank-increase certificate, including the matrix calculus (9), the first- and second-order necessary conditions for an equality-constrained program over rectangular matrices, and SDP complementary slackness in standard form. No machine-checked proof of these results is recorded in Mathlib or on the platform.

Difficulty

The SDP side (Propositions 2.1 and 2.4) is linear algebra: weak duality and the fact that the trace inner product of two positive semidefinite matrices is nonnegative. The substance lies in Proposition 2.3. The feasible set of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) is a variety cut out by mmm quadratic equations, and the multiplier rule and, especially, the second-order necessary condition require a constraint qualification and a curve in the feasible set realizing every tangent direction. Mathlib provides a first-order Lagrange multiplier rule, but not the second-order condition on the tangent space. A naive attempt to read Proposition 2.5 off Proposition 2.4 fails: local minimality of R∗R^*R∗ alone does not make S∗S^*S∗ positive semidefinite (when rrr is below the minimal optimal rank, it is not); the hypothesis on (Nr+1)(N_{r+1})(Nr+1​) is indispensable.

Formalization scope

Matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin r) ℝ with 0-based indices. The trace inner product is frob A B = trace(Aᵀ * B), defined for rectangular matrices. The data carry explicit symmetry hypotheses C.IsSymm and (A i).IsSymm; without them the formulas (9) are false. Primal feasibility uses Mathlib's PosSemidef, which over R\mathbb RR includes symmetry. Optimality for (1) and (3) is defined relative to their entire feasible sets. The standing assumptions are a separate predicate carried as a hypothesis by Propositions 2.1, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, and every statement about (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) carries 0<r0<r0<r and r≤nr\le nr≤n (or r<nr<nr<n). Gradients are Fréchet derivatives under the Frobenius norm, identified with matrices through the trace inner product; local minima use IsLocalMinOn on the feasible set of (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) together with feasibility. The injection appends the zero column as the last column.

The statement admits several trivializing encodings, all excluded here: optimality defined relative to the factorized feasible set instead of the whole SDP, an empty or unconstrained (Nr)(N_r)(Nr​) (an unconstrained local minimum or a local minimum without feasibility), a stationarity notion that already includes S⪰0S\succeq0S⪰0, and an injection other than the zero-column extension.

A complete development needs the matrix calculus of R↦RRTR\mapsto RR^{T}R↦RRT, a second-order necessary optimality condition under linear independence of the constraint gradients, and standard-form SDP weak duality and complementary slackness; all of these are reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of individual milestones, in particular the derivative formulas and Proposition 2.4, are welcome independently of the goal.

Selected references

  • S. Burer and R. D. C. Monteiro, A nonlinear programming algorithm for solving semidefinite programs via low-rank factorization, Mathematical Programming 95 (2003), 329–357. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-002-0352-8 (statements cited from the authors' manuscript of March 9, 2001)
  • A. Barvinok, Problems of distance geometry and convex properties of quadratic maps, Discrete & Computational Geometry 13 (1995), 189–202. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02574037
  • G. Pataki, On the rank of extreme matrices in semidefinite programs and the multiplicity of optimal eigenvalues, Mathematics of Operations Research 23 (1998), 339–358. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.23.2.339
  • R. D. C. Monteiro and M. Todd, Path-following methods for semidefinite programming, in Handbook of Semidefinite Programming, Kluwer, 2000 (source of Proposition 2.1).
  • S. Burer and R. D. C. Monteiro, Local minima and convergence in low-rank semidefinite programming, Mathematical Programming 103 (2005), 427–444. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-004-0564-1
  • N. Boumal, V. Voroninski and A. S. Bandeira, The non-convex Burer–Monteiro approach works on smooth semidefinite programs, NeurIPS 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04970
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems III: Contextual Bandits and the Banditron Mistake BoundTextbook

Motivation

In many sequential decision problems the learner sees side information before acting. A news site chooses an article for a visitor whose history and location it knows; an ad server chooses an advertisement for a query. Only the reward of the chosen action is observed. These are contextual bandit problems, and Chapter 4 of Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi's monograph Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems (arXiv:1204.5721v2) surveys several of their formal versions. In a contextual problem the learner is compared with the best policy, a map from contexts to arms, rather than with the best single arm.

This mission covers three of the chapter's models. The first marks each round with a context from a finite set. In the second, NNN experts give advice, as in prediction with expert advice. The third is the bandit multiclass problem: a linear classifier predicts one of KKK labels and then learns only whether its prediction was right. The goal is the mistake bound of the Banditron (Kakade, Shalev-Shwartz and Tewari, ICML 2008). The bound shows that one bit of feedback per round suffices to compete with every linear classifier, at regret O(n2/3)O(n^{2/3})O(n2/3).

Setting

There are K≥2K \ge 2K≥2 arms (or labels) {1,…,K}\{1,\dots,K\}{1,…,K} and rounds t=1,…,nt = 1, \dots, nt=1,…,n.

Adversarial losses. At round ttt an adversary assigns losses ℓi,t∈[0,1]\ell_{i,t} \in [0,1]ℓi,t​∈[0,1] to the arms and may adapt to the forecaster's past plays I1,…,It−1I_1, \dots, I_{t-1}I1​,…,It−1​. The forecaster draws ItI_tIt​ at random from a distribution ptp_tpt​ that depends on what it has observed, and it observes only ℓIt,t\ell_{I_t,t}ℓIt​,t​. Expectations E\mathbb EE are over the forecaster's draws.

Side information. Each round carries a context sts_tst​ from a finite set S\mathcal SS, and the sequence s1,s2,…s_1, s_2, \dotss1​,s2​,… is fixed in advance. The pseudo-regret against context-to-arm maps is

R‾nS=max⁡g:S→{1,…,K}E[∑t=1nℓIt,t−∑t=1nℓg(st),t].\overline R^{\mathcal S}_n = \max_{g:\mathcal S\to\{1,\dots,K\}} \mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^n \ell_{I_t,t} - \sum_{t=1}^n \ell_{g(s_t),t}\Big].RnS​=g:S→{1,…,K}max​E[t=1∑n​ℓIt​,t​−t=1∑n​ℓg(st​),t​].

The S-Exp3 forecaster runs one instance of Exp3 (Section 3.1 of the book) on each context.

Expert advice. At each round each of NNN experts jjj proposes a distribution ξtj\xi^j_tξtj​ over arms, which may depend on the forecaster's past plays. The contextual pseudo-regret is

R‾nctx=max⁡k=1,…,NE[∑t=1nℓIt,t−∑t=1nEi∼ξtkℓi,t].\overline R^{\mathrm{ctx}}_n = \max_{k=1,\dots,N}\mathbb E\Big[\sum_{t=1}^n \ell_{I_t,t} - \sum_{t=1}^n \mathbb E_{i\sim\xi^k_t}\ell_{i,t}\Big].Rnctx​=k=1,…,Nmax​E[t=1∑n​ℓIt​,t​−t=1∑n​Ei∼ξtk​​ℓi,t​].

Exp4 (Fig. 4.1) runs exponential weights over the experts with importance-weighted loss estimates.

Bandit multiclass. The examples (xt,yt)∈Rd×{1,…,K}(x_t, y_t) \in \mathbb R^d \times \{1,\dots,K\}(xt​,yt​)∈Rd×{1,…,K} are fixed in advance, with ∥xt∥=1\|x_t\| = 1∥xt​∥=1 (Euclidean). A K×dK\times dK×d matrix UUU classifies xxx by arg⁡max⁡i(Ux)i\arg\max_i (Ux)_iargmaxi​(Ux)i​. Its multiclass hinge loss on round ttt is ℓt(U)=[1−(Uxt)yt+max⁡i≠yt(Uxt)i]+\ell_t(U) = [1 - (Ux_t)_{y_t} + \max_{i\neq y_t}(Ux_t)_i]_+ℓt​(U)=[1−(Uxt​)yt​​+maxi=yt​​(Uxt​)i​]+​. Write Ln(U)=∑t≤nℓt(U)L_n(U) = \sum_{t\le n}\ell_t(U)Ln​(U)=∑t≤n​ℓt​(U) for the cumulative hinge loss, Lˉn(U)=Ln(U)/n\bar L_n(U) = L_n(U)/nLˉn​(U)=Ln​(U)/n for its average, and ∥U∥\|U\|∥U∥ for the Frobenius norm. The multiclass Perceptron predicts y^t=arg⁡max⁡i(Wtxt)i\hat y_t = \arg\max_i (W_tx_t)_iy^​t​=argmaxi​(Wt​xt​)i​ and, after seeing yty_tyt​, adds xtx_txt​ to row yty_tyt​ and subtracts it from row y^t\hat y_ty^​t​. The Banditron (p. 58) predicts YtY_tYt​ from pi,t=(1−γ)1y^t=i+γ/Kp_{i,t} = (1-\gamma)\mathbb 1_{\hat y_t = i} + \gamma/Kpi,t​=(1−γ)1y^​t​=i​+γ/K. It observes only 1Yt=yt\mathbb 1_{Y_t = y_t}1Yt​=yt​​ and updates Wt+1=Wt+X~tW_{t+1} = W_t + \widetilde X_tWt+1​=Wt​+Xt​, where (X~t)i,j=xt,j(1Yt=yt1Yt=i/pi,t−1y^t=i)(\widetilde X_t)_{i,j} = x_{t,j}\big(\mathbb 1_{Y_t=y_t}\mathbb 1_{Y_t=i}/p_{i,t} - \mathbb 1_{\hat y_t=i}\big)(Xt​)i,j​=xt,j​(1Yt​=yt​​1Yt​=i​/pi,t​−1y^​t​=i​). Its number of mistakes is Mn=∑t≤n1Yt≠ytM_n = \sum_{t\le n}\mathbb 1_{Y_t\neq y_t}Mn​=∑t≤n​1Yt​=yt​​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.7 (Banditron)

For n≥8Kn \ge 8Kn≥8K, γ=(K/n)1/3\gamma = (K/n)^{1/3}γ=(K/n)1/3, every example sequence as above and every K×dK\times dK×d matrix UUU,

E Mn≤Ln(U)+(1+∥U∥2Lˉn(U))K1/3n2/3+2∥U∥2K2/3n1/3+2 ∥U∥K1/6n1/3.\mathbb E\,M_n \le L_n(U) + \Big(1 + \|U\|\sqrt{2\bar L_n(U)}\Big)K^{1/3}n^{2/3} + 2\|U\|^2K^{2/3}n^{1/3} + \sqrt2\,\|U\|K^{1/6}n^{1/3}.EMn​≤Ln​(U)+(1+∥U∥2Lˉn​(U)​)K1/3n2/3+2∥U∥2K2/3n1/3+2​∥U∥K1/6n1/3.

Milestones

  1. Multiclass Perceptron bound (Section 4.4, p. 57). For every n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 and UUU, ∑t≤n1y^t≠yt≤Ln(U)+2∥U∥2+∥U∥2nLˉn(U)\sum_{t\le n}\mathbb 1_{\hat y_t\ne y_t} \le L_n(U) + 2\|U\|^2 + \|U\|\sqrt{2n\bar L_n(U)}∑t≤n​1y^​t​=yt​​≤Ln​(U)+2∥U∥2+∥U∥2nLˉn​(U)​.
  2. Theorem 4.1 (p. 44). S-Exp3 satisfies R‾nS≤2n∣S∣Kln⁡K\overline R^{\mathcal S}_n \le \sqrt{2n|\mathcal S|K\ln K}RnS​≤2n∣S∣KlnK​.
  3. Theorem 4.2 (p. 46), with corrected constants. Exp4 without mixing satisfies R‾nctx≤2nKln⁡N\overline R^{\mathrm{ctx}}_n \le \sqrt{2nK\ln N}Rnctx​≤2nKlnN​ for ηt=2ln⁡N/(nK)\eta_t = \sqrt{2\ln N/(nK)}ηt​=2lnN/(nK)​, and R‾nctx≤2nKln⁡N\overline R^{\mathrm{ctx}}_n \le 2\sqrt{nK\ln N}Rnctx​≤2nKlnN​ for ηt=ln⁡N/(tK)\eta_t = \sqrt{\ln N/(tK)}ηt​=lnN/(tK)​.
  4. Theorem 4.3 (p. 50), with corrected learning rate. Let the plays be drawn from distributions qtq_tqt​ with qi,t≥ε>0q_{i,t}\ge\varepsilon > 0qi,t​≥ε>0, and let Exp3 run on the estimates ℓi,t1It=i/qi,t\ell_{i,t}\mathbb 1_{I_t=i}/q_{i,t}ℓi,t​1It​=i​/qi,t​ with η=2εln⁡K/n\eta = \sqrt{2\varepsilon\ln K/n}η=2εlnK/n​. Then max⁡kE[∑tEi∼ptℓi,t−∑tℓk,t]≤(2n/ε)ln⁡K\max_k \mathbb E\big[\sum_t \mathbb E_{i\sim p_t}\ell_{i,t} - \sum_t\ell_{k,t}\big] \le \sqrt{(2n/\varepsilon)\ln K}maxk​E[∑t​Ei∼pt​​ℓi,t​−∑t​ℓk,t​]≤(2n/ε)lnK​.

Significance

Theorem 4.7 shows that, on any sequence of examples, the bandit version of online multiclass classification costs at most O(K1/3n2/3)O(K^{1/3}n^{2/3})O(K1/3n2/3) mistakes beyond the hinge loss of the best linear classifier. The full-information Perceptron, by comparison, pays O(n)O(\sqrt n)O(n​). The bound has no stochastic assumption and has explicit constants. Theorems 4.1–4.3 are the basic regret guarantees for side information and expert advice. Theorem 4.3 in particular lets learning algorithms serve as experts inside Exp4, which is the construction behind Theorem 4.5.

The mission produces machine-checked statements, and eventually proofs, of these results with fully explicit constants and an explicit model of adaptive adversaries and adaptive advice. To the curators' knowledge none of the Banditron, the multiclass Perceptron bound, S-Exp3 or Theorem 4.3 is formalized anywhere. The platform's Bandit Algorithms series has a proved Exp4 bound, but only for advice and rewards fixed in advance. The book proves all four milestones and the goal; two printed statements (4.2 and 4.3) contain misprints that this mission corrects.

Difficulty

The Banditron bound concerns a randomized process whose weight matrix depends on all earlier random predictions. The Perceptron argument tracks ⟨U,Wn+1⟩\langle U, W_{n+1}\rangle⟨U,Wn+1​⟩ and ∥Wn+1∥2\|W_{n+1}\|^2∥Wn+1​∥2. It carries over only in conditional expectation, and the second moment of the importance-weighted update is of order K/γK/\gammaK/γ on rounds where y^t≠yt\hat y_t \neq y_ty^​t​=yt​ and of order γ\gammaγ otherwise. Combining these into one inequality for ∑tP(y^t≠yt)\sum_t\mathbb P(\hat y_t\neq y_t)∑t​P(y^​t​=yt​) and then for EMn\mathbb E M_nEMn​ requires solving a quadratic inequality in the presence of expectations, and the constants must come out as printed. For the Exp3/Exp4 results, the obstacle is that losses and advice adapt to past plays. The standard potential argument has to be run conditionally on the history, and a version that fixes the losses in advance proves a weaker theorem.

Formalization scope

  • Rounds and laws. Rounds are numbered from 000 in Lean (Lean round ttt is the book's round t+1t+1t+1). Every forecaster is a sampling rule from past plays to weights on Fin K. The law of the first nnn plays is the product ∏tpt(ωt∣ω<t)\prod_t p_t(\omega_t\mid\omega_{<t})∏t​pt​(ωt​∣ω<t​) over sequences ω:Fin n→Fin K\omega : \mathrm{Fin}\,n\to\mathrm{Fin}\,Kω:Finn→FinK, and expectations are finite sums against it. The adversary and the experts are deterministic functions of past plays; an independent randomized adversary is a mixture of these. The examples of the Banditron are fixed.
  • Argmax. y^t\hat y_ty^​t​ uses any argmax selector; all tie-breaking rules are covered.
  • Norms. ∥xt∥=1\|x_t\| = 1∥xt​∥=1 is the Euclidean condition ∑jxt,j2=1\sum_j x_{t,j}^2 = 1∑j​xt,j2​=1; ∥U∥\|U\|∥U∥ is the Frobenius norm written out explicitly.
  • Infima and maxima. Each "inf⁡U\inf_UinfU​" and "max⁡k\max_kmaxk​" of the book is stated as "for every UUU" or "for every kkk", which is equivalent.
  • Explicit constants. Every bound is the one printed or, for the corrected items, the one the proof yields. No O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅) appears.
  • Corrected misprints. Theorem 4.7 prints the examples in Rd×{−1,+1}\mathbb R^d\times\{-1,+1\}Rd×{−1,+1}; labels are in {1,…,K}\{1,\dots,K\}{1,…,K}. Theorem 4.2 prints 2nNln⁡K\sqrt{2nN\ln K}2nNlnK​ and 2nNln⁡K2\sqrt{nN\ln K}2nNlnK​; the proof gives 2nKln⁡N\sqrt{2nK\ln N}2nKlnN​ and 2nKln⁡N2\sqrt{nK\ln N}2nKlnN​. Theorem 4.3 prints η=2ln⁡K/(nK)\eta = \sqrt{2\ln K/(nK)}η=2lnK/(nK)​; (4.7) follows from the proof with η=2εln⁡K/n\eta = \sqrt{2\varepsilon\ln K/n}η=2εlnK/n​.
  • Parameter range. At n=8Kn = 8Kn=8K the Banditron's γ\gammaγ equals 1/21/21/2, outside the box's open interval (0,1/2)(0,1/2)(0,1/2). The proof uses only γ≤1/2\gamma\le 1/2γ≤1/2, so n=8Kn = 8Kn=8K is included.
  • Ruling out trivial forms. Theorem 4.1 is stated for the explicit S-Exp3 forecaster, not as an existence claim, so no forecaster tuned to the losses can witness it. The losses and the advice are allowed to adapt, so a proof for oblivious sequences does not suffice.
  • Left out. Theorem 4.4 (Exp4 with mixing) is proved in the book only by reference. The argument that reference suggests yields 32γn+Kln⁡N/γ\tfrac32\gamma n + K\ln N/\gamma23​γn+KlnN/γ, not the printed γn/2+Kln⁡N/γ\gamma n/2 + K\ln N/\gammaγn/2+KlnN/γ. Theorem 4.5 is stated with O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅), Theorem 4.6 "for some constant ccc", and Eq. (4.8) is left to the reader.

Useful reusable infrastructure: the path-law expectation for history-dependent sampling, the exponential-weights potential argument under adaptive losses, and Perceptron-type inner-product arguments for matrices. Proofs of any milestone and of the goal are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012. arXiv:1204.5721v2. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.5721 ; https://doi.org/10.1561/2200000024
  • S. M. Kakade, S. Shalev-Shwartz, A. Tewari, Efficient Bandit Algorithms for Online Multiclass Prediction, ICML 2008. https://doi.org/10.1145/1390156.1390212
  • P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Y. Freund, R. E. Schapire, The Nonstochastic Multiarmed Bandit Problem, SIAM Journal on Computing 32(1), 2002. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539701398375
  • O.-A. Maillard, R. Munos, Adaptive Bandits: Towards the Best History-Dependent Strategy, AISTATS 2011. https://proceedings.mlr.press/v15/maillard11a.html
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Bandit AlgorithmsConvex OptimizationMachine Learning+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems V: Bandit Convex Optimization with One-Point FeedbackTextbook

Motivation

In bandit convex optimization a forecaster repeatedly picks a point xtx_txt​ of a convex set K⊆Rd\mathcal K\subseteq\mathbb R^dK⊆Rd, and an adversary picks a convex loss ℓt\ell_tℓt​. The forecaster pays ℓt(xt)\ell_t(x_t)ℓt​(xt​) and observes only that number: it never sees the function, its gradient, or its value elsewhere. This is the model of online optimization with only function-value access, as in tuning a system online from measured costs, dynamic pricing with an unknown convex demand-cost curve, or routing with path costs observed only on the route taken. The question is how fast the forecaster can approach the best fixed point in hindsight.

Chapter 6 of Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi's monograph (arXiv:1204.5721v2, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012) treats the problem through spherical gradient estimates fed to projected gradient descent. The one-point method is due to Flaxman, Kalai and McMahan (SODA 2005, arXiv:cs/0408007), who obtained an O(n3/4)\mathcal O(n^{3/4})O(n3/4) regret bound. Agarwal, Dekel and Xiao (COLT 2010) showed that two function evaluations per round allow O(n)\mathcal O(\sqrt n)O(n​). Whether one-point feedback admits n\sqrt nn​ regret was open when the monograph was written (p. 94); Bubeck, Eldan and Lee (STOC 2017, arXiv:1607.03084) later obtained n\sqrt nn​ regret up to logarithmic and polynomial-in-ddd factors for convex losses, with a different and much more involved algorithm.

Setting

Let B={x∈Rd:∥x∥≤1}\mathbb B=\{x\in\mathbb R^d:\|x\|\le1\}B={x∈Rd:∥x∥≤1} be the closed Euclidean unit ball and S={x:∥x∥=1}\mathbb S=\{x:\|x\|=1\}S={x:∥x∥=1} the unit sphere, with unnormalized spherical measure σ\sigmaσ, so that σ(S)=d Vol(B)\sigma(\mathbb S)=d\,\mathrm{Vol}(\mathbb B)σ(S)=dVol(B). Fix δ>0\delta>0δ>0. For a loss ℓ\ellℓ, the smoothed loss is ℓ~(x)=E ℓ(x+δB)\widetilde\ell(x)=\mathbb E\,\ell(x+\delta B)ℓ(x)=Eℓ(x+δB) with BBB uniform on B\mathbb BB.

The set K\mathcal KK is closed and convex with rB⊆K⊆RBr\mathbb B\subseteq\mathcal K\subseteq R\mathbb BrB⊆K⊆RB. The losses ℓ1,ℓ2,⋯:Rd→R\ell_1,\ell_2,\dots:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb Rℓ1​,ℓ2​,⋯:Rd→R are GGG-Lipschitz, differentiable and convex, and are fixed before the game (an oblivious adversary).

OSGD (Online Stochastic Gradient Descent) on a set K′\mathcal K'K′ with learning rate η\etaη starts at x1=0x_1=0x1​=0 and sets xt+1=argmin⁡y∈K′∥y−(xt−ηg~t(xt))∥x_{t+1}=\operatorname{argmin}_{y\in\mathcal K'}\|y-(x_t-\eta\widetilde g_t(x_t))\|xt+1​=argminy∈K′​∥y−(xt​−ηg​t​(xt​))∥, where g~t\widetilde g_tg​t​ is a gradient estimate. With S1,S2,…S_1,S_2,\dotsS1​,S2​,… independent and uniform on S\mathbb SS:

  • the two-point estimate (6.1) is g~t(xt)=d2δ(ℓt(Xt+)−ℓt(Xt−))St\widetilde g_t(x_t)=\frac d{2\delta}\big(\ell_t(X_t^+)-\ell_t(X_t^-)\big)S_tg​t​(xt​)=2δd​(ℓt​(Xt+​)−ℓt​(Xt−​))St​ with Xt±=xt±δStX_t^\pm=x_t\pm\delta S_tXt±​=xt​±δSt​; the played point is Xt+X_t^+Xt+​ or Xt−X_t^-Xt−​ by a fair coin;
  • the one-point estimate (6.3) is g~t(xt)=dδ ℓt(X~t)St\widetilde g_t(x_t)=\frac d\delta\,\ell_t(\widetilde X_t)S_tg​t​(xt​)=δd​ℓt​(Xt​)St​ with played point X~t=xt+δSt\widetilde X_t=x_t+\delta S_tXt​=xt​+δSt​.

OSGD runs on the shrunken set K′=(1−δ/r)K\mathcal K'=(1-\delta/r)\mathcal KK′=(1−δ/r)K, so that the perturbed points stay in K\mathcal KK. The pseudo-regret is

R‾n=E∑t=1nℓt(X~t)−min⁡x∈K∑t=1nℓt(x).\overline R_n=\mathbb E\sum_{t=1}^n\ell_t(\widetilde X_t)-\min_{x\in\mathcal K}\sum_{t=1}^n\ell_t(x).Rn​=Et=1∑n​ℓt​(Xt​)−x∈Kmin​t=1∑n​ℓt​(x).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.2, tuned

If in addition ∣ℓt∣≤L|\ell_t|\le L∣ℓt​∣≤L on K\mathcal KK, and δ=(2n)−1/4RdL/((3+R/r)G)\delta=(2n)^{-1/4}\sqrt{RdL/((3+R/r)G)}δ=(2n)−1/4RdL/((3+R/r)G)​, η=(2n)−3/4R3/(dL(3+R/r)G)\eta=(2n)^{-3/4}\sqrt{R^3/(dL(3+R/r)G)}η=(2n)−3/4R3/(dL(3+R/r)G)​, then one-point OSGD satisfies

R‾n≤4n3/4RdL (3+R/r) G.\overline R_n\le 4n^{3/4}\sqrt{RdL\,(3+R/r)\,G}.Rn​≤4n3/4RdL(3+R/r)G​.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 6.1: ∇∫Bℓ(x+δb) db=1δ∫Sℓ(x+δs)s dσ(s)\nabla\int_{\mathbb B}\ell(x+\delta b)\,db=\frac1\delta\int_{\mathbb S}\ell(x+\delta s)s\,d\sigma(s)∇∫B​ℓ(x+δb)db=δ1​∫S​ℓ(x+δs)sdσ(s).
  2. Lemma 6.2: dδE[ℓ(x+δS)S]=∇E ℓ(x+δB)\frac d\delta\mathbb E[\ell(x+\delta S)S]=\nabla\mathbb E\,\ell(x+\delta B)δd​E[ℓ(x+δS)S]=∇Eℓ(x+δB).
  3. Eq. (6.2): ∣ℓ(x)−ℓ~(x)∣≤δG|\ell(x)-\widetilde\ell(x)|\le\delta G∣ℓ(x)−ℓ(x)∣≤δG.
  4. Lemma 6.3: the queried points' regret against xxx is at most the smoothed regret of the iterates against (1−ξ)x(1-\xi)x(1−ξ)x, plus 3δGn+ξGRn3\delta Gn+\xi GRn3δGn+ξGRn.
  5. Theorem 6.1: two-point OSGD has R‾n≤R2/η+η(Gd)2n+δ(3+R/r)Gn\overline R_n\le R^2/\eta+\eta(Gd)^2n+\delta(3+R/r)GnRn​≤R2/η+η(Gd)2n+δ(3+R/r)Gn, and R‾n≤2RGdn+δ(3+R/r)Gn\overline R_n\le 2RGd\sqrt n+\delta(3+R/r)GnRn​≤2RGdn​+δ(3+R/r)Gn for η=R/(Gdn)\eta=R/(Gd\sqrt n)η=R/(Gdn​).
  6. Theorem 6.2, first display: one-point OSGD has R‾n≤R2/η+(dL)2δ2ηn+δ(3+R/r)Gn\overline R_n\le R^2/\eta+\frac{(dL)^2}{\delta^2}\eta n+\delta(3+R/r)GnRn​≤R2/η+δ2(dL)2​ηn+δ(3+R/r)Gn for every 0<δ≤r0<\delta\le r0<δ≤r and η>0\eta>0η>0.

Significance

The n3/4n^{3/4}n3/4 bound shows that a single function value per round suffices for sublinear regret against any oblivious sequence of Lipschitz convex losses, with a forecaster whose only operations are a random perturbation and a Euclidean projection. The smoothing identity of Lemmas 6.1–6.2 is the basic tool of zeroth-order (derivative-free) optimization, used well beyond bandits, and Theorem 6.1 is the n\sqrt nn​ benchmark for two-point methods.

All results are proved in the source. To the best of current knowledge none is formalized: the related items of the Introduction to Online Convex Optimization series on Prove2Me (Hazan's Lemma 6.7 and Theorem 6.9) were formalized with missing hypotheses and are recorded as disproved. This mission produces machine-checked statements with every hypothesis explicit, and the formal infrastructure (sphere measure calculus, a projected stochastic gradient analysis) for later zeroth-order results.

Difficulty

Two steps resist a direct formal treatment. First, Lemma 6.1 is a divergence-theorem identity on the ball; Mathlib has the sphere measure and polar coordinates, but its divergence theorem covers boxes rather than balls, so differentiating the ball average in xxx requires either such a theorem or a direct argument about translates of the ball. Second, the regret analysis takes expectations of quantities that depend on the whole past: the iterate xtx_txt​ is a function of S1,…,St−1S_1,\dots,S_{t-1}S1​,…,St−1​, and unbiasedness E[g~t∣xt]=∇ℓ~t(xt)\mathbb E[\widetilde g_t\mid x_t]=\nabla\widetilde\ell_t(x_t)E[g​t​∣xt​]=∇ℓt​(xt​) holds only conditionally, via independence of StS_tSt​ from the past. A pathwise gradient-descent inequality must be combined with this conditional expectation round by round, with measurability of the projected iterates established along the way. The naive approach of treating the estimate as the true gradient of ℓt\ell_tℓt​ fails: it is a gradient of ℓ~t\widetilde\ell_tℓt​, and the gap is handled only by Eq. (6.2) and Lemma 6.3.

Formalization scope

Points are in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) with d≥1d\ge1d≥1; rounds are t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,…, sums run over Finset.Icc 1 n. σ\sigmaσ is Mathlib's Measure.toSphere of Lebesgue measure; the uniform laws are normalized restrictions. Randomness lives on an arbitrary probability space; the directions StS_tSt​ are measurable, mutually independent (iIndepFun) and uniform on S\mathbb SS, and in Theorem 6.1 the pairs (St,Ct)(S_t,C_t)(St​,Ct​) are independent with CtC_tCt​ a fair sign independent of StS_tSt​. A run of OSGD is a predicate (start at 000, each iterate a Euclidean projection onto (1−δ/r)K(1-\delta/r)\mathcal K(1−δ/r)K), which determines the run uniquely, so the forecaster uses only observed values and its own randomness. The losses are Lipschitz, differentiable and convex on all of Rd\mathbb R^dRd; the bound ∣ℓt∣≤L|\ell_t|\le L∣ℓt​∣≤L is on K\mathcal KK, because a convex function bounded on Rd\mathbb R^dRd is constant. The minimum over K\mathcal KK is an infimum over the subtype K\mathcal KK, attained in every theorem.

Conventions and corrections, each stated in the item's Formalization Note:

  • Lemma 6.1 carries the factor 1/δ1/\delta1/δ that the printed statement omits and the proof contains (corrected misprint).
  • Theorem 6.1's second display prints η=R/(GDn)\eta=R/(GD\sqrt n)η=R/(GDn​) and a limit "for δ→0\delta\to0δ→0"; the item states R‾n≤2RGdn+δ(3+R/r)Gn\overline R_n\le 2RGd\sqrt n+\delta(3+R/r)GnRn​≤2RGdn​+δ(3+R/r)Gn for η=R/(Gdn)\eta=R/(Gd\sqrt n)η=R/(Gdn​) and every admissible δ\deltaδ, which implies the limit (corrected misprint).
  • Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 add 0<δ≤r0<\delta\le r0<δ≤r, which the proofs need for Xt±,X~t∈KX_t^\pm,\widetilde X_t\in\mathcal KXt±​,Xt​∈K; for the tuned δ\deltaδ of the goal it is a condition on nnn.
  • The goal adds G,L>0G,L>0G,L>0 and n≥1n\ge1n≥1, which its formulas for δ,η\delta,\etaδ,η need; the constant 444 is the book's rounding of 2⋅23/42\cdot2^{3/4}2⋅23/4 and is kept, as is the form R2/ηR^2/\etaR2/η.

The statements cannot be satisfied trivially: the run is pinned by its recursion, the losses are fixed before the randomness, the expectations are of bounded measurable functions (no zero-valued Bochner integrals), and the minimum is over the nonempty compact K\mathcal KK. Section 6.3 (Lemma 6.4, Theorem 6.3) is not included, because its algorithm box and proof use different stage lengths and its unimodality condition is stated on a smaller set than the proof uses.

Needed infrastructure: calculus of ball averages and sphere integrals, symmetry of the uniform sphere law, nonexpansiveness of projections onto closed convex sets, and conditional-expectation bookkeeping for adapted iterates. Each is reusable for zeroth-order optimization; contributions of any of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012. arXiv:1204.5721v2, doi:10.1561/2200000024
  • A. Flaxman, A. Kalai, H. B. McMahan, Online convex optimization in the bandit setting: gradient descent without a gradient, SODA 2005. arXiv:cs/0408007
  • A. Agarwal, O. Dekel, L. Xiao, Optimal algorithms for online convex optimization with multi-point bandit feedback, COLT 2010. link
  • S. Bubeck, R. Eldan, Y. T. Lee, Kernel-based methods for bandit convex optimization, STOC 2017. arXiv:1607.03084
10 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dimensioning Large Call Centers I: The Rationalized Staffing Function Is Asymptotically OptimalResearch Paper

Motivation

A call center with NNN agents facing Poisson arrivals at rate λ\lambdaλ and exponential service at rate μ\muμ is the M/M/N (Erlang-C) queue. Choosing NNN trades the cost of agents against the cost of customers waiting, and in practice it is done with the square-root safety-staffing rule N≈R+yRN \approx R + y\sqrt RN≈R+yR​, where R=λ/μR = \lambda/\muR=λ/μ is the offered load. Borst, Mandelbaum and Reiman (CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000; published in Operations Research 52(1), 2004, doi:10.1287/opre.1030.0081) turned that rule of thumb into an optimization result: for a general convex staffing cost and a general waiting-cost function, they identify the safety factor yyy that makes the rule asymptotically optimal as the arrival rate grows.

Timeline of the asymptotic regime the paper builds on:

  • 1917. Erlang's delay formula π(N,ν)\pi(N,\nu)π(N,ν) for the M/M/N queue.
  • 1981. Halfin and Whitt (Oper. Res. 29(3)) show that with N=R+βRN = R + \beta\sqrt RN=R+βR​ servers the probability of waiting converges to a limit P(β)∈(0,1)P(\beta) \in (0,1)P(β)∈(0,1), the quality-and-efficiency-driven regime.
  • 2000/2004. Borst, Mandelbaum and Reiman classify cost structures into a rationalized, an efficiency-driven and a quality-driven regime, and prove asymptotic optimality of an explicit staffing rule in each.

This mission is the first of a series of four on that paper and covers the rationalized regime (Section 5), where staffing and waiting costs are of the same order.

Setting

The service rate μ>0\mu > 0μ>0 is fixed and the arrival rate λ\lambdaλ grows. A staffing cost FFF, defined on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), is convex and strictly increasing; it does not depend on λ\lambdaλ. For each λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 a waiting-cost function DλD_\lambdaDλ​ satisfies Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0)=0Dλ​(0)=0, is strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and makes

G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞Dλ(t) e−(Nμ−λ)t dtG(N,\lambda) = (N\mu-\lambda)\int_0^\infty D_\lambda(t)\,e^{-(N\mu-\lambda)t}\,dtG(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞​Dλ​(t)e−(Nμ−λ)tdt

finite for every N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ. With the Erlang-C formula

π(N,ν)=νNN!{(1−νN)∑n=0N−1νnn!+νNN!}−1,\pi(N,\nu) = \frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Big\{\big(1-\tfrac{\nu}{N}\big)\sum_{n=0}^{N-1}\frac{\nu^n}{n!}+\frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Big\}^{-1},π(N,ν)=N!νN​{(1−Nν​)n=0∑N−1​n!νn​+N!νN​}−1,

the expected total cost of staffing N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ agents is C(N,λ)=F(N)+λ π(N,λ/μ) G(N,λ)C(N,\lambda) = F(N) + \lambda\,\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)\,G(N,\lambda)C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ), and Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​ is any integer N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ minimizing it (7).

In normalized units Nλ(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μN_\lambda(x) = \lambda/\mu + x\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}Nλ​(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μ​ the paper defines Fλ(x)=F(Nλ(x))−F(λ/μ)F_\lambda(x) = F(N_\lambda(x)) - F(\lambda/\mu)Fλ​(x)=F(Nλ​(x))−F(λ/μ), Gλ(x)=λG(Nλ(x),λ)G_\lambda(x) = \lambda G(N_\lambda(x),\lambda)Gλ​(x)=λG(Nλ​(x),λ), the continuous delay probability πλ(x)=H(Nλ(x),λ/μ)\pi_\lambda(x) = H(N_\lambda(x),\lambda/\mu)πλ​(x)=H(Nλ​(x),λ/μ) with

H(M,α)={α∫0∞e−αt t (1+t)M−1 dt}−1,H(M,\alpha) = \Big\{\alpha\int_0^\infty e^{-\alpha t}\,t\,(1+t)^{M-1}\,dt\Big\}^{-1},H(M,α)={α∫0∞​e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt}−1,

and Cλ(x)=Fλ(x)+πλ(x)Gλ(x)C_\lambda(x) = F_\lambda(x) + \pi_\lambda(x)G_\lambda(x)Cλ​(x)=Fλ​(x)+πλ​(x)Gλ​(x), minimized at xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​ (8). A surrogate C[z;F^,π^,G^]=F^(z)+π^(z)G^(z)C[z;\hat F,\hat\pi,\hat G] = \hat F(z)+\hat\pi(z)\hat G(z)C[z;F^,π^,G^]=F^(z)+π^(z)G^(z) approximates it. Rounding is measured by

Sλ(x)=min⁡{C(⌊Nλ(x)⌋,λ), C(⌈Nλ(x)⌉,λ)}.(10)S_\lambda(x) = \min\{C(\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor,\lambda),\,C(\lceil N_\lambda(x)\rceil,\lambda)\}. \tag{10}Sλ​(x)=min{C(⌊Nλ​(x)⌋,λ),C(⌈Nλ​(x)⌉,λ)}.(10)

The Halfin–Whitt delay function is P(x)=(1+x/h(−x))−1P(x) = \big(1 + x/h(-x)\big)^{-1}P(x)=(1+x/h(−x))−1, with h=ϕ/(1−Φ)h = \phi/(1-\Phi)h=ϕ/(1−Φ) the standard normal hazard rate (11). Asymptotic equality aλ≈∞bλa_\lambda \stackrel{\infty}{\approx} b_\lambdaaλ​≈∞bλ​ means aλ/bλ→1a_\lambda/b_\lambda \to 1aλ​/bλ​→1 as λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.1

Assume the rationalized condition (18): for some κ>0\kappa > 0κ>0, Fλ(κ)/Gλ(κ)→γ∈(0,∞)F_\lambda(\kappa)/G_\lambda(\kappa) \to \gamma \in (0,\infty)Fλ​(κ)/Gλ​(κ)→γ∈(0,∞). Let yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​ minimize Fλ(y)+P(y)Gλ(y)F_\lambda(y) + P(y)G_\lambda(y)Fλ​(y)+P(y)Gλ​(y) over y>0y>0y>0 (19). Then

lim⁡λ→∞Sλ(yλ∗)−F(λ/μ)C(Nλ∗,λ)−F(λ/μ)=1.\lim_{\lambda\to\infty}\frac{S_\lambda(y^*_\lambda) - F(\lambda/\mu)}{C(N^*_\lambda,\lambda) - F(\lambda/\mu)} = 1.λ→∞lim​C(Nλ∗​,λ)−F(λ/μ)Sλ​(yλ∗​)−F(λ/μ)​=1.

The goal fixes no constant and no rate: it asserts only that the excess cost of the explicit rule is asymptotically the optimal excess cost.

Milestones

  • Lemma C.1: GλG_\lambdaGλ​ is strictly convex and strictly decreasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  • Section 3, p. 12: H(N,ν)=π(N,ν)H(N,\nu) = \pi(N,\nu)H(N,ν)=π(N,ν) at integers N>ν>0N > \nu > 0N>ν>0.
  • Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, Corollary 3.3: the approximation principle. If the surrogate approximates CλC_\lambdaCλ​ at both xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​ and its own minimizer zλ∗z^*_\lambdazλ∗​, then rounding Nλ(zλ∗)N_\lambda(z^*_\lambda)Nλ​(zλ∗​) is asymptotically optimal.
  • Eqs. (13)–(14): FλF_\lambdaFλ​ preserves lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup-separation of ratios.
  • Lemma 4.1 (Halfin & Whitt): for bounded xλx_\lambdaxλ​, πλ(xλ)/P(xλ)→1\pi_\lambda(x_\lambda)/P(x_\lambda) \to 1πλ​(xλ​)/P(xλ​)→1.

Significance

The theorem justifies the square-root staffing rule from first principles for a broad cost class. In Example 5.3 of the paper (linear staffing cost ccc per agent, linear waiting cost aaa per unit time) it gives N∗≈R+y∗(a/c)RN^* \approx R + y^*(a/c)\sqrt RN∗≈R+y∗(a/c)R​, with y∗(r)y^*(r)y∗(r) the minimizer of y+rP(y)/yy + rP(y)/yy+rP(y)/y, a one-dimensional rule computable once for all loads. Corollary 3.3 is reused verbatim by the efficiency-driven and quality-driven theorems of the paper (missions II and III of this series), and Lemma 4.1 is the analytic input of all three.

The result has been proved since 2000; no machine-checked proof of it, or of the Halfin–Whitt limit for the continuous extension πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​, is known to exist. The mission produces a formal proof of the regime theorem together with reusable formal statements of the Erlang-C function, its integral representation, and the Halfin–Whitt limit.

Difficulty

The reduction from discrete to continuous staffing (Lemmas 3.1–3.2) is elementary once unimodality of CλC_\lambdaCλ​ is available, but unimodality rests on convexity of πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​, which the paper cites rather than proves, and on Lemma C.1, which needs differentiation under an improper integral. The central difficulty is Lemma 4.1: the paper derives it from Halfin and Whitt's limit theorem, which is stated for integer server counts, while πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ is evaluated at non-integer Nλ(xλ)N_\lambda(x_\lambda)Nλ​(xλ​); a proof needs a uniform Laplace-type asymptotic for the integral defining HHH. A further obstacle is bounding xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​: the obvious route through continuity of the optimizer fails because nothing converges, and the paper instead argues by contradiction via (14).

Formalization scope

All objects live in DimCallCenters.Rationalized. The arrival rate is a real lam, and every limit is Filter.atTop on R\mathbb RR with μ\muμ fixed. The queue itself is not modelled; the paper's theorems are statements about the closed-form cost C(N,λ)C(N,\lambda)C(N,λ), and so are these. Committed conventions:

  1. The standing assumptions are a structure WaitModel (μ>0\mu>0μ>0; Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0)=0Dλ​(0)=0; DλD_\lambdaDλ​ strictly increasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); t↦Dλ(t)e−θtt\mapsto D_\lambda(t)e^{-\theta t}t↦Dλ​(t)e−θt integrable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) for every θ>0\theta>0θ>0, which is the paper's finiteness of GGG). FFF is convex and strictly increasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞).
  2. Staffing levels in C(N,λ)C(N,\lambda)C(N,λ) are natural numbers; GGG and HHH take real NNN.
  3. Argmins (Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​, xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​, zλ∗z^*_\lambdazλ∗​, yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​) are hypotheses that a given function is a minimizer, for every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0; ties are allowed and the theorems hold for every choice.
  4. In SλS_\lambdaSλ​ the floor term is omitted when ⌊Nλ(x)⌋≤λ/μ\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor \le \lambda/\mu⌊Nλ​(x)⌋≤λ/μ, where CCC is undefined.
  5. lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup and lim inf⁡\liminfliminf relations are written with ∃ᶠ/∀ᶠ, not Filter.limsup on R\mathbb RR.
  6. Added hypothesis. The goal assumes G(N,λ)→∞G(N,\lambda)\to\inftyG(N,λ)→∞ as N↓λ/μN\downarrow\lambda/\muN↓λ/μ. The paper asserts this limit on p. 12, but it does not follow from its assumptions (it fails for bounded DλD_\lambdaDλ​); it is equivalent to DλD_\lambdaDλ​ being unbounded and is what makes the continuous optimum exist.

The hypotheses are met by linear staffing and waiting costs (F(N)=cNF(N)=cNF(N)=cN, Dλ(t)=atD_\lambda(t)=atDλ​(t)=at), for which (18) holds with γ=cκ2/a\gamma = c\kappa^2/aγ=cκ2/a, so the goal is not vacuous. It is not trivialized by junk values either: the ratio's denominator is positive at every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, and SλS_\lambdaSλ​ never evaluates CCC at an unstable level.

Needed infrastructure: Laplace asymptotics for ∫0∞e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt\int_0^\infty e^{-\alpha t}t(1+t)^{M-1}dt∫0∞​e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt, differentiation under the integral sign for GGG, and convexity of πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​. All of these are reusable for missions II–IV. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome, as are proofs of the convexity facts the paper cites from its references [9], [10].

Selected references

  • S. Borst, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000; Operations Research 52(1):17–34, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0081
  • S. Halfin, W. Whitt, Heavy-Traffic Limits for Queues with Many Exponential Servers, Operations Research 29(3):567–588, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.3.567
  • A. K. Erlang, Solution of some problems in the theory of probabilities of significance in automatic telephone exchanges, Elektroteknikeren 13, 1917.
21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Multicut Algorithm for Two-Stage Stochastic Linear Programs 2: Multicut for Simple Recourse Stops Within J·m2 + 1 IterationsResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-stage stochastic linear programs model decisions taken before uncertainty is resolved (first stage) and corrected afterwards at a cost (second stage, the recourse). The standard solution method for problems with finitely many scenarios is the L-shaped method of Van Slyke and Wets (1969), an outer linearization in the style of Benders decomposition: a master program approximates the expected recourse function by cutting planes, one cut per iteration. Birge and Louveaux (1988) proposed the multicut variant, which approximates the recourse function of each realization separately and can add several cuts per iteration, and compared the two methods by worst-case counts of major iterations.

The paper's §5 treats the special case of simple recourse, where the second stage only penalizes shortage and surplus of each component of the first-stage output against a random target. Simple recourse arises in production planning, inventory and capacity models, and is the case in which the recourse function separates into one-dimensional pieces. There the paper derives an explicit LP (25) equivalent to the problem, a dedicated multicut algorithm for it, and the bound of Jm2+1Jm_2+1Jm2​+1 iterations quoted below. This mission formalizes that section.

Setting

First-stage data are c∈Rn1c\in\mathbb R^{n_1}c∈Rn1​, A∈Rm1×n1A\in\mathbb R^{m_1\times n_1}A∈Rm1​×n1​, b∈Rm1b\in\mathbb R^{m_1}b∈Rm1​, and the first-stage feasible set is K1={x∣Ax=b, x≥0}K_1=\{x\mid Ax=b,\ x\ge0\}K1​={x∣Ax=b, x≥0}. A deterministic technology matrix T∈Rm2×n1T\in\mathbb R^{m_2\times n_1}T∈Rm2​×n1​, with rows TiT_iTi​, maps xxx to the tender χ=Tx∈Rm2\chi=Tx\in\mathbb R^{m_2}χ=Tx∈Rm2​. Problem (3) of the paper is

min⁡ z(x)=cx+Ψ(Tx)s.t. x∈K1.\min\ z(x)=cx+\Psi(Tx)\quad\text{s.t. } x\in K_1 .min z(x)=cx+Ψ(Tx)s.t. x∈K1​.

For each row i=1,…,m2i=1,\dots,m_2i=1,…,m2​ the random vector ξi=(qi+,qi−,hi)\xi_i=(q_i^+,q_i^-,h_i)ξi​=(qi+​,qi−​,hi​) takes JJJ values ξij=(qij+,qij−,hij)\xi_{ij}=(q^+_{ij},q^-_{ij},h_{ij})ξij​=(qij+​,qij−​,hij​) with probabilities pijp_{ij}pij​. The simple recourse cost (20) of row iii is the optimal value of a one-row LP,

ψi(χi,ξij)=min⁡{qij+y++qij−y−∣y+−y−=hij−χi, y+,y−≥0},\psi_i(\chi_i,\xi_{ij})=\min\{q^+_{ij}y^+ + q^-_{ij}y^- \mid y^+-y^-=h_{ij}-\chi_i,\ y^+,y^-\ge0\},ψi​(χi​,ξij​)=min{qij+​y++qij−​y−∣y+−y−=hij​−χi​, y+,y−≥0},

and by separability (19) the expected recourse function is Ψ(χ)=∑iΨi(χi)\Psi(\chi)=\sum_i\Psi_i(\chi_i)Ψ(χ)=∑i​Ψi​(χi​) with Ψi(χi)=∑jpijψi(χi,ξij)\Psi_i(\chi_i)=\sum_j p_{ij}\psi_i(\chi_i,\xi_{ij})Ψi​(χi​)=∑j​pij​ψi​(χi​,ξij​). Write qij=qij++qij−q_{ij}=q^+_{ij}+q^-_{ij}qij​=qij+​+qij−​.

The multicut algorithm for simple recourse problems (p. 389) keeps a set III of identified pairs l=(i,j)l=(i,j)l=(i,j), initially empty. Step 1 solves the master program (26),

min⁡ cx+∑i,jpijqij−(Tix)+∑l∈Iuls.t. Ax=b, x≥0, ul≥el−Elx, ul≥0 (l∈I),\min\ cx+\sum_{i,j}p_{ij}q^-_{ij}(T_ix)+\sum_{l\in I}u_l\quad\text{s.t. } Ax=b,\ x\ge0,\ u_l\ge e_l-E_lx,\ u_l\ge0\ (l\in I),min cx+i,j∑​pij​qij−​(Ti​x)+l∈I∑​ul​s.t. Ax=b, x≥0, ul​≥el​−El​x, ul​≥0 (l∈I),

with El=pijqijTiE_l=p_{ij}q_{ij}T_iEl​=pij​qij​Ti​ and el=pijqijhije_l=p_{ij}q_{ij}h_{ij}el​=pij​qij​hij​. Step 2 adds to III every pair for which the constraint 0≥pijqij(hij−Tixν)0\ge p_{ij}q_{ij}(h_{ij}-T_ix^\nu)0≥pij​qij​(hij​−Ti​xν) (27) is violated at the master's solution xνx^\nuxν, and returns to Step 1; when no pair is added the algorithm stops.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Jm2+1Jm_2+1Jm2​+1 bound, with correctness

The paper states (p. 389): "The initial problem (26) involves m1m_1m1​ constraints and n1n_1n1​ variables. For this problem, the worst-case situation is when at each iteration, only one constraint (27) is violated in Step 2. Then, the maximal number of iterations is Jm2+1Jm_2+1Jm2​+1." The goal asserts, for every run of the algorithm (any optimal solution of (26) may be used at each Step 1):

ν-th solve of Step 1 takes place ⟹ ν≤Jm2+1,\nu\text{-th solve of Step 1 takes place}\ \Longrightarrow\ \nu\le Jm_2+1,ν-th solve of Step 1 takes place ⟹ ν≤Jm2​+1,

and, when the algorithm stops at xνx^\nuxν, xν∈K1x^\nu\in K_1xν∈K1​ and cxν+Ψ(Txν)≤cx+Ψ(Tx)cx^\nu+\Psi(Tx^\nu)\le cx+\Psi(Tx)cxν+Ψ(Txν)≤cx+Ψ(Tx) for all x∈K1x\in K_1x∈K1​.

Milestones

  1. (22)–(23): for q++q−≥0q^++q^-\ge0q++q−≥0 the LP (20) attains its minimum max⁡{q−(χ−h),q+(h−χ)}\max\{q^-(\chi-h),q^+(h-\chi)\}max{q−(χ−h),q+(h−χ)}, so each θij\theta_{ij}θij​ has only two cuts.
  2. (24)–(25): the simple recourse problem is equivalent to the LP (25): same optimal xxx, and the value of (25) at xxx with the best slacks is z(x)z(x)z(x).
  3. Relaxation and stopping: (26) is a relaxation of (25), and if no unidentified pair violates (27) at an optimum of (26), that optimum (extended by zero slacks) is optimal for (25).
  4. Facets: each Ψi\Psi_iΨi​ is a maximum of J+1J+1J+1 affine functions, so Ψ\PsiΨ is a maximum of at most (J+1)m2(J+1)^{m_2}(J+1)m2​ affine functions.

Significance

The bound is linear in m2m_2m2​ and JJJ, while the L-shaped method may need as many iterations as Ψ\PsiΨ has facets, up to (J+1)m2(J+1)^{m_2}(J+1)m2​ (milestone 4). This is the paper's clearest instance of the multicut method's worst-case advantage, and the equivalence (25) shows that simple recourse problems are LPs of size linear in m2Jm_2Jm2​J, a fact used throughout the later literature on simple and integrated recourse.

The results are proved in the paper, briefly. To our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof. Formalizing them produces a checked reduction of simple recourse to an explicit LP, a checked correctness proof of a constraint-generation algorithm with an explicit iteration bound, and the piece count of a sum of one-dimensional convex piecewise linear functions.

Difficulty

The counting argument is short once the algorithm is pinned down; the difficulty lies in the rest. Correctness at stopping requires relating three optimization problems (3), (25) and (26) whose objectives differ by a constant and by slack variables that are only present for identified pairs, and doing so for an arbitrary optimal solution of the master. The step from (20) to (22)–(23) requires solving an LP in closed form, as an infimum that must first be shown finite. The facet count requires showing that a sum of JJJ convex functions, each with one breakpoint, is a maximum of exactly J+1J+1J+1 affine functions, which is not a consequence of convexity alone.

Formalization scope

All vectors are Fin n → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, realizations are indexed by Fin J, and pairs (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) by Fin m2 × Fin J. The second-stage value ψ\psiψ is the EReal infimum of the LP (20), not its closed form; expectations are finite sums weighted by pij≥0p_{ij}\ge0pij​≥0 with ∑jpij=1\sum_jp_{ij}=1∑j​pij​=1.

Readings pinned down, each recorded in the item statements:

  • qij≥0q_{ij}\ge0qij​≥0. The paper never states it, but without it (20) is unbounded below and (25) is not equivalent to (3). It is a field of the model.
  • x≥0x\ge0x≥0 belongs to (3) and is omitted in the displays of (25) and (26); it is kept in both.
  • Step 2 ranges over unidentified pairs. The paper writes "for each iii and jjj"; read literally, an identified pair whose ulu_lul​ already covers it could be re-added forever. The paper's remark that (27) "identifies any constraints in (25) that are not met" fixes the reading. The state of the algorithm is the set of identified pairs; the order of identification, and so the index ttt, is immaterial.
  • Stopping rule. It is implicit in the paper: stop when (27) is violated for no pair.
  • Counting. The paper writes "the maximal number of iterations is Jm2+1Jm_2+1Jm2​+1"; we count solves of Step 1, the stopping solve included, which is what its argument counts.
  • Constant. The objective of (26) omits the constant −∑pijqij−hij-\sum p_{ij}q^-_{ij}h_{ij}−∑pij​qij−​hij​ of (25), as printed.
  • Facets. "Ψi\Psi_iΨi​ contains J+1J+1J+1 facets" is read as "is a maximum of J+1J+1J+1 (not necessarily distinct) affine functions".

A formalization in which the master step could fire without a violated, unidentified pair, or in which the algorithm's optimal solutions were fixed in advance, would make the bound either false or empty; the definitions exclude both. The goal includes optimality at stopping so that it is not only a statement about a set growing inside a finite set.

Needed infrastructure: elementary LP feasibility and optimality, finite sums in EReal, and piecewise linear convex functions on R\mathbb RR. Contributions of any of the milestones, in any order, are welcome; milestone 1 is the natural first step.

Selected references

  • J.R. Birge and F.V. Louveaux, A multicut algorithm for two-stage stochastic linear programs, European Journal of Operational Research 34 (1988) 384–392. https://doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(88)90159-2
  • R.M. Van Slyke and R. Wets, L-shaped linear programs with applications to optimal control and stochastic programming, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 17 (1969) 638–663. https://doi.org/10.1137/0117061
  • J.R. Birge and F.V. Louveaux, Introduction to Stochastic Programming, 2nd ed., Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-0237-4
7 thms2 active usersReviewed
AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Łojasiewicz Inequality for Nonsmooth Subanalytic Functions with Applications to Subgradient Dynamical Systems I: The Łojasiewicz Inequality at Critical Points of Continuous Subanalytic FunctionsResearch Paper

Motivation

For a real-analytic function f:U→Rf : U \to \mathbb{R}f:U→R on an open set U⊆RnU \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nU⊆Rn and a critical point aaa (so ∇f(a)=0\nabla f(a) = 0∇f(a)=0), the Łojasiewicz gradient inequality says that there is an exponent θ∈[0,1)\theta \in [0,1)θ∈[0,1) such that ∣f−f(a)∣θ/∥∇f∥|f - f(a)|^{\theta} / \|\nabla f\|∣f−f(a)∣θ/∥∇f∥ stays bounded near aaa. It is the standard tool for proving that bounded gradient trajectories x˙=−∇f(x)\dot x = -\nabla f(x)x˙=−∇f(x) have finite length and converge to a single critical point, and, in its descendants (the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz property), for proving convergence of the whole iterate sequence of nonconvex descent methods: proximal gradient, alternating minimization, PALM, ADMM. Those algorithmic results all assume a nonsmooth version of the inequality, for functions that may take the value +∞+\infty+∞ and are not differentiable.

Bolte, Daniilidis and Lewis (SIAM J. Optim. 17 (2007)) supplied that nonsmooth version. This mission formalizes their first main result, Theorem 3.1: the inequality at critical points of subanalytic functions that are continuous on a closed domain.

Timeline.

  • 1963: Łojasiewicz proves the inequality for real-analytic functions (Une propriété topologique des sous-ensembles analytiques réels), and in 1984 derives convergence of bounded analytic gradient trajectories.
  • 1998: Kurdyka (Ann. Inst. Fourier 48) extends it to C1C^1C1 functions definable in an o-minimal structure, with a desingularizing function in place of the power.
  • 2006: Bolte, Daniilidis and Lewis prove a nonsmooth Sard theorem (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 321): a subanalytic function continuous on its closed domain is constant on each connected component of its critical set.
  • 2007: The present paper proves the nonsmooth inequality for continuous subanalytic functions (Theorem 3.1) and for lower semicontinuous convex ones (Theorem 3.3).
  • 2007: Bolte, Daniilidis, Lewis and Shiota (SIAM J. Optim. 18) extend it to lower semicontinuous functions definable in o-minimal structures (the KL property).

Setting

Write Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn with its Euclidean norm. A function f:Rn→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb{R}^n \to \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}f:Rn→R∪{+∞} has domain dom⁡f={x:f(x)<+∞}\operatorname{dom} f = \{x : f(x) < +\infty\}domf={x:f(x)<+∞}.

Subanalytic sets (Definition 2.1). A set A⊆RnA \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nA⊆Rn is semianalytic if every point of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn has a neighbourhood VVV on which A∩V=⋃i=1p⋂j=1q{x∈V:fij(x)=0, gij(x)>0}A \cap V = \bigcup_{i=1}^{p}\bigcap_{j=1}^{q}\{x \in V : f_{ij}(x) = 0,\ g_{ij}(x) > 0\}A∩V=⋃i=1p​⋂j=1q​{x∈V:fij​(x)=0, gij​(x)>0} with fij,gijf_{ij}, g_{ij}fij​,gij​ real-analytic on VVV. It is subanalytic if every point of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn has a neighbourhood VVV such that A∩VA \cap VA∩V is the projection onto Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn of a bounded semianalytic subset of Rn×Rm\mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^mRn×Rm, m≥1m \ge 1m≥1. A function fff is subanalytic if its graph {(x,λ)∈Rn×R:f(x)=λ}\{(x,\lambda) \in \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R} : f(x) = \lambda\}{(x,λ)∈Rn×R:f(x)=λ} is subanalytic. Semialgebraic functions, and functions locally built from analytic ones by finitely many algebraic operations, max/min and compositions, are subanalytic.

Subdifferentials (Definition 2.10). The Fréchet subdifferential ∂^f(x)\hat\partial f(x)∂^f(x) is the set of x∗x^*x∗ with lim inf⁡y→x, y≠xf(y)−f(x)−⟨x∗,y−x⟩∥y−x∥≥0\liminf_{y \to x,\, y \ne x} \frac{f(y) - f(x) - \langle x^*, y - x\rangle}{\|y - x\|} \ge 0liminfy→x,y=x​∥y−x∥f(y)−f(x)−⟨x∗,y−x⟩​≥0 (empty off dom⁡f\operatorname{dom} fdomf). The limiting subdifferential ∂f(x)\partial f(x)∂f(x) is the set of limits of xk∗∈∂^f(xk)x^*_k \in \hat\partial f(x_k)xk∗​∈∂^f(xk​) along xk→xx_k \to xxk​→x with f(xk)→f(x)f(x_k) \to f(x)f(xk​)→f(x).

Slope and critical points. The nonsmooth slope is mf(x)=inf⁡{∥x∗∥:x∗∈∂f(x)}m_f(x) = \inf\{\|x^*\| : x^* \in \partial f(x)\}mf​(x)=inf{∥x∗∥:x∗∈∂f(x)}, equal to +∞+\infty+∞ when ∂f(x)=∅\partial f(x) = \emptyset∂f(x)=∅ (equation (4)). The critical set is crit⁡f={x:0∈∂f(x)}\operatorname{crit} f = \{x : 0 \in \partial f(x)\}critf={x:0∈∂f(x)} (Definition 2.11).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1

Let fff be subanalytic with closed domain and f∣dom⁡ff|_{\operatorname{dom} f}f∣domf​ continuous, and let a∈crit⁡fa \in \operatorname{crit} fa∈critf. Then there is θ∈[0,1)\theta \in [0,1)θ∈[0,1) such that

∣f−f(a)∣θmf  is bounded around a,\frac{|f - f(a)|^{\theta}}{m_f} \ \text{ is bounded around } a,mf​∣f−f(a)∣θ​  is bounded around a,

with the conventions 00=10^0 = 100=1 and ∞/∞=0/0=0\infty/\infty = 0/0 = 0∞/∞=0/0=0. In division-free form: there are CCC and a neighbourhood UUU of aaa with ∣f(x)−f(a)∣θ≤C∥x∗∥|f(x) - f(a)|^{\theta} \le C\|x^*\|∣f(x)−f(a)∣θ≤C∥x∗∥ for all x∈Ux \in Ux∈U and x∗∈∂f(x)x^* \in \partial f(x)x∗∈∂f(x). The exponent is existential; the goal fixes no value of θ\thetaθ or CCC.

Milestones

  1. Remark 2.12, for fff continuous on a closed domain: the graph of ∂f\partial f∂f is closed; crit⁡f\operatorname{crit} fcritf is closed; mfm_fmf​ is lower semicontinuous; crit⁡f=mf−1(0)\operatorname{crit} f = m_f^{-1}(0)critf=mf−1​(0).
  2. Proposition 2.13(ii), its clause on the critical set: if fff is subanalytic and relatively bounded on its domain, then crit⁡f\operatorname{crit} fcritf is subanalytic.
  3. Equation (6), recalled from the nonsmooth Sard theorem: fff is constant on the connected component of crit⁡f\operatorname{crit} fcritf containing aaa.
  4. The curve selection lemma, recalled from Bierstone–Milman: a boundary point of a subanalytic set is the origin of an analytic arc entering the set.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.1 is the nonsmooth Łojasiewicz inequality at critical points. With the subgradient in place of the gradient, it yields finite length of bounded trajectories of subgradient systems x˙∈−∂f(x)\dot x \in -\partial f(x)x˙∈−∂f(x) (Section 4 of the paper) and is the template for the Kurdyka–Łojasiewicz property that underlies convergence proofs for proximal and splitting methods on nonconvex, nonsmooth problems (e.g. Attouch–Bolte–Redont–Soubeyran 2010, Bolte–Sabach–Teboulle 2014). Those papers assume the KL property and cite this line of results to know it holds for semialgebraic and subanalytic objectives.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved; this mission produces a machine-checked proof. To our knowledge no proof assistant has a formal definition of subanalytic sets or of the nonsmooth Łojasiewicz inequality. The definitions layer (semianalytic and subanalytic sets, the slope, the inequality) is reusable by any later formalization of KL-based convergence analyses, and the milestones on Remark 2.12 are general facts about limiting subdifferentials that apply well beyond subanalytic geometry.

Difficulty

The obvious argument restricts fff and mfm_fmf​ to an analytic curve and compares their Puiseux expansions. That step needs three pieces of subanalytic geometry that no library has: curve selection, the structure of one-variable subanalytic functions (monotonicity and Puiseux expansions), and the fact that the sets built in the proof (sets of points with a subgradient satisfying an inequality, level-wise infima of mfm_fmf​) are again subanalytic, which in the paper goes through global subanalyticity and the projection theorem. The second obstacle is that fff is not smooth: the classical proof differentiates fff along a curve, while here only Fréchet subgradients are available, and the chain rule along an analytic curve holds only almost everywhere. The constancy of fff on critical components, equation (6), is itself a nonsmooth Sard-type theorem whose published proof uses stratification. A solver who replaces subanalytic by semialgebraic, or assumes fff real-valued and C1C^1C1, proves a different and much weaker statement.

Formalization scope

  • Space and values. The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). The function is f : E → EReal with f x ≠ ⊥ for every x. The domain is {x | f x ≠ ⊤}; it is assumed closed, and f is assumed ContinuousOn it.
  • Subdifferentials. ∂^f\hat\partial f∂^f and ∂f\partial f∂f are the published platform definitions NonconvexSplitting.Shared.IsRegularSubgrad and LimitingSubdiff, which match Definition 2.10 for functions never equal to −∞-\infty−∞.
  • Subanalyticity. It is defined on any finite-dimensional real normed space, so that the same definition covers Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn, Rn×R\mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}Rn×R and Rn×Rm\mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^mRn×Rm. Analyticity is AnalyticOnNhd ℝ. The boundedness of the semianalytic set in Definition 2.1(ii) is part of the definition: without it every projection of a semianalytic set would count.
  • Slope. The slope is valued in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞], with +∞+\infty+∞ on points without subgradients.
  • The inequality. It is the predicate LojIneqAt f a θ: one constant CCC and one neighbourhood of aaa, quantified over all limiting subgradients. Under 00=10^0 = 100=1 the value θ=0\theta = 0θ=0 never works at a critical point, as under the paper's conventions.
  • Not assumed. The goal does not assume lower semicontinuity, real values, global subanalyticity, compactness of the critical set, or f(a)=0f(a) = 0f(a)=0. These are reductions inside the paper's proof. Any formalization that adds them, fixes θ\thetaθ, or replaces the class of fff by semialgebraic or C1C^1C1 functions trivializes the target.
  • Infrastructure. A complete proof needs: curve selection; the monotonicity lemma and Puiseux expansions for one-variable globally subanalytic functions; the projection theorem or an equivalent definability argument; the nonsmooth Sard theorem (6); and a chain rule for Fréchet subgradients along analytic curves. Each of these is welcome as a separate contribution, and the subanalytic-geometry results are reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • J. Bolte, A. Daniilidis, A. Lewis, The Łojasiewicz inequality for nonsmooth subanalytic functions with applications to subgradient dynamical systems, SIAM J. Optim. 17 (2007) 1205–1223. https://doi.org/10.1137/050644641
  • J. Bolte, A. Daniilidis, A. Lewis, A Sard theorem for non-differentiable functions, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 321 (2006) 729–740.
  • E. Bierstone, P. Milman, Semianalytic and subanalytic sets, Publ. Math. IHÉS 67 (1988) 5–42. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02699126
  • K. Kurdyka, On gradients of functions definable in o-minimal structures, Ann. Inst. Fourier 48 (1998) 769–783. https://doi.org/10.5802/aif.1638
  • J. Bolte, A. Daniilidis, A. Lewis, M. Shiota, Clarke subgradients of stratifiable functions, SIAM J. Optim. 18 (2007) 556–572. https://doi.org/10.1137/060670080
  • S. Łojasiewicz, Une propriété topologique des sous-ensembles analytiques réels, in Les Équations aux Dérivées Partielles, CNRS, Paris, 1963, 87–89.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-B. Wets, Variational Analysis, Grundlehren 317, Springer, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02431-3
12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games IV: For Symmetric Games the Maximum Social Cost Price of Anarchy Is at Most 5/2Research Paper

Motivation

The price of anarchy measures how much a system of selfish agents loses compared with a centrally optimized one: it is the worst ratio, over all Nash equilibria, between the social cost of the equilibrium and the optimal social cost. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou introduced it in 1999 (Worst-case equilibria, STACS 1999), and bounding it for routing and congestion games became a central topic of algorithmic game theory. Congestion games model routing in networks, load balancing on machines and any setting where agents choose sets of shared resources whose cost grows with their usage.

Christodoulou and Koutsoupias (The price of anarchy of finite congestion games, STOC 2005) determined the pure price of anarchy of finite (atomic, unweighted) congestion games with linear latencies for two social costs — the sum of the players' costs and the maximum cost of a player — and for asymmetric and symmetric games. Awerbuch, Azar and Epstein obtained the 5/25/25/2 bound for the sum independently in the same proceedings (The price of routing unsplittable flow, STOC 2005). This mission is the fourth of a series that formalizes the paper: the symmetric games with the maximum social cost (Sect. 3.4). For asymmetric games the maximum social cost has price of anarchy Θ(N)\Theta(\sqrt N)Θ(N​) (mission III); symmetry brings it down to a constant.

Setting

A congestion game has a finite set of players N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n}, a finite set EEE of facilities, for each player iii a collection Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ of pure strategies (each a subset of EEE), and for each facility eee a latency function fe:N→Rf_e:\mathbb N\to\mathbb Rfe​:N→R. A pure strategy profile A=(A1,…,An)A=(A_1,\dots,A_n)A=(A1​,…,An​) picks Ai∈ΣiA_i\in\Sigma_iAi​∈Σi​ for every player. The load ne(A)n_e(A)ne​(A) is the number of players whose strategy contains eee, and the cost of player iii is

ci(A)=∑e∈Aife(ne(A)).c_i(A)=\sum_{e\in A_i} f_e\big(n_e(A)\big).ci​(A)=e∈Ai​∑​fe​(ne​(A)).

A profile AAA is a pure Nash equilibrium if no player can lower its cost by changing only its own strategy: ci(A)≤ci(A−i,S)c_i(A)\le c_i(A_{-i},S)ci​(A)≤ci​(A−i​,S) for every iii and every S∈ΣiS\in\Sigma_iS∈Σi​, where (A−i,S)(A_{-i},S)(A−i​,S) replaces AiA_iAi​ by SSS.

The maximum social cost is MAX(A)=max⁡ici(A)\mathrm{MAX}(A)=\max_{i} c_i(A)MAX(A)=maxi​ci​(A) and the sum social cost is SUM(A)=∑ici(A)\mathrm{SUM}(A)=\sum_i c_i(A)SUM(A)=∑i​ci​(A). Latencies are linear when fe(k)=aek+bef_e(k)=a_e k+b_efe​(k)=ae​k+be​ with ae,be≥0a_e,b_e\ge 0ae​,be​≥0. The game is symmetric when all players share one strategy set, Σi=Σ\Sigma_i=\SigmaΣi​=Σ. The pure price of anarchy for the maximum social cost is

PA=sup⁡A NashMAX(A)min⁡PMAX(P).\mathrm{PA}=\sup_{A\ \text{Nash}}\frac{\mathrm{MAX}(A)}{\min_{P}\mathrm{MAX}(P)}.PA=A Nashsup​minP​MAX(P)MAX(A)​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorems 7 and 8

For every symmetric linear congestion game with at least one player, every pure Nash equilibrium AAA and every pure strategy profile PPP,

MAX(A)≤52 MAX(P),\mathrm{MAX}(A)\le\tfrac52\,\mathrm{MAX}(P),MAX(A)≤25​MAX(P),

and for every N≥3N\ge3N≥3 there is a symmetric linear congestion game with NNN players, a pure Nash equilibrium AAA and a profile PPP that minimizes the maximum social cost, with MAX(P)>0\mathrm{MAX}(P)>0MAX(P)>0 and

MAX(A)=5N+12N+2 MAX(P).\mathrm{MAX}(A)=\frac{5N+1}{2N+2}\,\mathrm{MAX}(P).MAX(A)=2N+25N+1​MAX(P).

The second part shows that the constant 5/25/25/2 of the first is tight as N→∞N\to\inftyN→∞.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 7, proof (first display). In a symmetric linear game, a Nash equilibrium cost is bounded by the cost of every strategy PjP_jPj​ evaluated at loads ne(A)+1n_e(A)+1ne​(A)+1: ci(A)≤∑e∈Pjfe(ne(A)+1)c_i(A)\le\sum_{e\in P_j}f_e(n_e(A)+1)ci​(A)≤∑e∈Pj​​fe​(ne​(A)+1).
  2. Theorem 7, proof (second display). Summed over jjj: N⋅ci(A)≤∑ene(P)fe(ne(A)+1)N\cdot c_i(A)\le\sum_e n_e(P)f_e(n_e(A)+1)N⋅ci​(A)≤∑e​ne​(P)fe​(ne​(A)+1).
  3. Lemma 1. β(α+1)≤13α2+53β2\beta(\alpha+1)\le\frac13\alpha^2+\frac53\beta^2β(α+1)≤31​α2+35​β2 for nonnegative integers α,β\alpha,\betaα,β.
  4. Theorem 7, proof (Lemma 1 step). ∑ene(P)fe(ne(A)+1)≤13SUM(A)+53SUM(P)\sum_e n_e(P)f_e(n_e(A)+1)\le\frac13\mathrm{SUM}(A)+\frac53\mathrm{SUM}(P)∑e​ne​(P)fe​(ne​(A)+1)≤31​SUM(A)+35​SUM(P).
  5. Theorem 1. For linear congestion games, SUM(A)≤52SUM(P)\mathrm{SUM}(A)\le\frac52\mathrm{SUM}(P)SUM(A)≤25​SUM(P) at every pure Nash equilibrium AAA.
  6. Theorem 7 and Theorem 8 as separate statements.

Significance

The result says that in symmetric congestion games with linear costs no player at an equilibrium is ever more than 5/25/25/2 times worse off than the worst-off player under the best allocation, regardless of the number of players. This contrasts with the asymmetric case, where the ratio grows like N\sqrt NN​ (Theorems 5 and 6 of the paper), and it fills the symmetric–maximum entry of the paper's Table 1. Together with the sum bounds it completes the picture of pure equilibria under linear latencies that later work on smoothness and robust price of anarchy (Roughgarden, Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy, STOC 2009) generalized.

The results are proved in the paper, which only displays the identity-latency case and states that the arguments extend to affine latencies. No machine-checked version of any of the paper's bounds is known to exist; the mission produces a formal proof of the affine statement, a checked construction for the lower bound (the paper verifies its Nash condition only partly), and a congestion-game layer shared with the rest of the series.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt bounds the worst player's cost by its deviation to its own optimal strategy only, as in the proof for the sum; that gives one inequality per player and loses the factor NNN needed to compare with MAX(P)\mathrm{MAX}(P)MAX(P). Without symmetry the factor cannot be recovered at all (Theorem 6 of the paper). For the lower bound, the difficulty is that the construction must be a Nash equilibrium against all strategies in the common set — including the other players' equilibrium strategies and the isolated strategy of the maximum-cost player — while the paper only writes out the deviation to the optimal strategies; its parameters are left as the solution of a linear equation, which must be chosen integral for every N≥3N\ge3N≥3.

Formalization scope

Players form a finite type (Fin N in the lower bound) and facilities a finite type; profiles are maps from players to Finsets of facilities, with feasibility Ai∈ΣiA_i\in\Sigma_iAi​∈Σi​ as a separate predicate IsProfile. Latencies are real-valued functions on natural-number loads; "linear" means affine with nonnegative coefficients. MAX is the maximum over a nonempty player set. Upper bounds are stated for every Nash equilibrium and every feasible profile, never dividing by the optimum. The lower bound asserts that PPP minimizes MAX over all profiles and that MAX(P)>0\mathrm{MAX}(P)>0MAX(P)>0: without positivity the equality would be satisfied by a game with all costs 000, and without symmetry or the full common strategy set the instance would not be the paper's. The lower bound gives PA≥5N+12N+2\mathrm{PA}\ge\frac{5N+1}{2N+2}PA≥2N+25N+1​ for the instance, which is what the paper's proof shows.

The development needs sums over facilities exchanged with sums over players (∑j∑e∈Pjg(e)=∑ene(P)g(e)\sum_j\sum_{e\in P_j}g(e)=\sum_e n_e(P)g(e)∑j​∑e∈Pj​​g(e)=∑e​ne​(P)g(e)), monotonicity of affine latencies, and an explicit finite instance. The congestion-game definitions are shared with the other missions of the series and will be merged with them; Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 are also milestones of mission I. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative constructions for Theorem 8, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias, The price of anarchy of finite congestion games, Proc. 37th ACM STOC, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060600
  • B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar and A. Epstein, The price of routing unsplittable flow, Proc. 37th ACM STOC, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060599
  • E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria, STACS 1999, LNCS 1563. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49116-3_38
  • R. W. Rosenthal, A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory 2, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
  • T. Roughgarden, Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy, Proc. 41st ACM STOC, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1145/1536414.1536430
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Theoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power of Randomization in On-Line Algorithms 4: Restarting a Bounded-Cost Algorithm Is (1+ε)α-Competitive in Games of Finite DiameterResearch Paper

Motivation

Competitive analysis compares an online algorithm, which must answer each request before seeing the next, with the optimal off-line solution of the same request sequence. Ben-David, Borodin, Karp, Tardos and Wigderson (Algorithmica 11, 1994) set up a general framework, request-answer games, in which paging, the KKK-server problem and metrical task systems are all instances, and used it to compare the power of randomized algorithms against several kinds of adversaries.

One of their results (Theorem 2.1) says that if a randomized algorithm is α\alphaα-competitive against every adaptive off-line adversary, then some deterministic algorithm is already α\alphaα-competitive. The argument is a game-theoretic existence proof: it says nothing about how to compute the deterministic algorithm. Section 4 of the paper, "A Constructive Version of Theorem 2.1", answers the natural follow-up question for a large class of games: under monotonicity, locality and a finite diameter, a deterministic algorithm that loses only a factor 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ can be assembled from a finite object.

Setting

A request-answer game FFF has a request set RRR, a finite answer set AAA, and cost functions fn:Rn×An→Rf_n : R^n \times A^n \to \mathbb{R}fn​:Rn×An→R, n≥0n \ge 0n≥0; f0f_0f0​ is the cost of the empty play. The off-line optimum of a request sequence rrr of length nnn is c(r)=min⁡a∈Anfn(r,a)c(r) = \min_{a \in A^n} f_n(r, a)c(r)=mina∈An​fn​(r,a). A deterministic online algorithm GGG answers the iii-th request by a function gi(r1,…,ri)g_i(r_1, \dots, r_i)gi​(r1​,…,ri​) of the requests so far; its cost on rrr is cG(r)=fn(r,G(r))c_G(r) = f_n(r, G(r))cG​(r)=fn​(r,G(r)). It is α\alphaα-competitive if cG(r)≤α(c(r))c_G(r) \le \alpha(c(r))cG​(r)≤α(c(r)) for every rrr.

The game is monotone if fn+1(rt,ab)≥fn(r,a)f_{n+1}(rt, ab) \ge f_n(r, a)fn+1​(rt,ab)≥fn​(r,a) always, and local if for every h>0h > 0h>0 only finitely many request sequences have c(r)≤hc(r) \le hc(r)≤h. The discrepancy of two request-answer sequences is

δ((r,a),(r′,a′))=f(rr′,aa′)−f(r,a)−f(r′,a′),\delta((r,a),(r',a')) = f(rr', aa') - f(r,a) - f(r',a'),δ((r,a),(r′,a′))=f(rr′,aa′)−f(r,a)−f(r′,a′),

and the diameter D(F)D(F)D(F) is the supremum of ∣δ∣|\delta|∣δ∣ over all pairs.

For a real HHH, the set RHR_HRH​ consists of the request sequences all of whose proper prefixes have off-line optimum at most HHH. Given a deterministic algorithm AHA_HAH​, the restart algorithm simulates AHA_HAH​ and, as soon as the request sequence leaves RHR_HRH​, starts over as if it had received no previous requests. This cuts every request sequence into segments r=r(1) r(2)⋯r(t)r = r(1)\, r(2) \cdots r(t)r=r(1)r(2)⋯r(t), each a longest prefix in RHR_HRH​ of what remains.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1 through its construction

Let FFF be monotone and local, with finite nonempty RRR and AAA, f0≥0f_0 \ge 0f0​≥0, and diameter at most DDD. Let α(x)=d x\alpha(x) = d\,xα(x)=dx with d≥1d \ge 1d≥1, ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0, and

H=(2+ϵ)Dϵ.H = \frac{(2+\epsilon) D}{\epsilon}.H=ϵ(2+ϵ)D​.

Then RHR_HRH​ is finite; the restart algorithm depends on AHA_HAH​ only through its values on RHR_HRH​; and for every AHA_HAH​ with cAH(r)≤α(c(r))c_{A_H}(r) \le \alpha(c(r))cAH​​(r)≤α(c(r)) on RHR_HRH​,

cRestart(r)≤(1+ϵ) α(c(r))for all request sequences r.c_{\mathrm{Restart}}(r) \le (1+\epsilon)\,\alpha(c(r)) \qquad \text{for all request sequences } r.cRestart​(r)≤(1+ϵ)α(c(r))for all request sequences r.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 4.1, pp. 17–18)

  1. RHR_HRH​ is finite.
  2. The restart rule produces the greedy decomposition into longest prefixes in RHR_HRH​.
  3. The restart algorithm answers AH(r(1)),AH(r(2)),…,AH(r(t))A_H(r(1)), A_H(r(2)), \dots, A_H(r(t))AH​(r(1)),AH​(r(2)),…,AH​(r(t)).
  4. c(r(i))≥Hc(r(i)) \ge Hc(r(i))≥H for i=1,…,t−1i = 1, \dots, t-1i=1,…,t−1.
  5. c(r)≥c(r(1))+∑i=2t(c(r(i))−D(F))c(r) \ge c(r(1)) + \sum_{i=2}^{t} (c(r(i)) - D(F))c(r)≥c(r(1))+∑i=2t​(c(r(i))−D(F)).
  6. cRestart(r)≤α(c(1))+∑i=2t(α(c(i))+D(F))c_{\mathrm{Restart}}(r) \le \alpha(c(1)) + \sum_{i=2}^{t} (\alpha(c(i)) + D(F))cRestart​(r)≤α(c(1))+∑i=2t​(α(c(i))+D(F)).

Significance

Theorem 2.1 shows that, against adaptive off-line adversaries, randomization gives no advantage, but only as an existence statement. Theorem 4.1 turns it into a recipe: a deterministic algorithm need only be good on the finite set RHR_HRH​, which can be prepared in advance, and restarting extends it to all inputs at a loss of 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ. The paper illustrates this with KKK-server problems on finite graphs, where AHA_HAH​ is a finite table and each step of the resulting algorithm costs one dynamic-programming evaluation of an off-line optimum.

The restart construction is of independent use: it is a general way to turn a guarantee on bounded-cost inputs into a guarantee on all inputs when the cost is nearly additive over concatenation.

To our knowledge neither the abstract request-answer game model nor this theorem has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a formal model of request-answer games with the monotonicity, locality and diameter conditions, the restart algorithm as an explicit definition, and the full chain of inequalities of the proof.

Difficulty

The individual inequalities are elementary; the work lies in the bookkeeping of the construction. The algorithm is defined online, one request at a time, while the analysis is phrased through the decomposition of the whole sequence. Relating the two requires showing that the online rule produces exactly the decomposition into longest prefixes in RHR_HRH​, and that the answers produced on each segment are those of AHA_HAH​ run from scratch, so that the cost of the whole play can be compared with the costs on the segments. The constants must close exactly: with H=(2+ϵ)D/ϵH = (2+\epsilon)D/\epsilonH=(2+ϵ)D/ϵ the additive losses at the t−1t-1t−1 cuts, on both the algorithm's side and the optimum's side, must be absorbed by the factor 1+ϵ1+\epsilon1+ϵ, and they do so only for ratios d≥1d \ge 1d≥1.

A tempting shortcut is to conclude Theorem 4.1 from Theorem 2.1 directly: a deterministic α\alphaα-competitive algorithm is trivially (1+ϵ)α(1+\epsilon)\alpha(1+ϵ)α-competitive when costs are nonnegative. This proves the sentence of the theorem without its point, and is ruled out below.

Formalization scope

  • Request and answer sequences are Lean Lists, oldest first; fn(r,a)f_n(r,a)fn​(r,a) is F.cost r a with r.length = a.length. Costs are real-valued (the paper allows +∞+\infty+∞; real costs are a special case).
  • The answer set is a Fintype and nonempty; in the goal the request set is a Fintype and nonempty.
  • A deterministic algorithm is one function List R → A. Competitiveness of a deterministic algorithm against adaptive off-line adversaries is stated as competitiveness on every request sequence, which is equivalent for deterministic algorithms (p. 8).
  • Finite diameter is a real bound DDD with ∣δ∣≤D|\delta| \le D∣δ∣≤D for all pairs, and every statement holds for every such DDD, in particular D=D(F)D = D(F)D=D(F); no real supremum is taken.
  • f0≥0f_0 \ge 0f0​≥0 is assumed in the goal; with monotonicity it makes every cost nonnegative. It holds in the paper's examples.
  • α(x)=d x\alpha(x) = d\,xα(x)=dx with d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 in the goal; the cost bound for the restart algorithm (milestone 6) holds for an arbitrary α\alphaα.
  • HHH is fixed to the paper's value (2+ϵ)D/ϵ(2+\epsilon)D/\epsilon(2+ϵ)D/ϵ.
  • The restart algorithm is a definition (a left fold over the requests), not a hypothesis. The paper's assumption of a randomized algorithm competitive against adaptive off-line adversaries is used only, through Theorem 2.1, to obtain AHA_HAH​; the goal quantifies over every AHA_HAH​ that is α\alphaα-competitive on RHR_HRH​. "Computable" has no precise meaning for real costs; its content is the finiteness of RHR_HRH​ together with the fact that the restart algorithm reads AHA_HAH​ only on RHR_HRH​. A formalization that proves only the existence of a deterministic (1+ϵ)α(1+\epsilon)\alpha(1+ϵ)α-competitive algorithm, without the construction, does not meet the goal.
  • Milestones 5 and 6 are stated for nonempty request sequences, so that t≥1t \ge 1t≥1; milestone 5 is stated for every decomposition into consecutive pieces.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and a connection to the other missions of this series, where the randomized model and Theorem 2.1 are formalized.

Selected references

  • S. Ben-David, A. Borodin, R. Karp, G. Tardos, A. Wigderson, On the power of randomization in on-line algorithms, Algorithmica 11 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01294260
  • M. Chrobak, H. Karloff, T. Payne, S. Vishwanathan, New results on server problems, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 4 (1991), 172–181. https://doi.org/10.1137/0404017
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CombinatoricsOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization 3: Fractional Double Greedy on the Multilinear Extension Achieves 1/2 of the OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

Unconstrained submodular maximization (USM) asks for a subset SSS of a finite ground set N\mathcal NN maximizing a nonnegative submodular function fff. It contains Max-Cut, Max-DiCut and maximum facility location as special cases, and it is the basic subproblem of many constrained submodular maximization algorithms. Because fff is given only through a value oracle, the question is how close to the optimum a polynomial number of queries can get.

Timeline of the approximation ratio for USM in the value oracle model:

  • Feige, Mirrokni and Vondrák (FOCS 2007; SIAM J. Comput. 2011) showed that a uniformly random set achieves 1/41/41/4, local search achieves 1/31/31/3 and 2/52/52/5, and that no algorithm making polynomially many queries achieves 1/2+ε1/2 + \varepsilon1/2+ε for any fixed ε>0\varepsilon > 0ε>0.
  • Oveis Gharan and Vondrák (SODA 2011) reached 0.410.410.41 by simulated annealing; Feldman, Naor and Schwartz (ICALP 2011) reached 0.420.420.42.
  • Buchbinder, Feldman, Naor and Schwartz (FOCS 2012) closed the gap with the double greedy algorithms: a deterministic 1/31/31/3-approximation and a randomized 1/21/21/2-approximation, both linear in the number of oracle calls. Their Appendix A gives a third, fractional variant, which is the subject of this mission.

This is the third mission on the FOCS 2012 paper; the first two treat the deterministic and the randomized double greedy on sets.

Setting

Let N\mathcal NN be a finite ground set with nnn elements and f:2N→R≥0f : 2^{\mathcal N} \to \mathbb R_{\ge 0}f:2N→R≥0​. The function fff is submodular if

f(A)+f(B)≥f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)for all A,B⊆N.f(A) + f(B) \ge f(A \cup B) + f(A \cap B) \qquad \text{for all } A, B \subseteq \mathcal N .f(A)+f(B)≥f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)for all A,B⊆N.

Write f(OPT)=max⁡S⊆Nf(S)f(OPT) = \max_{S \subseteq \mathcal N} f(S)f(OPT)=maxS⊆N​f(S) and let OPTOPTOPT be a maximizing set.

The multilinear extension of fff is the function on vectors x∈[0,1]Nx \in [0,1]^{\mathcal N}x∈[0,1]N

F(x)=∑S⊆Nf(S)∏u∈Sxu∏u∉S(1−xu)=E[f(R(x))],F(x) = \sum_{S \subseteq \mathcal N} f(S) \prod_{u \in S} x_u \prod_{u \notin S} (1 - x_u) = \mathbb E\bigl[f(R(x))\bigr],F(x)=S⊆N∑​f(S)u∈S∏​xu​u∈/S∏​(1−xu​)=E[f(R(x))],

where the random set R(x)R(x)R(x) contains each element uuu independently with probability xux_uxu​. A set is identified with its characteristic vector, so FFF agrees with fff on {0,1}N\{0,1\}^{\mathcal N}{0,1}N, and {u}\{u\}{u} also denotes the unit vector at uuu. For vectors, x∨yx \vee yx∨y and x∧yx \wedge yx∧y are the coordinate-wise maximum and minimum.

Algorithm 4 (MultilinearUSM). Fix an arbitrary order u1,…,unu_1, \dots, u_nu1​,…,un​ of N\mathcal NN and start from x0=∅x_0 = \emptysetx0​=∅ and y0=Ny_0 = \mathcal Ny0​=N (the vectors 0\mathbf 00 and 1\mathbf 11). In iteration i=1,…,ni = 1, \dots, ni=1,…,n compute

ai=F(xi−1+{ui})−F(xi−1),bi=F(yi−1−{ui})−F(yi−1),a_i = F(x_{i-1} + \{u_i\}) - F(x_{i-1}), \qquad b_i = F(y_{i-1} - \{u_i\}) - F(y_{i-1}),ai​=F(xi−1​+{ui​})−F(xi−1​),bi​=F(yi−1​−{ui​})−F(yi−1​),

set ai′=max⁡{ai,0}a_i' = \max\{a_i, 0\}ai′​=max{ai​,0}, bi′=max⁡{bi,0}b_i' = \max\{b_i, 0\}bi′​=max{bi​,0}, and update

xi=xi−1+ai′ai′+bi′{ui},yi=yi−1−bi′ai′+bi′{ui},x_i = x_{i-1} + \frac{a_i'}{a_i' + b_i'} \{u_i\}, \qquad y_i = y_{i-1} - \frac{b_i'}{a_i' + b_i'} \{u_i\},xi​=xi−1​+ai′​+bi′​ai′​​{ui​},yi​=yi−1​−ai′​+bi′​bi′​​{ui​},

with the convention that the two fractions are 111 and 000 when ai′=bi′=0a_i' = b_i' = 0ai′​=bi′​=0. The output is the random set R(xn)R(x_n)R(xn​). Every choice before the output is deterministic; the algorithm queries FFF at four points per element.

For the analysis, OPTi=(OPT∨xi)∧yiOPT_i = (OPT \vee x_i) \wedge y_iOPTi​=(OPT∨xi​)∧yi​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem A.1, oracle-access clause

For every nonnegative submodular fff and every order of the ground set,

xn=ynandf(OPT)≤2 F(xn)=2 E[f(R(xn))].x_n = y_n \qquad\text{and}\qquad f(OPT) \le 2\,F(x_n) = 2\,\mathbb E\bigl[f(R(x_n))\bigr].xn​=yn​andf(OPT)≤2F(xn​)=2E[f(R(xn​))].

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. ai+bi≥0a_i + b_i \ge 0ai​+bi​≥0 at every iteration (proof of Lemma A.2; the page cites Lemma II.1).
  2. Endpoints: OPT0=OPTOPT_0 = OPTOPT0​=OPT with F(OPT)=f(OPT)F(OPT) = f(OPT)F(OPT)=f(OPT), and OPTn=xn=ynOPT_n = x_n = y_nOPTn​=xn​=yn​.
  3. (4) and (5): if ai≥0a_i \ge 0ai​≥0 and bi>0b_i > 0bi​>0, then F(xi)−F(xi−1)=ai2/(ai+bi)F(x_i) - F(x_{i-1}) = a_i^2/(a_i+b_i)F(xi​)−F(xi−1​)=ai2​/(ai​+bi​) and F(yi)−F(yi−1)=bi2/(ai+bi)F(y_i) - F(y_{i-1}) = b_i^2/(a_i+b_i)F(yi​)−F(yi−1​)=bi2​/(ai​+bi​).
  4. (6): in the same case, F(OPTi−1)−F(OPTi)≤aibi/(ai+bi)F(OPT_{i-1}) - F(OPT_i) \le a_i b_i/(a_i + b_i)F(OPTi−1​)−F(OPTi​)≤ai​bi​/(ai​+bi​), whether or not ui∈OPTu_i \in OPTui​∈OPT.
  5. Lemma A.2: for every 1≤i≤n1 \le i \le n1≤i≤n,
F(OPTi−1)−F(OPTi)≤12[F(xi)−F(xi−1)+F(yi)−F(yi−1)].F(OPT_{i-1}) - F(OPT_i) \le \tfrac12\bigl[F(x_i) - F(x_{i-1}) + F(y_i) - F(y_{i-1})\bigr].F(OPTi−1​)−F(OPTi​)≤21​[F(xi​)−F(xi−1​)+F(yi​)−F(yi−1​)].
  1. Telescoped display: F(OPT0)−F(OPTn)≤12[F(xn)−F(x0)]+12[F(yn)−F(y0)]≤12(F(xn)+F(yn))F(OPT_0) - F(OPT_n) \le \tfrac12[F(x_n) - F(x_0)] + \tfrac12[F(y_n) - F(y_0)] \le \tfrac12(F(x_n) + F(y_n))F(OPT0​)−F(OPTn​)≤21​[F(xn​)−F(x0​)]+21​[F(yn​)−F(y0​)]≤21​(F(xn​)+F(yn​)).

Significance

The result. Theorem A.1 shows that the double greedy analysis survives a change of domain: the factor 1/21/21/2 is obtained by a procedure that never flips a coin until the end, and whose state is a pair of fractional points. The ratio matches the Feige–Mirrokni–Vondrák hardness bound, so it cannot be improved in the value oracle model. Its output is a fractional point together with an independent rounding, which separates the optimization from the rounding step.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked proof of a double greedy guarantee is known. A complete development yields reusable facts about the multilinear extension of a submodular function on a finite type: FFF is affine in each coordinate, its coordinate increments are antitone in the other coordinates on [0,1]N[0,1]^{\mathcal N}[0,1]N, and FFF restricted to characteristic vectors is fff. These are the standard tools of every continuous-relaxation argument for submodular maximization.

Difficulty

The proof on the page is short, but it relies on two facts it does not prove. First, the page justifies ai+bi≥0a_i + b_i \ge 0ai​+bi​≥0 "by Lemma II.1", which is a statement about sets; for vectors it requires that the increment of FFF along a coordinate decreases as the other coordinates increase, a property of the multilinear extension of a submodular function that must be derived from the sum defining FFF. Second, inequality (6) is written out only for ui∉OPTu_i \notin OPTui​∈/OPT, and Case 2 of Lemma A.2 is omitted as analogous; the formal statements cover all cases. The main technical work is the bookkeeping of the run: that each coordinate is touched once, that xi−1(ui)=0x_{i-1}(u_i) = 0xi−1​(ui​)=0 and yi−1(ui)=1y_{i-1}(u_i) = 1yi−1​(ui​)=1 when it is touched, that xi≤OPTi≤yix_i \le OPT_i \le y_ixi​≤OPTi​≤yi​, and that every state stays in [0,1]N[0,1]^{\mathcal N}[0,1]N, where the antitonicity applies.

Formalization scope

  • The ground set is a Fintype XXX with decidable equality; sets are Finset X; fff is real-valued, with nonnegativity a hypothesis ∀ S, 0 ≤ f S wherever the page uses it (the goal and the telescoped display). Submodularity is the published NonmonotoneSubmod.Shared.Submodular, the lattice form f(S∪T)+f(S∩T)≤f(S)+f(T)f(S \cup T) + f(S \cap T) \le f(S) + f(T)f(S∪T)+f(S∩T)≤f(S)+f(T); f(OPT)f(OPT)f(OPT) is the published NonmonotoneSubmod.Shared.OPT; FFF is the published NonmonotoneSubmod.Shared.F, the sum above, defined for every x:X→Rx : X \to \mathbb Rx:X→R.
  • The order u1,…,unu_1, \dots, u_nu1​,…,un​ is a duplicate-free list containing every element; uiu_iui​ is the entry at index i−1i-1i−1, and nnn is the list's length. The state after iii iterations is obtained by folding one step over the first iii entries from (0,1)(\mathbf 0, \mathbf 1)(0,1). Statements hold for every such order.
  • The footnote's convention ai′/(ai′+bi′)=1a_i'/(a_i'+b_i') = 1ai′​/(ai′​+bi′​)=1, bi′/(ai′+bi′)=0b_i'/(a_i'+b_i') = 0bi′​/(ai′​+bi′​)=0 when ai′=bi′=0a_i' = b_i' = 0ai′​=bi′​=0 is an explicit case split; with Lean's 0/0=00/0 = 00/0=0 it would otherwise be reversed and the run would no longer end with xn=ynx_n = y_nxn​=yn​.
  • Corrected slips of the page: lines 3–4 of Algorithm 4 assign ai′,bi′a_i', b_i'ai′​,bi′​ but define ai,bia_i, b_iai​,bi​; "f:N→R+f : \mathcal N \to \mathbb R^+f:N→R+" means f:2N→R+f : 2^{\mathcal N} \to \mathbb R^+f:2N→R+; "F(x)≜E[R(x)]F(x) \triangleq \mathbb E[R(x)]F(x)≜E[R(x)]" means E[f(R(x))]\mathbb E[f(R(x))]E[f(R(x))]; "NSM" in Theorem A.1 means USM. The main text's one-line definition of submodularity, read literally, forces monotonicity; the footnote's lattice form is used.
  • Not formalized: the sampling clause of Theorem A.1 (ratio (1/2)−o(1)(1/2) - o(1)(1/2)−o(1) without oracle access to FFF, whose proof the paper refers to Calinescu, Chekuri, Pál and Vondrák) and the running time. The guarantee is stated for the algorithm as printed, so the trivial existence of a 1/21/21/2-approximation by exhaustive search does not satisfy it. A statement in which xnx_nxn​ is an arbitrary point, or the state any process with xi≤yix_i \le y_ixi​≤yi​, would not be this theorem.
  • Contributions welcome: the multilinear-extension facts above as general lemmas, the run invariants, and proofs of the milestones in any order.

Selected references

  • N. Buchbinder, M. Feldman, J. Naor, R. Schwartz, A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization, FOCS 2012, 649–658. https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2012.73 (journal version: SIAM J. Comput. 44(5), 2015, https://doi.org/10.1137/130929205; its numbering differs and is not used here).
  • U. Feige, V. S. Mirrokni, J. Vondrák, Maximizing Non-monotone Submodular Functions, SIAM J. Comput. 40(4), 2011, 1133–1153. https://doi.org/10.1137/090779346
  • S. Oveis Gharan, J. Vondrák, Submodular Maximization by Simulated Annealing, SODA 2011, 1098–1117. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973082.83
  • M. Feldman, J. Naor, R. Schwartz, Nonmonotone Submodular Maximization via a Structural Continuous Greedy Algorithm, ICALP 2011, 342–353. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22006-7_29
  • G. Calinescu, C. Chekuri, M. Pál, J. Vondrák, Maximizing a Monotone Submodular Function Subject to a Matroid Constraint, SIAM J. Comput. 40(6), 2011, 1740–1766. https://doi.org/10.1137/080733991
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ProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power of Randomization in On-Line Algorithms 1: α-Competitiveness Against Adaptive On-Line and β Against Oblivious Adversaries Give a Deterministic α∘β-Competitive AlgorithmResearch Paper

Why randomization matters in online algorithms

An online algorithm must answer each request before it sees the next one. Its performance is compared with an optimum that may choose all its answers after seeing the complete request string. Randomization can improve an online algorithm's guarantee when the request string is fixed in advance. The comparison changes when an adversary chooses later requests after seeing the algorithm's earlier answers. Ben-David, Borodin, Karp, Tardos and Wigderson studied these choices of adversary in a common request-answer model and proved a general relation between their competitive guarantees (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript §§2–3).

The paper distinguishes three adversaries. An oblivious adversary fixes the request string before the algorithm's random choices affect any answer. An adaptive off-line adversary chooses the next request from previous answers but serves the resulting request string optimally after the play. An adaptive on-line adversary also chooses its own answer as each request arrives. The ability to react to answers makes the latter two adversaries materially different from the oblivious one for randomized algorithms (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript pp. 7–9).

Request-answer games and competitive cost

A request-answer game has a request set RRR, a finite nonempty answer set AAA, and a real cost fn(r,a)f_n(r,a)fn​(r,a) for a request string r∈Rnr\in R^nr∈Rn and an answer string a∈Ana\in A^na∈An. The off-line optimum for rrr is c(r)=min⁡a∈Anfn(r,a)c(r)=\min_{a\in A^n}f_n(r,a)c(r)=mina∈An​fn​(r,a). A deterministic online algorithm DDD returns its iiith answer from the first iii requests alone; it has no access to the rest of rrr or to the eventual stopping time. Its cost on rrr is cD(r)=fn(r,D(r))c_D(r)=f_n(r,D(r))cD​(r)=fn​(r,D(r)).

A randomized online algorithm is a distribution over deterministic online algorithms. With coins ω\omegaω, write GωG_\omegaGω​ for the resulting deterministic algorithm. For a fixed request string rrr, GGG is β\betaβ-competitive against oblivious adversaries when Eω[cGω(r)]≤β(c(r))\mathbb E_\omega[c_{G_\omega}(r)]\leq\beta(c(r))Eω​[cGω​​(r)]≤β(c(r)). The paper calls a transformation “linear” when it has the affine form x↦ux+vx\mapsto ux+vx↦ux+v (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript p. 7).

An adaptive off-line adversary QQQ has a rule from prior answer strings to either the next request or a stop signal, together with a common finite upper bound on play length. Let r(Gω,Q)r(G_\omega,Q)r(Gω​,Q) denote its request string and cQ(Gω)=c(r(Gω,Q))c_Q(G_\omega)=c(r(G_\omega,Q))cQ​(Gω​)=c(r(Gω​,Q)). Its competitiveness condition places the transformation inside the expectation: Eω[cGω(Q)]≤Eω[α(cQ(Gω))]\mathbb E_\omega[c_{G_\omega}(Q)]\leq\mathbb E_\omega[\alpha(c_Q(G_\omega))]Eω​[cGω​​(Q)]≤Eω​[α(cQ​(Gω​))]. An adaptive on-line adversary SSS has the same request rule and an additional answer rule; its own cost is cS(Gω)c_S(G_\omega)cS​(Gω​), and the corresponding condition uses Eω[α(cS(Gω))]\mathbb E_\omega[\alpha(c_S(G_\omega))]Eω​[α(cS​(Gω​))] on the right (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript pp. 8–9).

Formalization targets

Randomization against adaptive off-line adversaries

The first target is Theorem 2.1: if some randomized algorithm is α\alphaα-competitive against every adaptive off-line adversary, a deterministic algorithm has that same guarantee on every request string:

∃G  ∀Q,E[cG(Q)]≤E[α(cQ(G))]⟹∃D  ∀r,cD(r)≤α(c(r)).\exists G\;\forall Q,\quad \mathbb E[c_G(Q)]\leq\mathbb E[\alpha(c_Q(G))]\quad\Longrightarrow\quad\exists D\;\forall r,\quad c_D(r)\leq\alpha(c(r)).∃G∀Q,E[cG​(Q)]≤E[α(cQ​(G))]⟹∃D∀r,cD​(r)≤α(c(r)).

Composition of two guarantees

Theorem 2.2 takes an α\alphaα guarantee for GGG against adaptive on-line adversaries and a β\betaβ guarantee for another randomized algorithm against oblivious adversaries. It concludes that GGG has the composed guarantee against adaptive off-line adversaries:

E[cG(Q)]≤E[(α∘β)(cQ(G))]for every Q.\mathbb E[c_G(Q)]\leq\mathbb E[(\alpha\circ\beta)(c_Q(G))]\qquad\text{for every }Q.E[cG​(Q)]≤E[(α∘β)(cQ​(G))]for every Q.

The mission goal is Corollary 2.1, the deterministic consequence of these two results:

∃D  ∀r,cD(r)≤(α∘β)(c(r)).\exists D\;\forall r,\qquad c_D(r)\leq(\alpha\circ\beta)(c(r)).∃D∀r,cD​(r)≤(α∘β)(c(r)).

The milestones follow the paper's two theorems and the stated claims in their proofs, including the finite-horizon winning-position formulation and the adversary that simulates a fixed online algorithm (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript pp. 9–13).

What the result supplies

The corollary turns the existence of two randomized guarantees under different information rules into the existence of a deterministic online strategy with an explicit composed cost transformation. It is an existence result: it does not say that the deterministic strategy can be computed efficiently from the randomized algorithms. The paper itself notes that such a construction is unavailable in full generality and then examines settings where constructive versions are possible (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript p. 13).

The mathematical results were proved in the 1994 paper; this mission asks for machine-checked Lean proofs of the abstract model, the intermediate claims, and Corollary 2.1. The local draft currently contains compiled statements with proof placeholders, so it does not yet provide checked proofs. A completed development would make the adversary distinctions and the exact placement of expectations available for reuse in later online-algorithm formalizations.

Why the proof is difficult

The apparent shortcut is to treat an adaptive request sequence as fixed and apply a guarantee against oblivious adversaries directly. That loses the dependence of later requests on the algorithm's earlier answers. For Theorem 2.1, a winning request strategy must have one finite horizon that works for every answer path; separate finite horizons for each branch do not suffice when the answer set is infinite. For Theorem 2.2, the simulated adversary must make its own answers before the algorithm answers the current request, while still matching a fixed online benchmark along every resulting play. The expectation inequalities must remain valid when the request string itself depends on the algorithm's coins (Ben-David et al., 1994, manuscript pp. 9–11).

Formalization scope

Lean represents requests and answers as oldest-first lists. List index zero is request one in the paper. The general game is a separate definition; the algorithm, adversary, and competitiveness definitions build on it. An off-line adversary's rule returns Option R, where none is the stop signal, and has a uniform finite depth bound. A randomized algorithm consists of a coin probability space and a deterministic prefix algorithm for each coin; its answer events are measurable. Finiteness of AAA and bounded play depth make the cost of each fixed adversarial play take finitely many values, so its real expectation is an ordinary integrable expectation.

The formal game uses real-valued costs, a deliberate restriction of the paper's R∪{∞}\mathbb R\cup\{\infty\}R∪{∞} costs. The answer set is finite and nonempty, while the request set may be infinite. The transformations α\alphaα and β\betaβ are affine. Theorem 2.2 and the goal assume α\alphaα is monotone: the paper applies α\alphaα to an inequality in its proof, and its competitive-ratio examples have positive slope. Theorem 2.1 does not need this added assumption. The two randomized algorithms may have different coin spaces, each an arbitrary Lean type at the declaration's universe level. The off-line and on-line adaptive comparisons retain α\alphaα inside the expectation.

The target ranges over every equal-length request and answer play generated by these rules, including an adversary that stops without a request. It does not allow the deterministic algorithm to see future requests or choose a different policy for each adversary. Reusable contributions include the game interface, bounded adaptive plays, measurable randomized algorithms, and finite-horizon winning positions. The statements of all three principal results, their intervening claims, and proofs of those statements are within scope.

Selected references

  • S. Ben-David, A. Borodin, R. Karp, G. Tardos and A. Wigderson, On the Power of Randomization in On-Line Algorithms, Algorithmica 11, 1994. DOI: 10.1007/BF01294260. The local source is the authors' 20-page manuscript; citations above use its page numbers.
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ProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power of Randomization in On-Line Algorithms 2: The Bound α∘β Against Adaptive Off-Line Adversaries Is TightResearch Paper

Motivation

An on-line algorithm must answer each request as it arrives, without knowing the requests to come; paging, caching, the kkk-server problem and metrical task systems are standard examples. Its quality is measured by competitive analysis: its cost is compared with the cost of an optimal off-line solution that knows the whole request sequence. For randomized on-line algorithms the comparison depends on how much the adversary producing the requests is allowed to see. Ben-David, Borodin, Karp, Tardos and Wigderson (Algorithmica 11, 1994; conference version STOC 1990) introduced the three standard adversaries — oblivious, adaptive on-line and adaptive off-line — and related the competitive ratios achievable against each.

Their Theorem 2.2 (manuscript p. 10) shows that if a randomized algorithm is α\alphaα-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries and some randomized algorithm is β\betaβ-competitive against oblivious adversaries, then the first algorithm is αβ\alpha\betaαβ-competitive against adaptive off-line adversaries. This mission formalizes the paper's claim (manuscript p. 11) that this product bound cannot be improved in general, together with the explicit construction on pp. 12–13 that proves it.

Setting

A request-answer game consists of a request set RRR, a finite answer set AAA, and cost functions fn:Rn×An→Rf_n : R^n \times A^n \to \mathbb Rfn​:Rn×An→R. For a request sequence r‾∈Rn\underline r \in R^nr​∈Rn, the off-line optimum is c(r‾)=min⁡a‾∈Anfn(r‾,a‾)c(\underline r) = \min_{\underline a \in A^n} f_n(\underline r, \underline a)c(r​)=mina​∈An​fn​(r​,a​). A deterministic on-line algorithm GGG answers the iii-th request with ai=gi(r1,…,ri)a_i = g_i(r_1, \dots, r_i)ai​=gi​(r1​,…,ri​); a randomized one is a probability distribution over deterministic algorithms GxG_xGx​, xxx being the coin tosses.

An adaptive off-line adversary QQQ chooses each request ri+1=qi(a1,…,ai)r_{i+1} = q_i(a_1, \dots, a_i)ri+1​=qi​(a1​,…,ai​) from the answers given so far, stops after at most dQd_QdQ​ requests, and pays the off-line optimum cQ(G)=c(r‾)c_Q(G) = c(\underline r)cQ​(G)=c(r​) of the requests it made; the algorithm pays cG(Q)=fn(r‾,a‾)c_G(Q) = f_n(\underline r, \underline a)cG​(Q)=fn​(r​,a​). An adaptive on-line adversary SSS must in addition answer each request itself, before the algorithm does, with bi+1=pi(a1,…,ai)b_{i+1} = p_i(a_1, \dots, a_i)bi+1​=pi​(a1​,…,ai​), and pays cS(G)=fn(r‾,b‾)c_S(G) = f_n(\underline r, \underline b)cS​(G)=fn​(r​,b​). An oblivious adversary fixes r‾\underline rr​ in advance and pays c(r‾)c(\underline r)c(r​). A randomized GGG is α\alphaα-competitive against oblivious adversaries if Ex[cGx(r‾)]≤α c(r‾)\mathbb E_x[c_{G_x}(\underline r)] \le \alpha\, c(\underline r)Ex​[cGx​​(r​)]≤αc(r​) for all r‾\underline rr​, and against adaptive on-line adversaries if Ex[cGx(S)]≤Ex[α cS(Gx)]\mathbb E_x[c_{G_x}(S)] \le \mathbb E_x[\alpha\, c_S(G_x)]Ex​[cGx​​(S)]≤Ex​[αcS​(Gx​)] for all SSS.

The construction uses the mates game: R=AR = AR=A is a set of 2t2t2t elements split into ttt pairs of mates, and for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 the cost depends only on the first answer a1a_1a1​ and the second request r2r_2r2​: it is 111 if a1=r2a_1 = r_2a1​=r2​, MMM if a1a_1a1​ is the mate of r2r_2r2​, and mmm otherwise. The algorithm GGG draws a1a_1a1​ uniformly at random. The parameters solve

β=(2t−2)m+M+12t,α=1+(2t−1)M2+(2t−2)m.\beta = \frac{(2t-2)m + M + 1}{2t}, \qquad \alpha = \frac{1 + (2t-1)M}{2 + (2t-2)m}.β=2t(2t−2)m+M+1​,α=2+(2t−2)m1+(2t−1)M​.

Formalization targets

Goal: tightness of Theorem 2.2

For 1<β≤α1 < \beta \le \alpha1<β≤α (or α=β=1\alpha = \beta = 1α=β=1) and every C<αβC < \alpha\betaC<αβ, there are a game and a randomized algorithm GGG such that

G is α-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries,G is β-competitive against oblivious adversaries,G \text{ is } \alpha\text{-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries}, \qquad G \text{ is } \beta\text{-competitive against oblivious adversaries},G is α-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries,G is β-competitive against oblivious adversaries,

and for every randomized algorithm KKK some adaptive off-line adversary QQQ achieves

E[cQ(K)]>0,E[cK(Q)]≥C⋅E[cQ(K)].\mathbb E[c_Q(K)] > 0, \qquad \mathbb E[c_K(Q)] \ge C\cdot \mathbb E[c_Q(K)].E[cQ​(K)]>0,E[cK​(Q)]≥C⋅E[cQ​(K)].

Milestones (pp. 12–13)

  1. The closed forms m(t)m(t)m(t), M(t)M(t)M(t) are the unique solution of the two equations.
  2. m(t)→βm(t) \to \betam(t)→β and M(t)→αβM(t) \to \alpha\betaM(t)→αβ as t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞.
  3. For all large ttt: M(t)≥max⁡(m(t)2,C)M(t) \ge \max(m(t)^2, C)M(t)≥max(m(t)2,C), 1≤m(t)≤M(t)1 \le m(t) \le M(t)1≤m(t)≤M(t), α(m(t)−1)≤M(t)−m(t)\alpha(m(t)-1) \le M(t) - m(t)α(m(t)−1)≤M(t)−m(t).
  4. GGG is β\betaβ-competitive against oblivious adversaries in the mates game.
  5. GGG is α\alphaα-competitive against adaptive on-line adversaries in the mates game.
  6. An adaptive off-line adversary makes every algorithm pay MMM while paying 111.

Significance

The result. Together with Theorem 2.2, the claim pins down exactly how much the adaptive off-line adversary can gain over the other two: the product αβ\alpha\betaαβ is an upper bound for every game and is approached by a single game for every admissible pair (α,β)(\alpha, \beta)(α,β). It shows that no general argument relating the three adversary models can give a bound better than the product, so any improvement for a specific problem (paging, kkk-server) must use the structure of that problem. The paging example cited on p. 11 (RANDOM against the three adversaries) gives one instance of tightness; the mates game gives tightness for every admissible pair.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper, in about one page, with two steps left to the reader ("by inspection of the equations", "a simple case analysis"). No machine-checked proof of this or of any statement about adaptive adversaries is known to us. The formalization makes the model of §2 precise (sequences, stopping, the order in which adversary and algorithm commit, expectations over coins), checks the asymptotics of the parameters, and verifies the case analysis, which on inspection needs an inequality the page does not state. Two printed formulas on p. 12 contain typos; the formal statements carry the correct values.

Difficulty

The construction is explicit, but each competitiveness claim quantifies over all adversaries, which may adapt their requests to the algorithm's random answers, stop at any time, and (for the on-line adversary) commit to their own answers in advance. The algebra of α\alphaα-competitiveness is tight: the adversary's best expected advantage is exactly zero, so every case of its best reply must be checked with no slack. The page's condition M≥m2M \ge m^2M≥m2 does not suffice for this: when a1a_1a1​ is neither the adversary's first answer nor its mate, the reply "mate of a1a_1a1​" beats the reply "the adversary's own answer" only when α(m−1)≤M−m\alpha(m-1) \le M - mα(m−1)≤M−m, which holds for the solved parameters but is not implied by M≥m2M \ge m^2M≥m2. At β=1<α\beta = 1 < \alphaβ=1<α the solved parameter mmm is below 111 for every ttt, and the oblivious bound fails.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in OnlineRandomization.Tightness. The conventions:

  • Costs are real-valued; the paper allows +∞+\infty+∞, so the game class is a special case.
  • Answer sets are nonempty finite types; request sets are arbitrary types.
  • Sequences are Lean lists, oldest first; cost r a is fnf_nfn​ on lists of equal length nnn.
  • Adversaries return none for "stop" and carry a depth bound dQd_QdQ​; an on-line adversary's answer bi+1b_{i+1}bi+1​ depends only on a1,…,aia_1, \dots, a_ia1​,…,ai​.
  • Randomized algorithms are a probability space of coins with a deterministic algorithm per coin and measurable answers; expectations are Bochner integrals, with α\alphaα applied inside the expectation. In the goal, coin spaces range over Type.
  • Competitiveness uses the ratio functions x↦αxx \mapsto \alpha xx↦αx and x↦βxx \mapsto \beta xx↦βx, with no additive constant.
  • The mates game is on Fin t × Bool, with mate (i,b)↦(i,¬b)(i, b) \mapsto (i, \lnot b)(i,b)↦(i,¬b). The paper leaves the costs of plays with fewer than two requests undefined; the formalization sets f0=0f_0 = 0f0​=0 and f1≡1f_1 \equiv 1f1​≡1 (with f1≡0f_1 \equiv 0f1​≡0 the algorithm would not be α\alphaα-competitive).
  • Range. The goal assumes 1<β≤α1 < \beta \le \alpha1<β≤α or α=β=1\alpha = \beta = 1α=β=1; the page's case β=1<α\beta = 1 < \alphaβ=1<α is not covered by its construction and is left out. In fact the claim is false there for 1<C<α1 < C < \alpha1<C<α: an algorithm that is 111-competitive against oblivious adversaries answers optimally, almost surely, on every request sequence (its cost is never below the optimum and its expected cost does not exceed it), and an adaptive off-line adversary reaches only finitely many request sequences, so against K=GK = GK=G every adversary has E[cG(Q)]=E[cQ(G)]\mathbb E[c_G(Q)] = \mathbb E[c_Q(G)]E[cG​(Q)]=E[cQ​(G)], a ratio of 1<C1 < C1<C.

The positivity requirement E[cQ(K)]>0\mathbb E[c_Q(K)] > 0E[cQ​(K)]>0 in the goal is essential: without it the adversary that asks nothing satisfies E[cK(Q)]≥C⋅0\mathbb E[c_K(Q)] \ge C \cdot 0E[cK​(Q)]≥C⋅0 for every KKK, and the third clause would hold vacuously.

A complete development needs: finite expectations over a uniform coin, the evaluation of the play of an adversary against a constant algorithm, and limit and eventual-inequality arguments for rational functions of ttt. The model of §2 is shared with the other missions of this series and is reusable for any request-answer formulation of an on-line problem. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Ben-David, A. Borodin, R. Karp, G. Tardos, A. Wigderson, On the power of randomization in on-line algorithms, Algorithmica 11 (1994) 2–14. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01294260 (cited from the authors' manuscript, manuscript pp. 7–13).
  • A. Borodin, R. El-Yaniv, Online Computation and Competitive Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1998. ISBN 0-521-56392-5.
  • P. Raghavan, M. Snir, Memory versus randomization in on-line algorithms, IBM Journal of Research and Development 38 (1994) 683–707. https://doi.org/10.1147/rd.386.0683
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CombinatoricsComputational GeometryDiscrete Geometry·Captain: mikedeng1

A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Counting Integral Points in Polyhedra When the Dimension is Fixed: The Lattice-Point Count of an Integral Simplex Is a Short Signed Sum over Primitive ConesResearch Paper

Counting lattice points in fixed dimension

How many integral points does a polytope contain? The question arises in integer programming, where it measures the size of a feasible set, in combinatorics, where many enumeration problems are lattice-point counts in a polytope (contingency tables, magic squares, flows), in the representation theory of Lie groups, and in the analysis of loop nests in compilers. Counting is #P-hard when the dimension is part of the input, so the natural question is whether the count can be computed in polynomial time when the dimension ddd is fixed.

Timeline:

  • 1899. In dimension 222, Pick's formula leads to a polynomial algorithm.
  • 1983. Lenstra shows that integer feasibility is decidable in polynomial time for fixed ddd (Lenstra 1983). Deciding whether a lattice point exists does not count them.
  • 1988, 1992. Brion proves that the exponential sum over the lattice points of a rational polytope is the sum of the exponential sums of its vertex cones.
  • 1991. Dyer gives polynomial algorithms in dimensions 333 and 444, based on Dedekind sums (Dyer 1991).
  • 1994. Barvinok proves that for every fixed ddd the number of lattice points of an integral simplex, and hence of a rational polyhedron, can be computed in polynomial time (Barvinok 1994). The algorithm was later implemented (LattE, barvinok) and is the standard method.

Setting

Points of Rd\mathbb{R}^dRd have real coordinates and ⟨c,x⟩=∑lclxl\langle c,x\rangle=\sum_l c_lx_l⟨c,x⟩=∑l​cl​xl​. For integral vectors u1,…,uk∈Zdu_1,\dots,u_k\in\mathbb{Z}^du1​,…,uk​∈Zd, the rational cone they generate is co⁡{u1,…,uk}={∑iλiui:λi≥0}\operatorname{co}\{u_1,\dots,u_k\}=\{\sum_i\lambda_iu_i:\lambda_i\ge0\}co{u1​,…,uk​}={∑i​λi​ui​:λi​≥0}. The generators are simple if they are linearly independent, and primitive if moreover they form a basis of the lattice Zd∩Lin⁡{u1,…,uk}\mathbb{Z}^d\cap\operatorname{Lin}\{u_1,\dots,u_k\}Zd∩Lin{u1​,…,uk​}.

The index Ind⁡K\operatorname{Ind}KIndK of the cone given by simple generators is the number of integral points in the semi-open parallelepiped Π={∑iαiui:0≤αi<1}\Pi=\{\sum_i\alpha_iu_i:0\le\alpha_i<1\}Π={∑i​αi​ui​:0≤αi​<1}. It equals 111 exactly for primitive generators.

The exponential sum of KKK is σ(K;c)=∑x∈K∩Zde⟨c,x⟩\sigma(K;c)=\sum_{x\in K\cap\mathbb{Z}^d}e^{\langle c,x\rangle}σ(K;c)=∑x∈K∩Zd​e⟨c,x⟩. Where it converges it has the closed form

σ(K;c)=(∑x∈Π∩Zde⟨c,x⟩)∏i=1k11−e⟨c,ui⟩,\sigma(K;c)=\Bigl(\sum_{x\in\Pi\cap\mathbb{Z}^d}e^{\langle c,x\rangle}\Bigr)\prod_{i=1}^k\frac{1}{1-e^{\langle c,u_i\rangle}},σ(K;c)=(x∈Π∩Zd∑​e⟨c,x⟩)i=1∏k​1−e⟨c,ui​⟩1​,

and this closed form defines σ\sigmaσ at every regular point, i.e. every ccc with ⟨c,ui⟩≠0\langle c,u_i\rangle\ne0⟨c,ui​⟩=0 for all iii.

An integral simplex is Δ=conv⁡{v1,…,vk+1}\Delta=\operatorname{conv}\{v_1,\dots,v_{k+1}\}Δ=conv{v1​,…,vk+1​} with affinely independent vj∈Zdv_j\in\mathbb{Z}^dvj​∈Zd. Its supporting cone at a vertex vvv is Kv={u:v+δu∈Δ for all sufficiently small δ>0}K_v=\{u:v+\delta u\in\Delta\text{ for all sufficiently small }\delta>0\}Kv​={u:v+δu∈Δ for all sufficiently small δ>0}. A signed decomposition K=∑iεiKiK=\sum_i\varepsilon_iK_iK=∑i​εi​Ki​ with integers εi\varepsilon_iεi​ means χK=∑iεiχKi\chi_K=\sum_i\varepsilon_i\chi_{K_i}χK​=∑i​εi​χKi​​ on all of Rd\mathbb{R}^dRd. The constant term of the Laurent expansion of fff at t=0t=0t=0 is the coefficient of t0t^0t0 in the expansion of fff around its pole at 000.

Formalization targets

Goal: the short signed formula (Theorem 1.2, mathematical content)

For d≥2d\ge2d≥2 and every integral simplex Δ⊆Rd\Delta\subseteq\mathbb{R}^dΔ⊆Rd there are, for each vertex vjv_jvj​, primitive cones Kj,iK_{j,i}Kj,i​ and integers εj,i\varepsilon_{j,i}εj,i​ with Kvj=∑iεj,iKj,iK_{v_j}=\sum_i\varepsilon_{j,i}K_{j,i}Kvj​​=∑i​εj,i​Kj,i​ and at most (2d)Tj(2^d)^{T_j}(2d)Tj​ terms. Here TjT_jTj​ is the smallest integer

Tj≥−log⁡log⁡1.9+log⁡log⁡Ind⁡jlog⁡d−log⁡(d−1),T_j\ge\frac{-\log\log1.9+\log\log\operatorname{Ind}_j}{\log d-\log(d-1)},Tj​≥logd−log(d−1)−loglog1.9+loglogIndj​​,

and Ind⁡j\operatorname{Ind}_jIndj​ is the index of the edge vectors at vjv_jvj​. Moreover, for every ccc orthogonal to no generator of any Kj,iK_{j,i}Kj,i​,

#(Δ∩Zd)=∑j∑iεj,i R(Kj,i,vj,c),\#(\Delta\cap\mathbb{Z}^d)=\sum_j\sum_i\varepsilon_{j,i}\,R(K_{j,i},v_j,c),#(Δ∩Zd)=j∑​i∑​εj,i​R(Kj,i​,vj​,c),

where R(K,v,c)R(K,v,c)R(K,v,c) is the constant term at t=0t=0t=0 of t↦et⟨c,v⟩σ(K;tc)t\mapsto e^{t\langle c,v\rangle}\sigma(K;tc)t↦et⟨c,v⟩σ(K;tc).

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2.4 with Remark 2.5: the closed form of σ\sigmaσ for simple cones.
  2. Proposition 4.1: for primitive cones, σ(K;c)=∏i(1−e⟨c,ui⟩)−1\sigma(K;c)=\prod_i(1-e^{\langle c,u_i\rangle})^{-1}σ(K;c)=∏i​(1−e⟨c,ui​⟩)−1.
  3. Proposition 2.7 (Brion), for integral simplices.
  4. Corollary 4.2: R(K,v,c)=Qk(x;y)∏ixi−1R(K,v,c)=Q_k(x;y)\prod_ix_i^{-1}R(K,v,c)=Qk​(x;y)∏i​xi−1​ with deg⁡Qk≤k\deg Q_k\le kdegQk​≤k.
  5. Primitive generators iff Ind⁡K=1\operatorname{Ind}K=1IndK=1 (§5).
  6. Lemma 5.2: a short lattice vector www with Ind⁡Kj≤(Ind⁡K)(d−1)/d\operatorname{Ind}K_j\le(\operatorname{Ind}K)^{(d-1)/d}IndKj​≤(IndK)(d−1)/d.
  7. Lemma 5.3: at most 2d2^d2d cones of smaller index, with signs ±1\pm1±1.
  8. Theorem 5.4: decomposition into at most (2d)T(2^d)^T(2d)T primitive cones.
  9. The display in the proof of Theorem 5.4: (2d)T≤C1(d)(log⁡Ind⁡K)C2(d)(2^d)^T\le C_1(d)(\log\operatorname{Ind}K)^{C_2(d)}(2d)T≤C1​(d)(logIndK)C2​(d).
  10. Lemma 6.1: some c(t)=(1,t,…,td−1)c(t)=(1,t,\dots,t^{d-1})c(t)=(1,t,…,td−1), t∈{0,…,m(d−1)}t\in\{0,\dots,m(d-1)\}t∈{0,…,m(d−1)}, is orthogonal to none of mmm nonzero vectors.

Significance

The goal is the reason Barvinok's algorithm is polynomial. For fixed ddd, the number of terms is bounded by a polynomial in log⁡Ind⁡K\log\operatorname{Ind}KlogIndK, which is polynomial in the input size. Each term is an explicit rational function of inner products (Corollary 4.2). The identity therefore turns lattice-point counting into the evaluation of a short sum. Its consequences include polynomial-time counting for rational polyhedra in fixed dimension, polynomial-time computation of Ehrhart quasi-polynomials, and the theory of short rational generating functions (Barvinok–Woods), which underlies algorithms for parametric integer programming.

The result is proved and classical. As far as known it has not been machine-checked: Mathlib has convex cones, Minkowski's convex body theorem and lattices, but no signed cone decompositions, no generating functions of cones and no Brion identity. The mission produces a formal account of the algorithm's correctness and of the size of its output. Its milestones are statements of independent use: the closed form of cone generating functions, Brion's identity for simplices, and the index-reduction lemma.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is to triangulate the supporting cones into unimodular (primitive) cones. This fails: a cone of index Ind⁡K\operatorname{Ind}KIndK may need about Ind⁡K\operatorname{Ind}KIndK unimodular cones in any triangulation, which is exponential in the input size. The step that makes the count small is signed decomposition. Signed decomposition uses cones that are not contained in KKK, combined with signs ±1\pm1±1, and controls the index through the geometry of numbers rather than through a subdivision of KKK. The second difficulty is that c=0c=0c=0, where the exponential sum equals the count, is a singular point of every σ(Ki;⋅)\sigma(K_i;\cdot)σ(Ki​;⋅). The count is recovered as a constant term of a Laurent expansion, so every identity has to be valid as an identity of meromorphic functions on regular points, and not only where the series converge.

Formalization scope

  • Points of Rd\mathbb{R}^dRd are Fin d → ℝ, integral vectors Fin d → ℤ used through their real cast, and ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩ is dotProduct. A cone is given by its generator list, because index, parallelepiped and the closed form of σ\sigmaσ depend on the generators. Logarithms are natural, and ∣u∣|u|∣u∣ is the sup norm.
  • Theorem 1.2 is represented by its mathematical content. The paper's statement is "there exists a polynomial time algorithm". No machine model is formalized. The goal is the identity proved on p. 778, with the count of the proof of Theorem 5.4 (p. 777). The algorithmic clauses of Lemmas 5.2, 5.3, 6.1 and Theorem 5.4 are each replaced by the existence statement of the object the algorithm constructs. Lemma 5.3(c), whose constant is unquantified, is omitted.
  • Over R\mathbb{R}R. The paper uses c∈Cdc\in\mathbb{C}^dc∈Cd only to speak of meromorphic functions. Here ccc is real, σ\sigmaσ is defined by its closed form, and regularity means ⟨c,ui⟩≠0\langle c,u_i\rangle\ne0⟨c,ui​⟩=0 for every generator. The constant term is a predicate: tNf(t)t^Nf(t)tNf(t) agrees near 000 with a real-analytic function whose NNN-th Taylor coefficient is the value.
  • Added hypotheses. These are d≥2d\ge2d≥2 wherever TTT appears, k≥1k\ge1k≥1 in Lemma 5.2, d≥1d\ge1d≥1 in Lemma 5.3, ui≠0u_i\ne0ui​=0 in Lemma 6.1, and Ind⁡K≥2\operatorname{Ind}K\ge2IndK≥2 in the display bound. T=0T=0T=0 when the index is 111. Brion's identity is stated for integral simplices, the only case the proof uses.
  • Trivializations ruled out. σ\sigmaσ is never an infinite sum, which would take a junk value off its convergence region. "Primitive" means a lattice basis and not mere linear independence; with the weaker notion the decomposition is trivial. Decompositions hold for every x∈Rdx\in\mathbb{R}^dx∈Rd, not only on Zd\mathbb{Z}^dZd. The halfspace of Lemma 5.2 is linear, since an affine one would make it vacuous.
  • Infrastructure. A complete development needs generating functions of simplicial cones, Brion's theorem for simplices, the identity theorem for rational functions in ec1,…,ecde^{c_1},\dots,e^{c_d}ec1​,…,ecd​, Minkowski's theorem on a sublattice, and inclusion–exclusion for triangulations. Each is reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of any of these pieces are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. I. Barvinok, A polynomial time algorithm for counting integral points in polyhedra when the dimension is fixed, Mathematics of Operations Research 19(4), 1994, 769–779. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.19.4.769
  • M. Brion, Points entiers dans les polyèdres convexes, Annales scientifiques de l'École Normale Supérieure 21(4), 1988, 653–663. https://doi.org/10.24033/asens.1572
  • M. Dyer, On counting lattice points in polyhedra, SIAM Journal on Computing 20(4), 1991, 695–707. https://doi.org/10.1137/0220044
  • H. W. Lenstra Jr., Integer programming with a fixed number of variables, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(4), 1983, 538–548. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.4.538
  • R. P. Stanley, Enumerative Combinatorics, Vol. 1, Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole, 1986, §4.6. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-9763-6
  • A. Barvinok, K. Woods, Short rational generating functions for lattice point problems, Journal of the AMS 16(4), 2003, 957–979. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0894-0347-03-00428-4
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ProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretary Problems: Weights and Discounts 3: An O(log n)-Competitive Algorithm for the Discounted Secretary ProblemResearch Paper

Motivation

In the secretary problem, nnn candidates with arbitrary values arrive one at a time in a uniformly random order, and an online decision maker must accept or reject each candidate on arrival, irrevocably, keeping at most one. The rule that observes the first n/en/en/e candidates and then accepts the first one better than everything seen so far selects the best candidate with probability about 1/e1/e1/e (Dynkin, 1963). The problem is a basic model of online selection and, read economically, of posted-price mechanisms for agents who arrive in random order: a rule that compares each agent only against a threshold set by earlier agents is truthful.

Babaioff, Dinitz, Gupta, Immorlica and Talwar (SODA 2009) study a variant in which time costs value. Selecting the candidate who arrives at time ttt earns that candidate's value multiplied by a discount d(t)d(t)d(t), for an arbitrary non-negative discount function ddd known in advance. Earlier work treated only specific discount shapes, such as geometric discounting d(t)=βtd(t)=\beta^td(t)=βt (Rasmussen and Pliska, 1976). For a general ddd the classical rule can fail badly: if all the discount mass sits in the first few time steps, a rule that waits through a sample of size n/en/en/e earns nothing. The paper shows that the best competitive ratio for arbitrary discounts lies between Ω(log⁡n/log⁡log⁡n)\Omega(\log n/\log\log n)Ω(logn/loglogn) (its Theorem 4.3) and O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) (its Theorem 4.4). This mission formalizes the upper bound.

Setting

There are n≥1n\ge1n≥1 elements, indexed {0,…,n−1}\{0,\dots,n-1\}{0,…,n−1}, with values v(e)≥0v(e)\ge 0v(e)≥0, and nnn times with discounts d(t)≥0d(t)\ge0d(t)≥0. A uniformly random permutation π\piπ fixes the order of arrivals: element π(t)\pi(t)π(t) arrives at time ttt. An algorithm knows ddd but not vvv; it sees each value on arrival and may select the current element, irrevocably, earning d(t) v(π(t))d(t)\,v(\pi(t))d(t)v(π(t)). Expectations over π\piπ are exact averages over the n!n!n! orders.

The offline optimum on order π\piπ is OPT(π)=max⁡td(t) v(π(t))\mathsf{OPT}(\pi)=\max_t d(t)\,v(\pi(t))OPT(π)=maxt​d(t)v(π(t)); it is a random variable, and the benchmark is its expectation Eπ[OPT]\mathbb E_\pi[\mathsf{OPT}]Eπ​[OPT] (p. 4 of the paper).

Let dmax⁡=max⁡td(t)d_{\max}=\max_t d(t)dmax​=maxt​d(t) and vmax⁡=max⁡ev(e)v_{\max}=\max_e v(e)vmax​=maxe​v(e). For c≥1c\ge1c≥1 the ccc-th discount class is the set of times

Pc={ i:2−cdmax⁡<d(i)≤2−(c−1)dmax⁡ }.P_c=\{\,i : 2^{-c}d_{\max}<d(i)\le 2^{-(c-1)}d_{\max}\,\}.Pc​={i:2−cdmax​<d(i)≤2−(c−1)dmax​}.

The quantity OPTc\mathsf{OPT}_cOPTc​ is the part of Eπ[OPT]\mathbb E_\pi[\mathsf{OPT}]Eπ​[OPT] earned when the optimal time (the smallest time attaining the maximum) lies in PcP_cPc​.

The classical secretary rule on mmm arrivals observes the first ⌊m/e⌋\lfloor m/e\rfloor⌊m/e⌋ and then selects the first arrival that ranks above every earlier arrival. Ranks use a fixed tie-break order: larger value first, and smaller element index among equal values.

The algorithm A\mathcal AA sets M=3⌈log⁡2n⌉+2M=3\lceil\log_2 n\rceil+2M=3⌈log2​n⌉+2, draws c∈{1,…,M}c\in\{1,\dots,M\}c∈{1,…,M} uniformly, and runs the classical rule on the subsequence of arrivals at the times of PcP_cPc​, ignoring all other arrivals.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.4 with its explicit constant

Eπ[OPT]  ≤  4e (3⌈log⁡2n⌉+2)  E[A](n≥1, d≥0, v≥0).\mathbb E_\pi[\mathsf{OPT}]\;\le\;4e\,\bigl(3\lceil\log_2 n\rceil+2\bigr)\;\mathbb E[\mathcal A]\qquad(n\ge1,\ d\ge0,\ v\ge0).Eπ​[OPT]≤4e(3⌈log2​n⌉+2)E[A](n≥1, d≥0, v≥0).

The paper states E[OPT]/E[A]≤O(log⁡n)\mathbb E[\mathsf{OPT}]/\mathbb E[\mathcal A]\le O(\log n)E[OPT]/E[A]≤O(logn); the constant 4e4e4e is the one its proof yields.

Milestones

  1. The classical secretary rule selects the top-ranked of m≥1m\ge1m≥1 elements with probability at least 1/e1/e1/e (§2, p. 4).
  2. OPT1≥vmax⁡dmax⁡/n\mathsf{OPT}_1\ge v_{\max}d_{\max}/nOPT1​≥vmax​dmax​/n (proof of Theorem 4.4, p. 7).
  3. OPTc≤2−c 2n2dmax⁡vmax⁡\mathsf{OPT}_c\le 2^{-c}\,2n^2d_{\max}v_{\max}OPTc​≤2−c2n2dmax​vmax​ for every c≥1c\ge1c≥1 (p. 7).
  4. ∑c=13⌈log⁡2n⌉+1OPTc≥12Eπ[OPT]\sum_{c=1}^{3\lceil\log_2 n\rceil+1}\mathsf{OPT}_c\ge\tfrac12\mathbb E_\pi[\mathsf{OPT}]∑c=13⌈log2​n⌉+1​OPTc​≥21​Eπ​[OPT] (p. 7).
  5. E[Ac]≥OPTc/2e\mathbb E[\mathcal A_c]\ge\mathsf{OPT}_c/2eE[Ac​]≥OPTc​/2e for every c≥1c\ge1c≥1, where Ac\mathcal A_cAc​ is the classical rule on PcP_cPc​ (p. 7).

Significance

The theorem shows that a general discount function costs only a logarithmic factor against the offline benchmark, and that one algorithm achieves this without any knowledge of the values. Together with the lower bound of Theorem 4.3 it pins the competitive ratio of the discounted secretary problem between log⁡n/log⁡log⁡n\log n/\log\log nlogn/loglogn and log⁡n\log nlogn. The same scale-splitting idea, stated in the paper as Theorem 4.5 without full proof, extends the bound to the weighted discounted problem.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has not been formalized. A complete development would also produce a machine-checked proof of the classical secretary guarantee for the rule with sample size exactly ⌊m/e⌋\lfloor m/e\rfloor⌊m/e⌋ at every finite mmm, with an explicit tie-break, which is reusable by every secretary-type mission. Milestone 1 is that statement. Sharper constants or a smaller class range are welcome as additional statements but do not replace the goal, which is about this algorithm with this MMM.

Difficulty

The obvious argument, running the classical rule on all nnn arrivals, fails because the discounts can be concentrated at times the rule spends sampling. Splitting by discount scale fixes this but creates two problems. First, there are unboundedly many scales, and one has to show that the offline optimum's mass outside the top O(log⁡n)O(\log n)O(logn) of them is negligible against E[OPT]\mathbb E[\mathsf{OPT}]E[OPT], a random quantity rather than a fixed maximum. Second, the classical rule on a class sees only a random subset of the elements, in random order, and the guarantee must be transferred to this subsequence, conditioning on which elements land in PcP_cPc​. Neither step is deep, but both require careful bookkeeping of permutations, and the classical 1/e1/e1/e bound at finite mmm with a floor in the sample size is itself a nontrivial estimate.

Formalization scope

Elements and times are Fin n, an order is π : Equiv.Perm (Fin n) read as time ↦\mapsto↦ element, and the paper's time t=1,…,nt=1,\dots,nt=1,…,n is index t−1t-1t−1. Values and discounts are Fin n → ℝ with non-negativity hypotheses. Every expectation is the finite average 1n!∑π\frac1{n!}\sum_\pin!1​∑π​; the algorithm's random class is the explicit average 1M∑c=1M\frac1M\sum_{c=1}^MM1​∑c=1M​. Maxima are suprema over the finite index set. The logarithm is base 2, ⌈log⁡2n⌉\lceil\log_2 n\rceil⌈log2​n⌉ is Nat.clog 2 n, and the sample size is Nat.floor (m / Real.exp 1). Ties are broken by the order on Lex (ℝ × (Fin n)ᵒᵈ) (larger value, then smaller index); distinct values are not assumed. The optimal time is the smallest maximizing time, so that the OPTc\mathsf{OPT}_cOPTc​ add up to E[OPT]\mathbb E[\mathsf{OPT}]E[OPT]. Competitiveness is stated multiplicatively, never as a quotient, so E[A]=0\mathbb E[\mathcal A]=0E[A]=0 is not a loophole.

The goal is a statement about the specific algorithm A\mathcal AA, not "there exists an algorithm": an existential over unrestricted algorithms is witnessed by a clairvoyant rule that reads the values in advance. A\mathcal AA sees the values only through comparisons among arrivals that have already occurred, and E[OPT]\mathbb E[\mathsf{OPT}]E[OPT] is the expected offline maximum over the same random order, not dmax⁡vmax⁡d_{\max}v_{\max}dmax​vmax​.

Needed infrastructure: averages over permutations and the fact that the elements landing at a fixed set of times form a uniformly random subset in uniformly random order; the finite-mmm analysis of the classical rule; and elementary estimates on geometric sums. Contributions of general lemmas about uniform permutations are welcome and reusable.

Selected references

  • M. Babaioff, M. Dinitz, A. Gupta, N. Immorlica, K. Talwar, Secretary Problems: Weights and Discounts, Proc. 20th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973068.139
  • E. B. Dynkin, The optimum choice of the instant for stopping a Markov process, Soviet Math. Doklady 4, 1963.
  • T. S. Ferguson, Who solved the secretary problem?, Statistical Science 4(3), 1989. https://doi.org/10.1214/ss/1177012493
  • L. T. Rasmussen, S. R. Pliska, Choosing the maximum from a sequence with a discount function, Applied Mathematics and Optimization 2, 1976. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01458209
  • M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, R. Kleinberg, Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms, SODA 2007. https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1283383.1283429
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