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Operations Research

889 missions · 488 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Jointly Constrained Biconvex Programming II: The Convex-Envelope Branch-and-Bound Algorithm Converges to a Global SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

Bilinear programs, which minimize an objective containing a term x⊤yx^\top yx⊤y over constraints on xxx and yyy, model pooling and blending in petroleum refining, location–allocation, certain dynamic production problems and many other applications (Konno 1971, surveyed in Al-Khayyal and Falk 1983, p. 274). The term x⊤yx^\top yx⊤y is not convex, so such problems can have local minima that are not global. For example, min⁡{xy:−1≤x≤2, −2≤y≤3}\min\{xy : -1 \le x \le 2,\ -2 \le y \le 3\}min{xy:−1≤x≤2, −2≤y≤3} has local solutions at (−1,3)(-1, 3)(−1,3) and (2,−2)(2, -2)(2,−2). When xxx and yyy are constrained separately, a solution lies at an extreme point of the feasible region, and vertex-enumeration and cutting-plane methods apply. When the constraints couple xxx and yyy, this property is lost.

Al-Khayyal and Falk (Math. Oper. Res. 8(2), 1983) gave a branch-and-bound algorithm for this jointly constrained case. It lower-bounds the objective on each box by the convex envelope of the bilinear term, and they proved that it converges to a global solution. The closed form of that envelope, found independently by McCormick (1976) and now called the McCormick envelope, underlies the bilinear relaxations of modern global solvers.

Timeline:

  • 1969, Falk and Soland: a branch-and-bound scheme for separable nonconvex programs using convex envelopes, the pattern this algorithm follows.
  • 1976, McCormick: convex underestimators of factorable functions, including the envelope of xyxyxy on a rectangle.
  • 1983, Al-Khayyal and Falk: the envelope of xyxyxy over a rectangle (Theorem 2), the branch-and-bound algorithm for jointly constrained biconvex programs, and a proof of its convergence.

Setting

Fix n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 and a box Ω={(x,y)∈Rn×Rn:l≤x≤L, m≤y≤M}\Omega = \{(x,y) \in \mathbb{R}^n \times \mathbb{R}^n : l \le x \le L,\ m \le y \le M\}Ω={(x,y)∈Rn×Rn:l≤x≤L, m≤y≤M} with coordinate rectangles Ωi=[li,Li]×[mi,Mi]\Omega_i = [l_i, L_i] \times [m_i, M_i]Ωi​=[li​,Li​]×[mi​,Mi​]. Problem P\mathcal PP is

min⁡ φ(x,y)=f(x)+x⊤y+g(y)subject to (x,y)∈S∩Ω,\min\ \varphi(x,y) = f(x) + x^\top y + g(y) \quad \text{subject to } (x,y) \in S \cap \Omega,min φ(x,y)=f(x)+x⊤y+g(y)subject to (x,y)∈S∩Ω,

with fff, ggg convex (and continuous) on their boxes, SSS closed and convex, and S∩Ω≠∅S \cap \Omega \neq \emptysetS∩Ω=∅. Its optimal value is v∗v^*v∗.

The convex envelope VexB h\mathrm{Vex}_B\, hVexB​h of a function hhh over a set BBB is the pointwise supremum of all convex functions that underestimate hhh on BBB. For a box BBB, the node function ψB(x,y)=f(x)+VexB x⊤y+g(y)\psi^B(x,y) = f(x) + \mathrm{Vex}_B\, x^\top y + g(y)ψB(x,y)=f(x)+VexB​x⊤y+g(y) is convex and lies below φ\varphiφ on BBB. The subproblem at node BBB, minimizing ψB\psi^BψB over S∩BS \cap BS∩B, is a convex program.

A run of the algorithm is a sequence of stages. Stage 000 has the single open node Ω\OmegaΩ. At stage kkk the Best Bound Rule selects an open node BkB_kBk​ whose subproblem value is least, and the stage point (xk,yk)(x^k, y^k)(xk,yk) is its subproblem solution. The best lower bound is vbk=ψBk(xk,yk)v_b^k = \psi^{B_k}(x^k, y^k)vbk​=ψBk​(xk,yk) and the best upper bound is Vbk=min⁡l≤kφ(xl,yl)V_b^k = \min_{l \le k} \varphi(x^l, y^l)Vbk​=minl≤k​φ(xl,yl). The selected node is then split. The algorithm picks the coordinate III with the largest gap xikyik−Vex(Bk)i xiyix^k_i y^k_i - \mathrm{Vex}_{(B_k)_i}\, x_i y_ixik​yik​−Vex(Bk​)i​​xi​yi​ and replaces the rectangle (Bk)I(B_k)_I(Bk​)I​ by the four subrectangles cut out by the point (xIk,yIk)(x^k_I, y^k_I)(xIk​,yIk​) (Figure 1 of the paper). All other rectangles are kept. The stage function ψk\psi^kψk assigns to each point of Ω\OmegaΩ the least node value ψB\psi^BψB among the open boxes containing it.

Formalization targets

Goal: convergence to a global solution

For every run,

every accumulation point (xˉ,yˉ) of (xk,yk) solves P,lim⁡kvbk=v∗=lim⁡kVbk.\text{every accumulation point } (\bar x, \bar y) \text{ of } (x^k, y^k) \text{ solves } \mathcal P, \qquad \lim_k v_b^k = v^* = \lim_k V_b^k .every accumulation point (xˉ,yˉ​) of (xk,yk) solves P,klim​vbk​=v∗=klim​Vbk​.

Milestones

In attack order:

  • Theorem 2: VexΩ xy=max⁡{mx+ly−lm, Mx+Ly−LM}\mathrm{Vex}_\Omega\, xy = \max\{mx + ly - lm,\ Mx + Ly - LM\}VexΩ​xy=max{mx+ly−lm, Mx+Ly−LM} on a rectangle.
  • Theorem 3: the envelope is exact on the rectangle's boundary.
  • The Corollary, in two parts:
    • separability, VexΩ x⊤y=∑iVexΩi xiyi\mathrm{Vex}_\Omega\, x^\top y = \sum_i \mathrm{Vex}_{\Omega_i}\, x_i y_iVexΩ​x⊤y=∑i​VexΩi​​xi​yi​;
    • exactness at points whose every coordinate pair lies on ∂Ωi\partial\Omega_i∂Ωi​.
  • Along runs: ψk≤ψk+1≤φ\psi^k \le \psi^{k+1} \le \varphiψk≤ψk+1≤φ on Ω\OmegaΩ.
  • The bound chain vb1≤vb2≤⋯≤v∗≤⋯≤Vb2≤Vb1v_b^1 \le v_b^2 \le \cdots \le v^* \le \cdots \le V_b^2 \le V_b^1vb1​≤vb2​≤⋯≤v∗≤⋯≤Vb2​≤Vb1​.
  • Termination when vbk=Vbkv_b^k = V_b^kvbk​=Vbk​.
  • The gradient bound γi\gamma_iγi​.
  • The equicontinuity estimate ∥z−w∥<ε/(nγ)⇒∣VexB x⊤y(z)−VexB x⊤y(w)∣<ε\|z - w\| < \varepsilon/(n\gamma) \Rightarrow |\mathrm{Vex}_B\, x^\top y(z) - \mathrm{Vex}_B\, x^\top y(w)| < \varepsilon∥z−w∥<ε/(nγ)⇒∣VexB​x⊤y(z)−VexB​x⊤y(w)∣<ε within every sub-box BBB.
  • The limit identity: along a convergent subsequence of stage points, vbkt→φ(xˉ,yˉ)v_b^{k_t} \to \varphi(\bar x, \bar y)vbkt​​→φ(xˉ,yˉ​).

Theorem 4 of the paper, on the envelope of ∑fi(xi)+x⊤y+∑gi(yi)\sum f_i(x_i) + x^\top y + \sum g_i(y_i)∑fi​(xi​)+x⊤y+∑gi​(yi​) with concave fi,gif_i, g_ifi​,gi​, is included as a further target.

Significance

The convergence theorem certifies that the algorithm computes the global optimum of a nonconvex problem. It is not a local search. Its ingredients carry over to spatial branch-and-bound in general: envelopes that are exact on the boundary of their box, a subdivision at the relaxation's solution, and best-bound selection. Theorem 2 and its separable extension are the building block of McCormick relaxations, used for bilinear terms throughout global optimization.

As far as is known, none of these results is formalized. The mission produces a formal model of a spatial branch-and-bound procedure with rectangular subdivision at the relaxation solution, together with the convex-envelope facts it rests on. The paper's convergence proof is informal and, as printed, passes through two claims that do not hold (see Formalization scope). A machine-checked proof of the convergence theorem would settle the result on firm ground.

Difficulty

The algorithm splits at the relaxation's solution, not at the midpoint, so the boxes of a run need not shrink to points. The usual "exhaustive subdivision" argument, in which the diameters of nested boxes tend to zero, does not apply. What makes the gap close is Theorem 3: after a split, the split point sits on the boundary of the new rectangles in the split coordinate, where the envelope is exact. That exactness has to be carried from the selected points to their accumulation points, across coordinates that may be split finitely or infinitely often. The obvious route through a continuous limit of the stage functions is not available, because the stage functions are not continuous in general.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, points are pairs in (Fin n → ℝ) × (Fin n → ℝ), and boxes are four bound vectors, degenerate boxes allowed. The convex envelope is the paper's definition, the real supremum of values of convex minorants, and is used only at points of convex boxes. The McCormick closed form is Theorem 2, a target, and is not built into any definition. A run is a predicate on four sequences: open nodes as a multiset of boxes, selected node, branching index, stage point. Stages are numbered from 000 and runs are infinite: the stopping test is ignored, so a run stopped by the paper is a prefix of one. The optional pruning of p. 278 is omitted, and ties are arbitrary. The optimal value enters through IsMinOn, not through an infimum. The Euclidean distance on R2n\mathbb{R}^{2n}R2n is written out explicitly.

Hypotheses and corrections relative to the page:

  • Continuity of fff and ggg on their boxes is added; the paper uses it without stating it. n>0n > 0n>0 is assumed. The box form of convexity (p. 276) is used.
  • Corollary, second clause (p. 276): "for all (x,y)∈∂Ω(x,y) \in \partial\Omega(x,y)∈∂Ω" is false for n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 (take Ω1=Ω2=[0,2]2\Omega_1 = \Omega_2 = [0,2]^2Ω1​=Ω2​=[0,2]2, x=y=(0,1)x = y = (0,1)x=y=(0,1)). It is stated for points with every (xi,yi)∈∂Ωi(x_i, y_i) \in \partial\Omega_i(xi​,yi​)∈∂Ωi​.
  • Well-definedness of the stage function (p. 277) is false from stage 3 on. Two open boxes can share a point at which their node functions differ, and the stage function then jumps. It is not a target. The stage function takes the minimum over the open boxes containing a point, and the continuity asserted on p. 279 is not formalized. The piecewise convexity asserted there is formalized as convexity of each open node function on its box.
  • Equicontinuity (p. 282): the display ∣Hikj(xi,yi)−Hikj(ui,vi)∣≤∣xiyi−uivi∣|H_i^{kj}(x_i,y_i) - H_i^{kj}(u_i,v_i)| \le |x_i y_i - u_i v_i|∣Hikj​(xi​,yi​)−Hikj​(ui​,vi​)∣≤∣xi​yi​−ui​vi​∣ is false, and so is equicontinuity of the stage functions on all of Ω\OmegaΩ. The estimate is stated within each sub-box, with the paper's δ=ε/(nγ)\delta = \varepsilon/(n\gamma)δ=ε/(nγ).

Two trivializations are excluded. The goal is not a statement about an arbitrary sequence of boxes and points whose gap tends to zero: it quantifies over runs of the algorithm as defined, and a separate well-posedness item, run_exists, asserts that runs exist for every instance. Theorem 2 is about the supremum of convex minorants, not about a function defined by the closed form.

Reusable beyond this mission: the convex envelope and its bilinear closed form, and the box-splitting model. Contributions welcome: proofs of the envelope theorems, a proof of run_exists, and a convergence proof that avoids the false intermediate claims.

Selected references

  • F. A. Al-Khayyal and J. E. Falk, Jointly Constrained Biconvex Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(2):273–286, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.2.273
  • J. E. Falk and R. M. Soland, An Algorithm for Separable Nonconvex Programming Problems, Management Science 15(9):550–569, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.9.550
  • G. P. McCormick, Computability of Global Solutions to Factorable Nonconvex Programs: Part I — Convex Underestimating Problems, Mathematical Programming 10:147–175, 1976. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580665
  • H. Konno, Bilinear Programming: Part II. Applications of Bilinear Programming, Technical Report 71-10, Operations Research House, Stanford University, 1971 (reference [10] of Al-Khayyal and Falk; no online copy known). https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.2.273
16 thms3 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov Chain·Captain: mikedeng1

Discrete-Time Controlled Markov Processes with Average Cost Criterion: A Survey 4: Under Sennott's Conditions an Average-Cost Optimal Stationary Policy ExistsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many controlled queueing, inventory and maintenance systems are modelled as controlled Markov processes (CMPs) on a countable state space whose one-stage cost grows without bound: the holding cost of a queue grows with its length. For such systems the natural performance measure is the long-run average cost, and the basic question is whether some simple policy, one that looks only at the current state and never randomizes, is optimal among all policies, including those that use the whole history.

When the cost is bounded, the classical answer goes through a bounded solution of the average cost optimality equation (ACOE). For unbounded costs, bounded solutions are rare: in many queueing models the relative value function grows with the state, and growth conditions such as (5.2) of the survey may fail (Arapostathis et al. 1993, p. 307). Sennott (1986; 1989) replaced boundedness by one-sided conditions on the discounted value functions, which are often easy to verify for queueing models because the relative values are bounded below. This mission formalizes Sennott's existence theorem in the form given in the survey of Arapostathis, Borkar, Fernández-Gaucherand, Ghosh and Marcus, Theorem 5.9.

Timeline. For bounded costs, Ross (1983, the survey's Theorem 5.2) obtained a bounded ACOE solution, and with it an optimal stationary policy, when the differential discounted values are uniformly bounded. Federgruen, Hordijk and Tijms (1979) treated unbounded costs under Lyapunov-type recurrence conditions, which restrict how fast the cost may grow (survey, Remark 5.7). Sennott (1986, 1989) replaced these by a uniform lower bound and a pointwise, one-step integrable upper bound on the differential discounted values. The survey (1993, Theorem 5.9) states the result with compact action sets and continuous data, and Sennott's 1999 book (§7.2) gives the finite-action version in textbook form.

Setting

The state space is S={0,1,2,… }S=\{0,1,2,\dots\}S={0,1,2,…}. For each state iii the set U(i)U(i)U(i) of admissible actions is a nonempty compact subset of a metric space AAA. Choosing a∈U(i)a\in U(i)a∈U(i) in state iii costs c(i,a)≥0c(i,a)\ge0c(i,a)≥0, and the next state is jjj with probability P(j∣i,a)P(j\mid i,a)P(j∣i,a). For fixed i,ji,ji,j, the maps a↦c(i,a)a\mapsto c(i,a)a↦c(i,a) and a↦P(j∣i,a)a\mapsto P(j\mid i,a)a↦P(j∣i,a) are continuous on U(i)U(i)U(i).

An admissible policy π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π chooses the action at time ttt according to a probability distribution πt(⋅∣ht)\pi_t(\cdot\mid h_t)πt​(⋅∣ht​) concentrated on U(xt)U(x_t)U(xt​), where ht=(x0,a0,…,xt)h_t=(x_0,a_0,\dots,x_t)ht​=(x0​,a0​,…,xt​) is the history; it may use the whole history and may randomize. A stationary deterministic policy f∈ΠSDf\in\Pi_{SD}f∈ΠSD​ is a map f:S→Af:S\to Af:S→A with f(i)∈U(i)f(i)\in U(i)f(i)∈U(i), applied at every step. Given an initial state iii and a policy π\piπ, the states and actions (Xt,At)(X_t,A_t)(Xt​,At​) form a stochastic process with law PiπP^\pi_iPiπ​ and expectation EiπE^\pi_iEiπ​.

For β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1), the discounted cost and the average cost of π\piπ from iii are

Jβ(i,π)=Eiπ∑t=0∞βtc(Xt,At),J(i,π)=lim sup⁡N→∞1N Eiπ∑t=0N−1c(Xt,At),J_\beta(i,\pi)=E^\pi_i\sum_{t=0}^\infty\beta^tc(X_t,A_t),\qquad J(i,\pi)=\limsup_{N\to\infty}\frac1N\,E^\pi_i\sum_{t=0}^{N-1}c(X_t,A_t),Jβ​(i,π)=Eiπ​t=0∑∞​βtc(Xt​,At​),J(i,π)=N→∞limsup​N1​Eiπ​t=0∑N−1​c(Xt​,At​),

both in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]. The optimal values are Jβ∗(i)=inf⁡π∈ΠJβ(i,π)J^*_\beta(i)=\inf_{\pi\in\Pi}J_\beta(i,\pi)Jβ∗​(i)=infπ∈Π​Jβ​(i,π) and J∗(i)=inf⁡π∈ΠJ(i,π)J^*(i)=\inf_{\pi\in\Pi}J(i,\pi)J∗(i)=infπ∈Π​J(i,π), and the differential discounted value is hβ(i)=Jβ∗(i)−Jβ∗(0)h_\beta(i)=J^*_\beta(i)-J^*_\beta(0)hβ​(i)=Jβ∗​(i)−Jβ∗​(0). A policy f∈ΠSDf\in\Pi_{SD}f∈ΠSD​ is AC-optimal if J(i,f)=J∗(i)J(i,f)=J^*(i)J(i,f)=J∗(i) for every iii.

Sennott's conditions (Assumptions 5.14–5.16) are:

  1. Jβ∗(i)<∞J^*_\beta(i)<\inftyJβ∗​(i)<∞ for all i∈Si\in Si∈S and β∈(0,1)\beta\in(0,1)β∈(0,1);
  2. there is a nonnegative integer LLL with hβ(i)≥−Lh_\beta(i)\ge-Lhβ​(i)≥−L for all iii and β\betaβ;
  3. there is M:S→R+M:S\to\mathbb R_+M:S→R+​ with hβ(i)≤M(i)h_\beta(i)\le M(i)hβ​(i)≤M(i) for all iii and β\betaβ, and for each iii some a(i)∈U(i)a(i)\in U(i)a(i)∈U(i) with ∑jP(j∣i,a(i))M(j)<∞\sum_jP(j\mid i,a(i))M(j)<\infty∑j​P(j∣i,a(i))M(j)<∞.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.9

Under Assumptions 5.14–5.16, there is f∈ΠSD with J(i,f)=inf⁡π∈ΠJ(i,π)  for every i∈S.\text{Under Assumptions 5.14–5.16, there is } f\in\Pi_{SD}\text{ with } J(i,f)=\inf_{\pi\in\Pi}J(i,\pi)\ \text{ for every } i\in S.Under Assumptions 5.14–5.16, there is f∈ΠSD​ with J(i,f)=π∈Πinf​J(i,π)  for every i∈S.

The goal asserts only existence. It does not fix the optimal cost, and it does not claim that the optimal cost is constant or that an optimality equation holds.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 2.1 (i), (iii), countable form: the discounted cost optimality equation Jβ∗(i)=inf⁡a∈U(i){c(i,a)+β∑jP(j∣i,a)Jβ∗(j)}J^*_\beta(i)=\inf_{a\in U(i)}\{c(i,a)+\beta\sum_jP(j\mid i,a)J^*_\beta(j)\}Jβ∗​(i)=infa∈U(i)​{c(i,a)+β∑j​P(j∣i,a)Jβ∗​(j)} and a β\betaβ-discount optimal fβ∈ΠSDf_\beta\in\Pi_{SD}fβ​∈ΠSD​.
  2. Display (5.15): (1−β)Jβ∗(0)+hβ(i)=c(i,fβ(i))+β∑jP(j∣i,fβ(i))hβ(j)(1-\beta)J^*_\beta(0)+h_\beta(i)=c(i,f_\beta(i))+\beta\sum_jP(j\mid i,f_\beta(i))h_\beta(j)(1−β)Jβ∗​(0)+hβ​(i)=c(i,fβ​(i))+β∑j​P(j∣i,fβ​(i))hβ​(j).
  3. The limit objects: along a subsequence βn→1\beta_n\to1βn​→1, fβn→ff_{\beta_n}\to ffβn​​→f, hβn→h≥−Lh_{\beta_n}\to h\ge-Lhβn​​→h≥−L pointwise, and (1−βn)Jβn∗(i)→ρ∗(1-\beta_n)J^*_{\beta_n}(i)\to\rho^*(1−βn​)Jβn​∗​(i)→ρ∗, a constant.
  4. The average cost optimality inequality (ACOI) ρ∗+h(i)≥c(i,f(i))+∑jP(j∣i,f(i))h(j)\rho^*+h(i)\ge c(i,f(i))+\sum_jP(j\mid i,f(i))h(j)ρ∗+h(i)≥c(i,f(i))+∑j​P(j∣i,f(i))h(j).
  5. An ACOI along fff with hhh bounded below gives J(i,f)≤ρJ(i,f)\le\rhoJ(i,f)≤ρ.
  6. Theorem A.2: the Abelian inequalities between Cesàro and Abel means (already on the platform).
  7. J(i,π)≥ρ∗J(i,\pi)\ge\rho^*J(i,π)≥ρ∗ for every π∈Π\pi\in\Piπ∈Π.

Significance

The result. Theorem 5.9 is the standard existence theorem for average-optimal stationary policies with unbounded costs on countable state spaces. Its conditions are verified routinely for controlled queues, where relative values are monotone in the queue length and hence bounded below. It shows that randomization and memory do not reduce the long-run average cost, and the ACOI it produces is the starting point for value and policy iteration and for structural results such as threshold policies.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the literature (Sennott 1989; Sennott 1999, Theorem 7.2.3; survey, p. 308). It has no machine-checked proof. The finite-action version, SennottDP.SEN.thm_7_2_3_sen_acoi, is posed on Prove2Me and still open; this mission poses the compact-action version, which needs continuity and compactness arguments that the finite case avoids. A formal proof also requires a general theory of history-dependent policies on path space (Ionescu-Tulcea), the discounted optimality equation with unbounded costs, and the passage from Abel to Cesàro means. All three are reusable well beyond this paper.

Difficulty

The obvious argument lets β→1\beta\to1β→1 in the discounted optimality equation (5.6). Two steps fail without more structure. First, hβh_\betahβ​ need not converge, and with unbounded costs it is not uniformly bounded, so the limit has to be taken pointwise along a subsequence, with only a lower bound uniform in the state. Second, the limit cannot be passed through the infinite sum ∑jP(j∣i,a)hβ(j)\sum_jP(j\mid i,a)h_\beta(j)∑j​P(j∣i,a)hβ​(j) by dominated convergence, because no integrable dominating function exists for every action. Only an inequality survives (Fatou), so the limit is an ACOI, not an equation. The inequality then has to be turned into optimality against all of Π\PiΠ, which includes history-dependent randomized policies whose costs are not described by any optimality equation. The lower bound for these comes from comparing Cesàro and Abel means, not from dynamic programming.

Formalization scope

The Lean development uses the following representation and conventions.

  • States, actions, model. The state space is ℕ. The action space is a metric space with its Borel σ-algebra. U i is nonempty and compact, c is measurable and nonnegative on admissible pairs, P is a Markov kernel, and c(i,⋅)c(i,\cdot)c(i,⋅), P(j∣i,⋅)P(j\mid i,\cdot)P(j∣i,⋅) are continuous on U(i)U(i)U(i).
  • Policies. Π\PiΠ consists of all history-dependent randomized policies, with admissibility required almost surely. J∗J^*J∗ and Jβ∗J^*_\betaJβ∗​ are infima over all of Π\PiΠ, never over stationary policies only. Restricting the infimum to ΠSD\Pi_{SD}ΠSD​ would drop the Tauberian half of the theorem and is not the paper's statement.
  • Costs. Costs are lower Lebesgue integrals in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] against the Ionescu-Tulcea path measure, and the average cost is a limsup in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • Explicit hypotheses. hβh_\betahβ​ is a difference of real parts and is used only under Assumption 5.14, so it is never read off an infinite Jβ∗J^*_\betaJβ∗​. The quantifiers over iii and β\betaβ in Assumption 5.15, implicit on the page, are universal, and LLL is a natural number as printed. Every series ∑jP(j∣i,a)h(j)\sum_jP(j\mid i,a)h(j)∑j​P(j∣i,a)h(j) carries a summability hypothesis or conclusion.
  • Corrected claim. Remark 5.8(a) as printed claims that any scalar ρ\rhoρ satisfying the ACOI with hhh bounded below is the optimal average cost. That is false (h≡0h\equiv0h≡0, ρ=sup⁡c\rho=\sup cρ=supc), so only the inequality J(i,f)≤ρJ(i,f)\le\rhoJ(i,f)≤ρ, which the proof uses, is stated.
  • Sequences. The milestones about limits are stated for any sequence βn∈(0,1)\beta_n\in(0,1)βn​∈(0,1) with βn→1\beta_n\to1βn​→1, not only increasing ones.

A trivializing formalization is excluded. Sennott's conditions are satisfiable (a one-action, zero-cost model satisfies all three), and AC-optimality is measured against all admissible policies, so the goal cannot hold vacuously or by a junk value.

Welcome contributions: the Markov property of the path measure for history-dependent policies; the discounted optimality equation for nonnegative unbounded costs; a measurable-selection or compactness argument for minimizing actions on compact U(i)U(i)U(i); Fatou's lemma for series with converging weights; and the Abelian inequalities in a form applied to expected costs.

Selected references

  • A. Arapostathis, V. S. Borkar, E. Fernández-Gaucherand, M. K. Ghosh, S. I. Marcus, Discrete-time controlled Markov processes with average cost criterion: a survey, SIAM J. Control Optim. 31(2) (1993) 282–344. https://doi.org/10.1137/0331018
  • L. I. Sennott, Average cost optimal stationary policies in infinite state Markov decision processes with unbounded costs, Oper. Res. 37(4) (1989) 626–633. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.37.4.626
  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
  • L. I. Sennott, A new condition for the existence of optimal stationary policies in average cost Markov decision processes, Oper. Res. Lett. 5 (1986) 17–23 (reference [155] of the survey; no stable link checked).
  • S. M. Ross, Introduction to Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Academic Press, New York, 1983 (reference [150] of the survey).
  • A. Federgruen, A. Hordijk, H. C. Tijms, Denumerable state semi-Markov decision processes with unbounded costs, average cost criterion, Stochastic Process. Appl. 9 (1979) 223–235 (reference [53] of the survey).
  • R. Sznajder, J. A. Filar, Some comments on a theorem of Hardy and Littlewood, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 75 (1992) (reference [176] of the survey, cited for Theorem A.2).
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Bandit AlgorithmsProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms I: The Nonparametric Learn-then-Price Policy Has Regret at Most C(log n)^{1/2}/n^{1/4}Research Paper

Why price without knowing demand

A seller with a fixed stock of a single product and a finite selling season has to set prices without knowing how demand responds to them. This is the standard situation in revenue management: airline seats, hotel rooms, fashion goods and event tickets. The classical theory of dynamic pricing (Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994) assumes that the demand function λ(p)\lambda(p)λ(p), the rate of purchase requests at price ppp, is known. In practice it has to be learned from sales, while the season runs and the stock is consumed.

Besbes and Zeevi (2009) asked how much revenue is lost for not knowing λ\lambdaλ. They answered it with explicit policies and matching-order bounds. Their setting differs from the multi-armed bandit literature it borrows from in three ways:

  • the problem is constrained by an initial inventory;
  • the set of prices is a continuum;
  • the set of possible demand functions is a nonparametric class.

This mission formalizes their first main result, Proposition 1: a simple learn-then-price policy has worst-case relative regret of order (log⁡n)1/2n−1/4(\log n)^{1/2}n^{-1/4}(logn)1/2n−1/4 in a market of size nnn.

Setting

Prices. Fix 0<p‾<p‾<∞0<\underline p<\overline p<\infty0<p​<p​<∞ and an off price p∞>0p_\infty>0p∞​>0 outside [p‾,p‾][\underline p,\overline p][p​,p​]. The seller may charge any price in [p‾,p‾]∪{p∞}[\underline p,\overline p]\cup\{p_\infty\}[p​,p​]∪{p∞​}; charging p∞p_\inftyp∞​ stops demand.

Demand. Requests arrive as a Poisson process whose intensity at time ttt is λ(p(t))\lambda(p(t))λ(p(t)). Let NNN be a unit-rate Poisson process. By the time change (1), the cumulative requests up to time ttt under a price path p(⋅)p(\cdot)p(⋅) are N(∫0tλ(p(s)) ds)N\big(\int_0^t\lambda(p(s))\,ds\big)N(∫0t​λ(p(s))ds). The seller starts with inventory xxx and sells until either the horizon TTT ends or the stock runs out. The expected revenue of a policy π\piπ is Jπ(x,T;λ)J^\pi(x,T;\lambda)Jπ(x,T;λ).

Demand class. L=L(M,K‾,K‾,m)\mathcal L=\mathcal L(M,\underline K,\overline K,m)L=L(M,K​,K,m) is the set of regular demand functions satisfying Assumption 1. Regular means:

  • λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 and λ(p∞)=0\lambda(p_\infty)=0λ(p∞​)=0;
  • λ\lambdaλ is non-increasing on [p‾,p‾][\underline p,\overline p][p​,p​], with inverse γ\gammaγ;
  • the revenue rate r(l)=lγ(l)r(l)=l\gamma(l)r(l)=lγ(l) is concave.

Assumption 1 requires:

  • (i) λ≤M\lambda\le Mλ≤M on [p‾,p‾][\underline p,\overline p][p​,p​];
  • (ii) λ\lambdaλ is K‾\overline KK-Lipschitz and γ\gammaγ is K‾−1\underline K^{-1}K​−1-Lipschitz;
  • (iii) max⁡ppλ(p)≥m\max_p p\lambda(p)\ge mmaxp​pλ(p)≥m.

Benchmark. The deterministic relaxation (5) replaces the random demand by its mean:

JD(x,T∣λ)=sup⁡{∫0Tp(s)λ(p(s)) ds:∫0Tλ(p(s)) ds≤x}.J^D(x,T\mid\lambda)=\sup\Big\{\int_0^T p(s)\lambda(p(s))\,ds:\int_0^T\lambda(p(s))\,ds\le x\Big\}.JD(x,T∣λ)=sup{∫0T​p(s)λ(p(s))ds:∫0T​λ(p(s))ds≤x}.

The regret of a policy is Rπ=1−Jπ/JD\mathcal R^\pi=1-J^\pi/J^DRπ=1−Jπ/JD.

Scaling. In a market of size nnn the inventory is nxnxnx and the demand function is nλn\lambdanλ, as in (11). The corresponding quantities are JnπJ^\pi_nJnπ​, JnD=nJDJ^D_n=nJ^DJnD​=nJD and Rnπ\mathcal R^\pi_nRnπ​.

Algorithm 1, π(τ,κ)\pi(\tau,\kappa)π(τ,κ). The policy has three phases.

  1. Learning. On [0,τ][0,\tau][0,τ] it tests κ\kappaκ equally spaced prices pi=p‾+(i−1)(p‾−p‾)/κp_i=\underline p+(i-1)(\overline p-\underline p)/\kappapi​=p​+(i−1)(p​−p​)/κ, each for Δ=τ/κ\Delta=\tau/\kappaΔ=τ/κ time units. It estimates λ(pi)\lambda(p_i)λ(pi​) by the normalized request counts λ^(pi)\hat\lambda(p_i)λ^(pi​).
  2. Optimization. It chooses p^u=arg⁡max⁡ipiλ^(pi)\hat p^u=\arg\max_i p_i\hat\lambda(p_i)p^​u=argmaxi​pi​λ^(pi​) and p^c=arg⁡min⁡i∣λ^(pi)−x/T∣\hat p^c=\arg\min_i|\hat\lambda(p_i)-x/T|p^​c=argmini​∣λ^(pi​)−x/T∣, and sets p^=max⁡{p^u,p^c}\hat p=\max\{\hat p^u,\hat p^c\}p^​=max{p^​u,p^​c}.
  3. Pricing. It charges p^\hat pp^​ on (τ,T](\tau,T](τ,T] until the stock runs out.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1

Let τn≍n−1/4\tau_n\asymp n^{-1/4}τn​≍n−1/4 and κn≍n1/4\kappa_n\asymp n^{1/4}κn​≍n1/4, and let πn=π(τn,κn)\pi_n=\pi(\tau_n,\kappa_n)πn​=π(τn​,κn​). Then there is a finite constant CCC, independent of λ\lambdaλ and nnn, such that

sup⁡λ∈LRnπ(x,T;λ)≤C(log⁡n)1/2n1/4(n≥2).\sup_{\lambda\in\mathcal L}\mathcal R^{\pi}_n(x,T;\lambda)\le\frac{C(\log n)^{1/2}}{n^{1/4}}\qquad(n\ge2).λ∈Lsup​Rnπ​(x,T;λ)≤n1/4C(logn)1/2​(n≥2).

The constant is left unspecified, as in the paper. Its dependence on the class parameters, xxx and TTT is "somewhat complex" (p. 12), and the order (log⁡n)1/2n−1/4(\log n)^{1/2}n^{-1/4}(logn)1/2n−1/4 is the content of the result.

Milestones

The milestones follow the proof in the appendix, in order:

  • the scaling JnD=nJDJ^D_n=nJ^DJnD​=nJD (p. 12);
  • Fact 1, JD≥mmin⁡{T,x/M}J^D\ge m\min\{T,x/M\}JD≥mmin{T,x/M} on L\mathcal LL;
  • Lemma 1, the solution of (5): charge pD=max⁡{pu,pc}p^D=\max\{p^u,p^c\}pD=max{pu,pc} until the stock runs out;
  • Lemma 2, a Poisson deviation bound;
  • the revenue lower bound (A-2);
  • Lemma 3, the learned price is near pDp^DpD with high probability;
  • Lemma 4 and the Case 1 bound (A-11), for λ(p‾)≤x/T\lambda(\overline p)\le x/Tλ(p​)≤x/T;
  • Lemma 5 and the Case 2 bound (A-15), for λ(p‾)>x/T\lambda(\overline p)>x/Tλ(p​)>x/T;
  • the Step 4 bound Rnπ≤C12(un+τn)\mathcal R^\pi_n\le C_{12}(u_n+\tau_n)Rnπ​≤C12​(un​+τn​), where un=(log⁡n)1/2max⁡{1/κn,(nΔn)−1/2}u_n=(\log n)^{1/2}\max\{1/\kappa_n,(n\Delta_n)^{-1/2}\}un​=(logn)1/2max{1/κn​,(nΔn​)−1/2}.

Significance

Proposition 1 shows that a seller who knows only a nonparametric class of demand functions can approach the full-information revenue uniformly over the class. Learning costs a vanishing fraction of revenue, and the policy needs no parametric model. Together with the paper's lower bound of order n−1/2n^{-1/2}n−1/2 for every admissible policy (Proposition 2, not in this mission), it brackets the minimax regret of nonparametric pricing under an inventory constraint. The result is a reference point for the learning-and-earning literature in operations management that followed it.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge, it has no machine-checked proof. Formalizing it requires:

  • a working theory of policies driven by a time-changed Poisson process, with sales capped by an inventory;
  • the deterministic relaxation of Gallego and van Ryzin for a continuum of prices with an off price;
  • uniform (over the class) Poisson concentration bounds.

The mission produces Lean statements of all of these. A proof would also check every constant chain of the appendix, where the argument uses some displays in a form slightly different from their printed statement (see the scope section).

Difficulty

The obvious argument controls the estimation error at the tested prices and concludes that p^\hat pp^​ is close to the optimal price. It breaks in two places.

First, pDp^DpD is the larger of two prices, the revenue maximizer and the price that sells the inventory exactly. Near the boundary between these regimes, the revenue rate at p^\hat pp^​ is not controlled by the error in p^\hat pp^​ alone: it needs the concavity of the revenue rate and the inverse Lipschitz bound on γ\gammaγ.

Second, when demand at the highest price exceeds the inventory rate (λ(p‾)>x/T\lambda(\overline p)>x/Tλ(p​)>x/T), the revenue is limited by stock-outs rather than by the price. The bound must then show that nearly all of the inventory is sold during the pricing phase, uniformly over the class.

Throughout, every constant must be independent of the demand function, so the estimates have to hold uniformly over an infinite-dimensional class.

Formalization scope

  • Poisson process. The demand is driven by IsPoissonProcess N 1 on a probability space (Ω,P)(\Omega,\mathbb P)(Ω,P), a published platform definition: ℕ-valued, N(0)=0N(0)=0N(0)=0, monotone paths, independent Poisson increments. The time change (1) is rendered by evaluating NNN at cumulative intensities.
  • Inventory. The inventory of the market of size nnn is ⌊nx⌋\lfloor nx\rfloor⌊nx⌋ units, and sales are min⁡{N(⋅),⌊nx⌋}\min\{N(\cdot),\lfloor nx\rfloor\}min{N(⋅),⌊nx⌋}. The cap is never dropped.
  • Revenue. JnπJ^\pi_nJnπ​ is the Bochner expectation of a bounded, finitely-valued revenue, so it is a genuine integral.
  • Demand functions. A demand function is a map R→R\mathbb R\to\mathbb RR→R, nonnegative, with λ(p∞)=0\lambda(p_\infty)=0λ(p∞​)=0. Regularity and Assumption 1 are imposed on [p‾,p‾][\underline p,\overline p][p​,p​], and the inverse γ\gammaγ is Function.invFunOn.
  • Benchmark. JDJ^DJD is a supremum over measurable price paths with integrable demand rate. The supremum is genuine: the set of path revenues is nonempty and bounded.
  • Algorithm. The grid excludes p‾\overline pp​, as in the paper. Ties in the grid argmax and argmin go to the smallest index. The estimates compare λ^(pi)\hat\lambda(p_i)λ^(pi​) with x/Tx/Tx/T.
  • Tuning. τn≍n−1/4\tau_n\asymp n^{-1/4}τn​≍n−1/4 and κn≍n1/4\kappa_n\asymp n^{1/4}κn​≍n1/4 are encoded with explicit constants 0<c≤c′0<c\le c'0<c≤c′, with τn∈(0,T]\tau_n\in(0,T]τn​∈(0,T] and κn≥1\kappa_n\ge1κn​≥1. Constants may depend on c,c′c,c'c,c′, the class parameters, the prices, xxx and TTT, but never on λ\lambdaλ or nnn.
  • Range of nnn. Bounds whose right side vanishes at n=1n=1n=1 because log⁡1=0\log1=0log1=0 are stated for n≥2n\ge2n≥2: the goal and (A-15).
  • Typo correction. Lemma 5's event uses nx−C9nunnx-C_9nu_nnx−C9​nun​, as in its proof, not the printed nx−C9unnx-C_9u_nnx−C9​un​.
  • Ruled out. A specific demand curve, a fixed nnn, deterministic demand, a finite price set, a known λ\lambdaλ, constants depending on λ\lambdaλ, or dropping the inventory cap would each make the statement a different and easier theorem. None is used.
  • Not included. The lower bound of Proposition 2 and the second assertion of Lemma 1 (Jπ≤JDJ^\pi\le J^DJπ≤JD for all admissible policies) are not included.

Contributions are welcome at any level: proofs of the milestones (Fact 1, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are self-contained), measurability and integrability lemmas for the revenue functional, and a reusable Poisson concentration library built on Mathlib's poissonMeasure.

Selected references

  • O. Besbes and A. Zeevi, Dynamic Pricing Without Knowing the Demand Function: Risk Bounds and Near-Optimal Algorithms, Operations Research 57(6):1407–1420, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0640
  • G. Gallego and G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • K. Talluri and G. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/b139000
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Convex OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Robust Optimization VI: The Moment Set U^CS Has Support Function μ̂ᵀv + Γ₁‖v‖ + √(1/ε − 1)‖Cv‖, an Upper Bound on the Worst-Case Value at RiskResearch Paper

Motivation

In robust optimization, a constraint is checked against every parameter value in an uncertainty set. This turns uncertainty into a deterministic optimization problem, but the set must be chosen carefully: a large set can make decisions unnecessarily conservative, while a small one can miss likely outcomes. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus use data to calibrate sets through statistical confidence regions. Their question is whether feasibility for every parameter in the set protects a decision against a fresh uncertain outcome with a specified probability. This mission treats the part of their construction based on estimated first and second moments. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, §8.1.

The moment region originates in a concentration result attributed in the paper to Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini. That result bounds the distance between sample and population means and covariances when the uncertain vector is supported in a Euclidean ball. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus also discuss replacing those analytic thresholds with bootstrap thresholds; they describe the resulting coverage as approximate. The present target concerns the mathematical relation between a fixed moment region and its uncertainty set, leaving the statistical calibration of the thresholds to its cited source. Shawe-Taylor and Cristianini, 2003; Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, pp. 24–25.

Setting

Let the uncertain vector u~\tilde uu~ take values in Rd\mathbb R^dRd. A probability law PPP belongs to the moment confidence region PCS\mathcal P^{CS}PCS when it is supported in the Euclidean ball of radius RRR, its mean mPm_PmP​ is within Γ1\Gamma_1Γ1​ of an estimate μ^\hat\muμ^​, and its covariance SPS_PSP​ is within Γ2\Gamma_2Γ2​ of an estimate Σ^\hat\SigmaΣ^ in Frobenius norm. The covariance is SP=EP[u~u~⊤]−mPmP⊤S_P=\mathbb E_P[\tilde u\tilde u^\top]-m_Pm_P^\topSP​=EP​[u~u~⊤]−mP​mP⊤​. The thresholds Γ1,Γ2\Gamma_1,\Gamma_2Γ1​,Γ2​ are nonnegative and can be chosen by either calibration procedure discussed in the paper. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, Theorem 9 and (33).

For a vector vvv, Value at Risk VaR⁡εP(v)\operatorname{VaR}^{P}_{\varepsilon}(v)VaRεP​(v) is the smallest threshold ttt for which P(u~⊤v≤t)≥1−εP(\tilde u^\top v\le t)\ge1-\varepsilonP(u~⊤v≤t)≥1−ε. The support function of a set U\mathcal UU is δ∗(v∣U)=sup⁡u∈Uu⊤v\delta^*(v\mid\mathcal U)=\sup_{u\in\mathcal U}u^\top vδ∗(v∣U)=supu∈U​u⊤v. The authors construct the set

UεCS={μ^+y+C⊤w:∥y∥2≤Γ1, ∥w∥2≤1/ε−1},C⊤C=Σ^+Γ2I.\mathcal U^{CS}_{\varepsilon} =\{\hat\mu+y+C^\top w:\|y\|_2\le\Gamma_1,\ \|w\|_2\le\sqrt{1/\varepsilon-1}\}, \qquad C^\top C=\hat\Sigma+\Gamma_2 I.UεCS​={μ^​+y+C⊤w:∥y∥2​≤Γ1​, ∥w∥2​≤1/ε−1​},C⊤C=Σ^+Γ2​I.

Here 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1 is the allowed violation probability, III is the identity matrix, and CCC is a matrix factor of the adjusted covariance. The estimates and CCC stay fixed while ε\varepsilonε varies. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, (34)–(35).

Formalization targets

The first milestone bounds the quantile for every law in the moment region:

VaR⁡εP(v)≤μ^⊤v+Γ1∥v∥2+1−εεv⊤(Σ^+Γ2I)v(P∈PCS).\operatorname{VaR}^{P}_{\varepsilon}(v)\le \hat\mu^\top v+\Gamma_1\|v\|_2+ \sqrt{\frac{1-\varepsilon}{\varepsilon}} \sqrt{v^\top(\hat\Sigma+\Gamma_2I)v} \quad(P\in\mathcal P^{CS}).VaRεP​(v)≤μ^​⊤v+Γ1​∥v∥2​+ε1−ε​​v⊤(Σ^+Γ2​I)v​(P∈PCS).

The second milestone evaluates the two linear maxima over the Euclidean balls in UεCS\mathcal U^{CS}_{\varepsilon}UεCS​ and identifies ∥Cv∥2\|Cv\|_2∥Cv∥2​ with the quadratic form above. The goal, the deterministic part of Theorem 10, says the displayed bound equals δ∗(v∣UεCS)\delta^*(v\mid\mathcal U^{CS}_{\varepsilon})δ∗(v∣UεCS​) for every vvv, while the set is nonempty, convex and compact. This gives the support-function criterion of Theorem 1 for each law in the region. A companion formalizes Theorem 13(a): the resulting support constraint is separately convex in (v,t)(v,t)(v,t) and in ε\varepsilonε for 0<ε<3/40<\varepsilon<3/40<ε<3/4. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, Theorems 10 and 13(a).

Significance

The support formula turns a distributional statement about an entire region of probability laws into a deterministic bound on a linear projection. It gives the robust model an explicit quantity to compare with a constraint threshold. The companion convexity result describes which risk levels allow separate convex optimization in the decision variables and the violation probability. Together they explain why the particular set in (35) is useful beyond the fact that it contains plausible uncertain vectors. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, §§8.1 and 9.

The paper proves the mathematical construction and cites statistical results for the region's coverage. In Lean, the published Value-at-Risk and support-function definitions are already available, while this paper's moment region and set (35) need their own definitions. Formalizing the result therefore establishes a reusable interface between moment bounds, quantiles and set support. The theorem statements in this proposal are open proof targets; compiling them checks their types, not their proofs.

Difficulty

A bound on the mean and covariance does not directly bound a high quantile of every projection. The bound must work simultaneously for every probability law in the moment region, including discrete laws and singular covariances. The factor (1−ε)/ε\sqrt{(1-\varepsilon)/\varepsilon}(1−ε)/ε​ is essential: replacing it by a standard deviation or a Gaussian quantile would change the claim. On the set side, the ordinary norm of a Lean function vector is a sup norm, whereas both balls in (35) are Euclidean. Getting the norm wrong changes the support function. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, (34)–(35).

Formalization scope

Vectors are functions on Fin d, whose coordinates start at zero. enorm and frob explicitly compute the Euclidean and Frobenius norms. The ball-support condition in PCS\mathcal P^{CS}PCS secures finite first and second moments; no density is assumed. The goal fixes R≥0R\ge0R≥0, Γ1,Γ2≥0\Gamma_1,\Gamma_2\ge0Γ1​,Γ2​≥0, 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1, and C⊤C=Σ^+Γ2IC^\top C=\hat\Sigma+\Gamma_2IC⊤C=Σ^+Γ2​I. This factor relation makes the quadratic form nonnegative; a separate positive-semidefinite assumption on Σ^\hat\SigmaΣ^ is unnecessary. The matrix need not be triangular because (35) and its support depend on C⊤CC^\top CC⊤C. The uncertainty set's nonemptiness and compactness appear in the goal so the real support-function supremum cannot take Lean's default value for an empty or unbounded set.

Theorem 10's sampling claim is represented by its deterministic criterion for each P∈PCSP\in\mathcal P^{CS}P∈PCS. The confidence-region coverage of Theorem 9 is cited, and the bootstrap coverage discussed on p. 25 is approximate; neither is asserted as an exact probability theorem here. Equation (34) prints an equality for a supremum over PCS\mathcal P^{CS}PCS, yet that region restricts support to a ball, and the page does not establish attainment under that restriction. This mission uses the upper-bound direction needed for Theorem 10 and does not assert the equality or Remark 16's exact equivalence. The scope includes a sharp quantile bound, the exact support formula and the 3/43/43/4 convexity range; a definition that merely makes the claim true by construction would miss these targets. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus, pp. 24–25 and 29.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta and N. Kallus, Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; revised in Mathematical Programming 167 (2018), 235–292. arXiv preprint.
  • J. Shawe-Taylor and N. Cristianini, Estimating the Moments of a Random Vector with Applications, 2003. University of Southampton ePrint.
  • G. C. Calafiore and L. El Ghaoui, On Distributionally Robust Chance-Constrained Linear Programs, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 130 (2006), 1–22. DOI.
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Convex OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Robust Optimization V: The Order-Statistic Box U^M Built from Marginal Samples Dominates Value at Risk with Probability at Least 1 − αResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust optimization replaces an uncertain constraint f(u~,x)≤0f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x)\le 0f(u~,x)≤0 by the requirement that it hold for every u\mathbf uu in an uncertainty set U⊆Rd\mathcal U\subseteq\mathbb R^dU⊆Rd. The resulting problems are tractable for many sets, but the choice of U\mathcal UU decides whether the solution means anything probabilistically. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus (arXiv:1401.0212v2; Math. Program. 167:235–292, 2018) propose to build U\mathcal UU from data so that, with high probability over the sample, every robust-feasible decision is also feasible with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under the unknown distribution P∗\mathbb P^*P∗.

This mission covers §6 of that paper, the case where the data are samples of the marginals of P∗\mathbb P^*P∗, observed separately, with no assumption that the marginals are independent. This is the situation of asynchronous measurements or records with many missing entries: the joint law cannot be learned, yet a valid uncertainty set can still be built. The set is a box whose sides are order statistics, and its guarantee rests on an elementary binomial test (David and Nagaraja, Order Statistics, §7.1) and a Value-at-Risk bound of Embrechts, Höing and Juri (Finance Stoch. 7, 2003).

Setting

Let P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ be a probability measure on Rd\mathbb R^dRd whose support lies in a known box [u^(0),u^(N+1)]={u:u^i(0)≤ui≤u^i(N+1)}[\hat{\mathbf u}^{(0)},\hat{\mathbf u}^{(N+1)}]=\{\mathbf u:\hat u^{(0)}_i\le u_i\le\hat u^{(N+1)}_i\}[u^(0),u^(N+1)]={u:u^i(0)​≤ui​≤u^i(N+1)​}. Fix a violation level 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1 and a significance level 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1.

The Value at Risk of u~Tv\tilde{\mathbf u}^T\mathbf vu~Tv under a probability measure P\mathbb PP is

VaRϵP(v)=inf⁡{t:P(u~Tv≤t)≥1−ϵ},\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)=\inf\{t:\mathbb P(\tilde{\mathbf u}^T\mathbf v\le t)\ge1-\epsilon\},VaRϵP​(v)=inf{t:P(u~Tv≤t)≥1−ϵ},

and the support function of a set U\mathcal UU is δ∗(v∣U)=sup⁡u∈UvTu\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)=\sup_{\mathbf u\in\mathcal U}\mathbf v^T\mathbf uδ∗(v∣U)=supu∈U​vTu. A set U\mathcal UU implies a probabilistic guarantee at level ϵ\epsilonϵ for P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ if for every f(u,x)f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x)f(u,x) concave in u\mathbf uu and every x∗\mathbf x^*x∗, f(u,x∗)≤0f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x^*)\le0f(u,x∗)≤0 for all u∈U\mathbf u\in\mathcal Uu∈U implies P∗(f(u~,x∗)≤0)≥1−ϵ\mathbb P^*(f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x^*)\le0)\ge1-\epsilonP∗(f(u~,x∗)≤0)≥1−ϵ.

From a sample u^1,…,u^N\hat{\mathbf u}^1,\dots,\hat{\mathbf u}^Nu^1,…,u^N let u^i(j)\hat u^{(j)}_iu^i(j)​, 1≤j≤N1\le j\le N1≤j≤N, be the jjj-th order statistic (the jjj-th smallest value) of coordinate iii, and let u^i(0),u^i(N+1)\hat u^{(0)}_i,\hat u^{(N+1)}_iu^i(0)​,u^i(N+1)​ be the box ends. The index sss is

s=min⁡{k∈N:∑j=kN(Nj)(ϵ/d)N−j(1−ϵ/d)j≤α2d},s=N+1 if the set is empty,(26)s=\min\Big\{k\in\mathbb N:\sum_{j=k}^N\binom Nj(\epsilon/d)^{N-j}(1-\epsilon/d)^j\le\frac{\alpha}{2d}\Big\},\qquad s=N+1\text{ if the set is empty}, \tag{26}s=min{k∈N:j=k∑N​(jN​)(ϵ/d)N−j(1−ϵ/d)j≤2dα​},s=N+1 if the set is empty,(26)

and the uncertainty set is the box

UϵM={u∈Rd:u^i(N−s+1)≤ui≤u^i(s), i=1,…,d}.(28)\mathcal U^M_\epsilon=\{\mathbf u\in\mathbb R^d:\hat u^{(N-s+1)}_i\le u_i\le\hat u^{(s)}_i,\ i=1,\dots,d\}. \tag{28}UϵM​={u∈Rd:u^i(N−s+1)​≤ui​≤u^i(s)​, i=1,…,d}.(28)

The confidence region PM\mathcal P^MPM is the set of probability measures on the box with VaRϵ/dP(ei)≤u^i(s)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_{\epsilon/d}(\mathbf e_i)\le\hat u^{(s)}_iVaRϵ/dP​(ei​)≤u^i(s)​ and VaRϵ/dP(−ei)≤−u^i(N−s+1)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_{\epsilon/d}(-\mathbf e_i)\le-\hat u^{(N-s+1)}_iVaRϵ/dP​(−ei​)≤−u^i(N−s+1)​ for every iii.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

If N−s+1<sN-s+1<sN−s+1<s, then with probability at least 1−α1-\alpha1−α over the sample (NNN samples of each marginal of P∗\mathbb P^*P∗, each marginal's samples i.i.d., arbitrary dependence across marginals),

δ∗(v∣UϵM)≥VaRϵP∗(v)for all v∈Rd,\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U^M_\epsilon)\ge\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P^*}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)\qquad\text{for all }\mathbf v\in\mathbb R^d,δ∗(v∣UϵM​)≥VaRϵP∗​(v)for all v∈Rd,

and, for every sample, UϵM\mathcal U^M_\epsilonUϵM​ is nonempty, convex and compact with

δ∗(v∣UϵM)=∑i=1dmax⁡(viu^i(N−s+1), viu^i(s)).(29)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U^M_\epsilon)=\sum_{i=1}^d\max\big(v_i\hat u^{(N-s+1)}_i,\,v_i\hat u^{(s)}_i\big). \tag{29}δ∗(v∣UϵM​)=i=1∑d​max(vi​u^i(N−s+1)​,vi​u^i(s)​).(29)

Milestones

  1. Positive homogeneity: VaRδP(cw)=c VaRδP(w)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\delta(c\mathbf w)=c\,\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\delta(\mathbf w)VaRδP​(cw)=cVaRδP​(w) for c>0c>0c>0 (p. 10).
  2. Each one-sided order-statistic test is valid at level α/(2d)\alpha/(2d)α/(2d): PS∗(u^i(s)<VaRϵ/dP∗(ei))≤α/(2d)\mathbb P^*_{\mathcal S}(\hat u^{(s)}_i<\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P^*}_{\epsilon/d}(\mathbf e_i))\le\alpha/(2d)PS∗​(u^i(s)​<VaRϵ/dP∗​(ei​))≤α/(2d), and the mirror bound for −ei-\mathbf e_i−ei​ with u^i(N−s+1)\hat u^{(N-s+1)}_iu^i(N−s+1)​ (pp. 20–21).
  3. Union bound: PS∗(P∗∈PM)≥1−α\mathbb P^*_{\mathcal S}(\mathbb P^*\in\mathcal P^M)\ge1-\alphaPS∗​(P∗∈PM)≥1−α (p. 21).
  4. The weak Embrechts bound VaRϵP(v)≤∑iVaRϵ/dP(viei)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)\le\sum_i\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_{\epsilon/d}(v_i\mathbf e_i)VaRϵP​(v)≤∑i​VaRϵ/dP​(vi​ei​) for every probability measure P\mathbb PP (p. 21).
  5. If N−s+1<sN-s+1<sN−s+1<s then u^i(N−s+1)≤u^i(s)\hat u^{(N-s+1)}_i\le\hat u^{(s)}_iu^i(N−s+1)​≤u^i(s)​ (p. 21).
  6. (EC.8): for P∈PM\mathbb P\in\mathcal P^MP∈PM, VaRϵP(v)≤∑vi>0viu^i(s)+∑vi≤0viu^i(N−s+1)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)\le\sum_{v_i>0}v_i\hat u^{(s)}_i+\sum_{v_i\le0}v_i\hat u^{(N-s+1)}_iVaRϵP​(v)≤∑vi​>0​vi​u^i(s)​+∑vi​≤0​vi​u^i(N−s+1)​ (p. ec5).
  7. (29) as a standalone statement (p. 21).

Significance

Theorem 7 gives an uncertainty set with a finite-sample guarantee from data that carry no information on the dependence between coordinates. The set is a box, so the robust counterpart of a linear constraint is again linear, and Remark 12 of the paper notes that separation over {(v,t):δ∗(v∣UM)≤t}\{(\mathbf v,t):\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U^M)\le t\}{(v,t):δ∗(v∣UM)≤t} is in closed form. Unlike the other confidence regions of the paper (χ², G-test, Kolmogorov–Smirnov, bootstrap), whose coverage is asymptotic, tabulated or approximate, the test here is exact and distribution-free, so the probability statement itself is in scope.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of it has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a complete formal statement of Theorem 7 including the sampling probability, the binomial order-statistic test for a quantile, and the marginal Value-at-Risk bound, all of which are standard tools in nonparametric statistics and risk management that are absent from Mathlib.

Difficulty

The deterministic half, (EC.8) and (29), is short once the weak Embrechts bound is available. The work is in the probabilistic half, which the paper delegates to a textbook citation. Validity of the order-statistic test ties together facts that no library currently connects: the combinatorics of sorted tuples, the binomial law of the number of i.i.d. sample points below a threshold, the behaviour of a quantile at its left limit (the distribution function at the quantile can exceed 1−ϵ/d1-\epsilon/d1−ϵ/d, so the obvious bound uses the wrong probability), and the comparison of binomial tails across success probabilities. The lower-tail test must be handled with the index N−s+1N-s+1N−s+1 and the quantile of −u~i-\tilde u_i−u~i​, where a sign or off-by-one slip produces a false statement that still looks plausible. The boundary regime s=N+1s=N+1s=N+1, where UϵM\mathcal U^M_\epsilonUϵM​ is the a priori box, is valid only because P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ lives in that box and needs separate treatment.

Formalization scope

Rd\mathbb R^dRd is Fin d → ℝ with 0-based coordinates; vectors pair by ⬝ᵥ. Value at Risk is the published MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk at level 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ applied to u↦uTv\mathbf u\mapsto\mathbf u^T\mathbf vu↦uTv, and the support function is the published RobustMDP.Shared.supportFunction; both are real infima/suprema, genuine under 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1, a probability measure, and a nonempty bounded set (the goal proves the latter). The order statistics use Mathlib's Tuple.sort; the index N−s+1N-s+1N−s+1 is N + 1 - s in natural numbers, which is the paper's value since 1≤s≤N+11\le s\le N+11≤s≤N+1.

The data are an array S : Fin N → Fin d → ℝ, S k i the kkk-th sample of marginal iii, under any probability law Q such that, for each iii, the samples S 0 i, …, S (N-1) i are i.i.d. from the iii-th marginal of P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ (IsMarginalSampleLaw). The dependence between samples of different marginals is left arbitrary, as the paper's asynchronous setting requires; i.i.d. draws of whole vectors are one admissible law. Probabilities of possibly non-measurable events are outer measures. The level ϵ\epsilonϵ is fixed: by Remark 11 the family {UϵM}\{\mathcal U^M_\epsilon\}{UϵM​} need not work for all ϵ\epsilonϵ simultaneously.

The guarantee is stated in the criterion form of Theorem 1(a) of the paper: δ∗(v∣UϵM)≥VaRϵP∗(v)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U^M_\epsilon)\ge\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P^*}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)δ∗(v∣UϵM​)≥VaRϵP∗​(v) for all v\mathbf vv, together with nonemptiness, convexity and compactness of UϵM\mathcal U^M_\epsilonUϵM​. Theorem 1 (mission I of this series) shows that for such sets this criterion is equivalent to implying a probabilistic guarantee. The coverage of the test is proved, not assumed: there is no hypothesis that P∗∈PM\mathbb P^*\in\mathcal P^MP∗∈PM. A formalization in which the support function is evaluated on an empty or unbounded set, where the library value is 0, would make the criterion trivial; the nonemptiness and compactness conjunct of the goal rules it out.

Standing assumptions: d≥1d\ge1d≥1, 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1, 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1, u^(0)≤u^(N+1)\hat{\mathbf u}^{(0)}\le\hat{\mathbf u}^{(N+1)}u^(0)≤u^(N+1), P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ a probability measure with P∗\mathbb P^*P∗-null complement of the box, and Theorem 7's hypothesis N−s+1<sN-s+1<sN−s+1<s. The page prints the second condition of PM\mathcal P^MPM as "VaRϵ/dPi≥u^i(N−s+1)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P_i}_{\epsilon/d}\ge\hat u^{(N-s+1)}_iVaRϵ/dPi​​≥u^i(N−s+1)​"; the formal region uses the lower-tail condition VaRϵ/d(−ei)≤−u^i(N−s+1)\mathrm{VaR}_{\epsilon/d}(-\mathbf e_i)\le-\hat u^{(N-s+1)}_iVaRϵ/d​(−ei​)≤−u^i(N−s+1)​ that the hypothesis, its rejection rule and the proof use. (EC.8) is stated with "≤\le≤" for each P∈PM\mathbb P\in\mathcal P^MP∈PM; the page's middle equality is not claimed.

Reusable infrastructure welcome beyond this mission: order statistics of tuples and the binomial law of threshold counts for i.i.d. samples; monotonicity of binomial tails in the success probability; the left-limit property of quantiles; the Embrechts-type subadditivity bound for Value at Risk.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta, N. Kallus, Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; Math. Program. 167:235–292, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.0212
  • H. A. David, H. N. Nagaraja, Order Statistics, Wiley (cited by the paper as 1970; third edition 2003), §7.1, distribution-free confidence intervals for quantiles. https://doi.org/10.1002/0471722162
  • P. Embrechts, A. Höing, A. Juri, Using copulae to bound the Value-at-Risk for functions of dependent risks, Finance and Stochastics 7:145–167, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1007/s007800200085
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Convex OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Robust Optimization IV: The Forward–Backward Deviation Set U^FB Has a Closed-Form Support Function That Bounds the Worst-Case Value at RiskResearch Paper

Motivation

A robust linear constraint u⊤v≤tu^\top v \le tu⊤v≤t with uuu ranging over an uncertainty set U⊆Rd\mathcal U\subseteq\mathbb R^dU⊆Rd is tractable whenever the support function δ∗(v∣U)=sup⁡u∈Uu⊤v\delta^*(v\mid\mathcal U)=\sup_{u\in\mathcal U}u^\top vδ∗(v∣U)=supu∈U​u⊤v is. Robust optimization gains a probabilistic meaning when U\mathcal UU is chosen so that every robustly feasible decision also satisfies the constraint with probability at least 1−ε1-\varepsilon1−ε under the true distribution P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ of the uncertain parameter u~\tilde uu~. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus (arXiv:1401.0212v2; Math. Program. 167, 2018) build such sets from data: a statistical hypothesis test yields a confidence region P\mathcal PP of distributions, and the uncertainty set is any convex set whose support function dominates the worst-case Value at Risk over P\mathcal PP.

Section 5.2 of the paper applies this schema to the forward and backward deviations of Chen, Sim and Sun (Oper. Res. 55, 2007), one-sided measures of spread that capture skewness. Chen, Sim and Sun assume the mean and deviations are known; the data-driven version replaces them by confidence intervals and must work out the worst case over those intervals. The result is the set UεFB\mathcal U^{FB}_\varepsilonUεFB​ of Theorem 6, whose support function has a closed form.

Setting

The uncertain parameter u~\tilde uu~ takes values in Rd\mathbb R^dRd and P\mathbb PP is its law. For ε∈(0,1)\varepsilon\in(0,1)ε∈(0,1) and v∈Rdv\in\mathbb R^dv∈Rd, the Value at Risk is

VaRεP(v)=inf⁡{t:P(u~⊤v≤t)≥1−ε}.\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\varepsilon(v)=\inf\{t:\mathbb P(\tilde u^\top v\le t)\ge1-\varepsilon\}.VaRεP​(v)=inf{t:P(u~⊤v≤t)≥1−ε}.

For a probability measure Pi\mathbb P_iPi​ on R\mathbb RR with mean μi\mu_iμi​, the forward deviation and the backward deviation are

σf(Pi)=sup⁡x>0−2μix+2x2log⁡EPi[exu~i],σb(Pi)=sup⁡x>02μix+2x2log⁡EPi[e−xu~i].\sigma_f(\mathbb P_i)=\sup_{x>0}\sqrt{-\tfrac{2\mu_i}{x}+\tfrac{2}{x^2}\log\mathbb E^{\mathbb P_i}[e^{x\tilde u_i}]},\qquad\sigma_b(\mathbb P_i)=\sup_{x>0}\sqrt{\tfrac{2\mu_i}{x}+\tfrac{2}{x^2}\log\mathbb E^{\mathbb P_i}[e^{-x\tilde u_i}]}.σf​(Pi​)=x>0sup​−x2μi​​+x22​logEPi​[exu~i​]​,σb​(Pi​)=x>0sup​x2μi​​+x22​logEPi​[e−xu~i​]​.

From a sample, a bootstrap produces thresholds tit_iti​, σˉfi\bar\sigma_{fi}σˉfi​, σˉbi\bar\sigma_{bi}σˉbi​. With the sample mean μ^i\hat\mu_iμ^​i​ put mbi=μ^i−tim_{bi}=\hat\mu_i-t_imbi​=μ^​i​−ti​ and mfi=μ^i+tim_{fi}=\hat\mu_i+t_imfi​=μ^​i​+ti​. The confidence region PFB\mathcal P^{FB}PFB consists of the distributions of vectors with independent components u~i∼Pi\tilde u_i\sim\mathbb P_iu~i​∼Pi​, each Pi\mathbb P_iPi​ having bounded support, mean in [mbi,mfi][m_{bi},m_{fi}][mbi​,mfi​], σf(Pi)≤σˉfi\sigma_f(\mathbb P_i)\le\bar\sigma_{fi}σf​(Pi​)≤σˉfi​ and σb(Pi)≤σˉbi\sigma_b(\mathbb P_i)\le\bar\sigma_{bi}σb​(Pi​)≤σˉbi​.

The uncertainty set is

UεFB={y1+y2−y3: y2,y3∈R+d, ∑i=1d(y2i22σˉfi2+y3i22σˉbi2)≤log⁡(1/ε), mbi≤y1i≤mfi}.\mathcal U^{FB}_\varepsilon=\Big\{y_1+y_2-y_3:\ y_2,y_3\in\mathbb R^d_+,\ \sum_{i=1}^d\Big(\frac{y_{2i}^2}{2\bar\sigma_{fi}^2}+\frac{y_{3i}^2}{2\bar\sigma_{bi}^2}\Big)\le\log(1/\varepsilon),\ m_{bi}\le y_{1i}\le m_{fi}\Big\}.UεFB​={y1​+y2​−y3​: y2​,y3​∈R+d​, i=1∑d​(2σˉfi2​y2i2​​+2σˉbi2​y3i2​​)≤log(1/ε), mbi​≤y1i​≤mfi​}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6

For mb≤mfm_b\le m_fmb​≤mf​, σˉf,σˉb>0\bar\sigma_f,\bar\sigma_b>0σˉf​,σˉb​>0 and ε∈(0,1)\varepsilon\in(0,1)ε∈(0,1), the set UεFB\mathcal U^{FB}_\varepsilonUεFB​ is nonempty, convex and compact,

δ∗(v∣UεFB)=∑i:vi≥0mfivi+∑i:vi<0mbivi+2log⁡(1/ε)(∑i:vi≥0σˉfi2vi2+∑i:vi<0σˉbi2vi2)(24)\delta^*(v\mid\mathcal U^{FB}_\varepsilon)=\sum_{i:v_i\ge0}m_{fi}v_i+\sum_{i:v_i<0}m_{bi}v_i+\sqrt{2\log(1/\varepsilon)\Big(\sum_{i:v_i\ge0}\bar\sigma_{fi}^2v_i^2+\sum_{i:v_i<0}\bar\sigma_{bi}^2v_i^2\Big)}\qquad(24)δ∗(v∣UεFB​)=i:vi​≥0∑​mfi​vi​+i:vi​<0∑​mbi​vi​+2log(1/ε)(i:vi​≥0∑​σˉfi2​vi2​+i:vi​<0∑​σˉbi2​vi2​)​(24)

for every vvv, and VaRεP(v)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\varepsilon(v)VaRεP​(v) is at most the right-hand side of (24) for every P∈PFB\mathbb P\in\mathcal P^{FB}P∈PFB and every vvv.

Milestones

  1. The Chen–Sim–Sun bound (22): for independent components with known means μi\mu_iμi​ and deviations, VaRεP(v)≤∑iμivi+2log⁡(1/ε)(∑vi<0σbi2vi2+∑vi≥0σfi2vi2)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\varepsilon(v)\le\sum_i\mu_iv_i+\sqrt{2\log(1/\varepsilon)(\sum_{v_i<0}\sigma_{bi}^2v_i^2+\sum_{v_i\ge0}\sigma_{fi}^2v_i^2)}VaRεP​(v)≤∑i​μi​vi​+2log(1/ε)(∑vi​<0​σbi2​vi2​+∑vi​≥0​σfi2​vi2​)​.
  2. The right-hand side of (24) is the worst case of (22) over the parameters allowed by PFB\mathcal P^{FB}PFB.
  3. Lagrangian strong duality for max⁡u∈UεFBu⊤v\max_{u\in\mathcal U^{FB}_\varepsilon}u^\top vmaxu∈UεFB​​u⊤v.
  4. The three one-dimensional sub-subproblems and their optimal values.
  5. The combined formula: δ∗\delta^*δ∗ equals a linear term plus inf⁡λ>0{λlog⁡(1/ε)+S/(2λ)}\inf_{\lambda>0}\{\lambda\log(1/\varepsilon)+S/(2\lambda)\}infλ>0​{λlog(1/ε)+S/(2λ)}.
  6. inf⁡λ>0{λL+S/(2λ)}=2LS\inf_{\lambda>0}\{\lambda L+S/(2\lambda)\}=\sqrt{2LS}infλ>0​{λL+S/(2λ)}=2LS​, attained at λ∗=S/(2L)\lambda^*=\sqrt{S/(2L)}λ∗=S/(2L)​ when S>0S>0S>0.

Companions

  • Remark 9: when (24) exceeds ttt, an explicit point of UεFB\mathcal U^{FB}_\varepsilonUεFB​ gives a violated cut u⊤v≤tu^\top v\le tu⊤v≤t.
  • Theorem 13(b): the constraint δ∗(v∣UεFB)≤t\delta^*(v\mid\mathcal U^{FB}_\varepsilon)\le tδ∗(v∣UεFB​)≤t is convex in (v,t)(v,t)(v,t) and convex in ε\varepsilonε for 0<ε<1/e0<\varepsilon<1/\sqrt e0<ε<1/e​.

Significance

Theorem 6 gives a data-driven uncertainty set for which a robust linear constraint is a second-order cone constraint, (24) being an explicit norm expression. By Theorem 1 of the paper, the domination of the worst-case Value at Risk over the region by the support function means that every robustly feasible solution satisfies a chance constraint at level ε\varepsilonε for every distribution in the region. Unlike the Chen–Sim–Sun set, which requires the true mean and deviations, UεFB\mathcal U^{FB}_\varepsilonUεFB​ needs only data and allows the mean and the support to be unknown. Theorem 13(b) supports the alternating heuristic of §9 for choosing the levels εj\varepsilon_jεj​ across several constraints.

The paper's proof is short and leans on "by inspection" and "by Lagrangian strong duality". A formal development makes each of these steps explicit, including the case where the multiplier is not attained, and corrects two printed slips (the optimal values viσˉ2/(2λ)v_i\bar\sigma^2/(2\lambda)vi​σˉ2/(2λ), which should be vi2σˉ2/(2λ)v_i^2\bar\sigma^2/(2\lambda)vi2​σˉ2/(2λ), and the bound mb≤y1≤mbm_b\le y_1\le m_bmb​≤y1​≤mb​). The Chen–Sim–Sun bound itself, a Chernoff-type tail bound under one-sided moment-generating conditions, is cited by the paper without proof. None of these results has a machine-checked proof that this mission is aware of.

Difficulty

The support function of (23) is a maximisation over a set defined by a box, two nonnegative orthants and one coupled quadratic constraint. A coordinate-wise argument does not apply directly because the quadratic budget is shared. The worst case over PFB\mathcal P^{FB}PFB is not a single distribution: the extreme mean and the extreme deviations are chosen coordinate by coordinate according to the sign of viv_ivi​. The Value at Risk bound needs independence of the components; without it (22) fails. When v=0v=0v=0 or the sign pattern makes the quadratic term vanish, the dual multiplier escapes to zero and the dual minimum is only an infimum.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin d → ℝ, with 0-based coordinates; u~⊤v\tilde u^\top vu~⊤v is u ⬝ᵥ v. The Value at Risk is the published MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk at level 1−ε1-\varepsilon1−ε, and the support function is the published RobustMDP.Shared.supportFunction, a real supremum; the goal includes nonemptiness and compactness of UεFB\mathcal U^{FB}_\varepsilonUεFB​, so the supremum is a true maximum and cannot hold through the value 000 of an empty or unbounded set.

The statement is formalized in the criterion form: VaRεP(v)≤δ∗(v∣UεFB)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\varepsilon(v)\le\delta^*(v\mid\mathcal U^{FB}_\varepsilon)VaRεP​(v)≤δ∗(v∣UεFB​) for all vvv and every P\mathbb PP in the region. By Theorem 1 (mission I of this series), for a nonempty convex compact set this criterion is equivalent to the probabilistic guarantee. The page's "with probability 1−α1-\alpha1−α with respect to the sample" is the coverage of the bootstrap confidence region, which the paper itself treats as approximate; it is not formalized.

Conventions and added hypotheses:

  • σˉfi,σˉbi>0\bar\sigma_{fi},\bar\sigma_{bi}>0σˉfi​,σˉbi​>0, so that the denominators of (23) are genuine; with σˉ=0\bar\sigma=0σˉ=0 Lean's x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0 would leave y2y_2y2​ unconstrained instead of forcing y2=0y_2=0y2​=0.
  • mb≤mfm_b\le m_fmb​≤mf​, which holds because ti≥0t_i\ge0ti​≥0.
  • The region is built from a product measure (independence) of probability measures with bounded support. These are the hypotheses of Theorem 6 on P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ and the section's standing assumption; the page's set-builder for PFB\mathcal P^{FB}PFB omits independence. Without bounded support, the Bochner integral of a non-integrable exponential is 000 in Lean and the deviation conditions would lose their meaning.
  • "σf(Pi)≤σˉ\sigma_f(\mathbb P_i)\le\bar\sigmaσf​(Pi​)≤σˉ" is the predicate "the expression under the root is at most σˉ2\bar\sigma^2σˉ2 for every x>0x>0x>0", which is equivalent and avoids an unbounded supremum.
  • Dual minimisations over λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 are infima over λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, stated with IsGLB.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: a region without independence would make the goal false, a region without the probability and bounded-support conditions would let junk integrals satisfy the deviation predicates, and a support function of an empty set would make (24) a statement about 000.

The development needs a Chernoff argument for products of measures, finite-dimensional Lagrangian duality for one convex quadratic constraint (or a direct Cauchy–Schwarz argument), and compactness of the set (23). The definitions file is self-contained and reusable for other forward/backward-deviation sets. Proofs of any milestone, and of the Chen–Sim–Sun bound as a standalone tail inequality, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta, N. Kallus, Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; Math. Program. 167:235–292, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.0212
  • X. Chen, M. Sim, P. Sun, A Robust Optimization Perspective on Stochastic Programming, Operations Research 55(6):1058–1071, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0441
12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Robust Optimization III: For Independent Marginals, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov Set U^I Has Support Function (19) and Bounds the Worst-Case Value at RiskResearch Paper

Motivation

A robust linear constraint f(u,x)≤0f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x)\le 0f(u,x)≤0 for all u∈U\mathbf u\in\mathcal Uu∈U replaces an uncertain parameter u~\tilde{\mathbf u}u~ by a deterministic uncertainty set U⊆Rd\mathcal U\subseteq\mathbb R^dU⊆Rd. Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus (arXiv:1401.0212v2; Math. Program. 167, 2018) build such sets directly from data. Their requirement is a probabilistic guarantee: every robust-feasible decision should satisfy the constraint with probability at least 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ under the true distribution P∗\mathbb P^*P∗, and this should hold with probability at least 1−α1-\alpha1−α over the sample. The construction runs a statistical hypothesis test, takes its confidence region of distributions, and turns the worst-case Value at Risk over that region into a set.

This mission covers the case where P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ may be continuous but its ddd coordinates are known to be independent and supported in a known box (§5.1 of the paper). The test is the classical Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) goodness-of-fit test, applied separately to each marginal. The result is a convex set UϵI\mathcal U^I_\epsilonUϵI​ whose support function has a one-dimensional closed form, (19). The set is representable with exponential cones, and a line search over a single multiplier separates over it (Remarks 6–7).

Setting

Let d≥0d\ge 0d≥0 and N≥1N\ge 1N≥1 (the sample size). For each coordinate iii we are given points u^i(0)<u^i(1)<⋯<u^i(N)<u^i(N+1)\hat u^{(0)}_i<\hat u^{(1)}_i<\cdots<\hat u^{(N)}_i<\hat u^{(N+1)}_iu^i(0)​<u^i(1)​<⋯<u^i(N)​<u^i(N+1)​. The interval [u^i(0),u^i(N+1)][\hat u^{(0)}_i,\hat u^{(N+1)}_i][u^i(0)​,u^i(N+1)​] is the known box containing the support, and u^i(1),…,u^i(N)\hat u^{(1)}_i,\dots,\hat u^{(N)}_iu^i(1)​,…,u^i(N)​ are the order statistics of the iii-th coordinates of the data. Let Γ=ΓKS∈(0,1)\Gamma=\Gamma^{KS}\in(0,1)Γ=ΓKS∈(0,1) be the KS threshold and 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1.

  • The Value at Risk of P\mathbb PP in direction v\mathbf vv is VaRϵP(v)=inf⁡{t:P(u~Tv≤t)≥1−ϵ}\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)=\inf\{t:\mathbb P(\tilde{\mathbf u}^{\mathsf T}\mathbf v\le t)\ge 1-\epsilon\}VaRϵP​(v)=inf{t:P(u~Tv≤t)≥1−ϵ}.
  • The support function of a set is δ∗(v∣U)=sup⁡u∈UvTu\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)=\sup_{\mathbf u\in\mathcal U}\mathbf v^{\mathsf T}\mathbf uδ∗(v∣U)=supu∈U​vTu.
  • The KS region PiKS\mathcal P^{KS}_iPiKS​ is the set of Borel probability measures Pi\mathbb P_iPi​ on [u^i(0),u^i(N+1)][\hat u^{(0)}_i,\hat u^{(N+1)}_i][u^i(0)​,u^i(N+1)​] with Pi(u~i≤u^i(j))≥j/N−Γ\mathbb P_i(\tilde u_i\le\hat u^{(j)}_i)\ge j/N-\GammaPi​(u~i​≤u^i(j)​)≥j/N−Γ and Pi(u~i<u^i(j))≤(j−1)/N+Γ\mathbb P_i(\tilde u_i<\hat u^{(j)}_i)\le (j-1)/N+\GammaPi​(u~i​<u^i(j)​)≤(j−1)/N+Γ for j=1,…,Nj=1,\dots,Nj=1,…,N.
  • The independent region PI\mathcal P^IPI is the set of product measures ∏iPi\prod_i\mathbb P_i∏i​Pi​ with Pi∈PiKS\mathbb P_i\in\mathcal P^{KS}_iPi​∈PiKS​.
  • The vectors qL(Γ),qR(Γ)∈ΔN+2q^L(\Gamma),q^R(\Gamma)\in\Delta_{N+2}qL(Γ),qR(Γ)∈ΔN+2​ of (17) are the two boundary distributions of the KS band. With k=⌊N(1−Γ)⌋k=\lfloor N(1-\Gamma)\rfloork=⌊N(1−Γ)⌋, qLq^LqL puts mass Γ\GammaΓ at j=0j=0j=0, mass 1/N1/N1/N at j=1,…,kj=1,\dots,kj=1,…,k, and mass 1−Γ−k/N1-\Gamma-k/N1−Γ−k/N at j=k+1j=k+1j=k+1. Its mirror image is qjR=qN+1−jLq^R_j=q^L_{N+1-j}qjR​=qN+1−jL​.
  • The relative entropy is D(q,p)=∑jqjlog⁡(qj/pj)D(\mathbf q,\mathbf p)=\sum_jq_j\log(q_j/p_j)D(q,p)=∑j​qj​log(qj​/pj​).
  • The uncertainty set (18) is
UϵI={u:∃ θi∈[0,1], qi∈ΔN+2, ∑j=0N+1u^i(j)qji=ui, ∑i=1dD(qi,θiqL+(1−θi)qR)≤log⁡(1/ϵ)}.\mathcal U^I_\epsilon=\Big\{\mathbf u:\exists\,\theta_i\in[0,1],\ \mathbf q^i\in\Delta_{N+2},\ \sum_{j=0}^{N+1}\hat u^{(j)}_iq^i_j=u_i,\ \sum_{i=1}^dD\big(\mathbf q^i,\theta_i\mathbf q^L+(1-\theta_i)\mathbf q^R\big)\le\log(1/\epsilon)\Big\}.UϵI​={u:∃θi​∈[0,1], qi∈ΔN+2​, j=0∑N+1​u^i(j)​qji​=ui​, i=1∑d​D(qi,θi​qL+(1−θi​)qR)≤log(1/ϵ)}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5 (deterministic content)

For every v∈Rd\mathbf v\in\mathbb R^dv∈Rd:

UϵI is nonempty, convex and compact,VaRϵP(v)≤δ∗(v∣UϵI)  ∀ P∈PI,\mathcal U^I_\epsilon\ \text{is nonempty, convex and compact},\qquad \mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)\le\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U^I_\epsilon)\ \ \forall\,\mathbb P\in\mathcal P^I,UϵI​ is nonempty, convex and compact,VaRϵP​(v)≤δ∗(v∣UϵI​)  ∀P∈PI, δ∗(v∣UϵI)=inf⁡λ>0{λlog⁡(1/ϵ)+λ∑i=1dlog⁡[max⁡(∑jqjLeviu^i(j)/λ,∑jqjReviu^i(j)/λ)]}.(19)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U^I_\epsilon)=\inf_{\lambda>0}\Big\{\lambda\log(1/\epsilon)+\lambda\sum_{i=1}^d\log\Big[\max\Big(\sum_{j}q^L_je^{v_i\hat u^{(j)}_i/\lambda},\sum_jq^R_je^{v_i\hat u^{(j)}_i/\lambda}\Big)\Big]\Big\}.\tag{19}δ∗(v∣UϵI​)=λ>0inf​{λlog(1/ϵ)+λi=1∑d​log[max(j∑​qjL​evi​u^i(j)​/λ,j∑​qjR​evi​u^i(j)​/λ)]}.(19)

Milestones, in attack order

  1. The Nemirovski–Shapiro bound VaRϵP(v)≤λlog⁡(1/ϵ)+λ∑ilog⁡EPi[eviu~i/λ]\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)\le\lambda\log(1/\epsilon)+\lambda\sum_i\log\mathbb E^{\mathbb P_i}[e^{v_i\tilde u_i/\lambda}]VaRϵP​(v)≤λlog(1/ϵ)+λ∑i​logEPi​[evi​u~i​/λ] for independent, compactly supported marginals.
  2. The boundary laws qLq^LqL, qRq^RqR belong to PiKS\mathcal P^{KS}_iPiKS​.
  3. Theorem EC.2: for monotone ggg, sup⁡PiKSE[g(u~i)]=max⁡(∑jqjLg(u^i(j)),∑jqjRg(u^i(j)))\sup_{\mathcal P^{KS}_i}\mathbb E[g(\tilde u_i)]=\max(\sum_jq^L_jg(\hat u^{(j)}_i),\sum_jq^R_jg(\hat u^{(j)}_i))supPiKS​​E[g(u~i​)]=max(∑j​qjL​g(u^i(j)​),∑j​qjR​g(u^i(j)​)).
  4. (16) combined with EC.2: the Value at Risk over PI\mathcal P^IPI is at most the expression in (19), for every λ>0\lambda>0λ>0.
  5. The Lagrangian dual of max⁡{vTu:u∈UϵI}\max\{\mathbf v^{\mathsf T}\mathbf u:\mathbf u\in\mathcal U^I_\epsilon\}max{vTu:u∈UϵI​}.
  6. (EC.6): max⁡q∈Δ{cTq−D(q,p)}=log⁡∑jpjecj\max_{\mathbf q\in\Delta}\{\mathbf c^{\mathsf T}\mathbf q-D(\mathbf q,\mathbf p)\}=\log\sum_jp_je^{c_j}maxq∈Δ​{cTq−D(q,p)}=log∑j​pj​ecj​.
  7. (EC.7): the linear optimization over θi∈[0,1]\theta_i\in[0,1]θi​∈[0,1] is solved at an endpoint.

Significance

Theorem 5 gives a data-driven uncertainty set for continuous distributions with independent components. Its guarantee is finite-sample, not asymptotic, and its support function costs one line search over λ\lambdaλ to evaluate. Theorem 1 of the paper shows that VaR≤δ∗\mathrm{VaR}\le\delta^*VaR≤δ∗ for all v\mathbf vv is equivalent to the probabilistic guarantee for nonempty convex compact sets. So the goal certifies that every robust-feasible solution of a constraint concave in u\mathbf uu satisfies the chance constraint for every distribution the KS tests cannot reject. Theorem EC.2 is a reusable fact about KS bands: monotone expectations are extremized at the band's two boundary distributions.

The result is proved in the paper, but none of it has been formalized. A formal development would supply:

  • worst-case expectations over a KS confidence band;
  • the finite Gibbs variational identity with possibly vanishing reference masses;
  • a Chernoff-type Value-at-Risk bound for product measures;
  • a strong-duality statement for an entropy-constrained convex program.

Difficulty

The obvious route to the VaR bound is a union bound over coordinates. It loses a factor of ddd in ϵ\epsilonϵ, which is why the paper uses exponential moments and independence instead. The KS region is infinite dimensional, so the inner supremum of (16) is not a finite linear program. Reducing it to the boundary distributions needs the monotonicity of u↦eviu/λu\mapsto e^{v_iu/\lambda}u↦evi​u/λ, and a measure-level comparison of distribution functions against the band. The support-function identity needs strong duality for a jointly convex divergence constraint. The duality holds because θi↦θiqL+(1−θi)qR\theta_i\mapsto\theta_i\mathbf q^L+(1-\theta_i)\mathbf q^Rθi​↦θi​qL+(1−θi​)qR is affine and DDD is jointly convex. The reference vector can have zero entries (when N(1−Γ)N(1-\Gamma)N(1−Γ) is an integer, or in the middle of the band), so the Gibbs step must handle vanishing masses.

Formalization scope

  • Data and conventions. Coordinates are Fin d. The points are uhat : Fin d → Fin (N + 2) → ℝ with the page's indices j=0,…,N+1j=0,\dots,N+1j=0,…,N+1, and the KS constraints run over j : Fin N, which is the page's j−1j-1j−1. The order statistics are data. They are ordered, u^i(0)≤u^i(1)≤⋯≤u^i(N+1)\hat u^{(0)}_i\le\hat u^{(1)}_i\le\dots\le\hat u^{(N+1)}_iu^i(0)​≤u^i(1)​≤⋯≤u^i(N+1)​ (Monotone (uhat i)), as order statistics of a sample in the box are; ties are allowed.
  • Standing assumptions. N≥1N\ge1N≥1, 0<Γ<10<\Gamma<10<Γ<1 and 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1.
  • Regions. Measures in PiKS\mathcal P^{KS}_iPiKS​ are probability measures on R\mathbb RR carried by the box, and PI\mathcal P^IPI consists of the Measure.pi products of such measures, so independence is built in.
  • Relative entropy. DDD carries an explicit finiteness predicate (qj>0⇒pj>0q_j>0\Rightarrow p_j>0qj​>0⇒pj​>0), so Lean's log 0 = 0 cannot make an infinite divergence finite.
  • Published definitions. Value at Risk is the published MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk at level 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ, and δ∗\delta^*δ∗ is the published RobustMDP.Shared.supportFunction, a real sSup. The goal proves UϵI\mathcal U^I_\epsilonUϵI​ nonempty and compact, so δ∗\delta^*δ∗ is never the junk value 000 of an empty or unbounded set.
  • Infima and the multiplier. Infima over λ\lambdaλ are over λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and stated with IsGLB. The page's λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 gives the same value.
  • Criterion form of the guarantee. The guarantee is stated as VaRϵP(v)≤δ∗(v∣UϵI)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)\le\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U^I_\epsilon)VaRϵP​(v)≤δ∗(v∣UϵI​) for all P∈PI\mathbb P\in\mathcal P^IP∈PI. By Theorem 1 (mission I of this series), this criterion is equivalent to the probabilistic guarantee for nonempty convex compact sets.
  • Coverage of the test. The statement "with probability at least 1−α1-\alpha1−α over the sample" is the coverage of PI\mathcal P^IPI. It rests on the distribution-free law of the KS statistic (tables) and on combining ddd tests at level 1−1−αd1-\sqrt[d]{1-\alpha}1−d1−α​. This part is cited, not formalized.
  • Ruled out. The VaR inequality is never checked against a δ∗\delta^*δ∗ that sSup collapses to 000, and the divergence budget is never relaxed by unguarded logarithms.

Contributions are welcome on any milestone. Milestones 1, 3 and 6 are independent of each other and of the rest; the goal follows from milestones 1–7 together with the convex-analytic facts about UϵI\mathcal U^I_\epsilonUϵI​.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta, N. Kallus, Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; Math. Program. 167:235–292, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.0212
  • A. Nemirovski, A. Shapiro, Convex approximations of chance constrained programs, SIAM J. Optim. 17(4):969–996, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1137/050622328
  • M. A. Stephens, EDF statistics for goodness of fit and some comparisons, J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 69(347):730–737, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1974.10480196
  • S. Boyd, L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization, Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://web.stanford.edu/~boyd/cvxbook/
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Convex OptimizationProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Robust Optimization II: With Known Finite Support, the χ² and G Uncertainty Sets Bound the Worst-Case Value at Risk over Their Confidence RegionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust optimization replaces uncertain data by a set of possible values and requires a decision to work for every value in that set. A central question is how to choose the set from data so that robust feasibility also gives a specified chance of satisfying the original constraint. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus study this question for several sampling models in Data-Driven Robust Optimization. Their finite-support construction addresses a practical case: the uncertain vector can take one of finitely many known outcomes, while their probabilities must be inferred from observations. The resulting sets use classical goodness-of-fit tests to account for uncertainty in those probabilities. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, §§2–4, pp. 2–13.

In this case the support vectors are known in advance, so the problem is not to discover which outcomes are possible. The question is how much confidence to place in their estimated frequencies and how to turn that confidence region into a set of uncertain vectors suitable for a robust constraint. The paper gives two answers, one based on Pearson's chi-square statistic and one based on the likelihood-ratio, or G, statistic. Both answers are meant to work at every requested risk level 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1 for the same observed sample. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, Theorem 4, p. 13.

Setting

Let a0,…,an−1∈Rda_0,\ldots,a_{n-1}\in\mathbb R^da0​,…,an−1​∈Rd be the listed possible outcomes. A probability vector p=(pj)p=(p_j)p=(pj​) belongs to the simplex Δn\Delta_nΔn​ when all pjp_jpj​ are nonnegative and ∑jpj=1\sum_jp_j=1∑j​pj​=1. It determines the finite-support law Pp=∑jpjδajP_p=\sum_jp_j\delta_{a_j}Pp​=∑j​pj​δaj​​. From a sample one obtains the empirical frequencies p^∈Δn\hat p\in\Delta_np^​∈Δn​. A nonnegative number ρ\rhoρ records the test threshold; in the paper it is χn−1,1−α2/(2N)\chi^2_{n-1,1-\alpha}/(2N)χn−1,1−α2​/(2N), where NNN is sample size and α\alphaα is the test's significance level. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, (10), p. 12.

The Pearson confidence region Pχ2\mathcal P^{\chi^2}Pχ2 contains candidates p∈Δnp\in\Delta_np∈Δn​ satisfying ∑j(pj−p^j)2/(2pj)≤ρ\sum_j(p_j-\hat p_j)^2/(2p_j)\le\rho∑j​(pj​−p^​j​)2/(2pj​)≤ρ. The G confidence region PG\mathcal P^GPG instead requires D(p^,p)≤ρD(\hat p,p)\le\rhoD(p^​,p)≤ρ, with relative entropy D(r,p)=∑jrjlog⁡(rj/pj)D(r,p)=\sum_jr_j\log(r_j/p_j)D(r,p)=∑j​rj​log(rj​/pj​). In either region, a candidate pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 is excluded when p^j>0\hat p_j>0p^​j​>0: the source's divergence is then infinite. If both entries are zero, that coordinate contributes zero. These conventions matter because ordinary real division and logarithm in Lean have total values at zero. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, (10), p. 12.

For a direction v∈Rdv\in\mathbb R^dv∈Rd, value at risk VaR⁡ϵPp(v)\operatorname{VaR}^{P_p}_\epsilon(v)VaRϵPp​​(v) is the lower 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ quantile of the scalar loss uTvu^{\mathsf T}vuTv. Conditional value at risk is the minimum over real ttt of t+ϵ−1∑jpj(ajTv−t)+t+\epsilon^{-1}\sum_jp_j(a_j^{\mathsf T}v-t)^+t+ϵ−1∑j​pj​(ajT​v−t)+. The paper's auxiliary set UϵCVaR⁡PpU^{\operatorname{CVaR}_{P_p}}_\epsilonUϵCVaRPp​​​ reweights the outcomes with another probability vector qqq constrained by qj≤pj/ϵq_j\le p_j/\epsilonqj​≤pj​/ϵ. The two data-driven uncertainty sets Uϵχ2U^{\chi^2}_\epsilonUϵχ2​ and UϵGU^G_\epsilonUϵG​ allow such a reweighting for some ppp in the corresponding confidence region. Their support function δ∗(v∣U)\delta^*(v\mid U)δ∗(v∣U) is the largest uTvu^{\mathsf T}vuTv over u∈Uu\in Uu∈U. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, (11)–(13), pp. 12–13; Theorem EC.1, p. ec2.

Formalization targets

The first target is the paper's finite-support CVaR identity and the comparison between the two risk measures:

VaR⁡ϵPp(v)≤CVaR⁡ϵPp(v)=δ∗(v∣UϵCVaR⁡Pp).\operatorname{VaR}^{P_p}_\epsilon(v) \le \operatorname{CVaR}^{P_p}_\epsilon(v) =\delta^*(v\mid U^{\operatorname{CVaR}_{P_p}}_\epsilon).VaRϵPp​​(v)≤CVaRϵPp​​(v)=δ∗(v∣UϵCVaRPp​​​).

The goal is Theorem 4's deterministic claim, simultaneously for all 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1. For each ppp in the relevant confidence region, it asks for both bounds

VaR⁡ϵPp(v)≤δ∗(v∣Uϵχ2),VaR⁡ϵPp(v)≤δ∗(v∣UϵG)\operatorname{VaR}^{P_p}_\epsilon(v)\le\delta^*(v\mid U^{\chi^2}_\epsilon), \qquad \operatorname{VaR}^{P_p}_\epsilon(v)\le\delta^*(v\mid U^G_\epsilon)VaRϵPp​​(v)≤δ∗(v∣Uϵχ2​),VaRϵPp​​(v)≤δ∗(v∣UϵG​)

for every vvv, with each uncertainty set nonempty, convex, and compact. A supporting milestone identifies each support function as the supremum of CVaR over its confidence region. The paper also displays conic optimization programs for these support functions in (14) and (15); those programs are outside this mission's drafted statements. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, Theorem 4, p. 13; proof, p. ec2.

Significance

The bounds give a way to certify the directional risk of every candidate distribution accepted by a goodness-of-fit test. For a nonempty convex compact uncertainty set, the paper's Theorem 1 turns this directional condition into a probabilistic guarantee for every constraint concave in the uncertain vector. Theorem 4 adds the sampling claim through coverage of the confidence region: when the true finite-support distribution belongs to that region, the whole family indexed by ϵ\epsilonϵ receives the guarantee. The statistical tests use chi-square approximations, so their advertised coverage is asymptotic rather than an exact finite-sample result. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, Theorems 1–4, pp. 10–13.

The paper proves the mathematical result. This mission asks for machine-checked proofs of its finite-dimensional definitions, the CVaR identity, the worst-case support identities, and the deterministic risk bounds. The drafted Lean statements are open goals. A completed development would also give reusable facts about finite-support risk measures and support functions under divergence-constrained probabilities. It would leave the test coverage calculation and the explicit programs (14)–(15) for separate work.

Difficulty

The risk comparison alone does not identify a robust uncertainty set: the support function must agree with the worst-case CVaR over an entire region of probability vectors. This brings a finite-dimensional optimization identity into the formal proof, including attainment and the relationship between reweightings and distributions. Boundary coordinates create another difficulty. The Pearson expression divides by pjp_jpj​, and the G expression contains log⁡(p^j/pj)\log(\hat p_j/p_j)log(p^​j​/pj​); silently accepting Lean's values at zero would enlarge the regions and change the theorem. The support function and CVaR are real infima or suprema, so their nonempty, bounded domains must also be established. Bertsimas, Gupta, and Kallus, (10)–(13), pp. 12–13; proof, p. ec2.

Formalization scope

Lean represents outcomes and probability vectors as functions on Fin d and Fin n; indices start at zero. The simplex is Mathlib's stdSimplex. The law is a finite sum of point masses. If two listed vectors coincide, their point masses aggregate; the paper's notation pj=Pp(u~=aj)p_j=P_p(\tilde u=a_j)pj​=Pp​(u~=aj​) is recovered with the intended distinct listing. Value at risk and the support function reuse published Prove2Me definitions; the finite-vector relative entropy also reuses a published definition, guarded at zero in this mission's G region. CVaR uses a real sInf, equal to the paper's minimum for a simplex law and 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1. No statement applies it outside that domain.

The goal assumes p^∈Δn\hat p\in\Delta_np^​∈Δn​ and ρ≥0\rho\ge0ρ≥0. These express, respectively, that the center is an empirical probability vector and that the chi-square threshold is nonnegative. It quantifies over every 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1, with the same confidence regions for all levels. The paper's sample size, chi-square quantile, and significance level are compressed into ρ\rhoρ; coverage of the true distribution by the test is a separate statistical premise and is not formalized here. The source's P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ is represented by Pp∗P_{p^*}Pp∗​ for a supported probability vector p∗p^*p∗. The draft does not treat an arbitrary unsupported law as a member of the confidence region.

The nonempty and compact conclusions rule out a zero returned by a support function on an empty or unbounded set. The zero-denominator guards rule out candidates the paper assigns infinite divergence. Contributions needed to close the mission include finite-simplex geometry, the finite-support CVaR identity, continuity of the divergence regions at boundary coordinates, and the risk-bound theorem. Those facts can be reused in later data-driven robust optimization developments.

Selected references

  • Dimitris Bertsimas, Vishal Gupta, and Nathan Kallus, Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; revised version in Mathematical Programming 167 (2018), 235–292. Preprint.
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons 1: A Fixed Price Earns at Least 1 − 1/(2√min{n, λ*t}) of the Optimal Expected RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm holds a fixed stock of a perishable or seasonal product: airline seats, hotel rooms, fashion goods, tickets. It must sell the stock over a finite season, and whatever is left at the end is worth nothing. The firm can change its price at any time, and demand responds to the price at random. Should it adjust its price continually as sales occur and time runs out, or is one well-chosen price nearly as good?

Gallego and van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons (Management Science 40(8), 1994, doi:10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999), set up this question as a continuous-time stochastic control problem and answered it. The source for this mission is the published 1994 article. Its answer is quantitative: the expected revenue of a single fixed price is within a factor 1−1/(2min⁡{n,λ∗t})1-1/(2\sqrt{\min\{n,\lambda^*t\}})1−1/(2min{n,λ∗t}​) of the best possible dynamic policy. The paper is one of the founding results of dynamic pricing in revenue management. The deterministic (fluid) upper bound it introduced became the standard benchmark of the field, and later work on re-solving heuristics, network revenue management and learning-while-pricing builds on it.

Setting

Demand. The firm chooses a demand intensity λ\lambdaλ from an interval Λ∋0\Lambda\ni 0Λ∋0 of allowable rates, and the market charges the inverse-demand price p(λ)p(\lambda)p(λ). On nonzero rates, ppp is strictly decreasing and nonnegative; rate 000 corresponds to the null price p∞p_\inftyp∞​, at which nothing sells. The revenue rate is r(λ)=λp(λ)r(\lambda)=\lambda p(\lambda)r(λ)=λp(λ). It has r(0)=0r(0)=0r(0)=0, and it is continuous, concave and bounded on Λ\LambdaΛ. λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ denotes its least maximizer, and p∗=p(λ∗)p^*=p(\lambda^*)p∗=p(λ∗), r∗=r(λ∗)r^*=r(\lambda^*)r∗=r(λ∗). Such data form a regular demand function (§2.1).

The stochastic problem. At time 000 the firm holds nnn items and has a horizon [0,t][0,t][0,t]. A non-anticipating pricing policy uuu chooses the intensity λs∈Λ\lambda_s\in\Lambdaλs​∈Λ at each elapsed time sss as a function of the sales history so far. Sales follow a Poisson process with this controlled intensity, and at most nnn items can be sold. A sale at time sss earns the current price psp_sps​. The expected revenue is Ju(n,t)=Eu[∫0tps dNs]J_u(n,t)=E_u[\int_0^t p_s\,dN_s]Ju​(n,t)=Eu​[∫0t​ps​dNs​], where NsN_sNs​ counts the sales, and the optimal expected revenue is J∗(n,t)=sup⁡uJu(n,t)J^*(n,t)=\sup_u J_u(n,t)J∗(n,t)=supu​Ju​(n,t).

The deterministic problem. Replacing random sales by their rates gives

JD(x,t)=sup⁡{∫0tr(λ(s)) ds: λ(s)∈Λ, ∫0tλ(s) ds≤x}.J^D(x,t)=\sup\Big\{\int_0^t r(\lambda(s))\,ds:\ \lambda(s)\in\Lambda,\ \int_0^t\lambda(s)\,ds\le x\Big\}.JD(x,t)=sup{∫0t​r(λ(s))ds: λ(s)∈Λ, ∫0t​λ(s)ds≤x}.

It is solved by the constant rate λD=min⁡{λ∗,x/t}\lambda^D=\min\{\lambda^*,x/t\}λD=min{λ∗,x/t} (Proposition 2).

Fixed-price heuristics. JFP(n,t)J^{FP}(n,t)JFP(n,t) is the expected revenue of charging pD=p(λD)p^D=p(\lambda^D)pD=p(λD) for the whole horizon. JOFP(n,t)J^{OFP}(n,t)JOFP(n,t) is the expected revenue of the best constant price.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

For λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0, n≥1n\ge1n≥1 and t>0t>0t>0, J∗(n,t)J^*(n,t)J∗(n,t) is finite and positive, and

JOFP(n,t)J∗(n,t) ≥ JFP(n,t)J∗(n,t) ≥ 1−12min⁡{n,λ∗t}.\frac{J^{OFP}(n,t)}{J^*(n,t)}\ \ge\ \frac{J^{FP}(n,t)}{J^*(n,t)}\ \ge\ 1-\frac{1}{2\sqrt{\min\{n,\lambda^*t\}}}.J∗(n,t)JOFP(n,t)​ ≥ J∗(n,t)JFP(n,t)​ ≥ 1−2min{n,λ∗t}​1​.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 2: λD\lambda^DλD solves (11), and JD(x,t)=t r(λD)J^D(x,t)=t\,r(\lambda^D)JD(x,t)=tr(λD).
  2. Eqs. (13)–(14): Eu[Nt]=Eu[∫0tλsds]≤nE_u[N_t]=E_u[\int_0^t\lambda_s ds]\le nEu​[Nt​]=Eu​[∫0t​λs​ds]≤n and Ju(n,t)=Eu[∫0tr(λs)ds]J_u(n,t)=E_u[\int_0^t r(\lambda_s)ds]Ju​(n,t)=Eu​[∫0t​r(λs​)ds] for every policy.
  3. Eq. (15) and Lemma 1: Ju(n,t)≤Ju(n,t,μ)≤JD(n,t,μ)J_u(n,t)\le J_u(n,t,\mu)\le J^D(n,t,\mu)Ju​(n,t)≤Ju​(n,t,μ)≤JD(n,t,μ) for all μ≥0\mu\ge0μ≥0.
  4. The zero duality gap: JD(n,t)=min⁡μ≥0JD(n,t,μ)J^D(n,t)=\min_{\mu\ge0}J^D(n,t,\mu)JD(n,t)=minμ≥0​JD(n,t,μ).
  5. Theorem 2: J∗(n,t)≤JD(n,t)J^*(n,t)\le J^D(n,t)J∗(n,t)≤JD(n,t) for all n≥0n\ge 0n≥0, t≥0t\ge0t≥0.
  6. Eq. (17): a fixed price ppp earns p E[min⁡{n,Nλ(p)t}]p\,E[\min\{n,N_{\lambda(p)t}\}]pE[min{n,Nλ(p)t​}], with NNN Poisson.
  7. Inequality (18), Gallego's bound E[(N−n)+]≤(σ2+(n−μ)2−(n−μ))/2E[(N-n)^+]\le(\sqrt{\sigma^2+(n-\mu)^2}-(n-\mu))/2E[(N−n)+]≤(σ2+(n−μ)2​−(n−μ))/2, already on the platform.
  8. The two case bounds of the proof of Theorem 3, including (19), and the exact fixed-price revenue of the Remark.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 says that uncertainty can only cost revenue. The deterministic value is a computable upper bound for every policy, so any heuristic can be judged against it. Theorem 3 turns this into a guarantee: with 400 items and scarce stock, a single price earns at least 97.5% of the optimum. The loss vanishes as the expected sales volume grows. This is the justification for the stable, rarely changed prices seen in practice, and the template for the asymptotic-optimality analyses that followed: fluid bounds, re-solving, bid prices.

Formalizing it. The results are proved on paper, and none is formalized. The platform has a discrete-time Bernoulli analogue of Theorem 2 (Talluri–van Ryzin, RevenueManagement.deterministic_upper_bound) and Bitran–Caldentey's periodic-review version as open items. Neither is this continuous-time model. A formalization would add a controlled Poisson sales process with a policy-dependent intensity, the compensator identities (13)–(14) for it, and a Lagrangian-duality argument over measurable rate paths. These are reusable for every continuous-time revenue-management model on the platform. Gallego's moment bound (18) is already proved there.

Difficulty

The deterministic side (Proposition 2, the duality gap) is convex analysis on one concave function. The fixed-price bounds reduce to a Poisson computation and (18). The obstacle is Theorem 2's stochastic step. The revenue is collected at random jump times chosen by an adaptive policy, and comparing it with a deterministic integral requires the compensator identity Eu[∫ps dNs]=Eu[∫r(λs) ds]E_u[\int p_s\,dN_s]=E_u[\int r(\lambda_s)\,ds]Eu​[∫ps​dNs​]=Eu​[∫r(λs​)ds] for an arbitrary non-anticipating intensity. The paper cites Brémaud's martingale theory for this, which Mathlib does not have. A first idea is to apply Jensen's inequality to JuJ_uJu​ directly. It fails because the stock constraint holds only pathwise, through Nt≤nN_t\le nNt​≤n, and not in expectation for a rate path. Restricting to Markovian policies does not remove the need for the identity.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Rates are real numbers, and Λ⊆[0,∞)\Lambda\subseteq[0,\infty)Λ⊆[0,∞) is an interval containing 000. ppp is a real function, strictly decreasing and nonnegative on Λ∖{0}\Lambda\setminus\{0\}Λ∖{0}. r(λ)=λp(λ)r(\lambda)=\lambda p(\lambda)r(λ)=λp(λ) is continuous, concave and bounded above on Λ\LambdaΛ, and λ∗\lambda^*λ∗ is its least maximizer. p(0)p(0)p(0) is never used, since the null price may be +∞+\infty+∞.
  • Policies depend on elapsed time and the past sale times (the internal history); randomized policies are not included. Intensities are jointly measurable and locally integrable.
  • The sales process is built from i.i.d. Exp(1)\mathrm{Exp}(1)Exp(1) clocks, one per item. A sale occurs when the intensity integrated since the last sale reaches the next clock, so at most nnn items are sold. Constraint (2) is part of the construction, not a hypothesis.
  • Values. Expected revenues and J∗J^*J∗ are in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], as lower Lebesgue integrals and suprema. JDJ^DJD is a real supremum over measurable, integrable rate paths, nonempty and bounded for x,t≥0x,t\ge0x,t≥0. JFPJ^{FP}JFP and JOFPJ^{OFP}JOFP are expected revenues of constant-price policies of this process, and the goal also asserts 0<J∗<∞0<J^*<\infty0<J∗<∞. Defining JuJ_uJu​ by the right side of (14), J∗J^*J∗ by the HJB equation, or JFPJ^{FP}JFP by formula (17) would trivialize the mission, and is ruled out.
  • Added hypotheses. Theorem 3 assumes n≥1n\ge1n≥1, t>0t>0t>0 and λ∗>0\lambda^*>0λ∗>0, which the page leaves implicit: the ratios divide by J∗J^*J∗, which vanishes otherwise. Eqs. (13)–(14) are stated for every policy, without Proposition 1's bound λs≤λ∗\lambda_s\le\lambda^*λs​≤λ∗, and without the reduction to Markovian policies.
  • Corrected slips. (12) prints JD(x,t)=tmin⁡{r∗,r0}J^D(x,t)=t\min\{r^*,r^0\}JD(x,t)=tmin{r∗,r0}, which is false for x>λ∗tx>\lambda^*tx>λ∗t (exponential demand with x=atx=atx=at gives r0=0r^0=0r0=0). The statement uses t r(λD)t\,r(\lambda^D)tr(λD), and the printed form where x≤λ∗tx\le\lambda^*tx≤λ∗t. The Remark's "E(Nn−n)+=n(1−P{Nn=n})E(N_n-n)^+=n(1-P\{N_n=n\})E(Nn​−n)+=n(1−P{Nn​=n})" should read E[min⁡{Nn,n}]E[\min\{N_n,n\}]E[min{Nn​,n}]; its displayed JFPJ^{FP}JFP formula is right. Proposition 2's "the optimal solution" is stated as optimality, since uniqueness fails without strict concavity.
  • Welcome contributions. Infrastructure for counting processes with stochastic intensity (the clock construction, the compensator identity), Jensen and Lagrangian duality for concave integral functionals on rate paths, and Poisson truncated-mean computations.

Selected references

  • G. Gallego, G. van Ryzin, Optimal Dynamic Pricing of Inventories with Stochastic Demand over Finite Horizons, Management Science 40(8):999–1020, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.40.8.999
  • G. Gallego, A Minmax Distribution Free Procedure for the (Q, R) Inventory Model, Operations Research Letters 11:55–60, 1992 (cited in the paper's references, p. 1019).
  • P. Brémaud, Point Processes and Queues: Martingale Dynamics, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1980 (as cited in the paper).
  • K. T. Talluri, G. J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Springer, 2004 (Chapter 5; on the platform as RevenueManagement.*).
  • G. Bitran, R. Caldentey, An Overview of Pricing Models for Revenue Management, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 5(3):203–229, 2003 (on the platform as PricingRM.DetHeuristic.*).
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Probability·Captain: mikedeng1

Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model 3: A Closed Form for the Induced Penalty Cost under Normal DemandResearch Paper

Motivation

Multiechelon inventory theory studies supply systems in which stock is held at several levels: here, a depot that orders from an outside supplier and a retail outlet that is replenished from the depot and faces random customer demand. The question is how much to order and ship in each period so as to minimize expected holding, shortage and ordering costs over an infinite horizon. Clark and Scarf (Management Science, 1960) showed that the finite-horizon problem of a serial system decomposes into single-location problems linked by an induced penalty cost. Federgruen and Zipkin (Operations Research 32(4), 1984) extended the decomposition to the infinite horizon under discounted and average costs, and then asked what it costs to compute an optimal policy.

In the reduced single-location problem the only nonlinear part of the one-period cost is the expected induced penalty PLP^LPL. Any algorithm for the reduced problem (Veinott–Wagner type policy computations, for instance) evaluates PLP^LPL many times. In general each evaluation is a numerical integral. Section 4 of the paper shows that when demand is normal, PLP^LPL has a closed form in the univariate and bivariate standard normal distribution functions. This mission formalizes that closed form, eq. (13) on p. 830.

Setting

Time is discrete. One-period demand is u∼N(μ,σ2)u\sim N(\mu,\sigma^2)u∼N(μ,σ2) with σ>0\sigma>0σ>0, independent across periods. For i≥1i\ge1i≥1, u(i)u^{(i)}u(i) is the total demand over iii periods. It is normal with mean μ(i)=iμ\mu^{(i)}=i\muμ(i)=iμ and standard deviation σ(i)=i1/2σ\sigma^{(i)}=i^{1/2}\sigmaσ(i)=i1/2σ, density f(i)f^{(i)}f(i) and cdf F(i)F^{(i)}F(i). The shipment lead time from depot to outlet is l≥0l\ge0l≥0 and the order lead time from the supplier is L≥1L\ge1L≥1. The cost factors are a system-wide holding cost hd>0h^d>0hd>0, a retailer holding cost hr>0h^r>0hr>0 and a retailer shortage penalty pr>0p^r>0pr>0. Write ps=hd+prp^s=h^d+p^rps=hd+pr. Costs are average costs, so the discount factor is α=1\alpha=1α=1 throughout.

The retailer's one-period cost (p. 822) is

R(x)=−hd(x−μ(l))+prE[u(l+1)−x]++(hd+hr)E[x−u(l+1)]+.R(x)=-h^d(x-\mu^{(l)})+p^rE[u^{(l+1)}-x]^++(h^d+h^r)E[x-u^{(l+1)}]^+ .R(x)=−hd(x−μ(l))+prE[u(l+1)−x]++(hd+hr)E[x−u(l+1)]+.

The critical number xr∗x^{r*}xr∗ is a global minimizer of RRR (property (b), p. 824). The induced penalty cost is P(x)=0P(x)=0P(x)=0 for x≥xr∗x\ge x^{r*}x≥xr∗ and P(x)=R(x)−R(xr∗)P(x)=R(x)-R(x^{r*})P(x)=R(x)−R(xr∗) for x<xr∗x<x^{r*}x<xr∗. Its expectation over the order lead time is

PL(x)=E P[x−u(L)](eq. (10)).P^L(x)=E\,P[x-u^{(L)}]\qquad\text{(eq. (10))}.PL(x)=EP[x−u(L)](eq. (10)).

Let Φ\PhiΦ and ϕ\phiϕ be the standard normal cdf and density, Θ(z)=zΦ(z)+ϕ(z)\Theta(z)=z\Phi(z)+\phi(z)Θ(z)=zΦ(z)+ϕ(z), and Φ(ξ1,ξ2;ρ)\Phi(\xi_1,\xi_2;\rho)Φ(ξ1​,ξ2​;ρ) the cdf of a bivariate normal pair with standard normal marginals and correlation ρ\rhoρ. The paper defines (p. 830)

τ1(x)=−x−(xr∗+μ(L))σ(L),τ2(x)=x−μ(L+l+1)σ(L+l+1),νr∗=xr∗−μ(l+1)σ(l+1),\tau_1(x)=-\frac{x-(x^{r*}+\mu^{(L)})}{\sigma^{(L)}},\quad \tau_2(x)=\frac{x-\mu^{(L+l+1)}}{\sigma^{(L+l+1)}},\quad \nu^{r*}=\frac{x^{r*}-\mu^{(l+1)}}{\sigma^{(l+1)}},τ1​(x)=−σ(L)x−(xr∗+μ(L))​,τ2​(x)=σ(L+l+1)x−μ(L+l+1)​,νr∗=σ(l+1)xr∗−μ(l+1)​, τ3(x)=−x−(xr∗+μ(L))−[σ(L)/σ(l+1)]2[xr∗−μ(l+1)]σ(L)σ(L+l+1)/σ(l+1),\tau_3(x)=-\frac{x-(x^{r*}+\mu^{(L)})-[\sigma^{(L)}/\sigma^{(l+1)}]^2[x^{r*}-\mu^{(l+1)}]}{\sigma^{(L)}\sigma^{(L+l+1)}/\sigma^{(l+1)}},τ3​(x)=−σ(L)σ(L+l+1)/σ(l+1)x−(xr∗+μ(L))−[σ(L)/σ(l+1)]2[xr∗−μ(l+1)]​, ϵ1(x)=Φ[τ3(x)]ϕ[τ2(x)]σ(L+l+1),ϵ2(x)=Φ(νr∗)ϕ[τ1(x)]σ(L),ι(x)=σ(L)Θ[τ1(x)],\epsilon_1(x)=\frac{\Phi[\tau_3(x)]\phi[\tau_2(x)]}{\sigma^{(L+l+1)}},\qquad \epsilon_2(x)=\frac{\Phi(\nu^{r*})\phi[\tau_1(x)]}{\sigma^{(L)}},\qquad \iota(x)=\sigma^{(L)}\Theta[\tau_1(x)],ϵ1​(x)=σ(L+l+1)Φ[τ3​(x)]ϕ[τ2​(x)]​,ϵ2​(x)=σ(L)Φ(νr∗)ϕ[τ1​(x)]​,ι(x)=σ(L)Θ[τ1​(x)], κ(x)=σ(l+1)Θ(νr∗)Φ[τ1(x)]−{[σ(L+l+1)]2ϵ1(x)−[σ(L)]2ϵ2(x)}−[x−μ(L+l+1)] Φ[τ1(x),τ2(x);ρ],\kappa(x)=\sigma^{(l+1)}\Theta(\nu^{r*})\Phi[\tau_1(x)]-\{[\sigma^{(L+l+1)}]^2\epsilon_1(x)-[\sigma^{(L)}]^2\epsilon_2(x)\}-[x-\mu^{(L+l+1)}]\,\Phi[\tau_1(x),\tau_2(x);\rho],κ(x)=σ(l+1)Θ(νr∗)Φ[τ1​(x)]−{[σ(L+l+1)]2ϵ1​(x)−[σ(L)]2ϵ2​(x)}−[x−μ(L+l+1)]Φ[τ1​(x),τ2​(x);ρ],

with ρ=−σ(L)/σ(L+l+1)\rho=-\sigma^{(L)}/\sigma^{(L+l+1)}ρ=−σ(L)/σ(L+l+1).

Formalization targets

Goal: eq. (13)

For every real xxx,

PL(x)=ps ι(x)−(ps+hr) κ(x).P^L(x)=p^s\,\iota(x)-(p^s+h^r)\,\kappa(x).PL(x)=psι(x)−(ps+hr)κ(x).

This is an exact identity for every admissible parameter value. It holds with no constants left free.

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's outline of the derivation on pp. 829–831:

  1. eq. (11), R(x)=ps[μ(l+1)−x]+(ps+hr)∫−∞xF(l+1)(t) dt−hdμR(x)=p^s[\mu^{(l+1)}-x]+(p^s+h^r)\int_{-\infty}^xF^{(l+1)}(t)\,dt-h^d\muR(x)=ps[μ(l+1)−x]+(ps+hr)∫−∞x​F(l+1)(t)dt−hdμ;
  2. eq. (12), PL(x)=∫x−xr∗∞[R(x−t)−R(xr∗)]f(L)(t) dtP^L(x)=\int_{x-x^{r*}}^\infty[R(x-t)-R(x^{r*})]f^{(L)}(t)\,dtPL(x)=∫x−xr∗∞​[R(x−t)−R(xr∗)]f(L)(t)dt;
  3. eq. (14), PL′(x)=−psΦ[τ1(x)]+(ps+hr)∫x−xr∗∞F(l+1)(x−t)f(L)(t) dtP^{L\prime}(x)=-p^s\Phi[\tau_1(x)]+(p^s+h^r)\int_{x-x^{r*}}^\infty F^{(l+1)}(x-t)f^{(L)}(t)\,dtPL′(x)=−psΦ[τ1​(x)]+(ps+hr)∫x−xr∗∞​F(l+1)(x−t)f(L)(t)dt;
  4. eq. (15), the same derivative with the integral replaced by Φ[τ1(x),τ2(x);ρ]\Phi[\tau_1(x),\tau_2(x);\rho]Φ[τ1​(x),τ2​(x);ρ];
  5. PL(x)→0P^L(x)\to0PL(x)→0 as x→∞x\to\inftyx→∞, hence PL(x)=−∫x∞PL′(t) dtP^L(x)=-\int_x^\infty P^{L\prime}(t)\,dtPL(x)=−∫x∞​PL′(t)dt;
  6. ι′(x)=−Φ[τ1(x)]\iota'(x)=-\Phi[\tau_1(x)]ι′(x)=−Φ[τ1​(x)] and ι(x)→0\iota(x)\to0ι(x)→0;
  7. the two conditional-normal identities, which give Φ[τ3(x)]\Phi[\tau_3(x)]Φ[τ3​(x)] and Φ(νr∗)\Phi(\nu^{r*})Φ(νr∗);
  8. ddxΦ[τ1(x),τ2(x);ρ]=ϵ1(x)−ϵ2(x)\frac{d}{dx}\Phi[\tau_1(x),\tau_2(x);\rho]=\epsilon_1(x)-\epsilon_2(x)dxd​Φ[τ1​(x),τ2​(x);ρ]=ϵ1​(x)−ϵ2​(x);
  9. and 10. the formulas for ϵ1′\epsilon_1'ϵ1′​ and ϵ2′\epsilon_2'ϵ2′​;
  10. κ′(x)=−Φ[τ1(x),τ2(x);ρ]\kappa'(x)=-\Phi[\tau_1(x),\tau_2(x);\rho]κ′(x)=−Φ[τ1​(x),τ2​(x);ρ] and κ(x)→0\kappa(x)\to0κ(x)→0.

Two side remarks of p. 830 are also included: Θ′=Φ\Theta'=\PhiΘ′=Φ, and the simplified form of τ3\tau_3τ3​.

Significance

The result. Under normal demand, (13) replaces the numerical integral (12) with a few evaluations of Φ\PhiΦ, ϕ\phiϕ and the bivariate normal cdf, all available in standard numerical libraries. Together with the decomposition results of Sections 1–3 of the paper, it makes the policy computation for the two-echelon system with normal demand no harder than a single-location computation with an explicit cost function. The same functions reappear in the paper's Section 5 for several retail outlets, after a reinterpretation of σ(l+1)\sigma^{(l+1)}σ(l+1).

Formalizing it. The paper proves (13) only in outline: it calls the derivation "an elementary integration problem, but … sufficiently involved to warrant an outline" and leaves "tedious algebra" and "more algebra" to the reader. A machine-checked proof turns that outline into a complete argument, including the analytic steps the outline passes over: differentiation under the integral sign, the limits at +∞+\infty+∞, and the identification of an integral of normal densities with a bivariate normal probability. To our knowledge no formal proof of (13) exists, and no bivariate normal distribution function is on the platform yet.

Difficulty

The obvious approach is to substitute (11) into (12) and integrate. The result is a double integral of normal densities over a region bounded by a line, and it does not reduce to univariate functions. The paper's route is to differentiate first, identify the derivative (14) as a probability for the correlated pair (u(L),u(L)+u(l+1))(u^{(L)},u^{(L)}+u^{(l+1)})(u(L),u(L)+u(l+1)), and then recover PLP^LPL by integrating from +∞+\infty+∞. That route needs three things: justification for differentiating under the integral in (12), whose integrand has a kink at t=x−xr∗t=x-x^{r*}t=x−xr∗; control of the limits at +∞+\infty+∞; and the conditional-normal identities, which involve conditioning on a null event and so must be handled through densities. The verification of κ′\kappa'κ′ is a long computation with Θ\ThetaΘ, ϵ1\epsilon_1ϵ1​ and ϵ2\epsilon_2ϵ2​, in which every constant matters.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace FZEchelon.NormalDemand. The model data form the structure Data (fields μ,σ,hd,hr,pr,l,L,xr∗\mu,\sigma,h^d,h^r,p^r,l,L,x^{r*}μ,σ,hd,hr,pr,l,L,xr∗). The law of u(i)u^{(i)}u(i) is the platform's normal demand law InventoryControl.newsboyDemand with mean iμi\muiμ and standard deviation i σ\sqrt i\,\sigmai​σ. Expectations are Bochner integrals, and improper integrals are set integrals over Set.Ioi/Set.Iic. Φ\PhiΦ is cdf (gaussianReal 0 1). The bivariate cdf is the iterated integral of the explicit bivariate density over a lower-left quadrant (meaningful for ∣ρ∣<1|\rho|<1∣ρ∣<1; here ρ∈(−1,0)\rho\in(-1,0)ρ∈(−1,0)). Derivatives are HasDerivAt and limits are Tendsto … atTop (𝓝 0).

Standing hypotheses of every theorem: σ>0\sigma>0σ>0; hd,hr,pr>0h^d,h^r,p^r>0hd,hr,pr>0 (p. 821); L≥1L\ge1L≥1; and xr∗x^{r*}xr∗ minimizes RRR. Two of these are added to the page and disclosed. σ>0\sigma>0σ>0 is needed because every τ\tauτ divides by some σ(i)\sigma^{(i)}σ(i). L≥1L\ge1L≥1 is needed because σ(0)=0\sigma^{(0)}=0σ(0)=0, and the paper treats zero order lead time separately (p. 819). Demand is exactly normal, as in §4, which acknowledges that this violates u≥0u\ge0u≥0 and ignores the objection. No nonnegativity, truncation or approximation enters. The goal fixes α=1\alpha=1α=1, the average-cost case the section restricts to. The discounted analogue is not part of this mission.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: every Bochner integral in the statements has an integrable integrand, since integrands grow at most linearly and the normal law has all moments. No division by a zero standard deviation can occur under the hypotheses. A sorry-free check in the workspace shows that all hypotheses hold together, with a minimizer xr∗x^{r*}xr∗ of RRR proved to exist.

Needed infrastructure: properties of gaussianReal (moments, convolution of independent normals), differentiation of parametric integrals, and a bivariate normal distribution function with its partial derivatives. A reusable treatment of the bivariate normal cdf, linking the density form used here to Mathlib's multivariateGaussian, would be a contribution of independent value. Proofs of individual milestones are welcome in any order.

Selected references

  • A. Federgruen and P. Zipkin, Computational Issues in an Infinite-Horizon, Multiechelon Inventory Model, Operations Research 32(4):818–836, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.32.4.818
  • A. J. Clark and H. Scarf, Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem, Management Science 6(4):475–490, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.4.475
  • A. F. Veinott Jr. and H. M. Wagner, Computing Optimal (s, S) Inventory Policies, Management Science 11(5):525–552, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.5.525
17 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Asymptotic Optimality of Order-up-to Policies in Lost Sales Inventory Systems: Ordering Up to the Newsvendor Level for Penalty b + τh Is Asymptotically Optimal as b → ∞Research Paper

Motivation

Periodic-review inventory systems face a simple choice each period: how much to order before the next demand is known. When unmet demand is lost, the order can affect the stock available several periods later without preserving a backlog that records earlier shortages. This makes the optimal policy difficult to describe when replenishment takes time. An order-up-to policy offers a practical rule: order enough to bring the inventory position to a fixed level. Huh, Janakiraman, Muckstadt and Rusmevichientong ask when that simple rule performs as well as the best admissible lost-sales policy as the penalty for a lost unit grows. Their working paper, pp. 3–4 and 17–18, proves asymptotic optimality for a particular level obtained from a related backorder system.

The motivating costs are concrete. A lost sale may represent an expedited service part or a missed sale whose cost is much larger than one period of holding inventory. The paper's central comparison concerns the high-penalty regime while holding the demand law, lead time and holding rate fixed. The fixed-level policy can be computed from the distribution of demand over the lead time plus the order period; it does not require solving the full lost-sales control problem. The paper also supplies a finite-penalty bound, which this mission retains as a milestone. Huh et al., pp. 3–4, 17–18.

Setting

Let D1,D2,…D_1,D_2,\ldotsD1​,D2​,… be independent, identically distributed nonnegative demands with finite positive mean. An order takes a fixed integer lead time τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 to arrive. At the start of period ttt, the order placed τ\tauτ periods earlier arrives; then a new order is placed, and demand DtD_tDt​ is observed. Unmet demand is lost. At period end, each unit remaining on hand incurs holding cost h>0h>0h>0, and each lost unit incurs penalty b>0b>0b>0. The inventory position counts on-hand units and outstanding orders. An order-up-to-SSS policy raises this position to S≥0S\ge0S≥0 whenever possible.

Write CL,S(h,b)C^{\mathcal L,S}(h,b)CL,S(h,b) for the long-run average cost of that policy and CL∗(h,b)C^{\mathcal L*}(h,b)CL∗(h,b) for the infimum over admissible policies. The corresponding backorder system retains unmet demand as negative net inventory and charges bbb per backordered unit per period. For an order-up-to level SSS, its stationary average cost is

CB,S(h,b)=hE[(S−D)+]+bE[(D−S)+],D=∑i=1τ+1Di.C^{\mathcal B,S}(h,b)=h\mathbb E[(S-\mathbf D)^+]+b\mathbb E[(\mathbf D-S)^+],\qquad \mathbf D=\sum_{i=1}^{\tau+1}D_i.CB,S(h,b)=hE[(S−D)+]+bE[(D−S)+],D=i=1∑τ+1​Di​.

The newsvendor level SB∗(h,b)S^{\mathcal B*}(h,b)SB∗(h,b) is the smallest nonnegative SSS with Pr⁡(D≤S)≥b/(b+h)\Pr(\mathbf D\le S)\ge b/(b+h)Pr(D≤S)≥b/(b+h); it attains the best backorder order-up-to cost CB∗(h,b)C^{\mathcal B*}(h,b)CB∗(h,b). The paper's Assumption 1 concerns this lead-time demand D\mathbf DD: if mD(t)=E[D−t∣D>t]m_{\mathbf D}(t)=\mathbb E[\mathbf D-t\mid\mathbf D>t]mD​(t)=E[D−t∣D>t] when the conditioning event has positive probability and zero otherwise, then mD(t)/t→0m_{\mathbf D}(t)/t\to0mD​(t)/t→0 as t→∞t\to\inftyt→∞. Huh et al., pp. 3–4, 9, 11–12.

Formalization targets

Asymptotically optimal order-up-to level

Fix hhh, τ\tauτ and the demand law satisfying Assumption 1. Set Sb+τh=SB∗(h,b+τh)S_{b+\tau h}=S^{\mathcal B*}(h,b+\tau h)Sb+τh​=SB∗(h,b+τh). The goal is the equivalent multiplicative form of Theorem 15(b): for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, all sufficiently large bbb satisfy

inf⁡S≥0CL,S(h,b)≤CL,Sb+τh(h,b)≤(1+ε)CL∗(h,b).\inf_{S\ge0}C^{\mathcal L,S}(h,b)\le C^{\mathcal L,S_{b+\tau h}}(h,b)\le(1+\varepsilon)C^{\mathcal L*}(h,b).S≥0inf​CL,S(h,b)≤CL,Sb+τh​(h,b)≤(1+ε)CL∗(h,b).

The infimum over order-up-to levels captures the paper's best such policy. The right-hand comparator remains the infimum over all admissible lost-sales policies. The multiplicative form also covers an almost-surely constant demand law, where both costs can be zero and a literal ratio would be undefined. Huh et al., Theorem 15(b), p. 17.

Explicit finite-penalty bound

Theorem 15(a) is a milestone. With S′=SB∗(h,b/(τ+1))S'=S^{\mathcal B*}(h,b/(\tau+1))S′=SB∗(h,b/(τ+1)) and ψ(S′;h,q)=qE[(D−S′)+]/(hE[(S′−D)+])\psi(S';h,q)=q\mathbb E[(\mathbf D-S')^+]/(h\mathbb E[(S'-\mathbf D)^+])ψ(S′;h,q)=qE[(D−S′)+]/(hE[(S′−D)+]), its factor is

1+νbψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1))1+ψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1)),νb=(b+τh)(τ+1)b.\frac{1+\nu_b\psi(S';h,b/(\tau+1))}{1+\psi(S';h,b/(\tau+1))},\qquad \nu_b=\frac{(b+\tau h)(\tau+1)}{b}.1+ψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1))1+νb​ψ(S′;h,b/(τ+1))​,νb​=b(b+τh)(τ+1)​.

The milestone states the bound where the expected holding quantity in ψ\psiψ is positive. Earlier milestones state the pathwise comparison of the systems, the two-sided average-cost comparison with penalties b/(τ+1)b/(\tau+1)b/(τ+1) and b+τhb+\tau hb+τh, the lower bound on unrestricted lost-sales optimal cost, the newsvendor formula, and the backorder sensitivity results used by the theorem. Huh et al., Lemmas 5, 9, 13 and Theorems 6, 15, pp. 11–18.

Significance

The theorem gives a specific computable stock level whose relative cost loss vanishes in the high-penalty regime. It addresses the gap between a tractable backorder benchmark and the more difficult lost-sales control problem. The finite-penalty factor states how the comparison depends on lead time, holding cost, penalty and the shortage-to-holding ratio; the asymptotic statement alone would not quantify that dependence. The paper establishes these mathematical results; the mission asks for machine-checked proofs of the stated Lean targets. Huh et al., pp. 17–18.

Formalizing the result would also supply reusable infrastructure for coupled inventory systems: measurable demand-path laws, pathwise recursions with delayed delivery, extended nonnegative long-run costs, and a clean comparison between an explicit policy and the infimum over unrestricted policies. The backorder newsvendor and mean-residual-life components can be reused beyond this particular lost-sales model.

Difficulty

The backorder system has a closed stationary cost formula, while a lost-sales order-up-to process generally cannot be replaced directly by that formula. The paper notes that its on-hand inventory distribution need not converge from every starting state, even under a fixed order-up-to policy. One must therefore justify the long-run comparison without assuming stationarity from an arbitrary start. A second difficulty is the benchmark: comparing only against other order-up-to policies is too weak to establish Theorem 15, because the goal uses the optimal cost over all admissible lost-sales policies. Huh et al., pp. 14–16, 18.

Formalization scope

Lean reuses the published CappedBaseStock lost-sales model. Its demands are nonnegative and i.i.d. with finite positive mean; τ≥1\tau\ge1τ≥1 and h,b>0h,b>0h,b>0. Period zero in Lean is period one in the paper. Both coupled processes start with zero on-hand stock and an empty pipeline. Inventory XtX_tXt​ is read immediately after delivery, before current demand. Lost-sales costs lie in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and use the limsup of expected Cesàro averages; the backorder closed form uses real Bochner expectations under finite-mean demand. The paper's stationary lost-sales cost and this Cesàro cost are identified using its long-run results, but those convergence results are outside this proposal. Huh et al., pp. 14–16.

The paper prints nonnegative rates in Theorem 15, while its displayed newsvendor fraction and shortage-to-holding ratios require positive denominators. Theorem 6(a) therefore states the ratio limit for nonconstant demand laws. The main theorem uses a multiplicative limit bound that also covers constant demand, where the printed ratio is undefined.

The quantity CL∗C^{\mathcal L*}CL∗ is an infimum over measurable, history-dependent policies with private randomization; no attaining policy is assumed. The backorder optimum is an infimum over nonnegative order-up-to levels. Assumption 1 is imposed on the sum of τ+1\tau+1τ+1 demands, and the limit b→∞b\to\inftyb→∞ is expressed by a positive threshold uniform over all parameter records with the fixed lead time and holding rate. The mission excludes a restricted policy comparator, a fixed penalty, a one-period lead-time specialization, and Assumption 1 on single-period demand. Solvers may contribute proofs of any milestone, along with finite-mean and measurability lemmas needed to connect the model to the backorder benchmarks.

Selected references

  • W. T. Huh, G. Janakiraman, J. A. Muckstadt and P. Rusmevichientong, Asymptotic Optimality of Order-up-to Policies in Lost Sales Inventory Systems, working paper, December 4, 2006; published in Management Science 55(3), 2009. DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0945.
  • G. Janakiraman, S. Seshadri and G. Shanthikumar, A Comparison of the Optimal Costs of Two Canonical Inventory Systems, working paper, Stern School of Business, New York University, 2005; bound quoted in Huh et al., §5, p. 13. Quoted source.
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Convex OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimization with Stochastic Dominance Constraints: Lagrange Multipliers of a Second-Order Dominance Constraint Are Concave Nondecreasing Utility FunctionsResearch Paper

Motivation

A decision maker choosing a random outcome XXX (a portfolio return, a policy's cost savings, a schedule's throughput) often has a reference outcome YYY, the result of a benchmark policy, and wants the new outcome to be preferable to it for every risk-averse decision maker, not just on average. Expected-utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern) makes this precise: XXX is preferred to YYY by every decision maker with a concave nondecreasing utility function uuu exactly when XXX dominates YYY in the second order, X⪰(2)YX\succeq_{(2)}YX⪰(2)​Y. Requiring X⪰(2)YX\succeq_{(2)}YX⪰(2)​Y as a constraint in an optimization problem avoids having to elicit any particular utility function, which is rarely possible in practice and impossible when several decision makers must agree.

Dentcheva and Ruszczyński (preprint 2002, published in SIAM J. Optim. 14(2), 2003) introduced optimization problems with stochastic dominance constraints and developed their optimality and duality theory. The central finding is that the Lagrange multiplier of a second-order dominance constraint is itself a concave nondecreasing utility function: the optimal solution maximizes the objective plus an expected utility, for a utility function implied by the problem. This interpretation underlies the later literature on dominance-constrained portfolio optimization, risk-averse stochastic programming, and the dual (quantile) theory of stochastic orders.

Setting

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space and L1=L1(Ω,F,P)\mathcal L^1=\mathcal L^1(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)L1=L1(Ω,F,P) the space of integrable random variables with its norm topology. For X∈L1X\in\mathcal L^1X∈L1 the distribution function is F(X;η)=P[X≤η]F(X;\eta)=P[X\le\eta]F(X;η)=P[X≤η] and the second-order shortfall function is

F2(X;η)=∫−∞ηF(X;α) dα,η∈R.(2.1)F_2(X;\eta)=\int_{-\infty}^{\eta}F(X;\alpha)\,d\alpha,\qquad \eta\in\mathbb R. \tag{2.1}F2​(X;η)=∫−∞η​F(X;α)dα,η∈R.(2.1)

Changing the order of integration gives F2(X;η)=E[(η−X)+]F_2(X;\eta)=\mathbb E[(\eta-X)_+]F2​(X;η)=E[(η−X)+​] (2.6), where (⋅)+=max⁡(0,⋅)(\cdot)_+=\max(0,\cdot)(⋅)+​=max(0,⋅). The relation X⪰(2)YX\succeq_{(2)}YX⪰(2)​Y means F2(X;η)≤F2(Y;η)F_2(X;\eta)\le F_2(Y;\eta)F2​(X;η)≤F2​(Y;η) for all η\etaη, and A2(Y)={X∈L1:X⪰(2)Y}A_2(Y)=\{X\in\mathcal L^1:X\succeq_{(2)}Y\}A2​(Y)={X∈L1:X⪰(2)​Y}.

The problem data are a reference outcome Y∈L1Y\in\mathcal L^1Y∈L1, a convex closed set C⊆L1C\subseteq\mathcal L^1C⊆L1, a functional fff that is concave and continuous on CCC, and an interval [a,b][a,b][a,b]. The paper studies the relaxation in which dominance is enforced on [a,b][a,b][a,b]:

max⁡f(X)subject toE[(η−X)+]≤E[(η−Y)+]  for all η∈[a,b],X∈C.(3.1–3.3)\max f(X)\quad\text{subject to}\quad\mathbb E[(\eta-X)_+]\le\mathbb E[(\eta-Y)_+]\ \ \text{for all }\eta\in[a,b],\qquad X\in C. \tag{3.1–3.3}maxf(X)subject toE[(η−X)+​]≤E[(η−Y)+​]  for all η∈[a,b],X∈C.(3.1–3.3)

The uniform dominance condition (Definition 4.1) asks for some X~∈C\tilde X\in CX~∈C with inf⁡η∈[a,b]{F2(Y;η)−F2(X~;η)}>0\inf_{\eta\in[a,b]}\{F_2(Y;\eta)-F_2(\tilde X;\eta)\}>0infη∈[a,b]​{F2​(Y;η)−F2​(X~;η)}>0.

The multiplier class U1\mathcal U_1U1​ consists of the functions u:R→Ru:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Ru:R→R that are concave and nondecreasing, vanish on [b,∞)[b,\infty)[b,∞), and are affine on (−∞,a](-\infty,a](−∞,a]: u(t)=u(a)+c(t−a)u(t)=u(a)+c(t-a)u(t)=u(a)+c(t−a) for t≤at\le at≤a, with a constant c≥0c\ge0c≥0. The Lagrangian is

L(X,u)=f(X)+E[u(X)]−E[u(Y)].(4.1)L(X,u)=f(X)+\mathbb E[u(X)]-\mathbb E[u(Y)]. \tag{4.1}L(X,u)=f(X)+E[u(X)]−E[u(Y)].(4.1)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2

Assume the uniform dominance condition. If X^\hat XX^ is an optimal solution of (3.1)–(3.3), there is u^∈U1\hat u\in\mathcal U_1u^∈U1​ with

L(X^,u^)=max⁡X∈CL(X,u^)(4.2)andE[u^(X^)]=E[u^(Y)].(4.3)L(\hat X,\hat u)=\max_{X\in C}L(X,\hat u)\quad(4.2)\qquad\text{and}\qquad\mathbb E[\hat u(\hat X)]=\mathbb E[\hat u(Y)].\quad(4.3)L(X^,u^)=X∈Cmax​L(X,u^)(4.2)andE[u^(X^)]=E[u^(Y)].(4.3)

Conversely, if for some u^∈U1\hat u\in\mathcal U_1u^∈U1​ a maximizer X^∈C\hat X\in CX^∈C of L(⋅,u^)L(\cdot,\hat u)L(⋅,u^) satisfies (3.2) and (4.3), then X^\hat XX^ is optimal for (3.1)–(3.3).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof. They are: finiteness of E[u(X)]\mathbb E[u(X)]E[u(X)] for u∈U1u\in\mathcal U_1u∈U1​; the identity (2.6), already proved on the platform; Proposition 2.3 (convexity and closedness of A2(Y)A_2(Y)A2​(Y), and its recession cone); the concavity of the constraint operator G(X)(η)=F2(Y;η)−F2(X;η)G(X)(\eta)=F_2(Y;\eta)-F_2(X;\eta)G(X)(η)=F2​(Y;η)−F2​(X;η) with respect to the cone of nonnegative functions; the existence of a nonnegative measure multiplier μ^\hat\muμ^​ on [a,b][a,b][a,b] satisfying (4.5)–(4.6); the facts that the function uμ(t)=−∫tbμ([τ,b]) dτu_\mu(t)=-\int_t^b\mu([\tau,b])\,d\tauuμ​(t)=−∫tb​μ([τ,b])dτ (t<bt<bt<b), uμ(t)=0u_\mu(t)=0uμ​(t)=0 (t≥bt\ge bt≥b) of a nonnegative measure lies in U1\mathcal U_1U1​ and that every u∈U1u\in\mathcal U_1u∈U1​ is uμu_\muuμ​ for exactly one μ\muμ; the key identity

∫abF2(X;η) dμ(η)=−E[uμ(X)];(4.9)\int_a^b F_2(X;\eta)\,d\mu(\eta)=-\mathbb E[u_\mu(X)]; \tag{4.9}∫ab​F2​(X;η)dμ(η)=−E[uμ​(X)];(4.9)

and the weak-duality step: (3.2) implies E[u(X)]≥E[u(Y)]\mathbb E[u(X)]\ge\mathbb E[u(Y)]E[u(X)]≥E[u(Y)] for every u∈U1u\in\mathcal U_1u∈U1​.

Further: Theorem 5.1

With D(u)=sup⁡X∈CL(X,u)D(u)=\sup_{X\in C}L(X,u)D(u)=supX∈C​L(X,u), the dual problem min⁡u∈U1D(u)\min_{u\in\mathcal U_1}D(u)minu∈U1​​D(u) has a solution, its value equals the primal optimal value, and its solutions are exactly the u^∈U1\hat u\in\mathcal U_1u^∈U1​ satisfying (4.2)–(4.3).

Significance

Theorem 4.2 turns an infinite family of constraints, one for each η∈[a,b]\eta\in[a,b]η∈[a,b], into a single scalar trade-off: at the optimum, the decision maker behaves as an expected-utility maximizer for an implicit utility u^\hat uu^, and the dominance constraint is active exactly in the sense E[u^(X^)]=E[u^(Y)]\mathbb E[\hat u(\hat X)]=\mathbb E[\hat u(Y)]E[u^(X^)]=E[u^(Y)]. Theorem 5.1 makes U1\mathcal U_1U1​ the space of dual variables, which is the starting point of dual decomposition and cutting-plane methods for dominance-constrained problems and of their extensions to several constraints and to higher orders (Sections 6–7 of the paper, not part of this mission).

All results are proved in the paper. Apart from the identity (2.6), which is proved on the platform, none of them is formalized as far as the platform records show. A machine-checked development would provide, on top of the paper, a rigorous treatment of the measure–utility correspondence that the paper obtains from a textbook theorem "after an obvious adaptation", and a careful account of the multiplier class itself (see the scope section on the constant ccc). The definitions of F2F_2F2​ and of the identity (2.6) are shared with the platform's missions on Dual Stochastic Dominance and Related Mean-Risk Models (Ogryczak and Ruszczyński, 2002).

Difficulty

The necessity half needs a Lagrange multiplier for a constraint taking values in the infinite-dimensional space C([a,b])\mathcal C([a,b])C([a,b]); finite-dimensional convex duality does not apply, and the multiplier first appears as a nonnegative measure on [a,b][a,b][a,b], an element of the dual of C([a,b])\mathcal C([a,b])C([a,b]). A Slater-type point is required: without the uniform dominance condition the multiplier may not exist. This is why the dominance relation, which the paper first poses on all of R\mathbb RR, is relaxed to a bounded interval [a,b][a,b][a,b]: for a reference outcome with a smallest value y1y_1y1​, F2(Y;y1)=0F_2(Y;y_1)=0F2​(Y;y1​)=0, so no X~\tilde XX~ can dominate YYY strictly near y1y_1y1​.

The second obstacle is the translation of that measure into a utility function. The identity (4.9) requires an interchange of integrals over R×[a,b]\mathbb R\times[a,b]R×[a,b] and an integration by parts against the distribution function of an arbitrary integrable XXX, followed by a limit in which the integrability of XXX controls the linear growth of uuu at −∞-\infty−∞. The converse direction needs every u∈U1u\in\mathcal U_1u∈U1​ to be represented by a unique measure, through the left derivative of a concave function.

Formalization scope

Outcomes are elements of Mathlib's L1L^1L1 space Ω →₁[P] ℝ over a probability measure P, coerced to functions inside integrals; no statement is pointwise in ω\omegaω. F2F_2F2​ is the published definition DualSSD.Shared.secondPerformance, a Bochner integral of P[X≤α]P[X\le\alpha]P[X≤α] over (−∞,η](-\infty,\eta](−∞,η]. The problem data form a structure whose fields include every standing assumption of the paper: CCC convex and closed, fff concave and continuous on CCC. The constraint (3.2) is stated in its printed expectation form, while Definition 4.1 and the proof objects use F2F_2F2​, as printed; their equality is (2.6).

Committed conventions:

  • U1\mathcal U_1U1​ uses c≥0c\ge0c≥0. The paper prints c>0c>0c>0. With c>0c>0c>0 the necessity half of Theorem 4.2 is false: take Y≡0Y\equiv0Y≡0, [a,b]=[1,2][a,b]=[1,2][a,b]=[1,2], f(X)=EXf(X)=\mathbb EXf(X)=EX and CCC the constant random variables with values in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Then X~≡1\tilde X\equiv1X~≡1 satisfies Definition 4.1, X^≡1\hat X\equiv1X^≡1 is optimal, and (4.3) forces c=0c=0c=0. The proof itself produces c=μ([a,b])c=\mu([a,b])c=μ([a,b]), which vanishes for the zero multiplier of a slack constraint, and the paper calls U1\mathcal U_1U1​ a convex cone, which must contain 000.
  • Definition 4.1's infimum is encoded as a positive lower bound ε\varepsilonε on [a,b][a,b][a,b]. "=max⁡X∈C=\max_{X\in C}=maxX∈C​" is encoded as membership in CCC plus an upper bound over CCC.
  • A nonnegative measure in rca([a,b])\mathbf{rca}([a,b])rca([a,b]) is a finite Borel measure on R\mathbb RR giving zero mass to the complement of [a,b][a,b][a,b], which is the paper's own extension by zero. Integrals ∫ab⋅ dμ\int_a^b\cdot\,d\mu∫ab​⋅dμ are over the closed interval, so atoms at aaa and bbb count.
  • No relation between aaa and bbb is assumed. For a>ba>ba>b every statement remains meaningful: the constraint is vacuous and U1={0}\mathcal U_1=\{0\}U1​={0}.
  • Theorem 5.1's dual function takes values in the extended reals.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: a junk-valued expectation (a Bochner integral of a non-integrable function, which Lean sets to 000) cannot occur for u∈U1u\in\mathcal U_1u∈U1​, and its integrability is a milestone. Dropping the concavity of fff or the convexity of CCC would make the necessity half false, so these assumptions are fields of the problem data.

Infrastructure a complete development needs: convex duality for cone constraints in C([a,b])\mathcal C([a,b])C([a,b]) (or a direct separation argument in R×C([a,b])\mathbb R\times\mathcal C([a,b])R×C([a,b])), the Riesz representation of nonnegative functionals on C([a,b])\mathcal C([a,b])C([a,b]), Fubini and integration by parts for Stieltjes measures, and the measure of a left-continuous monotone function. These pieces are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone are welcome. The extensions to several dominance constraints and to higher-order dominance are not included.

Selected references

  • D. Dentcheva and A. Ruszczyński, Optimization with stochastic dominance constraints, preprint dated December 27, 2002 (Stochastic Programming E-Print Series); published in SIAM Journal on Optimization 14(2):548–566, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623402420528
  • W. Ogryczak and A. Ruszczyński, Dual stochastic dominance and related mean-risk models, SIAM Journal on Optimization 13(1):60–78, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623400375075
  • J. F. Bonnans and A. Shapiro, Perturbation Analysis of Optimization Problems, Springer, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1394-9
  • J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, 1944.
13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Solutions of Uncertain Linear Programs I: Under Constraint-wise Uncertainty and the Boundedness Assumption the Robust Counterpart Is No Worse Than the Worst InstanceResearch Paper

Motivation

A linear program is solved with data that, in practice, is rarely known exactly: coefficients come from measurements, estimates or forecasts. Robust optimization asks for a solution that remains feasible for every realization of the data in a prescribed uncertainty set, and among those the one with the best guaranteed objective value. Ben-Tal and Nemirovski introduced this framework for linear programming in Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs (Oper. Res. Lett. 25, 1999), following their treatment of robust convex optimization (Math. Oper. Res. 23, 1998) and Soyster's earlier work on inexact linear programming (Oper. Res. 21, 1973). The robust counterpart has since become the starting point of a large literature on uncertainty sets, budgets of uncertainty and adjustable policies.

A natural first objection is that the robust counterpart might be needlessly conservative: by demanding feasibility for all realizations simultaneously, it could be infeasible, or have a worse value, even when every individual realization is perfectly well behaved. This mission formalizes the paper's answer (§2.2): under two structural hypotheses, the robust counterpart is no worse than the worst realization.

Setting

Fix c,f∈Rnc, f \in \mathbb R^nc,f∈Rn and write a linear program in the homogeneous form (6)

(P)min⁡{cTx∣Ax≥0, fTx=1},(P)\qquad \min\{c^{T}x \mid Ax \ge 0,\ f^{T}x = 1\},(P)min{cTx∣Ax≥0, fTx=1},

where AAA is a real m×nm\times nm×n matrix and Ax≥0Ax\ge0Ax≥0 is componentwise. Every linear program can be put in this form. The matrix AAA is uncertain: it is only known to lie in an uncertainty set U\mathcal UU of m×nm\times nm×n matrices. Each A∈UA\in\mathcal UA∈U gives an instance (P)(P)(P) with feasible set {x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1}\{x\mid Ax\ge0,\ f^{T}x = 1\}{x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1} and optimal value c∗(P)c^*(P)c∗(P); the family of instances is P\mathcal PP. The robust counterpart (7) is

(PU)min⁡{cTx∣x∈GU},GU={x∣Ax≥0  ∀A∈U; fTx=1},(P_{\mathcal U})\qquad \min\{c^{T}x \mid x \in G_{\mathcal U}\},\qquad G_{\mathcal U} = \{x\mid Ax\ge0\ \ \forall A\in\mathcal U;\ f^{T}x = 1\},(PU​)min{cTx∣x∈GU​},GU​={x∣Ax≥0  ∀A∈U; fTx=1},

and its optimal value is c∗c^*c∗. Since GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ does not change when U\mathcal UU is replaced by its closed convex hull, the paper assumes throughout that U\mathcal UU is convex and closed.

Let Ui⊆Rn\mathcal U_i\subseteq\mathbb R^nUi​⊆Rn be the set of all realizations of the iii-th row, the projection of U\mathcal UU onto the data of the iii-th constraint. The uncertainty is constraint-wise if U=U1×⋯×Um\mathcal U = \mathcal U_1\times\dots\times\mathcal U_mU=U1​×⋯×Um​: the rows vary independently. The Boundedness Assumption asks for a convex compact set Q⊆RnQ\subseteq\mathbb R^nQ⊆Rn that contains the feasible set of every instance.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.1 (p. 5)

If the uncertainty is constraint-wise and the Boundedness Assumption holds, then

  1. (PU)(P_{\mathcal U})(PU​) is infeasible if and only if some instance is infeasible:
GU=∅  ⟺  ∃A∈U: {x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1}=∅;G_{\mathcal U} = \emptyset \iff \exists A\in\mathcal U:\ \{x\mid Ax\ge0,\ f^{T}x=1\}=\emptyset;GU​=∅⟺∃A∈U: {x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1}=∅;
  1. if (PU)(P_{\mathcal U})(PU​) is feasible with optimal value c∗c^*c∗, then
c∗=sup⁡{c∗(P)∣(P)∈P}.(9)c^* = \sup\{c^*(P)\mid (P)\in\mathcal P\}. \tag{9}c∗=sup{c∗(P)∣(P)∈P}.(9)

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof: the row-wise description (8) of robust feasibility; the inclusion of GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ in every instance's feasible set; the reduction of the semi-infinite system (8) on QQQ to a finite subsystem; the statement that the finite system (10) A1x≥0,…,ANx≥0, fTx=1A_1x\ge0,\dots,A_Nx\ge0,\ f^{T}x=1A1​x≥0,…,AN​x≥0, fTx=1 then has no solution at all; the Farkas certificate (11); the construction of one infeasible instance from it; and part (i) alone, which part (ii) uses for an augmented program.

Companions

The §2.2 example (every instance has optimal value 1, the robust counterpart is infeasible), and the two invariance remarks: GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ is unchanged under passing to the closed convex hull of U\mathcal UU (§2.1) or to the product U1×⋯×Um\mathcal U_1\times\dots\times\mathcal U_mU1​×⋯×Um​ of its projections (§2.2).

Significance

Proposition 2.1 says that, for constraint-wise uncertainty, robustness costs nothing beyond what the worst realization already costs: the robust counterpart is feasible exactly when every instance is, and its optimal value equals the worst instance value. The §2.2 example shows the hypothesis cannot be dropped: there, correlated uncertainty in two rows makes every instance solvable with value 1 while the robust counterpart is infeasible. Together with the invariance of GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ under passing to the product of projections, this explains why row-wise (constraint-wise) uncertainty sets are the standard modelling choice in robust linear optimization.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known to exist. Formalizing it produces a reusable development of semi-infinite linear systems: the compactness reduction to finite subsystems, a homogeneous Farkas alternative, and the row-averaging argument that uses convexity and the product structure of U\mathcal UU.

Difficulty

The robust counterpart has a continuum of constraints, one for each A∈UA\in\mathcal UA∈U, so Farkas' Lemma cannot be applied to it directly. The step that requires care is passing from infeasibility of this semi-infinite system to infeasibility of a single instance. Compactness yields only finitely many instances whose joint system has no solution in QQQ; those instances are in general all feasible individually, and the infeasible instance has to be manufactured from their rows. Without constraint-wise uncertainty the manufactured matrix need not lie in U\mathcal UU, which is exactly what the §2.2 example exploits. Part (ii) needs the optimal values of the instances to be attained on compact feasible sets, which is where the Boundedness Assumption enters again.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, and Ax≥0Ax\ge0Ax≥0 is 0 ≤ A *ᵥ x in the componentwise order. The iii-th row of AAA is A i and aTxa^{T}xaTx is a ⬝ᵥ x. The projections Ui\mathcal U_iUi​ are the images of U\mathcal UU under A↦AiA\mapsto A_iA↦Ai​, not free sets, and constraint-wise uncertainty is the inclusion U1×⋯×Um⊆U\mathcal U_1\times\dots\times\mathcal U_m\subseteq\mathcal UU1​×⋯×Um​⊆U (the reverse inclusion always holds). The Boundedness Assumption keeps both convexity and compactness of QQQ, as on the page.

Optimal values are infima: c∗c^*c∗ is the greatest lower bound (IsGLB) of cTxc^{T}xcTx over GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​, and (9) states that c∗c^*c∗ is the least upper bound (IsLUB) of the set of real optimal values of the instances. No real sInf/sSup is used, so no junk value can make the statement true.

The goal carries the paper's standing assumption that U\mathcal UU is convex and closed, and one disclosed addition: U\mathcal UU is nonempty. The paper takes this for granted; without it part (i) fails for f=0f = 0f=0 and the supremum in (9) ranges over the empty set. The goal does not assume that the robust counterpart or any instance attains its optimum, and it does not mention finite subsystems, multipliers or the averaged matrix; those appear only in the milestones. A formalization in which the uncertainty sets Ui\mathcal U_iUi​ are arbitrary sets with U=∏iUi\mathcal U = \prod_i\mathcal U_iU=∏i​Ui​, or in which optimal values are taken as sInf without boundedness, would not be faithful and is ruled out.

A complete development needs: compactness arguments for families of closed half-spaces, a Farkas alternative for homogeneous systems with one normalizing equation, and elementary convexity of linear images. These pieces are general and reusable beyond robust optimization. Proofs of the milestones, alternative arguments (for instance via LP duality for part (ii)) and proofs of the companion statements are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Operations Research Letters 25(1):1–13, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6377(99)00016-4 (cited here by the pages of the authors' manuscript).
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust convex optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 23(4):769–805, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.23.4.769
  • A. L. Soyster, Convex programming with set-inclusive constraints and applications to inexact linear programming, Operations Research 21(5):1154–1157, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.5.1154
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks IX: Partial Balance — Equivalent Characterizations via Truncation, Rate Changes and Time ReversalTextbook

Why partial balance

Equilibrium distributions of Markov models of networks are rarely computed by solving the full equilibrium equations directly. In the classical product-form results (migration processes, Jackson and Kelly networks, loss networks, clustering processes) the equilibrium distribution satisfies a stronger, local family of equations, and that is what makes it computable. The strongest such family is detailed balance, which characterizes reversibility. Many models that are not reversible still satisfy an intermediate family, partial balance: the probability flux balances not pair by pair but across a chosen set of transitions. F. P. Kelly's Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979) uses partial balance throughout: quasi-reversibility in Chapter 3 is a form of it, and the models that display it tend to be insensitive, meaning their equilibrium distribution does not change when exponential holding times are replaced by general ones with the same mean.

Section 9.4 of the book collects what partial balance means in a single statement. Theorem 9.5 summarizes Exercises 1.6.2–1.6.4 and 1.7.7–1.7.8 and gives five operational characterizations of partial balance. Corollaries 9.6–9.8 translate them into the language of spatial processes, and Theorem 9.9 turns partial balance of a coarse description into a product-form equilibrium for a finer one. This last step is the mechanism behind insensitivity.

Setting

A Markov process on a state space S\mathcal SS has transition rates q(j,k)≥0q(j,k)\ge0q(j,k)≥0 for j≠kj\ne kj=k, with q(j,j)=0q(j,j)=0q(j,j)=0. It is irreducible: every state can be reached from every other through transitions of positive rate. An equilibrium distribution is a collection of positive numbers π(j)\pi(j)π(j) summing to one that satisfies the equilibrium equations

π(j)∑k∈Sq(j,k)=∑k∈Sπ(k)q(k,j),j∈S.\pi(j)\sum_{k\in\mathcal S}q(j,k)=\sum_{k\in\mathcal S}\pi(k)q(k,j),\qquad j\in\mathcal S.π(j)k∈S∑​q(j,k)=k∈S∑​π(k)q(k,j),j∈S.

For an irreducible process on a finite state space it exists and is unique.

Given a set A⊆S\mathcal A\subseteq\mathcal SA⊆S, π\piπ satisfies partial balance with respect to A\mathcal AA if

π(j)∑k∈Aq(j,k)=∑k∈Aπ(k)q(k,j),j∈A.\pi(j)\sum_{k\in\mathcal A}q(j,k)=\sum_{k\in\mathcal A}\pi(k)q(k,j),\qquad j\in\mathcal A.π(j)k∈A∑​q(j,k)=k∈A∑​π(k)q(k,j),j∈A.

Truncating the process to A\mathcal AA deletes every transition out of A\mathcal AA, and the result is required to be irreducible within A\mathcal AA. The time-reversed process of a process with equilibrium distribution π\piπ has rates π(k)q(k,j)/π(j)\pi(k)q(k,j)/\pi(j)π(k)q(k,j)/π(j).

A spatial process has JJJ sites, the vertices of a graph GGG. Site jjj carries an attribute njn_jnj​ from a finite set Nj\mathcal N_jNj​, and the state space is S=N1×⋯×NJ\mathcal S=\mathcal N_1\times\cdots\times\mathcal N_JS=N1​×⋯×NJ​. Write TjmnT_j^m\mathbf nTjm​n for the state n\mathbf nn with the attribute of site jjj changed to mmm. The process must satisfy three conditions: only one site changes at a time; the rate q(n,Tjmn)q(\mathbf n,T_j^m\mathbf n)q(n,Tjm​n) depends on the other sites only through the neighbours of jjj; and any TjmnT_j^m\mathbf nTjm​n can be reached from n\mathbf nn without changing the other sites. The conditional distribution of site jjj given the rest is P(nj∣nG−j)=π(n)/∑mπ(Tjmn)P(n_j\mid\mathbf n_{G-j})=\pi(\mathbf n)/\sum_m\pi(T_j^m\mathbf n)P(nj​∣nG−j​)=π(n)/∑m​π(Tjm​n). A Markov field is a positive distribution whose conditional distributions depend only on the neighbours of jjj.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9.5

For an irreducible process on a finite S\mathcal SS with equilibrium distribution π\piπ, a nonempty A\mathcal AA within which the truncated process is irreducible, and a constant c>0c>0c>0, c≠1c\ne1c=1, the following are equivalent:

  1. partial balance with respect to A\mathcal AA;
  2. the equilibrium distribution of the truncated process is π(j)/∑k∈Aπ(k)\pi(j)/\sum_{k\in\mathcal A}\pi(k)π(j)/∑k∈A​π(k);
  3. multiplying the rates q(j,k)q(j,k)q(j,k), j,k∈Aj,k\in\mathcal Aj,k∈A, by ccc leaves the equilibrium distribution unchanged;
  4. multiplying the rates q(j,k)q(j,k)q(j,k), j∈Aj\in\mathcal Aj∈A, k∉Ak\notin\mathcal Ak∈/A, by ccc changes the equilibrium distribution to
Bπ(j) (j∈A),Bcπ(j) (j∉A),B−1=∑j∈Aπ(j)+c∑j∉Aπ(j);B\pi(j)\ (j\in\mathcal A),\qquad Bc\pi(j)\ (j\notin\mathcal A),\qquad B^{-1}=\sum_{j\in\mathcal A}\pi(j)+c\sum_{j\notin\mathcal A}\pi(j);Bπ(j) (j∈A),Bcπ(j) (j∈/A),B−1=j∈A∑​π(j)+cj∈/A∑​π(j);
  1. time reversal and truncation to A\mathcal AA commute.

When S−A\mathcal S-\mathcal AS−A is nonempty, these are also equivalent to:

  1. the chain observed just before each exit from A\mathcal AA and the chain observed just after each entry into A\mathcal AA have the same equilibrium distribution.

Milestones

  • Corollary 9.6: the equivalences for the sets on which all sites but jjj are frozen, i.e. partial balance (9.26) at a site.
  • Corollary 9.7: on a state space with at least two states, partial balance at every site makes π\piπ a Markov field, with 0<π(n)<10<\pi(\mathbf n)<10<π(n)<1 as in the book's definition.
  • Corollary 9.8: the equivalences for the set on which site jjj is frozen at one attribute (9.27).
  • Theorem 9.9: if a reduced description n=f(x)\mathbf n=f(\mathbf x)n=f(x) has a distribution π(n)\pi(\mathbf n)π(n) in partial balance for the rates (9.31), then the finer process has equilibrium distribution π(x)=π(n)∏jPj(xj∣nj)\pi(\mathbf x)=\pi(\mathbf n)\prod_jP_j(x_j\mid n_j)π(x)=π(n)∏j​Pj​(xj​∣nj​).

What the results give

Theorem 9.5 makes partial balance testable by operations on the process itself: truncation, speeding up or slowing down transitions, and time reversal. The book points to close relationships between statement (iv) and the product form of Section 2.3, and between statement (ii) and part (iii) of Theorem 3.12. Corollary 9.6 (iv) explains why the reversed migration process has such a simple form. Corollary 9.7 strengthens Theorem 9.3 by replacing reversibility with partial balance at each site. Theorem 9.9 is the step from partial balance to insensitivity: it is what the book uses to show that a spatial process keeps its equilibrium distribution when the lifetimes of attributes are mixtures of gamma distributions.

All of these results were proved in 1979. None has a machine-checked proof. The platform has the reversible special case of statement (ii) (KellyStochasticNetworks.truncated_reversible) and the rate-level objects for time reversal and truncation, which this mission reuses. Formalizing Theorem 9.5 also produces a reusable account of embedded exit and entry chains of a finite Markov process.

Difficulty

Most of the equivalences (i)–(v) are short manipulations of the equilibrium equations, but each direction from a property of an altered process back to partial balance needs uniqueness of equilibrium distributions for irreducible finite processes, and (v) ⇒ (i) also needs their existence. Mathlib has neither in the form needed here. Statement (vi) is a different kind of claim. The equilibrium distribution of the exit chain is proportional to the exit flux π(j)∑k∉Aq(j,k)\pi(j)\sum_{k\notin\mathcal A}q(j,k)π(j)∑k∈/A​q(j,k), and that of the entry chain to the entry flux. Proving this requires the hitting distributions and the Green's function of the jump chain killed on leaving a set, and the convergence of the series that define them. Corollary 9.8 (v) inherits that work. Theorem 9.9 requires uniqueness for the reduced frozen processes and careful bookkeeping of the fibres {xj:fj(xj)=nj}\{x_j:f_j(x_j)=n_j\}{xj​:fj​(xj​)=nj​}.

Formalization scope

State spaces are finite types, and every sum is an unconditional sum over a finite type. Because the state space is finite, the book's extra condition for (vi), a finite flux out of A\mathcal AA, holds automatically. Rates are real functions with q(j,j)=0q(j,j)=0q(j,j)=0 built into the hypotheses; the reduced rates of (9.31) also have zero self-rates. "The equilibrium distribution of a process is XXX" means: XXX is positive, sums to one, satisfies the equilibrium equations, and every distribution with these properties equals XXX. The book's "c≠0c\ne0c=0 or 111" is read as c>0c>0c>0, c≠1c\ne1c=1, so that altered rates remain rates. Truncation to A\mathcal AA is the published truncatedRates, a process on the subtype A\mathcal AA, and the reversed rates are the published reversedRates. The exit and entry chains are defined from the jump chain through series of restricted matrix powers. Spatial processes live on ∏jNj\prod_j\mathcal N_j∏j​Nj​ with TjmT_j^mTjm​ given by Function.update. In Theorem 9.9 the graph is complete, as the book assumes from p. 202 on.

The equilibrium distribution of the truncated process must be the unique positive normalized solution of the truncated equilibrium equations. It must not be defined as the conditional distribution, which would make (ii) a tautology. For the same reason (iii) and (iv) are stated through the equilibrium equations of the altered rates, not by assumption.

Theorem 9.10 (p. 207) is not a target. Its hypothesis, that a nominal lifetime "can have any distribution with unit mean", is not defined on the page, and the point-process and lifetime description it needs lies outside this rate-level development.

Contributions are welcome at every level: uniqueness and existence of equilibrium distributions for irreducible finite rate matrices (reusable across the series), convergence of the killed Green's function, and proofs of the corollaries from the goal.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley, Chichester, 1979; reissued Cambridge University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139171724 (§9.4, pp. 200–208; §1.6, pp. 25–27)
  • F. P. Kelly and E. Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565363
11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryMarkov ChainProbability+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks VIII: Markov Fields — A Positive Random Field Is Markov iff It Factorizes over the Simplices of the GraphTextbook

Motivation

Many systems consist of a finite number of sites whose states influence one another only locally: fruit trees in an orchard that are diseased or healthy, power sources that are working or broken, individuals holding one of several views. Chapter 9 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979) asks which joint distributions such systems have in equilibrium. Earlier chapters of the book produce product-form distributions in which the components are independent; spatial models instead give a limited dependence, and §9.1 makes that notion precise through Markov fields.

The central characterization, that a positive random field is Markov with respect to a graph exactly when it factorizes over the cliques of that graph, is the theorem of Hammersley and Clifford (1971, unpublished manuscript), with published proofs by Besag (1974), Grimmett (1973) and Preston (1973). It underlies Gibbs random fields in statistical mechanics, spatial statistics, image analysis and graphical models. Kelly's §§9.2–9.3 then use it to identify the equilibrium distributions of interacting-particle Markov processes ("spatial processes"), connecting it to reversibility and partial balance.

Setting

There are JJJ sites, the vertices of a finite graph GGG; ∂j\partial j∂j is the set of neighbours of site jjj and G−jG-jG−j the set of sites other than jjj. Site jjj carries an attribute njn_jnj​ from a finite set Nj\mathcal N_jNj​, and a state is n=(n1,…,nJ)\mathbf n=(n_1,\dots,n_J)n=(n1​,…,nJ​) in S=N1×⋯×NJ\mathcal S=\mathcal N_1\times\cdots\times\mathcal N_JS=N1​×⋯×NJ​. For a set of sites HHH, nH\mathbf n_HnH​ is the vector of attributes of the sites in HHH. The operator TjmT_j^mTjm​ changes the attribute of site jjj to mmm.

A random field is a function π\piπ on S\mathcal SS with π(n)>0\pi(\mathbf n)>0π(n)>0 for every state and ∑nπ(n)=1\sum_{\mathbf n}\pi(\mathbf n)=1∑n​π(n)=1. The conditional probability that site jjj has attribute njn_jnj​ given all other sites is

P(nj∣nG−j)=π(n)∑m∈Njπ(Tjmn).(9.1)P(n_j\mid\mathbf n_{G-j}) = \frac{\pi(\mathbf n)}{\sum_{m\in\mathcal N_j}\pi(T_j^m\mathbf n)}. \qquad (9.1)P(nj​∣nG−j​)=∑m∈Nj​​π(Tjm​n)π(n)​.(9.1)

π\piπ is a Markov field if P(nj∣nG−j)=P(nj∣n∂j)P(n_j\mid\mathbf n_{G-j}) = P(n_j\mid\mathbf n_{\partial j})P(nj​∣nG−j​)=P(nj​∣n∂j​) for every jjj and n\mathbf nn (9.2): the attribute of a site depends on the rest of the system only through its neighbours. A simplex is a single site or a set of sites any two of which are neighbours; C\mathcal CC is the set of simplices of GGG.

A spatial process is a Markov process n(t)\mathbf n(t)n(t) on S\mathcal SS with rates qqq such that (i) only one component changes at a time, (ii) q(n,Tjmn)q(\mathbf n,T_j^m\mathbf n)q(n,Tjm​n) depends on n\mathbf nn only through njn_jnj​ and n∂j\mathbf n_{\partial j}n∂j​, and (iii) TjmnT_j^m\mathbf nTjm​n can be reached from n\mathbf nn by transitions that do not alter nG−j\mathbf n_{G-j}nG−j​. The general spatial process of §9.3 has rates

q(n,Tjmn)=λj(nj,m) Φ(n)ΦG−j(nG−j)(9.15)q(\mathbf n,T_j^m\mathbf n)=\lambda_j(n_j,m)\,\frac{\Phi(\mathbf n)}{\Phi_{G-j}(\mathbf n_{G-j})} \qquad (9.15)q(n,Tjm​n)=λj​(nj​,m)ΦG−j​(nG−j​)Φ(n)​(9.15)

for positive functions Φ\PhiΦ, ΦG−j\Phi_{G-j}ΦG−j​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9.2 (p. 186)

A random field π\piπ is a Markov field if and only if

π(n)=B∏C∈CϕC(nC),n∈S,(9.5)\pi(\mathbf n) = B\prod_{C\in\mathcal C}\phi_C(\mathbf n_C), \qquad \mathbf n\in\mathcal S, \qquad (9.5)π(n)=BC∈C∏​ϕC​(nC​),n∈S,(9.5)

for some constant BBB and functions ϕC\phi_CϕC​.

Milestones

  • Lemma 9.1 (p. 185): the conditional probabilities P(nj∣nG−j)P(n_j\mid\mathbf n_{G-j})P(nj​∣nG−j​), j∈Gj\in Gj∈G, n∈S\mathbf n\in\mathcal Sn∈S, determine the random field uniquely.
  • Theorem 9.3 (p. 189): the equilibrium distribution of a reversible spatial process is a Markov field.
  • Theorem 9.4 (p. 193): for the rates (9.15), with αj>0\alpha_j>0αj​>0 solving αj(n)∑mλj(n,m)=∑mαj(m)λj(m,n)\alpha_j(n)\sum_m\lambda_j(n,m)=\sum_m\alpha_j(m)\lambda_j(m,n)αj​(n)∑m​λj​(n,m)=∑m​αj​(m)λj​(m,n) (9.16), the equilibrium distribution is
π(n)=B ∏j=1Jαj(nj)Φ(n),(9.17)\pi(\mathbf n) = B\,\frac{\prod_{j=1}^J\alpha_j(n_j)}{\Phi(\mathbf n)}, \qquad (9.17)π(n)=BΦ(n)∏j=1J​αj​(nj​)​,(9.17)

and it satisfies the partial balance equations (9.18) site by site.

Significance

Theorem 9.2 turns a statement about conditional laws, which is how local interaction is usually specified, into an explicit parametrization of the joint law by clique potentials. On a lattice with binary attributes it reduces a Markov field to one parameter per site and one per pair of adjacent sites, giving the form π(n)=BαMβR\pi(\mathbf n)=B\alpha^M\beta^Rπ(n)=BαMβR (9.9). Theorem 9.3 shows that local, reversible dynamics produce Markov-field equilibria, and Theorem 9.4 gives a family of non-reversible processes, containing the closed migration process of Chapter 2, whose equilibria are still explicit; its partial balance equations are the bridge to §9.4.

All four results are classical and proved in the book. They are not, to our knowledge, machine-checked in this discrete form. The platform has an open statement of Hammersley–Clifford in a different setting, HighDimStat.GraphicalModels.thm11_8_hammersley_clifford (Wainwright, High-Dimensional Statistics, Theorem 11.8): a random vector in RV\mathbb R^VRV with a strictly positive Lebesgue density and the global (separation) Markov property. Neither statement implies the other as formalized, so this mission poses Kelly's finite, local version separately. A formal proof here also gives reusable infrastructure: conditional probabilities of a distribution on a finite product space, and factorizations over the cliques of a graph.

Difficulty

The "if" direction is routine. The "only if" direction is where the content lies: the functions ϕC\phi_CϕC​ must be produced from π\piπ alone, and a product over the cliques of GGG must reproduce π\piπ at every state, not only at the states whose nonzero attributes sit on a single clique. The natural first idea, one factor per site read off from the conditional laws, fails as soon as two sites interact. The Markov property must also be brought from its explicit form (9.2), which involves a marginal over the non-neighbours, into a usable statement about π\piπ itself. Strict positivity is essential: without it the "only if" direction is false (Exercise 9.2.2). For Theorem 9.3, condition (iii) cannot be dropped: Exercise 9.2.2 gives a reversible process satisfying (i) and (ii) whose equilibrium is not a Markov field, so any argument that uses only the local form of the rates fails.

Formalization scope

  • Sites form an arbitrary finite type V with decidable equality; attributes at site j form a finite type N j, which may differ between sites. States are dependent functions (j : V) → N j, and TjmnT_j^m\mathbf nTjm​n is Function.update n j m. The graph is a Mathlib SimpleGraph V, so ∂j\partial j∂j is G.neighborSet j.
  • A random field is a real function, positive at every state, with finite sum 111. P(nj∣n∂j)P(n_j\mid\mathbf n_{\partial j})P(nj​∣n∂j​) is the conditional probability computed from π\piπ (a ratio of finite sums), so (9.2) is stated literally.
  • Simplices are the nonempty cliques of the given graph GGG, including single sites. The factorization ranges over exactly these sets; a product over all subsets of sites, or over the cliques of the complete graph, would make the goal trivially true and is ruled out.
  • Theorems 9.3 and 9.4 are read at the level of rates: "equilibrium distribution of a reversible process" is a positive distribution summing to one in detailed balance with qqq (the published KellyStochasticNetworks.DetailedBalance), and "equilibrium distribution" in 9.4 is a positive distribution summing to one satisfying the equilibrium equations (KellyStochasticNetworks.FullBalance), together with its uniqueness under irreducibility. The Markov process itself is not constructed. The state space is always finite, so all sums are finite.
  • Contributions welcome: proofs of any item, general lemmas on conditional laws over finite product spaces, and a formal account of the general Hammersley–Clifford theorem that both this mission and the Wainwright statement could use.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley, 1979, Chapter 9. https://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html
  • J. Besag, Spatial interaction and the statistical analysis of lattice systems, J. Roy. Statist. Soc. B 36 (1974), 192–236. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1974.tb00999.x
  • G. R. Grimmett, A theorem about random fields, Bull. London Math. Soc. 5 (1973), 81–84. https://doi.org/10.1112/blms/5.1.81
  • C. J. Preston, Generalized Gibbs states and Markov random fields, Adv. Appl. Probab. 5 (1973), 242–261. https://doi.org/10.2307/1426035
  • M. J. Wainwright, High-Dimensional Statistics, Cambridge University Press, 2019, Theorem 11.8. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108627771
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks III: Open Networks of Queues with General Customer Routes Have Product-Form EquilibriumTextbook

Motivation

Networks of queues model systems in which jobs visit a sequence of service stations: items in a manufacturing job-shop, packets in a communication network, patients moving between hospital departments. The open migration process of Chapter 2 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979), and the job-shop networks of Jackson (Jackson 1963) route a customer leaving a queue at random, independently of where he has been. That rules out the most common situation in practice: an item that has passed machines 1 and 3 must next go to machine 4, while an item that has passed machines 2 and 3 must go to machine 5.

Section 3.1 of the book removes this restriction. Customers are divided into types, a type fixes a deterministic route through the queues, and a stochastic routing rule is recovered by using one type per possible route. Within each queue, the order of service is described by two position-dependent functions, which cover first-come first-served KKK-server queues, last-come first-served, processor sharing and service in random order. Theorem 3.1 states that, for every such network, the equilibrium distribution is a product of explicit single-queue factors. This is the result behind the "Kelly network" and "Kelly-type queue" terminology of later work (Kelly 1975; Baskett, Chandy, Muntz, Palacios 1975).

Setting

There are III customer types and JJJ queues. Customers of type iii enter the system in a Poisson stream of rate ν(i)>0\nu(i)>0ν(i)>0 and visit the queues r(i,1),r(i,2),…,r(i,S(i))r(i,1),r(i,2),\dots,r(i,S(i))r(i,1),r(i,2),…,r(i,S(i)) in that order before leaving; two successive stages of a route are at different queues.

Queue jjj holds its njn_jnj​ customers in positions 1,…,nj1,\dots,n_j1,…,nj​. Each customer needs an exponentially distributed amount of service with unit mean. The queue supplies total service effort at rate ϕj(nj)\phi_j(n_j)ϕj​(nj​), with ϕj(n)>0\phi_j(n)>0ϕj​(n)>0 for n>0n>0n>0; a proportion γj(l,nj)\gamma_j(l,n_j)γj​(l,nj​) goes to the customer in position lll. An arriving customer takes position lll with probability δj(l,nj+1)\delta_j(l,n_j+1)δj​(l,nj​+1). For each n≥1n\ge1n≥1, γj(⋅,n)\gamma_j(\cdot,n)γj​(⋅,n) and δj(⋅,n)\delta_j(\cdot,n)δj​(⋅,n) are probability vectors on {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n}.

The class of the customer in position lll of queue jjj is cj(l)=(tj(l),sj(l))c_j(l)=(t_j(l),s_j(l))cj​(l)=(tj​(l),sj​(l)), his type and the stage of his route. The state of queue jjj is cj=(cj(1),…,cj(nj))\mathbf c_j=(c_j(1),\dots,c_j(n_j))cj​=(cj​(1),…,cj​(nj​)) and the state of the network is C=(c1,…,cJ)\mathbf C=(\mathbf c_1,\dots,\mathbf c_J)C=(c1​,…,cJ​). Its transition rates q(C,D)q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)q(C,D), displays (3.1)–(3.6), are the sums of the intensities of all events taking C\mathbf CC to D\mathbf DD: a departure from the system (intensity ϕj(nj)γj(l,nj)\phi_j(n_j)\gamma_j(l,n_j)ϕj​(nj​)γj​(l,nj​)), a move from position lll of queue jjj to position mmm of the next queue kkk (intensity ϕj(nj)γj(l,nj)δk(m,nk+1)\phi_j(n_j)\gamma_j(l,n_j)\delta_k(m,n_k+1)ϕj​(nj​)γj​(l,nj​)δk​(m,nk​+1)), and an arrival into position mmm of the first queue kkk of a route (intensity ν(i)δk(m,nk+1)\nu(i)\delta_k(m,n_k+1)ν(i)δk​(m,nk​+1)).

With αj(i,s)=ν(i)\alpha_j(i,s)=\nu(i)αj​(i,s)=ν(i) if r(i,s)=jr(i,s)=jr(i,s)=j and 000 otherwise, set

aj=∑i,sαj(i,s),bj−1=∑n=0∞ajn∏l=1nϕj(l),πj(cj)=bj∏l=1njαj(tj(l),sj(l))ϕj(l).a_j=\sum_{i,s}\alpha_j(i,s),\qquad b_j^{-1}=\sum_{n=0}^{\infty}\frac{a_j^n}{\prod_{l=1}^{n}\phi_j(l)},\qquad \pi_j(\mathbf c_j)=b_j\prod_{l=1}^{n_j}\frac{\alpha_j(t_j(l),s_j(l))}{\phi_j(l)}.aj​=i,s∑​αj​(i,s),bj−1​=n=0∑∞​∏l=1n​ϕj​(l)ajn​​,πj​(cj​)=bj​l=1∏nj​​ϕj​(l)αj​(tj​(l),sj​(l))​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 61)

If every series defining bj−1b_j^{-1}bj−1​ converges, then

π(C)=∏j=1Jπj(cj)\pi(\mathbf C)=\prod_{j=1}^{J}\pi_j(\mathbf c_j)π(C)=j=1∏J​πj​(cj​)

is positive, sums to 111 over all network states, and satisfies the equilibrium equations

π(C)∑Dq(C,D)=∑Dπ(D) q(D,C)for every C.\pi(\mathbf C)\sum_{\mathbf D}q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)=\sum_{\mathbf D}\pi(\mathbf D)\,q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)\quad\text{for every }\mathbf C.π(C)D∑​q(C,D)=D∑​π(D)q(D,C)for every C.

Milestones

  • Theorem 3.2 (p. 62). The time-reversed rates π(D)q(D,C)/π(C)\pi(\mathbf D)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)/\pi(\mathbf C)π(D)q(D,C)/π(C) are the rates of the reversed network: routes traversed backwards, γj\gamma_jγj​ and δj\delta_jδj​ interchanged.
  • Corollary 3.4 (p. 63). Queue jjj is independent of the rest of the network, is in state cj\mathbf c_jcj​ with probability πj(cj)\pi_j(\mathbf c_j)πj​(cj​), holds nnn customers with probability bjajn/∏l=1nϕj(l)b_ja_j^n/\prod_{l=1}^n\phi_j(l)bj​ajn​/∏l=1n​ϕj​(l) (3.7), and a customer in position lll is of class (i,s)(i,s)(i,s) with probability αj(i,s)/aj\alpha_j(i,s)/a_jαj​(i,s)/aj​.
  • Corollary 3.5 (p. 63). A type-iii customer reaching queue jjj at stage sss finds it in state cj\mathbf c_jcj​ with probability πj(cj)\pi_j(\mathbf c_j)πj​(cj​).
  • Lemma 3.13 (p. 89). For a multiclass queue with Poisson arrivals of rate ν(c)\nu(c)ν(c) and departure intensities ν(c)ϕc(n)\nu(c)\phi_c(\mathbf n)ν(c)ϕc​(n): reversible ⇔\Leftrightarrow⇔ quasi-reversible ⇔\Leftrightarrow⇔ Φ(n)=ϕc(n)Φ(n−ec)\Phi(\mathbf n)=\phi_c(\mathbf n)\Phi(\mathbf n-\mathbf e_c)Φ(n)=ϕc​(n)Φ(n−ec​) for some positive Φ\PhiΦ (3.26).

Significance

Theorem 3.1 gives the full joint law of a network in which routes carry memory, and its corollaries turn it into usable performance formulas: each queue behaves, in its marginal law and as seen by arriving customers, like an isolated queue fed by a Poisson stream of rate aja_jaj​, even though the actual arrival stream at queue jjj is not Poisson. Mean sojourn times along a route then follow from Little's result. Theorem 3.2 identifies the reversed process as a network of the same kind; it is the source of the departure-stream results (Corollary 3.3) and of the arrival theorem (Corollary 3.5). Lemma 3.13 isolates the condition (3.26) under which state-dependent arrival rates preserve the product form (Theorem 3.14).

The results are classical and proved in the book. None of them has a machine-checked proof: the Prove2Me catalogue holds the rate-level theorems for migration processes (Chapter 2 of Kelly–Yudovina), and open targets for the BCMP and Jackson models, which have different state descriptions. This mission adds a formal model of the position-structured multiclass network itself, with the summation over coinciding transitions that (3.2), (3.4) and (3.6) require, and product-form, reversal and arrival-theorem statements over it.

Difficulty

The obvious first attempt, detailed balance, fails: π(C)q(C,D)\pi(\mathbf C)q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)π(C)q(C,D) and π(D)q(D,C)\pi(\mathbf D)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)π(D)q(D,C) differ in general, because a customer's route cannot be run backwards inside the same network (q(D,C)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)q(D,C) is usually 000 when q(C,D)>0q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)>0q(C,D)>0). The equilibrium equations therefore involve, for each state, all its predecessors at once. The rates are themselves sums over coinciding transitions, so a statement about individual events does not transfer to the rates without accounting for which positions lead to the same successor state. In Lean this brings in insertion into and deletion from position lists, the relabelling of stages, and the normalization of a product over a countable space of JJJ-tuples of lists, reorganized by queue length together with the identity ∑classes at jαj=aj\sum_{\text{classes at } j}\alpha_j=a_j∑classes at j​αj​=aj​.

Formalization scope

  • Finite types and queues. Types are Fin I, queues Fin J; the book allows countably many types with ∑iν(i)<∞\sum_i\nu(i)<\infty∑i​ν(i)<∞. A network state is a function assigning to each queue a list of classes (i,s)(i,s)(i,s) with r(i,s)=jr(i,s)=jr(i,s)=j; the state space is countable and all sums over it are tsum/HasSum.
  • Indexing. Stages and list positions are 000-based in Lean; γj(l,n)\gamma_j(l,n)γj​(l,n) and δj(l,n)\delta_j(l,n)δj​(l,n) keep the book's 111-based position argument.
  • Rate level. Equilibrium means: positive, summing to 111, and satisfying the equilibrium equations (the published KellyStochasticNetworks.FullBalance). The existence of the Markov process, irreducibility and non-explosion are not formalized. "The reversed process" (Theorem 3.2) is read through the reversed rates π(D)q(D,C)/π(C)\pi(\mathbf D)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)/\pi(\mathbf C)π(D)q(D,C)/π(C); "the probability he finds" (Corollary 3.5) is read as a ratio of equilibrium arrival fluxes; quasi-reversibility is its rate characterization (3.8), (3.10).
  • Normalizing constants. bjb_jbj​ is defined through a tsum, which Lean sets to 000 for a divergent series; every theorem assumes the series converges, the book's "none of b1,…,bJb_1,\dots,b_Jb1​,…,bJ​ is zero".
  • No trivial instance. The goal holds for arbitrary III, JJJ, ν\nuν, routes, ϕj\phi_jϕj​, γj\gamma_jγj​, δj\delta_jδj​ subject only to the book's constraints; a proof for a single queue, or for fixed γ=δ\gamma=\deltaγ=δ disciplines, does not prove it. In Lemma 3.13 the function Φ\PhiΦ is required to be positive, since Φ≡0\Phi\equiv0Φ≡0 satisfies (3.26) for every queue.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs: list insertion/deletion lemmas for position bookkeeping, sums of products over ∏jList(⋅)\prod_j \mathrm{List}(\cdot)∏j​List(⋅), and a bijection-of-events argument for summed rates. The quasi-reversibility predicate and the reversed-rate apparatus are reusable for the closed networks of §3.4 and the symmetric queues of §3.3. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, in any order.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, John Wiley & Sons, 1979. https://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues with customers of different types, Journal of Applied Probability 12 (1975), 542–554. https://doi.org/10.2307/3212785
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, closed, and mixed networks of queues with different classes of customers, Journal of the ACM 22 (1975), 248–260. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
  • J. R. Jackson, Jobshop-like queueing systems, Management Science 10 (1963), 131–142. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.10.1.131
  • F. P. Kelly, E. Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565363
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks IV: Symmetric Queues with Gamma-Mixture Service RequirementsTextbook

Why symmetric queues

The classical product-form results for queueing networks (Jackson, Kelly, Baskett–Chandy–Muntz–Palacios) assume exponentially distributed service requirements, because then the state of a queue need not record how much service each customer has received. Real service times are rarely exponential: telephone call lengths, job sizes in time-shared computers and web transfers are far from it. Symmetric queues, introduced in §3.3 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979), form the class of single queues for which the stationary distribution of the number of customers, and of their classes, depends on the service requirement distribution only through its mean. This property, insensitivity, is what makes Erlang's loss formula valid for arbitrarily distributed call lengths (Kelly, p. 79), and it is the reason processor-sharing, last-come-first-served preemptive and infinite-server stations may appear with general service in product-form networks.

Timeline. Sevastyanov (1957) proved that Erlang's loss formula holds for arbitrarily distributed call lengths. Kelly (1975, 1976) introduced queues with customers of different types whose effort and arrival-position functions coincide, and showed product form for networks of them with non-exponential service built from exponential stages; Barbour (1976) extended the method of stages; Baskett, Chandy, Muntz and Palacios (1975) gave product form for networks containing processor-sharing, LCFS-preemptive and infinite-server stations with phase-type service. Kelly's 1979 book presents the symmetric queue in the form formalized here.

Setting

A symmetric queue holds customers in positions 1,2,…,n1, 2, \dots, n1,2,…,n, where nnn is the number present. It operates as follows (Kelly, p. 72):

  1. the service requirement of a customer is a random variable whose distribution may depend on the class of the customer;
  2. a total service effort is supplied at rate ϕ(n)\phi(n)ϕ(n), with ϕ(n)>0\phi(n) > 0ϕ(n)>0 for n>0n > 0n>0;
  3. a proportion γ(l,n)\gamma(l, n)γ(l,n) of this effort, ∑l=1nγ(l,n)=1\sum_{l=1}^n \gamma(l, n) = 1∑l=1n​γ(l,n)=1, goes to the customer in position lll; when he leaves, the customers in positions l+1,…,nl+1, \dots, nl+1,…,n move down by one;
  4. an arriving customer moves into position l∈{1,…,n+1}l \in \{1, \dots, n+1\}l∈{1,…,n+1} with probability γ(l,n+1)\gamma(l, n+1)γ(l,n+1) — the same function — and the customers in positions l,…,nl, \dots, nl,…,n move up by one.

Server-sharing (γ(l,n)=1/n\gamma(l, n) = 1/nγ(l,n)=1/n), the stack (γ(n,n)=1\gamma(n, n) = 1γ(n,n)=1, last come first served preemptive), the queue with no waiting room and the infinite-server queue are examples (pp. 73–74).

Customers of class ccc arrive in a Poisson stream of rate ν(c)\nu(c)ν(c). On arrival a class-ccc customer receives a refined class (c,z)(c, z)(c,z) with probability p(c,z)p(c, z)p(c,z), ∑zp(c,z)=1\sum_z p(c, z) = 1∑z​p(c,z)=1, and then needs w(c,z)≥1w(c, z) \ge 1w(c,z)≥1 independent stages of service, each exponentially distributed with mean d(c,z)>0d(c, z) > 0d(c,z)>0. The class-ccc service requirement is therefore a mixture of gamma distributions with mean

a(c)=∑zp(c,z) w(c,z) d(c,z),a(c) = \sum_z p(c, z)\, w(c, z)\, d(c, z),a(c)=z∑​p(c,z)w(c,z)d(c,z),

and the work arriving per unit time is a=∑cν(c)a(c)a = \sum_c \nu(c) a(c)a=∑c​ν(c)a(c). The record of the customer in position lll is c(l)=(c(l),z(l),u(l))\mathbf c(l) = (c(l), z(l), u(l))c(l)=(c(l),z(l),u(l)), u(l)u(l)u(l) the stage in progress, and c=(c(1),…,c(n))\mathbf c = (\mathbf c(1), \dots, \mathbf c(n))c=(c(1),…,c(n)) is a Markov process. Its transitions are: an arrival of class (c,z)(c,z)(c,z) into position lll at stage 111, at rate ν(c)p(c,z)γ(l,n+1)\nu(c)p(c,z)\gamma(l, n+1)ν(c)p(c,z)γ(l,n+1); and, at rate ϕ(n)γ(l,n)/d(c(l),z(l))\phi(n)\gamma(l,n)/d(c(l),z(l))ϕ(n)γ(l,n)/d(c(l),z(l)), completion of the current stage of the customer in position lll, which moves him to the next stage or, after stage w(c(l),z(l))w(c(l), z(l))w(c(l),z(l)), out of the queue. The normalizing constant is

b−1=∑n=0∞an∏l=1nϕ(l).(3.15)b^{-1} = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{a^n}{\prod_{l=1}^n \phi(l)}. \tag{3.15}b−1=n=0∑∞​∏l=1n​ϕ(l)an​.(3.15)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.8

When (3.15) converges, the distribution

π(c)=b∏l=1nν(c(l)) p(c(l),z(l)) d(c(l),z(l))ϕ(l)(3.18)\pi(\mathbf c) = b \prod_{l=1}^n \frac{\nu(c(l))\, p(c(l), z(l))\, d(c(l), z(l))}{\phi(l)} \tag{3.18}π(c)=bl=1∏n​ϕ(l)ν(c(l))p(c(l),z(l))d(c(l),z(l))​(3.18)

is the equilibrium distribution of c\mathbf cc, and under it

P(n customers)=b an∏l=1nϕ(l),P(classes c1,…,cn∣n)=∏l=1nν(cl) a(cl)a,\mathbb P(n \text{ customers}) = \frac{b\,a^n}{\prod_{l=1}^n \phi(l)}, \qquad \mathbb P(\text{classes } c_1, \dots, c_n \mid n) = \prod_{l=1}^n \frac{\nu(c_l)\, a(c_l)}{a},P(n customers)=∏l=1n​ϕ(l)ban​,P(classes c1​,…,cn​∣n)=l=1∏n​aν(cl​)a(cl​)​,

and the queue is quasi-reversible with respect to the classification ccc and to (c,z)(c, z)(c,z): from every state, the rate of arrivals of each class does not depend on the state, both for the process and its time reversal (relations (3.8) and (3.10) of p. 67).

Milestones

  • Eqs. (3.14)–(3.15): the case of one refinement per class, π(c)=b∏lν(c(l))d(c(l))/ϕ(l)\pi(\mathbf c) = b\prod_l \nu(c(l))d(c(l))/\phi(l)π(c)=b∏l​ν(c(l))d(c(l))/ϕ(l) with a=∑cν(c)d(c)w(c)a = \sum_c \nu(c)d(c)w(c)a=∑c​ν(c)d(c)w(c).
  • Eqs. (3.16)–(3.17): in that case, the law of nnn, and given nnn independent positions of class ccc with probability ν(c)d(c)w(c)/a\nu(c)d(c)w(c)/aν(c)d(c)w(c)/a and uniform stage.
  • Eq. (3.18): the equilibrium distribution under gamma-mixture service.
  • Lemma 3.9: mixtures of gamma distributions approximate, at continuity points, the distribution function of any positive random variable.

Significance

Theorem 3.8 gives the stationary law of a symmetric queue in closed form and shows that it depends on the service requirement distributions only through their means a(c)a(c)a(c). Quasi-reversibility (part (iii)) is the property that lets symmetric queues be placed in networks: Kelly's §3.2 shows that a network of quasi-reversible queues has a product-form equilibrium, so Theorem 3.8 is the single-queue input to product-form networks with processor-sharing, LCFS-preemptive and infinite-server stations and class-dependent, non-exponential service. Lemma 3.9 is the approximation step behind the extension to arbitrary service distributions (Theorem 3.10).

These results are classical and proved in the book. To our knowledge none of them is machine-checked; Mathlib has the gamma distribution and distribution functions but no queueing theory. The mission produces a formal model of the symmetric queue as a countable-state Markov process, its equilibrium distribution, the insensitive marginals and the rate characterization of quasi-reversibility, all reusable by the chapter on networks of quasi-reversible queues.

Difficulty

The obvious first attempt, detailed balance, fails: the stage process is not reversible in general, since an intermediate stage completion has no transition back. The equilibrium equations must be verified in full, over a countable state space in which a single state is reached from infinitely many others. The symmetry condition γ≡δ\gamma \equiv \deltaγ≡δ is essential and must enter the argument: without it (for first-come-first-served, say) the distribution (3.18) is false for non-exponential service. Positions shift on every arrival and departure, so the bookkeeping of which list results from which event, including coincidences when neighbouring customers have identical records, is the main formal burden. The marginal computations sum (3.18) over lists of records, where convergence must be tracked, and Lemma 3.9 needs an explicit construction of approximating gamma mixtures.

Formalization scope

  • The state is a List of customer records (class, refined class, stage); list index iii is position l=i+1l = i + 1l=i+1, and γ(l,n)\gamma(l, n)γ(l,n), ϕ(n)\phi(n)ϕ(n) keep the book's 111-based indexing. The state space consists of the lists whose records have ν(c)p(c,z)>0\nu(c)p(c,z) > 0ν(c)p(c,z)>0 and 1≤u≤w(c,z)1 \le u \le w(c, z)1≤u≤w(c,z): records of a refined class arriving at rate zero are unreachable and excluded.
  • Classes C\mathcal CC and refinements Z\mathcal ZZ are arbitrary countable types. All infinite sums are HasSum or tsum with explicit convergence hypotheses: ∑cν(c)<∞\sum_c \nu(c) < \infty∑c​ν(c)<∞ (finite exit rates, the book's standing assumption of §1.1), convergence of a(c)a(c)a(c), of aaa, and of (3.15). "Equilibrium distribution" means positive, summing to one, and satisfying the equilibrium equations with convergent series.
  • The statement is rate level: (3.18) is shown to satisfy the equilibrium equations of the stage process, and quasi-reversibility is its rate characterization (3.8), (3.10). That these describe the stationary process and its time reversal is the book's Chapter 1 and is not reformalized.
  • Trivializing readings ruled out: the goal keeps ppp, www and ddd general (not w≡1w \equiv 1w≡1, which would make the result Section 3.1's exponential case); the arrival position uses the same γ\gammaγ as the service split; and in Lemma 3.9 the approximants must be genuine gamma mixtures with integer shapes, which a point mass is not.
  • Not planned: Theorem 3.10 (arbitrary service distributions; only an outline of proof and a continuous state space the book does not construct) and Theorem 3.11 (reversibility of the number in queue, a non-Markov process).

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, lemmas about List.insertIdx/List.eraseIdx bookkeeping for queues with positions, and summation over lists of records.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley, Chichester, 1979, §3.3, pp. 72–82. https://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues with customers of different types, Journal of Applied Probability 12 (1975), 542–554. https://www.jstor.org/journal/japplprob
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues, Advances in Applied Probability 8 (1976), 416–432. https://www.jstor.org/journal/advaapplprob
  • A. D. Barbour, Networks of queues and the method of stages, Advances in Applied Probability 8 (1976), 584–591. https://www.jstor.org/journal/advaapplprob
  • B. A. Sevastyanov, An ergodic theorem for Markov processes and its application to telephone systems with refusals, Theory of Probability and its Applications 2 (1957), 104–112.
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, closed, and mixed networks of queues with different classes of customers, Journal of the ACM 22 (1975), 248–260. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Maximization of a Linear Function of Variables Subject to Linear Inequalities: Under Nondegeneracy the Simplex Technique Ends in Infeasibility, Unboundedness, or a Maximum Feasible SolutionResearch Paper

Motivation

Linear programming asks for the best value of a linear objective under linear constraints. In the form studied by George B. Dantzig in 1951, all variables are nonnegative and the constraints are equalities. The simplex technique moves between small sets of columns, seeking a feasible vector first and then improving its objective. Its basic promise is operational: a run should end with a valid answer, whether that answer is a maximum, infeasibility, or an objective that can grow without bound. Dantzig's chapter sets out both phases and the tests that distinguish these outcomes.

The formulation matters to readers of optimization because it separates the algebraic claim about a linear program from a particular rule for selecting the next column. The chapter permits any entering column satisfying the stated improvement test. This mission captures the correctness claim for every sequence of admissible choices under the chapter's nondegeneracy assumption, with one additional general-position condition needed for the Phase I argument.

Setting

Fix integers 1≤m≤n1\le m\le n1≤m≤n. Let P0∈RmP_0\in\mathbb R^mP0​∈Rm be a right-hand side, P1,…,Pn∈RmP_1,\ldots,P_n\in\mathbb R^mP1​,…,Pn​∈Rm be columns, and c1,…,cn∈Rc_1,\ldots,c_n\in\mathbb Rc1​,…,cn​∈R be objective coefficients. A feasible solution is a weight vector λ∈Rn\lambda\in\mathbb R^nλ∈Rn with λj≥0\lambda_j\ge0λj​≥0 and ∑jλjPj=P0\sum_j\lambda_jP_j=P_0∑j​λj​Pj​=P0​. Its objective value is z(λ)=∑jλjcjz(\lambda)=\sum_j\lambda_jc_jz(λ)=∑j​λj​cj​. It is maximum feasible when z(μ)≤z(λ)z(\mu)\le z(\lambda)z(μ)≤z(λ) for every feasible μ\muμ. Unboundedness means that feasible objective values exceed every real threshold.

Dantzig assumes nondegeneracy: every indexed selection of mmm points among P0,P1,…,PnP_0,P_1,\ldots,P_nP0​,P1​,…,Pn​ is linearly independent. A Phase II state uses exactly mmm basic columns BBB, each with a positive weight, and represents P0P_0P0​ with them. Every column has unique coordinates Pj=∑i∈BxijPiP_j=\sum_{i\in B}x_{ij}P_iPj​=∑i∈B​xij​Pi​, and zj=∑i∈Bxijciz_j=\sum_{i\in B}x_{ij}c_izj​=∑i∈B​xij​ci​ is the corresponding objective value. A column with cj>zjc_j>z_jcj​>zj​ can improve the objective. When some xij>0x_{ij}>0xij​>0, the step uses the smallest ratio λi/xij\lambda_i/x_{ij}λi​/xij​ over those positive coordinates and replaces a minimizing basic column.

A Phase I state begins from m−1m-1m−1 basic columns SSS and a fixed reference point GGG. Positive weights wiw_iwi​ and ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0 satisfy G+ρP0=∑i∈SwiPiG+\rho P_0=\sum_{i\in S}w_iP_iG+ρP0​=∑i∈S​wi​Pi​. Write Pj=y0jP0+∑i∈SyijPiP_j=y_{0j}P_0+\sum_{i\in S}y_{ij}P_iPj​=y0j​P0​+∑i∈S​yij​Pi​. A column with y0j>0y_{0j}>0y0j​>0 either gives a new Phase I basis through the positive-ratio test or supplies the nonnegative weights in equation (39), which start Phase II.

Formalization targets

The goal is the correctness of the complete two-phase transition system. There is no infinite admissible run. Every state with no outgoing transition has one of three outcomes:

Phase I:y0j≤0 (∀j),no feasible solution;Phase II:∃j (cj>zj ∧ xij≤0 (∀i∈B)),∀M∈R ∃λ feasible:z(λ)>M;Phase II:cj≤zj (∀j),z(μ)≤z(λ) for every feasible μ.\begin{array}{ll} \text{Phase I:}& y_{0j}\le0\ (\forall j),\quad \text{no feasible solution};\\ \text{Phase II:}& \exists j\ (c_j>z_j\ \land\ x_{ij}\le0\ (\forall i\in B)),\quad \forall M\in\mathbb R\ \exists\lambda\text{ feasible}: z(\lambda)>M;\\ \text{Phase II:}& c_j\le z_j\ (\forall j),\quad z(\mu)\le z(\lambda)\text{ for every feasible }\mu. \end{array}Phase I:Phase II:Phase II:​y0j​≤0 (∀j),no feasible solution;∃j (cj​>zj​ ∧ xij​≤0 (∀i∈B)),∀M∈R ∃λ feasible:z(λ)>M;cj​≤zj​ (∀j),z(μ)≤z(λ) for every feasible μ.​

The five milestones follow the chapter's own statements: Theorem 3's infeasibility certificate, Section 2's termination and hand-off, Theorem 1's improving family and two cases, Section 1's termination alternatives, and Theorem 2's optimality test. The goal includes the hand-off from the first phase to the second; the milestones make each outcome separately auditable.

Significance

The result gives a complete outcome guarantee for the chapter's procedure under its stated nondegeneracy regime. A terminal basis satisfying cj≤zjc_j\le z_jcj​≤zj​ is certified optimal against every feasible solution, not just against nearby bases. The other terminal tests certify properties of the original problem: nonexistence of feasible weights or arbitrarily large feasible objective values. This is the distinction needed to use the procedure as an algorithm for an LP rather than merely a local improvement rule.

The chapter's Theorems A and B assert existence of a basic feasible solution, and existence of a basic optimal one when the objective is bounded above. A proved platform theorem on basic optimal solutions covers these structural results after changing minimization cost qqq to −c-c−c; it is included by reference. Existing simplex results in the platform's minimization convention do not state Dantzig's Phase I reference-point process or his xijx_{ij}xij​ and zjz_jzj​ tests. Formalizing this mission adds that two-phase interface and a machine-checkable statement of its outcomes.

Difficulty

An improving column alone does not say whether another basis exists. In Phase II, the signs of its basis coordinates determine whether the positive weights meet a finite ratio limit or instead continue along an unbounded feasible family. In Phase I, the analogous limit must preserve strictly positive weights on exactly m−1m-1m−1 columns. The printed argument says that a coefficient vanishes at the limit, but does not exclude two coefficients vanishing together. That gap matters because the next state in the paper's recurrence must again have strictly positive basic weights. The mission states a general-position condition on GGG that rules out this simultaneous-vanishing case. It is an explicit addition to the printed assumptions and should be reviewed as such.

Formalization scope

Lean uses Fin n → (Fin m → ℝ) for the columns, Fin m → ℝ for P0P_0P0​ and GGG, Fin n → ℝ for weights and costs, and finite sets for bases. Its zero-based Fin n labels correspond to the paper's 1,…,n1,\ldots,n1,…,n. Each state carries its basis cardinality, independence, coordinate equations, and strictly positive basic weights. This keeps the coordinate functions defined on genuine bases and prevents a zero-weight intermediate state from counting as a valid pivot. The transition relation records every admissible entering column and minimizing leaving index; the pivot-selection heuristics (20) and (21) are outside the claim.

The phrases “upper bound of zzz is infinite” and “process terminates” are read as, respectively, objective values above every real threshold on the original feasible set and absence of an infinite sequence of admissible steps. “A feasible solution has been obtained” is the explicit vector of equation (39), not an unnamed existence assertion. Maximum feasible means feasible plus comparison with every feasible vector, avoiding a real supremum's empty-set default. The dimensions 1≤m≤n1\le m\le n1≤m≤n make both kinds of basis possible and prevent a vacuous nondegeneracy condition. General position asks every family containing GGG, P0P_0P0​, and m−2m-2m−2 distinct PjP_jPj​ to be independent. The paper does not write this condition, so its inclusion is a substantive qualification of the target.

The printed indices in (30), (45), and a sentence following (18) do not match their defining ranges. The Lean statements use all nnn columns for jjj and the current m−1m-1m−1 Phase I columns for iii. The indices in (17) and (45) also carry the entering conditions cj>zjc_j>z_jcj​>zj​ and y0j>0y_{0j}>0y0j​>0, respectively. These corrections preserve the paper's described procedure and prevent a terminal test from becoming trivial through a basic column. Contributions may address the finite-state termination argument, the ratio-test lemmas, coordinate uniqueness, and the translation from terminal signs to the three global LP outcomes. The operation counts and geometric interpretation on the last pages are outside the formalization.

Selected references

  • George B. Dantzig, “Maximization of a Linear Function of Variables Subject to Linear Inequalities,” in T. C. Koopmans (ed.), Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Wiley, 1951, Chapter XXI, pp. 339–347. Book catalog search.
  • Hartmann_Psi, “A bounded feasible standard-form LP attains its minimum at a basic feasible solution,” Prove2Me, proved platform theorem. Theorem record.
  • Shuze Chen, “Finite termination of the simplex method under nondegeneracy,” Prove2Me, proved platform theorem in a minimization convention. Theorem record.
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 4: With Retailer Effort, the Supplier Prefers the Wholesale-Price Contract Exactly When τ > 1/√2Research Paper

Motivation

A revenue-sharing contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} lets a supplier charge a retailer a wholesale price www per unit and, in addition, collect the share 1−ϕ1 - \phi1−ϕ of the retailer's revenue. The video-rental industry adopted such contracts at scale in the late 1990s, and Cachon and Lariviere showed that in a broad class of models they coordinate the supply chain: the retailer's privately optimal decisions coincide with those that maximize total channel profit, and the profit can be split arbitrarily between the firms (missions 1 and 2 of this series).

The same authors also studied where revenue sharing breaks down. The most practically relevant limitation is retailer effort: shelf space, service, store cleanliness and promotion raise demand, cost the retailer money, and cannot be written into a contract. Once the retailer gives away part of its revenue, it earns only a share of the return on its effort while still paying the whole cost. This mission formalizes Section 4.2 of the authors' working paper, which shows that revenue sharing then cannot coordinate the channel while leaving the supplier any profit, and, in an explicit linear-demand example, determines exactly when the supplier is better off with the plain wholesale-price contract.

The source is the June 2000 working paper (Cachon and Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations), whose results are displayed claims inside numbered sections rather than numbered theorems; the milestones cite section, printed page and display. The published version appeared in Management Science 51(1), 2005.

Setting

General model (Sec. 4.2.1). A supplier produces at unit cost c>0c > 0c>0. The retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0 after observing the contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w}. Expected revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e) is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing in eee and concave in qqq; effort costs the retailer g(e)g(e)g(e), where ggg is continuous, increasing, differentiable and convex with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0. The profits of the integrated channel, the retailer and the supplier are

Π(q,e)=R(q,e)−g(e)−qc,πr(q,e)=ϕR(q,e)−g(e)−qw,(1−ϕ)R(q,e)+q(w−c).\Pi(q, e) = R(q, e) - g(e) - qc,\qquad \pi_r(q, e) = \phi R(q, e) - g(e) - qw,\qquad (1-\phi)R(q, e) + q(w - c).Π(q,e)=R(q,e)−g(e)−qc,πr​(q,e)=ϕR(q,e)−g(e)−qw,(1−ϕ)R(q,e)+q(w−c).

The integrated solution (qI,eI)(q_I, e_I)(qI​,eI​) maximizes Π\PiΠ over q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0.

Linear example (Sec. 4.2.2). Inverse demand is P(q,e)=1−q+2τeP(q, e) = 1 - q + 2\tau eP(q,e)=1−q+2τe with an effort-impact parameter τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0, revenue is R(q,e)=qP(q,e)R(q, e) = qP(q, e)R(q,e)=qP(q,e) and effort costs g(e)=e2g(e) = e^2g(e)=e2. For a share ϕ\phiϕ the supplier's profit when the retailer responds optimally to {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} is πs(w,ϕ)\pi_s(w, \phi)πs​(w,ϕ), and the supplier's optimal profit is

V(ϕ)=sup⁡w≥0πs(w,ϕ).V(\phi) = \sup_{w \ge 0} \pi_s(w, \phi).V(ϕ)=w≥0sup​πs​(w,ϕ).

The share ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1 is the wholesale-price contract.

Formalization targets

Goal: the supplier's choice of contract

For 0≤τ<10 \le \tau < 10≤τ<1, 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 and every ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1], the supremum defining V(ϕ)V(\phi)V(ϕ) is attained at the price w(ϕ)=ϕ((1−τ2)ϕ+c(1−ϕτ2))/(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))w(\phi) = \phi\big((1-\tau^2)\phi + c(1-\phi\tau^2)\big)/\big(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)w(ϕ)=ϕ((1−τ2)ϕ+c(1−ϕτ2))/(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)), and

V(ϕ)=(1−c)24(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)).V(\phi) = \frac{(1 - c)^2}{4\big(1 + \phi(1 - 2\tau^2)\big)} .V(ϕ)=4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))(1−c)2​.

Consequently VVV is strictly increasing on (0,1](0, 1](0,1] if τ>1/2\tau > 1/\sqrt 2τ>1/2​ (the wholesale-price contract is the supplier's unique best share), constant if τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​, and strictly decreasing if τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​, with V(ϕ)→(1−c)2/4V(\phi) \to (1-c)^2/4V(ϕ)→(1−c)2/4 as ϕ→0+\phi \to 0^+ϕ→0+.

Milestones

  1. Sec. 4.2.1, p. 22: with w=ϕcw = \phi cw=ϕc and ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1 the retailer's optimal effort at qIq_IqI​ is below eIe_IeI​.
  2. Sec. 4.2.1, p. 22: if (qI,eI)(q_I, e_I)(qI​,eI​) is optimal for the retailer, then ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1, w=cw = cw=c, and the supplier earns nothing.
  3. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 23: the retailer's unique optimal effort at quantity qqq is e(q)=ϕτqe(q) = \phi\tau qe(q)=ϕτq.
  4. Sec. 4.2.2, pp. 23–24: the retailer's reduced profit q[ϕ−q(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)−w]q[\phi - q(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2) - w]q[ϕ−q(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)−w], its unique joint optimum (q(w,ϕ),e(q(w,ϕ)))\big(q(w,\phi), e(q(w,\phi))\big)(q(w,ϕ),e(q(w,ϕ))) with q(w,ϕ)=(ϕ−w)/(2(ϕ−ϕ2τ2))q(w, \phi) = (\phi - w)/(2(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2))q(w,ϕ)=(ϕ−w)/(2(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)) for w<ϕw < \phiw<ϕ and 000 otherwise, and the optimal profit (ϕ−w)2/(4(ϕ−ϕ2τ2))(\phi - w)^2/(4(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2))(ϕ−w)2/(4(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)).
  5. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: the integrated retail price pI=(1+c(1−2τ2))/(2(1−τ2))p_I = (1 + c(1-2\tau^2))/(2(1-\tau^2))pI​=(1+c(1−2τ2))/(2(1−τ2)), increasing in ccc if τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​ and decreasing if τ>1/2\tau > 1/\sqrt 2τ>1/2​.
  6. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: πs(⋅,ϕ)\pi_s(\cdot, \phi)πs​(⋅,ϕ) is strictly concave where the retailer orders, and w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) is its unique maximizer over w≥0w \ge 0w≥0.
  7. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: πs(w(ϕ),ϕ)=(1−c)2/(4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)))\pi_s(w(\phi), \phi) = (1-c)^2/\big(4(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2))\big)πs​(w(ϕ),ϕ)=(1−c)2/(4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))).

Significance

The general result (milestones 1–2) is a clean impossibility statement: with non-contractible effort, the only contract in the revenue-sharing family that coordinates the channel is the wholesale-price contract at marginal cost, which leaves the supplier zero profit. It marks the boundary of the coordination results of the earlier sections, and contrasts with the price-dependent newsvendor, where revenue sharing does coordinate price and quantity because the cost of expanding demand is captured in the revenue function and shared by both firms.

The example turns the impossibility into a design rule. Because coordination is out of reach, the supplier compares contracts by her own profit, and the threshold τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​ separates two regimes: when effort matters a lot she should leave the retailer all revenue and charge only a wholesale price ("a smaller share of a larger pie"); when it matters little she should take as much revenue as possible. The same threshold governs the counterintuitive comparative static that the integrated channel's retail price falls as production cost rises.

All results are proved on paper in the source. None has a machine-checked proof; this mission produces the first. The example is a fully explicit two-stage optimization problem, so the formal development also yields a verified computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium with moral hazard that other contract-design missions can reuse.

Difficulty

The individual calculations are elementary, and the work lies in getting the optimization statements right. The page solves the retailer's problem sequentially (effort first, then quantity) and writes the supplier's objective by substituting closed forms. A faithful proof must instead show that these closed forms are global optima over the constrained domains: the retailer optimizes jointly over the quadrant q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0, the corner q=0q = 0q=0 is optimal whenever w≥ϕw \ge \phiw≥ϕ, and the supplier's objective is a quadratic on w≤ϕw \le \phiw≤ϕ glued to the zero function on w≥ϕw \ge \phiw≥ϕ, which is not concave on all of w≥0w \ge 0w≥0. The first-order-condition argument of the general model similarly needs an interior integrated optimum and a strictly positive marginal effect of effort, which "strictly increasing in eee" alone does not provide.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. The general model is a structure RevShareCoord.Effort.Model carrying RRR, its partial derivatives, ggg, g′g'g′ and ccc; derivatives are one-sided within [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), and joint differentiability of RRR is replaced by its partial derivatives and joint continuity. The example lives in RevShareCoord.Effort.Linear. "Optimal" always means a maximizer over the whole admissible set (q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0 for the retailer, w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 for the supplier), and the supplier's value V(ϕ)V(\phi)V(ϕ) is defined as the supremum of her attainable profits, not by the printed formula.

Deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • τ<1\tau < 1τ<1 instead of τ∈[0,1]\tau \in [0, 1]τ∈[0,1]: at τ=1\tau = 1τ=1 the integrated problem is unbounded and pIp_IpI​ divides by zero. The page's "jointly concave in qqq and τ\tauτ" is read as qqq and eee.
  • 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1: c>0c > 0c>0 is the standing assumption of Sec. 1, and c<1c < 1c<1 is needed for a positive integrated quantity.
  • ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1] in the example: at ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0 the retailer keeps no revenue and q(w,ϕ)q(w, \phi)q(w,ϕ) divides by zero. The page's optimal share "ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0" for τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​ is stated as strict decrease on (0,1](0, 1](0,1] with the limit at 0+0^+0+.
  • The printed second derivative −(1−ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2)-\big(1 - \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)/\big(2\phi^2(1-\phi\tau^2)^2\big)−(1−ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2) has a sign slip in the numerator; the Lean states −(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2)-\big(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)/\big(2\phi^2(1-\phi\tau^2)^2\big)−(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2).
  • "Otherwise decreasing" fails at τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​, where VVV and pIp_IpI​ are constant; the trichotomy is stated.
  • In the general model, the integrated optimum is interior, ∂R/∂e>0\partial R/\partial e > 0∂R/∂e>0 at it, and, for milestone 1, πr(qI,⋅)\pi_r(q_I, \cdot)πr​(qI​,⋅) is strictly concave in eee (the page asserts this but it does not follow from the assumptions).

Plugging the printed w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) into πs\pi_sπs​ and comparing across ϕ\phiϕ would turn the dichotomy into a statement about an arbitrary price schedule; the goal instead asserts that w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) attains the supremum over all w≥0w \ge 0w≥0, with the retailer best-responding jointly in (q,e)(q, e)(q,e).

No external library beyond Mathlib's real analysis and convexity is needed. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, reusable lemmas on maximizing strictly concave quadratics over orthants, and a generalization of milestone 2 to non-interior optima.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • S. Desiraju, S. Moorthy, Managing a Distribution Channel under Asymmetric Information with Performance Requirements, Management Science 43(12), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.12.1628
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OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dimensioning Large Call Centers III: Asymptotically Optimal Staffing in the Quality-Driven RegimeResearch Paper

Motivation

How many agents should a call center staff? Telephone call centers employ millions of people, and staffing is their largest cost, so the question is asked every half hour of every day (Gans, Koole & Mandelbaum, 2003). The classical model is the M/M/N (Erlang-C) queue: calls arrive at rate λ\lambdaλ, service times are exponential with mean 1/μ1/\mu1/μ, and NNN agents serve in parallel. Practitioners use the square-root safety staffing rule N≈λ/μ+yλ/μN \approx \lambda/\mu + y\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}N≈λ/μ+yλ/μ​, which Halfin and Whitt (1981) justified in the regime where the probability of waiting stays bounded away from 000 and 111.

Borst, Mandelbaum and Reiman (CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000; published as Operations Research 52(1), 2004) asked when such a rule is actually optimal: given a staffing cost and a waiting cost, which staffing level minimizes total cost as the arrival rate grows? They identified three regimes according to how the two costs compare. This mission formalizes their third case, the quality-driven regime, in which waiting is so expensive relative to staffing that the optimal number of agents exceeds the offered load by more than any fixed multiple of its square root.

Setting

Fix a service rate μ>0\mu > 0μ>0. For every arrival rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 a waiting-cost function DλD_\lambdaDλ​ assigns cost Dλ(t)D_\lambda(t)Dλ​(t) to a wait of ttt time units; it satisfies Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0) = 0Dλ​(0)=0, is strictly increasing, and t↦Dλ(t)e−θtt \mapsto D_\lambda(t)e^{-\theta t}t↦Dλ​(t)e−θt is integrable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) for every θ>0\theta > 0θ>0. A staffing cost FFF, defined for real N>0N > 0N>0, is convex and strictly increasing.

For an integer N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ the probability of waiting is the Erlang-C formula

π(N,ν)=νNN!{(1−ν/N)∑n=0N−1νnn!+νNN!}−1,ν=λ/μ,\pi(N,\nu) = \frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Bigl\{(1-\nu/N)\sum_{n=0}^{N-1}\frac{\nu^n}{n!} + \frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Bigr\}^{-1},\qquad \nu = \lambda/\mu,π(N,ν)=N!νN​{(1−ν/N)n=0∑N−1​n!νn​+N!νN​}−1,ν=λ/μ,

the expected waiting cost of a delayed customer is G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞Dλ(t)e−(Nμ−λ)t dtG(N,\lambda) = (N\mu-\lambda)\int_0^\infty D_\lambda(t)e^{-(N\mu-\lambda)t}\,dtG(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞​Dλ​(t)e−(Nμ−λ)tdt, and the total cost per unit time is C(N,λ)=F(N)+λ π(N,λ/μ) G(N,λ)C(N,\lambda) = F(N) + \lambda\,\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)\,G(N,\lambda)C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ). An optimal staffing level Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​ minimizes C(⋅,λ)C(\cdot,\lambda)C(⋅,λ) over the integers N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ.

Write Nλ(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μN_\lambda(x) = \lambda/\mu + x\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}Nλ​(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μ​, and for x>0x > 0x>0 put Fλ(x)=F(Nλ(x))−F(λ/μ)F_\lambda(x) = F(N_\lambda(x)) - F(\lambda/\mu)Fλ​(x)=F(Nλ​(x))−F(λ/μ), Gλ(x)=λG(Nλ(x),λ)G_\lambda(x) = \lambda G(N_\lambda(x),\lambda)Gλ​(x)=λG(Nλ​(x),λ), and πλ(x)=H(Nλ(x),λ/μ)\pi_\lambda(x) = H(N_\lambda(x),\lambda/\mu)πλ​(x)=H(Nλ​(x),λ/μ), where H(M,α)={α∫0∞e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt}−1H(M,\alpha) = \{\alpha\int_0^\infty e^{-\alpha t}t(1+t)^{M-1}dt\}^{-1}H(M,α)={α∫0∞​e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt}−1 extends the Erlang-C formula to real MMM. The normalized cost is Cλ(x)=Fλ(x)+πλ(x)Gλ(x)C_\lambda(x) = F_\lambda(x) + \pi_\lambda(x)G_\lambda(x)Cλ​(x)=Fλ​(x)+πλ​(x)Gλ​(x), and a surrogate cost is C[z;F^,π^,G^]=F^(z)+π^(z)G^(z)C[z;\hat F,\hat\pi,\hat G] = \hat F(z) + \hat\pi(z)\hat G(z)C[z;F^,π^,G^]=F^(z)+π^(z)G^(z). Rounding is measured by Sλ(x)=min⁡{C(⌊Nλ(x)⌋,λ),C(⌈Nλ(x)⌉,λ)}S_\lambda(x) = \min\{C(\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor,\lambda), C(\lceil N_\lambda(x)\rceil,\lambda)\}Sλ​(x)=min{C(⌊Nλ​(x)⌋,λ),C(⌈Nλ​(x)⌉,λ)}.

Two special functions appear. The Halfin–Whitt delay function is P(x)=1/(1+x/h(−x))P(x) = 1/(1 + x/h(-x))P(x)=1/(1+x/h(−x)) with h=ϕ/(1−Φ)h = \phi/(1-\Phi)h=ϕ/(1−Φ) the standard normal hazard rate. The Stirling-type approximation is

Qλ(x)=exp⁡{Nλ(x)[1−rλ(x)+log⁡rλ(x)]}2πNλ(x) (1−rλ(x)),rλ(x)=λ/μNλ(x).Q_\lambda(x) = \frac{\exp\{N_\lambda(x)[1 - r_\lambda(x) + \log r_\lambda(x)]\}}{\sqrt{2\pi N_\lambda(x)}\,(1-r_\lambda(x))},\qquad r_\lambda(x) = \frac{\lambda/\mu}{N_\lambda(x)}.Qλ​(x)=2πNλ​(x)​(1−rλ​(x))exp{Nλ​(x)[1−rλ​(x)+logrλ​(x)]}​,rλ​(x)=Nλ​(x)λ/μ​.

Asymptotic relations are limits of ratios as λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞: aλ≈∞bλa_\lambda \stackrel{\infty}{\approx} b_\lambdaaλ​≈∞bλ​ means aλ/bλ→1a_\lambda/b_\lambda \to 1aλ​/bλ​→1, and aλ≪∞bλa_\lambda \stackrel{\infty}{\ll} b_\lambdaaλ​≪∞​bλ​ means aλ/bλ→0a_\lambda/b_\lambda \to 0aλ​/bλ​→0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.1

Assume the regime is quality-driven, display (27): Fλ(κ)≪∞Gλ(κ)F_\lambda(\kappa) \stackrel{\infty}{\ll} G_\lambda(\kappa)Fλ​(κ)≪∞​Gλ​(κ) for every κ>0\kappa > 0κ>0. Let yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​ minimize Fλ(y)+Qλ(y)Gλ(y)F_\lambda(y) + Q_\lambda(y)G_\lambda(y)Fλ​(y)+Qλ​(y)Gλ​(y) over y>0y > 0y>0. Then

lim⁡λ→∞Sλ(yλ∗)−F(λ/μ)C(Nλ∗,λ)−F(λ/μ)=1.\lim_{\lambda\to\infty}\frac{S_\lambda(y^*_\lambda) - F(\lambda/\mu)}{C(N^*_\lambda,\lambda) - F(\lambda/\mu)} = 1.λ→∞lim​C(Nλ∗​,λ)−F(λ/μ)Sλ​(yλ∗​)−F(λ/μ)​=1.

The statement fixes no constants and no rate; it asserts only that rounding the surrogate optimum loses a vanishing fraction of the excess cost.

Milestones

In attack order: Lemma C.1 (GλG_\lambdaGλ​ strictly convex decreasing); the identity H(N,ν)=π(N,ν)H(N,\nu) = \pi(N,\nu)H(N,ν)=π(N,ν) at integer NNN (Section 3, p. 12); Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2; Corollary 3.3 (the asymptotic optimality criterion); Lemma B.1 (PPP strictly convex decreasing); display (15); Lemma 4.1 (Halfin and Whitt); and the first statement of Lemma 4.2, πλ(xλ)≈∞Qλ(xλ)\pi_\lambda(x_\lambda) \stackrel{\infty}{\approx} Q_\lambda(x_\lambda)πλ​(xλ​)≈∞Qλ​(xλ​) whenever xλ→∞x_\lambda\to\inftyxλ​→∞.

Significance

Theorem 7.1 completes the paper's picture of optimal staffing. In the rationalized regime the square-root rule with the Halfin–Whitt function PPP is optimal; in the efficiency-driven regime staffing barely exceeds the load; in the quality-driven regime the staffing excess outgrows λ/μ\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}λ/μ​ and PPP must be replaced by the Stirling-type expression QλQ_\lambdaQλ​. The theorem gives a one-dimensional minimization whose solution is asymptotically optimal, which turns a discrete optimization over NNN into a smooth problem, and it marks the boundary of validity of square-root staffing.

The result is proved in the paper; it is not formalized anywhere to our knowledge. A complete development formalizes the Section 3 framework (shared with the other regimes of the same paper), the convexity of GλG_\lambdaGλ​ and of PPP, the Halfin–Whitt limit for the continuous extension πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​, and the Stirling-type asymptotics of the Erlang-C formula. Each of these is a reusable piece of queueing theory in Lean.

Difficulty

The regime theorem itself is short once the framework is in place; the weight lies in the analytic lemmas. Lemma 4.2 requires uniform asymptotics of πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ at a staffing excess xλx_\lambdaxλ​ that may grow at any rate, from barely faster than a constant to faster than λ\sqrt{\lambda}λ​, where neither the central-limit picture of Halfin and Whitt nor a single Stirling expansion covers all cases. Lemma 4.1 concerns the continuous extension πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ at non-integer server counts, whereas Halfin and Whitt's theorem is about integer ones. The natural first idea, that the goal follows from Corollary 3.3 by plugging in Lemma 4.2, does not apply directly: Lemma 4.2 only covers staffing excesses that tend to infinity, and nothing in the definition of the true optimum xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​ or the surrogate optimum yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​ says that they do.

Formalization scope

Lean represents λ\lambdaλ as a positive real, and λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞ is the filter atTop on R\mathbb{R}R with μ\muμ fixed. The standing assumptions on μ\muμ and DλD_\lambdaDλ​ are the structure WaitModel; FFF is a function argument with hypotheses ConvexOn and StrictMonoOn on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Staffing levels NNN are natural numbers. Minimizers (Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​, xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​, zλ∗z^*_\lambdazλ∗​, yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​) are function arguments with minimality hypotheses at every λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, so every statement holds for every choice among ties. Liminf and limsup relations are stated through Filter.Frequently, avoiding boundedness side conditions.

The queue itself (Poisson arrivals, waiting-time law) is not formalized: the paper's analysis and all its theorems concern the closed-form cost C(N,λ)C(N,\lambda)C(N,λ) with the Erlang-C formula.

Conventions committed to: (i) the goal adds the hypothesis G(N,λ)→∞G(N,\lambda)\to\inftyG(N,λ)→∞ as N↓λ/μN\downarrow\lambda/\muN↓λ/μ, which the paper asserts on p. 12 to show the continuous optimum exists but which does not follow from its standing assumptions (it holds exactly when DλD_\lambdaDλ​ is unbounded); (ii) in SλS_\lambdaSλ​ the floor term is omitted when ⌊Nλ(x)⌋≤λ/μ\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor \le \lambda/\mu⌊Nλ​(x)⌋≤λ/μ, since the cost is undefined at unstable levels; (iii) the integrability of Dλ(t)e−θtD_\lambda(t)e^{-\theta t}Dλ​(t)e−θt is explicit, because a Lean integral of a non-integrable function is 000; (iv) P(0)=1P(0) = 1P(0)=1, the value of formula (11) at 000; (v) display (15) is stated for b>0b > 0b>0, since the ratio aλ/ba_\lambda/baλ​/b is undefined at b=0b = 0b=0. The instance μ=1\mu = 1μ=1, F(N)=cNF(N) = cNF(N)=cN, Dλ(t)=aλ tD_\lambda(t) = a\sqrt{\lambda}\,tDλ​(t)=aλ​t (Section 9) satisfies every hypothesis of the goal, so the goal is not vacuous; taking πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ or GλG_\lambdaGλ​ at Lean default values is ruled out by these explicit domain conditions.

Only the first statement of Lemma 4.2 is a milestone: the second, πλ(xλ)≈Q(xλ)\pi_\lambda(x_\lambda)\approx Q(x_\lambda)πλ​(xλ​)≈Q(xλ​) under xλ≤sup⁡λ1/6x_\lambda \stackrel{\sup}{\le} \lambda^{1/6}xλ​≤sup​λ1/6, fails as printed at xλ=λ1/6x_\lambda = \lambda^{1/6}xλ​=λ1/6. Contributions on the Erlang-C asymptotics, the normal hazard rate, and Laplace transforms of increasing functions are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • S. Borst, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000 (the version formalized here; every index and page cited in this mission is the report's).
  • S. Borst, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, Operations Research 52(1):17–34, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0081
  • S. Halfin, W. Whitt, Heavy-Traffic Limits for Queues with Many Exponential Servers, Operations Research 29(3):567–588, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.3.567
  • N. Gans, G. Koole, A. Mandelbaum, Telephone Call Centers: Tutorial, Review, and Research Prospects, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 5(2):79–141, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.5.2.79.16071
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 2: With Competing Retailers, Revenue Sharing Supports the System-Optimal Quantities as a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

A supplier that sells through independent retailers usually loses part of the profit an integrated firm would earn: each retailer orders to maximize its own profit, not the channel's. Supply chain coordination asks which contracts make the decentralized choices coincide with the integrated optimum. Cachon and Lariviere study revenue-sharing contracts, under which a retailer pays a per-unit wholesale price and keeps only a fraction ϕ\phiϕ of its revenue, the rest going to the supplier. The contracts were made prominent by the video rental industry around 1998, where studios lowered tape prices in exchange for a share of rental income.

With a single retailer, revenue sharing at the wholesale price ϕc\phi cϕc coordinates the channel and splits its profit in the proportion ϕ\phiϕ. This mission formalizes the extension in Section 3.2 of the paper to competing retailers: several locations whose revenues depend on each other's stock, so that one retailer's order lowers the others' revenue. Competition creates externalities the single-retailer argument does not have, and the question is whether revenue sharing still coordinates, and at what prices. Section 4.1.2 then works out a Cournot example in closed form, measuring how far the supplier's own optimal wholesale price leaves the channel from the integrated profit.

The source is the authors' working paper of June 2000; the published version (Management Science 51(1), 2005) renumbers and revises the results. The working paper numbers no theorem, so results are cited by section, displayed equation and page.

Setting

A single supplier sells one product through nnn locations i=1,…,ni = 1,\dots,ni=1,…,n, each run by an independent retailer. A stocking profile is qˉ=(q1,…,qn)\bar q = (q_1,\dots,q_n)qˉ​=(q1​,…,qn​), and the revenue at location iii is Ri(qˉ)R_i(\bar q)Ri​(qˉ​), which may depend on every location's quantity. The system revenue is R(qˉ)=∑iRi(qˉ)R(\bar q) = \sum_i R_i(\bar q)R(qˉ​)=∑i​Ri​(qˉ​), every unit costs the supplier c>0c > 0c>0, and the integrated system profit is

Π(qˉ)=R(qˉ)−c∑i=1nqi.\Pi(\bar q) = R(\bar q) - c\sum_{i=1}^n q_i .Π(qˉ​)=R(qˉ​)−ci=1∑n​qi​.

Write Rji(qˉ)=∂Rj(qˉ)/∂qiR_j^i(\bar q) = \partial R_j(\bar q)/\partial q_iRji​(qˉ​)=∂Rj​(qˉ​)/∂qi​: the superscript is the variable differentiated, the subscript the revenue function. The paper assumes that each RiR_iRi​ is continuous, that ∂2Ri/∂qi∂qj≤0\partial^2 R_i/\partial q_i\partial q_j \le 0∂2Ri​/∂qi​∂qj​≤0 for j≠ij \ne ij=i (locations are substitutes), and that RiR_iRi​ is unimodal in qiq_iqi​. The system-optimal profile qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I has positive entries and solves the first-order system

Rii(qˉI)+∑j≠iRji(qˉI)=c,i=1,…,n.(6)R_i^i(\bar q^I) + \sum_{j\ne i} R_j^i(\bar q^I) = c, \qquad i = 1,\dots,n. \tag{6}Rii​(qˉ​I)+j=i∑​Rji​(qˉ​I)=c,i=1,…,n.(6)

Under a revenue-sharing contract (ϕ,wi)(\phi, w_i)(ϕ,wi​) retailer iii earns πri(qˉ,ϕ,wˉ)=ϕRi(qˉ)−wiqi\pi_{r_i}(\bar q,\phi,\bar w) = \phi R_i(\bar q) - w_i q_iπri​​(qˉ​,ϕ,wˉ)=ϕRi​(qˉ​)−wi​qi​ and the supplier earns πs(qˉ,ϕ,wˉ)=∑i((1−ϕ)Ri(qˉ)+wiqi)−c∑iqi\pi_s(\bar q,\phi,\bar w) = \sum_i\big((1-\phi)R_i(\bar q) + w_i q_i\big) - c\sum_i q_iπs​(qˉ​,ϕ,wˉ)=∑i​((1−ϕ)Ri​(qˉ​)+wi​qi​)−c∑i​qi​; the wholesale-price contract is ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1, with profits written πri(qˉ,wˉ)\pi_{r_i}(\bar q,\bar w)πri​​(qˉ​,wˉ) and πs(qˉ,wˉ)\pi_s(\bar q,\bar w)πs​(qˉ​,wˉ). A Nash equilibrium in order quantities is a profile qˉ≥0\bar q \ge 0qˉ​≥0 from which no retailer gains by changing its own quantity to any x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The coordinating wholesale prices are

wiI=c−∑j≠iRji(qˉI).w_i^I = c - \sum_{j\ne i} R_j^i(\bar q^I).wiI​=c−j=i∑​Rji​(qˉ​I).

The Cournot example (7) is Ri(qˉ)=qi(1−qi−β∑j≠iqj)R_i(\bar q) = q_i\big(1 - q_i - \beta\sum_{j\ne i} q_j\big)Ri​(qˉ​)=qi​(1−qi​−β∑j=i​qj​) with 0≤β<10 \le \beta < 10≤β<1.

Formalization targets

Goal: revenue sharing supports qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I (Sec. 3.2, p. 14)

For ϕ∈[0,1]\phi\in[0,1]ϕ∈[0,1] and wi(ϕ)=ϕwiIw_i(\phi) = \phi w_i^Iwi​(ϕ)=ϕwiI​:

qˉI is a Nash equilibrium,πri(qˉI,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=ϕ πri(qˉI,wˉI),πs(qˉI,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=(1−ϕ)Π(qˉI)+ϕ πs(qˉI,wˉI).\bar q^I \text{ is a Nash equilibrium},\quad \pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\phi,\phi\bar w^I) = \phi\,\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I),\quad \pi_s(\bar q^I,\phi,\phi\bar w^I) = (1-\phi)\Pi(\bar q^I) + \phi\,\pi_s(\bar q^I,\bar w^I).qˉ​I is a Nash equilibrium,πri​​(qˉ​I,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=ϕπri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI),πs​(qˉ​I,ϕ,ϕwˉI)=(1−ϕ)Π(qˉ​I)+ϕπs​(qˉ​I,wˉI).

Wholesale-price contracts (Sec. 3.2, pp. 13–14)

An interior equilibrium satisfies Rii(qˉN)=wiR_i^i(\bar q^N) = w_iRii​(qˉ​N)=wi​ (Eq. (8)), so marginal-cost pricing does not support qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I when a location imposes a negative externality; the prices wˉI\bar w^IwˉI make qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I an equilibrium; wiI≥cw_i^I \ge cwiI​≥c when cross-effects are nonpositive; and wˉI\bar w^IwˉI supports exactly the split πs(qˉI,wˉI)=∑iqiI∑j≠i(−Rji(qˉI))\pi_s(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) = \sum_i q_i^I\sum_{j\ne i}(-R_j^i(\bar q^I))πs​(qˉ​I,wˉI)=∑i​qiI​∑j=i​(−Rji​(qˉ​I)).

Revenue sharing (Sec. 3.2, p. 14)

An interior equilibrium satisfies ϕRii(qˉN)=wi(ϕ)\phi R_i^i(\bar q^N) = w_i(\phi)ϕRii​(qˉ​N)=wi​(ϕ); the two profit identities hold for every ϕ\phiϕ; and πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0.

The Cournot example (Sec. 4.1.2, pp. 19–20)

At a common price w<1w<1w<1 the unique equilibrium is qiN=(1−w)/(2+β(n−1))q_i^N = (1-w)/(2+\beta(n-1))qiN​=(1−w)/(2+β(n−1)); the integrated optimum is qiI=(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1))q_i^I = (1-c)/(2+2\beta(n-1))qiI​=(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1)); the coordinating price wI=c+β(n−1)(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1))w^I = c + \beta(n-1)(1-c)/(2+2\beta(n-1))wI=c+β(n−1)(1−c)/(2+2β(n−1)) increases in β\betaβ and nnn; the supplier's optimal price is w∗=(1+c)/2w^* = (1+c)/2w∗=(1+c)/2; and the efficiency at w∗w^*w∗ is

Π(qˉN(w∗))Π(qˉI)=1−1(2+β(n−1))2.\frac{\Pi(\bar q^N(w^*))}{\Pi(\bar q^I)} = 1 - \frac{1}{(2+\beta(n-1))^2}.Π(qˉ​I)Π(qˉ​N(w∗))​=1−(2+β(n−1))21​.

Significance

The goal shows that the single-retailer coordination result survives competition, with one change: the coordinating price must charge each retailer for the externality it imposes on the others, so it depends on every location's revenue function, and wiIw^I_iwiI​ exceeds the production cost. The supplier's profit then moves along a line between what wholesale prices alone give her and the whole system profit, which is how revenue sharing provides a profit split that linear prices cannot. The Cournot results make the comparison quantitative: when retailers compete intensely, the supplier's own optimal wholesale price already achieves most of the integrated profit, so revenue sharing, which has administrative costs, is less attractive.

No machine-checked proof of these results is known. The mission produces a reusable formal description of an nnn-player quantity game under per-retailer linear contracts, equilibrium conditions for it, and a fully worked Cournot instance, including a uniqueness claim for equilibria among all (not only symmetric) profiles.

Difficulty

The equilibrium claims are global: a retailer must not gain from any nonnegative deviation, not only from small ones. A first-order condition at qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I does not give this by itself. The page assumes RiR_iRi​ unimodal in qiq_iqi​, but unimodality does not survive subtracting the linear purchase cost, so the first-order condition is not sufficient under that assumption alone; the formalization uses concavity in the own quantity, under which it is. The participation claim πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0 is stated on the page without proof and needs a bound on the revenue of a location that stocks nothing.

In the Cournot example, uniqueness of the equilibrium must exclude asymmetric profiles and profiles where some retailers stock nothing, and the supplier's optimal price must be compared against every equilibrium at every price, including prices at which the retailers order nothing.

Formalization scope

Locations are Fin n; a profile is Fin n → ℝ; revenues are R : Fin n → (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ, and dR i j q is Rji(qˉ)=∂Rj/∂qiR_j^i(\bar q) = \partial R_j/\partial q_iRji​(qˉ​)=∂Rj​/∂qi​, given as a partial derivative at every profile with all entries positive. A deviation of retailer iii to xxx is Function.update q i x, and Nash equilibria quantify over all x≥0x \ge 0x≥0. The standing assumptions of Section 3.2 are fields of the structure Model: c>0c > 0c>0; continuity of RiR_iRi​ on the nonnegative orthant; the partial derivatives; ∂2Ri/∂qi∂qj≤0\partial^2 R_i/\partial q_i\partial q_j \le 0∂2Ri​/∂qi​∂qj​≤0, encoded as "RiiR_i^iRii​ does not increase in qjq_jqj​"; and concavity of RiR_iRi​ in qiq_iqi​, which is the formalization's reading of "unimodal in qiq_iqi​". The paper's assumption that marginal revenue eventually falls below every δ>0\delta > 0δ>0 is used only for existence of an equilibrium, which is not formalized, and is omitted.

Deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item concerned:

  • qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I is taken as any positive solution of (6); its optimality for Π\PiΠ is not used.
  • "qˉ∗\bar q^*qˉ​∗ is a Nash equilibrium" (p. 13) is read as qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I.
  • In ϕ(Ri(qˉI)−qiIwi)\phi(R_i(\bar q^I) - q_i^I w_i)ϕ(Ri​(qˉ​I)−qiI​wi​) (p. 14), wiw_iwi​ is read as wiIw_i^IwiI​.
  • "Rii(qˉI)>cR_i^i(\bar q^I) > cRii​(qˉ​I)>c" needs a negative externality ∑j≠iRji(qˉI)<0\sum_{j\ne i}R_j^i(\bar q^I) < 0∑j=i​Rji​(qˉ​I)<0, which is assumed.
  • "Rji(qˉ)≤0R_j^i(\bar q) \le 0Rji​(qˉ​)≤0" is not a standing assumption, so it is a hypothesis of wiI≥cw_i^I \ge cwiI​≥c, and strictness needs some strictly negative cross-effect.
  • πri(qˉI,wˉI)≥0\pi_{r_i}(\bar q^I,\bar w^I) \ge 0πri​​(qˉ​I,wˉI)≥0 assumes nonnegative revenue at a location that stocks nothing.
  • In the Cournot example the implicit w<1w < 1w<1 and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 are hypotheses; all retailers pay a common price; "increasing" is strict exactly where it holds (n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 for β\betaβ, β>0\beta > 0β>0 for nnn).

A formalization that defines "the prices coordinate" as "the prices satisfy the first-order condition at qˉI\bar q^Iqˉ​I" restates (6) and is ruled out: every equilibrium claim here is the game-theoretic statement about unilateral deviations. Contributions welcome: proofs of the equilibrium lemmas from concavity and the derivative, the Cournot uniqueness argument, and a general existence theorem for the quantity game.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • D. Fudenberg, J. Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press, 1991 (Theorem 1.2, existence of pure-strategy equilibria).
  • F. Bernstein, A. Federgruen, Pricing and Replenishment Strategies in a Distribution System with Competing Retailers, Operations Research 51(3):409–426, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.3.409.14957
  • J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988.
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OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dimensioning Large Call Centers II: Asymptotically Optimal Staffing in the Efficiency-Driven RegimeResearch Paper

Why staffing large call centers is a mathematical question

A call center must choose enough servers to limit waiting while paying for every server it staffs. When arrivals are heavy, small changes in the number of servers can change the probability of delay substantially. Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reiman study how to make this choice when the arrival rate grows and the costs of staffing and waiting need not grow at the same rate. Their CWI report treats several regimes within one queueing model. This mission concerns the efficiency-driven regime, where the incremental staffing cost eventually dominates the conditional waiting cost at every fixed positive square-root staffing offset. The resulting rule chooses an offset by optimizing a simpler cost that treats the probability of waiting as one.

The result is useful when the staffing-cost and waiting-cost primitives change with system scale. It says that the simplified choice still attains the optimal total cost asymptotically, even though the actual staffing decision is an integer and the simplified problem uses a real variable. The report states this as Theorem 6.1 on printed page 19, with its interpretation of asymptotic optimality supplied by Corollary 3.3 on printed page 14.

The Erlang-C cost model

Customers arrive at rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and receive exponential service at rate μ>0\mu>0μ>0 per server. The service rate μ\muμ is fixed as λ\lambdaλ grows. For an integer number of servers N>λ/μN>\lambda/\muN>λ/μ, the Erlang-C delay probability π(N,λ/μ)\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)π(N,λ/μ) is the explicit finite-sum expression in Section 2 of the report. A customer who waits has an exponential waiting time with rate Nμ−λN\mu-\lambdaNμ−λ. Let Dλ(t)D_\lambda(t)Dλ​(t) be the cost of a wait of length ttt. It is strictly increasing on t≥0t\ge0t≥0, satisfies Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0)=0Dλ​(0)=0, and has finite exponential expectation at every positive rate. The resulting conditional waiting cost is

G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞Dλ(t)e−(Nμ−λ)t dt.G(N,\lambda)=(N\mu-\lambda)\int_0^\infty D_\lambda(t)e^{-(N\mu-\lambda)t}\,dt.G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞​Dλ​(t)e−(Nμ−λ)tdt.

The staffing cost F(N)F(N)F(N) is one fixed, convex, strictly increasing function of the server count. Its continuous extension is evaluated at real N>0N>0N>0. Total cost per unit of time at a stable integer level is

C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ).C(N,\lambda)=F(N)+\lambda\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)G(N,\lambda).C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ).

Write Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​ for any minimizing stable integer level. Ties are permitted. For a positive real offset xxx, define Nλ(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μN_\lambda(x)=\lambda/\mu+x\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}Nλ​(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μ​, Fλ(x)=F(Nλ(x))−F(λ/μ)F_\lambda(x)=F(N_\lambda(x))-F(\lambda/\mu)Fλ​(x)=F(Nλ​(x))−F(λ/μ), and Gλ(x)=λG(Nλ(x),λ)G_\lambda(x)=\lambda G(N_\lambda(x),\lambda)Gλ​(x)=λG(Nλ​(x),λ). The report extends Erlang-C continuously to πλ(x)\pi_\lambda(x)πλ​(x) and writes the incremental continuous objective as Cλ(x)=Fλ(x)+πλ(x)Gλ(x)C_\lambda(x)=F_\lambda(x)+\pi_\lambda(x)G_\lambda(x)Cλ​(x)=Fλ​(x)+πλ​(x)Gλ​(x). These definitions and the integer-extension identity are from Section 3, printed pages 11–12.

Formalization targets

The report defines the efficiency-driven regime by

for every κ>0,lim⁡λ→∞Fλ(κ)Gλ(κ)=+∞.\text{for every }\kappa>0,\qquad \lim_{\lambda\to\infty}\frac{F_\lambda(\kappa)}{G_\lambda(\kappa)}=+\infty.for every κ>0,λ→∞lim​Gλ​(κ)Fλ​(κ)​=+∞.

For each λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, choose yλ∗>0y^*_\lambda>0yλ∗​>0 to minimize Fλ(y)+Gλ(y)F_\lambda(y)+G_\lambda(y)Fλ​(y)+Gλ​(y) over y>0y>0y>0. Let Sλ(y)S_\lambda(y)Sλ​(y) be the smaller cost of the stable integer levels immediately below and above Nλ(y)N_\lambda(y)Nλ​(y); if the lower one is unstable, use the upper one. The goal, Theorem 6.1 together with Corollary 3.3, is

lim⁡λ→∞Sλ(yλ∗)−F(λ/μ)C(Nλ∗,λ)−F(λ/μ)=1.\lim_{\lambda\to\infty} \frac{S_\lambda(y^*_\lambda)-F(\lambda/\mu)} {C(N^*_\lambda,\lambda)-F(\lambda/\mu)}=1.λ→∞lim​C(Nλ∗​,λ)−F(λ/μ)Sλ​(yλ∗​)−F(λ/μ)​=1.

The milestone path includes the convexity of the conditional waiting cost (Lemma C.1), the agreement of the continuous Erlang-C extension with its integer formula, the two approximation lemmas and their corollary (Lemmas 3.1–3.2 and Corollary 3.3), the convex staffing-cost comparison of equation (13), and all three clauses of the Halfin–Whitt limit in Lemma 4.1. This ordering follows the objects each later statement uses.

What the result gives

The theorem certifies a staffing rule defined by a one-variable surrogate rather than the exact Erlang-C probability in the objective. Its guarantee concerns the incremental total cost above the unavoidable baseline F(λ/μ)F(\lambda/\mu)F(λ/μ), which is the economically relevant quantity when comparing two near-minimal stable staffing levels. The ratio tends to one, so the theorem is stronger than a claim that the two costs merely have the same growth order. The source also presents other regimes with different surrogates; their conclusions are separate targets in this series.

The paper proves the mathematical theorem. This mission asks for a Lean proof of its closed-form model and the surrounding lemmas. The complete development would make the report's approximation framework reusable for later results that combine a continuous queueing approximation, a surrogate minimizer, and integer rounding. It would also expose the exact assumptions needed to pass between real and integer staffing levels. No machine-checked proof of this report's Theorem 6.1 is claimed here.

Where the difficulty lies

The simple objective replaces the delay probability πλ(y)\pi_\lambda(y)πλ​(y) by one. That replacement is accurate near zero offset, but the minimizing offset itself changes with λ\lambdaλ. Pointwise asymptotics at a fixed positive offset do not directly control the value of an objective at its moving minimizer. The proof therefore has to relate the regime assumption to the location of the relevant minimizers before using the Halfin–Whitt limit. Integer rounding introduces another boundary issue: when Nλ(y)N_\lambda(y)Nλ​(y) is just above λ/μ\lambda/\muλ/μ, its floor need not be stable, so evaluating the ordinary Erlang-C formula there would compare the target against a meaningless cost. These difficulties are visible already in the statements of Theorem 6.1 and Lemma 3.2.

Formalization scope and conventions

Lean represents λ\lambdaλ, μ\muμ, offsets, and costs as real numbers; arrival-rate limits use the real filter at +∞+\infty+∞. Staffing counts are natural numbers. The service rate is positive and fixed. A WaitModel packages strict increase and normalization of DλD_\lambdaDλ​ on nonnegative waits together with integrability against every positive exponential rate. This integrability expresses the report's finiteness assumption for GGG and prevents a nonintegrable real integral from silently evaluating to zero. The hypotheses on FFF are convexity and strict increase on positive real staffing levels; FFF does not depend on λ\lambdaλ.

The report asserts that G(N,λ)G(N,\lambda)G(N,λ) diverges as NNN decreases to λ/μ\lambda/\muλ/μ, although the stated assumptions permit bounded increasing waiting penalties for which that assertion fails. The goal therefore includes this explicit divergence hypothesis, which also supports existence of the continuous minimizer used in the report's argument. The integer optimum and the surrogate optimum are functions constrained to be minimizers at every positive arrival rate. They cannot be arbitrary choices that make the conclusion vacuous. The continuous optimum appears only in the framework milestones; it is not a hypothesis of Theorem 6.1.

All formulas are total Lean functions. Their values at λ≤0\lambda\le0λ≤0, unstable integer counts, nonpositive offsets, or invalid parameters to the continuous Erlang-C integral have no queueing interpretation. Every theorem using them constrains its relevant inputs. The definition of SλS_\lambdaSλ​ ignores an unstable floor and uses the stable ceiling. At a positive offset and arrival rate this ceiling is above offered load. The Gaussian density, its cumulative integral, the hazard rate, and the delay function use the explicit formulas of Section 4; the value of the delay function at zero is the continuous extension needed by Lemma 4.1.

The queue's stochastic construction is outside this mission. The formal objects are the report's cost formulas and asymptotic comparisons, not a continuous-time Markov chain. Useful contributions include proofs of the special-function limit, convexity of conditional waiting cost, the integer-extension identity, and the reusable approximation lemmas. The regime condition is the full limit in equation (23); weakening it to an unrelated boundedness condition would change the theorem.

Selected references

  • Sem Borst, Avi Mandelbaum, and Martin I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000. Report PDF. Theorem 6.1, printed p. 19; Corollary 3.3, printed p. 14; Lemma 4.1, printed p. 15; Lemma C.1, printed p. 40.
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Dynamical SystemsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms 4: Subgaussian Martingale Noise with Σ exp(−c/γ_n) < ∞ for Every c > 0 Satisfies Assumption A1 Almost SurelyResearch Paper

Motivation

A stochastic approximation algorithm is a recursion

xn+1−xn=γn+1(F(xn)+Un+1)x_{n+1}-x_n=\gamma_{n+1}\big(F(x_n)+U_{n+1}\big)xn+1​−xn​=γn+1​(F(xn​)+Un+1​)

in Rd\mathbb R^dRd, where FFF is a vector field, γn\gamma_nγn​ are small step sizes and Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​ is noise. Such recursions go back to Robbins and Monro's root-finding scheme (Robbins–Monro 1951) and underlie stochastic gradient descent, temporal-difference learning, adaptive control and learning in games. The ODE method studies them by comparing the iterates with the trajectories of x˙=F(x)\dot x=F(x)x˙=F(x).

Benaïm's lecture notes (Benaïm 1999) organize the ODE method in two steps. A deterministic step, Proposition 4.1, shows that whenever the noise satisfies a condition called A1 (together with a boundedness condition on the iterates), the interpolated process is an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF. A probabilistic step then verifies A1 for concrete noise models. Proposition 4.2 does this for martingale difference noise with bounded qqq-th moments, at the price of step sizes with ∑nγn1+q/2<∞\sum_n\gamma_n^{1+q/2}<\infty∑n​γn1+q/2​<∞. This mission formalizes the second verification, Proposition 4.4: when the noise is subgaussian, A1 holds almost surely under the much weaker requirement that ∑ne−c/γn<∞\sum_ne^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty∑n​e−c/γn​<∞ for every c>0c>0c>0, which allows step sizes decaying only slightly faster than 1/log⁡n1/\log n1/logn. The notes attribute the result to Duflo (1997), see also Kushner and Yin (1997) and Benaïm and Hirsch (1996).

Setting

Let {γn}n≥1\{\gamma_n\}_{n\ge1}{γn​}n≥1​ be a deterministic sequence with γn≥0\gamma_n\ge0γn​≥0, ∑nγn=∞\sum_n\gamma_n=\infty∑n​γn​=∞ and γn→0\gamma_n\to0γn​→0 (a step sequence). Put τ0=0\tau_0=0τ0​=0, τn=∑i=1nγi\tau_n=\sum_{i=1}^n\gamma_iτn​=∑i=1n​γi​, and let

m(t)=sup⁡{k≥0: t≥τk}m(t)=\sup\{k\ge0:\ t\ge\tau_k\}m(t)=sup{k≥0: t≥τk​}

be the index of the step that contains time t≥0t\ge0t≥0. For a sequence {Un}n≥1\{U_n\}_{n\ge1}{Un​}n≥1​ define the piecewise constant processes Uˉ(t)=Um(t)+1\bar U(t)=U_{m(t)+1}Uˉ(t)=Um(t)+1​ and γˉ(t)=γm(t)+1\bar\gamma(t)=\gamma_{m(t)+1}γˉ​(t)=γm(t)+1​, so that step n+1n+1n+1 occupies the time interval [τn,τn+1)[\tau_n,\tau_{n+1})[τn​,τn+1​) of length γn+1\gamma_{n+1}γn+1​.

Assumption A1 asks that for every T>0T>0T>0

lim⁡n→∞sup⁡{∥∑i=nk−1γi+1Ui+1∥: k=n+1,…,m(τn+T)}=0,\lim_{n\to\infty}\sup\Big\{\Big\|\sum_{i=n}^{k-1}\gamma_{i+1}U_{i+1}\Big\|:\ k=n+1,\dots,m(\tau_n+T)\Big\}=0,n→∞lim​sup{​i=n∑k−1​γi+1​Ui+1​​: k=n+1,…,m(τn​+T)}=0,

or, in the form the notes call equivalent, lim⁡t→∞Δ(t,T)=0\lim_{t\to\infty}\Delta(t,T)=0limt→∞​Δ(t,T)=0 for every T>0T>0T>0, where

Δ(t,T)=sup⁡0≤h≤T∥∫tt+hUˉ(s) ds∥.\Delta(t,T)=\sup_{0\le h\le T}\Big\|\int_t^{t+h}\bar U(s)\,ds\Big\|.Δ(t,T)=0≤h≤Tsup​​∫tt+h​Uˉ(s)ds​.

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space with a nondecreasing sequence {Fn}\{\mathcal F_n\}{Fn​} of sub-σ\sigmaσ-algebras, and F:Rd→RdF:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb R^dF:Rd→Rd continuous. A sequence {xn}\{x_n\}{xn​} given by the recursion above is a Robbins–Monro algorithm if γ\gammaγ is deterministic, UnU_nUn​ is Fn\mathcal F_nFn​-measurable, and E(Un+1∣Fn)=0E(U_{n+1}\mid\mathcal F_n)=0E(Un+1​∣Fn​)=0. The noise is subgaussian if there is a number Γ>0\Gamma>0Γ>0 such that for all nnn and all θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd

E(exp⁡⟨θ,Un+1⟩ ∣ Fn)≤exp⁡(Γ2∥θ∥2).E\big(\exp\langle\theta,U_{n+1}\rangle\,\big|\,\mathcal F_n\big)\le\exp\Big(\frac\Gamma2\|\theta\|^2\Big).E(exp⟨θ,Un+1​⟩​Fn​)≤exp(2Γ​∥θ∥2).

Bounded noise, ∥Un∥≤Γ\|U_n\|\le\sqrt\Gamma∥Un​∥≤Γ​, is an example.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.4

For a Robbins–Monro algorithm with subgaussian noise and a deterministic step sequence such that

∑ne−c/γn<∞for each c>0,\sum_ne^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty\qquad\text{for each }c>0,n∑​e−c/γn​<∞for each c>0,

with probability one the realised noise sequence satisfies A1, in both of its forms, simultaneously for all T>0T>0T>0.

Milestones

  1. The exponential supermartingale. For every θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd,
Zn(θ)=exp⁡[∑i=1n⟨θ,γiUi⟩−Γ2∑i=1nγi2∥θ∥2]Z_n(\theta)=\exp\Big[\sum_{i=1}^n\langle\theta,\gamma_iU_i\rangle-\frac\Gamma2\sum_{i=1}^n\gamma_i^2\|\theta\|^2\Big]Zn​(θ)=exp[i=1∑n​⟨θ,γi​Ui​⟩−2Γ​i=1∑n​γi2​∥θ∥2]

is a supermartingale. 2. Directional maximal tail bound. For every unit vector eee, α>0\alpha>0α>0, nnn and T>0T>0T>0,

P(sup⁡n<k≤m(τn+T)⟨e,∑i=nk−1γi+1Ui+1⟩≥α)≤exp⁡(−α22Γ∑i=nm(τn+T)−1γi+12).P\Big(\sup_{n<k\le m(\tau_n+T)}\Big\langle e,\sum_{i=n}^{k-1}\gamma_{i+1}U_{i+1}\Big\rangle\ge\alpha\Big)\le\exp\Big(\frac{-\alpha^2}{2\Gamma\sum_{i=n}^{m(\tau_n+T)-1}\gamma_{i+1}^2}\Big).P(n<k≤m(τn​+T)sup​⟨e,i=n∑k−1​γi+1​Ui+1​⟩≥α)≤exp(2Γ∑i=nm(τn​+T)−1​γi+12​−α2​).
  1. Eq. (18). There are C,C′>0C,C'>0C,C′>0 depending only on ddd and Γ\GammaΓ with
P(Δ(t,T)≥α)≤Cexp⁡(−α2C′∫tt+Tγˉ(s) ds)(t≥0, T>0, α>0).P(\Delta(t,T)\ge\alpha)\le C\exp\Big(\frac{-\alpha^2}{C'\int_t^{t+T}\bar\gamma(s)\,ds}\Big)\qquad(t\ge0,\ T>0,\ \alpha>0).P(Δ(t,T)≥α)≤Cexp(C′∫tt+T​γˉ​(s)ds−α2​)(t≥0, T>0, α>0).
  1. Block comparison. Δ(t,T)≤2Δ(kT,T)+Δ((k+1)T,T)\Delta(t,T)\le2\Delta(kT,T)+\Delta((k+1)T,T)Δ(t,T)≤2Δ(kT,T)+Δ((k+1)T,T) for kT≤t<(k+1)TkT\le t<(k+1)TkT≤t<(k+1)T.

Significance

Proposition 4.4 is the sufficient condition for the ODE method when the noise has Gaussian-type tails. Its step-size condition holds whenever γnlog⁡n→0\gamma_n\log n\to0γn​logn→0, so it admits steps that decrease far more slowly than the ∑γn2<∞\sum\gamma_n^2<\infty∑γn2​<∞ of the classical L2L^2L2 theory; slowly decreasing steps are what practitioners use to keep algorithms responsive. Combined with Proposition 4.1 it shows that the interpolated process of such an algorithm, with bounded iterates, is almost surely an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF, and the limit set theorems of the notes then locate the limit points of the algorithm.

The result is proved in the notes and in the cited literature; it has not, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A formal proof would add reusable pieces: an exponential supermartingale and maximal inequality for vector-valued martingale differences with a conditional subgaussian bound (Mathlib's conditional subgaussian notion is scalar), a Borel–Cantelli argument along the grid kTkTkT, and the continuous-time bookkeeping of Uˉ\bar UUˉ, γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​ and Δ\DeltaΔ shared with the other missions of this series.

Difficulty

The moment method of Proposition 4.2 does not reach this regime: any fixed polynomial moment of the window sums decays only polynomially in the window's step sizes, and under ∑e−c/γn<∞\sum e^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty∑e−c/γn​<∞ alone polynomial bounds are not summable over windows. Exponential tail bounds are needed, and they must be maximal (uniform over the window) and must hold for the norm of a vector, not only for a scalar. The continuous-time deviation Δ(t,T)\Delta(t,T)Δ(t,T) involves partial steps at both ends of [t,t+h][t,t+h][t,t+h], so the bound must be stated in terms of ∫tt+Tγˉ\int_t^{t+T}\bar\gamma∫tt+T​γˉ​ rather than a sum over whole steps, with constants that do not depend on ttt, TTT or α\alphaα. Finally, A1 quantifies over all T>0T>0T>0: the almost-sure statement must hold on a single event of full probability for every TTT.

Formalization scope

The space is Rd\mathbb R^dRd as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) (the paper writes Rm\mathbb R^mRm); time is real. The sequences γ\gammaγ and UUU are indexed by N\mathbb NN, and their values at 000 are unused, as the paper indexes them from 111. The filtration is a Mathlib Filtration ℕ; Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​ is Fn+1\mathcal F_{n+1}Fn+1​-strongly measurable and integrable, and E(Un+1∣Fn)=0E(U_{n+1}\mid\mathcal F_n)=0E(Un+1​∣Fn​)=0 almost surely. The subgaussian condition requires exp⁡⟨θ,Un+1⟩\exp\langle\theta,U_{n+1}\rangleexp⟨θ,Un+1​⟩ to be integrable for every θ\thetaθ and nnn. The summand e−c/γne^{-c/\gamma_n}e−c/γn​ is taken to be 000 when γn=0\gamma_n=0γn​=0, its limiting value. The suprema in A1 and Δ\DeltaΔ are taken in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the supremum over an empty range of kkk is 000. In Eq. (18) the constants are chosen before the probability space, the algorithm and t,T,αt,T,\alphat,T,α.

The following readings are excluded and are not acceptable formalizations: a subgaussian condition that holds vacuously because the exponential is not integrable (Lean's conditional expectation of a non-integrable function is 000); a summability condition made trivial or false by the convention c/0=0c/0=0c/0=0; and the conclusion "for each TTT, A1 holds almost surely" in place of "almost surely, A1 holds for all TTT". The second sentence of Proposition 4.4 (the asymptotic pseudotrajectory conclusion) is outside this mission.

All hypotheses are satisfiable: U=0U=0U=0, x=0x=0x=0, F=0F=0F=0, Γ=1\Gamma=1Γ=1 and γn=1/n\gamma_n=1/nγn​=1/n satisfy every one of them.

Contributions welcome: a maximal inequality for nonnegative supermartingales in the form needed here, vector subgaussian tail bounds for martingale transforms with deterministic weights (reusable well beyond this mission), lemmas on the step processes and Δ\DeltaΔ (measurability, local integrability, additivity), and the proofs of the milestones.

Selected references

  • M. Benaïm, Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms, Séminaire de Probabilités XXXIII, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1709, Springer, 1999, pp. 1–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0096509
  • M. Duflo, Random Iterative Models, Applications of Mathematics 34, Springer, 1997.
  • H. J. Kushner and G. G. Yin, Stochastic Approximation Algorithms and Applications, Springer, 1997.
  • M. Benaïm and M. W. Hirsch, Asymptotic pseudotrajectories and chain recurrent flows, with applications, Journal of Dynamics and Differential Equations 8 (1996), 141–176. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02218617
  • H. Robbins and S. Monro, A stochastic approximation method, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22 (1951), 400–407. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729586
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 1: Revenue Sharing at w = φc Coordinates the Channel and Gives the Retailer the Share φ of Its Optimal ProfitResearch Paper

Why revenue sharing

A supplier who sells to an independent retailer through a plain per-unit wholesale price faces double marginalization: the retailer orders less than the quantity that maximizes the profit of the supply chain as a whole, because each unit costs him the wholesale price rather than the production cost. Supply chain contracting studies payment schemes under which the retailer's own optimum coincides with the system optimum. Such a scheme is said to coordinate the channel. The usual examples are buy-back contracts (Pasternack, 1985), quantity-flexibility contracts (Tsay and Lovejoy, 1999) and quantity discounts (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Moorthy, 1987).

Cachon and Lariviere study revenue sharing, in which the retailer pays a low wholesale price and also hands over a fixed fraction of his revenue. The scheme was common in video-cassette rental in the late 1990s, where it let rental chains stock far more copies of new releases. This mission formalizes the paper's single-retailer result: revenue sharing coordinates the channel, and the supplier can choose any split of the channel's maximal profit. It also includes the three further results of the paper that use the same argument.

The source is the authors' working paper of June 2000. Its results are unnumbered, so every item cites a section, a displayed equation and a printed page. The 2005 Management Science version renumbers and revises the material.

Setting

A supplier sells to one retailer, who orders q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 units before a selling season. The retailer's expected revenue is a function R(q)R(q)R(q) of the quantity alone. Leftover units have zero salvage value, and the supplier produces each unit at cost c>0c > 0c>0. The paper's standing assumptions (Sec. 1, p. 5) are:

  • RRR is strictly concave and differentiable for q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, with marginal revenue R′(q)R'(q)R′(q);
  • the product is viable: R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c;
  • a finite quantity is optimal: R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c.

A revenue-sharing contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} has two terms. The retailer pays the wholesale price w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 per unit, and he keeps the share ϕ\phiϕ of the revenue and transfers (1−ϕ)R(q)(1-\phi)R(q)(1−ϕ)R(q) to the supplier. The case ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1 is the plain wholesale-price contract. The profits of the supply chain, the retailer and the supplier are

Π(q)=R(q)−qc,πr(q)=ϕR(q)−qw,πs(q)=(1−ϕ)R(q)+qw−qc.\Pi(q) = R(q) - qc,\qquad \pi_r(q) = \phi R(q) - qw,\qquad \pi_s(q) = (1-\phi)R(q) + qw - qc .Π(q)=R(q)−qc,πr​(q)=ϕR(q)−qw,πs​(q)=(1−ϕ)R(q)+qw−qc.

The integrated channel quantity qIq_IqI​ is the maximizer of Π\PiΠ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0. In Lean these objects are RevShareCoord.Single.Model (fields R, R', c and the three assumptions) and its functions Pi, retailerProfit and supplierProfit.

Formalization targets

Goal: revenue sharing coordinates the channel (Sec. 2.2, p. 6)

Let ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0,1]ϕ∈(0,1] and w(ϕ)=ϕcw(\phi) = \phi cw(ϕ)=ϕc. Then

qI=arg max⁡q≥0 πr(q) (uniquely),w(ϕ)≤c,πr(qI)=ϕ Π(qI),πs(qI)=(1−ϕ) Π(qI).q_I = \operatorname*{arg\,max}_{q\ge 0}\ \pi_r(q) \ \text{(uniquely)},\qquad w(\phi)\le c,\qquad \pi_r(q_I) = \phi\,\Pi(q_I),\qquad \pi_s(q_I) = (1-\phi)\,\Pi(q_I).qI​=q≥0argmax​ πr​(q) (uniquely),w(ϕ)≤c,πr​(qI​)=ϕΠ(qI​),πs​(qI​)=(1−ϕ)Π(qI​).

The statement fixes no revenue function and no share. It holds for every model and every ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1], which is what "the supplier can take any share of the channel profit" means.

Milestones on the way

  1. Eq. (1), p. 6. qIq_IqI​ exists, is unique and positive, and is the only positive root of R′(qI)=cR'(q_I) = cR′(qI​)=c.
  2. Retailer's first-order condition, p. 6. If R′(0)>w/ϕR'(0) > w/\phiR′(0)>w/ϕ, an order q^≥0\hat q \ge 0q^​≥0 is optimal for the retailer exactly when q^>0\hat q > 0q^​>0 and ϕR′(q^)=w\phi R'(\hat q) = wϕR′(q^​)=w. The retailer has at most one optimal order.
  3. Profit identities, p. 6. Under {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi, \phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, πr(q)=ϕΠ(q)\pi_r(q) = \phi\Pi(q)πr​(q)=ϕΠ(q) and πs(q)=(1−ϕ)Π(q)\pi_s(q) = (1-\phi)\Pi(q)πs​(q)=(1−ϕ)Π(q) at every qqq.
  4. Heterogeneous retailers, p. 7. Given ccc and ϕ\phiϕ, a single wholesale price, chosen before the revenue function, coordinates every retailer of the model.

Further results on the same argument

  1. Buy-back equivalence, Sec. 2.3, p. 9. Take the fixed-price newsvendor and the buy-back contract b∗=p(1−ϕ)b^* = p(1-\phi)b∗=p(1−ϕ), wb∗=p(1−ϕ)+ϕcw_b^* = p(1-\phi)+\phi cwb∗​=p(1−ϕ)+ϕc. It gives the retailer and the supplier the same realized profits as {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi, \phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, for every order and every demand realization.
  2. Endogenous price, Sec. 3.1 and footnote 3, p. 11. Let revenue Rev(q,p)\mathrm{Rev}(q,p)Rev(q,p) be any function of quantity and price, with costs linear in quantity. Then πr(q,p)=ϕ Π(q,p)\pi_r(q,p) = \phi\,\Pi(q,p)πr​(q,p)=ϕΠ(q,p) under {ϕ,ϕc}\{\phi,\phi c\}{ϕ,ϕc}, and the integrated optimum (qI,pI)(q_I,p_I)(qI​,pI​), assumed unique, is the retailer's unique optimum.

Significance

The result separates coordination from profit division. A contract family coordinates for every value of a parameter, and that parameter then moves profit between the firms without changing the quantity, so the contract terms can be settled by bargaining power alone. The heterogeneous-retailer milestone gives the practical advantage over quantity discounts: the coordinating terms do not depend on the retailer's demand, so one price list serves retailers who face different markets. The Sec. 2.3 equivalence shows that, in the fixed-price newsvendor, buy-backs are a special case of revenue sharing. The Sec. 3.1 statement shows that revenue sharing still coordinates when the retailer also sets the price, a setting in which Emmons and Gilbert (1998) showed buy-backs fail.

All of these results are proved in the paper, and none is open. The mission adds a machine-checked version of the single-retailer theory for a general strictly concave revenue function. A related newsvendor version is already formalized on the platform: SupplyChainTheory.revenue_sharing_coordinates, from Snyder and Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, Thm 14.6. That version has a newsvendor revenue with salvage values and goodwill costs, and it concludes the optimality of three profits, not the ϕ\phiϕ-split of this paper. It is a different statement, so it is not reused here.

Difficulty

The algebra is short. The identity πr=ϕΠ\pi_r = \phi\Piπr​=ϕΠ under w=ϕcw = \phi cw=ϕc is a single line, and it is a milestone, not the goal. The work lies in the optimization claims over a half-line with only one-sided information at 000. The integrated optimum must be shown to exist. R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c gives only an eventual bound on the derivative, so the existence argument needs the continuity of a concave function and its supergradient inequality. It must also be shown positive, which uses R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c as a one-sided derivative. Its uniqueness rests on strict concavity. The retailer's first-order condition needs the same machinery for ϕR−wq\phi R - wqϕR−wq, including the observation that the boundary point 000 is never optimal. A stationary point of πr\pi_rπr​ is not enough. The goal asserts that qIq_IqI​ is the unique maximizer over all of [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

Formalization scope

  • Quantities, prices and shares are real numbers. RRR and R′R'R′ are functions R→R\mathbb R \to \mathbb RR→R, constrained only on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). Differentiability is HasDerivWithinAt R (R' q) (Set.Ici 0) q for q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, so it is one-sided at 000. Strict concavity is StrictConcaveOn ℝ (Set.Ici 0) R.
  • R′(∞)<cR'(\infty) < cR′(∞)<c is encoded as "R′(Q)<cR'(Q) < cR′(Q)<c for some Q≥0Q \ge 0Q≥0". For a decreasing R′R'R′ this is equivalent, and it allows R′→−∞R' \to -\inftyR′→−∞.
  • "Optimal" means IsMaxOn over [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) (over [0,∞)×P[0,\infty)\times P[0,∞)×P in Sec. 3.1), and "unique" means every other maximizer equals it.
  • The supplier's profit πs\pi_sπs​ is not displayed in the paper. It is read off the sequence of events of Sec. 1.
  • The goal and the first-order condition take ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0,1]ϕ∈(0,1]. At ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0 the retailer's profit is identically zero and qIq_IqI​ is not the unique optimum. The profit identities and the buy-back identities hold for all real parameters and are stated that way.
  • Corrected slips. (a) Eq. (1) is introduced with "R′(0)≥cR'(0) \ge cR′(0)≥c". This contradicts the standing assumption R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c: with equality, qI=0q_I = 0qI​=0 is not positive. The statement uses R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c. (b) The display πr(qI)=ϕR(qI)−qIc=ϕΠ(qI)\pi_r(q_I) = \phi R(q_I) - q_I c = \phi\Pi(q_I)πr​(qI​)=ϕR(qI​)−qI​c=ϕΠ(qI​) has a wrong middle term, which should read ϕR(qI)−qIϕc\phi R(q_I) - q_I\phi cϕR(qI​)−qI​ϕc. The outer equality is stated.
  • The first-order-condition milestone adds the converse direction and uniqueness to the paper's "must satisfy". It does not claim that an optimum exists, which may fail when w/ϕ<cw/\phi < cw/ϕ<c.
  • Sec. 3.1 is stated in the generality of footnote 3: an arbitrary revenue function Rev(q,p)\mathrm{Rev}(q,p)Rev(q,p) and a set PPP of admissible prices, with the integrated optimum's uniqueness as a hypothesis, as the paper assumes it. The paper's monotonicity of F(x,p)F(x,p)F(x,p) in ppp is unused and omitted.
  • Sec. 2.3 is formalized pathwise. The expected-profit equations (2)–(4) are not part of the mission.
  • A goal that only asserts πr(ϕ,ϕc,q)=ϕ Π(q)\pi_r(\phi, \phi c, q) = \phi\,\Pi(q)πr​(ϕ,ϕc,q)=ϕΠ(q) would be an unfolding of definitions. The goal therefore carries the argmax-and-uniqueness claim, which needs strict concavity and the model's assumptions.
  • Needed infrastructure: first-order conditions for concave functions on a closed half-line with one-sided derivatives, and existence of maximizers from an eventual derivative bound. Both are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of that general kind are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • B. A. Pasternack, Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable commodities, Marketing Science 4(2):166–176, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.2.166
  • K. S. Moorthy, Managing channel profits: Comment, Marketing Science 6(4):375–379, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.6.4.375
  • A. A. Tsay, W. S. Lovejoy, Quantity flexibility contracts and supply chain performance, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 1(2):89–111, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1.2.89
  • H. Emmons, S. M. Gilbert, Note: The role of returns policies in pricing and inventory decisions for catalogue goods, Management Science 44(2):276–283, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.2.276
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Ch. 14. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation I: The Price of Stability of Fair Cost Sharing Is at Most H(k), and This Is TightResearch Paper

Motivation

Many networks are built and paid for by the users they serve: multicast trees, virtual overlays, shared subnetworks of the Internet. A protocol proposes a design and a rule for splitting its cost, and each participant is free to accept the proposal or defect to a cheaper alternative. The designer therefore cannot impose the global optimum; the best it can do is propose the cheapest outcome that no participant wants to leave, a Nash equilibrium. The ratio between the cost of the best equilibrium and the optimal cost, the price of stability, measures the loss caused by requiring stability. It contrasts with the price of anarchy, which compares the worst equilibrium with the optimum and suits settings with no coordinating protocol at all.

Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler and Roughgarden (SIAM J. Comput. 2008; preliminary version FOCS 2004) studied this question for the most common cost-sharing rule, the Shapley (equal-split) rule, under which every user of an edge pays the same share of its cost. Their first result, the subject of this mission, is that the price of stability is at most the harmonic number H(k)H(k)H(k), where kkk is the number of players, and that this bound is attained in the limit.

Setting

There are kkk players and a finite set EEE of edges. Each player iii has a family Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ of feasible strategies, each a set of edges; in the network setting Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ consists of the edge sets connecting player iii's terminals in a directed graph. Each edge eee has a nonnegative cost cec_ece​. In a strategy vector S=(S1,…,Sk)S=(S_1,\dots,S_k)S=(S1​,…,Sk​), Si∈ΣiS_i\in\Sigma_iSi​∈Σi​, let xex_exe​ be the number of players whose strategy contains eee. Under Shapley cost sharing player iii pays

Ci(S)=∑e∈Sicexe.C_i(S)=\sum_{e\in S_i}\frac{c_e}{x_e}.Ci​(S)=e∈Si​∑​xe​ce​​.

The cost of the designed network is

cost⁡(S)=∑e∈⋃iSice,\operatorname{cost}(S)=\sum_{e\in\bigcup_i S_i}c_e ,cost(S)=e∈⋃i​Si​∑​ce​,

and the payments add up to exactly this amount. The profile SSS is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if no player iii has a strategy Si′∈ΣiS_i'\in\Sigma_iSi′​∈Σi​ with Ci(S−i,Si′)<Ci(S)C_i(S_{-i},S_i')<C_i(S)Ci​(S−i​,Si′​)<Ci​(S). Finally,

H(k)=1+12+⋯+1k.H(k)=1+\tfrac12+\dots+\tfrac1k .H(k)=1+21​+⋯+k1​.

The game is a congestion game: the per-user cost of an edge, fe(x)=ce/xf_e(x)=c_e/xfe​(x)=ce​/x, depends only on the edge and its number of users. Rosenthal's potential

Φ(S)=∑e∈E∑x=1xefe(x)\Phi(S)=\sum_{e\in E}\sum_{x=1}^{x_e}f_e(x)Φ(S)=e∈E∑​x=1∑xe​​fe​(x)

changes by exactly the deviating player's change in cost when a single player changes strategy. The same objects are used with load-dependent edge costs ce(x)c_e(x)ce​(x), in which case fe(x)=ce(x)/xf_e(x)=c_e(x)/xfe​(x)=ce​(x)/x.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 and its tightness

For every game with ce≥0c_e\ge0ce​≥0 in which each player has a feasible strategy there is a Nash equilibrium SSS with

cost⁡(S)≤H(k)⋅cost⁡(P)for every profile P,\operatorname{cost}(S)\le H(k)\cdot\operatorname{cost}(P)\quad\text{for every profile }P,cost(S)≤H(k)⋅cost(P)for every profile P,

and for every k≥1k\ge1k≥1, ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 the instance of Fig. 1.1 (player iii has its own path of cost 1/i1/i1/i, and all players can share a path of cost 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε) has a Nash equilibrium, every Nash equilibrium of it costs H(k)H(k)H(k), and some profile costs 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε. The ratio H(k)/(1+ε)H(k)/(1+\varepsilon)H(k)/(1+ε) tends to H(k)H(k)H(k) as ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0.

Milestones

  1. Budget balance: ∑iCi(S)=cost⁡(S)\sum_iC_i(S)=\operatorname{cost}(S)∑i​Ci​(S)=cost(S) for every SSS (Sect. 1).
  2. Rosenthal's potential is exact (Theorem 2.1, proof, (2.1)).
  3. From every profile some Nash equilibrium of no larger potential is reached (Theorem 2.1, proof).
  4. Theorem 3.1: if cost⁡(S)≤A Φ(S)\operatorname{cost}(S)\le A\,\Phi(S)cost(S)≤AΦ(S) and Φ(S)≤Bcost⁡(S)\Phi(S)\le B\operatorname{cost}(S)Φ(S)≤Bcost(S) for all SSS, the price of stability is at most ABABAB.
  5. For nondecreasing concave edge costs ce(x)c_e(x)ce​(x): cost⁡(S)≤Φ(S)≤H(k)cost⁡(S)\operatorname{cost}(S)\le\Phi(S)\le H(k)\operatorname{cost}(S)cost(S)≤Φ(S)≤H(k)cost(S) (Theorem 2.3, proof).
  6. Theorem 2.3: the H(k)H(k)H(k) bound for nondecreasing concave edge costs.
  7. The Fig. 1.1 instance: its Nash equilibrium is unique and costs H(k)H(k)H(k); a profile costs 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε.

Significance

The bound shows that requiring stability under the Shapley rule costs at most a logarithmic factor, H(k)=Θ(log⁡k)H(k)=\Theta(\log k)H(k)=Θ(logk), whereas the price of anarchy of the same game is kkk (two parallel edges of costs 111 and kkk already show this). It was among the first price-of-stability results and is the starting point for a line of work on network design games: the undirected case, where the H(k)H(k)H(k) bound is not tight and the correct value remained open for years, weighted players, and other cost-sharing rules. The argument (an exact potential that over- and under-estimates the social cost by bounded factors) is the standard tool for price-of-stability bounds, and Theorem 3.1 isolates it in a reusable form.

The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no machine-checked proof exists. This mission produces a formal account of Shapley cost-sharing games as congestion games, of Rosenthal's potential and the finite improvement property, of the potential-sandwich argument of Theorem 3.1, and of the matching lower-bound instance, for constant and for nondecreasing concave edge costs.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, bounding the cost of an arbitrary equilibrium, fails: some equilibria cost kkk times the optimum, so any proof must select a particular equilibrium. The selection uses the finiteness of the strategy space together with the exact potential, and the bound needs the inequality Φ≤H(k)⋅cost⁡\Phi\le H(k)\cdot\operatorname{cost}Φ≤H(k)⋅cost, which for concave costs requires the per-user cost ce(x)/xc_e(x)/xce​(x)/x to be nonincreasing. On the lower-bound side, the claim that every equilibrium of Fig. 1.1 costs H(k)H(k)H(k) requires excluding all equilibria in which some players share the common path, for every kkk at once, not only checking that the all-own profile is stable.

Formalization scope

Games are encoded as congestion games over arbitrary finite families of edge sets, reusing the published CongestionPoA.AsymSum.Model (congestion game, loads, player costs, cost-form pure Nash equilibrium, total cost). The paper notes that its proofs do not use the graph structure; the directed-graph game is the instance in which Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ is the family of edge sets connecting player iii's terminals. Players and edges form finite types; kkk is the number of players and H(k)H(k)H(k) is Mathlib's harmonic k cast to R\mathbb RR. The price of stability is stated as the existence of a Nash equilibrium whose cost is at most the constant times the cost of every profile, with no division by the optimum, and with the hypothesis that some profile exists. Concave costs are functions on N\mathbb NN with nonincreasing increments, nondecreasing, with ce(0)≥0c_e(0)\ge0ce​(0)≥0; this last condition is implicit in the paper and needed for ce(x)/xc_e(x)/xce​(x)/x to be nonincreasing. Theorem 3.1 carries the implicit hypothesis A≥0A\ge0A≥0.

A statement that bounds every equilibrium is false, and one that asserts a cheap profile without the Nash condition is trivial; both are excluded, and the tightness part quantifies over every Nash equilibrium of the instance and asserts that one exists.

Needed infrastructure: finite improvement paths in potential games, sum manipulations over loads, and bounds on harmonic sums. The potential lemmas apply to every finite congestion game and are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, É. Tardos, T. Wexler, T. Roughgarden, The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation, SIAM J. Comput. 38(4):1602–1623, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/070680096
  • R. W. Rosenthal, A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria, Int. J. Game Theory 2:65–67, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential games, Games Econ. Behav. 14:124–143, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
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