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Operations Research

889 missions · 480 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Processing Networks II: Subcriticality is Necessary for StabilityTextbook

Motivation

Before a queueing network's stability can be studied in any depth, a much cruder question has to be settled: is stability even possible for the given arrival rates and service capacities, under any control policy at all? For a single M/M/1 queue the answer is the familiar λ<μ\lambda < \muλ<μ, but a general stochastic processing network (SPN) — many buffers, many activities, servers that can be pooled or shared across job classes — has no single scalar "utilization" to compare against a threshold. J. G. Dai and J. Michael Harrison's Processing Networks: Fluid Models and Stability (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming; cited here from the authors' pre-publication draft, 2020-4-2, http://spnbook.org) answers this with a linear program: the static planning problem, first formulated by Harrison (2000). This mission formalizes the theorem that answers the crude question in one direction — no control policy can stabilize a network outside the region that program identifies — which is why, as the book puts it, "throughout the remainder of this book, attention is essentially restricted to subcritical networks."

Setting

An SPN has III buffers, indexed by i∈Ii \in \mathcal{I}i∈I, and JJJ activities, indexed by j∈Jj \in \mathcal{J}j∈J. Its first-order data — the quantities that matter for a capacity calculation, as opposed to full stochastic detail — are: the I×JI \times JI×J material requirement matrix BBB (BijB_{ij}Bij​ = number of class-iii items one type-jjj service consumes), the I×JI \times JI×J mean output matrix Γ\GammaΓ (its jjjth column is the expected output vector of a type-jjj service), the mean service times mj>0m_j > 0mj​>0, the K×JK \times JK×J capacity consumption matrix AAA (server pool kkk against activity jjj), and the server-pool capacities b∈R+Kb \in \mathbb{R}_+^Kb∈R+K​. From these,

R:=(B−Γ)M−1,M:=diag⁡(m1,…,mJ),R := (B - \Gamma)M^{-1}, \qquad M := \operatorname{diag}(m_1, \dots, m_J),R:=(B−Γ)M−1,M:=diag(m1​,…,mJ​),

so that RijR_{ij}Rij​ is the long-run average rate at which activity jjj depletes buffer iii's content.

Given an arrival-rate vector λ∈R+I\lambda \in \mathbb{R}_+^Iλ∈R+I​, the static planning problem (SPP) is the linear program

γ∗(λ):=min⁡x≥0, γ γs.t.Rx=λ,Ax≤γb,\gamma^\ast(\lambda) := \min_{x \ge 0,\, \gamma} \ \gamma \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Rx = \lambda, \quad Ax \le \gamma b,γ∗(λ):=x≥0,γmin​ γs.t.Rx=λ,Ax≤γb,

whose decision variable xjx_jxj​ is a long-run average activity rate and whose objective γ\gammaγ upper-bounds every server pool's utilization. The network is subcritical at λ\lambdaλ if γ∗(λ)<1\gamma^\ast(\lambda) < 1γ∗(λ)<1, and the subcritical region is Λ:={λ:γ∗(λ)<1}\Lambda := \{\lambda : \gamma^\ast(\lambda) < 1\}Λ:={λ:γ∗(λ)<1}.

An SPN is stable (Definition 3.6, mission I) when its ambient Markov chain is positive recurrent, equivalently has a unique stationary distribution, equivalently its buffer contents converge in distribution to a non-defective limit. This mission's chapter portion (Chapters 4-5) also treats three extensions used elsewhere in the book: a Markovian arrival process replacing independent Poisson arrivals; alternate routing with immediate commitment, where arrivals must be routed into an eligible buffer at the instant they arrive, with routing rates constrained by an augmented version of the SPP; and processor sharing (PS) networks, whose service discipline falls outside the book's ordinary relaxed-control framework and is instead analyzed through an equivalent head-of-line (EHL) model built to have the same generator.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.2 — only subcritical networks can be stable

(baseline stochastic assumptions) ∧ (Markov representation) ∧ (SPN stable)  ⟹  λ∈Λ.\text{(baseline stochastic assumptions)} \ \wedge \ \text{(Markov representation)} \ \wedge \ \text{(SPN stable)} \implies \lambda \in \Lambda.(baseline stochastic assumptions) ∧ (Markov representation) ∧ (SPN stable)⟹λ∈Λ.

This is the weakest target that captures the chapter's content: it asserts nothing about which policy achieves stability, or whether subcriticality is sufficient (Chapters 6 onward answer that, case by case, and Chapter 5 itself gives two counterexamples where it is not) — only that subcriticality is unconditionally necessary.

Further results (milestones)

Proposition 4.1 (a strong law of large numbers for class-level arrivals under randomized routing), Proposition 4.4 (PS-network stability reduces to EHL-model stability), Proposition 5.1 (for a unitary network, subcriticality reduces to the classical load condition ρ<b\rho < bρ<b), and Corollaries 5.4-5.6 (the same necessity conclusion under a Markovian arrival process, under alternate routing, and its consequence for maximally stable policies).

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 5.2 converts "can this network be stabilized at all?" from an open-ended search over control policies into a single linear-program feasibility check on first-order data alone. Corollary 5.6 turns this into the standard proof template every later chapter uses: exhibit a policy whose implementation does not reference λ\lambdaλ, show it is stable throughout the subcritical region, and conclude maximal stability — without having to separately characterize the true stability region Λ∗\Lambda^\astΛ∗, which the book calls "a deep mathematical problem" in general.

Formalizing it. A search of the platform for "processing network," "static planning problem," and "linear program" returned no hits: the SPN-specific static planning problem — its decision variables xxx tied to a network's material-balance matrix RRR and capacity matrix AAA — has no existing counterpart, though the platform's linear-optimization field (16 missions) has general LP duality substrate a future proof of Proposition 5.1 or Theorem 5.2 could draw on. This mission is a from-scratch formalization of the SPP, the subcritical region, and the necessity theorem.

Difficulty

The natural first attempt states Theorem 5.2 as a claim about the buffer-contents process Z(t)Z(t)Z(t) directly. This fails to separate cleanly from the proof, because the actual argument passes through an auxiliary quantity — the stationary mean x:=Eπ[N(0)]x := \mathbb{E}_\pi[N(0)]x:=Eπ​[N(0)] under the chain's (unique, by stability) stationary distribution π\piπ — that has no meaning outside a specific proof strategy. The formalization instead states the goal purely in terms of the data (R,A,b)(R, A, b)(R,A,b) and the hypothesis of stability, exactly as the book's own statement does, leaving xxx's construction to the (currently sorry) proof. A second difficulty is Corollary 5.4's Markovian arrival process: naively reusing BaselineAssumptions with a non-Poisson arrival process is impossible, since Poisson-ness is a mandatory structural field of that definition, not an optional hypothesis — the corollary needs its own hypothesis structure that changes exactly the one clause Assumption 2.1(a) contributes and nothing else.

Formalization scope

Buffers and activities are Fin I, Fin J; matrices are Matrix over ℝ. The subcritical region is defined via the optimal SPP value γ∗\gamma^\astγ∗, formalized with Mathlib's IsLeast (attained infimum, matching the book's own "γ∗≤1\gamma^\ast \le 1γ∗≤1 iff xxx exists" phrasing, which presupposes attainment) rather than a bare existential — a formalization using, say, sInf would silently commit to junk values on an infeasible or unbounded LP and would not obviously match the book's own usage of γ∗\gamma^\astγ∗ as literally attained. The basic SPN model's full state-process construction (Sections 2.3-2.4) is not re-derived from scratch here; Theorem 5.2 instead takes the structural facts its own proof invokes — the capacity constraint AN(t)≤bAN(t) \le bAN(t)≤b (Eq. 2.11) and the material-requirement matrix BBB — as explicit data, reusing mission I's BaselineAssumptions and MarkovRepresentation for the stochastic and Markov-chain apparatus. Proposition 4.4's shared- generator fact between a PS network and its EHL model (the actual content the book's construction of Section 4.4 establishes) is likewise taken as an explicit hypothesis rather than rebuilt from the refined-class/phase-type machinery of Eqs. (4.19)-(4.29); reconstructing that machinery from scratch, or reproving Proposition 4.1's SLLN from the chain's strong Markov property at regeneration times, are both welcome future contributions. A formalization that stated Theorem 5.2 with Λ\LambdaΛ replaced by an unconstrained existential (dropping the LP structure entirely) would trivialize the chapter's actual content — the LP-feasibility characterization is what makes Λ\LambdaΛ checkable, and is preserved here in full.

Selected references

  • J. G. Dai and J. Michael Harrison, Processing Networks: Fluid Models and Stability, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming), pre-publication draft 2020-4-2. http://spnbook.org
  • J. M. Harrison, "Brownian models of open processing networks: canonical representation of workload," Annals of Applied Probability 10 (2000), 75-103.
  • J. G. Dai and W. Lin, "Maximum pressure policies in stochastic processing networks," Operations Research 53 (2005), 197-218.
13 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsGraph TheoryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cones of Matrices and Set-Functions and 0–1 Optimization II: One Round of N on the Stable Set Polytope Gives Exactly the Odd Hole ConstraintsResearch Paper

Motivation

The stable set problem (vertex packing) asks for a largest set of pairwise non-adjacent nodes of a graph. It is NP-hard, and its polyhedral study, the description of the stable set polytope STAB(G)\mathrm{STAB}(G)STAB(G) by linear inequalities, is one of the most studied topics of polyhedral combinatorics. Classes of valid inequalities (clique, odd hole, odd antihole, wheel constraints) and the graph classes they describe exactly (perfect, ttt-perfect, hhh-perfect graphs) organize much of that literature; see Grötschel, Lovász and Schrijver, Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization (Springer, 1988).

Lovász and Schrijver (SIAM J. Optim. 1(2), 1991) introduced a general lift-and-project procedure for 0–1 programs: lift a relaxation KKK into a space of matrices, impose linear conditions that every 0–1 point satisfies, and project back. One round of their operator NNN gives a tighter relaxation N(K)N(K)N(K) that still contains every 0–1 point of KKK; nnn rounds give the 0–1 hull. The procedure is an ancestor of the Sherali–Adams and Lasserre hierarchies, and the stable set problem is its first test case. This mission formalizes the paper's exact description of what one round of NNN does to the fractional stable set polytope: it adds precisely the odd hole constraints.

Setting

Let G=(V,E)G = (V, E)G=(V,E) be a finite graph with no isolated nodes, n=∣V∣n = |V|n=∣V∣. Vectors of RV∪{0}\mathbb{R}^{V \cup \{0\}}RV∪{0} have a distinguished coordinate x0x_0x0​; RV\mathbb{R}^VRV sits inside as the hyperplane H0={x0=1}H_0 = \{x_0 = 1\}H0​={x0​=1}, via x↦(1,x)x \mapsto (1, x)x↦(1,x).

  • FRAC(G)⊆RV\mathrm{FRAC}(G) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^VFRAC(G)⊆RV is the solution set of the nonnegativity constraints xi≥0x_i \ge 0xi​≥0 (i∈Vi \in Vi∈V) and the edge constraints xi+xj≤1x_i + x_j \le 1xi​+xj​≤1 (ij∈Eij \in Eij∈E).
  • FR(G)⊆RV∪{0}\mathrm{FR}(G) \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{V\cup\{0\}}FR(G)⊆RV∪{0} is the cone given by xi≥0x_i \ge 0xi​≥0 and xi+xj≤x0x_i + x_j \le x_0xi​+xj​≤x0​; it is the cone spanned by the vectors (1,x)(1, x)(1,x) with x∈FRAC(G)x \in \mathrm{FRAC}(G)x∈FRAC(G).
  • QQQ is the cone spanned by the 0–1 vectors with x0=1x_0 = 1x0​=1. For a convex cone KKK, its polar cone is K∗={u:uTx≥0 ∀x∈K}K^* = \{u : u^{\mathsf T}x \ge 0 \ \forall x \in K\}K∗={u:uTx≥0 ∀x∈K}.
  • M(K)=M(K,Q)M(K) = M(K, Q)M(K)=M(K,Q) is the set of (n+1)×(n+1)(n+1)\times(n+1)(n+1)×(n+1) matrices Y=(yij)Y = (y_{ij})Y=(yij​) that are symmetric, satisfy yii=y0iy_{ii} = y_{0i}yii​=y0i​ for i∈Vi \in Vi∈V, and satisfy uTYv≥0u^{\mathsf T} Y v \ge 0uTYv≥0 for all u∈K∗u \in K^*u∈K∗, v∈Q∗v \in Q^*v∈Q∗.
  • N(K)={Ye0:Y∈M(K)}N(K) = \{Y e_0 : Y \in M(K)\}N(K)={Ye0​:Y∈M(K)}, and N(G)={x∈RV:(1,x)∈N(FR(G))}N(G) = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^V : (1, x) \in N(\mathrm{FR}(G))\}N(G)={x∈RV:(1,x)∈N(FR(G))}.
  • A set C⊆VC \subseteq VC⊆V is an odd hole if it induces a chordless cycle of odd length ∣C∣≥3|C| \ge 3∣C∣≥3 (triangles included). Its odd hole constraint is ∑i∈Cxi≤12(∣C∣−1)\sum_{i \in C} x_i \le \frac12(|C| - 1)∑i∈C​xi​≤21​(∣C∣−1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.3 (p. 178)

For every finite graph GGG without isolated nodes,

N(G)={x∈RV:xi≥0 (i∈V),  xi+xj≤1 (ij∈E),  ∑i∈Cxi≤12(∣C∣−1) (C an odd hole)}.N(G) = \Big\{x \in \mathbb{R}^V : x_i \ge 0\ (i \in V),\ \ x_i + x_j \le 1\ (ij \in E),\ \ \sum_{i \in C} x_i \le \tfrac12(|C|-1)\ (C \text{ an odd hole})\Big\}.N(G)={x∈RV:xi​≥0 (i∈V),  xi​+xj​≤1 (ij∈E),  i∈C∑​xi​≤21​(∣C∣−1) (C an odd hole)}.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Lemma 1.3 (p. 171): for a convex cone K⊆QK \subseteq QK⊆Q and i∈Vi \in Vi∈V, N(K)⊆(K∩Hi)+(K∩Gi)N(K) \subseteq (K \cap H_i) + (K \cap G_i)N(K)⊆(K∩Hi​)+(K∩Gi​), with Hi={xi=0}H_i = \{x_i = 0\}Hi​={xi​=0}, Gi={xi=x0}G_i = \{x_i = x_0\}Gi​={xi​=x0​}.
  2. Lemma 2.2 (p. 178): if both the deletion and the contraction of some node vvv give inequalities valid for KKK, then aTx≤ba^{\mathsf T}x \le baTx≤b is valid for N(K)N(K)N(K).
  3. Part (1) of the proof of Theorem 2.3 (p. 178): for an odd hole CCC and i∈Ci \in Ci∈C, the deletion and contraction of iii in the odd hole constraint are valid for FRAC(G)\mathrm{FRAC}(G)FRAC(G).
  4. Observation of Section 2.b (p. 177): every Y∈M(FR(G))Y \in M(\mathrm{FR}(G))Y∈M(FR(G)) has yij=0y_{ij} = 0yij​=0 for ij∈Eij \in Eij∈E.
  5. Part (2) of the proof of Theorem 2.3 (p. 178): x∈N(G)x \in N(G)x∈N(G) if and only if some nonnegative symmetric YYY with y00=1y_{00} = 1y00​=1, yi0=yii=xiy_{i0} = y_{ii} = x_iyi0​=yii​=xi​ satisfies xi+xj+xk−1≤yik+yjk≤xkx_i + x_j + x_k - 1 \le y_{ik} + y_{jk} \le x_kxi​+xj​+xk​−1≤yik​+yjk​≤xk​ for all i,j,ki, j, ki,j,k with ij∈Eij \in Eij∈E.
  6. Lemma 2.4 (p. 178): a system a(ij)≤yi+yj≤b(ij)a(ij) \le y_i + y_j \le b(ij)a(ij)≤yi​+yj​≤b(ij), y≥0y \ge 0y≥0, y∣U=0y|_U = 0y∣U​=0 on a graph is infeasible if and only if a walk with a negative alternating sum of one of four types exists.

Significance

Theorem 2.3 gives a complete description of one round of NNN on the stable set problem: the only new constraints are the odd hole constraints. Consequences:

  • For ttt-perfect graphs (those for which nonnegativity, edge and odd hole constraints describe STAB(G)\mathrm{STAB}(G)STAB(G)), N(G)=STAB(G)N(G) = \mathrm{STAB}(G)N(G)=STAB(G).
  • It is the base case for the paper's bounds on the NNN-index of stable set inequalities (Theorem 2.13), and it contrasts with the semidefinite operator N+N_+N+​, which after one round already satisfies clique, odd antihole and wheel constraints.
  • Lemma 2.4 is a combinatorial feasibility criterion for systems with two variables per inequality, useful beyond this paper.

The result has been proved since 1991. At the time of drafting, Prove2Me holds no formalization of it or of any part of the Lovász–Schrijver construction, and Mathlib has none. The mission produces a formal account of the NNN operator on the stable set polytope and a formal proof of the walk criterion for two-variable systems.

Difficulty

The inclusion of N(G)N(G)N(G) in the odd hole system is a short argument once Lemma 1.3 is available. The reverse inclusion is the substance: given xxx satisfying all odd hole constraints, one must exhibit a lifted matrix YYY. A direct appeal to Farkas' lemma yields a certificate with no visible relation to odd cycles; the difficulty is to show that every obstruction to solvability of the matrix system forces a violated odd hole constraint, which is what Lemma 2.4 and the analysis of its four walk types accomplish. Case (d) of that analysis needs the odd hole constraints; the other cases need only the edge constraints. Lemma 2.4 itself is called folklore on the page and is stated without proof there.

A further point: Lemma 2.4 is stated for lower bounds 0≤a0 \le a0≤a, while the lower bounds that arise from the matrix system, xi+xj+xk−1x_i + x_j + x_k - 1xi​+xj​+xk​−1, can be negative.

Formalization scope

  • Coordinates of RV∪{0}\mathbb{R}^{V\cup\{0\}}RV∪{0} are indexed by Option V, with none the coordinate x0x_0x0​. Graphs are Mathlib SimpleGraphs on a finite type VVV with decidable adjacency. Every statement about a graph carries the paper's standing assumption that GGG has no isolated nodes (∀ v, ∃ w, G.Adj v w).
  • MMM is defined by condition (iii), never by its rewritings. Lemma 1.3 and Lemma 2.2 take the cone KKK closed, a hypothesis the paper leaves tacit (its cones are polyhedral); for a non-closed KKK Lemma 1.3 is false. FR(G)\mathrm{FR}(G)FR(G) is polyhedral, so the goal needs no such hypothesis.
  • FR(G)\mathrm{FR}(G)FR(G) is defined by its constraints; this agrees with the cone over FRAC(G)\mathrm{FRAC}(G)FRAC(G) because GGG has no isolated nodes.
  • Lemma 2.2 is stated in cone form: KKK is any closed convex cone inside FR(G)\mathrm{FR}(G)FR(G), and validity is read on the slice x0=1x_0 = 1x0​=1. The paper's extra hypothesis STAB(G)⊆K\mathrm{STAB}(G) \subseteq KSTAB(G)⊆K is dropped, which strengthens the lemma.
  • Deletion and contraction of a node are coefficient vectors on the same graph (coefficients set to 000), not inequalities on the subgraphs G−vG - vG−v and G−Γ(v)−vG - \Gamma(v) - vG−Γ(v)−v.
  • Odd holes are chordless odd cycles including triangles; triangles are needed, as 121\tfrac12\mathbf 121​1 satisfies all other constraints on a triangle.
  • The matrix system of part (2) is stated as an equivalence; the page uses one direction.
  • Lemma 2.4 uses edge values on unordered pairs and strict inequalities, exactly as printed.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal is the set equality for every graph without isolated nodes, not the existence of a lifted matrix and not a single graph.

Not formalized here: the semidefinite operator N+N_+N+​, the operator N^\hat NN^, algorithmic statements (Theorems 1.6, 2.1, Corollary 2.5), and the set-function results of Section 3.

Reusable beyond this mission: the matrix cone layer (QQQ, MMM, NNN), the stable-set cones, and the two-variable feasibility criterion of Lemma 2.4. Contributions of any of the milestones, and of general facts about polar cones of polyhedral cones in this setting, are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. Lovász and A. Schrijver, Cones of matrices and set-functions and 0–1 optimization, SIAM Journal on Optimization 1(2) (1991) 166–190. https://doi.org/10.1137/0801013
  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász and A. Schrijver, Geometric Algorithms and Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-97881-4
  • H. D. Sherali and W. P. Adams, A hierarchy of relaxations between the continuous and convex hull representations for zero-one programming problems, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 3(3) (1990) 411–430. https://doi.org/10.1137/0403036
13 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsGraph TheoryLinear algebra+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximating Clique-Width and Branch-Width: Well-Linked Sets Certify Clique-WidthResearch Paper

Motivation

Clique-width is a graph parameter introduced by Courcelle and Olariu (Discrete Appl. Math. 101 (2000)) that measures how far a graph is from being built by a few labelled operations. Every problem expressible in monadic second-order logic with quantification over vertices and vertex sets (MSO1_11​) can be solved in linear time on graphs given together with a decomposition of bounded clique-width (Courcelle, Makowsky and Rotics, Theory Comput. Syst. 33 (2000)). Bounded clique-width is more general than bounded tree-width: complete graphs have unbounded tree-width but clique-width 222.

For fixed kkk there was, before this paper, no polynomial-time algorithm that either decides that a graph has clique-width at least k+1k+1k+1 or outputs a decomposition of clique-width bounded by a function of kkk; the best known algorithm, by Johansson (2001), gave width 2klog⁡n2k\log n2klogn. Oum and Seymour (J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 96 (2006)) closed this gap with approximation 23k+2−12^{3k+2}-123k+2−1, through rank-width and a factor-3 approximation for the branch-width of symmetric submodular functions.

Timeline:

  • 1991: Robertson and Seymour introduce branch-width of graphs and hypergraphs (J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 52).
  • 2000: Courcelle and Olariu define clique-width; Courcelle, Makowsky and Rotics solve MSO1_11​ problems on graphs given with a kkk-expression.
  • 2001: Johansson gives a 2klog⁡n2k\log n2klogn approximation.
  • 2006: Oum and Seymour define rank-width, prove rwd(G)≤cwd(G)≤2rwd(G)+1−1\mathrm{rwd}(G) \le \mathrm{cwd}(G) \le 2^{\mathrm{rwd}(G)+1}-1rwd(G)≤cwd(G)≤2rwd(G)+1−1, and give an O(n9log⁡n)O(n^9 \log n)O(n9logn) algorithm that outputs a (23k+2−1)(2^{3k+2}-1)(23k+2−1)-expression or certifies clique-width above kkk.

Setting

All graphs are finite and simple. For a finite set VVV, a function f:2V→Zf : 2^V \to \mathbb{Z}f:2V→Z is submodular if f(X)+f(Y)≥f(X∩Y)+f(X∪Y)f(X)+f(Y) \ge f(X\cap Y)+f(X\cup Y)f(X)+f(Y)≥f(X∩Y)+f(X∪Y) and symmetric if f(X)=f(V∖X)f(X) = f(V\setminus X)f(X)=f(V∖X).

A branch-decomposition of fff is a pair (T,L)(T, L)(T,L) where TTT is a tree with at least two vertices and all degrees at most 333, and LLL is a bijection from VVV onto the leaves of TTT. Removing an edge eee of TTT splits the leaves in two; the width of eee is fff of the set of elements of VVV on one side. The width of (T,L)(T, L)(T,L) is the largest edge width, and the branch-width bw(f)\mathrm{bw}(f)bw(f) is the least width of a branch-decomposition, with bw(f)=f(∅)\mathrm{bw}(f) = f(\emptyset)bw(f)=f(∅) when ∣V∣≤1|V| \le 1∣V∣≤1.

A set W⊆VW \subseteq VW⊆V is well-linked with respect to fff if for every partition (X,Y)(X, Y)(X,Y) of WWW and every ZZZ with X⊆Z⊆V∖YX \subseteq Z \subseteq V\setminus YX⊆Z⊆V∖Y, f(Z)≥min⁡(∣X∣,∣Y∣)f(Z) \ge \min(|X|, |Y|)f(Z)≥min(∣X∣,∣Y∣).

Let A(G)A(G)A(G) be the adjacency matrix of GGG over GF(2)\mathrm{GF}(2)GF(2). For disjoint X,Y⊆V(G)X, Y \subseteq V(G)X,Y⊆V(G), cutrkG∗(X,Y)\mathrm{cutrk}^*_G(X, Y)cutrkG∗​(X,Y) is the rank of the submatrix of A(G)A(G)A(G) with rows XXX and columns YYY, and the cut-rank function is cutrkG(X)=cutrkG∗(X,V(G)∖X)\mathrm{cutrk}_G(X) = \mathrm{cutrk}^*_G(X, V(G)\setminus X)cutrkG​(X)=cutrkG∗​(X,V(G)∖X). The rank-width rwd(G)\mathrm{rwd}(G)rwd(G) is bw(cutrkG)\mathrm{bw}(\mathrm{cutrk}_G)bw(cutrkG​).

A kkk-expression is a term built from constants ⋅i\cdot_i⋅i​ (a vertex with label i∈{1,…,k}i \in \{1,\dots,k\}i∈{1,…,k}), the operators ηi,j\eta_{i,j}ηi,j​ (i≠ji \ne ji=j; add all edges between labels iii and jjj), ρi→j\rho_{i\to j}ρi→j​ (relabel iii into jjj) and disjoint union ⊕\oplus⊕. Its value is the labelled graph it produces; GGG has clique-width cwd(G)≤k\mathrm{cwd}(G) \le kcwd(G)≤k if some kkk-expression has value isomorphic to GGG.

An interpolation of fff is a function f∗f^*f∗ on disjoint pairs (X,Y)(X, Y)(X,Y) that agrees with fff on (X,V∖X)(X, V\setminus X)(X,V∖X), is monotone, submodular in the sense f∗(A,B)+f∗(C,D)≥f∗(A∩C,B∪D)+f∗(A∪C,B∩D)f^*(A,B)+f^*(C,D) \ge f^*(A\cap C, B\cup D) + f^*(A\cup C, B\cap D)f∗(A,B)+f∗(C,D)≥f∗(A∩C,B∪D)+f∗(A∪C,B∩D), and has f∗(∅,∅)=f(∅)f^*(\emptyset,\emptyset)=f(\emptyset)f∗(∅,∅)=f(∅).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1.1, certificate form

For a graph GGG with at least one vertex and an integer k≥1k \ge 1k≥1:

∃ W, ∣W∣=3k+1, W well-linked for cutrkG  ⟹  cwd(G)≥k+1,\exists\, W,\ |W| = 3k+1,\ W \text{ well-linked for } \mathrm{cutrk}_G \;\Longrightarrow\; \mathrm{cwd}(G) \ge k+1,∃W, ∣W∣=3k+1, W well-linked for cutrkG​⟹cwd(G)≥k+1, ∄ W, ∣W∣=3k+1, W well-linked for cutrkG  ⟹  cwd(G)≤23k+2−1.\nexists\, W,\ |W| = 3k+1,\ W \text{ well-linked for } \mathrm{cutrk}_G \;\Longrightarrow\; \mathrm{cwd}(G) \le 2^{3k+2}-1.∄W, ∣W∣=3k+1, W well-linked for cutrkG​⟹cwd(G)≤23k+2−1.

The same explicit condition decides which side of the approximation holds; this is what the paper's algorithm certifies.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 4.1: properties of an interpolation, including that X↦f∗(X,B)−f(∅)X \mapsto f^*(X, B) - f(\emptyset)X↦f∗(X,B)−f(∅) is a matroid rank function on V∖BV\setminus BV∖B when f({v})−f(∅)≤1f(\{v\}) - f(\emptyset) \le 1f({v})−f(∅)≤1.
  2. Proposition 4.2: fmin⁡(X,Y)=min⁡X⊆Z⊆V∖Yf(Z)f_{\min}(X,Y) = \min_{X\subseteq Z\subseteq V\setminus Y} f(Z)fmin​(X,Y)=minX⊆Z⊆V∖Y​f(Z) is an interpolation.
  3. Theorem 5.1: a well-linked set of size kkk forces bw(f)≥k/3\mathrm{bw}(f) \ge k/3bw(f)≥k/3 (for k≠1k \ne 1k=1).
  4. Theorem 5.2: no well-linked set of size kkk implies bw(f)≤k\mathrm{bw}(f) \le kbw(f)≤k, when f({v})≤1f(\{v\}) \le 1f({v})≤1.
  5. Proposition 6.1: rk M[X1,Y1]+rk M[X2,Y2]≥rk M[X1∪X2,Y1∩Y2]+rk M[X1∩X2,Y1∪Y2]\mathrm{rk}\,M[X_1,Y_1] + \mathrm{rk}\,M[X_2,Y_2] \ge \mathrm{rk}\,M[X_1\cup X_2, Y_1\cap Y_2] + \mathrm{rk}\,M[X_1\cap X_2, Y_1\cup Y_2]rkM[X1​,Y1​]+rkM[X2​,Y2​]≥rkM[X1​∪X2​,Y1​∩Y2​]+rkM[X1​∩X2​,Y1​∪Y2​].
  6. Corollary 6.2: submodularity of cutrkG∗\mathrm{cutrk}^*_GcutrkG∗​ and cutrkG\mathrm{cutrk}_GcutrkG​.
  7. Section 6 claim: cutrkG\mathrm{cutrk}_GcutrkG​ is symmetric submodular and cutrkG∗\mathrm{cutrk}^*_GcutrkG∗​ interpolates it.
  8. Proposition 6.3: rwd(G)≤cwd(G)≤2rwd(G)+1−1\mathrm{rwd}(G) \le \mathrm{cwd}(G) \le 2^{\mathrm{rwd}(G)+1}-1rwd(G)≤cwd(G)≤2rwd(G)+1−1.

Significance

The dichotomy turns clique-width, for which no exact polynomial algorithm is known even for fixed kkk, into a parameter that can be approximated with an explicit witness in each direction. Downstream, every algorithm for graphs of bounded clique-width that needs a kkk-expression as input becomes applicable to graphs given without one, at the cost of an exponential blow-up of the width.

The result is proved in the literature; this mission formalizes it. To our knowledge none of the objects involved — branch-width of set functions, rank-width, cut-rank, kkk-expressions, clique-width — has been formalized in Mathlib, and the submodularity of submatrix rank (Proposition 6.1) is absent from Mathlib's Matrix.rank API. The formal development would give reusable definitions of branch-decompositions of arbitrary integer set functions, of cut-rank, and of clique-width, and a machine-checked link between the combinatorial and the linear-algebraic width parameters.

Difficulty

The upper bound in Theorem 5.2 is the core. The natural approach, growing a branch-decomposition one leaf split at a time while keeping the width at most kkk, gets stuck at a leaf carrying a set BBB with f(B)=kf(B) = kf(B)=k: a split of BBB into two parts of fff-value below kkk has to be found, and it must be found from the failure of well-linkedness of a set that is not obviously related to BBB. The paper's device is the interpolation f∗f^*f∗, which attaches a matroid to BBB whose base has exactly f(B)f(B)f(B) elements. Formalizing this requires handling partial branch-decompositions, their extensions, and a maximality argument over trees, none of which exists in Mathlib.

Proposition 6.3's upper bound is a second, independent difficulty: a rank-decomposition must be converted into a kkk-expression by an induction over a rooted binary tree, with a relabelling argument bounding the number of labels by the number of distinct nonzero rows of a GF(2)\mathrm{GF}(2)GF(2) matrix of rank kkk. Its lower bound needs the tree structure of a kkk-expression to be read as a branch-decomposition.

Formalization scope

The ground set is a Fintype V with DecidableEq V; subsets are Finset V; set functions are Finset V → ℤ, as in the paper. A branch-decomposition is a tree T : SimpleGraph (Fin n) with n≥2n \ge 2n≥2, all neighbour sets of size at most 333, and an injective map LLL from VVV onto the vertices of degree 111; the side of an edge uwuwuw is found by reachability from uuu after deleting uwuwuw. Branch-width, rank-width and clique-width are never computed as minima: "bw(f)≤k\mathrm{bw}(f) \le kbw(f)≤k" is the predicate "∣V∣≤1|V| \le 1∣V∣≤1 and f(∅)≤kf(\emptyset) \le kf(∅)≤k, or a branch-decomposition of width at most kkk exists", lower bounds say that every branch-decomposition has a wide edge, and "cwd(G)≤k\mathrm{cwd}(G) \le kcwd(G)≤k" is "GGG has a kkk-expression". Labels {1,…,k}\{1,\dots,k\}{1,…,k} are Fin k. The value of a kkk-expression has as vertex type the occurrences of constants (a nested sum type), and ηi,j\eta_{i,j}ηi,j​ requires i≠ji \ne ji=j. Cut-rank uses Matrix.rank over ZMod 2 of submatrices of SimpleGraph.adjMatrix. An interpolation is a function on all pairs of subsets whose axioms are imposed on disjoint pairs only.

Running time is not formalized. The paper's Theorem 1.1 asserts an O(n9log⁡n)O(n^9\log n)O(n9logn) algorithm; there is no cost model on the page, and the goal states the certificate the algorithm returns instead. Without the running time, "cwd(G)≥k+1\mathrm{cwd}(G) \ge k+1cwd(G)≥k+1 or cwd(G)≤23k+2−1\mathrm{cwd}(G) \le 2^{3k+2}-1cwd(G)≤23k+2−1" holds for every graph, so that reading is ruled out as a formalization of the goal; so are well-linkedness with respect to anything other than cutrkG\mathrm{cutrk}_GcutrkG​, widths defined by an unguarded infimum (which is 000 on an empty family), kkk-expressions whose value is not the graph up to isomorphism or whose η\etaη may join equal labels, and Theorem 5.1 stated for k=1k = 1k=1.

Correction of Theorem 5.1. As printed, Theorem 5.1 fails for k=1k = 1k=1: a singleton is always well-linked, but the edgeless graph on two vertices has cut-rank identically 000 and branch-width 0<1/30 < 1/30<1/3. The milestone carries the hypothesis k≠1k \ne 1k=1; the goal uses the theorem only at size 3k+1≥43k+1 \ge 43k+1≥4.

The graph with no vertex is excluded from the goal and from the upper bound of Proposition 6.3, since it has no kkk-expression for any kkk. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, lemmas on branch-decompositions (suppressing degree-2 vertices, extending partial decompositions), and submatrix-rank submodularity, which is reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • S. Oum and P. Seymour, Approximating clique-width and branch-width, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 96 (2006) 514–528. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jctb.2005.10.006
  • B. Courcelle and S. Olariu, Upper bounds to the clique width of graphs, Discrete Appl. Math. 101 (2000) 77–114. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-218X(99)00184-5
  • B. Courcelle, J. A. Makowsky and U. Rotics, Linear time solvable optimization problems on graphs of bounded clique-width, Theory Comput. Syst. 33 (2000) 125–150. https://doi.org/10.1007/s002249910009
  • N. Robertson and P. D. Seymour, Graph minors. X. Obstructions to tree-decomposition, J. Combin. Theory Ser. B 52 (1991) 153–190. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(91)90061-N
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Advance Demand Information, Price Discrimination, and Preorder Strategies: When Preorder Profit Increases with Demand CorrelationResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms that sell new products (consoles, books, films) often take preorders before release. A preorder serves two purposes at once. It lets the firm charge early adopters a different price from later buyers, a form of price discrimination, and the number of preorders is advance demand information: an early signal of how large regular-season demand will be. Li and Zhang (MSOM 15(1), 2013) ask whether better advance information always helps a seller who runs a preorder, when consumers are strategic and anticipate the seller's stocking decision. Their answer is no. The second-period stocking decision improves, but the preorder price can fall. Whether the net effect is positive depends on the low-type margin and the size of the early-adopter segment.

This mission formalizes that answer, §4 of the paper: the preorder profit as a function of the demand correlation ρ\rhoρ.

Setting

A seller sells a perishable product over two periods. High-type consumers, with valuation vHv_HvH​, arrive in the first period and may preorder at price p1p_1p1​. Low-type consumers, with valuation vL<vHv_L < v_HvL​<vH​, arrive in the second period, when the price is p2p_2p2​. A high type who waits values the product at δvH\delta v_HδvH​, where δ≤1\delta \le 1δ≤1 and δvH>vL\delta v_H > v_LδvH​>vL​. The unit cost is ccc, with 0<c<vL0 < c < v_L0<c<vL​. Unsold units have no salvage value and unmet demand carries no penalty. Write Δ=δvH−vL\Delta = \delta v_H - v_LΔ=δvH​−vL​.

The demands are jointly normal with correlation ρ∈[0,1)\rho \in [0,1)ρ∈[0,1). The high-type demand has mean μH\mu_HμH​, and XXX denotes its standardization, a standard normal variable. The low-type demand has mean μL\mu_LμL​, standard deviation σL\sigma_LσL​ and λL=μL/σL\lambda_L = \mu_L/\sigma_LλL​=μL​/σL​. Given X=xX = xX=x, the updated low-type demand X~L(x)\tilde X_L(x)X~L​(x) is normal with mean μ~L(x)=μL+ρσLx\tilde\mu_L(x) = \mu_L + \rho\sigma_L xμ~​L​(x)=μL​+ρσL​x and standard deviation σ~L=σL1−ρ2\tilde\sigma_L = \sigma_L\sqrt{1-\rho^2}σ~L​=σL​1−ρ2​. Φ\PhiΦ and ϕ\phiϕ are the standard normal distribution function and density, and zLz_LzL​ solves Φ(zL)=(vL−c)/vL\Phi(z_L) = (v_L - c)/v_LΦ(zL​)=(vL​−c)/vL​.

In the second period the seller charges p2=vLp_2 = v_Lp2​=vL​ and solves a newsvendor problem. It orders

Q(x)=μ~L(x)+zLσ~L(1)Q(x) = \tilde\mu_L(x) + z_L\tilde\sigma_L \qquad (1)Q(x)=μ~​L​(x)+zL​σ~L​(1)

and earns ΠL(x)=(vL−c)(μL+ρσLx)−vLϕ(zL)σL1−ρ2\Pi_L(x) = (v_L - c)(\mu_L + \rho\sigma_L x) - v_L\phi(z_L)\sigma_L\sqrt{1-\rho^2}ΠL​(x)=(vL​−c)(μL​+ρσL​x)−vL​ϕ(zL​)σL​1−ρ2​ (2). A waiting high type believes half of the remaining consumers will be served before her, so her belief of product availability is

ξ(ρ)=E[Pr⁡(X~L(X)2<Q(X))].(3)\xi(\rho) = \mathbb E\Big[\Pr\Big(\tfrac{\tilde X_L(X)}{2} < Q(X)\Big)\Big]. \qquad (3)ξ(ρ)=E[Pr(2X~L​(X)​<Q(X))].(3)

In the rational-expectations equilibrium every high type preorders at p1=vH−Δξp_1 = v_H - \Delta\xip1​=vH​−Δξ. The preorder profit is

Πp(ρ)=(vH−Δξ(ρ)−c)μH+ΠL(0).(4)\Pi^p(\rho) = (v_H - \Delta\xi(\rho) - c)\mu_H + \Pi_L(0). \qquad (4)Πp(ρ)=(vH​−Δξ(ρ)−c)μH​+ΠL​(0).(4)

The threshold is

μ~(ρ)=−vLϕ(zL)σL2ΔzL ϕ(2zL1−ρ2+λL).(6)\tilde\mu(\rho) = -\frac{v_L\phi(z_L)\sigma_L}{2\Delta z_L\,\phi\big(2z_L\sqrt{1-\rho^2} + \lambda_L\big)}. \qquad (6)μ~​(ρ)=−2ΔzL​ϕ(2zL​1−ρ2​+λL​)vL​ϕ(zL​)σL​​.(6)

Formalization targets

Goal: PROPOSITION 2

(i) c<vL<2c: Πp strictly increases on every interval where μH<μ~(ρ),and strictly decreases on every interval where μH≥μ~(ρ);(ii) vL≥2c: Πp strictly increases on [0,1).\begin{aligned} &\text{(i) } c < v_L < 2c:\ \Pi^p \text{ strictly increases on every interval where } \mu_H < \tilde\mu(\rho),\\ &\qquad\text{and strictly decreases on every interval where } \mu_H \ge \tilde\mu(\rho);\\ &\text{(ii) } v_L \ge 2c:\ \Pi^p \text{ strictly increases on } [0,1). \end{aligned}​(i) c<vL​<2c: Πp strictly increases on every interval where μH​<μ~​(ρ),and strictly decreases on every interval where μH​≥μ~​(ρ);(ii) vL​≥2c: Πp strictly increases on [0,1).​

Milestones

  1. (1)–(2): Q(x)Q(x)Q(x) is the unique maximizer of E[vLmin⁡(Q,X~L(x))−cQ]\mathbb E[v_L\min(Q,\tilde X_L(x)) - cQ]E[vL​min(Q,X~L​(x))−cQ], and its value is ΠL(x)\Pi_L(x)ΠL​(x).
  2. (3): ξ(ρ)=E[Φ((λL+ρX)/1−ρ2+2zL)]\xi(\rho) = \mathbb E\big[\Phi\big((\lambda_L + \rho X)/\sqrt{1-\rho^2} + 2z_L\big)\big]ξ(ρ)=E[Φ((λL​+ρX)/1−ρ2​+2zL​)].
  3. LEMMA 1(i): if c<vL<2cc < v_L < 2cc<vL​<2c, then zL<0z_L < 0zL​<0 and ξ\xiξ is strictly increasing in ρ\rhoρ.
  4. LEMMA 1(ii): if vL≥2cv_L \ge 2cvL​≥2c, then zL≥0z_L \ge 0zL​≥0 and ξ\xiξ is non-increasing in ρ\rhoρ, strictly so when vL>2cv_L > 2cvL​>2c.
  5. After (5): ddρΠL(0)=vLϕ(zL)σL ρ/1−ρ2>0\dfrac{d}{d\rho}\Pi_L(0) = v_L\phi(z_L)\sigma_L\,\rho/\sqrt{1-\rho^2} > 0dρd​ΠL​(0)=vL​ϕ(zL​)σL​ρ/1−ρ2​>0 for ρ∈(0,1)\rho \in (0,1)ρ∈(0,1).
  6. PROPOSITION 2(i), pointwise: for ρ∈(0,1)\rho \in (0,1)ρ∈(0,1), dΠp/dρ>0  ⟺  μH<μ~(ρ)d\Pi^p/d\rho > 0 \iff \mu_H < \tilde\mu(\rho)dΠp/dρ>0⟺μH​<μ~​(ρ) and dΠp/dρ<0  ⟺  μH>μ~(ρ)d\Pi^p/d\rho < 0 \iff \mu_H > \tilde\mu(\rho)dΠp/dρ<0⟺μH​>μ~​(ρ).
  7. LEMMA 2(i): if −λL/2<zL<0-\lambda_L/2 < z_L < 0−λL​/2<zL​<0, then μ~\tilde\muμ~​ is strictly increasing in ρ\rhoρ.
  8. LEMMA 2(ii): if zL≤−λL/2z_L \le -\lambda_L/2zL​≤−λL​/2, then μ~\tilde\muμ~​ is quasi-convex in ρ\rhoρ.

Significance

The proposition splits the value of advance demand information into two effects with opposite signs. Better information always raises the second-period profit (milestone 5). Its effect on the preorder price depends on the margin. When vL<2cv_L < 2cvL​<2c, the seller stocks below the conditional mean. A more precise forecast then raises the stock and the availability ξ\xiξ, and waiting becomes more attractive, which lowers the preorder price. The threshold μ~(ρ)\tilde\mu(\rho)μ~​(ρ) says which effect wins, and LEMMA 2 describes its shape. This is the basis for the paper's later comparisons of preorder, price-guarantee and no-preorder strategies.

The paper states these results and leaves the proofs to an online appendix. None of them has a machine-checked proof. A complete development would also give reusable facts about normal laws: the expectation E[Φ(a+bX)]\mathbb E[\Phi(a + bX)]E[Φ(a+bX)] for standard normal XXX, the normal newsvendor solution with its closed-form optimal profit, and derivatives of Gaussian integrals with respect to a correlation parameter.

Difficulty

The model is explicit, so the difficulty is not in modelling. It is in turning the two expectations into closed forms and differentiating them. The availability ξ\xiξ is an integral over XXX of a normal probability whose mean and variance both move with ρ\rhoρ. The expected newsvendor profit involves E[min⁡(Q,Y)]\mathbb E[\min(Q, Y)]E[min(Q,Y)] for a normal YYY. Neither closed form is in Mathlib, and neither is a derivative in ρ\rhoρ of a Gaussian integral. The obvious route, differentiating under the integral sign in (3), needs domination estimates that are uniform in ρ\rhoρ near each point, and these degenerate as ρ→1\rho \to 1ρ→1.

Signs are the second difficulty. zLz_LzL​ changes sign at vL=2cv_L = 2cvL​=2c, μ~\tilde\muμ~​ carries a leading minus and divides by zLz_LzL​, and the derivative of Πp\Pi^pΠp vanishes at ρ=0\rho = 0ρ=0 and wherever μ~(ρ)=μH\tilde\mu(\rho) = \mu_Hμ~​(ρ)=μH​. Strict monotonicity on an interval has to be recovered from a derivative that is positive except at finitely many points.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace PreorderADI.Correlation. A structure Params holds vH,vL,c,δ,μH,μL,σL,zLv_H, v_L, c, \delta, \mu_H, \mu_L, \sigma_L, z_LvH​,vL​,c,δ,μH​,μL​,σL​,zL​. The predicate Params.Standing records the model's assumptions: vH>vLv_H > v_LvH​>vL​, c<vLc < v_Lc<vL​, δ≤1\delta \le 1δ≤1 and δvH>vL\delta v_H > v_LδvH​>vL​, together with Φ(zL)=(vL−c)/vL\Phi(z_L) = (v_L-c)/v_LΦ(zL​)=(vL​−c)/vL​. σH\sigma_HσH​ is omitted because nothing in §4 uses it after standardization. Φ\PhiΦ is ProbabilityTheory.cdf (gaussianReal 0 1) and ϕ\phiϕ is gaussianPDFReal 0 1. The normal law with mean mmm and standard deviation sss is gaussianReal m (s^2).

The formalization commits to the following conventions and additions:

  • Added hypotheses. Four hypotheses are added to the page's assumptions:
    • c>0c > 0c>0, so that zLz_LzL​ exists;
    • σL>0\sigma_L > 0σL​>0, so that the conditional law is a genuine normal law;
    • μL>0\mu_L > 0μL​>0, so that λL>0\lambda_L > 0λL​>0, as LEMMA 2 presupposes;
    • μH>0\mu_H > 0μH​>0, which PROPOSITION 2(ii) needs.
  • zLz_LzL​. zLz_LzL​ is a parameter pinned down by Φ(zL)=(vL−c)/vL\Phi(z_L) = (v_L-c)/v_LΦ(zL​)=(vL​−c)/vL​, not an inverse function with junk values.
  • Range of ρ\rhoρ. ρ\rhoρ ranges over [0,1)[0,1)[0,1), the paper's "we will focus on ρ≥0\rho \ge 0ρ≥0" together with ρ<1\rho < 1ρ<1. Derivative statements use (0,1)(0,1)(0,1).
  • ξ\xiξ and Πp\Pi^pΠp. ξ\xiξ is defined as the first expression of (3), the expected probability, so that no closed form is assumed. Πp\Pi^pΠp is defined by (4). PROPOSITION 1, which derives (4) as the unique equilibrium profit, is not formalized: the paper defines the equilibrium only through conditions that already assume every high type preorders.
  • Monotonicity. "Increases in ρ\rhoρ when μH<μ~(ρ)\mu_H < \tilde\mu(\rho)μH​<μ~​(ρ)" is formalized as strict monotonicity on every order-connected I⊆[0,1)I \subseteq [0,1)I⊆[0,1) on which the condition holds. "Decreasing" in LEMMA 1(ii) is non-strict, since ξ\xiξ is constant when vL=2cv_L = 2cvL​=2c. Quasi-convexity is Mathlib's QuasiconvexOn.
  • The ε_v sentence is omitted. PROPOSITION 2(i) also claims that some εv>0\varepsilon_v > 0εv​>0 makes Πp\Pi^pΠp always decrease when vL<c+εvv_L < c + \varepsilon_vvL​<c+εv​. That claim is false in the paper's own model. As vL↓cv_L \downarrow cvL​↓c, μ~(ρ)→∞\tilde\mu(\rho) \to \inftyμ~​(ρ)→∞ for ρ\rhoρ below roughly 3/2\sqrt 3/23​/2, so Πp\Pi^pΠp increases there for every fixed μH\mu_HμH​. The paper's Figure 1 shows the same behaviour.
  • Out of scope. §5 rests on an approximation that treats normal demands as nonnegative, so it is excluded. §§6–7 depend on models given only in the online appendix and are excluded too.

A statement about the closed form Φ(λL+2zL1−ρ2)\Phi(\lambda_L + 2z_L\sqrt{1-\rho^2})Φ(λL​+2zL​1−ρ2​) in place of ξ\xiξ would make LEMMA 1 a one-line monotonicity fact. So would a definition of Πp\Pi^pΠp that bypasses (3). The definitions rule both out.

Welcome contributions include proofs of the milestones, general Mathlib-style lemmas on Gaussian expectations of Φ\PhiΦ and of min⁡(Q,Y)\min(Q, Y)min(Q,Y), and a formalization of PROPOSITION 1 from conditions (i)–(v).

Selected references

  • C. Li and F. Zhang, Advance Demand Information, Price Discrimination, and Preorder Strategies, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15(1):57–71, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1120.0398
  • G. P. Cachon and R. Swinney, Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers, Management Science 55(3):497–511, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0948
  • X. Su and F. Zhang, On the Value of Commitment and Availability Guarantees When Selling to Strategic Consumers, Management Science 55(5):713–726, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0967
10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Information TheoryOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Value-At-Risk and Robust Portfolio Optimization: A Conic Programming Approach 2: Closed Form of the Entropy-Constrained Worst-Case VaRResearch Paper

Motivation

Value-at-Risk (VaR) is the loss level that a portfolio exceeds with probability at most ε\varepsilonε. It is the standard risk measure of banking regulation, and its classical computation assumes Gaussian returns: for a Gaussian return vector with mean x^\hat xx^ and covariance Γ\GammaΓ it equals −Φ−1(ε)w⊤Γw−x^⊤w-\Phi^{-1}(\varepsilon)\sqrt{w^\top\Gamma w} - \hat x^\top w−Φ−1(ε)w⊤Γw​−x^⊤w, where Φ\PhiΦ is the standard normal distribution function. Real returns are not exactly Gaussian, and a VaR computed from a misspecified distribution can badly understate risk.

El Ghaoui, Oks and Oustry (Oper. Res. 51(4), 2003) replace the single distribution by a class P\mathcal PP of distributions and define the worst-case VaR as the smallest loss level whose probability is at most ε\varepsilonε under every distribution of the class. Their first class, distributions with a given mean and covariance, leads to the Chebyshev-type bound of their Theorem 1, whose worst case is attained by discrete distributions. §4.2 of the paper asks instead for distributions that stay close to a Gaussian, measured by relative entropy (Kullback–Leibler divergence). Such balls are the basic uncertainty sets of distributionally robust optimization and of robust control in economics (Hansen and Sargent's multiplier and constraint preferences), and they give a smooth worst case. Theorem 9 computes the resulting worst-case VaR in closed form.

Setting

Returns are random vectors x∈Rnx \in \mathbb R^nx∈Rn and a portfolio is a vector w∈Rnw \in \mathbb R^nw∈Rn with w≠0w \neq 0w=0; its return is r(w,x)=w⊤xr(w,x) = w^\top xr(w,x)=w⊤x. For a level γ∈R\gamma \in \mathbb Rγ∈R the loss set is Sγ={x:γ≤−x⊤w}\mathcal S_\gamma = \{x : \gamma \le -x^\top w\}Sγ​={x:γ≤−x⊤w} (Eq. 13 of the paper).

Given a class P\mathcal PP of probability distributions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn and ε∈(0,1)\varepsilon \in (0,1)ε∈(0,1), the worst-case Value-at-Risk (Eq. 4) is

VP(w)=min⁡{γ∈R:sup⁡P∈PP(Sγ)≤ε}.V_{\mathcal P}(w) = \min\Big\{\gamma \in \mathbb R : \sup_{P \in \mathcal P} P(\mathcal S_\gamma) \le \varepsilon\Big\}.VP​(w)=min{γ∈R:P∈Psup​P(Sγ​)≤ε}.

Fix a mean x^∈Rn\hat x \in \mathbb R^nx^∈Rn and a positive definite covariance Γ≻0\Gamma \succ 0Γ≻0, and let P0=N(x^,Γ)P_0 = \mathcal N(\hat x, \Gamma)P0​=N(x^,Γ) be the reference Gaussian. For d≥0d \ge 0d≥0 the relative-entropy class (Eq. 43) is

Pd={P probability on Rn:KL(P,P0)=∫log⁡dPdP0 dP≤d},\mathcal P_d = \Big\{P \text{ probability on } \mathbb R^n : \mathrm{KL}(P, P_0) = \int \log\frac{dP}{dP_0}\,dP \le d\Big\},Pd​={P probability on Rn:KL(P,P0​)=∫logdP0​dP​dP≤d},

with KL(P,P0)=+∞\mathrm{KL}(P,P_0) = +\inftyKL(P,P0​)=+∞ unless PPP is absolutely continuous with respect to P0P_0P0​.

The risk factor (Eq. 45) is

f(ε,d)=sup⁡λ>0eε/λ−d−1e1/λ−1,κ(ε,d)=−Φ−1(f(ε,d)),f(\varepsilon,d) = \sup_{\lambda>0}\frac{e^{\varepsilon/\lambda - d} - 1}{e^{1/\lambda} - 1}, \qquad \kappa(\varepsilon,d) = -\Phi^{-1}\big(f(\varepsilon,d)\big),f(ε,d)=λ>0sup​e1/λ−1eε/λ−d−1​,κ(ε,d)=−Φ−1(f(ε,d)),

and the Gaussian tail of the loss set is ϕ(γ)=P0(Sγ)=1−Φ((γ+w⊤x^)/w⊤Γw)\phi(\gamma) = P_0(\mathcal S_\gamma) = 1 - \Phi\big((\gamma + w^\top\hat x)/\sqrt{w^\top\Gamma w}\big)ϕ(γ)=P0​(Sγ​)=1−Φ((γ+w⊤x^)/w⊤Γw​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 9 (p. 553)

For Γ≻0\Gamma \succ 0Γ≻0, w≠0w \neq 0w=0, d≥0d \ge 0d≥0 and 0<ε<10 < \varepsilon < 10<ε<1, the minimum in (4) over Pd\mathcal P_dPd​ exists and

VPd(w)=κ(ε,d)w⊤Γw−x^⊤w.(44)V_{\mathcal P_d}(w) = \kappa(\varepsilon,d)\sqrt{w^\top\Gamma w} - \hat x^\top w. \tag{44}VPd​​(w)=κ(ε,d)w⊤Γw​−x^⊤w.(44)

Milestones

The milestones follow the proof of Theorem 9 on pp. 553–554, in attack order.

  1. Eq. (45). The two expressions of fff agree: sup⁡λ>0eε/λ−d−1e1/λ−1=sup⁡v>0e−d(v+1)ε−1v\sup_{\lambda>0}\frac{e^{\varepsilon/\lambda-d}-1}{e^{1/\lambda}-1} = \sup_{v>0}\frac{e^{-d}(v+1)^\varepsilon - 1}{v}supλ>0​e1/λ−1eε/λ−d−1​=supv>0​ve−d(v+1)ε−1​.
  2. Gaussian tail. P0(Sγ)=1−Φ((γ+w⊤x^)/w⊤Γw)P_0(\mathcal S_\gamma) = 1 - \Phi\big((\gamma + w^\top\hat x)/\sqrt{w^\top\Gamma w}\big)P0​(Sγ​)=1−Φ((γ+w⊤x^)/w⊤Γw​).
  3. Eq. (47). For λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, the Lagrangian L(Q)=Q(Sγ)+λ0(1−Q(Rn))+λ(d−KL-integral)L(Q) = Q(\mathcal S_\gamma) + \lambda_0(1 - Q(\mathbb R^n)) + \lambda(d - \mathrm{KL}\text{-integral})L(Q)=Q(Sγ​)+λ0​(1−Q(Rn))+λ(d−KL-integral) is maximised over finite measures Q≪P0Q \ll P_0Q≪P0​ by the exponentially tilted density dQ⋆/dP0=exp⁡((χS−λ0)/λ−1)dQ^\star/dP_0 = \exp((\chi_{\mathcal S} - \lambda_0)/\lambda - 1)dQ⋆/dP0​=exp((χS​−λ0​)/λ−1), with value
θ(λ0,λ)=λ0+λd+λe−λ0/λ−1((e1/λ−1)ϕ(γ)+1).\theta(\lambda_0,\lambda) = \lambda_0 + \lambda d + \lambda e^{-\lambda_0/\lambda - 1}\big((e^{1/\lambda}-1)\phi(\gamma) + 1\big).θ(λ0​,λ)=λ0​+λd+λe−λ0​/λ−1((e1/λ−1)ϕ(γ)+1).
  1. Eq. (48). min⁡λ0∈Rθ(λ0,λ)=λd+λlog⁡((e1/λ−1)ϕ(γ)+1)\min_{\lambda_0\in\mathbb R}\theta(\lambda_0,\lambda) = \lambda d + \lambda\log\big((e^{1/\lambda}-1)\phi(\gamma)+1\big)minλ0​∈R​θ(λ0​,λ)=λd+λlog((e1/λ−1)ϕ(γ)+1).
  2. Duality. sup⁡P∈PdP(Sγ)=inf⁡λ>0(λd+λlog⁡((e1/λ−1)ϕ(γ)+1))\sup_{P\in\mathcal P_d} P(\mathcal S_\gamma) = \inf_{\lambda>0}\big(\lambda d + \lambda\log((e^{1/\lambda}-1)\phi(\gamma)+1)\big)supP∈Pd​​P(Sγ​)=infλ>0​(λd+λlog((e1/λ−1)ϕ(γ)+1)).
  3. Inversion. For d>0d > 0d>0: some λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 makes the dual value at most ε\varepsilonε if and only if γ≥κ(ε,d)w⊤Γw−w⊤x^\gamma \ge \kappa(\varepsilon,d)\sqrt{w^\top\Gamma w} - w^\top\hat xγ≥κ(ε,d)w⊤Γw​−w⊤x^.
  4. Remark after Theorem 9. f(ε,0)=εf(\varepsilon, 0) = \varepsilonf(ε,0)=ε, so κ(ε,0)=−Φ−1(ε)\kappa(\varepsilon,0) = -\Phi^{-1}(\varepsilon)κ(ε,0)=−Φ−1(ε). The risk factor κ(ε,d)\kappa(\varepsilon, d)κ(ε,d) is strictly increasing in d≥0d \ge 0d≥0.

Significance

Theorem 9 says that an entropy ball around a Gaussian leaves the form of the Gaussian VaR unchanged: only the risk factor moves, from −Φ−1(ε)-\Phi^{-1}(\varepsilon)−Φ−1(ε) to κ(ε,d)\kappa(\varepsilon,d)κ(ε,d), a scalar computed by a one-dimensional maximisation. The worst-case VaR therefore stays a convex function of www whenever κ≥0\kappa \ge 0κ≥0, and minimising it over a polytope of portfolios is a second-order cone program (problem (3) of the paper). The number f(ε,d)f(\varepsilon,d)f(ε,d) is the largest ppp with KL(Bernoulli(ε) ∥ Bernoulli(p))≤d\mathrm{KL}(\mathrm{Bernoulli}(\varepsilon)\,\|\,\mathrm{Bernoulli}(p)) \le dKL(Bernoulli(ε)∥Bernoulli(p))≤d, which ties the result to the binary-divergence bounds used throughout information theory.

The theorem was proved in 2003. The worst-case-probability step (milestone 5) is an instance of the Donsker–Varadhan / Gibbs variational duality for relative-entropy balls, which the paper imports from the literature (Smith 1995). No machine-checked proof of Theorem 9 or of this duality on Rn\mathbb R^nRn is known. A formalization would give a verified closed form for a relative-entropy distributionally robust chance constraint, and the duality and tilting lemmas would serve any mission on KL-ball robust optimization.

Difficulty

The obvious argument is Lagrangian duality for the infinite-dimensional problem sup⁡{P(Sγ):KL(P,P0)≤d}\sup\{P(\mathcal S_\gamma) : \mathrm{KL}(P,P_0) \le d\}sup{P(Sγ​):KL(P,P0​)≤d}. Weak duality and the pointwise maximisation that produces the tilted density are elementary. The difficulty is the step the paper cites rather than proves: that the duality gap is zero, and that the supremum over distributions equals the infimum of the dual over λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0. The feasible set is a set of measures, the objective is an indicator, and the constraint is a divergence that is +∞+\infty+∞ off a set of absolutely continuous measures, so a finite-dimensional Slater argument does not apply as stated.

The second difficulty is at the boundary of the parameters. At d=0d = 0d=0 the supremum defining f(ε,0)f(\varepsilon,0)f(ε,0) is approached only as λ→∞\lambda \to \inftyλ→∞, so the final inversion step behaves differently from d>0d > 0d>0. At ε=1\varepsilon = 1ε=1 the theorem is false, since every level γ\gammaγ is feasible and (4) has no minimum.

Formalization scope

Returns live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n). P0P_0P0​ is Mathlib's multivariateGaussian xhat Γ with Γ.PosDef, and KL\mathrm{KL}KL is InformationTheory.klDiv, which is ∞\infty∞ unless P≪P0P \ll P_0P≪P0​ with integrable log-likelihood ratio and equals ∫log⁡dPdP0 dP\int\log\frac{dP}{dP_0}\,dP∫logdP0​dP​dP otherwise for probability measures. The class Pd\mathcal P_dPd​ requires IsProbabilityMeasure P. Φ\PhiΦ is cdf (gaussianReal 0 1), and Φ−1(p)\Phi^{-1}(p)Φ−1(p) is defined as inf⁡{t:p≤Φ(t)}\inf\{t : p \le \Phi(t)\}inf{t:p≤Φ(t)}, which inverts Φ\PhiΦ on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1). The quadratic form w⊤Γww^\top\Gamma ww⊤Γw is a double sum, and ∥Γ1/2w∥2\|\Gamma^{1/2}w\|_2∥Γ1/2w∥2​ is written w⊤Γw\sqrt{w^\top\Gamma w}w⊤Γw​.

Conventions the Lean statements commit to:

  • "min" in (4) is IsLeast of the feasible set {γ:P(Sγ)≤ε ∀P∈Pd}\{\gamma : P(\mathcal S_\gamma) \le \varepsilon \ \forall P \in \mathcal P_d\}{γ:P(Sγ​)≤ε ∀P∈Pd​}. "sup⁡PP(Sγ)≤ε\sup_{P}P(\mathcal S_\gamma) \le \varepsilonsupP​P(Sγ​)≤ε" is written "for every PPP", with probabilities compared in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • The paper prints ε∈(0,1]\varepsilon \in (0,1]ε∈(0,1]. The mission assumes 0<ε<10 < \varepsilon < 10<ε<1, because the goal is false at ε=1\varepsilon = 1ε=1.
  • w≠0w \neq 0w=0 is the paper's assumption that the admissible set of portfolios excludes 000.
  • f(ε,d)f(\varepsilon,d)f(ε,d) is a Lean sSup of a set that is nonempty and bounded above by 111 for ε≤1\varepsilon \le 1ε≤1, d≥0d \ge 0d≥0.
  • The duality of milestone 5 is stated as the existence of one real number that is both the least upper bound of the worst-case probabilities and the greatest lower bound of the dual values, not as an equality of Lean's sSup and sInf.
  • Eq. (48) is stated as an attained minimum (IsLeast), which the calculus gives.
  • Milestone 3 works with finite measures Q≪P0Q \ll P_0Q≪P0​ with integrable log-likelihood ratio in place of the paper's densities ppp. It uses the complement of Sγ\mathcal S_\gammaSγ​ where the paper writes {γ≥−x⊤w}\{\gamma \ge -x^\top w\}{γ≥−x⊤w}, which differs by a P0P_0P0​-null hyperplane.
  • Milestone 6 assumes d>0d > 0d>0; the goal keeps d≥0d \ge 0d≥0.

Restricting Pd\mathcal P_dPd​ to {P0}\{P_0\}{P0​}, dropping IsProbabilityMeasure, or taking an arbitrary reference measure would trivialize or change the theorem. The class is the full KL ball around the nondegenerate Gaussian.

Infrastructure a complete development needs: the pushforward of a multivariate Gaussian under a linear functional (a one-dimensional Gaussian), the Gibbs variational principle for relative entropy, the strong duality for KL balls, and properties of Φ\PhiΦ and its quantile (continuity, strict monotonicity, symmetry Φ(−t)=1−Φ(t)\Phi(-t) = 1 - \Phi(t)Φ(−t)=1−Φ(t)). The Gaussian-quantile and KL-ball duality lemmas are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. El Ghaoui, M. Oks, F. Oustry, Worst-Case Value-at-Risk and Robust Portfolio Optimization: A Conic Programming Approach, Operations Research 51(4):543–556, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.51.4.543.16101
  • J. E. Smith, Generalized Chebychev Inequalities: Theory and Applications in Decision Analysis, Operations Research 43(5):807–825, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.43.5.807
  • M. D. Donsker, S. R. S. Varadhan, Asymptotic evaluation of certain Markov process expectations for large time, I, Communications on Pure and Applied Mathematics 28(1):1–47, 1975. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpa.3160280102
  • L. P. Hansen, T. J. Sargent, Robust Control and Model Uncertainty, American Economic Review 91(2):60–66, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.2.60
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Discrete GeometryNumber Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Minkowski's Convex Body Theorem and Integer Programming: Lattice-Free Convex Bodies Meet Few Translates of an Integral SubspaceResearch Paper

Motivation

Integer programming asks whether a system of linear inequalities Ax≤bAx\le bAx≤b has a solution x∈Znx\in\mathbb Z^nx∈Zn. In fixed dimension nnn it is solvable in polynomial time: Lenstra (1983) proved this by showing that a convex body without integer points is "flat" in some integral direction, so that the search splits into few lower-dimensional subproblems. Kannan's 1987 paper in Mathematics of Operations Research sharpened this approach. It computes a Korkine–Zolotarev ("reduced") basis of a lattice, solves the shortest and closest vector problems exactly in nO(n)n^{O(n)}nO(n) operations, and runs integer programming in O(n9n/2s)O(n^{9n/2}s)O(n9n/2s) arithmetic operations. Underneath the algorithm sits a purely geometric statement, Theorem (5.5): a lattice-free convex body meets only boundedly many integer translates of some integral subspace.

Timeline.

  • Korkine and Zolotareff (1873): the reduced bases used here.
  • Minkowski (1896): a symmetric convex body of volume greater than 2n2^n2n contains a nonzero integer point.
  • Khinchine (1948): lattice-free convex bodies have lattice width bounded by a function of nnn alone (the flatness theorem).
  • Lenstra (1983): integer programming in fixed dimension is polynomial, via a flat direction.
  • Kannan (1987, this paper): Theorem (5.5), with subspaces VVV of any dimension between 111 and n−1n-1n−1 and an explicit bound n2(n−dim⁡V)n^{2(n-\dim V)}n2(n−dimV).
  • Kannan and Lovász (1988), Banaszczyk et al. (1999), and later work: polynomial bounds on the flatness constant.

Setting

Rn\mathcal R^nRn is Euclidean space with dot product (a,b)(a,b)(a,b) and length ∣a∣|a|∣a∣, and Zn\mathbb Z^nZn is the set of integer vectors. For linearly independent b1,…,bm∈Rkb_1,\dots,b_m\in\mathcal R^kb1​,…,bm​∈Rk, the lattice L(b1,…,bm)L(b_1,\dots,b_m)L(b1​,…,bm​) is the set of integer combinations ∑jλjbj\sum_j\lambda_jb_j∑j​λj​bj​, λj∈Z\lambda_j\in\mathbb Zλj​∈Z, and b1,…,bmb_1,\dots,b_mb1​,…,bm​ is a basis. Gram–Schmidt orthogonalisation gives b1∗,…,bm∗b_1^*,\dots,b_m^*b1∗​,…,bm∗​ and unit vectors uj=bj∗/∣bj∗∣u_j=b_j^*/|b_j^*|uj​=bj∗​/∣bj∗​∣, and bi(j)=(bi,uj)b_i(j)=(b_i,u_j)bi​(j)=(bi​,uj​), so bi=∑jbi(j)ujb_i=\sum_jb_i(j)u_jbi​=∑j​bi​(j)uj​ and bj(j)=∣bj∗∣b_j(j)=|b_j^*|bj​(j)=∣bj∗​∣. The determinant is d(L)=∏j∣bj∗∣d(L)=\prod_j|b_j^*|d(L)=∏j​∣bj∗​∣. Λ1(L)\Lambda_1(L)Λ1​(L) is the length of a shortest nonzero vector of LLL. The projected lattice Lj(b1,…,bm)L_j(b_1,\dots,b_m)Lj​(b1​,…,bm​) is the image of LLL under orthogonal projection onto the complement of span⁡(b1,…,bj−1)\operatorname{span}(b_1,\dots,b_{j-1})span(b1​,…,bj−1​). A basis is reduced (Definition 2.6) if bj(j)=Λ1(Lj)b_j(j)=\Lambda_1(L_j)bj​(j)=Λ1​(Lj​) for every jjj and ∣bi(j)∣≤bj(j)/2|b_i(j)|\le b_j(j)/2∣bi​(j)∣≤bj​(j)/2 for i>ji>ji>j.

A convex body is a convex set of positive volume, which for a convex set means nonempty interior. A subspace VVV has a basis of integer vectors if it is the real span of integer vectors. Its integer translates are the sets z+Vz+Vz+V with z∈Znz\in\mathbb Z^nz∈Zn.

In Lean, Rk\mathcal R^kRk is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin k), a basis is b : Fin m → EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin k), the lattice is lattice b = Submodule.span ℤ (Set.range b), ∣bj∗∣|b_j^*|∣bj∗​∣ is gsLen b j, bi(j)b_i(j)bi​(j) is gsCoeff b i j, d(L)d(L)d(L) is latticeDet b, Λ1\Lambda_1Λ1​ is lambdaOne, Lj+1L_{j+1}Lj+1​ is projLattice b j, and a reduced basis is IsReduced b.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem (5.5), corrected reading

For n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and every bounded convex set K⊆RnK\subseteq\mathcal R^nK⊆Rn with nonempty interior and K∩Zn=∅K\cap\mathbb Z^n=\emptysetK∩Zn=∅ there is a subspace VVV spanned by integer vectors with 1≤dim⁡V≤n−11\le\dim V\le n-11≤dimV≤n−1 and

#{ z+V:z∈Zn, (z+V)∩K≠∅ } ≤ n2(n−dim⁡V).\#\{\,z+V : z\in\mathbb Z^n,\ (z+V)\cap K\ne\emptyset\,\}\ \le\ n^{2(n-\dim V)}.#{z+V:z∈Zn, (z+V)∩K=∅} ≤ n2(n−dimV).

The printed theorem allows "an iii dimensional space VVV" with 1≤i≤n1\le i\le n1≤i≤n and bound n2(n−i+1)n^{2(n-i+1)}n2(n−i+1). Taken literally that is trivial (V=RnV=\mathcal R^nV=Rn, one translate). The proof on the same page takes V=span⁡(b1,…,bi−1)V=\operatorname{span}(b_1,\dots,b_{i-1})V=span(b1​,…,bi−1​), of dimension i−1i-1i−1, and remarks that this "ensures that the subspace VVV is always of dimension at least 1". The goal states that reading.

Milestones

  1. Theorem (1.11), Minkowski's convex body theorem (referenced from the platform, in Mathlib's general form).
  2. Theorem (1.12): every mmm-dimensional lattice has a nonzero vector with ∣v∣≤m d(L)1/m|v|\le\sqrt m\,d(L)^{1/m}∣v∣≤m​d(L)1/m.
  3. Proposition 1.9: a primitive lattice vector belongs to some basis.
  4. Proposition 2.16, existence form: every lattice has a reduced basis.
  5. Proposition 4.2: for any b0b_0b0​ with projection bˉ0\bar b_0bˉ0​ onto the span, some b∈Lb\in Lb∈L has ∣b−bˉ0∣≤12(∑jbj(j)2)1/2≤m2max⁡jbj(j)|b-\bar b_0|\le\frac12(\sum_jb_j(j)^2)^{1/2}\le\frac{\sqrt m}2\max_jb_j(j)∣b−bˉ0​∣≤21​(∑j​bj​(j)2)1/2≤2m​​maxj​bj​(j).
  6. Proposition 4.3: for a reduced basis and iii maximising bi(i)b_i(i)bi​(i), the tail (λi,…,λm)(\lambda_i,\dots,\lambda_m)(λi​,…,λm​) of every closest lattice point to b0b_0b0​ lies in an explicit set of at most mm−i+1m^{m-i+1}mm−i+1 integer vectors.

Significance

Theorem (5.5) is a structural form of the flatness theorem. For dim⁡V=n−1\dim V=n-1dimV=n−1 it says that a lattice-free convex body meets fewer than n2n^2n2 consecutive integer hyperplanes of some integral direction. For smaller dim⁡V\dim VdimV it gives a finer decomposition of Zn\mathbb Z^nZn into translates, each a lower-dimensional integer program. This is the recursion behind fixed-dimension integer programming, and statements of this form are used in lattice-point enumeration, in the geometry of numbers (covering minima), and in cutting-plane theory (lattice-free bodies define split and intersection cuts). Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 are the correctness core of exact closest-vector enumeration.

The results are proved in the literature, though Theorem (5.5) is proved "albeit sketchily" in the paper itself. As far as is known, none of them is formalized: Mathlib has Minkowski's convex body theorem and the ZLattice API, but not Gram–Schmidt lattice invariants, Korkine–Zolotarev bases, Hermite-type bounds, nearest-plane rounding, or any flatness theorem. This mission produces the first machine-checked versions. It also corrects three statements that are wrong as printed (below), so the formal statements are the ones that can be relied on.

Difficulty

The naive route to (5.5) is to take a flat direction directly: bound the lattice width of KKK and count hyperplanes. That needs a flatness theorem with an explicit bound below n2n^2n2, which is itself the hard part. The paper's argument instead needs John's theorem (every convex body lies between an ellipsoid and its nnn-fold dilation), a reduced basis of the transformed lattice, and a counting argument across projected lattices that combines Minkowski's bound on each LiL_iLi​ with the covering estimate of Proposition 4.2. None of John's theorem, reduced bases or the projected-lattice counting is in Mathlib.

Proposition 4.3 is also delicate as printed: the per-coordinate count on p. 24 undercounts the integers in a closed interval, so the printed arithmetic cannot be transcribed as it stands. Proposition 2.16 in the paper is the correctness of the algorithm SHORTEST. Here only the existence of a reduced basis is needed, which requires attainment of Λ1\Lambda_1Λ1​ on every projected lattice and a lifting argument (Proposition 1.9).

Formalization scope

Conventions: indices are 0-based (Fin m), so the paper's LjL_jLj​ is projLattice b (j-1) and its bound nn−i+1n^{n-i+1}nn−i+1 is m ^ (m - i). Gram–Schmidt is Mathlib's unnormalised gramSchmidt. Lattices are Submodule ℤs of a real Euclidean space generated by a linearly independent family, and m≤km\le km≤k is allowed, because (1.12) and 4.2 are applied to projected lattices. The goal counts translates as sets with Set.encard, so the bound includes finiteness. KKK is assumed convex, bounded and with nonempty interior, but not closed.

Three printed statements are corrected, and the corrections are recorded in each item's Formalization Note.

  • (1.12)'s constant 12n\frac12\sqrt n21​n​ is false for n≤7n\le7n≤7 (for example L=ZL=\mathbb ZL=Z, or the hexagonal lattice) and is replaced by n\sqrt nn​, the constant the paper's own later proofs use.
  • Proposition 4.2's second sentence is stated for bˉ0\bar b_0bˉ0​ instead of b0b_0b0​.
  • Proposition 4.3 fails at n=1n=1n=1 and is stated for m≥2m\ge2m≥2 with the proof's explicit candidate set TTT, since an existential TTT is satisfied by the set of tails of closest points and says nothing.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the goal forbids dim⁡V=n\dim V=ndimV=n, which gives one translate, and dim⁡V=0\dim V=0dimV=0, where no translate meets KKK. It requires nonempty interior (the empty set would satisfy everything) and counts with encard (an infinite count cannot become 000).

Out of scope: the paper's algorithms (SHORTEST, SELECT-BASIS, ENUMERATE, CLP, CLP′, ILP) and their operation and bit counts (Theorems 2.17, 3.9, 4.5, 5.4), because Mathlib has no cost model. Also out of scope is §6 (NP-completeness of the L2L_2L2​ closest vector problem and Cook reductions), because Mathlib has no complexity classes. The definitions of this mission (lattice, gsLen, gsCoeff, latticeDet, lambdaOne, projLattice, IsReduced) are reusable for any later work on lattice reduction. Contributions are welcome at every level: John's theorem, Hermite-type bounds, Korkine–Zolotarev existence, and the counting lemmas.

Selected references

  • R. Kannan, Minkowski's Convex Body Theorem and Integer Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 12(3):415–440, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.12.3.415
  • H. W. Lenstra Jr., Integer programming with a fixed number of variables, Mathematics of Operations Research 8(4):538–548, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.4.538
  • R. Kannan, L. Lovász, Covering minima and lattice-point-free convex bodies, Annals of Mathematics 128(3):577–602, 1988. https://doi.org/10.2307/1971436
  • A. K. Lenstra, H. W. Lenstra Jr., L. Lovász, Factoring polynomials with rational coefficients, Mathematische Annalen 261:515–534, 1982. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01457454
  • F. John, Extremum problems with inequalities as subsidiary conditions, Studies and Essays presented to R. Courant, 1948, 187–204.
9 thms3 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Integrating Replenishment Decisions with Advance Demand Information I: The Myopic Order-Up-To Level Is Optimal When Observed Demand Beyond the Protection Period Is LargeResearch Paper

Motivation

Many firms learn part of future demand before it has to be served: customers place orders days or weeks ahead of the date they need the goods, or commit to delivery dates in contracts. Advance demand information of this kind reduces the uncertainty the inventory manager has to protect against, and the question is how replenishment decisions should use it. Gallego and Özer (Management Science 47(10), 2001) model orders placed up to NNN periods ahead and a supply lead time LLL. They show that, with a fixed ordering cost, the classical (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) structure survives with parameters that depend on the observed future demand, and they identify when that dependence disappears.

The classical theory this builds on is the finite-horizon inventory model with a set-up cost. Scarf (1960) introduced KKK-convexity to prove that (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) policies are optimal there. Veinott (1966) and Iglehart (1963) bounded the optimal policy parameters by myopic quantities. Gallego and Özer extend both results to a state that carries a vector of observed demands.

Setting

Periods are t=1,…,Tt = 1, \dots, Tt=1,…,T. In period ttt customers place orders Dt=(Dt,t,…,Dt,t+N)D_t = (D_{t,t}, \dots, D_{t,t+N})Dt​=(Dt,t​,…,Dt,t+N​) for periods t,…,t+Nt, \dots, t+Nt,…,t+N; DtD_tDt​ is a random vector with law μt\mu_tμt​ and nonnegative components. The lead time LLL and the information horizon NNN satisfy N>L+1N > L+1N>L+1; write M=N−L−1≥1M = N - L - 1 \ge 1M=N−L−1≥1. The state at the start of period ttt is a pair (xt,ot)(x_t, o_t)(xt​,ot​): the modified inventory position xt∈Rx_t \in \mathbb{R}xt​∈R, and the vector

ot=(ot,t+L+1,…,ot,t+N−1)∈RMo_t = (o_{t,t+L+1}, \dots, o_{t,t+N-1}) \in \mathbb{R}^Mot​=(ot,t+L+1​,…,ot,t+N−1​)∈RM

of demands already observed for the periods beyond the protection period t,…,t+Lt, \dots, t+Lt,…,t+L.

The manager raises xtx_txt​ to an order-up-to level y≥xty \ge x_ty≥xt​, paying a set-up cost Kt>0K_t > 0Kt​>0 if y>xty > x_ty>xt​. After DtD_tDt​ is observed, the state moves to

xt+1=y−∑s=tt+L+1Dt,s−ot,t+L+1,ot+1,s=ot,s+Dt,s  (s=t+L+2,…,t+N),x_{t+1} = y - \sum_{s=t}^{t+L+1} D_{t,s} - o_{t,t+L+1},\qquad o_{t+1,s} = o_{t,s} + D_{t,s}\ \ (s = t+L+2,\dots,t+N),xt+1​=y−s=t∑t+L+1​Dt,s​−ot,t+L+1​,ot+1,s​=ot,s​+Dt,s​  (s=t+L+2,…,t+N),

with ot,t+N=0o_{t,t+N} = 0ot,t+N​=0. With a convex single-period cost GtG_tGt​, discount factors αt>0\alpha_t > 0αt​>0 and δ(z)=1{z>0}\delta(z) = \mathbf 1\{z > 0\}δ(z)=1{z>0}, the optimal cost satisfies JT+1≡0J_{T+1} \equiv 0JT+1​≡0 and

Jt(x,o)=min⁡y≥x{Ktδ(y−x)+Vt(y,o)},Vt(y,o)=Gt(y)+αt+1 E Jt+1(xt+1,ot+1).J_t(x, o) = \min_{y \ge x}\{K_t\delta(y - x) + V_t(y, o)\},\qquad V_t(y, o) = G_t(y) + \alpha_{t+1}\,\mathbb E\,J_{t+1}(x_{t+1}, o_{t+1}).Jt​(x,o)=y≥xmin​{Kt​δ(y−x)+Vt​(y,o)},Vt​(y,o)=Gt​(y)+αt+1​EJt+1​(xt+1​,ot+1​).

Let Ht(x,o)=Kt+min⁡y≥xVt(y,o)−Vt(x,o)H_t(x, o) = K_t + \min_{y\ge x}V_t(y,o) - V_t(x,o)Ht​(x,o)=Kt​+miny≥x​Vt​(y,o)−Vt​(x,o). The order-up-to level St(o)S_t(o)St​(o) is the least minimizer of Vt(⋅,o)V_t(\cdot, o)Vt​(⋅,o), and the reorder point is st(o)=max⁡{x:Ht(x,o)≤0}s_t(o) = \max\{x : H_t(x,o) \le 0\}st​(o)=max{x:Ht​(x,o)≤0}.

A function ggg is (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-convex, g∈C(a,b)g \in C(a,b)g∈C(a,b), if g(θx1+(1−θ)x2)≤θ(a+g(x1))+(1−θ)(b+g(x2))g(\theta x_1 + (1-\theta)x_2) \le \theta(a + g(x_1)) + (1-\theta)(b + g(x_2))g(θx1​+(1−θ)x2​)≤θ(a+g(x1​))+(1−θ)(b+g(x2​)) for all x1≤x2x_1 \le x_2x1​≤x2​ and θ∈[0,1]\theta \in [0,1]θ∈[0,1]; C(0,K)C(0,K)C(0,K) is Scarf's KKK-convexity. In the stationary problem Gt=GG_t = GGt​=G, Kt=KK_t = KKt​=K, αt=α\alpha_t = \alphaαt​=α and μt=ν\mu_t = \nuμt​=ν, and the myopic levels are

Sm=min⁡{y:G(y)≤G(x) ∀x},sm=max⁡{y≤Sm:G(y)≥K+G(Sm)},S‾=inf⁡{y>Sm:G(y)>G(Sm)+αK}.S^m = \min\{y : G(y) \le G(x)\ \forall x\},\quad s^m = \max\{y \le S^m : G(y) \ge K + G(S^m)\},\quad \overline S = \inf\{y > S^m : G(y) > G(S^m) + \alpha K\}.Sm=min{y:G(y)≤G(x) ∀x},sm=max{y≤Sm:G(y)≥K+G(Sm)},S=inf{y>Sm:G(y)>G(Sm)+αK}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 1350)

For the stationary problem, every 1≤t≤T1 \le t \le T1≤t≤T and every observed-demand vector ot≥0o_t \ge 0ot​≥0,

ot,t+L+1≥S‾−sm  ⟹  St(ot)=Sm.o_{t,t+L+1} \ge \overline S - s^m \implies S_t(o_t) = S^m.ot,t+L+1​≥S−sm⟹St​(ot​)=Sm.

Only the observed demand for the first period beyond the protection period is compared with the threshold; the other components of oto_tot​ are free.

Milestones

  • Lemma 1, Parts 1, 2, 4, 5 (p. 1349): inclusion, positive combinations, expectations, and g(max⁡(x,s))g(\max(x,s))g(max(x,s)) for (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-convex functions.
  • Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 (p. 1350): for V∈C(0,K)V \in C(0,K)V∈C(0,K) with a minimizer SSS, HHH changes sign once from −-− to +++, and (for continuous VVV) J(x)=V(max⁡(s,x))J(x) = V(\max(s,x))J(x)=V(max(s,x)).
  • Theorem 1, Parts 1–3 (p. 1350): Vt(⋅,ot)∈C(0,Kt)V_t(\cdot, o_t) \in C(0, K_t)Vt​(⋅,ot​)∈C(0,Kt​) is coercive, a state-dependent (st(ot),St(ot))(s_t(o_t), S_t(o_t))(st​(ot​),St​(ot​)) policy is optimal, and Jt(⋅,ot)∈C(0,Kt)J_t(\cdot, o_t) \in C(0, K_t)Jt​(⋅,ot​)∈C(0,Kt​) with its limits at ±∞\pm\infty±∞.
  • Lemma 3 (p. 1351): Sm≤St(ot)≤S‾S^m \le S_t(o_t) \le \overline SSm≤St​(ot​)≤S and sm≤st(ot)s^m \le s_t(o_t)sm≤st​(ot​).

Significance

Theorem 1 says that advance demand information does not destroy the (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) structure: the optimal policy is still a reorder point and an order-up-to level, now functions of oto_tot​. Theorem 2 is a horizon result. Once enough demand is already booked for period t+L+1t+L+1t+L+1, the order-up-to level is the myopic one, computed from GGG alone, and the rest of the information vector can be ignored. The threshold S‾−sm\overline S - s^mS−sm grows with the set-up cost. In practice the manager then orders only to cover demand up to period t+Lt+Lt+L, knowing another order will be placed in period t+1t+1t+1, and the search for state-dependent policies is confined to states with little booked demand.

The results are proved in the paper, with some steps argued informally (the unit forward difference in Lemma 3, a minimum over an open set in the definition of S‾\overline SS). As far as the platform's catalog shows, no (s,S)(s,S)(s,S) optimality theorem of this form has a machine-checked proof: the platform has KKK-convexity lemmas for a single constant, not for (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-convexity or a dynamic program with a vector state. A formal proof would check the infinite-state induction and the conditions under which the expectation in (9) is finite. The (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-convexity layer and the one-period results (Lemma 2, Corollary 1) are reusable for any set-up cost model.

Difficulty

The obvious induction proves KKK-convexity of VtV_tVt​ and then applies Scarf's argument. The vector state makes each step conditional on facts the scalar case gets for free. The expectation in (9) mixes a random shift of xxx with a random update of ooo, so preserving KKK-convexity needs Lemma 1, Part 4 rather than the scalar version. Coercivity and continuity of Vt(⋅,o)V_t(\cdot, o)Vt​(⋅,o), and measurability and integrability of D↦Jt+1(xt+1,ot+1)D \mapsto J_{t+1}(x_{t+1}, o_{t+1})D↦Jt+1​(xt+1​,ot+1​), must be carried through the induction jointly in (x,o)(x, o)(x,o). They cannot be assumed.

For Theorem 2, VtV_tVt​ is not a function of GGG alone, and a comparison of St(ot)S_t(o_t)St​(ot​) with SmS^mSm has to control EJt+1\mathbb E J_{t+1}EJt+1​. That requires the lower bound sm≤st+1(ot+1)s^m \le s_{t+1}(o_{t+1})sm≤st+1​(ot+1​) at the next period, which holds only on the nonnegative state space.

Formalization scope

Everything is stated about the functional equation (8)–(9). The paper derives it in Appendix A from a control problem over history-dependent policies, citing Özer (2000); that reduction is out of scope. The demand vector is Fin (L + M + 2) → ℝ and ooo is Fin M → ℝ, with component jjj equal to ot,t+L+1+jo_{t,t+L+1+j}ot,t+L+1+j​. JJJ is defined by backward recursion, minima over y≥xy \ge xy≥x are infima over {y:x≤y}\{y : x \le y\}{y:x≤y}, and expectations are Bochner integrals. GtG_tGt​ is an abstract primitive, not built from holding and penalty costs.

The paper's hypotheses are GtG_tGt​ convex with Gt(y)→∞G_t(y) \to \inftyGt​(y)→∞ as ∣y∣→∞|y| \to \infty∣y∣→∞ (stated for G~t\widetilde G_tGt​, used for GtG_tGt​), Kt>0K_t > 0Kt​>0 (Section 4), and αt+1Kt+1≤Kt\alpha_{t+1}K_{t+1} \le K_tαt+1​Kt+1​≤Kt​. The formalization adds hypotheses the paper uses without stating:

  • positive discount factors;
  • demands nonnegative almost surely;
  • every demand component has a finite mean, and ∣Gt(y)∣≤at+bt∣y∣|G_t(y)| \le a_t + b_t|y|∣Gt​(y)∣≤at​+bt​∣y∣ (so the expectation in (9) is finite);
  • continuity of VVV in the abstract Corollary 1;
  • nonnegative observed demands oto_tot​ in Lemma 3 and Theorem 2, where the lower bound fails for negative ot,t+L+1o_{t,t+L+1}ot,t+L+1​.

All hypotheses are placed on the primitives; nothing is assumed about the derived VtV_tVt​ or JtJ_tJt​. A Solutions/verification instance (G(y)=∣y∣G(y) = |y|G(y)=∣y∣, K=1K = 1K=1, α=1/2\alpha = 1/2α=1/2, zero demand) shows these hypotheses can be met together.

The definition of S‾\overline SS is read as an infimum: the paper prints a minimum over an open set. St(ot)S_t(o_t)St​(ot​) and st(ot)s_t(o_t)st​(ot​) appear through IsLeast and IsGreatest, never as sInf/sSup values. A default value therefore cannot satisfy a conclusion, and vacuous readings (an empty minimizer set, an unbounded reorder set) are excluded. The infinite-horizon results (Lemma 4, Theorem 3, Corollary 2) and the zero set-up cost case are not part of this mission. Contributions are welcome at every level, and most of all a reusable library for (a,b)(a,b)(a,b)-convex functions.

Selected references

  • G. Gallego, Ö. Özer, Integrating Replenishment Decisions with Advance Demand Information, Management Science 47(10):1344–1360, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.10.1344.10261
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (S, s) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960.
  • A. F. Veinott, On the Optimality of (s,S) Inventory Policies: New Conditions and a New Proof, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics 14(5):1067–1083, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1137/0114086
  • D. L. Iglehart, Optimality of (s, S) Policies in the Infinite Horizon Dynamic Inventory Problem, Management Science 9(2):259–267, 1963. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.259
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A Threshold of ln n for Approximating Set Cover II: The Inapproximability of Max k-CoverResearch Paper

Motivation

Max kkk-cover is the basic coverage problem of combinatorial optimization. The input is a collection of subsets of a finite ground set and a number kkk; the task is to choose kkk subsets that together cover as many points as possible. It models facility and sensor placement, the selection of a small committee or feature set representing a population, and budgeted versions of set cover. It is also the prototype of maximizing a monotone submodular function under a cardinality constraint.

The greedy algorithm covers at least a 1−1/e≈0.6321-1/e\approx 0.6321−1/e≈0.632 fraction of the optimum. This bound goes back to Hochbaum and Pathria and, for general submodular functions, to Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher (1978). For two decades it was not known whether a polynomial-time algorithm could do better. Uriel Feige answered the question in A Threshold of ln n for Approximating Set Cover (J. ACM 45(4), 1998, pp. 634–652, doi:10.1145/285055.285059), Section 5. His Theorem 5.3 (p. 648) states: "For any ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0, max kkk-cover cannot be approximated in polynomial time within a ratio of (1−1/e+ϵ)(1 - 1/e + \epsilon)(1−1/e+ϵ), unless P=NPP = NPP=NP." Together with the greedy bound, it makes 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e the exact approximation threshold of max kkk-cover.

Timeline:

  • 1978: Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher prove the greedy 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e bound for monotone submodular maximization.
  • 1992: Arora, Lund, Motwani, Sudan and Szegedy prove the PCP theorem. With Papadimitriou–Yannakakis (1991) it gives Theorem 2.1.1 of the paper: MAX 3SAT-B has a constant gap unless P = NP.
  • 1994: Lund and Yannakakis introduce partition-system reductions from multi-prover proof systems to set cover.
  • 1995: Raz proves the parallel repetition theorem (Theorem 2.2.2 of the paper).
  • 1998: Feige proves the ln n threshold for set cover (the subject of mission I of this series) and the 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e threshold for max kkk-cover.

Setting

An instance consists of nnn points {0,…,n−1}\{0,\dots,n-1\}{0,…,n−1}, a list of subsets S1,…,SsS_1,\dots,S_sS1​,…,Ss​ of the points, and a number kkk. Its value opt\mathrm{opt}opt is the largest number of points covered by at most kkk of the sets. Instances are written over a three-letter alphabet:

  • nnn in unary;
  • each set as its characteristic bit-vector;
  • kkk in unary.

Following p. 648, a polynomial-time algorithm approximates max kkk-cover within a ratio δ\deltaδ if on every input it outputs a number vvv with

δ⋅opt≤v≤opt.\delta\cdot\mathrm{opt}\le v\le\mathrm{opt}.δ⋅opt≤v≤opt.

The algorithm need not name the sets. This is the non-constructive notion of approximation.

The proof is a reduction from the MAX 3SAT-5 problem. A 3CNF-5 formula has exactly three literals per clause, over three distinct variables, and every variable occurs in exactly five clauses. The reduction goes through a kkk-prover proof system for such a formula φ\varphiφ with MMM clauses:

  • The verifier picks ℓ\ellℓ clauses at random, and a distinguished variable in each; there are R=(3M)ℓR=(3M)^\ellR=(3M)ℓ random strings rrr.
  • Each prover PiP_iPi​ is attached to a code word of length ℓ\ellℓ and weight ℓ/2\ell/2ℓ/2; distinct words are at Hamming distance at least ℓ/3\ell/3ℓ/3.
  • On coordinate jjj, prover PiP_iPi​ receives the clause if its bit is 1, and the distinguished variable if its bit is 0.
  • Answers are satisfying assignments of the received clauses and bits for the received variables.
  • Two provers are consistent if they assign the same values to the distinguished variables. The verifier weakly accepts if some pair of distinct provers is consistent, and strongly accepts if every pair is.

The max k′k'k′-cover instance of §5 attaches to every random string rrr a copy BrB_rBr​ of the explicit partition system. Its points are the vectors in {0,…,k−1}L\{0,\dots,k-1\}^L{0,…,k−1}L with L=2ℓL=2^\ellL=2ℓ, so m=kLm=k^Lm=kL. Its LLL partitions are labelled by the ℓ\ellℓ-bit strings, and each splits the points by the value of one coordinate. There are N=mRN=mRN=mR points in all. For each prover iii, question qqq and answer aaa, the set S(q,a,i)S_{(q,a,i)}S(q,a,i)​ collects, for every rrr on which PiP_iPi​ receives qqq, the iiith part of the partition of BrB_rBr​ labelled by the values that aaa gives to the distinguished variables of rrr. The budget is k′=kQk'=kQk′=kQ, where QQQ is the number of questions a single prover can receive.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.3

∀ε>0:max k-cover is approximable within 1−1e+ε ⟹ P=NP,\forall\varepsilon>0:\quad \text{max } k\text{-cover is approximable within } 1-\tfrac1e+\varepsilon \ \Longrightarrow\ \mathrm{P}=\mathrm{NP},∀ε>0:max k-cover is approximable within 1−e1​+ε ⟹ P=NP,

conditional on the two cited results below. The ratio is left free (any ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0), so the goal records the shape of the threshold and not a particular constant.

Milestones

  • Proposition 2.1.2 (p. 640): for some ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 it is NP-hard to distinguish satisfiable 3CNF-5 formulas from those in which at most a (1−ε)(1-\varepsilon)(1−ε)-fraction of the clauses can be satisfied simultaneously.
  • Lemma 2.3.1 (p. 643): a satisfiable φ\varphiφ admits a strategy that always strongly accepts; on a far-from-satisfiable φ\varphiφ the weak acceptance probability is at most k2 2−cℓk^2\,2^{-c\ell}k22−cℓ.
  • Coverage of the explicit partition system (p. 649): jjj subsets from pairwise different partitions cover exactly (1−(1−1/k)j)m(1-(1-1/k)^j)m(1−(1−1/k)j)m points.
  • Proposition 5.4 (p. 649): if at most kQkQkQ sets cover a (1−1/e+ε)(1-1/e+\varepsilon)(1−1/e+ε)-fraction of the points, then at least an ε/3\varepsilon/3ε/3-fraction of the random strings are good. Here rrr is good if wr≤3k/εw_r\le3k/\varepsilonwr​≤3k/ε sets meet BrB_rBr​ and two of them from different provers lie in the same partition.
  • Decoding (p. 649): such a covering yields a strategy that weakly accepts with probability at least (ε/3)(ε/3k)2(\varepsilon/3)(\varepsilon/3k)^2(ε/3)(ε/3k)2.
  • Gap (p. 649): a satisfiable formula gives a cover of all NNN points by kQkQkQ sets. If at most a (1−ε′)(1-\varepsilon')(1−ε′)-fraction of the clauses are satisfiable, kQkQkQ sets cover at most (1−1/e+g(k))N(1-1/e+g(k))N(1−1/e+g(k))N points, where g(k)→0g(k)\to0g(k)→0, for all large ℓ\ellℓ.
  • Proposition 5.1 (p. 647): every greedy run covers at least (1−1/e) opt(1-1/e)\,\mathrm{opt}(1−1/e)opt points.

Significance

The result closes the approximability of max kkk-cover: the greedy algorithm cannot be beaten by any constant unless P = NP. Consequences:

  • Submodular maximization. Coverage functions are monotone submodular, so the bound transfers to monotone submodular maximization under a cardinality constraint, whenever the function is given in a form that encodes a coverage instance.
  • Other problems. Hardness results for facility location, budgeted allocation, and welfare maximization with coverage valuations reduce from it.
  • The reduction itself. The ℓ\ellℓ-fold kkk-prover system combined with a partition system that is exactly countable is the template for later 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e hardness proofs.

Status: the theorem has been proved since 1998. It has not been formalized; neither the reduction nor the underlying proof systems exist in Mathlib or on this platform. This mission produces:

  • a machine-checked reduction from MAX 3SAT-5 to max kkk-cover;
  • an exact counting lemma for product partition systems;
  • the averaging and concavity argument of Proposition 5.4;
  • a formal statement of the greedy bound for coverage.

The cited PCP-based gap (Theorem 2.1.1) and parallel repetition (Theorem 2.2.2) remain hypotheses. They are separate, much larger formalization projects.

Difficulty

The obvious argument uses the soundness of the proof system directly: a large cover should force consistent answers. It fails because a cover may spend many sets on a few random strings and cover them completely, while covering the rest partially without any two sets from the same partition. What saves the argument is exact counting. For sets from pairwise different partitions, coverage is exactly h(j)=(1−(1−1/k)j)mh(j)=(1-(1-1/k)^j)mh(j)=(1−(1−1/k)j)m, a concave function of the number jjj of sets used. Since the sets meet a random string kkk times on average, Jensen's inequality caps the total coverage of such "unstructured" strings at about (1−(1−1/k)k)(1-(1-1/k)^k)(1−(1−1/k)k), which tends to 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e. A further obstacle is that the reduction must run in polynomial time. The paper therefore takes ℓ\ellℓ and kkk constant (unlike the set-cover reduction, where ℓ=Θ(log⁡log⁡n)\ell=\Theta(\log\log n)ℓ=Θ(loglogn)), and the soundness bound k22−cℓk^2 2^{-c\ell}k22−cℓ must beat (ε/3)(ε/3k)2(\varepsilon/3)(\varepsilon/3k)^2(ε/3)(ε/3k)2 at a constant ℓ\ellℓ. The quantifier order (kkk large first, then ℓ\ellℓ large) is part of the difficulty.

A second obstacle is the machine model. The goal is a statement about polynomial-time Turing machines, so the reduction and the decision procedure built from a hypothetical approximation algorithm must be compiled into Cook's one-tape machines.

Formalization scope

  • Machine model. CookPvsNP_defs (a published platform definition): one-tape Turing machines, P\mathrm{P}P, NP\mathrm{NP}NP, polynomial-time computable functions, CNF formulas and their encoding. "P = NP" is P Bool = NP Bool, the form in which CookPvsNP.P_ne_NP states the open problem.
  • Cited results as hypotheses. Theorem 2.1.1 enters as Thm211. Raz's theorem enters as RazRepetition, its consequence stated on p. 642: the ℓ\ellℓ-fold clause–variable game on a far-from-satisfiable 3CNF-5 formula has acceptance probability at most 2−cℓ2^{-c\ell}2−cℓ. This is weaker than Raz's general theorem, so the conditional statement is stronger. No hypothesis about max kkk-cover is assumed.
  • Approximation. The value form above, with no size threshold. For ε>1/e\varepsilon>1/eε>1/e the ratio exceeds one and the hypothesis is unsatisfiable on any instance with opt>0\mathrm{opt}>0opt>0; those values are vacuous, as in the paper.
  • opt\mathrm{opt}opt. Taken over at most kkk sets. This agrees with the paper's "exactly kkk" whenever k≤sk\le sk≤s.
  • Probability and counting. Probabilities are uniform counts over the (3M)ℓ(3M)^\ell(3M)ℓ random strings. Fractions in lower-bound statements are written as counts compared with multiples of RRR.
  • Canonical answers. The type of answers is restricted to satisfying assignments of the received clauses, following the paper's "without loss of generality" (p. 643). All indices are 0-based.
  • Partition system. The §4 construction is defined for any partition system with ℓ\ellℓ-bit partition labels and instantiated with the explicit product system. Its L=2ℓL=2^\ellL=2ℓ coordinates are the ℓ\ellℓ-bit strings themselves.
  • Not formalized. The running time of the greedy algorithm, and the constructive variant (Proposition 5.2), which belongs to the set-cover mission.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: every cited input is a named, satisfiable proposition about 3CNF formulas or the two-prover game, never about max kkk-cover, and the approximation hypothesis is satisfiable for ratios up to 111.

Needed infrastructure, reusable beyond this mission:

  • composition and simulation lemmas for Cook's machines;
  • the uniformity of the verifier's questions on 3CNF-5 formulas;
  • concavity of j↦1−(1−1/k)jj\mapsto 1-(1-1/k)^jj↦1−(1−1/k)j;
  • (1−1/k)k→1/e(1-1/k)^k\to 1/e(1−1/k)k→1/e bounds.

Contributions to any of these, or to either cited theorem, are welcome.

Selected references

  • U. Feige, A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover, J. ACM 45(4) (1998) 634–652. https://doi.org/10.1145/285055.285059
  • R. Raz, A parallel repetition theorem, SIAM J. Comput. 27(3) (1998) 763–803 (STOC 1995). https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539795280895
  • S. Arora, C. Lund, R. Motwani, M. Sudan, M. Szegedy, Proof verification and the hardness of approximation problems, J. ACM 45(3) (1998) 501–555. https://doi.org/10.1145/278298.278306
  • C. Papadimitriou, M. Yannakakis, Optimization, approximation, and complexity classes, J. Comput. System Sci. 43(3) (1991) 425–440. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0000(91)90023-X
  • C. Lund, M. Yannakakis, On the hardness of approximating minimization problems, J. ACM 41(5) (1994) 960–981. https://doi.org/10.1145/185675.306789
  • G. L. Nemhauser, L. A. Wolsey, M. L. Fisher, An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I, Math. Programming 14 (1978) 265–294. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01588971
  • S. Cook, The P versus NP problem, Clay Mathematics Institute. https://www.claymath.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/pvsnp.pdf
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CombinatoricsComplexity TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

A Threshold of ln n for Approximating Set Cover I: The ln n Inapproximability of Set CoverResearch Paper

Motivation

Set cover is the problem of covering a finite ground set with as few members of a given family of subsets as possible. It models facility location, crew scheduling, test-suite minimization and many other selection problems in operations research, and it is one of the canonical NP-hard problems. The greedy algorithm, which repeatedly picks the subset covering the most uncovered points, finds a cover at most about ln⁡n\ln nlnn times larger than the optimum on an instance with nnn points (Johnson 1974; Lovász 1975; Chvátal 1979). Whether any efficient algorithm does substantially better was open for two decades.

Timeline of the lower bounds:

  • 1992. The PCP theorem (Arora, Lund, Motwani, Sudan, Szegedy) implies that set cover cannot be approximated within some constant 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε unless P = NP.
  • 1994. Lund and Yannakakis showed that set cover cannot be approximated within 14log⁡2n\tfrac14\log_2 n41​log2​n unless NP⊆TIME(nO(polylog n))\mathrm{NP}\subseteq\mathrm{TIME}(n^{O(\mathrm{polylog}\, n)})NP⊆TIME(nO(polylogn)), and within 12log⁡2n≈0.72ln⁡n\tfrac12\log_2 n\approx 0.72\ln n21​log2​n≈0.72lnn under a randomized assumption.
  • 1998. Feige showed that for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, set cover cannot be approximated within (1−ε)ln⁡n(1-\varepsilon)\ln n(1−ε)lnn unless NP⊆TIME(nO(log⁡log⁡n))\mathrm{NP}\subseteq\mathrm{TIME}(n^{O(\log\log n)})NP⊆TIME(nO(loglogn)) (J. ACM 45(4), 634–652). This matches the greedy bound up to lower-order terms.
  • 2014. Dinur and Steurer replaced the assumption by P ≠ NP (STOC 2014).

This mission formalizes Feige's theorem, the result that fixed ln⁡n\ln nlnn as the threshold.

Setting

An instance consists of nnn points {0,…,n−1}\{0,\dots,n-1\}{0,…,n−1} and a list of subsets S1,…,SsS_1,\dots,S_sS1​,…,Ss​. A cover is a set of indices whose subsets together contain every point. The instance is coverable if every point lies in some SiS_iSi​. It is written as a string: nnn in unary, then each subset as its characteristic vector.

A deterministic polynomial-time algorithm approximates set cover within ρ(n)\rho(n)ρ(n) if, for some threshold n0n_0n0​ and every coverable instance with n≥n0n \ge n_0n≥n0​ points, the value vvv it outputs satisfies OPT≤v≤ρ(n)⋅OPT\mathrm{OPT}\le v\le\rho(n)\cdot\mathrm{OPT}OPT≤v≤ρ(n)⋅OPT, where OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the size of a smallest cover.

TIME(nO(log⁡log⁡n))\mathrm{TIME}(n^{O(\log\log n)})TIME(nO(loglogn)) is the class of languages that a deterministic one-tape Turing machine decides within ∣w∣c(log⁡2log⁡2∣w∣+1)+c|w|^{c(\log_2\log_2|w|+1)}+c∣w∣c(log2​log2​∣w∣+1)+c steps, for some constant ccc. Machines, P\mathrm{P}P and NP\mathrm{NP}NP are those of the published definition CookPvsNP_defs.

The proof passes through three objects, each defined in the mission:

  1. 3CNF-5 formulas: CNF formulas in which every clause has three literals on distinct variables and every variable occurs in exactly five clauses.
  2. The kkk-prover proof system of §2.3. A verifier picks ℓ\ellℓ random clauses and a distinguished variable in each. Each prover, according to its code word, receives some of these clauses and the distinguished variables of the others. Under the weak acceptance predicate, some two provers give consistent answers on the distinguished variables. Under the strong acceptance predicate, all provers do.
  3. Partition systems B(m,L,k,d)B(m,L,k,d)B(m,L,k,d) (Definition 3.1). These are LLL partitions of mmm points, each into kkk parts, such that covering the points with parts taken from pairwise different partitions needs at least ddd parts.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.4

∃ ε>0: set cover is approximable within (1−ε)ln⁡n ⟹ NP⊆TIME(nO(log⁡log⁡n)).\exists\,\varepsilon>0:\ \text{set cover is approximable within }(1-\varepsilon)\ln n\ \Longrightarrow\ \mathrm{NP}\subseteq\mathrm{TIME}\big(n^{O(\log\log n)}\big).∃ε>0: set cover is approximable within (1−ε)lnn ⟹ NP⊆TIME(nO(loglogn)).

The statement fixes no constant beyond ε\varepsilonε. The parameters kkk, ℓ\ellℓ and mmm of the reduction are choices made inside the proof. The goal carries three cited results as hypotheses: Theorem 2.1.1 (MAX 3SAT-B gap), the consequence of Raz's parallel repetition theorem for the clause–variable game, and the Naor–Schulman–Srinivasan construction of partition systems.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. Proposition 2.1.2: MAX 3SAT-5 is gap NP-hard.
  2. Proposition 2.2.1: the one-round clause–variable game has value 1−ε/31-\varepsilon/31−ε/3.
  3. Lemma 2.3.1: the kkk-prover system is complete with strong acceptance and has soundness k22−cℓk^2 2^{-c\ell}k22−cℓ for weak acceptance.
  4. Lemma 3.2: partition systems with d=(1−2/k)kln⁡md=(1-2/k)k\ln md=(1−2/k)klnm exist.
  5. Propositions 4.2 and 4.3: a cover with (1−δ)kQln⁡m(1-\delta)kQ\ln m(1−δ)kQlnm subsets yields a prover strategy that is weakly accepted with probability at least 2δ/(kln⁡m)22\delta/(k\ln m)^22δ/(klnm)2.
  6. Lemma 4.1: the gap between kQkQkQ and (1−2f(k))kQln⁡m(1-2f(k))kQ\ln m(1−2f(k))kQlnm.

Significance

The result. Combined with the greedy algorithm, Theorem 4.4 shows that ln⁡n\ln nlnn is the approximation threshold of set cover under a mild complexity assumption. Set cover reduces approximation-preservingly to many covering problems, so the threshold transfers to them. Examples are dominating set, several facility-location and group Steiner problems, and hitting-set formulations used in scheduling and testing. The kkk-prover system with two acceptance predicates and the partition-system gadget became standard tools for later hardness-of-approximation proofs.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved and has been strengthened (Dinur–Steurer 2014), but no machine-checked proof of any Ω(log⁡n)\Omega(\log n)Ω(logn) inapproximability of set cover is known. This mission contributes:

  • a Lean model of multi-prover proof systems with uniform-count probabilities;
  • partition systems and their probabilistic existence proof;
  • a gap-preserving reduction whose running time is analysed on Turing machines, not merely asserted.

Difficulty

  • The ratio comes from two gaps at once. One is a gap in acceptance probability. The other is a gap between strong and weak acceptance. A reduction from a two-prover system, as in Lund–Yannakakis, loses a constant factor because a cheating cover can use two parts of the same partition. Feige's analysis must turn every small cover into a strategy under which some pair of provers is consistent (Proposition 4.3), and this averaging argument has to lose only a factor (kln⁡m)2(k\ln m)^2(klnm)2.
  • Parameters interlock. ℓ=Θ(log⁡log⁡n)\ell=\Theta(\log\log n)ℓ=Θ(loglogn) must make k22−cℓk^2 2^{-c\ell}k22−cℓ smaller than 2δ/(kln⁡m)22\delta/(k\ln m)^22δ/(klnm)2 while keeping the instance of size nO(log⁡log⁡n)n^{O(\log\log n)}nO(loglogn). The time bound must hold for a one-tape machine, including the deterministic partition-system construction.
  • Encoding. The reduction must be computed by an explicit machine on string encodings. Showing that a "clearly polynomial" construction meets the time bound on such a machine is substantial work.

Formalization scope

  • Cited results as hypotheses. Theorem 2.1.1, Raz's theorem and the Naor et al. construction are not proved in the mission; each is a named proposition (Thm211, RazRepetition, NaorPartitionSystems) and a hypothesis of the goal.
    • RazRepetition is only the consequence of Raz's theorem that the paper uses (p. 642): a 2−cℓ2^{-c\ell}2−cℓ error bound for the repeated clause–variable game on 3CNF-5 formulas far from satisfiable.
    • NaorPartitionSystems relaxes "time linear in mmm" to polynomial time and renders "LLL polynomial in ddd" as L≤⌊log⁡2m⌋aL\le\lfloor\log_2 m\rfloor^aL≤⌊log2​m⌋a. Both relaxations weaken the hypothesis.
  • Approximation in value form. The algorithm outputs a number vvv with OPT≤v≤ρ(n)OPT\mathrm{OPT}\le v\le\rho(n)\mathrm{OPT}OPT≤v≤ρ(n)OPT, and only on coverable instances with n≥n0n\ge n_0n≥n0​. Any algorithm that outputs a cover yields such a value, so this hypothesis is weaker than the paper's. The guard n≥n0n\ge n_0n≥n0​ is needed because (1−ε)ln⁡n<1(1-\varepsilon)\ln n<1(1−ε)lnn<1 for small nnn.
  • Machine model. The machines are Cook's deterministic one-tape machines. Multi-tape simulation costs a quadratic factor, which the class absorbs.
  • Probabilities are uniform counts over the (5n)ℓ(5n)^\ell(5n)ℓ random strings. Strategies are deterministic. Answers are canonical (satisfying on clause coordinates), as the paper assumes without loss of generality.
  • Not formalized. Randomized classes (ZTIME) are not defined here, so the following are omitted: the last sentence of Lemma 3.2, Proposition 6.1, and the randomized variants.
  • Ruling out a trivial formalization. The gap notion requires far-from-satisfiable formulas to have at least one clause. Otherwise the empty formula would be both a yes-instance and a no-instance, and Theorem 2.1.1 would hold trivially.
  • Infrastructure and reuse. The shared layer can serve other PCP-based hardness proofs: 3CNF-5 formulas, the kkk-prover system, partition systems, and the gap-NP-hardness notion. Welcome contributions include:
    • time bounds for list and table manipulations on one-tape machines;
    • a Hadamard-code construction satisfying the weight and distance conditions;
    • the union-bound and averaging lemmas behind Lemma 2.3.1 and Proposition 4.2.

Selected references

  • U. Feige, A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover, J. ACM 45(4), 634–652, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1145/285055.285059
  • C. Lund, M. Yannakakis, On the hardness of approximating minimization problems, J. ACM 41(5), 960–981, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1145/185675.306789
  • R. Raz, A parallel repetition theorem, SIAM J. Comput. 27(3), 763–803, 1998 (STOC 1995). https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539795280895
  • M. Naor, L. J. Schulman, A. Srinivasan, Splitters and near-optimal derandomization, FOCS 1995, 182–191. https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.1995.492475
  • S. Arora, C. Lund, R. Motwani, M. Sudan, M. Szegedy, Proof verification and the hardness of approximation problems, J. ACM 45(3), 501–555, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1145/278298.278306
  • C. Papadimitriou, M. Yannakakis, Optimization, approximation, and complexity classes, J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 43(3), 425–440, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0000(91)90023-X
  • V. Chvátal, A greedy heuristic for the set-covering problem, Math. Oper. Res. 4(3), 233–235, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.4.3.233
  • I. Dinur, D. Steurer, Analytical approach to parallel repetition, STOC 2014, 624–633. https://doi.org/10.1145/2591796.2591884
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Bargaining under Incomplete Information I: Class A Equilibrium Offer Strategies Satisfy the Linked Differential EquationsResearch Paper

Motivation

A buyer and a seller negotiate over a single indivisible good. Each knows how much the good is worth to them, but not how much it is worth to the other side. Whether the two will trade, and at what price, then depends on how each party shades its offer to exploit the other's uncertainty. Chatterjee and Samuelson (Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Operations Research 31(5), 1983) modelled this situation as a one-shot game in which both parties submit sealed offers simultaneously, and characterised its Bayesian equilibria.

The model became the standard reference point for bilateral trade with two-sided private information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (J. Econ. Theory 29, 1983) showed that no mechanism can guarantee efficient trade in this setting, and that the equilibrium of the Chatterjee–Samuelson game with k=1/2k = 1/2k=1/2 and uniform values attains the second-best efficiency bound. Later work on the kkk-double auction (Satterthwaite and Williams, J. Econ. Theory 48, 1989; Leininger, Linhart and Radner, J. Econ. Theory 48, 1989) studies the continuum of equilibria of exactly this game. The object of the present mission, a pair of linked differential equations, is the tool these papers use to construct and classify equilibria.

Setting

A seller has reservation price vs∈[v‾s,vˉs]v_s \in [\underline v_s, \bar v_s]vs​∈[v​s​,vˉs​] and a buyer has reservation price vb∈[v‾b,vˉb]v_b \in [\underline v_b, \bar v_b]vb​∈[v​b​,vˉb​]. Each knows their own value. The buyer's belief about vsv_svs​ is a probability measure μb\mu_bμb​ with distribution function FbF_bFb​; the seller's belief about vbv_bvb​ is μs\mu_sμs​ with distribution function FsF_sFs​. The subscript names the player who holds the belief, not the variable. Each belief is regular: F(v‾)=0F(\underline v) = 0F(v​)=0, F(vˉ)=1F(\bar v) = 1F(vˉ)=1, and FFF is strictly increasing and differentiable on the value interval, with density fbf_bfb​ (respectively fsf_sfs​).

Under the Bargaining Rule, the seller asks sss and the buyer offers bbb simultaneously. If b≥sb \ge sb≥s the good is sold at P=kb+(1−k)sP = kb + (1-k)sP=kb+(1−k)s for a fixed k∈[0,1]k \in [0, 1]k∈[0,1]; otherwise nothing happens. Profits are P−vsP - v_sP−vs​ for the seller and vb−Pv_b - Pvb​−P for the buyer on trade, and zero otherwise.

An offer strategy is a function SSS (for the seller) or BBB (for the buyer) from values to offers. Against SSS, a buyer with value vvv offering bbb earns in expectation

πb(b,v)=∫1{S(vs)≤b} (v−kb−(1−k)S(vs)) dμb(vs),\pi_b(b, v) = \int \mathbf 1\{S(v_s) \le b\}\,\bigl(v - kb - (1-k)S(v_s)\bigr)\,d\mu_b(v_s),πb​(b,v)=∫1{S(vs​)≤b}(v−kb−(1−k)S(vs​))dμb​(vs​),

and symmetrically πs(s,v)=∫1{s≤B(vb)} (kB(vb)+(1−k)s−v) dμs(vb)\pi_s(s, v) = \int \mathbf 1\{s \le B(v_b)\}\,(kB(v_b) + (1-k)s - v)\,d\mu_s(v_b)πs​(s,v)=∫1{s≤B(vb​)}(kB(vb​)+(1−k)s−v)dμs​(vb​). The pair (S,B)(S, B)(S,B) is an equilibrium if B(v)B(v)B(v) maximises πb(⋅,v)\pi_b(\cdot, v)πb​(⋅,v) over all real offers for every buyer value vvv, and S(v)S(v)S(v) maximises πs(⋅,v)\pi_s(\cdot, v)πs​(⋅,v) for every seller value vvv.

A strategy is of class AAA if its offers are bounded, it is nondecreasing, it is strictly increasing except where it sits at its lowest offer mmm or its highest offer MMM, and it is differentiable wherever its offer lies strictly between mmm and MMM. A class AAA equilibrium is an equilibrium in which both strategies are of class AAA.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, the linked differential equations

In a class AAA equilibrium, wherever the seller's strategy is strictly increasing around yyy and the buyer value xxx offers B(x)=S(y)B(x) = S(y)B(x)=S(y),

kFb(y)S′(y)+fb(y)S(y)=x fb(y),(3a)k F_b(y) S'(y) + f_b(y) S(y) = x\, f_b(y), \tag{3a}kFb​(y)S′(y)+fb​(y)S(y)=xfb​(y),(3a)

and wherever the buyer's strategy is strictly increasing around xxx and the seller value yyy asks S(y)=B(x)S(y) = B(x)S(y)=B(x),

(1−k)(1−Fs(x))B′(x)−fs(x)B(x)=− y fs(x).(3b)(1-k)\bigl(1 - F_s(x)\bigr) B'(x) - f_s(x) B(x) = -\,y\, f_s(x). \tag{3b}(1−k)(1−Fs​(x))B′(x)−fs​(x)B(x)=−yfs​(x).(3b)

The paper writes x=B−1(S(y))x = B^{-1}(S(y))x=B−1(S(y)) in (3a) and y=S−1(B(x))y = S^{-1}(B(x))y=S−1(B(x)) in (3b).

Milestones: the displays of the proof

  1. Gb(S(y))=Fb(y)G_b(S(y)) = F_b(y)Gb​(S(y))=Fb​(y): the buyer's probability that the seller asks at most S(y)S(y)S(y) equals Fb(y)F_b(y)Fb​(y).
  2. The buyer's first-order condition: ∂πb/∂b=(v−b)gb(b)−kGb(b)\partial \pi_b / \partial b = (v - b) g_b(b) - k G_b(b)∂πb​/∂b=(v−b)gb​(b)−kGb​(b) at b=S(y)b = S(y)b=S(y), with offer density gb(S(y))=fb(y)/S′(y)g_b(S(y)) = f_b(y)/S'(y)gb​(S(y))=fb​(y)/S′(y), and it vanishes at an equilibrium offer.
  3. The seller's first-order condition: ∂πs/∂s=(v−s)gs(s)+(1−k)(1−Gs(s))\partial \pi_s / \partial s = (v - s) g_s(s) + (1-k)(1 - G_s(s))∂πs​/∂s=(v−s)gs​(s)+(1−k)(1−Gs​(s)) at s=B(x)s = B(x)s=B(x), and it vanishes at an equilibrium ask.

The milestones assume S′(y)>0S'(y) > 0S′(y)>0 (respectively B′(x)>0B'(x) > 0B′(x)>0), which the paper's formula for the offer density needs. The goal does not assume it.

Significance

Theorem 2 reduces the search for equilibria to the analysis of a pair of ordinary differential equations. Every explicit equilibrium in the paper and in the later kkk-double-auction literature is found as a solution of (3a)–(3b) with suitable boundary conditions: the linear equilibrium for uniform beliefs (the paper's Example 1), the one-parameter families of Satterthwaite–Williams, and the non-linear equilibria of Leininger–Linhart–Radner. The equations also expose how the split parameter kkk distributes bargaining power: at k=1k = 1k=1 equation (3b) forces the seller to ask their own value, and at k=0k = 0k=0 equation (3a) forces the buyer to bid theirs.

The result is proved in the paper. To the best of a search of the platform, no formalization of it or of the bargaining model exists. This mission produces a machine-checked version of the necessary conditions. Its definitions of beliefs, expected profits, equilibrium and class AAA are also the basis for companion missions on the uniform linear equilibrium and its trade probability.

Difficulty

The paper's proof is four lines: differentiate the expected profit, set the derivative to zero, substitute. Three steps of that argument do not survive a careful reading.

First, the paper differentiates under an offer density gbg_bgb​ that exists only if SSS is strictly increasing and has a positive derivative. Class AAA allows SSS to be flat at its bounds, to jump between them, and to have zero derivative. The formal goal assumes none of this. It must handle the case S′(y)=0S'(y) = 0S′(y)=0, where the offer distribution has an infinite density at S(y)S(y)S(y) and the first-order condition becomes a one-sided argument.

Second, identifying Gb(S(y))G_b(S(y))Gb​(S(y)) with Fb(y)F_b(y)Fb​(y) requires that no seller value outside a neighbourhood of yyy makes the same offer. That is a global statement about SSS, and it is where monotonicity on the whole interval and the "flat only at the bounds" clause of class AAA enter.

Third, the first-order condition needs the equilibrium offer S(y)S(y)S(y) to be an interior maximiser of a function of bbb that is differentiable there. The profit πb\pi_bπb​ is an integral over the belief, and its differentiability at S(y)S(y)S(y) must be derived from the differentiability of SSS at the single point yyy and of FbF_bFb​. Neither SSS nor πb\pi_bπb​ is assumed continuous elsewhere.

Formalization scope

Values, offers and kkk are real numbers. Beliefs are probability measures on R\mathbb RR, with distribution function Mathlib's ProbabilityTheory.cdf. Expected profits are Bochner integrals over the opponent's value, not over an offer density. The two agree whenever the density exists, and the integral form needs none. Integrability is not assumed: for a class AAA strategy and a regular belief supported on the value interval, the integrand is bounded and almost everywhere measurable. Ties (b=sb = sb=s) trade. Deviations range over all real offers. Strategies are arbitrary functions R→R\mathbb R \to \mathbb RR→R whose values outside the value interval play no role.

The derivative S′(y)S'(y)S′(y) is deriv S y. The paper's inverses B−1B^{-1}B−1 and S−1S^{-1}S−1 are not introduced as functions. The matching value is a universally quantified variable xxx with B(x)=S(y)B(x) = S(y)B(x)=S(y), so no junk value of an inverse can make an equation true or false. The equations are asserted only at values yyy interior to an open subinterval on which SSS is strictly increasing. A formalization that assumed the first-order condition, or restricted to strategies with S′>0S' > 0S′>0 everywhere, would be a different and weaker theorem.

A complete development needs: differentiation of parametric integrals of indicator type (the derivative of b↦∫1{S≤b} h dμb \mapsto \int \mathbf 1\{S \le b\}\,h\,d\mub↦∫1{S≤b}hdμ), the change of variables from values to offers under a strictly increasing strategy, and Fermat's rule (IsLocalMax.hasDerivAt_eq_zero). The first two are reusable for auctions and other Bayesian games with monotone strategies. Proofs of the milestones, alternative proofs of the goal, and general lemmas about monotone strategies are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson, Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Operations Research 31(5):835–851, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.31.5.835
  • R. B. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, Journal of Economic Theory 29(2):265–281, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
  • M. A. Satterthwaite and S. R. Williams, Bilateral Trade with the Sealed Bid k-Double Auction: Existence and Efficiency, Journal of Economic Theory 48(1):107–133, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90120-8
  • W. Leininger, P. B. Linhart and R. Radner, Equilibria of the Sealed-Bid Mechanism for Bargaining with Incomplete Information, Journal of Economic Theory 48(1):63–106, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90121-X
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Generalized Quasi-Variational Inequality Problem I: Existence for the Generalized Implicit Complementarity Problem under Strong CopositivityResearch Paper

Motivation

Variational inequalities and complementarity problems are the standard formulation of equilibrium in operations research and mathematical economics: traffic equilibria, spatial price equilibria, Nash equilibria of convex games, and the optimality conditions of constrained optimization all take this form. Many applications have two features that the classical theory does not cover. The feasible set of a player or a flow can depend on the current state (a quasi-variational inequality, as in generalized Nash games with shared constraints), and the response map can be set-valued (a subdifferential, or a best-response correspondence). D. Chan and J. S. Pang (Math. Oper. Res. 7 (1982) 211–222) introduced the generalized quasi-variational inequality covering both, proved existence theorems for it, and derived existence for a new generalized implicit complementarity problem.

Timeline of the results this mission builds on:

  • 1966: Hartman and Stampacchia prove existence for the variational inequality on a compact convex set.
  • 1973: Bensoussan, Goursat and Lions introduce quasi-variational inequalities for impulse control.
  • 1976: Saigal extends the complementarity problem to set-valued maps.
  • 1974: Moré gives coercivity conditions for nonlinear complementarity problems; a special version of the lemma of §3 appears there.
  • 1979: Fang and Peterson prove a general existence theorem for generalized variational inequalities (report, University of Maryland Baltimore County); the lemma of §3 and the constant-KKK case of Theorem 3.2 are taken from there.
  • 1982: Chan and Pang prove existence for the generalized quasi-variational inequality using the Eilenberg–Montgomery fixed point theorem, and derive existence for the generalized implicit complementarity problem under strong copositivity (Theorem 4.2), the goal of this mission.

Setting

Throughout, Rn\mathbb R^nRn carries the Euclidean inner product xTyx^T yxTy and norm ∥x∥\|x\|∥x∥. A point-to-set mapping KKK assigns to each x∈Rnx\in\mathbb R^nx∈Rn a set K(x)⊆RnK(x)\subseteq\mathbb R^nK(x)⊆Rn. Given point-to-set mappings KKK and fff, the problem GQVI(K,f)\mathrm{GQVI}(K,f)GQVI(K,f) asks for vectors x,yx,yx,y with

x∈K(x),y∈f(x),(x′−x)Ty≥0  for all x′∈K(x).x\in K(x),\qquad y\in f(x),\qquad (x'-x)^T y\ge 0\ \text{ for all } x'\in K(x).x∈K(x),y∈f(x),(x′−x)Ty≥0  for all x′∈K(x).

A cone is a convex set containing 000 and closed under nonnegative scaling. The dual cone of a set SSS is S∗={y:yTx≥0 for all x∈S}S^*=\{y : y^T x\ge 0 \text{ for all } x\in S\}S∗={y:yTx≥0 for all x∈S}. For a point-to-point map mmm, a cone-valued map LLL and a point-to-set map fff, the problem GICP(L,m,f)\mathrm{GICP}(L,m,f)GICP(L,m,f) asks for x,yx,yx,y with

x∈m(x)+L(x),y∈f(x)∩L(x)∗,yT(x−m(x))=0.x\in m(x)+L(x),\qquad y\in f(x)\cap L(x)^*,\qquad y^T\big(x-m(x)\big)=0 .x∈m(x)+L(x),y∈f(x)∩L(x)∗,yT(x−m(x))=0.

A mapping fff is upper semicontinuous on a set CCC at x∈Cx\in Cx∈C if for each open G⊇f(x)G\supseteq f(x)G⊇f(x) there is a neighbourhood NNN of xxx with f(y)⊆Gf(y)\subseteq Gf(y)⊆G for y∈N∩Cy\in N\cap Cy∈N∩C; lower semicontinuous if for each open GGG meeting f(x)f(x)f(x), f(y)f(y)f(y) meets GGG for all yyy near xxx in CCC; continuous if both. A set SSS is contractible if some point x∈Sx\in Sx∈S and a continuous g:S×[0,1]→Sg:S\times[0,1]\to Sg:S×[0,1]→S satisfy g(x′,0)=x′g(x',0)=x'g(x′,0)=x′, g(x′,1)=xg(x',1)=xg(x′,1)=x. BrB_rBr​ is the closed ball of radius rrr about the origin, CrC_rCr​ its boundary sphere. For point-to-set maps μ\muμ and KKK, the coercivity function is

Cμ,K(r,x0)=inf⁡x∈K(x)∩Cr[inf⁡y∈μ(x)(x−x0)Ty]/(r+∥x0∥),C_{\mu,K}(r,x^0)=\inf_{x\in K(x)\cap C_r}\Big[\inf_{y\in\mu(x)}(x-x^0)^T y\Big]\Big/(r+\|x^0\|),Cμ,K​(r,x0)=x∈K(x)∩Cr​inf​[y∈μ(x)inf​(x−x0)Ty]/(r+∥x0∥),

with inf⁡∅=+∞\inf\emptyset=+\inftyinf∅=+∞. The map μ\muμ is strongly copositive with respect to KKK at x0x^0x0 if x0∈K(x0)x^0\in K(x^0)x0∈K(x0) and for some α>0\alpha>0α>0 and y0∈μ(x0)y^0\in\mu(x^0)y0∈μ(x0), (y−y0)T(x−x0)≥α∥x−x0∥2(y-y^0)^T(x-x^0)\ge\alpha\|x-x^0\|^2(y−y0)T(x−x0)≥α∥x−x0∥2 for all x∈K(x)x\in K(x)x∈K(x) and y∈μ(x)y\in\mu(x)y∈μ(x). For μ\muμ and q∈Rnq\in\mathbb R^nq∈Rn, (μ+q)(x)={y+q:y∈μ(x)}(\mu+q)(x)=\{y+q : y\in\mu(x)\}(μ+q)(x)={y+q:y∈μ(x)}.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.2 (p. 218)

Let L~\tilde LL~ be a closed cone with nonempty interior, mmm continuous, K(x)=m(x)+L~K(x)=m(x)+\tilde LK(x)=m(x)+L~, and μ\muμ a mapping with nonempty contractible compact values, upper semicontinuous on Rn\mathbb R^nRn. If some u~\tilde uu~ satisfies u~−m(x)∈L~\tilde u-m(x)\in\tilde Lu~−m(x)∈L~ for all xxx, and μ\muμ is strongly copositive with respect to KKK at u~\tilde uu~, then for every qqq

∃ x,y:x−m(x)∈L~,y∈μ(x)+q,y∈L~∗,yT(x−m(x))=0.\exists\, x,y:\quad x-m(x)\in\tilde L,\quad y\in\mu(x)+q,\quad y\in\tilde L^*,\quad y^T(x-m(x))=0 .∃x,y:x−m(x)∈L~,y∈μ(x)+q,y∈L~∗,yT(x−m(x))=0.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  • Theorem 3.1 (p. 214): for continuous φ\varphiφ quasi-concave in its first argument on a nonempty compact convex CCC, some u∗∈V(u∗)=K(u∗)∩Cu^*\in V(u^*)=K(u^*)\cap Cu∗∈V(u∗)=K(u∗)∩C and w∗∈f(u∗)w^*\in f(u^*)w∗∈f(u∗) satisfy φ(v,u∗,w∗)≤φ(u∗,u∗,w∗)\varphi(v,u^*,w^*)\le\varphi(u^*,u^*,w^*)φ(v,u∗,w∗)≤φ(u∗,u∗,w∗) for all v∈V(u∗)v\in V(u^*)v∈V(u∗).
  • Lemma of §3 (p. 215): a variational inequality on W∩EW\cap EW∩E at a point of W∩E0W\cap E^0W∩E0 extends to WWW.
  • Theorem 3.2 (p. 215): existence for GQVI(K,f)\mathrm{GQVI}(K,f)GQVI(K,f) from a compact truncation C=U∩EC=U\cap EC=U∩E and a boundary condition on ∂E\partial E∂E.
  • Theorem 4.1 (p. 217): if Cμ,K(r,x0)≥0C_{\mu,K}(r,x^0)\ge 0Cμ,K​(r,x0)≥0, then GQVI(K,μ+q)\mathrm{GQVI}(K,\mu+q)GQVI(K,μ+q) has a solution in BrB_rBr​ whenever ∥q∥≤Cμ,K(r,x0)\|q\|\le C_{\mu,K}(r,x^0)∥q∥≤Cμ,K​(r,x0).
  • Corollary 4.1 (pp. 217–218): under the coercivity condition (4), GQVI(K,μ+q)\mathrm{GQVI}(K,\mu+q)GQVI(K,μ+q) is solvable for every qqq, with bounded solution set.
  • Lemma 4.1 (p. 218): strong copositivity at x0x^0x0 implies coercivity (4) at x0x^0x0.
  • Proposition 2.1 (p. 213): GICP(L,m,f)\mathrm{GICP}(L,m,f)GICP(L,m,f) and GQVI(m+L,f)\mathrm{GQVI}(m+L,f)GQVI(m+L,f) have the same solutions.

Significance

Theorem 4.2 gives existence for complementarity problems whose cone is translated by a state-dependent map mmm and whose response map is set-valued. It contains existence for the implicit complementarity problem of Capuzzo-Dolcetta, Mosco and Pang (L~=R+n\tilde L=\mathbb R^n_+L~=R+n​) with strongly monotone data (Corollary 4.2 of the paper), and Saigal's generalized complementarity problem (m≡0m\equiv0m≡0). Theorems 3.2 and 4.1 are general-purpose existence tools for quasi-variational inequalities with set-valued maps; Theorem 3.2 reduces to the Fang–Peterson theorem when KKK is constant, and Corollary 3.1 to the Hartman–Stampacchia theorem when in addition fff is single-valued.

All results of the paper are proved; none is open. To our knowledge none of them has been formalized: no proof assistant library contains quasi-variational inequalities with set-valued maps, and Mathlib has neither Kakutani's nor the Eilenberg–Montgomery fixed point theorem (nor Brouwer's). A formal proof of the goal therefore also produces a reusable library of set-valued existence theory.

Difficulty

The whole chain rests on Theorem 3.1, whose proof applies the Eilenberg–Montgomery fixed point theorem for upper semicontinuous maps with acyclic (here contractible) compact values; this in turn needs either singular homology or an approximation argument, neither of which is available in Mathlib. Replacing "contractible" by "convex" to use Kakutani's theorem would prove a strictly weaker theorem: the paper states contractible values deliberately. The second difficulty is that the fixed point only solves the problem on the truncation V(x)=K(x)∩CV(x)=K(x)\cap CV(x)=K(x)∩C; turning it into a solution over all of K(x)K(x)K(x) needs the boundary argument of Theorem 3.2, and for Theorem 4.2 the continuity of x↦(m(x)+L~)∩Bρx\mapsto (m(x)+\tilde L)\cap B_\rhox↦(m(x)+L~)∩Bρ​, which is where the solidity of L~\tilde LL~ is used. The obvious approach of applying Theorem 3.2 directly with C=RnC=\mathbb R^nC=Rn fails because CCC must be compact.

Formalization scope

The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), so all norms and balls are Euclidean (not the sup norm of Fin n → ℝ). Point-to-set mappings are functions into Set; semicontinuity "on CCC" is Mathlib's UpperHemicontinuousOn/LowerHemicontinuousOn with neighbourhoods relative to CCC, and "on Rn\mathbb R^nRn" is UpperHemicontinuous. Cones are PointedCone ℝ _ (convex, containing 000, as footnote 1 of the paper says). Balls are centred at the origin.

Conventions that the Lean statements make explicit:

  • The paper takes its semicontinuity from Berge, whose upper semicontinuous maps have compact values. Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and Corollary 4.1 are false without this (K(x)≡(0,1)K(x)\equiv(0,1)K(x)≡(0,1), C=[0,1]C=[0,1]C=[0,1], f≡{1}f\equiv\{1\}f≡{1}), so each one carries an explicit closedness hypothesis on K(x)∩CK(x)\cap CK(x)∩C or K(x)∩BρK(x)\cap B_\rhoK(x)∩Bρ​. Theorem 4.2 needs none, since m(x)+L~m(x)+\tilde Lm(x)+L~ is closed.
  • Every infimum uses inf⁡∅=+∞\inf\emptyset=+\inftyinf∅=+∞. Bounds of the form Cμ,K(r,x0)≥cC_{\mu,K}(r,x^0)\ge cCμ,K​(r,x0)≥c, condition (v) of Theorem 3.2, and the limit (4) are stated in universally quantified form. A real-valued Cμ,KC_{\mu,K}Cμ,K​ would be wrong: it returns 000 on an empty set.
  • Lemma 4.1 is stated at the same point x0x^0x0, which is what its proof gives. In Corollary 4.1 the bound rrr on the solutions is chosen after qqq.
  • Three glyphs are illegible in the scan and are read from the proofs: ≤\le≤ in Theorem 3.1, ≥0\ge 0≥0 in Theorem 3.2(v), and ≥\ge≥ in the Lemma of §3.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the GQVI solution tests over all of K(x)K(x)K(x), not over V(x)=K(x)∩CV(x)=K(x)\cap CV(x)=K(x)∩C, and the GICP solution keeps both the dual-cone condition and the complementarity equation. Dropping any of these would turn the goal into a restatement of Theorem 3.1.

A complete development needs: an Eilenberg–Montgomery (or at least Kakutani plus an acyclicity argument) fixed point theorem for set-valued maps, Berge's maximum theorem, and basic facts on hemicontinuity of intersections and translates of set-valued maps. The fixed point theorems, the maximum theorem and the hemicontinuity lemmas are reusable far beyond this mission. Contributions of any of these as separate theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Chan, J. S. Pang, The generalized quasi-variational inequality problem, Mathematics of Operations Research 7(2) (1982) 211–222. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.2.211
  • S. Eilenberg, D. Montgomery, Fixed point theorems for multi-valued transformations, American Journal of Mathematics 68 (1946) 214–222. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371832
  • C. Berge, Topological Spaces, Macmillan, New York, 1963.
  • S. C. Fang, E. L. Peterson, Generalized variational inequalities, Mathematics Research Report 79-10, Department of Mathematics, University of Maryland Baltimore County, 1979 (no public link).
  • J. J. Moré, Coercivity conditions in nonlinear complementarity problems, SIAM Review 16(1) (1974) 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1137/1016001
  • P. Hartman, G. Stampacchia, On some non-linear elliptic differential-functional equations, Acta Mathematica 115 (1966) 271–310. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02392210
  • R. Saigal, Extension of the generalized complementarity problem, Mathematics of Operations Research 1(3) (1976) 260–266. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1.3.260
12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities I: Beale's Simplex Method for a Convex Quadratic Function TerminatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Quadratic programming, the minimization of a convex quadratic function subject to linear constraints, is the simplest nonlinear extension of linear programming. It arises in least-squares estimation with sign constraints, in portfolio selection, and as the subproblem solved at each iteration of Newton-type methods for general smooth convex programs. E. M. L. Beale's 1955 paper (DOI 10.1111/j.2517-6161.1955.tb00191.x) gave one of the first finite algorithms for it by extending Dantzig's simplex method: the method keeps the simplex tableau and adds free variables, linear functions of the original variables with no sign restriction, along which the quadratic stops decreasing.

Timeline:

  • 1951: Dantzig publishes the simplex method for linear programming.
  • 1952: Charnes introduces ε-perturbations to resolve degeneracy in the simplex method.
  • 1955: Beale extends the simplex method to convex quadratic objectives and proves that the iteration terminates (§3 of the paper; the result formalized here).
  • 1959: Beale's "On quadratic programming" (Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 6) develops the method further; Wolfe's simplex method for quadratic programming (Econometrica 27) appears the same year.

Setting

There are nnn restricted variables xj≥0x_j \ge 0xj​≥0 satisfying mmm linearly independent linear equations, and a convex quadratic objective CCC. The iteration keeps N=n−mN = n - mN=n−m nonbasic variables z1,…,zNz_1, \dots, z_Nz1​,…,zN​, each either a restricted variable or a free variable, and writes every restricted variable as an affine function of them:

xh=ah0+∑l=1Nahlzl.(2.3)x_h = a_{h0} + \sum_{l=1}^{N} a_{hl} z_l. \qquad (2.3)xh​=ah0​+l=1∑N​ahl​zl​.(2.3)

A restricted variable that is not nonbasic is basic. The associated solution sets every zl=0z_l = 0zl​=0, so xh=ah0x_h = a_{h0}xh​=ah0​. The objective is written as

C=∑k=0N∑l=0Ncklzkzl,z0=1,(3.1)C = \sum_{k=0}^{N} \sum_{l=0}^{N} c_{kl} z_k z_l, \qquad z_0 = 1, \qquad (3.1)C=k=0∑N​l=0∑N​ckl​zk​zl​,z0​=1,(3.1)

with (ckl)(c_{kl})(ckl​) symmetric. Thus c00c_{00}c00​ is the value of CCC at the associated solution and 2ck02c_{k0}2ck0​ is its linear coefficient in zkz_kzk​. The number of nonbasic free variables is sss.

One step chooses a nonbasic zpz_pzp​ that can profitably be altered: a free one with cp0≠0c_{p0} \ne 0cp0​=0 if there is one, otherwise a restricted one with cp0<0c_{p0} < 0cp0​<0. It orients zpz_pzp​ so that it is to be increased, and increases it from 000. It stops at the first of two events. Either a basic variable xqx_qxq​ reaches 000 (the ratio test (2.4)), and then xqx_qxq​ becomes nonbasic in place of zpz_pzp​. Or CCC stops decreasing where the free variable ur=cp0+∑lcplzlu_r = c_{p0} + \sum_l c_{pl} z_lur​=cp0​+∑l​cpl​zl​ vanishes (3.2), and then uru_rur​ becomes nonbasic in place of zpz_pzp​. The coefficients are then transformed by substituting for zpz_pzp​ (eqs. (3.4)–(3.6)). CCC is in standard form when it has no linear term in any free variable.

Formalization targets

Goal: the iteration terminates

From a tableau with symmetric (ckl)(c_{kl})(ckl​), positive semidefinite quadratic block (ckl)k,l≥1(c_{kl})_{k,l \ge 1}(ckl​)k,l≥1​ and consistent labels, there is no infinite run

T0→T1→T2→⋯T_0 \to T_1 \to T_2 \to \cdotsT0​→T1​→T2​→⋯

of steps along which every basic variable stays strictly positive in the associated solution. No bound on the number of steps is claimed, as in the paper.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (3.7): the closed form of the transformed matrix, its symmetry, and the invariance ∑cklzkzl=∑ckl′′zk′zl′\sum c_{kl} z_k z_l = \sum c''_{kl} z'_k z'_l∑ckl​zk​zl​=∑ckl′′​zk′​zl′​.
  2. Lemma 1: when a free variable enters, its row and column vanish off the diagonal, the index 000 included.
  3. Lemma 2: a slot whose row and column vanish off the diagonal keeps this property when another free variable enters.
  4. The optimality criterion (p. 175): if no nonbasic variable can profitably be altered and CCC is convex, then c00c_{00}c00​ is the minimum over the feasible region.
  5. In standard form, c00≤C(z)c_{00} \le C(z)c00​≤C(z) for every zzz with the restricted nonbasic variables at 000.
  6. CCC decreases at every step: c00′<c00c'_{00} < c_{00}c00′​<c00​.
  7. A finite run never returns to a standard form with the same set of restricted nonbasic variables.
  8. If CCC is not in standard form and s=s0s = s_0s=s0​, then within s0s_0s0​ steps either standard form is reached or sss drops, and sss never exceeds s0s_0s0​ on the way.

Significance

The theorem makes Beale's method an algorithm: a finite procedure that ends either at an optimal tableau (milestone 4) or with a ray along which CCC decreases without bound. This finiteness is what later active-set methods for quadratic programming inherit.

The result was proved in 1955. What remains is to formalize it: a machine-checked account of a simplex-type method whose state includes variables that are created during the run and later discarded. Mathlib has no simplex-type algorithm for quadratic programming, and no machine-checked proof of this theorem is known. The pivot algebra (3.4)–(3.7) and the tableau model are reusable for other pivoting methods for quadratic programs.

Difficulty

The argument for linear programming does not carry over. There, the objective strictly decreases and a basis is a subset of a finite set of columns, so no basis repeats. Here each step may create a new free variable, and nothing bounds the number of distinct free variables that can occur. Tableaux are therefore not drawn from a finite set, and a strictly decreasing objective alone does not give termination. The paper states this itself: "there is no obvious limit to the number of free variables that may be involved". The difficulty is to bound the number of steps between returns to a well-behaved tableau, and this depends both on the rule that free variables are chosen first and on how the coefficient matrix evolves under repeated pivots.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. The nonbasic variables occupy fixed slots Fin (N+1). Slot 0 is z0=1z_0 = 1z0​=1; the nonbasic slot k : Fin N is index k.succ. A pivot stores the new nonbasic variable in the slot of the variable it replaces, so the paper's index qqq in (3.4)–(3.7) is that slot. The tableau holds the labels (restricted xjx_jxj​ or free), the rows of all nnn restricted variables (a nonbasic one has the unit row), and (ckl)(c_{kl})(ckl​). Free variables carry no row, as in the paper.
  • The pivot. pivotC is computed literally from (3.5) and then (3.6). Rows are transformed by the same substitution, as the paper states.
  • The step. The step is a relation. It allows any profitable choice of zpz_pzp​ subject to the free-first rule, and at a tie either outcome. No pricing rule is fixed, since the paper fixes none.
  • Convexity. Convexity of CCC is the symmetry of (ckl)(c_{kl})(ckl​) plus positive semidefiniteness of the block (ckl)k,l≥1(c_{kl})_{k,l \ge 1}(ckl​)k,l≥1​, assumed on the initial tableau.
  • Added hypothesis. The one hypothesis not on the page is that every basic restricted variable is strictly positive in the associated solution of every tableau of the run. It replaces Charnes's ε-perturbations, by which the paper ensures "the ah0a_{h0}ah0​ are always positive, and not zero". Positivity is required of basic variables only; nonbasic variables are 000 in the associated solution.
  • Out of scope. The link to the original equations (2.1) and phase 1 (artificial variables, the M-method) are not formalized: the iteration starts from a tableau already in the form (2.3).
  • Ruling out a trivial goal. A step relation that never fires, or a positivity hypothesis that no tableau can meet after a step, would make the goal trivially true. A sorry-free check exhibits a convex instance with consistent labels, a step, and positive basic variables before and after it.

Contributions are welcome on every milestone. The algebraic milestones 1–3 are self-contained.

Selected references

  • E. M. L. Beale, On Minimizing a Convex Function Subject to Linear Inequalities, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B 17(2):173–184, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2517-6161.1955.tb00191.x
  • A. Charnes, Optimality and Degeneracy in Linear Programming, Econometrica 20(2):160–170, 1952. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907845
  • G. B. Dantzig, Maximization of a Linear Function of Variables Subject to Linear Inequalities, in T. C. Koopmans (ed.), Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, Wiley, 1951, pp. 339–347.
  • E. M. L. Beale, On Quadratic Programming, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 6(3):227–243, 1959. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800060305
  • P. Wolfe, The Simplex Method for Quadratic Programming, Econometrica 27(3):382–398, 1959. https://doi.org/10.2307/1909468
12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies I: Subjective Mixed Equilibria of Two-Person Games Have Objective PayoffsResearch Paper

Motivation

Classical non-cooperative game theory randomizes with objective, independent devices: each player spins a private wheel whose odds everyone agrees on. Aumann's 1974 paper (doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8) asks what changes when the randomizing events are ordinary events of the world, about which players may hold different subjective probabilities and may be differently informed. The paper introduced correlated equilibrium, and it also separates two effects that the classical model fuses: subjectivity (players disagree about probabilities) and correlation (players peg their choices on common or dependent events).

This mission formalizes the paper's result on subjectivity without correlation. Example 2.3 of the paper exhibits a three-person game in which strategies pegged on subjective but mutually secret events form an equilibrium that every player prefers to every classical mixed equilibrium. Proposition 5.1 shows that this cannot happen with two players.

Setting

A game has a finite set N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\dots,n\}N={1,…,n} of players, a finite set SiS_iSi​ of pure strategies for each player, a finite set XXX of outcomes and an outcome function ggg from S=×i∈NSiS=\times_{i\in N}S_iS=×i∈N​Si​ onto XXX. Player iii has a utility ui:X→Ru_i:X\to\mathbb Rui​:X→R; write hi(a)=ui(g(a))h_i(a)=u_i(g(a))hi​(a)=ui​(g(a)) for a∈Sa\in Sa∈S.

A randomizing structure consists of a set Ω\OmegaΩ of states of the world with a σ\sigmaσ-field B\mathcal BB of events, a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field Ji⊆B\mathcal J_i\subseteq\mathcal BJi​⊆B for each player (the events iii is informed about), and a probability measure pip_ipi​ on B\mathcal BB for each player (the subjective probability of iii). A strategy of iii is a map si:Ω→Sis_i:\Omega\to S_isi​:Ω→Si​ whose level sets {si=a}\{s_i=a\}{si​=a} lie in Ji\mathcal J_iJi​. For a profile s=(s1,…,sn)s=(s_1,\dots,s_n)s=(s1​,…,sn​) of strategies the payoff of iii is

Hi(s)=∫Ωhi(s(ω)) dpi(ω),H_i(s)=\int_\Omega h_i\big(s(\omega)\big)\,dp_i(\omega),Hi​(s)=∫Ω​hi​(s(ω))dpi​(ω),

computed under player iii's own beliefs. An equilibrium point is a profile sss with Hi(s)≥Hi(s1,…,ti,…,sn)H_i(s)\ge H_i(s_1,\dots,t_i,\dots,s_n)Hi​(s)≥Hi​(s1​,…,ti​,…,sn​) for every player iii and every strategy tit_iti​ of iii.

An event AAA is iii-secret if A∈JiA\in\mathcal J_iA∈Ji​ and every other player jjj regards AAA as independent of every event in the σ\sigmaσ-field generated by the Jk\mathcal J_kJk​, k≠ik\ne ik=i: pj(A∩B)=pj(A)pj(B)p_j(A\cap B)=p_j(A)p_j(B)pj​(A∩B)=pj​(A)pj​(B). A strategy is mixed if its level sets are iii-secret, and objective if each level set has the same probability under every pjp_jpj​. A measure is non-atomic on a σ\sigmaσ-field R\mathcal RR if every event of R\mathcal RR of positive measure contains an event of R\mathcal RR of strictly smaller positive measure; a roulette is a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field of B\mathcal BB on which every pjp_jpj​ is non-atomic. Throughout, Assumption II holds: every player iii has a σ\sigmaσ-field Ri\mathcal R_iRi​ of iii-secret events on which every pjp_jpj​ is non-atomic.

For distributions σi\sigma_iσi​ on SiS_iSi​ the classical payoff is Fi(σ)=∑a∈Shi(a)∏jσj(aj)F_i(\sigma)=\sum_{a\in S}h_i(a)\prod_j\sigma_j(a_j)Fi​(σ)=∑a∈S​hi​(a)∏j​σj​(aj​), and σ\sigmaσ is a Nash equilibrium point if no player gains by switching to another distribution.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5.1 (p. 78)

Let n=2n=2n=2 and assume

p1(B)=0  ⟺  p2(B)=0for every B∈B.(5.2)p_1(B)=0\iff p_2(B)=0\qquad\text{for every }B\in\mathcal B.\tag{5.2}p1​(B)=0⟺p2​(B)=0for every B∈B.(5.2)

Then for every equilibrium point sss in mixed strategies there is an equilibrium point ttt in objective mixed strategies with

H(s)=H(t).H(s)=H(t).H(s)=H(t).

The game need not be zero-sum.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 7.1 (p. 81): in a roulette R\mathcal RR, for events B1,…,BlB^1,\dots,B^lB1,…,Bl and α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1], there is an objective A∈RA\in\mathcal RA∈R with pi(A)=αp_i(A)=\alphapi​(A)=α and pi(A∩Bk)=pi(A)pi(Bk)p_i(A\cap B^k)=p_i(A)p_i(B^k)pi​(A∩Bk)=pi​(A)pi​(Bk) for all i,ki,ki,k.
  2. Lemma 4.1 (p. 77): every distribution σi\sigma_iσi​ on SiS_iSi​ is realised by an objective mixed strategy sis_isi​ with p{si=a}=σi(a)p\{s_i=a\}=\sigma_i(a)p{si​=a}=σi​(a).
  3. Lemma 7.3 (p. 82): if every sjs_jsj​, j≠ij\ne ij=i, is mixed, then pi{s=a}=pi{si=ai} pi{sj=aj ∀j≠i}=∏jpi{sj=aj}p_i\{s=a\}=p_i\{s_i=a_i\}\,p_i\{s_j=a_j\ \forall j\ne i\}=\prod_j p_i\{s_j=a_j\}pi​{s=a}=pi​{si​=ai​}pi​{sj​=aj​ ∀j=i}=∏j​pi​{sj​=aj​}.
  4. Corollary 7.4 (p. 83): mixed strategies are independent under every pkp_kpk​.
  5. Proposition 4.3 (p. 77): {F(σ):σ Nash}={H(s):s an equilibrium point in objective mixed strategies}\{F(\sigma):\sigma\text{ Nash}\}=\{H(s): s\text{ an equilibrium point in objective mixed strategies}\}{F(σ):σ Nash}={H(s):s an equilibrium point in objective mixed strategies}.

Significance

The result. Proposition 5.1 isolates correlation as the source of the new equilibrium payoffs of the subjective model in two-person games: disagreement about probabilities alone, with strategies pegged on secret events, reproduces only payoffs already achievable by classical mixed strategies (by Proposition 4.3, only Nash equilibrium payoffs). The paper uses it to explain Example 2.9, where two zero-sum players both expect more than the value, as an effect of subjectivity combined with correlation. Proposition 4.3 is the bridge that embeds classical Nash theory in the subjective model; with Nash's theorem it gives existence of equilibrium points in every game.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of them has been machine-checked. The mission produces a reusable measure-theoretic model of randomized strategies with private information and subjective beliefs (secret events, mixed and objective strategies, roulettes), a non-atomicity notion relative to a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field, and the Lyapunov-type construction of Lemma 7.1, none of which exists in Mathlib at the pinned revision.

Difficulty

The equilibrium conditions quantify over all strategies of the deviator, i.e. all Ji\mathcal J_iJi​-measurable maps, and the deviator may know events on which the opponent's mixed strategy is pegged. The obvious computation of H1(t1,s2)H_1(t_1,s_2)H1​(t1​,s2​) as a sum of products of marginal probabilities is valid only because the opponent's strategy is pegged on secret events, which is the content of Lemma 7.3; for correlated strategies it fails, and Example 2.9 shows the proposition then fails. A second obstacle is that the replacement t1t_1t1​ must reproduce player 2's beliefs about s1s_1s1​, while player 1's own equilibrium condition is stated under p1p_1p1​; condition (5.2) is what transfers "aaa is played with positive probability" from one player's beliefs to the other's. Constructing objective strategies with prescribed probabilities (Lemmas 7.1 and 4.1) needs the convexity of the range of a non-atomic vector measure (Lyapunov's theorem), which is not in Mathlib.

Formalization scope

Players are a finite type (Fin 2 in the goal, players 1,2↦0,11,2\mapsto 0,11,2↦0,1); the SiS_iSi​ and XXX are finite types, and ggg is surjective. The σ\sigmaσ-field B\mathcal BB is an explicit parameter mΩ of the structure RandomizingStructure ι Ω mΩ, which carries the Ji\mathcal J_iJi​ and the probability measures pip_ipi​. Probabilities are [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]-valued Mathlib measures. Utilities and pip_ipi​ are data (Assumption I is used only to compare lotteries by expected utility; the uniqueness of pip_ipi​ is not encoded). HiH_iHi​ is a Bochner integral; for strategy profiles the integrand has finitely many values and is measurable, hence integrable. Non-atomicity on a sub-σ\sigmaσ-field is defined directly; Mathlib's NoAtoms (singletons are null) would trivialize Assumption II and is not used. "Mixed" means pegged on the family of all iii-secret events, not on the σ\sigmaσ-field Ri\mathcal R_iRi​ of Assumption II. Classical distributions, FiF_iFi​ and Nash equilibrium points are AGT.IsLottery, AGT.expectedPayoff and AGT.IsMixedNash from the published definition agt_games.

A formalization that restricted deviations to mixed or objective strategies, or dropped "mixed" from the hypothesis on sss, would state a different theorem and is ruled out.

Useful contributions: Lyapunov's convexity theorem for finite-dimensional non-atomic vector measures (or the special case needed for Lemma 7.1), the factorization of Lemma 7.3, and the payoff identities used in the proof of Proposition 4.3. The model definitions are shared in meaning with the companion mission on two-person zero-sum games.

Selected references

  • R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974) 67–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
  • J. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286–295. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529
  • A. Liapounoff, Sur les fonctions-vecteurs complètement additives, Izv. Akad. Nauk SSSR Ser. Mat. 4 (1940) 465–478.
  • L. J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley, 1954.
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems IV: The (Q, r) Cost Is Flatter in the Order Quantity than the EOQ CostResearch Paper

Motivation

The continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy is the standard replenishment rule of inventory theory: whenever the inventory position (stock on hand plus on order minus backorders) drops to the reorder point rrr, order a fixed order quantity QQQ. It is used in practice and taught in every operations management course, usually after the deterministic economic order quantity (EOQ) model, which is the same system with a constant demand stream.

Practitioners and textbooks rely on a robustness property of the EOQ: its cost is very insensitive to the choice of order quantity. If the order quantity is off by a factor α\alphaα, the cost rises only by the factor 12(α+1/α)\tfrac12(\alpha + 1/\alpha)21​(α+1/α); ordering 50% too much costs about 8% extra. The insensitivity of the stochastic (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) system to its control parameters had been observed numerically (Wagner, O'Hagan and Lundh 1965; Naddor 1975; Archibald and Silver 1978), but, as Zheng notes, no analytical result on it was known.

Timeline:

  • 1963: Hadley and Whitin derive the (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) cost for Poisson demand.
  • 1986: Zipkin proves that the average backorders of a (Q,r)(Q,r)(Q,r) policy are jointly convex in (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) under continuous demand (Zipkin 1986).
  • 1992: Zheng derives simple optimality conditions for the continuous (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) model and compares it with the EOQ model under the same cost structure. One of the results is that the stochastic cost curve is flatter in the order quantity than the EOQ curve (Zheng 1992). This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

Demands arrive at rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0; orders arrive after a fixed leadtime L>0L>0L>0; all stockouts are backordered. Each order costs K>0K>0K>0; holding costs accrue at rate h>0h>0h>0 per unit in stock and penalty costs at rate p>0p>0p>0 per unit backordered. The leadtime demand D≥0D\ge 0D≥0 has distribution μ\muμ with finite mean E(D)=λLE(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL.

The inventory cost rate at inventory position yyy is

G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],G(y) = E\big[h(y-D)^+ + p(D-y)^+\big],G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],

assumed to attain its minimum at a unique point y0y^0y0. The long-run average cost of the policy (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) is

c(Q,r)=λK+∫rr+QG(y) dyQ,Q>0.c(Q, r) = \frac{\lambda K + \int_r^{r+Q} G(y)\,dy}{Q}, \qquad Q>0.c(Q,r)=QλK+∫rr+Q​G(y)dy​,Q>0.

For fixed Q>0Q>0Q>0 let r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) be a reorder point minimizing c(Q,⋅)c(Q,\cdot)c(Q,⋅), and let

C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)),H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0).C(Q) = c(Q, r(Q)), \qquad H(Q) = G(r(Q))\ (Q>0), \quad H(0) = G(y^0).C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)),H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0).

CCC is the cost of the order quantity QQQ when the reorder point is always chosen optimally for it. An optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ minimizes CCC over Q>0Q>0Q>0, and C∗=C(Q∗)C^* = C(Q^*)C∗=C(Q∗).

The EOQ model is the same system with the constant leadtime demand λL\lambda LλL. Its cost rate is Gd(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+G_d(y) = h(y-\lambda L)^+ + p(\lambda L-y)^+Gd​(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+, and rdr_drd​, HdH_dHd​, CdC_dCd​ are the objects above at GdG_dGd​, with optimum Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ and Cd∗C^*_dCd∗​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

C(αQ∗)C∗≤12(α+1α)∀α>0.\frac{C(\alpha Q^*)}{C^*} \le \frac12\left(\alpha + \frac1\alpha\right) \qquad \forall \alpha>0.C∗C(αQ∗)​≤21​(α+α1​)∀α>0.

The goal holds for every demand distribution satisfying the standing assumptions and every optimal Q∗Q^*Q∗. Both regimes, α<1\alpha<1α<1 and α>1\alpha>1α>1, are included.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. Eq. (7): ∫r(Q)r(Q)+QG=∫0QH\int_{r(Q)}^{r(Q)+Q} G = \int_0^Q H∫r(Q)r(Q)+Q​G=∫0Q​H, hence C(Q)=(λK+∫0QH(y)dy)/QC(Q) = \big(\lambda K + \int_0^Q H(y)dy\big)/QC(Q)=(λK+∫0Q​H(y)dy)/Q for Q>0Q>0Q>0.
  2. Lemma 4: HHH is increasing and convex on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p).
  3. Eq. (8): an optimal Q∗Q^*Q∗ exists, and Q>0Q>0Q>0 is optimal iff H(Q)=C(Q)H(Q) = C(Q)H(Q)=C(Q).
  4. Eq. (18): Hd(Q)=hph+pQH_d(Q) = \frac{hp}{h+p}QHd​(Q)=h+php​Q, with rd(Q)=λL−hh+pQr_d(Q) = \lambda L - \frac{h}{h+p}Qrd​(Q)=λL−h+ph​Q.
  5. Lemma 7: H0(Q)≤Hd(Q)≤H(Q)H_0(Q) \le H_d(Q) \le H(Q)H0​(Q)≤Hd​(Q)≤H(Q) and A(Q)≤Ad(Q)A(Q)\le A_d(Q)A(Q)≤Ad​(Q), where H0=H−G(y0)H_0 = H - G(y^0)H0​=H−G(y0) and A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0QHA(Q) = QH(Q) - \int_0^Q HA(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0Q​H.
  6. Eqs. (26)–(27): H(αQ)≤αH(Q)H(\alpha Q)\le \alpha H(Q)H(αQ)≤αH(Q) for α>1\alpha>1α>1 and H(αQ)≥αH(Q)H(\alpha Q)\ge\alpha H(Q)H(αQ)≥αH(Q) for 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1.
  7. Lemma 9: ∫QαQH(y) dy≤α2−12 QH(Q)\int_Q^{\alpha Q} H(y)\,dy \le \frac{\alpha^2-1}{2}\,Q H(Q)∫QαQ​H(y)dy≤2α2−1​QH(Q) for all α>0\alpha>0α>0, Q>0Q>0Q>0.

Significance

In the EOQ model the relative cost of a scaled order quantity is exactly Cd(αQd∗)/Cd∗=12(α+1/α)C_d(\alpha Q^*_d)/C^*_d = \tfrac12(\alpha + 1/\alpha)Cd​(αQd∗​)/Cd∗​=21​(α+1/α) (Eq. (25) of the paper). Theorem 4 shows that the stochastic system is at least as forgiving. The bound holds for every leadtime-demand distribution with a unique newsvendor minimizer, and it does not depend on the parameters KKK, hhh, ppp, λ\lambdaλ or LLL. Because the reorder point is re-optimized for each quantity, the bound applies to the practical question of how much a misestimated lot size costs when the safety stock is set correctly.

Together with the other results of the paper (the 1/81/81/8 bound for the EOQ heuristic and the bounds between Q∗Q^*Q∗ and Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​, which are separate missions of this series), it gives a closed-form account of why the EOQ is a good heuristic for stochastic systems.

The result has a complete published proof. It has not been machine-checked. The work that remains is a formal proof for general distributions: the paper differentiates GGG and r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) twice, and a formal proof has to replace those derivatives with arguments that need no density.

Difficulty

C(Q)C(Q)C(Q) is defined through an inner minimization over the reorder point, so its shape in QQQ is controlled by the implicitly defined function H(Q)=G(r(Q))H(Q) = G(r(Q))H(Q)=G(r(Q)) rather than by GGG directly. The obvious approach would bound C(αQ∗)C(\alpha Q^*)C(αQ∗) with the reorder point fixed at r(Q∗)r(Q^*)r(Q∗). That approach is the wrong comparison: it bounds a larger quantity, and the resulting bound depends on the distribution.

The paper's proof uses three properties of HHH: that it is convex, that its slope never exceeds the EOQ slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p), and that it dominates HdH_dHd​. The paper obtains these from the derivatives r′(Q)r'(Q)r′(Q) and H′(Q)H'(Q)H′(Q) under a smooth demand distribution. Without a density, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) is only an argmin and HHH need not be differentiable, so none of these three properties can be read off a derivative formula; the asymptotic slope in particular depends on the finite mean E(D)=λLE(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL and on the behaviour of GGG at ±∞\pm\infty±∞.

Formalization scope

The mission is set in Lean 4 with Mathlib. All objects are real valued.

  • Model. The structure QRModel bundles λ,L,K,h,p>0\lambda, L, K, h, p>0λ,L,K,h,p>0, a probability measure μ\muμ on R\mathbb{R}R with integrable identity, ∫x dμ=λL\int x\,d\mu = \lambda L∫xdμ=λL, D≥0D\ge 0D≥0 almost surely, and the unique-minimizer hypothesis on GGG. K>0K>0K>0 is implicit in the paper and made explicit here. No density is assumed; deterministic and discrete demands are allowed, and the paper's own numerical study uses Poisson demand.
  • Generic machinery. ccc, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q), y0y^0y0, HHH, H0H_0H0​, CCC and AAA are defined for an arbitrary cost rate and instantiated at GGG and at GdG_dGd​. r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and y0y^0y0 are chosen minimizers; they are never defined by the equation G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r) = G(r+Q)G(r)=G(r+Q), which is a lemma of the paper. H(0)=G(y0)H(0) = G(y^0)H(0)=G(y0). Values at Q<0Q<0Q<0 (and of ccc, CCC at Q≤0Q\le 0Q≤0) are junk, and every statement restricts to Q>0Q>0Q>0 or Q≥0Q\ge 0Q≥0.
  • Readings of informal words. "Increasing" in Lemma 4 is strict on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), since the proof shows H′>0H'>0H′>0. "Asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)" is stated as H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q\to hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p) together with the chord bound H(Q2)−H(Q1)≤hph+p(Q2−Q1)H(Q_2)-H(Q_1)\le \frac{hp}{h+p}(Q_2-Q_1)H(Q2​)−H(Q1​)≤h+php​(Q2​−Q1​) for 0≤Q1≤Q20\le Q_1\le Q_20≤Q1​≤Q2​. The chord bound is the derivative-free form of H′≤hp/(h+p)H'\le hp/(h+p)H′≤hp/(h+p) that the proofs of Lemmas 7–9 use. "The optimal order quantity" is IsOptQty Q, meaning Q>0Q>0Q>0 and C(Q)≤C(Q′)C(Q)\le C(Q')C(Q)≤C(Q′) for all Q′>0Q'>0Q′>0. Its existence is asserted in the Eq. (8) milestone, so the goal is not vacuous. "∀α>0\forall\alpha>0∀α>0" is a real α>0\alpha>0α>0 with real division 1/α1/\alpha1/α. In Lemma 9 the integral ∫QαQ\int_Q^{\alpha Q}∫QαQ​ is oriented, as on the page.
  • Ruling out trivializations. C(αQ∗)C(\alpha Q^*)C(αQ∗) re-optimizes the reorder point for αQ∗\alpha Q^*αQ∗; holding it at r(Q∗)r(Q^*)r(Q∗) would be a different theorem. C∗>0C^*>0C∗>0 is a consequence of the model, not a hypothesis.

A complete development needs the following:

  • integrability and continuity of GGG;
  • existence of the optimal reorder point;
  • convexity of HHH;
  • the asymptotics G−Gd→0G - G_d\to 0G−Gd​→0 at ±∞\pm\infty±∞;
  • Jensen's inequality Gd≤GG_d\le GGd​≤G (Eq. (22));
  • existence of Q∗Q^*Q∗.

These facts about newsvendor cost functions are reusable in the other missions of this series. Contributions of any of them as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • Y.-S. Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • P. H. Zipkin, Inventory Service-Level Measures: Convexity and Approximation, Management Science 32(8):975–981, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.8.975
  • G. Hadley and T. M. Whitin, Analysis of Inventory Systems, Prentice-Hall, 1963.
  • H. M. Wagner, M. O'Hagan and B. Lundh, An Empirical Study of Exactly and Approximately Optimal Inventory Policies, Management Science 11(7):690–723, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.7.690
  • A. Federgruen and Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems II: The Optimal Order Quantity of the Stochastic (Q, r) Model Exceeds the EOQ by a Bounded GapResearch Paper

Motivation

The continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) policy is the standard control rule for a single stocked item with random demand: whenever the inventory position falls to the reorder point rrr, an order of fixed size QQQ is placed. It is implemented in a large share of commercial inventory systems. Choosing the two parameters jointly has traditionally required numerical search (Hadley and Whitin, 1963; Federgruen and Zheng, 1992). In practice the order quantity is therefore often taken from the deterministic economic order quantity (EOQ) formula with backorders, and the reorder point is then set for the random demand.

Zheng (1992) turned this practice into a question with an exact answer: how does the optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ of the stochastic model compare with the EOQ quantity Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ computed from the same cost data and the same mean demand? Its Theorem 2 answers it with a two-sided bound. This mission formalizes that theorem. Companion missions of the same series formalize the paper's cost bounds (Theorem 3), the flatness of the cost curve (Theorem 4) and the 1/81/81/8 bound on the cost of using the EOQ quantity (Theorem 5).

Setting

Demand arrives at rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 and replenishment orders arrive after a fixed leadtime L>0L > 0L>0. Shortages are backordered. Holding costs accrue at rate h>0h > 0h>0 per unit held, backorder penalties at rate p>0p > 0p>0 per unit short, and every order costs K>0K > 0K>0. The leadtime demand DDD is a nonnegative random variable with law μ\muμ and mean E(D)=λL\mathbb{E}(D) = \lambda LE(D)=λL. The expected inventory cost rate at inventory position yyy is the newsvendor cost

G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],G(y) = \mathbb{E}\big[h(y - D)^+ + p(D - y)^+\big],G(y)=E[h(y−D)++p(D−y)+],

assumed, as in the paper, to attain its minimum at a unique point y0y^0y0. The long-run average cost of the policy (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) is

c(Q,r)=λK+∫rr+QG(y) dyQ.c(Q, r) = \frac{\lambda K + \int_r^{r+Q} G(y)\,dy}{Q}.c(Q,r)=QλK+∫rr+Q​G(y)dy​.

For each Q>0Q > 0Q>0, let r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) be an optimal reorder point, i.e. a minimizer of c(Q,⋅)c(Q, \cdot)c(Q,⋅). The analysis runs through the curves

H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0),H0(Q)=H(Q)−G(y0),A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0QH(y) dy,H(Q) = G(r(Q))\ (Q > 0),\quad H(0) = G(y^0),\qquad H_0(Q) = H(Q) - G(y^0),\qquad A(Q) = QH(Q) - \int_0^Q H(y)\,dy,H(Q)=G(r(Q)) (Q>0),H(0)=G(y0),H0​(Q)=H(Q)−G(y0),A(Q)=QH(Q)−∫0Q​H(y)dy,

and through the cost C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q))C(Q) = c(Q, r(Q))C(Q)=c(Q,r(Q)) of order quantity QQQ with the reorder point set optimally. The optimal order quantity Q∗Q^*Q∗ is the minimizer of CCC over Q>0Q > 0Q>0.

The EOQ model is the case of a constant leadtime demand λL\lambda LλL. Its cost rate is Gd(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+G_d(y) = h(y - \lambda L)^+ + p(\lambda L - y)^+Gd​(y)=h(y−λL)++p(λL−y)+, and the same construction gives rdr_drd​, HdH_dHd​, AdA_dAd​ and the optimal quantity

Qd∗=2λK(h+p)hp.Q^*_d = \sqrt{\frac{2\lambda K(h+p)}{hp}}.Qd∗​=hp2λK(h+p)​​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 96)

For K>0K > 0K>0, let Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, Qˉ1\bar Q_1Qˉ​1​, Qˉ2\bar Q_2Qˉ​2​ be the positive solutions of

QH0(Q)=2λK,H0(Q)=Hd(Qd∗),∫0QH0(y) dy=λK.Q H_0(Q) = 2\lambda K,\qquad H_0(Q) = H_d(Q^*_d),\qquad \int_0^Q H_0(y)\,dy = \lambda K.QH0​(Q)=2λK,H0​(Q)=Hd​(Qd∗​),∫0Q​H0​(y)dy=λK.

Each has exactly one positive solution, and

Qd∗≤Q∗≤Qˉ,Qˉ≤Qˉ1,Qˉ≤Qˉ2.Q^*_d \le Q^* \le \bar Q,\qquad \bar Q \le \bar Q_1,\qquad \bar Q \le \bar Q_2.Qd∗​≤Q∗≤Qˉ​,Qˉ​≤Qˉ​1​,Qˉ​≤Qˉ​2​.

Moreover, with λ,L,h,p\lambda, L, h, pλ,L,h,p and the demand law fixed, K↦Qˉ1(K)−Qd∗(K)K \mapsto \bar Q_1(K) - Q^*_d(K)K↦Qˉ​1​(K)−Qd∗​(K) is nondecreasing on (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞) and converges to a finite constant as K→∞K \to \inftyK→∞.

Milestones

The milestones are the paper's own numbered results that feed Theorem 2, listed in the order the argument uses them:

  1. Lemma 2 (p. 90): for Q>0Q > 0Q>0, rrr is optimal iff G(r)=G(r+Q)G(r) = G(r + Q)G(r)=G(r+Q).
  2. Eq. (7) (p. 91): C(Q)=(λK+∫0QH(y) dy)/QC(Q) = (\lambda K + \int_0^Q H(y)\,dy)/QC(Q)=(λK+∫0Q​H(y)dy)/Q.
  3. Lemma 4 (p. 91): HHH is increasing and convex with asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p).
  4. Lemma 6 (p. 92): AAA is increasing and convex, and Q=Q∗Q = Q^*Q=Q∗ iff A(Q)=λKA(Q) = \lambda KA(Q)=λK.
  5. Eqs. (18), (20) (p. 94): Hd(Q)=hph+pQH_d(Q) = \frac{hp}{h+p}QHd​(Q)=h+php​Q, and Qd∗Q^*_dQd∗​ is optimal for the EOQ model.
  6. Lemma 7 (p. 95): H0≤Hd≤HH_0 \le H_d \le HH0​≤Hd​≤H and A≤AdA \le A_dA≤Ad​.
  7. Lemma 8 (p. 95): ∫0QH≥12QH(Q)≥A(Q)≥12QH0(Q)≥∫0QH0\int_0^Q H \ge \tfrac12 QH(Q) \ge A(Q) \ge \tfrac12 QH_0(Q) \ge \int_0^Q H_0∫0Q​H≥21​QH(Q)≥A(Q)≥21​QH0​(Q)≥∫0Q​H0​, with equalities for deterministic demand.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 says that the EOQ formula always underestimates the optimal order quantity when leadtime demand is random. The underestimate is bounded by Qˉ1−Qd∗\bar Q_1 - Q^*_dQˉ​1​−Qd∗​, a quantity that stays bounded however large the ordering cost is. So the relative error of the EOQ quantity vanishes as KKK grows. The first inequality, Qd∗≤Q∗Q^*_d \le Q^*Qd∗​≤Q∗, is also an ingredient of the paper's Theorem 3 (cost bounds) and Theorem 5 (the EOQ quantity raises costs by at most 1/81/81/8). The explicit bounds Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, Qˉ1\bar Q_1Qˉ​1​, Qˉ2\bar Q_2Qˉ​2​ bracket Q∗Q^*Q∗ and give a search interval for it.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved on paper since 1992. No machine-checked version of it, or of the continuous-review (Q,r)(Q, r)(Q,r) cost of Eq. (1), exists on this platform. The inventory items already here treat the discrete cost with integer order quantities, a normally distributed demand, or the EOQ without backorders. This mission provides a machine-checked version of the paper's optimality conditions for a general demand distribution. The paper's argument differentiates GGG twice, i.e. it tacitly assumes a density. The formal statements do not, so a formal proof must redo those steps with one-sided (convexity) arguments. The printed argument for the limit in part (b) shows only that a derivative tends to zero. A complete proof of convergence is part of the work.

Difficulty

The obvious route to Qd∗≤Q∗Q^*_d \le Q^*Qd∗​≤Q∗ compares the two cost curves CCC and CdC_dCd​ directly. It fails because C≥CdC \ge C_dC≥Cd​ pointwise, and a pointwise inequality between two convex functions says nothing about the order of their minimizers. The stochastic curve HHH is defined only implicitly, as GGG evaluated at a minimizer of a parametric integral, so its growth relative to the linear HdH_dHd​ has to be established before any comparison of order quantities. For part (b), a vanishing derivative does not imply convergence (log⁡K\log KlogK also has a vanishing derivative), so the printed proof of the limit does not go through as written.

Without a density, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) need not be differentiable. Every derivative in the paper's proofs (of rrr, HHH and AAA) must be replaced by monotonicity or chord arguments.

Formalization scope

The Lean development uses the namespace ZhengQR.OrderQty. Its conventions:

  • Parameters. λ,L,K,h,p\lambda, L, K, h, pλ,L,K,h,p are reals, all assumed strictly positive. K>0K > 0K>0 is implicit in the paper; at K=0K = 0K=0 the optimal quantity degenerates.
  • Demand. The law μ\muμ of DDD is a probability measure on R\mathbb{R}R that is integrable, has mean λL\lambda LλL and is carried by [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞). No density is assumed, so discrete laws such as the Poisson of the paper's §4 are allowed.
  • Standing assumption. GGG has a unique global minimizer (p. 90). It is a hypothesis of every statement about the stochastic model.
  • Generic machinery. ccc, r(Q)r(Q)r(Q), y0y^0y0, HHH, CCC, AAA, H0H_0H0​ and optimality of QQQ are defined for an arbitrary cost rate GGG and applied to both the newsvendor cost and GdG_dGd​. So Eqs. (18) and (20) are theorems, not definitions. r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) and y0y^0y0 are chosen minimizers, never solutions of Lemma 2's equation. r(Q)r(Q)r(Q) minimizes ∫rr+QG\int_r^{r+Q}G∫rr+Q​G, which for Q>0Q > 0Q>0 has the same minimizers as c(Q,⋅)c(Q, \cdot)c(Q,⋅), so HHH, H0H_0H0​ and AAA do not depend on KKK.
  • Domains. HHH, H0H_0H0​ and AAA are used on [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), ccc and CCC for Q>0Q > 0Q>0 only, and Q∗Q^*Q∗ is a Q>0Q > 0Q>0 minimizing CCC over (0,∞)(0, \infty)(0,∞).
  • Readings of informal words.
    • Lemma 4's "increasing" and Lemma 6's "increasing/decreasing" mean strictly.
    • Lemma 4's "asymptotic slope hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)hp/(h+p)" means H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q \to hp/(h+p)H(Q)/Q→hp/(h+p) together with the chord bound H(Q′)−H(Q)≤hph+p(Q′−Q)H(Q') - H(Q) \le \frac{hp}{h+p}(Q' - Q)H(Q′)−H(Q)≤h+php​(Q′−Q) for 0≤Q<Q′0 \le Q < Q'0≤Q<Q′.
    • "Qˉ=def{Q:… }\bar Q \overset{\text{def}}{=} \{Q : \dots\}Qˉ​=def{Q:…}" means the unique positive solution. The goal quantifies over every positive solution and separately asserts that exactly one exists.
    • Theorem 2's "increasing function of KKK" means nondecreasing, which is what the paper's proof establishes (a nonnegative derivative).
    • "Converges to a constant" means a finite real limit.
    • Lemma 8's "the leadtime demand is deterministic" means the EOQ model with cost rate GdG_dGd​.
  • Ruling out trivial readings. The goal's hypotheses are satisfiable (for example by a deterministic leadtime demand). Existence of Q∗Q^*Q∗ (Lemma 6) and of Qˉ\bar QQˉ​, Qˉ1\bar Q_1Qˉ​1​, Qˉ2\bar Q_2Qˉ​2​ (the goal itself) is asserted, so neither the bounds nor the limit hold vacuously.

Infrastructure needed includes the following. Much of it is reusable for any single-item inventory model:

  • differentiation under the expectation, or one-sided substitutes, for GGG;
  • convexity of HHH as the inverse of the width of the sublevel sets of GGG;
  • the envelope identity behind Eq. (7);
  • elementary convex-analysis facts about chords.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones in any order, general lemmas on the newsvendor cost, and a complete convergence argument for part (b).

Selected references

  • Y.-S. Zheng, On Properties of Stochastic Inventory Systems, Management Science 38(1):87–103, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.1.87
  • A. Federgruen, Y.-S. Zheng, An Efficient Algorithm for Computing an Optimal (r, Q) Policy in Continuous Review Stochastic Inventory Systems, Operations Research 40(4):808–813, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.4.808
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Dynamic ProgrammingProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Asymptotic Optimality of Tailored Base-Surge Policies in Dual-Sourcing Inventory Systems: Asymptotic Optimality of the Best TBS Policy for Long Lead TimesResearch Paper

Motivation

Firms that can buy the same item from two suppliers, a cheap slow one and a fast expensive one, face the dual-sourcing inventory problem: how much to order from each source in every period when demand is random and unmet demand is backlogged. Global sourcing (offshore regular supply plus a near-shore express supply) is the standard example (Allon and Van Mieghem 2010). When the two lead times differ by more than one period, the optimal policy depends on the whole pipeline of outstanding orders. No simple optimal policy is known, and dynamic programming is intractable for long lead times.

The tailored base-surge (TBS) policy orders a constant amount from the slow source and uses the fast source to bring the expedited inventory position up to a fixed level. It is simple, and it is used in practice. Janakiraman, Seshadri and Sheopuri (JSS, Management Science 2015) showed that its best parameters solve a convex program that does not depend on the regular lead time, and they conjectured, with numerical support, that TBS is near-optimal when that lead time is long.

Timeline:

  • Karlin and Scarf (1958), Scarf (1960): structure of optimal single-source backlog policies with a lead time.
  • Sheopuri, Janakiraman and Seshadri (2010): reduction of dual-sourcing policies to the truncated regular pipeline and the expedited inventory position (Lemma 1 here).
  • Allon and Van Mieghem (2010): the TBS policy, with conjectures and numerical evidence.
  • JSS (2015): the TBS cost formula and a convex program for its parameters.
  • Xin and Goldberg (2018): proof of the conjecture with an explicit rate (Management Science 64(1), 2018). This mission formalizes that result.

Setting

Let DDD be a nonnegative random variable with finite mean E[D]\mathbb E[D]E[D] that is not almost surely constant. Demands D1,D2,…D_1, D_2, \dotsD1​,D2​,… are i.i.d. copies of DDD. The regular source has lead time LLL, the express source has lead time L0≥0L_0 \ge 0L0​≥0, and L>L0+1L > L_0 + 1L>L0​+1. In period ttt the controller orders qtR≥0q^R_t \ge 0qtR​≥0 and qtE≥0q^E_t \ge 0qtE​≥0; then qt−LR+qt−L0Eq^R_{t-L} + q^E_{t-L_0}qt−LR​+qt−L0​E​ arrives and DtD_tDt​ is realized, so the on-hand inventory evolves as It+1=It+qt−LR+qt−L0E−DtI_{t+1} = I_t + q^R_{t-L} + q^E_{t-L_0} - D_tIt+1​=It​+qt−LR​+qt−L0​E​−Dt​ and may be negative. Initially nothing is on order and I1=−∑i=1G^D−i′I_1 = -\sum_{i=1}^{\hat G} D'_{-i}I1​=−∑i=1G^​D−i′​, where the D−i′D'_{-i}D−i′​ are further i.i.d. copies of DDD and P(G^=k)=2−k\mathbb P(\hat G = k) = 2^{-k}P(G^=k)=2−k, k≥1k \ge 1k≥1.

The per-period cost is c qt−L0E+G(It+1)c\,q^E_{t-L_0} + G(I_{t+1})cqt−L0​E​+G(It+1​) with G(y)=hy++by−G(y) = h y^+ + b y^-G(y)=hy++by−, where b,h>0b, h > 0b,h>0 and c>0c > 0c>0 is the express premium (the regular unit cost is normalized to 000). An admissible policy π∈Π\pi \in \Piπ∈Π chooses the two orders in period ttt as deterministic measurable functions of (qt−LR,…,qt−1R,qt−L0E,…,qt−1E,It)(q^R_{t-L}, \dots, q^R_{t-1}, q^E_{t-L_0}, \dots, q^E_{t-1}, I_t)(qt−LR​,…,qt−1R​,qt−L0​E​,…,qt−1E​,It​). Its long-run average cost is

C(π)=lim sup⁡T→∞1T∑t=L0+1TE[Ctπ],OPT(L)=inf⁡π∈ΠC(π).C(\pi) = \limsup_{T\to\infty}\frac1T\sum_{t=L_0+1}^T \mathbb E[C^\pi_t], \qquad \mathrm{OPT}(L) = \inf_{\pi\in\Pi}C(\pi).C(π)=T→∞limsup​T1​t=L0​+1∑T​E[Ctπ​],OPT(L)=π∈Πinf​C(π).

With the expedited inventory position I^t=It+∑k=t−L0t−1qkE+∑k=t−Lt−L+L0qkR\hat I_t = I_t + \sum_{k=t-L_0}^{t-1}q^E_k + \sum_{k=t-L}^{t-L+L_0}q^R_kI^t​=It​+∑k=t−L0​t−1​qkE​+∑k=t−Lt−L+L0​​qkR​, the TBS policy πr,S\pi_{r,S}πr,S​ orders qtR=rq^R_t = rqtR​=r and qtE=max⁡(0,S−I^t)q^E_t = \max(0, S - \hat I_t)qtE​=max(0,S−I^t​). A best TBS pair (r∗,S∗)(r^*, S^*)(r∗,S∗) minimizes C(πr,S)C(\pi_{r,S})C(πr,S​) over 0≤r≤E[D]0 \le r \le \mathbb E[D]0≤r≤E[D] and S∈RS \in \mathbb RS∈R (first in rrr through F∞(r)=inf⁡SC(πr,S)F^\infty(r) = \inf_S C(\pi_{r,S})F∞(r)=infS​C(πr,S​), then in SSS).

The constants ϵ0\epsilon_0ϵ0​ and Y0Y_0Y0​ are explicit functionals of the law of DDD and of L0,b,h,cL_0, b, h, cL0​,b,h,c. They are built from g=inf⁡xE[G(x−∑i=1L0+1Di′)]g = \inf_x\mathbb E[G(x - \sum_{i=1}^{L_0+1}D'_i)]g=infx​E[G(x−∑i=1L0​+1​Di′​)], U=c E[D]+E[G(−∑i=1L0+1Di′)]U = c\,\mathbb E[D] + \mathbb E[G(-\sum_{i=1}^{L_0+1}D'_i)]U=cE[D]+E[G(−∑i=1L0​+1​Di′​)], p0=P(D<E[D])p_0 = \mathbb P(D < \mathbb E[D])p0​=P(D<E[D]), the mean absolute deviation η0\eta_0η0​, and the large-deviation quantities γϵ,ϑϵ\gamma_\epsilon, \vartheta_\epsilonγϵ​,ϑϵ​ of ϕϵ(θ)=eθ(E[D]−ϵ)E[e−θD]\phi_\epsilon(\theta) = e^{\theta(\mathbb E[D]-\epsilon)}\mathbb E[e^{-\theta D}]ϕϵ​(θ)=eθ(E[D]−ϵ)E[e−θD] (p. 441).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 441)

For all L0≥0L_0 \ge 0L0​≥0, ϵ∈(0,1)\epsilon \in (0,1)ϵ∈(0,1) and L>ϵ0−2+Y0ϵ−2L > \epsilon_0^{-2} + Y_0\epsilon^{-2}L>ϵ0−2​+Y0​ϵ−2,

C(πr∗,S∗)OPT(L)<1+ϵ.\frac{C(\pi_{r^*,S^*})}{\mathrm{OPT}(L)} < 1 + \epsilon.OPT(L)C(πr∗,S∗​)​<1+ϵ.

The threshold does not depend on LLL, so the statement gives an explicit, inverse-polynomial rate. Its limit form C(πr∗,S∗)/OPT(L)→1C(\pi_{r^*,S^*})/\mathrm{OPT}(L) \to 1C(πr∗,S∗​)/OPT(L)→1 is Corollary 1 of the paper.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  • the bound g≤OPT(L)≤Ug \le \mathrm{OPT}(L) \le Ug≤OPT(L)≤U;
  • Lemma 1, the reduction to Π^\hat\PiΠ^ (quoted from Sheopuri et al.);
  • Eq. (3), the TBS cost formula C(πr,S)=c(E[D]−r)+E[G(I∞r+S−∑i=1L0+1Di′)]C(\pi_{r,S}) = c(\mathbb E[D]-r) + \mathbb E[G(I^r_\infty + S - \sum_{i=1}^{L_0+1}D'_i)]C(πr,S​)=c(E[D]−r)+E[G(I∞r​+S−∑i=1L0​+1​Di′​)] (quoted from JSS);
  • Theorem 2, the existence of a stationary-like vector (χ∗,L,q∗,L,I∗,L)(\chi^{*,L}, q^{*,L}, \mathcal I^{*,L})(χ∗,L,q∗,L,I∗,L) with rL=E[χ1∗,L]r_L = \mathbb E[\chi^{*,L}_1]rL​=E[χ1∗,L​];
  • Corollary 2 and Lemma 2, the lower bound OPT(L)≥c(E[D]−rL)+(1−α)VαL−L0(rL,−∞)\mathrm{OPT}(L) \ge c(\mathbb E[D]-r_L) + (1-\alpha)V^{L-L_0}_\alpha(r_L,-\infty)OPT(L)≥c(E[D]−rL​)+(1−α)VαL−L0​​(rL​,−∞) through a discounted single-source problem;
  • Lemma 3, the Bellman equation and structure of that problem (quoted from JSS and Scarf 1960);
  • Lemma 4 (8) and (9), and Corollary 3, the passage to the infinite horizon and to base-stock policies;
  • Lemma 5, the random-walk maxima MkrM^r_kMkr​ (proof omitted in the paper);
  • Lemmas 8–9 and Corollary 4: rL<E[D]−ϵ0r_L < \mathbb E[D] - \epsilon_0rL​<E[D]−ϵ0​ once L>ϵ0−2+L0+1L > \epsilon_0^{-2} + L_0 + 1L>ϵ0−2​+L0​+1.

Significance

The theorem shows that one of the simplest dual-sourcing heuristics is asymptotically optimal as the regular lead time grows. This is the regime where exact dynamic programming is hopeless. The best TBS parameters come from a convex program independent of LLL, so the result yields an algorithm whose running time does not grow with LLL and whose optimality gap is bounded explicitly for every finite LLL. It extends the lower-bounding technique of Xin and Goldberg's lost-sales work (Operations Research 2016) from a static to a dynamic relaxation.

Formalization adds the following. To the best of available knowledge, none of the objects involved (average-cost inventory control with backlog, TBS policies, Lindley-type maxima of random walks with their Spitzer identity) exists in Mathlib or on the platform. The paper's proof defers several ingredients to the literature or omits them: Lemma 1, Eq. (3), Lemma 3, and the details of Lemmas 5 and 7. A complete formal proof must supply them. The result is proved on paper but not formalized anywhere.

Difficulty

An optimal dual-sourcing policy need not be stationary, its induced Markov chain need not have a stationary distribution, and the inventory is unbounded below. The natural argument would compare the optimal policy's steady state with the TBS steady state, and it fails at its first step. Theorem 2 replaces the steady state by a vector with a few distributional properties, built from time averages. That construction, and the independence structure it must carry, is the central technical step. The conditional Jensen step then leads to a single-source problem with possibly negative demand, where textbook interchange-of-limits theorems do not apply directly. Finally, bounding rLr_LrL​ away from E[D]\mathbb E[D]E[D] requires a quantitative lower bound on the growth of random-walk maxima under only a first-moment assumption.

Formalization scope

Conventions of the Lean development (namespace XinGoldbergTBS.Asymptotic):

  • The law of DDD is a probability measure on R\mathbb RR with no mass on (−∞,0)(-\infty,0)(−∞,0), finite mean, and no atom of mass 111. The paper's "strictly positive (possibly infinite) variance" is read as "not almost surely constant".
  • cR=0c_R = 0cR​=0, b>0b > 0b>0, h>0h > 0h>0, c>0c > 0c>0, and L,L0L, L_0L,L0​ are natural numbers. The paper's standing assumption L>L0+1L > L_0 + 1L>L0​+1 is a hypothesis wherever the paper states it; in Theorem 1 it follows from the threshold.
  • Costs, expectations, C(π)C(\pi)C(π), OPT(L)\mathrm{OPT}(L)OPT(L), VαnV^n_\alphaVαn​ and Vα∞V^\infty_\alphaVα∞​ take values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so infinite costs are never truncated. The ratio in Theorem 1 is stated as C(πr∗,S∗)<(1+ϵ)OPT(L)C(\pi_{r^*,S^*}) < (1+\epsilon)\mathrm{OPT}(L)C(πr∗,S∗​)<(1+ϵ)OPT(L), which is equivalent because 0<g≤OPT(L)≤U<∞0 < g \le \mathrm{OPT}(L) \le U < \infty0<g≤OPT(L)≤U<∞.
  • Π\PiΠ is exactly the paper's class: deterministic, time-dependent, measurable, nonnegative orders that depend on the pipeline and inventory. It is neither restricted to stationary policies nor enlarged to randomized ones. TBS policies are members, so C(πr,S)≥OPT(L)C(\pi_{r,S}) \ge \mathrm{OPT}(L)C(πr,S​)≥OPT(L) by construction.
  • ϑϵ∈[0,∞]\vartheta_\epsilon \in [0,\infty]ϑϵ​∈[0,∞] is the supremum of the minimizers of ϕϵ\phi_\epsilonϕϵ​ on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), and it is ∞\infty∞ if the infimum is not attained; 1/∞=01/\infty = 01/∞=0.
  • The existence of a best TBS pair is asserted in the paper via JSS. The goal therefore also asserts that some TBS policy with 0≤r≤E[D]0 \le r \le \mathbb E[D]0≤r≤E[D] meets the bound, so it cannot hold vacuously when no minimizer exists.
  • rLr_LrL​ belongs to a witness of Theorem 2, and the results that use it hold for every witness.
  • The single-source class Πˉ\bar\PiΠˉ ("feasible nonanticipative policies, as typically defined") is read as nonnegative orders that are measurable functions of past demands. In Lemma 3 "increasing" is read as nondecreasing, and convexity in xxx includes finiteness.
  • The paper states Eq. (3) without a range for rrr; it is stated here for 0≤r≤E[D]0 \le r \le \mathbb E[D]0≤r≤E[D], the TBS parameters over which the paper optimizes. At r=E[D]r = \mathbb E[D]r=E[D] both sides are +∞+\infty+∞. In Lemma 8, the range's upper end is +∞+\infty+∞ when ϵ=0\epsilon = 0ϵ=0.
  • Differences such as Vα∞−VαnV^\infty_\alpha - V^n_\alphaVα∞​−Vαn​ and M∞r−MnrM^r_\infty - M^r_nM∞r​−Mnr​ are stated additively, and the negative terms of (9) and Corollary 3 are moved to the other side.

Lemma 1, Eq. (3) and Lemma 3 are results the paper quotes from Sheopuri et al. (2010), JSS and Scarf (1960). Proposition 1 (conditional-expectation form of the bound) is not included.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: OPT(L)\mathrm{OPT}(L)OPT(L) ranges over the full admissible class, the constants are definitions rather than hypotheses, and the goal includes an existence clause.

Reusable beyond this mission: average-cost inventory models with lead times, discounted single-source backlog value functions, and Spitzer-type identities for random-walk maxima. Contributions to any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • L. Xin and D. A. Goldberg, Asymptotic Optimality of Tailored Base-Surge Policies in Dual-Sourcing Inventory Systems, Management Science 64(1):437–452, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2607
  • G. Janakiraman, S. Seshadri and A. Sheopuri, Analysis of Tailored Base-Surge Policies in Dual Sourcing Inventory Systems, Management Science 61(7):1547–1561, 2015.
  • G. Allon and J. A. Van Mieghem, Global Dual Sourcing: Tailored Base-Surge Allocation to Near- and Offshore Production, Management Science 56(1):110–124, 2010.
  • A. Sheopuri, G. Janakiraman and S. Seshadri, New Policies for the Stochastic Inventory Control Problem with Two Supply Sources, Operations Research 58(3):734–745, 2010.
  • H. Scarf, The Optimality of (s, S) Policies in the Dynamic Inventory Problem, in Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960, pp. 196–202.
  • L. Xin and D. A. Goldberg, Optimality Gap of Constant-Order Policies Decays Exponentially in the Lead Time for Lost Sales Models, Operations Research 64(6):1556–1565, 2016.
20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Markovian Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Probabilities II: Max-Max and Max-Min Optimal Returns Bound the Bayesian Optimal ReturnResearch Paper

Motivation

A Markovian decision process (Howard, 1960) models a controller who, in each of finitely many states, picks a decision, earns a reward and moves to a random next state according to known transition probabilities. In applications (inventory control, equipment replacement, quality control) those probabilities are estimated, not known. Satia and Lave (Operations Research 21(3), 1973) treat the uncertainty in two ways: a game-theoretic formulation, in which each unknown row only lies in a given set, and a Bayesian formulation, going back to Silver (1963) and Martin (1967), in which the controller holds a prior on the unknown matrix and learns from observed transitions.

The Bayesian problem is the natural one but its state includes the whole prior, so it cannot be solved exactly beyond small cases. The paper's contribution in the Bayesian part is a pair of computable bounds on the Bayesian optimal return in terms of the two game-theoretic values (max-max and max-min). This mission formalizes those bounds and the chain of facts they rest on.

Setting

There are NNN states iii and, in state iii, a finite nonempty set KiK_iKi​ of decisions. A transition i→ji \to ji→j under decision kkk earns rijkr^k_{ij}rijk​ and rewards are discounted by β\betaβ, 0≤β<10 \le \beta < 10≤β<1. The row pik=(pijk)jp_i^k = (p^k_{ij})_jpik​=(pijk​)j​ of transition probabilities is unknown; it is known to lie in a closed convex nonempty set SikS_i^kSik​ of probability vectors, and S={P:pik∈Sik for all i,k}S = \{P : p_i^k \in S_i^k \text{ for all } i, k\}S={P:pik​∈Sik​ for all i,k}.

A prior ggg is a probability distribution on matrices P=(pik)P = (p_i^k)P=(pik​) whose rows are all probability vectors. Its means are pˉijk=E(pijk)\bar p^k_{ij} = E(p^k_{ij})pˉ​ijk​=E(pijk​). After a transition l→jl \to jl→j under decision mmm the prior is replaced by the Bayes transformation Tljmg(P)=C pljm g(P)T^m_{lj} g(P) = C\,p^m_{lj}\,g(P)Tljm​g(P)=Cpljm​g(P) (Eq. (8)), with CCC the normalizing constant. The Bayesian optimal return f(i,g)f(i,g)f(i,g) solves the recursion

f(i,g)=max⁡k∈Ki{∑jpˉijkrijk+β∑jpˉijkf(j,Tijkg)}.(10)f(i, g) = \max_{k \in K_i} \Big\{ \sum_j \bar p^k_{ij} r^k_{ij} + \beta \sum_j \bar p^k_{ij} f(j, T^k_{ij} g) \Big\}. \qquad (10)f(i,g)=k∈Ki​max​{j∑​pˉ​ijk​rijk​+βj∑​pˉ​ijk​f(j,Tijk​g)}.(10)

The max-max and max-min values V+V^+V+, V−V^-V− solve

Vi±=max⁡k∈Kimax/min⁡pik∈Sik{∑jpijkrijk+β∑jpijkVj±},V_i^\pm = \max_{k \in K_i} \operatorname*{max/min}_{p_i^k \in S_i^k} \Big\{ \sum_j p^k_{ij} r^k_{ij} + \beta \sum_j p^k_{ij} V_j^\pm \Big\},Vi±​=k∈Ki​max​pik​∈Sik​max/min​{j∑​pijk​rijk​+βj∑​pijk​Vj±​},

with max for V+V^+V+ and min for V−V^-V−. Finally α=prob⁡(P∈S∣g)\alpha = \operatorname{prob}(P \in S \mid g)α=prob(P∈S∣g), the prior probability that the true matrix lies in SSS.

The Lean development lives in the namespace SatiaLave.Bayes: UncertainMDP, IsPrior, pbar, bayes, SolvesEq10, SolvesVplus, SolvesVminus, alpha, rmax, rmin, policyValue.

Formalization targets

Goal: Propositions 9 and 10

For every bounded solution fff of (10), all solutions V+V^+V+, V−V^-V−, every prior ggg and every state iii,

αVi−+(1−α)min⁡i,j,krijk1−β  ≤  f(i,g)  ≤  αVi++(1−α)max⁡i,j,krijk1−β,\alpha V_i^- + (1-\alpha)\min_{i,j,k}\frac{r^k_{ij}}{1-\beta} \;\le\; f(i,g) \;\le\; \alpha V_i^+ + (1-\alpha)\max_{i,j,k}\frac{r^k_{ij}}{1-\beta},αVi−​+(1−α)i,j,kmin​1−βrijk​​≤f(i,g)≤αVi+​+(1−α)i,j,kmax​1−βrijk​​,

together with the existence of fff, V+V^+V+ and V−V^-V−. Both halves are the paper's printed statements.

Milestones

  1. Proposition 6 (Martin): (9)/(10) has a unique bounded solution (unique at priors).
  2. No learning (p. 733): at a point-mass prior δP\delta_PδP​, f(⋅,δP)f(\cdot,\delta_P)f(⋅,δP​) solves the optimality equations of the process with known PPP.
  3. Proposition 8: f(i,g)f(i,g)f(i,g) is convex in ggg.
  4. Jensen step (proof of Proposition 9): f(i,g)≤∫f(i,δP) dg(P)f(i,g) \le \int f(i,\delta_P)\,dg(P)f(i,g)≤∫f(i,δP​)dg(P).
  5. Policy step (proof of Proposition 10): f(i,g)≥∫[q+βPAq+β2[PA]2q+⋯ ]i dg(P)f(i,g) \ge \int [q + \beta P^A q + \beta^2 [P^A]^2 q + \cdots]_i\,dg(P)f(i,g)≥∫[q+βPAq+β2[PA]2q+⋯]i​dg(P) for every pure stationary policy AAA.

Significance

The result. The bounds sandwich an intractable quantity between two quantities computable by finite algorithms (the max-max and max-min policy-iteration procedures of the same paper), weighted by a single prior probability α\alphaα. When the prior concentrates on SSS (α→1\alpha \to 1α→1) the bounds become Vi−≤f(i,g)≤Vi+V_i^- \le f(i,g) \le V_i^+Vi−​≤f(i,g)≤Vi+​: the Bayesian return lies between the pessimistic and optimistic robust values. They are the upper and lower bounds on the return that the paper's implicit-enumeration method (the decision tree of its Fig. 2 and Proposition 12) uses to compare decisions. The Jensen step is a value-of-information inequality (Bayesian optimal return is at most the expected full-information optimal return), which recurs throughout Bayesian control and bandit theory.

Formalizing it. The results are proved on paper (Propositions 6 and 8 by reference to Martin's book and Satia's thesis, Propositions 9 and 10 in the text); none is machine-checked. The mission produces a Lean model of Bayes-adaptive Markov decision processes with priors as measures, the Bayes transformation and its fixed-point recursion, and the link between the Bayesian and the robust (rectangular) formulations. Martin's existence-uniqueness theorem and the convexity of the Bayesian value are reusable for any Bayes-adaptive model.

Difficulty

The prior space is infinite-dimensional and not a vector space, so the recursion (10) lives on a space of measures, and the usual finite-state arguments do not apply verbatim. Proposition 8 gives convexity only along finite mixtures, while the proof of Proposition 9 applies Jensen's inequality to the integral mixture g=∫δP dg(P)g = \int \delta_P\,dg(P)g=∫δP​dg(P) of point masses; bridging the two, or proving the value-of-information inequality directly, is the central step. The paper also restricts the point masses to xik∈Sikx_i^k \in S_i^kxik​∈Sik​, which cannot represent a prior with mass outside SSS; the formal statement integrates over every transition matrix, as the next line of the paper's display requires. Measurability of P↦f(i,δP)P \mapsto f(i,\delta_P)P↦f(i,δP​) is not automatic, since fff is only characterized by a functional equation.

Formalization scope

  • States are a nonempty Fintype S; decisions a dependent family D i of nonempty finite types. A matrix is P : (i : S) → D i → S → ℝ with the product Borel σ\sigmaσ-algebra.
  • Priors are measures: a probability measure giving full mass to matrices whose rows are probability vectors. This generalizes the paper's densities g(P)g(P)g(P) and includes the point masses axa_xax​ its proof uses.
  • Bayes transformation at pˉ=0\bar p = 0pˉ​=0: the normalizing constant does not exist; bayes then returns ggg. That posterior is always multiplied by pˉ=0\bar p = 0pˉ​=0 in (10), so the choice is immaterial.
  • Readings of informal words. "The problem reduces to a Markovian decision process" = at a point-mass prior, fixed by every Bayes transformation, fff solves the known-PPP optimality equations. "Convex in ggg" = convex along mixtures of priors. "Unique set of bounded functions" = two bounded solutions agree at every prior (values at non-priors are unconstrained). "Satisfy (9)" is formalized as (10), which the paper derives from (9) by linearity of EEE. max⁡P∈S\max_{P\in S}maxP∈S​/min⁡P∈S\min_{P\in S}minP∈S​ in V±V^\pmV± is taken over the row pik∈Sikp_i^k \in S_i^kpik​∈Sik​ (the only row that enters; SSS is a product), as ⨆/⨅ over a nonempty bounded set. "Obviously f(i,g)≥ViAf(i,g)\ge V_i^Af(i,g)≥ViA​" is stated for every pure stationary policy AAA, not only a max-min optimal one. The policy return is the componentwise series ∑nβn(PA)nq\sum_n \beta^n (P^A)^n q∑n​βn(PA)nq.
  • Added hypotheses, not printed: 0≤β<10 \le \beta < 10≤β<1; Sik≠∅S_i^k \ne \emptysetSik​=∅; N≥1N \ge 1N≥1. Printed and kept: SikS_i^kSik​ closed and convex.
  • fff, V+V^+V+, V−V^-V− are quantified as solutions of their equations; α\alphaα is computed from ggg, never a free parameter; max⁡i,j,k[rijk/(1−β)]\max_{i,j,k}[r^k_{ij}/(1-\beta)]maxi,j,k​[rijk​/(1−β)] ranges over all states i,ji,ji,j and k∈Kik \in K_ik∈Ki​. Integrability of the integrands in milestones 4 and 5 is part of their conclusions.
  • Trivializations ruled out. A free α∈[0,1]\alpha \in [0,1]α∈[0,1], or fff defined off priors, would make the goal false or vacuous; the goal also asserts that bounded fff and V±V^\pmV± exist, so its universal part is not vacuous.
  • Not in scope: Proposition 7 (matrix-beta conjugacy, which needs a Dirichlet distribution), Propositions 11–13 and the numerical example.

Welcome contributions: the Banach fixed-point argument for (10) on bounded functions of priors; lemmas that bayes maps priors to priors and that point masses are fixed; continuity of the known-PPP optimal value in PPP; a general Jensen inequality for functions convex along mixtures of probability measures.

Selected references

  • J. K. Satia and R. E. Lave, Jr., Markovian Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Probabilities, Operations Research 21(3), 728–740, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.3.728
  • J. J. Martin, Bayesian Decision Problems and Markov Chains, Wiley, New York, 1967.
  • E. A. Silver, Markovian Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Probabilities or Rewards, Interim Technical Report No. 1, Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1963.
  • R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960.
  • J. K. Satia, Markovian Decision Process with Uncertain Transition Matrices or/and Probabilistic Observation of States, Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1968.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryDynamic ProgrammingMarkov Chain·Captain: mikedeng1

Markovian Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Probabilities I: The Max-Min Policy-Iteration Algorithm Terminates at a Max-Min Optimal Pure Stationary PolicyResearch Paper

Motivation

Howard's finite Markovian decision process (MDP) models a controller who, at each instant, observes the state of a system, chooses a decision, collects a reward and moves to a random next state with known transition probabilities. Howard's policy-iteration algorithm computes an optimal policy, and the model has been applied to inventory control, equipment replacement, quality control and marketing. Its weak point is the requirement that every transition probability be known exactly: in applications these numbers are estimated and are hard to measure.

Satia and Lave (Operations Research 21(3), 1973) relax this requirement. In their game-theoretic formulation, the controller knows only a set of admissible probability rows for every state–decision pair, and nature chooses the rows adversarially. This is the model now called a robust MDP with (s,a)-rectangular uncertainty, studied later by Iyengar (Math. Oper. Res. 2005) and Nilim and El Ghaoui (Oper. Res. 2005), who reprove and extend the dynamic-programming results for it. The paper gives a policy-iteration algorithm for the max-min criterion and proves that it terminates at an optimal policy. This mission formalizes that part of the paper (pp. 728–732).

Timeline:

  • 1953: Shapley introduces stochastic games (PNAS 39).
  • 1960: Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, policy iteration for known transitions.
  • 1973: Satia and Lave, max-min and max-max policy iteration for uncertain transitions (dynamic-programming equations and optimality of pure stationary policies cited from Satia's 1968 Stanford thesis).
  • 2005: Iyengar; Nilim and El Ghaoui, robust dynamic programming under rectangular uncertainty.

Setting

There are finitely many states iii and, in state iii, a finite nonempty set DiD_iDi​ of decisions kkk. A transition i→ji\to ji→j under decision kkk earns reward rijkr^k_{ij}rijk​; rewards are discounted by β\betaβ with 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1. For every pair (i,k)(i,k)(i,k) there is a nonempty, closed, convex set SikS_i^kSik​ of probability rows p=(p1,…,pN)p=(p_1,\dots,p_N)p=(p1​,…,pN​), pj≥0p_j\ge0pj​≥0, ∑jpj=1\sum_j p_j=1∑j​pj​=1. Nature's choice is a matrix P∈SP\in SP∈S: one row pik∈Sikp_i^k\in S_i^kpik​∈Sik​ for every pair.

A pure stationary policy A=(A1,…,AN)A=(A_1,\dots,A_N)A=(A1​,…,AN​) selects Ai∈DiA_i\in D_iAi​∈Di​. Under PPP its present value vA(P)v^A(P)vA(P) is the unique solution of equations (5),

viA=∑jpijAi(rijAi+βvjA).v_i^A=\sum_j p^{A_i}_{ij}\big(r^{A_i}_{ij}+\beta v_j^A\big).viA​=j∑​pijAi​​(rijAi​​+βvjA​).

Nature's minimum is v‾i(A)=inf⁡P∈SviA(P)\underline v_i(A)=\inf_{P\in S}v_i^A(P)v​i​(A)=infP∈S​viA​(P), and the max-min return of criterion (2) is vˉi=max⁡Av‾i(A)\bar v_i=\max_A\underline v_i(A)vˉi​=maxA​v​i​(A). A policy is max-min optimal if v‾(A)=vˉ\underline v(A)=\bar vv​(A)=vˉ in every state.

The algorithm alternates two routines. Phase 1 (nature's policy evaluation) fixes AAA, computes vAv^AvA from the current rows, replaces each row at AiA_iAi​ by a minimizer of ∑jpj(rijAi+βvjA)\sum_j p_j(r^{A_i}_{ij}+\beta v^A_j)∑j​pj​(rijAi​​+βvjA​) over SiAiS_i^{A_i}SiAi​​ (6), and stops when the minima reproduce vAv^AvA. Phase 2 (policy improvement) chooses in each state a decision BiB_iBi​ maximizing the test quantity (7),

tik(v)=min⁡p∈Sik∑jpj(rijk+βvj),t_i^k(v)=\min_{p\in S_i^k}\sum_j p_j\big(r^k_{ij}+\beta v_j\big),tik​(v)=p∈Sik​min​j∑​pj​(rijk​+βvj​),

at v=v‾(A)v=\underline v(A)v=v​(A), keeping AiA_iAi​ on ties; if B=AB=AB=A the algorithm terminates.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 5 with Proposition 3

Along every run A0,A1,…A^0,A^1,\dotsA0,A1,… of Phase 2 steps,

v‾(An)≤v‾(An+1)  ∀n,∃ n<#{policies}: An+1=An,  v‾(An)=vˉ,\underline v(A^n)\le\underline v(A^{n+1})\ \ \forall n,\qquad \exists\,n<\#\{\text{policies}\}:\ A^{n+1}=A^n,\ \ \underline v(A^n)=\bar v,v​(An)≤v​(An+1)  ∀n,∃n<#{policies}: An+1=An,  v​(An)=vˉ,

and the terminal policy attains the solution of the equations (4) and is ε\varepsilonε-optimal for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0.

Milestones

  • Eq. (5): the present-value equations have a unique solution.
  • [I−βP]−1[I-\beta P]^{-1}[I−βP]−1 is nonnegative with diagonal at least 1 for stochastic PPP (proof of Proposition 5).
  • Proposition 1: equations (4), with randomized decisions and mixed choices of nature, have a unique solution, and it is the max-min return.
  • Proposition 2: a pure stationary policy attains it.
  • A non-final Phase 1 iteration lowers nature's value weakly everywhere and strictly somewhere (proof of Proposition 4).
  • Proposition 4: Phase 1 comes within ε\varepsilonε of nature's optimum after finitely many iterations.
  • Proposition 3: at termination no pure stationary policy is better.
  • Each policy change strictly improves the max-min return (proof of Proposition 5).

Significance

The goal certifies a complete algorithm for the max-min problem: it computes a policy that is optimal against the worst admissible transition probabilities, in all states at once, in finitely many improvement steps. Propositions 1 and 2 show that the dynamic-programming equations (4) characterize the max-min value and that neither side gains from randomization. The known-transition case (every SikS_i^kSik​ a single row) recovers Howard's policy iteration.

On the platform, Howard-type policy iteration for known transitions has been formalized (the Bertsekas Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control missions); nothing with uncertain transitions exists. The results of this paper are proved in the literature (Satia's thesis, and in greater generality by Iyengar and by Nilim and El Ghaoui); none has a machine-checked proof. This mission produces the first formal robust-MDP model and robust policy-iteration theorem on the platform.

Difficulty

The obvious argument copies Howard's improvement lemma. It fails at two points. First, the value of a policy is itself the result of an inner optimization by nature, so comparing two policies requires comparing two different worst-case transition matrices; the matrix P∗BP^{*B}P∗B minimizing against BBB is not the one minimizing against AAA. Second, the proof of Proposition 4 as printed shows only that nature's values decrease and converge; that the limit is nature's optimum, over a continuum of admissible rows, needs a separate argument. Finally, Proposition 1 involves randomized strategies and probability measures on the uncertainty sets, and reducing them to pure strategies is the content of Propositions 1 and 2, not a definitional convenience.

Formalization scope

States are a finite type S (nonemptiness is not needed: every statement is unchanged in meaning at N=1N=1N=1 and trivially true at N=0N=0N=0), decisions a family D : S → Type* of finite nonempty types. The model fixes these conventions and readings:

  • 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1 (not printed; every return is an infinite discounted sum) and nonempty SikS_i^kSik​ (not printed; Phase 1 presupposes a feasible row) are added standing hypotheses; closedness and convexity are the paper's.
  • The present value is [I−βPA]−1[I-\beta P^A]^{-1}[I−βPA]−1 applied to the one-step rewards; the Eq. (5) milestone proves it is the unique solution of (5).
  • "min over pik∈Sikp_i^k\in S_i^kpik​∈Sik​" in (2) is an infimum over the nonempty type of admissible choices P∈SP\in SP∈S, bounded below; "max over all policies" is a maximum over pure stationary policies, with randomization handled in (4).
  • In (4), τ\tauτ ranges over probability vectors on DjD_jDj​ and α\alphaα over probability measures on row vectors with α(Sjk)=1\alpha(S_j^k)=1α(Sjk​)=1; the missing integral sign and unmatched brace of the printed display are corrected.
  • "Optimal" = equal to the max-min return in every state; "ε\varepsilonε-optimal" = within ±ε\pm\varepsilon±ε in every state (p. 731); "ε\varepsilonε-optimal for nature" = within ε\varepsilonε of nature's minimum.
  • "Terminates" = Phase 2 returns the same policy; "a finite number of iterations" is stated with the explicit bound "fewer than the number of policies".
  • Phase 1 is taken exact in Phase 2 (the proofs of Propositions 3 and 5 use exact minimizers); the Phase 1 stopping test is printed without Σ\SigmaΣ and the sum is formalized.
  • Retention rule: Phase 2 keeps AiA_iAi​ when it is already a maximizer. It is not printed, but it is Howard's rule and Proposition 5 is false without it.
  • Proposition 5's "ε\varepsilonε-optimal … in a finite number of iterations" is formalized as exact termination at an optimal policy, which implies the printed claim for every ε\varepsilonε.

Equation (4) must not be collapsed to max⁡kmin⁡p∈Sjk\max_k\min_{p\in S_j^k}maxk​minp∈Sjk​​ in its definition: that would make Proposition 2 true by definition. Similarly, the Phase 2 relation always has a successor and algorithm runs exist from every policy, so the goal is not vacuous.

Needed infrastructure: Neumann series for I−βPI-\beta PI−βP with stochastic PPP, monotonicity of policy evaluation, existence of minimizers of linear functions on compact subsets of the simplex, and the contraction argument for the robust Bellman operator. These are reusable for any robust or known-transition MDP development. Proofs of any milestone, alternative arguments for Propositions 1 and 2, and extensions to the max-max criterion are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. K. Satia and R. E. Lave, Jr., Markovian Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Probabilities, Operations Research 21(3), 728–740, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.3.728
  • R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960.
  • L. S. Shapley, Stochastic Games, PNAS 39(10), 1095–1100, 1953. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.10.1095
  • G. N. Iyengar, Robust Dynamic Programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 30(2), 257–280, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1040.0129
  • A. Nilim and L. El Ghaoui, Robust Control of Markov Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Matrices, Operations Research 53(5), 780–798, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1050.0216
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

An Exact Duality Theory for Semidefinite Programming and Its Complexity Implications: The Extended Lagrange–Slater Dual Has Zero Duality Gap and Attains Its OptimumResearch Paper

Motivation

Semidefinite programming (SDP) optimizes a linear function over the intersection of the cone of positive semidefinite matrices with an affine subspace. It contains linear programming as the diagonal case and is the computational core of relaxations in combinatorial optimization, control theory and polynomial optimization. Its standard duality theory, however, is weaker than that of linear programming. The Lagrangian dual of an SDP can have a strictly positive duality gap, can fail to attain its optimal value, and an infeasible semidefinite system need not have a certificate of infeasibility of the naive Farkas form. All the classical strong duality theorems for SDP therefore assume a constraint qualification such as Slater's condition (a strictly feasible point).

M. V. Ramana (1997, Math. Program. 77, 129–162) constructed a dual, the Extended Lagrange–Slater Dual (ELSD), whose size is polynomial in the data and which enjoys every property of linear programming duality for every SDP, with no constraint qualification. The same construction yields an exact theorem of the alternative for semidefinite feasibility and the complexity consequence that semidefinite feasibility lies in NP if and only if it lies in co-NP in the Turing model.

Timeline:

  • 1980s–1990s: Lagrangian (Slater-type) duality for SDP, with strong duality under strict feasibility (see e.g. the surveys of Vandenberghe and Boyd, SIAM Rev. 38 (1996)).
  • 1981: Borwein and Wolkowicz, facial reduction for general convex programs, which regularizes a problem by passing to the minimal face containing the feasible set; not of polynomial size in the SDP data (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 83 (1981)).
  • 1997: Ramana, the ELSD, an explicit polynomial-size dual with zero gap and dual attainment for every SDP.
  • 1997: Ramana, Tunçel and Wolkowicz relate the ELSD to facial reduction (SIAM J. Optim. 7 (1997)).

Setting

Let n,mn, mn,m be natural numbers, Mn\mathcal M_nMn​ the space of real n×nn\times nn×n matrices, and Sn⊆Mn\mathcal S_n\subseteq\mathcal M_nSn​⊆Mn​ the symmetric ones. On Mn\mathcal M_nMn​ the inner product is A∙B=∑i,jAijBijA\bullet B = \sum_{i,j}A_{ij}B_{ij}A∙B=∑i,j​Aij​Bij​. For symmetric AAA, A⪰0A\succeq 0A⪰0 means AAA is positive semidefinite. The data are symmetric Q0,Q1,…,Qm∈SnQ_0, Q_1,\dots,Q_m\in\mathcal S_nQ0​,Q1​,…,Qm​∈Sn​ and c∈Rmc\in\mathbb R^mc∈Rm. The primal SDP is

(P)sup⁡ cTxs.t.Q(x):=Q0−∑i=1mxiQi⪰0,(\mathrm P)\qquad \sup\ c^{\mathsf T}x\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Q(x) := Q_0-\sum_{i=1}^m x_iQ_i\succeq 0 ,(P)sup cTxs.t.Q(x):=Q0​−i=1∑m​xi​Qi​⪰0,

with feasible region G={x∣Q(x)⪰0}G = \{x\mid Q(x)\succeq 0\}G={x∣Q(x)⪰0}, a spectrahedron. Define Q∗:Mn→RmQ^*:\mathcal M_n\to\mathbb R^mQ∗:Mn​→Rm by Q∗(U)=(U∙Qi)i=1mQ^*(U) = (U\bullet Q_i)_{i=1}^mQ∗(U)=(U∙Qi​)i=1m​ and write Q#(U)=0Q^\#(U) = 0Q#(U)=0 for "Q0∙U=0Q_0\bullet U = 0Q0​∙U=0 and Q∗(U)=0Q^*(U) = 0Q∗(U)=0".

For k≥1k\ge 1k≥1 let Ck\mathcal C_kCk​ be the set of tuples (Ui,Wi)i=1k(U_i, W_i)_{i=1}^k(Ui​,Wi​)i=1k​ of real n×nn\times nn×n matrices with W0=0W_0 = 0W0​=0 and, for i=1,…,ki = 1,\dots,ki=1,…,k,

Q#(Ui+Wi−1)=0,Ui⪰WiWiT.Q^\#(U_i+W_{i-1}) = 0,\qquad U_i\succeq W_iW_i^{\mathsf T}.Q#(Ui​+Wi−1​)=0,Ui​⪰Wi​WiT​.

The WiW_iWi​ need not be symmetric. Uk\mathcal U_kUk​ and Wk\mathcal W_kWk​ are the sets of last components UkU_kUk​ and WkW_kWk​; W0={0}\mathcal W_0 = \{0\}W0​={0}. The ELSD is

inf⁡ (U+W)∙Q0s.t.Q∗(U+W)=c,W∈Wm,U⪰0,\inf\ (U+W)\bullet Q_0\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Q^*(U+W) = c,\quad W\in\mathcal W_m,\quad U\succeq 0,inf (U+W)∙Q0​s.t.Q∗(U+W)=c,W∈Wm​,U⪰0,

and Weak-ELSD is the same program with Wm−1\mathcal W_{m-1}Wm−1​. For the milestones: the polar G∘={y∣xTy≤1 ∀x∈G}G^\circ = \{y\mid x^{\mathsf T}y\le 1\ \forall x\in G\}G∘={y∣xTy≤1 ∀x∈G}, the algebraic polar G∗={Q∗(U)∣U∙Q0≤1, U⪰0}G^* = \{Q^*(U)\mid U\bullet Q_0\le 1,\ U\succeq 0\}G∗={Q∗(U)∣U∙Q0​≤1, U⪰0}, and Sk=Q∗(Wk)S_k = Q^*(\mathcal W_k)Sk​=Q∗(Wk​).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6 (Duality Theorem)

For all data (Q0,…,Qm,c)(Q_0,\dots,Q_m,c)(Q0​,…,Qm​,c):

  1. weak duality: cTx≤(U+W)∙Q0c^{\mathsf T}x\le (U+W)\bullet Q_0cTx≤(U+W)∙Q0​ for x∈Gx\in Gx∈G and (U,W)(U,W)(U,W) feasible for ELSD or Weak-ELSD;
  2. if G≠∅G\neq\emptysetG=∅, then sup⁡x∈GcTx<∞\sup_{x\in G}c^{\mathsf T}x<\inftysupx∈G​cTx<∞ iff ELSD is feasible, iff Weak-ELSD is feasible;
  3. if G≠∅G\ne\emptysetG=∅ and ELSD (or Weak-ELSD) is feasible, there is v∈Rv\in\mathbb Rv∈R with
v=sup⁡x∈GcTx=inf⁡ELSD(U+W)∙Q0=inf⁡Weak-ELSD(U+W)∙Q0;v = \sup_{x\in G}c^{\mathsf T}x = \inf_{\mathrm{ELSD}}(U+W)\bullet Q_0 = \inf_{\mathrm{Weak\text{-}ELSD}}(U+W)\bullet Q_0;v=x∈Gsup​cTx=ELSDinf​(U+W)∙Q0​=Weak-ELSDinf​(U+W)∙Q0​;
  1. if G≠∅G\ne\emptysetG=∅ and the primal is bounded, ELSD attains vvv.

Milestones

Propositions 7(vi) and 7(vii) (facts on PSD matrices), Lemma 9 (annihilation Q(x)U=Q(x)W=0Q(x)U = Q(x)W = 0Q(x)U=Q(x)W=0), weak duality over every Wk\mathcal W_kWk​, Lemma 10 (nested subspaces), Lemma 13 (G∘=Cl(G∗)G^\circ = \mathrm{Cl}(G^*)G∘=Cl(G∗)), Corollary 14, Claims 17 and 16, the central Theorem 12,

G∘={Q∗(U+W)∣W∈Wk, U⪰0, U∙Q0≤1}(0∈G, k≥m−1),G^\circ = \{Q^*(U+W)\mid W\in\mathcal W_k,\ U\succeq 0,\ U\bullet Q_0\le 1\}\qquad(0\in G,\ k\ge m-1),G∘={Q∗(U+W)∣W∈Wk​, U⪰0, U∙Q0​≤1}(0∈G, k≥m−1),

the translation invariance of Ck,Uk,Wk\mathcal C_k,\mathcal U_k,\mathcal W_kCk​,Uk​,Wk​ (§2.5), and system (14) (dual attainment at value 0). Theorems 19–21 (Farkas lemma for SDP, optimality condition, primal attainment) are further items stated on the same definitions.

Significance

The Duality Theorem gives SDP a dual with the full strength of linear programming duality for every instance, at polynomial size. Consequences in the paper: an exact theorem of the alternative for semidefinite feasibility (Theorem 19); semidefinite characterizations of optimality of a given point and of primal attainment (Theorems 20, 21); and the complexity results that semidefinite feasibility is in NP iff it is in co-NP in the Turing model and in NP ∩ co-NP in the Blum–Shub–Smale model (Theorem 25, not part of this mission). Theorem 12 separately gives an exact semidefinite description of the polar of any spectrahedron containing the origin.

The results are proved on paper and are classical. No machine-checked version is known to exist; the platform's existing SDP duality theorem assumes Slater's condition. A formalization would provide the first constraint-qualification-free SDP duality in Lean, together with reusable infrastructure on PSD matrices (range inclusion, A∙B=0⇒AB=0A\bullet B = 0\Rightarrow AB = 0A∙B=0⇒AB=0) and on polars of convex sets.

Difficulty

The obvious route to SDP strong duality separates the primal's value from the image of the PSD cone under a linear map and invokes a closed-cone Farkas lemma. That step fails: the linear image of the PSD cone need not be closed, which is exactly why Lagrangian duality has gaps. In this mission the obstruction reappears as the non-closedness of the algebraic polar G∗G^*G∗ (Lemma 13 only gives G∘=Cl(G∗)G^\circ = \mathrm{Cl}(G^*)G∘=Cl(G∗)). The difficulty is to show that finitely many, and at most m−1m-1m−1, corrections by the sets SkS_kSk​ close G∗+SkG^*+S_kG∗+Sk​ (Claims 16, 17), and to control dimensions in doing so. A proof by assuming closedness, strict feasibility or a Slater point is a different theorem.

Formalization scope

Everything lives in the namespace ExactSDPDuality.ELSD, in one definition file. Matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ, vectors Fin m → ℝ; "⪰0\succeq 0⪰0" is Mathlib's PosSemidef (which over ℝ includes symmetry); A∙BA\bullet BA∙B is the entrywise sum on all of Mn\mathcal M_nMn​; cTxc^{\mathsf T}xcTx is the dot product. The data Q0,…,QmQ_0,\dots,Q_mQ0​,…,Qm​ carry symmetry hypotheses in every statement, as the paper assumes throughout. Ck\mathcal C_kCk​ is encoded by sequences U,W:N→MnU, W:\mathbb N\to\mathcal M_nU,W:N→Mn​ with U0=W0=0U_0 = W_0 = 0U0​=W0​=0, so U0=W0={0}\mathcal U_0 = \mathcal W_0 = \{0\}U0​=W0​={0}; for m=0m = 0m=0 the index m−1m-1m−1 is 000. Optimal values are least upper and greatest lower bounds of the value sets, never real sSup/sInf. The polar is the one-sided polar. In §2.4 statements the standing assumption 0∈G0\in G0∈G is a hypothesis. In Claim 16 the index satisfies k+1≤mk+1\le mk+1≤m, the range where Sk+1S_{k+1}Sk+1​ is introduced, and dim⁡Sk\dim S_kdimSk​ is the rank of the span of SkS_kSk​.

Theorems 20 and 21 are printed with Q∗(U+W)=0Q^*(U+W) = 0Q∗(U+W)=0; both are false as printed (counterexamples in the items) and are stated with the corrected Q∗(U+W)=cQ^*(U+W) = cQ∗(U+W)=c that the paper's derivation from Theorem 6 gives.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: no Slater or other constraint qualification appears; the dual is the ELSD built from the recursively defined Wm\mathcal W_mWm​, not the Lagrangian dual or an arbitrary subspace; the WiW_iWi​ range over all of Mn\mathcal M_nMn​, not only symmetric matrices (the paper's Example 4 needs a nonsymmetric W2W_2W2​).

Needed infrastructure: PSD matrix facts (Proposition 7), bipolar theorem for closed convex sets containing the origin (Proposition 11), closedness arguments for linear images of cones, and dimension counting of subspaces of Rm\mathbb R^mRm. Contributions of any milestone, of these general lemmas, and of alternative proofs (for instance via facial reduction) are welcome.

Selected references

  • M. V. Ramana, An exact duality theory for semidefinite programming and its complexity implications, Mathematical Programming 77 (1997) 129–162. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02614433
  • M. V. Ramana, L. Tunçel, H. Wolkowicz, Strong duality for semidefinite programming, SIAM Journal on Optimization 7 (1997) 641–662. https://doi.org/10.1137/S1052623495288350
  • J. M. Borwein, H. Wolkowicz, Regularizing the abstract convex program, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 83 (1981) 495–530. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-247X(81)90138-4
  • L. Vandenberghe, S. Boyd, Semidefinite programming, SIAM Review 38 (1996) 49–95. https://doi.org/10.1137/1038003
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400873173
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CombinatoricsOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Performance Bounds for Simple One-Dimensional Packing Algorithms 4: First-Fit Decreasing Uses at Most 71/60 L* + 5 Bins When No Item Exceeds 1/2Research Paper

Motivation

Bin packing asks how to place a list of items with sizes in (0,1](0,1](0,1] into as few unit-capacity bins as possible. It models the cutting of stock material, the packing of files onto tracks of a disc and the assignment of jobs to machines with a common deadline. Deciding the optimum is NP-hard, so in practice simple rules are used, and the question is how far they can stray from the optimum in the worst case.

Johnson, Demers, Ullman, Garey and Graham (SIAM J. Comput. 3(4), 1974) gave the first sharp worst-case bounds for the four classical rules. For First-Fit Decreasing (FFD), the rule that sorts the items into nonincreasing order and then places each into the first bin with room, they announced the bound FFD(L)≤119L∗+4FFD(L)\le\frac{11}{9}L^*+4FFD(L)≤911​L∗+4, whose full proof in Johnson's thesis exceeds 75 pages. To show the method, Section 4 of the paper proves a simpler bound in detail: when no item exceeds 1/21/21/2, FFD uses at most 7160L∗+5\frac{71}{60}L^*+56071​L∗+5 bins. That result is the subject of this mission.

Timeline:

  • 1973: D. S. Johnson's MIT thesis, Near-optimal bin packing algorithms, contains the complete proofs of the 11/911/911/9 and 71/6071/6071/60 bounds.
  • 1974: Johnson, Demers, Ullman, Garey and Graham publish the 71/6071/6071/60 bound for lists in (0,1/2](0,1/2](0,1/2] (Theorem 4.1) with a proof that is complete except for parts of two lemmas, and show by example that 71/6071/6071/60 cannot be lowered.
  • 1985: B. S. Baker gives a shorter proof of the 11/911/911/9 bound for FFD (J. Algorithms 6, 1985).
  • 2007: G. Dósa determines the tight additive constant 6/96/96/9 in the 11/911/911/9 bound (ESCAPE 2007, LNCS 4614).

Setting

A list is a finite sequence L=(a1,…,an)L=(a_1,\dots,a_n)L=(a1​,…,an​) of real numbers in (0,1](0,1](0,1]; values may repeat. A bin has capacity 111; its level is the sum of the numbers in it. The optimum L∗L^*L∗ is the least number of bins into which the elements of LLL can be placed with no bin level exceeding 111.

First-Fit places a1,a2,…a_1,a_2,\dotsa1​,a2​,… in order into bins B1,B2,…B_1,B_2,\dotsB1​,B2​,…, each initially at level 000: aia_iai​ goes into the bin of least index whose level β\betaβ satisfies β≤1−ai\beta\le 1-a_iβ≤1−ai​. First-Fit Decreasing first arranges LLL into nonincreasing order and then runs First-Fit. FFD(L)FFD(L)FFD(L) is the number of bins it uses.

The proof uses a weight WWW on finite sets of elements. For an integer k≥1k\ge1k≥1, xxx is a kkk-piece if x∈(1k+1,1k]x\in(\frac1{k+1},\frac1k]x∈(k+11​,k1​], and a kkk-bin is a bin whose largest element is a kkk-piece. Set w1(x)=⌊1/x⌋−1w_1(x)=\lfloor 1/x\rfloor^{-1}w1​(x)=⌊1/x⌋−1. A pair (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) obeys relation kkk if xxx is a kkk-piece and kx+y≤1kx+y\le1kx+y≤1; then w2(x,y)=w1(x)+k−1kw1(y)w_2(x,y)=w_1(x)+\frac{k-1}{k}w_1(y)w2​(x,y)=w1​(x)+kk−1​w1​(y), and otherwise w2(x,y)=w1(x)+w1(y)w_2(x,y)=w_1(x)+w_1(y)w2​(x,y)=w1​(x)+w1​(y). For a partition π\piπ of XXX into one- and two-element sets, with each pair ordered (earlier, later) in the nonincreasing order,

w12(π)=∑{x}∈πw1(x)+∑(x,y)∈πw2(x,y),W(X)=min⁡πw12(π).w_{12}(\pi)=\sum_{\{x\}\in\pi}w_1(x)+\sum_{(x,y)\in\pi}w_2(x,y),\qquad W(X)=\min_\pi w_{12}(\pi).w12​(π)={x}∈π∑​w1​(x)+(x,y)∈π∑​w2​(x,y),W(X)=πmin​w12​(π).

BASIC is the set of elements of LLL that are kkk-pieces lying in a kkk-bin of the FFD packing of LLL, for some kkk; SURPLUS is the rest of LLL.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

for every list L⊆(0,12]:FFD(L)≤7160L∗+5.\text{for every list } L\subseteq(0,\tfrac12]:\qquad FFD(L)\le\frac{71}{60}L^*+5 .for every list L⊆(0,21​]:FFD(L)≤6071​L∗+5.

The constants are those printed in the paper. The multiplicative constant 71/6071/6071/60 is best possible.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3.3 (FFD part): if FFD(L)>rL∗+dFFD(L)>rL^*+dFFD(L)>rL∗+d with r,d≥1r,d\ge1r,d≥1, the list L′L'L′ of the elements of LLL exceeding (r−1)/r(r-1)/r(r−1)/r also has FFD(L′)>rL′∗+dFFD(L')>rL'^*+dFFD(L′)>rL′∗+d.
  2. Claim 4.2.1: for N≥4N\ge4N≥4 and L⊆(1N,12]L\subseteq(\frac1N,\frac12]L⊆(N1​,21​], ∑x∈BASICw1(x)≥FFD(L)−∑j=2N−1j−1j\sum_{x\in\mathrm{BASIC}}w_1(x)\ge FFD(L)-\sum_{j=2}^{N-1}\frac{j-1}{j}∑x∈BASIC​w1​(x)≥FFD(L)−∑j=2N−1​jj−1​.
  3. Claim 4.2.2: for N≥4N\ge4N≥4, L⊆(1N,12]L\subseteq(\frac1N,\frac12]L⊆(N1​,21​] and every partition π\piπ of LLL into one- and two-element sets, w12(π)≥w1(BASIC)−∑j=3N−11jw_{12}(\pi)\ge w_1(\mathrm{BASIC})-\sum_{j=3}^{N-1}\frac1jw12​(π)≥w1​(BASIC)−∑j=3N−1​j1​.
  4. Lemma 4.2: for N≥4N\ge4N≥4 and L⊆(1N,12]L\subseteq(\frac1N,\frac12]L⊆(N1​,21​], W(L)≥FFD(L)−N+2W(L)\ge FFD(L)-N+2W(L)≥FFD(L)−N+2.
  5. Subadditivity: W(X1∪⋯∪Xk)≤∑iW(Xi)W(X_1\cup\dots\cup X_k)\le\sum_i W(X_i)W(X1​∪⋯∪Xk​)≤∑i​W(Xi​).
  6. Lemma 4.3: if X⊆(17,12]X\subseteq(\frac17,\frac12]X⊆(71​,21​] and ∑x∈Xx≤1\sum_{x\in X}x\le1∑x∈X​x≤1, then W(X)≤7160W(X)\le\frac{71}{60}W(X)≤6071​.

A companion item states the Remark after Theorem 4.1: for every N≥1N\ge1N≥1 there is a list with all elements below 1/31/31/3, L∗=60NL^*=60NL∗=60N and FFD(L)=71NFFD(L)=71NFFD(L)=71N.

Significance

Theorem 4.1 shows the weighting-function method in its simplest nontrivial form: a weight whose total is within a constant of the algorithm's bin count, and which no feasible bin can exceed by more than the target ratio. The same method, with more elaborate weights, gives the 11/911/911/9 bound for FFD, and it is the model for later worst-case analyses of packing heuristics. The Remark shows that 71/6071/6071/60 is exact for items in (0,1/2](0,1/2](0,1/2], and the Corollary on p. 322 extends the analysis to the asymptotic ratio RFFDαR^\alpha_{FFD}RFFDα​ when items are bounded by α∈(8/29,1/2]\alpha\in(8/29,1/2]α∈(8/29,1/2].

The source proof is partial. The billing argument behind Claim 4.2.2 is given only when two auxiliary conditions (G1) and (G2) hold ("The more intricate argument here omitted", p. 321), and Lemma 4.3 is checked in four of about seventy-four cases ("leaving the remaining 70-odd, more or less routine, cases to the ambitious reader", p. 321). Complete details are in Johnson's thesis. The theorem itself is established. A formalization therefore gives the first complete, checked proof in a single place. The finite case analysis of Lemma 4.3 is well suited to machine checking. No machine-checked proof of any FFD bound is known to exist.

Difficulty

The obvious weight w1w_1w1​ alone fails. Claim 4.2.1 shows that w1(BASIC)w_1(\mathrm{BASIC})w1​(BASIC) covers the FFD bins, but many sets XXX of elements with sum at most 111 have w1(X)>71/60w_1(X)>71/60w1​(X)>71/60, for example two 222-pieces, a 555-piece and a 666-piece. The pair discounts of w2w_2w2​ repair Lemma 4.3, but they must then be paid for in Lemma 4.2, for every partition. That is Claim 4.2.2: a charge from each discounted pair to distinct SURPLUS elements that are no larger. The charge is straightforward only when no member of a pair obeying relation kkk lies in a bin of type k′<kk'<kk′<k. In general a pair's larger element may already have been charged by a smaller relation, and the paper omits the argument that handles this. Lemma 4.3 is elementary but has many cases, each determined by the piece types in XXX and the relations they obey.

Formalization scope

A list is L : List ℝ with IsList L (0<a≤10<a\le10<a≤1 for each element) in every statement. L∗L^*L∗ is optBins L, the least bbb such that some map from positions to Fin b has every bin sum at most 111. The First-Fit run keeps the nonempty bins as a List (List ℝ), and opens a new bin at the end exactly when no existing bin fits, which is the paper's "least jjj". The fit test is β+a≤1\beta+a\le1β+a≤1. FFD is First-Fit on sortDesc L, the mergeSort into nonincreasing order; ties do not affect the bin count. Indices are 000-based.

W(X)W(X)W(X) sorts XXX into nonincreasing order and minimises w12w_{12}w12​ over the involutions of its positions: fixed points are singletons, and a pair i<σ(i)i<\sigma(i)i<σ(i) is oriented (larger, smaller). The minimum is over a finite nonempty set, so it is attained. BASIC is a set of positions of sortDesc L, and each position's bin is its bin in the final FFD packing. In w2w_2w2​, k=⌊1/x⌋k=\lfloor1/x\rfloork=⌊1/x⌋ is the piece type of the first element. Sums ∑j=2N−1\sum_{j=2}^{N-1}∑j=2N−1​ are over Finset.Icc 2 (N - 1) with N≥4N\ge4N≥4.

The goal's range is (0,1/2](0,1/2](0,1/2]. The restriction to (1/7,1/2](1/7,1/2](1/7,1/2] belongs only to the proof, through Lemma 3.3. Stating the goal for (1/7,1/2](1/7,1/2](1/7,1/2], weakening 71/6071/6071/60 or 555, or making WWW an unattained infimum would each change the theorem. Only the FFD half of Lemma 3.3 is stated. Claim 4.2.1 is stated with Lemma 4.2's standing hypothesis N≥4N\ge4N≥4. The Remark's printed range 0<ε≤5/870<\varepsilon\le5/870<ε≤5/87 is a misprint: its FFD packing needs ε<1/174\varepsilon<1/174ε<1/174, and the companion item states only the existence claim.

Infrastructure needed: a usable API for the First-Fit run (the invariants of the fold, bin levels, the order of bins), a lemma that FFD bins receive items in nonincreasing order, and a decision procedure for Lemma 4.3's case analysis over piece types. The model file and the weight file are reusable for the 11/911/911/9 bound (mission 3 of this series) and for the bounded-α\alphaα corollaries. Contributions of proofs of Lemma 4.3 by computer-checked case enumeration, and of the missing general case of Claim 4.2.2, are especially welcome.

Selected references

  • D. S. Johnson, A. Demers, J. D. Ullman, M. R. Garey, R. L. Graham, Worst-Case Performance Bounds for Simple One-Dimensional Packing Algorithms, SIAM J. Comput. 3(4):299–325, 1974. https://doi.org/10.1137/0203025
  • D. S. Johnson, Near-Optimal Bin Packing Algorithms, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1973 (reference [8] of the paper).
  • B. S. Baker, A new proof for the first-fit decreasing bin-packing algorithm, J. Algorithms 6, 1985.
  • G. Dósa, The tight bound of first fit decreasing bin-packing algorithm is FFD(I) ≤ 11/9 OPT(I) + 6/9, ESCAPE 2007, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4614, 2007.
9 thms3 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimizing Strategic Safety Stock Placement in Supply Chains: Binding Base Stocks Are Optimal in a Serial System without Guaranteed Internal ServiceResearch Paper

Motivation

Where to hold safety stock in a multi-stage supply chain is a basic question of inventory planning. Graves and Willems (MSOM 2(1), 2000) optimize safety-stock placement under the guaranteed-service assumption: each stage quotes a service time to its customers and always meets it. That assumption makes the placement problem tractable, and it is the basis of the dynamic program in the body of the paper and of later work built on it. It also has a price. A stage that promises a service time must hold enough stock to keep the promise even when it would be cheaper to let a downstream stage absorb an occasional delay.

The paper's Appendix measures that price in the simplest setting where it can be computed exactly. The setting is a serial chain in which internal stages promise nothing and only the external customer is guaranteed 100% service. Its one theorem, called the Result, characterizes the optimal base stocks of this relaxed model in closed form. The paper then compares that policy with the guaranteed-service optimum on 36 test instances. The guaranteed-service counterpart of this serial model, Simpson's all-or-nothing property of optimal service times, is on Prove2Me as a separate statement (SupplyChainTheory.gs_all_or_nothing, from Snyder and Shen's textbook). This mission formalizes the other side of the comparison.

Setting

A serial supply chain has NNN stages. Stage 111 is the demand node and stage iii supplies stage i−1i-1i−1 for i=2,…,Ni = 2, \dots, Ni=2,…,N. Time is discrete, with periods t∈Zt \in \mathbb{Z}t∈Z. Stage iii has a deterministic lead time Ti∈NT_i \in \mathbb{N}Ti​∈N and a base stock Bi∈RB_i \in \mathbb{R}Bi​∈R. It follows a base-stock policy: in each period it observes end-item demand and orders that amount from its supplier.

The end-item demand in period ttt is d(t)d(t)d(t). The window demand is d(a,b]=d(a+1)+⋯+d(b)d(a, b] = d(a+1) + \dots + d(b)d(a,b]=d(a+1)+⋯+d(b), which is 000 when a≥ba \ge ba≥b. The demand bound D:N→RD : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}D:N→R gives D(τ)D(\tau)D(τ), the maximum possible end-item demand over τ\tauτ periods, with D(0)=0D(0) = 0D(0)=0.

The backlog Qi(t)Q_i(t)Qi​(t) is the amount the customer of stage iii has ordered but not yet received. It satisfies the recursion (A1):

Qi(t)=[d(t−Ti,t]+Qi+1(t−Ti)−Bi]+,QN+1≡0.Q_i(t) = \bigl[d(t - T_i, t] + Q_{i+1}(t - T_i) - B_i\bigr]^+, \qquad Q_{N+1} \equiv 0 .Qi​(t)=[d(t−Ti​,t]+Qi+1​(t−Ti​)−Bi​]+,QN+1​≡0.

Unrolling it gives the closed max-form (A2). The external customer receives 100% service when Q1(t)=0Q_1(t) = 0Q1​(t)=0 for all ttt. When demand never exceeds its bound, this is ensured by the service constraints

B1+⋯+Bi≥D(T1+⋯+Ti),i=1,…,N.(A3)B_1 + \dots + B_i \ge D(T_1 + \dots + T_i), \qquad i = 1, \dots, N. \tag{A3}B1​+⋯+Bi​≥D(T1​+⋯+Ti​),i=1,…,N.(A3)

Let hih_ihi​ be the holding cost at stage iii and ei=hi−hi+1e_i = h_i - h_{i+1}ei​=hi​−hi+1​ the echelon holding cost. After constant terms are dropped, the expected holding cost gives program P∗\mathbf P^*P∗:

min⁡B ∑i=1NhiBi−∑i=2Nei−1E[Qi]s.t. (A3) and Bi≥0.\min_B\ \sum_{i=1}^N h_i B_i - \sum_{i=2}^N e_{i-1} E[Q_i] \quad\text{s.t. (A3) and } B_i \ge 0 .Bmin​ i=1∑N​hi​Bi​−i=2∑N​ei−1​E[Qi​]s.t. (A3) and Bi​≥0.

Demand is random, and E[Qi]E[Q_i]E[Qi​] is the expected backlog at stage iii in a period ttt.

Formalization targets

Goal: the Result, Eq. (A6)

If the echelon holding costs are nonnegative and DDD is nondecreasing, then an optimal solution of P∗\mathbf P^*P∗ is

B1=D(T1),Bi=D(T1+⋯+Ti)−D(T1+⋯+Ti−1),i=2,…,N.(A6)B_1 = D(T_1), \qquad B_i = D(T_1 + \dots + T_i) - D(T_1 + \dots + T_{i-1}), \quad i = 2, \dots, N. \tag{A6}B1​=D(T1​),Bi​=D(T1​+⋯+Ti​)−D(T1​+⋯+Ti−1​),i=2,…,N.(A6)

Formally, (A6) is feasible, and for every period ttt its objective value is at most that of every feasible vector. The goal names this vector and compares it with every feasible BBB. The weaker claim that "some optimal solution binds all of (A3)" would not be enough.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (A2). The closed max-form of Qi(t)Q_i(t)Qi​(t), derived from the recursion (A1).
  2. Eq. (A3). Under the demand bound d(a,a+s]≤D(s)d(a, a+s] \le D(s)d(a,a+s]≤D(s), the constraints (A3) force Q1≡0Q_1 \equiv 0Q1​≡0 (sufficiency).
  3. (A6) is feasible and is the unique binding solution of (A3).
  4. Backlog bounds under a transfer. Moving Δ≥0\Delta \ge 0Δ≥0 units of base stock from stage kkk to stage k+1k+1k+1 leaves E[Qi]E[Q_i]E[Qi​] unchanged for i>k+1i > k+1i>k+1 and raises it by at most Δ\DeltaΔ for i≤ki \le ki≤k. It lowers E[Qk+1]E[Q_{k+1}]E[Qk+1​] by at most Δ\DeltaΔ.
  5. Eqs. (A7)–(A8). For k<Nk < Nk<N, the transfer that makes the kkk-th constraint binding keeps the vector feasible and does not raise the objective.
  6. The case k=Nk = Nk=N. Lowering BNB_NBN​ until the NNN-th constraint binds does not raise the objective.

Significance

The Result shows that, without guaranteed internal service, the optimal base stocks do not depend on the holding costs, provided the echelon costs are nonnegative. Each stage then covers exactly the increment of maximal demand that its own lead time adds. This closed form is the benchmark against which the paper measures the cost of guaranteed service: 26% more safety-stock holding cost on average over its test problems. The paper also remarks, without proof, that Rosling's transformation extends the Result to assembly systems.

The Result is proved in the paper. As far as is known, neither it nor the backlog identity (A2) has been machine-checked. A complete development would yield a verified model of serial base-stock backlogs under bounded demand. It would also verify an exchange argument that recurs in multi-echelon inventory theory: moving stock toward the customer, with echelon costs controlling the sign of the change.

Difficulty

The objective is not linear in BBB. Each E[Qi]E[Q_i]E[Qi​] is a convex, nonsmooth function of Bi,…,BNB_i, \dots, B_NBi​,…,BN​ through the maximum in (A2), and the objective subtracts these terms, so P∗\mathbf P^*P∗ minimizes a concave function over a polyhedron. The obvious approaches are linear-programming duality and convex first-order optimality conditions on P∗\mathbf P^*P∗, and neither applies. The result is a comparison of objective values between arbitrary feasible vectors and (A6). It has to hold pathwise under every demand distribution, and it then has to be carried through expectations. The hypotheses the Result leaves implicit must be recovered from the rest of the paper. Two of them, stated below, are necessary.

Formalization scope

Stages are natural numbers read on the range {1,…,N}\{1, \dots, N\}{1,…,N}. Lead times are natural numbers cast to Z\mathbb{Z}Z. Base stocks, holding costs and the demand bound are real-valued. A base-stock vector is a function N→R\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}N→R, and only indices 1,…,N1, \dots, N1,…,N are read. The backlog is defined by the recursion (A1), computed in N+1−iN + 1 - iN+1−i steps, with Qi≡0Q_i \equiv 0Qi​≡0 for i>Ni > Ni>N. The closed form (A2) is a theorem. Randomness is a probability space (Ω,μ)(\Omega, \mu)(Ω,μ) with a demand path d(ω,⋅)d(\omega, \cdot)d(ω,⋅) whose value in each period is integrable. The integrability of the backlog is not assumed; it follows from the integrability of demand.

The page's informal words are read as follows:

  • "The echelon holding costs are nonnegative" means hi−hi+1≥0h_i - h_{i+1} \ge 0hi​−hi+1​≥0 for 1≤i<N1 \le i < N1≤i<N, and hN≥0h_N \ge 0hN​≥0, i.e. eN≥0e_N \ge 0eN​≥0 with hN+1:=0h_{N+1} := 0hN+1​:=0. The case k=Nk = Nk=N of the proof uses hN≥0h_N \ge 0hN​≥0. Without it the Result is false (N=1N = 1N=1, h1<0h_1 < 0h1​<0).
  • D(0)=0D(0) = 0D(0)=0 is the paper's convention (§2, p. 70) and is added as a hypothesis. Without it (A6) can be infeasible (D≡−1D \equiv -1D≡−1 is nondecreasing).
  • "D( )D(\,)D() is a nondecreasing function" means Monotone D on N\mathbb{N}N.
  • "An optimal solution to P∗\mathbf P^*P∗" means feasible, with objective at most that of every feasible vector.
  • "E[Qi]E[Q_i]E[Qi​]" means the expectation of Qi(t)Q_i(t)Qi​(t) at a fixed period ttt. Every statement holds for all ttt, and stationarity is not assumed. The paper writes E[Qi]E[Q_i]E[Qi​] without ttt because its demand is stationary, and this reading is at least as strong.
  • The demand bound d(a,a+s]≤D(s)d(a, a+s] \le D(s)d(a,a+s]≤D(s) appears only in milestone 2. The Result does not use it, so it is not a hypothesis of the goal.
  • Eq. (A3) is formalized in the sufficiency direction only. The page's necessity remark ("as we assume that the demand bounds can be realized") is not stated.

A non-integrable backlog would make its Bochner integral 000 and erase the backlog terms of the objective. The formalization rules this out by assuming integrable demand, which makes the backlogs integrable; it does not assume the backlogs themselves integrable. Out of scope: the spanning-tree dynamic program of §5, the unproved remarks of §§3–4, the Rosling extension, the Kodak application and the computational study.

Useful contributions include a proof of (A2) by downward induction on stages, the integrability of Qi(t)Q_i(t)Qi​(t), the pathwise version of milestone 4, and the iteration argument that assembles milestones 3, 5 and 6 into the goal.

Selected references

  • S. C. Graves and S. P. Willems, Optimizing Strategic Safety Stock Placement in Supply Chains, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2(1):68–83, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2.1.68.23267
  • K. F. Simpson, In-Process Inventories, Operations Research 6(6):863–873, 1958. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.6.6.863
  • K. Rosling, Optimal Inventory Policies for Assembly Systems under Random Demands, Operations Research 37(4):565–579, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.37.4.565
  • L. V. Snyder and Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, Wiley, 2nd ed., 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
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Algorithmic Game TheoryTopology·Captain: mikedeng1

A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem: Equilibrium Points Exist When Actions Are Contractible Polyhedra and Constrained Best Responses Are ContractibleResearch Paper

Motivation

Nash's equilibrium existence theorem assumes that each player's set of available strategies is fixed. Many social and economic systems do not work that way: a consumer's budget set depends on prices, which are the choices of another agent, and a firm's feasible production may depend on what other firms do. Gerard Debreu's A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem (PNAS 38(10), 1952) proves that an equilibrium exists in such a system, called a social system or abstract economy (today also a generalized game). Here each agent's feasible actions depend on the actions of all the others.

Arrow and Debreu used this theorem to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium (Econometrica 22(3), 1954). It is the standard existence result for generalized Nash equilibrium problems in operations research, where the feasible sets are coupled by shared constraints.

Timeline.

  • 1928: von Neumann proves the minimax theorem for matrix games.
  • 1941: Kakutani proves a fixed-point theorem for convex-valued maps with closed graphs on compact convex sets (Duke Math. J. 8, 1941).
  • 1946: Eilenberg and Montgomery extend fixed-point theory to acyclic-valued maps on acyclic absolute neighbourhood retracts (Amer. J. Math. 68, 1946).
  • 1950: Nash proves the existence of equilibrium points for finite games (PNAS 36, 1950).
  • 1952: Debreu proves the theorem of this mission. He requires contractibility instead of convexity, and his payoffs take values in the completed real line.

Setting

There are finitely many agents ι=1,…,ν\iota=1,\dots,\nuι=1,…,ν. Agent ι\iotaι chooses an action aιa_\iotaaι​ in a set Aι\mathfrak A_\iotaAι​, a subset of a finite-dimensional real space. A profile a=(a1,…,aν)a=(a_1,\dots,a_\nu)a=(a1​,…,aν​) lies in A=A1×⋯×Aν\mathfrak A=\mathfrak A_1\times\cdots\times\mathfrak A_\nuA=A1​×⋯×Aν​. For each agent, aˉι\bar a_\iotaaˉι​ denotes the actions of the others, ranging over Aˉι=∏j≠ιAj\bar{\mathfrak A}_\iota=\prod_{j\ne\iota}\mathfrak A_jAˉι​=∏j=ι​Aj​.

Given aˉι\bar a_\iotaaˉι​, agent ι\iotaι may only choose from a nonempty set Aι(aˉι)⊆AιA_\iota(\bar a_\iota)\subseteq\mathfrak A_\iotaAι​(aˉι​)⊆Aι​, a multi-valued function of the others' actions. Its graph is Gι={(aˉι,aι)∣aι∈Aι(aˉι)}G_\iota=\{(\bar a_\iota,a_\iota)\mid a_\iota\in A_\iota(\bar a_\iota)\}Gι​={(aˉι​,aι​)∣aι​∈Aι​(aˉι​)}. The payoff fι(aˉι,aι)f_\iota(\bar a_\iota,a_\iota)fι​(aˉι​,aι​) takes values in the completed real line R‾=R∪{−∞,+∞}\overline{\mathbb R}=\mathbb R\cup\{-\infty,+\infty\}R=R∪{−∞,+∞}. The best value available to agent ι\iotaι and the set of constrained best responses are

φι(aˉι)=max⁡aι∈Aι(aˉι)fι(aˉι,aι),Maˉι={aι∈Aι(aˉι)∣fι(aˉι,aι)=φι(aˉι)}.\varphi_\iota(\bar a_\iota)=\max_{a_\iota\in A_\iota(\bar a_\iota)}f_\iota(\bar a_\iota,a_\iota),\qquad M_{\bar a_\iota}=\{a_\iota\in A_\iota(\bar a_\iota)\mid f_\iota(\bar a_\iota,a_\iota)=\varphi_\iota(\bar a_\iota)\}.φι​(aˉι​)=aι​∈Aι​(aˉι​)max​fι​(aˉι​,aι​),Maˉι​​={aι​∈Aι​(aˉι​)∣fι​(aˉι​,aι​)=φι​(aˉι​)}.

An equilibrium point is a profile a∗a^*a∗ such that, for every ι\iotaι, aι∗∈Aι(aˉι∗)a^*_\iota\in A_\iota(\bar a^*_\iota)aι∗​∈Aι​(aˉι∗​) and fι(a∗)=φι(aˉι∗)f_\iota(a^*)=\varphi_\iota(\bar a^*_\iota)fι​(a∗)=φι​(aˉι∗​).

The topological vocabulary is Debreu's §1:

  • a convex cell is the convex hull of finitely many points;
  • a geometric polyhedron is a finite union of convex cells;
  • a polyhedron is a set homeomorphic to a geometric polyhedron;
  • a nonempty set ZZZ is contractible if there is a continuous H:[0,1]×Z→ZH:[0,1]\times Z\to ZH:[0,1]×Z→Z with H(0,z)=zH(0,z)=zH(0,z)=z and H(1,z)=z0H(1,z)=z^0H(1,z)=z0 for a fixed z0∈Zz^0\in Zz0∈Z.

A multi-valued function is semicontinuous if its graph is closed.

Formalization targets

Goal: the THEOREM (p. 888)

Assume that for every ι\iotaι, Aι\mathfrak A_\iotaAι​ is a contractible polyhedron, GιG_\iotaGι​ is closed, fιf_\iotafι​ is continuous on GιG_\iotaGι​, φι\varphi_\iotaφι​ is continuous on Aˉι\bar{\mathfrak A}_\iotaAˉι​, and MaˉιM_{\bar a_\iota}Maˉι​​ is contractible for every aˉι\bar a_\iotaaˉι​. Then

∃ a∗∈A  ∀ι:aι∗∈Aι(aˉι∗)  and  fι(aˉι∗,b)≤fι(a∗)  for all b∈Aι(aˉι∗).\exists\,a^*\in\mathfrak A\ \ \forall\iota:\quad a^*_\iota\in A_\iota(\bar a^*_\iota)\ \text{ and }\ f_\iota(\bar a^*_\iota,b)\le f_\iota(a^*)\ \text{ for all } b\in A_\iota(\bar a^*_\iota).∃a∗∈A  ∀ι:aι∗​∈Aι​(aˉι∗​)  and  fι​(aˉι∗​,b)≤fι​(a∗)  for all b∈Aι​(aˉι∗​).

Milestones on the path of the proof

  1. §1: products of two convex cells, of two geometric polyhedra, of two polyhedra and of two contractible sets are of the same kind.
  2. A\mathfrak AA is a contractible polyhedron, and ϕ(a)=Maˉ1×⋯×Maˉν\phi(a)=M_{\bar a_1}\times\cdots\times M_{\bar a_\nu}ϕ(a)=Maˉ1​​×⋯×Maˉν​​ is contractible for every aaa.
  3. The LEMMA (p. 889): a semicontinuous multi-valued function ϕ:Z→Z\phi:Z\to Zϕ:Z→Z on a contractible polyhedron with contractible values has a fixed point z∗∈ϕ(z∗)z^*\in\phi(z^*)z∗∈ϕ(z∗).
  4. The set Mι={(aˉι,aι)∣aι∈Maˉι}M_\iota=\{(\bar a_\iota,a_\iota)\mid a_\iota\in M_{\bar a_\iota}\}Mι​={(aˉι​,aι​)∣aι​∈Maˉι​​} is closed, and so is the graph Γ\GammaΓ of ϕ\phiϕ.
  5. a∗∈ϕ(a∗)a^*\in\phi(a^*)a∗∈ϕ(a∗) holds exactly when a∗a^*a∗ is an equilibrium point.

Further results of the paper

  • The Remark (p. 889) and its steps (α) and (β) (p. 890). If GιG_\iotaGι​ is compact and fιf_\iotafι​ is continuous on it, then φι\varphi_\iotaφι​ is upper semicontinuous. If AιA_\iotaAι​ is moreover continuous at a point, φι\varphi_\iotaφι​ is lower semicontinuous, and hence continuous, there.
  • The COROLLARY (p. 890). A continuous f:X×Y→R‾f:X\times Y\to\overline{\mathbb R}f:X×Y→R on contractible polyhedra whose argmin sets Ux0U_{x^0}Ux0​ and argmax sets Vy0V_{y^0}Vy0​ are contractible has a saddle point, min⁡yf(x0,y)=f(x0,y0)=max⁡xf(x,y0)\min_y f(x^0,y)=f(x^0,y^0)=\max_x f(x,y^0)miny​f(x0,y)=f(x0,y0)=maxx​f(x,y0).

Significance

The result. The theorem gives an equilibrium for games in which one agent's choices constrain another's. This is the step that makes competitive equilibrium an equilibrium of a game: the market participant's price choice constrains the consumers' budget sets. The same result gives existence for generalized Nash equilibrium problems, including games with shared constraints. Replacing convexity by contractibility also admits non-convex best-response sets: a contractible set such as a star-shaped region or an arc qualifies. Nash's theorem for finite games and von Neumann's minimax theorem are special cases. With values in R‾\overline{\mathbb R}R, payoffs may take infinite values.

The formalization. The theorem was proved in 1952. None of it is formalized on the platform: neither the theorem itself, nor the LEMMA, nor the topological vocabulary of polyhedra and contractible sets used here. Brouwer's theorem is available on the platform as AGT.brouwer_fixed_point. Nash's existence theorem for finite games (AGT.nash_existence) and Sion's minimax theorem are also formalized. All of these assume convexity. The mission produces a machine-checked existence theorem for generalized games, together with a fixed-point theorem for set-valued maps with contractible values on polyhedra.

Difficulty

Most of the argument reduces to the LEMMA, which is a particular case of the Eilenberg–Montgomery fixed-point theorem. The usual route to Kakutani's theorem does not carry over: it approximates a convex-valued map by continuous selections and applies Brouwer's theorem on a convex set. Contractible values do not admit convex combinations of nearby values, and a contractible polyhedron need not be convex, so neither the selection step nor Brouwer on a simplex applies directly. Debreu cites the LEMMA without proof, and Mathlib has no fixed-point theorem for set-valued maps and none of the algebraic topology of polyhedra that the classical results rest on.

The remaining steps are point-set topology. The product milestones require building homeomorphisms and deformations on products of subspaces, and the closed-graph steps require care with continuity on GιG_\iotaGι​ as opposed to continuity everywhere.

Formalization scope

  • Spaces and agents. Each Aι\mathfrak A_\iotaAι​ is a subset of a finite-dimensional real normed space EιE_\iotaEι​, standing in for Debreu's "finite Euclidean spaces". The agents form a Fintype. Profiles live in ∏ιAι\prod_\iota\mathfrak A_\iota∏ι​Aι​. The others' actions aˉι\bar a_\iotaaˉι​ range over the product over the subtype {j∣j≠ι}\{j\mid j\ne\iota\}{j∣j=ι}, so AιA_\iotaAι​ cannot depend on agent ι\iotaι's own action. With a single agent this product is a point, and the theorem becomes the one-agent statement.
  • Payoffs. The completed real line is Mathlib's EReal with its order topology. φι\varphi_\iotaφι​ is a supremum (sSup) in EReal; under the hypotheses it is attained, so it is Debreu's Max. No arithmetic in EReal is used anywhere.
  • Polyhedra and contractible sets. A polyhedron is a subspace homeomorphic to a finite union of convex hulls of nonempty finite sets in some Rm\mathbb R^mRm; polyhedra are therefore compact. Contractibility is Debreu's definition verbatim, and it includes nonemptiness.
  • Hypotheses. Non-void values of AιA_\iotaAι​ are Debreu's standing assumption and are stated explicitly. Continuity of fιf_\iotafι​ is required on GιG_\iotaGι​ only, and continuity of φι\varphi_\iotaφι​ on all of Aˉι\bar{\mathfrak A}_\iotaAˉι​.

Three formalizations would be easier but are not this theorem: one that replaces contractible by convex (that is the Kakutani–Nash setting), one that maximizes over all of Aι\mathfrak A_\iotaAι​ instead of Aι(aˉι)A_\iota(\bar a_\iota)Aι​(aˉι​), and one that assumes a fixed point of ϕ\phiϕ or states only the closed-graph step. None of these is acceptable, and the LEMMA may not be weakened to convex domains or convex values.

The work needed includes a small library of polyhedra and contractible subsets, and closed-graph correspondences on products. The largest piece is a proof of the LEMMA, a fixed-point theorem that is reusable well beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, alternative routes to the LEMMA, and supporting lemmas on polyhedra, such as compactness, triangulation or being absolute neighbourhood retracts, are all welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Debreu, A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 38(10), 886–893, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.38.10.886
  • S. Eilenberg and D. Montgomery, Fixed Point Theorems for Multi-Valued Transformations, Amer. J. Math. 68(2), 214–222, 1946. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371832
  • E. G. Begle, A Fixed Point Theorem, Ann. of Math. 51(3), 544–550, 1950. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969367
  • S. Kakutani, A Generalization of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, Duke Math. J. 8(3), 457–459, 1941. https://doi.org/10.1215/S0012-7094-41-00838-4
  • J. F. Nash, Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 36(1), 48–49, 1950. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.36.1.48
  • K. J. Arrow and G. Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, Econometrica 22(3), 265–290, 1954. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907353
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CombinatoricsOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling III: From One Machine to Many with Delay ListResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing the sum of weighted completion times ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_jC_j∑j​wj​Cj​ is one of the standard objectives of machine scheduling: it measures the average time a job spends in the system, weighted by its importance. With release dates or precedence constraints the problem is NP-hard already on one machine, and on mmm identical parallel machines it is harder still, so the literature of the 1990s concentrated on approximation algorithms. Many of these, including LP-based ones, are naturally designed for a single machine, where an order of the jobs determines the schedule.

Chekuri, Motwani, Natarajan and Stein (SIAM J. Comput. 31(1), 2001) gave a generic way to move from one machine to many. Their §4 describes an algorithm, Delay List, that takes any one-machine schedule as a priority list and produces an mmm-machine schedule, and proves that a ρ\rhoρ-approximate one-machine schedule yields a ((1+β)ρ+1+1/β)\bigl((1+\beta)\rho+1+1/\beta\bigr)((1+β)ρ+1+1/β)-approximate mmm-machine schedule for every β>0\beta>0β>0. The guarantee holds with release dates and arbitrary precedence constraints simultaneously, which at the time gave the best bounds known for several special cases, for example a factor 4 for series-parallel precedence without release dates.

Setting

An instance has nnn jobs J0,…,Jn−1J_0,\dots,J_{n-1}J0​,…,Jn−1​. Job JjJ_jJj​ has processing time pj>0p_j>0pj​>0, release date rj≥0r_j\ge 0rj​≥0 and weight wj>0w_j>0wj​>0. Precedence constraints form a strict partial order ≺\prec≺: i≺ji\prec ji≺j means that JjJ_jJj​ may start only after JiJ_iJi​ completes.

A feasible nonpreemptive schedule on mmm machines assigns each job a start time SjS_jSj​ and a machine; each job runs uninterrupted for pjp_jpj​ time units on its machine, two jobs on one machine do not overlap, Sj≥rjS_j\ge r_jSj​≥rj​, and Si+pi≤SjS_i+p_i\le S_jSi​+pi​≤Sj​ whenever i≺ji\prec ji≺j. The completion time is Cj=Sj+pjC_j=S_j+p_jCj​=Sj​+pj​ and the value of the schedule is ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_jC_j∑j​wj​Cj​. A one-machine schedule is the case m=1m=1m=1.

The critical-path length κj\kappa_jκj​ (Definition 4.1) is pj+rjp_j+r_jpj​+rj​ for a job without predecessors and pj+max⁡{max⁡i≺jκi, rj}p_j+\max\{\max_{i\prec j}\kappa_i,\,r_j\}pj​+max{maxi≺j​κi​,rj​} otherwise; it is the earliest time JjJ_jJj​ could complete with unlimited machines.

A list is an ordering π\piπ of the jobs. Delay List with parameter β>0\beta>0β>0 processes time continuously. A job is ready once it is released and all its predecessors have completed; qjmq^m_jqjm​ is the time it becomes ready. The head is the first unscheduled job of the list. Idle machine-time is recorded as charged to jobs. Whenever a machine is idle:

  1. if the head is ready, it is started, and charged all uncharged idle time in (qjm,sjm)(q^m_j,s^m_j)(qjm​,sjm​);
  2. otherwise the first ready job JkJ_kJk​ of the list is started as soon as at least βpk\beta p_kβpk​ units of uncharged idle time have accumulated, and is charged βpk\beta p_kβpk​ of it;
  3. otherwise nothing happens.

For a job JiJ_iJi​, BiB_iBi​ is the set of jobs up to and including JiJ_iJi​ in the list, AiA_iAi​ the set after it, Oi⊆AiO_i\subseteq A_iOi​⊆Ai​ the set of jobs of AiA_iAi​ started before JiJ_iJi​, and p(A)=∑k∈Apkp(A)=\sum_{k\in A}p_kp(A)=∑k∈A​pk​. Definition 4.4 builds from the schedule a backward path Pi′P'_iPi′​ ending at JiJ_iJi​, whose length is κi′\kappa'_iκi′​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.13

Let S1S^1S1 be a feasible one-machine schedule of the instance with ∑jwjCj1≤ρ∑jwjCj′\sum_j w_jC^1_j\le\rho\sum_j w_jC'_j∑j​wj​Cj1​≤ρ∑j​wj​Cj′​ for every feasible one-machine schedule C′C'C′. Let m≥2m\ge 2m≥2 and β>0\beta>0β>0. Every Delay List schedule SmS^mSm built on the completion order of S1S^1S1 satisfies, for every feasible mmm-machine schedule NNN,

∑jwjCjm≤((1+β)ρ+1+1β)∑jwjCjN.\sum_j w_jC^m_j\le\Bigl((1+\beta)\rho+1+\frac1\beta\Bigr)\sum_j w_jC^N_j .j∑​wj​Cjm​≤((1+β)ρ+1+β1​)j∑​wj​CjN​.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  • Fact 4.5: κi′≤κi\kappa'_i\le\kappa_iκi′​≤κi​.
  • Fact 4.6: the idle time charged to JiJ_iJi​ is at most βpi\beta p_iβpi​.
  • Lemma 4.7: no uncharged idle time remains in (qim,sim)(q^m_i,s^m_i)(qim​,sim​), and that idle time is charged only to jobs in BiB_iBi​.
  • Lemma 4.8: the idle time charged to AiA_iAi​ within (0,sim)(0,s^m_i)(0,sim​) is at most m(κi′−pi)m(\kappa'_i-p_i)m(κi′​−pi​), so p(Oi)≤m(κi′−pi)/β≤m(κi−pi)/βp(O_i)\le m(\kappa'_i-p_i)/\beta\le m(\kappa_i-p_i)/\betap(Oi​)≤m(κi′​−pi​)/β≤m(κi​−pi​)/β.
  • Theorem 4.9: Cim≤(1+β)p(Bi)/m+(1+1/β)κi′−pi/βC^m_i\le(1+\beta)p(B_i)/m+(1+1/\beta)\kappa'_i-p_i/\betaCim​≤(1+β)p(Bi​)/m+(1+1/β)κi′​−pi​/β for any list obeying precedence.
  • Lemma 4.10: COPTm≥COPT1/mC^m_{\mathrm{OPT}}\ge C^1_{\mathrm{OPT}}/mCOPTm​≥COPT1​/m.
  • Lemma 4.11: COPTm≥∑iwiκi=COPT∞C^m_{\mathrm{OPT}}\ge\sum_i w_i\kappa_i=C^\infty_{\mathrm{OPT}}COPTm​≥∑i​wi​κi​=COPT∞​.
  • Corollary 4.12: Cim≤(1+β)Ci1/m+(1+1/β)κiC^m_i\le(1+\beta)C^1_i/m+(1+1/\beta)\kappa_iCim​≤(1+β)Ci1​/m+(1+1/β)κi​ when the list is the completion order of S1S^1S1.

A further item states that a Delay List schedule exists for every instance and every list, so that the goal does not hold vacuously.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4.13 turns every one-machine approximation algorithm for weighted completion time with release dates and precedence into an mmm-machine algorithm at a bounded loss. With an optimal one-machine schedule and β=1\beta=1β=1 the factor is 444 (Corollary 4.14, for series-parallel orders), and the bounds are job-by-job (Theorem 4.9, Corollary 4.12), which the paper uses in Remark 4.15 to extend the method to other metrics and to one-machine schedules that ignore release dates. The same algorithm is the engine of the paper's 222\sqrt222​-approximation for parallel machines with release dates (§4.5).

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved since 1997 (SODA) and 2001 (journal). There is no machine-checked version of it or of any of its lemmas, and the platform currently has no model of scheduling with release dates and precedence constraints. A formalization produces a precise specification of Delay List, whose informal description is given in discrete time and repaired in a remark; a checked proof of the charging argument; and reusable lower bounds (Lemmas 4.10 and 4.11) for any later work on parallel-machine scheduling with precedence.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt, list scheduling (start the first available job of the list whenever a machine is free), fails with non-identical processing times: a long job taken out of order can occupy a machine and delay a more valuable job that becomes ready shortly afterwards. Delay List allows out-of-order jobs only against accumulated idle time, and the analysis rests on a charging invariant. Stating it needs care about time (the paper's discrete-time exposition can over-charge by a time unit), about which idle time a charge consumes, and about many jobs being scheduled at one instant. The bound must hold simultaneously for release dates and arbitrary precedence constraints, where idle machines can be forced both by jobs that are not yet released and by chains of predecessors, and it must hold for every tie-breaking choice of the algorithm.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin n, machines Fin m, and times are real numbers. Processing times are positive, release dates nonnegative and weights positive, as in §1. Precedence is a strict partial order, the transitive closure of the paper's DAG; κ\kappaκ, readiness and feasibility are unchanged by taking the closure. The optimum is never a real infimum: "within a factor ρ\rhoρ of an optimal one-machine schedule" and "within a factor ccc of an optimal mmm-machine schedule" are inequalities against every feasible schedule of the same instance, with the same release dates and precedence constraints.

Delay List is formalized in the continuous-time version described in the proof of Fact 4.6, as a predicate on runs that records start times, machines, the order in which jobs are scheduled at equal times, and charge windows. A case-2 charge takes the most recent uncharged idle time, and idle time is charged by whole time slices. Every guarantee is claimed for every run satisfying the predicate. The ties in Definition 4.4 are broken arbitrarily, so statements involving κi′\kappa'_iκi′​ hold for every admissible path. Lemma 4.10 uses nonpreemptive one-machine schedules. Lemma 4.11's COPT∞C^\infty_{\mathrm{OPT}}COPT∞​ is modelled by nnn machines.

It would be trivializing to assume the conclusions of Fact 4.6 or Lemma 4.7 as properties of the run, or to measure ρ\rhoρ against a relaxation without release dates or precedence; both are ruled out. The algorithm's rules are the only hypotheses on the run.

Not stated: the running time of Delay List; the discrete-time algorithm; Corollary 4.14 (it needs a formal class of series-parallel orders and the external one-machine algorithm of Adolphson for them); Remark 4.15 (release-date-free one-machine schedules), whose hypotheses the paper does not pin down; and the extension to delays between jobs. Contributions of general infrastructure, such as idle-time accounting for step functions and lemmas about list schedules under precedence, are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • C. Chekuri, R. Motwani, B. Natarajan, C. Stein, Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling, SIAM Journal on Computing 31(1):146–166, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539797327180
  • R. L. Graham, Bounds for certain multiprocessing anomalies, Bell System Technical Journal 45:1563–1581, 1966. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1966.tb01709.x
  • D. Adolphson, Single machine job sequencing with precedence constraints, SIAM Journal on Computing 6(1):40–54, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1137/0206002
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CombinatoricsOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling II: A 2.83-Approximation for Parallel Machines with Release DatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing the average completion time of jobs that arrive over time is a basic objective in machine scheduling. It measures how long a job spends in the system on average. With several identical machines, release dates and no preemption (written P∣rj∣∑CjP|r_j|\sum C_jP∣rj​∣∑Cj​), the problem is strongly NP-hard already on one machine. Research has therefore looked for approximation algorithms: polynomial-time rules whose total completion time is provably within a constant factor of every feasible schedule.

A common approach solves a relaxation that is easy to optimize and converts its solution into a feasible schedule. Chekuri, Motwani, Natarajan and Stein (SIAM J. Comput. 31(1), 2001) use a relaxation that needs neither linear programming nor dynamic programming: pretend that the mmm machines are one machine that is mmm times as fast, and allow preemption.

Timeline:

  • 1996, Chakrabarti, Phillips, Schulz, Shmoys, Stein and Wein (ICALP 1996, LNCS 1099, pp. 646–657): a (2.89+ϵ)(2.89+\epsilon)(2.89+ϵ)-approximation for P∣rj∣∑CjP|r_j|\sum C_jP∣rj​∣∑Cj​.
  • 2001, Chekuri, Motwani, Natarajan and Stein (SIAM J. Comput. 31(1), §3 and §4.5). §3 gives a simple (3−1/m)(3-1/m)(3−1/m)-approximation by list scheduling from the one-machine relaxation. §4.5 combines it with the Delay List conversion to obtain 22≈2.832\sqrt2\approx2.8322​≈2.83. This mission's goal is the §4.5 result.
  • 1999, Afrati, Bampis, Chekuri, Karger, Kenyon, Khanna, Milis, Queyranne, Skutella, Stein and Sviridenko (FOCS 1999, pp. 32–43): polynomial-time approximation schemes for P∣rj∣∑wjCjP|r_j|\sum w_jC_jP∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​. These settle the approximability, but the algorithms are far more involved than the ones formalized here.

Setting

An instance has nnn jobs J0,…,Jn−1J_0,\dots,J_{n-1}J0​,…,Jn−1​ and m≥1m\ge1m≥1 identical machines. Job JjJ_jJj​ has a processing time pj>0p_j>0pj​>0 and a release date rj≥0r_j\ge0rj​≥0.

A feasible schedule gives each job a start time Sj≥rjS_j\ge r_jSj​≥rj​ and a machine. Job JjJ_jJj​ runs without interruption on its machine during [Sj,Sj+pj)[S_j,S_j+p_j)[Sj​,Sj​+pj​), and two jobs on the same machine never overlap. The completion times are Cj=Sj+pjC_j=S_j+p_jCj​=Sj​+pj​ and the objective is ∑jCj\sum_j C_j∑j​Cj​. Cj∗C^*_jCj∗​ denotes the completion times of an arbitrary feasible schedule, against which every bound is stated.

The one-machine relaxation I1I1I1 has the same jobs and a single machine. Job JjJ_jJj​ has processing time pj/mp_j/mpj​/m and release date rjr_jrj​ in I1I1I1, and may be preempted. A preemptive schedule P1P1P1 of I1I1I1 gives each job a processing rate ρj(t)≥0\rho_j(t)\ge0ρj​(t)≥0. The rates sum to at most 111 at each time, and no job is processed before its release date. Each job receives pj/mp_j/mpj​/m units in total. Its completion time CjP1C^{P1}_jCjP1​ is the first time by which all of it has been processed. P1P1P1 is optimal if ∑jCjP1\sum_j C^{P1}_j∑j​CjP1​ is minimal among all such schedules.

A list is an ordering π\piπ of the jobs, and the completion order of P1P1P1 lists the jobs by nondecreasing CjP1C^{P1}_jCjP1​. Two ways of turning a list into an mmm-machine schedule are compared.

  • Strict-order list scheduling gives the schedule NNN. The jobs start in the order of the list. Each job starts at the earliest time that is no earlier than its release date, no earlier than the previous job's start, and at which some machine is free.
  • Delay List with parameter β>0\beta>0β>0 gives the schedule DDD. When a machine is idle, Delay List starts the first unscheduled job of the list if it has been released. If that job has not been released, the first released job of the list may jump ahead, but only once at least βpj\beta p_jβpj​ units of idle time (machine × time) have accumulated that no earlier job has charged. The job then charges exactly that amount. A job started in list order charges all uncharged idle time since its release.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 4.19

With P1P1P1 optimal, π\piπ its completion order, NNN the strict-order list schedule of π\piπ and DDD a Delay List schedule of π\piπ with β0=3−22\beta_0=\sqrt{3-2\sqrt2}β0​=3−22​​, every feasible schedule satisfies

min⁡(∑jCjN, ∑jCjD)≤22 ∑jCj∗.\min\Bigl(\sum_j C^N_j,\ \sum_j C^D_j\Bigr)\le 2\sqrt2\,\sum_j C^*_j .min(j∑​CjN​, j∑​CjD​)≤22​j∑​Cj∗​.

The printed lemma says 2.832.832.83. Its proof gives 22≈2.82842\sqrt2\approx2.828422​≈2.8284, which is stated here.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them:

  1. (4.2): if ∑jpj>α∑jCj∗\sum_j p_j>\alpha\sum_j C^*_j∑j​pj​>α∑j​Cj∗​ then ∑jrj≤(1−α)∑jCj∗\sum_j r_j\le(1-\alpha)\sum_j C^*_j∑j​rj​≤(1−α)∑j​Cj∗​.
  2. Lemma 3.1: ∑jCjP1≤∑jCj∗\sum_j C^{P1}_j\le\sum_j C^*_j∑j​CjP1​≤∑j​Cj∗​ for P1P1P1 optimal.
  3. (3.3): ∑jCjN≤2∑jCjP1+(1−1/m)∑jpj\sum_j C^N_j\le 2\sum_j C^{P1}_j+(1-1/m)\sum_j p_j∑j​CjN​≤2∑j​CjP1​+(1−1/m)∑j​pj​ for any P1P1P1.
  4. Lemma 3.2: ∑jCjN≤(3−1/m)∑jCj∗\sum_j C^N_j\le(3-1/m)\sum_j C^*_j∑j​CjN​≤(3−1/m)∑j​Cj∗​.
  5. Theorem 4.9, specialised to no precedence constraints. With BiB_iBi​ the jobs at or before JiJ_iJi​ in the list,
CiD≤(1+β)p(Bi)m+(1+1β)(ri+pi)−piβ.C^D_i\le\frac{(1+\beta)p(B_i)}{m}+\Bigl(1+\frac1\beta\Bigr)(r_i+p_i)-\frac{p_i}{\beta}.CiD​≤m(1+β)p(Bi​)​+(1+β1​)(ri​+pi​)−βpi​​.
  1. Lemma 4.18: ∑jCjD≤(2+β)∑jCj∗+1β∑jrj\sum_j C^D_j\le(2+\beta)\sum_j C^*_j+\frac1\beta\sum_j r_j∑j​CjD​≤(2+β)∑j​Cj∗​+β1​∑j​rj​.
  2. The balanced bound: under (4.2)'s hypothesis, ∑jCjD≤(2+β+(1−α)/β)∑jCj∗\sum_j C^D_j\le(2+\beta+(1-\alpha)/\beta)\sum_j C^*_j∑j​CjD​≤(2+β+(1−α)/β)∑j​Cj∗​.
  3. The constants: at α=22−2\alpha=2\sqrt2-2α=22​−2 and β=3−22\beta=\sqrt{3-2\sqrt2}β=3−22​​, 2+α=2+β+(1−α)/β=222+\alpha=2+\beta+(1-\alpha)/\beta=2\sqrt22+α=2+β+(1−α)/β=22​.

Two existence statements accompany them. One says an optimal P1P1P1 exists. The other says a Delay List schedule exists for every list and every β>0\beta>0β>0.

Significance

The result gives a 222\sqrt222​-approximation for P∣rj∣∑CjP|r_j|\sum C_jP∣rj​∣∑Cj​ that is simple to state and runs in O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) time. It improves the 2.89+ϵ2.89+\epsilon2.89+ϵ bound of Chakrabarti et al. Neither of its two algorithms achieves the ratio alone. It comes from an analysis in which each algorithm is good exactly when the other is bad. List scheduling is good when processing times are small relative to the optimum. Delay List is good when release dates are small. The inequality (4.2) connects the two cases.

The component results are reusable beyond this paper. The one-machine relaxation lower bound (Lemma 3.1) and the (3−1/m)(3-1/m)(3−1/m) bound for list scheduling from it (Lemma 3.2) apply to any conversion from a fast single machine. The per-job bound of Theorem 4.9 is the core of the Delay List technique. Its general form, with precedence constraints, drives the paper's results for precedence-constrained scheduling.

All results are proved in the paper. None of them has a machine-checked proof that this mission knows of. A formalization would check the Delay List charging argument, which the paper states only in discrete time and adapts to continuous time in one sentence. It would also produce reusable Lean definitions of parallel-machine schedules with release dates and of list scheduling.

Difficulty

The arithmetic of the goal is routine once the milestones are in place. The substance lies in two places.

The first is Lemma 3.1 together with the "standard makespan argument" behind (3.2). The one-machine relaxation must be related to the mmm-machine schedule, and to the list schedule, with care about release dates. In particular, in the list schedule every machine is busy between the last release among the first jjj jobs of the list and the start of the jjj-th job. Proving this needs the strict order.

The second, and harder, is Theorem 4.9. The obvious argument bounds the waiting time of job JiJ_iJi​ by the work of the jobs ahead of it, but Delay List lets later jobs jump ahead. The idle time before JiJ_iJi​ starts and the work of the jobs that jump ahead of it must both be controlled, and the paper's charging argument for this depends on where charged idle time lies on the time axis and on which jobs charged it. Making that bookkeeping precise for a continuous-time algorithm is the main formalization cost.

Formalization scope

Jobs are Fin n and machines Fin m with m≥1m\ge1m≥1. Times are real, processing times are positive and release dates nonnegative. There are no weights and no precedence constraints. "Optimal" is never an infimum. Every bound is stated against every feasible nonpreemptive schedule, and P1P1P1's optimality is the hypothesis that its total completion time is at most that of every preemptive schedule of I1I1I1.

Committed conventions:

  • Preemptive schedules of I1I1I1 are rate functions, so the machine of I1I1I1 may be shared. The paper's one-job-at-a-time schedules are a special case.
  • Lists are bijections Fin n ≃ Fin n. A list of P1P1P1 may break ties in completion time in any way, and every such list is covered.
  • NNN is the strict-order variant of list scheduling, which footnote 3 of the paper contrasts with the greedy variant used in §4. It is a recursive definition over list positions.
  • Delay List is the continuous-time algorithm, as adopted in the proof of Fact 4.6. It is a predicate on start times, machines, the scheduling order and charge windows. A job scheduled out of order takes its charge from the most recent uncharged idle time; the paper leaves this placement open. Theorem 4.9 and Lemma 4.18 assume m≥2m\ge2m≥2, the setting of §4.1. The goal assumes only m≥1m\ge1m≥1.
  • The printed Lemma 4.18 lacks a ∑j\sum_j∑j​ on the C∗C^*C∗ term. The summed form of its proof's last display is stated.

The statement cannot be made easy by the hypotheses. Two existence items show that an optimal P1P1P1 and a Delay List schedule always exist, so no statement is vacuous. The bound is against every feasible schedule, not against the relaxation's value.

Not stated: the O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n)O(nlogn) running time, the on-line version of §3's algorithm, and Delay List with precedence constraints (Theorem 4.9 in general, which is the subject of mission III of this series). Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and reusable lemmas on list scheduling with release dates.

Selected references

  • C. Chekuri, R. Motwani, B. Natarajan, C. Stein, Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling, SIAM J. Comput. 31(1):146–166, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539797327180
  • S. Chakrabarti, C. A. Phillips, A. S. Schulz, D. B. Shmoys, C. Stein, J. Wein, Improved scheduling algorithms for minsum criteria, in Proceedings of ICALP 1996, LNCS 1099, Springer, pp. 646–657 (reference [3] of the paper).
  • F. Afrati et al., Approximation schemes for minimizing average weighted completion time with release dates, in Proceedings of the 40th IEEE FOCS, 1999, pp. 32–43 (reference [2] of the paper).
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CombinatoricsOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling I: Best-α on One Machine with Release DatesResearch Paper

Motivation

Minimizing the average completion time of jobs that arrive over time is one of the basic objectives of machine scheduling: it measures how long, on average, a job waits in the system. On a single machine with release dates and no preemption (written 1∣rj∣∑Cj1|r_j|\sum C_j1∣rj​∣∑Cj​), the problem is strongly NP-hard, so research has focused on approximation algorithms whose guarantees are stated against every feasible schedule.

The standard route runs through the preemptive relaxation. When jobs may be interrupted and resumed, the shortest-remaining-processing-time rule (SRPT) produces an optimal schedule, and its value is a lower bound for every nonpreemptive schedule. The question is how to turn that preemptive schedule into a nonpreemptive one without losing too much.

Timeline:

  • 1995, Phillips, Stein and Wein (WADS 1995, pp. 86–97): order the jobs by their SRPT completion times and schedule them nonpreemptively in that order. This gives a 2-approximation. Later 2-approximations are by Hoogeveen and Vestjens (IPCO 1996), Stougie (1995), and Goemans (SODA 1997). Hoogeveen and Vestjens also showed that deterministic on-line algorithms cannot beat 2.
  • 2001, Chekuri, Motwani, Natarajan and Stein (SIAM J. Comput. 31(1)): order by α\alphaα-points instead of completion times, choose α\alphaα at random, and take the best α\alphaα off-line. This gives the e/(e−1)≈1.58e/(e-1)\approx1.58e/(e−1)≈1.58 bound for Best-α\alphaα that is the goal of this mission, and an optimal randomized on-line algorithm.
  • 1999, Afrati et al. (FOCS 1999): a polynomial-time approximation scheme for 1∣rj∣∑wjCj1|r_j|\sum w_jC_j1∣rj​∣∑wj​Cj​. This settled the approximability of the problem, but the resulting algorithms are far from simple.

Setting

An instance has nnn jobs J0,…,Jn−1J_0,\dots,J_{n-1}J0​,…,Jn−1​. Job JjJ_jJj​ has a processing time pj>0p_j>0pj​>0, a release date rj≥0r_j\ge0rj​≥0, and, where the objective is weighted, a weight wj>0w_j>0wj​>0. There is one machine.

A nonpreemptive schedule assigns each job a start time Sj≥rjS_j\ge r_jSj​≥rj​ such that the intervals [Sj,Sj+pj)[S_j,S_j+p_j)[Sj​,Sj​+pj​) are pairwise disjoint. Its completion times are Cj=Sj+pjC_j=S_j+p_jCj​=Sj​+pj​.

A preemptive schedule PPP specifies, for each time ttt, which job runs at ttt, if any. Job JjJ_jJj​ runs only at times t≥max⁡(0,rj)t\ge\max(0,r_j)t≥max(0,rj​), receives exactly pjp_jpj​ units of processing in total, and finishes by some finite time. Its completion time CjPC^P_jCjP​ is the first time by which all of JjJ_jJj​ has been processed. For α∈(0,1]\alpha\in(0,1]α∈(0,1], its α\alphaα-point CjP(α)C^P_j(\alpha)CjP​(α) is the first time by which αpj\alpha p_jαpj​ units have been processed.

For a job JiJ_iJi​, TiT_iTi​ denotes the idle time of PPP before CiPC^P_iCiP​. xijx_{ij}xij​ denotes the fraction of JjJ_jJj​ processed before CiPC^P_iCiP​. The paper writes SiP(β)S^P_i(\beta)SiP​(β) for the set of jobs with xij=βx_{ij}=\betaxij​=β, and also for their total processing time.

One-machine list scheduling in a given order runs the jobs nonpreemptively in that order. Each job starts at the later of its release date and the completion of the previous job in the list. An α\alphaα-schedule is list scheduling in nondecreasing order of the α\alphaα-points CjP(α)C^P_j(\alpha)CjP​(α). CjαC^\alpha_jCjα​ denotes the completion times of an α\alphaα-schedule.

Random-α\alphaα draws α\alphaα from a distribution on (0,1](0,1](0,1] and outputs the α\alphaα-schedule. Best-α\alphaα outputs the α\alphaα-schedule of smallest total completion time min⁡α∑jCjα\min_\alpha\sum_j C^\alpha_jminα​∑j​Cjα​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2.7

Let PPP be optimal among preemptive schedules for ∑jCj\sum_j C_j∑j​Cj​. Then there is α∈(0,1]\alpha\in(0,1]α∈(0,1] such that every α\alphaα-schedule derived from PPP satisfies

∑jCjα  ≤  ee−1∑jCjfor every feasible nonpreemptive schedule (Cj)j.\sum_j C^\alpha_j\;\le\;\frac{e}{e-1}\sum_j C_j\qquad\text{for every feasible nonpreemptive schedule } (C_j)_j .j∑​Cjα​≤e−1e​j∑​Cj​for every feasible nonpreemptive schedule (Cj​)j​.

Since Best-α\alphaα returns a schedule no worse than this α\alphaα-schedule, Best-α\alphaα is an e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1)-approximation.

Milestones

  1. The calculus behind the constant. For f(α)=eα/(e−1)f(\alpha)=e^\alpha/(e-1)f(α)=eα/(e−1) and every β∈(0,1]\beta\in(0,1]β∈(0,1],
∫0β1+α−ββf(α) dα=1e−1.\int_0^\beta\frac{1+\alpha-\beta}{\beta}f(\alpha)\,d\alpha=\frac1{e-1}.∫0β​β1+α−β​f(α)dα=e−11​.
  1. Lemma 2.2: CiP=Ti+∑0<β≤1βSiP(β)C^P_i=T_i+\sum_{0<\beta\le1}\beta S^P_i(\beta)CiP​=Ti​+∑0<β≤1​βSiP​(β).
  2. Lemma 2.3: Ciα≤Ti+(1+α)∑β≥αSiP(β)+∑β<αβSiP(β)C^\alpha_i\le T_i+(1+\alpha)\sum_{\beta\ge\alpha}S^P_i(\beta)+\sum_{\beta<\alpha}\beta S^P_i(\beta)Ciα​≤Ti​+(1+α)∑β≥α​SiP​(β)+∑β<α​βSiP​(β).
  3. Lemma 2.5: if α\alphaα has density fff on (0,1](0,1](0,1], then E[Ciα]≤(1+δ)CiPE[C^\alpha_i]\le(1+\delta)C^P_iE[Ciα​]≤(1+δ)CiP​ with δ=max⁡0<β≤1∫0β1+α−ββf(α) dα\delta=\max_{0<\beta\le1}\int_0^\beta\frac{1+\alpha-\beta}{\beta}f(\alpha)\,d\alphaδ=max0<β≤1​∫0β​β1+α−β​f(α)dα.
  4. Theorem 2.6, for the weighted objective with PPP optimal among preemptive schedules: the expected approximation ratio of Random-α\alphaα is at most 222 for uniform α\alphaα, at most 1.81.81.8 for α=1\alpha=1α=1 w.p. 3/53/53/5 and α=1/2\alpha=1/2α=1/2 w.p. 2/52/52/5, and at most e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) for the density eα/(e−1)e^\alpha/(e-1)eα/(e−1).

Companion statements, not milestones:

  • the upper bound of Theorem 2.1, ∑jCjα≤(1+1/α)∑jCjP\sum_jC^\alpha_j\le(1+1/\alpha)\sum_jC^P_j∑j​Cjα​≤(1+1/α)∑j​CjP​;
  • the existence of an optimal preemptive schedule.

Significance

The e/(e−1)e/(e-1)e/(e−1) bound shows that conversion from the preemptive relaxation can beat the factor 2 of the natural ordering. It does so by exploiting that no single instance is bad for many values of α\alphaα at once. The α\alphaα-point technique was also used with LP relaxations, for example by Goemans (SODA 1997) and by Schulz and Skutella. The randomized version is an optimal randomized on-line algorithm for 1∣rj∣∑Cj1|r_j|\sum C_j1∣rj​∣∑Cj​. Lemma 2.3 is a statement about any preemptive schedule, so it applies wherever a good preemptive or fractional schedule is available.

All results of the mission are proved in the paper, except that the proof of Theorem 2.6, part 2 is omitted there. No machine-checked proof of them is known. A complete development would give a verified model of preemptive one-machine schedules, α\alphaα-points and list scheduling, together with the averaging argument over α\alphaα. These are reusable for the later results of the same paper and for the α\alphaα-point literature.

Difficulty

The obvious argument bounds each job's α\alphaα-schedule completion time directly against its preemptive completion time. That argument loses a factor 1+1/α1+1/\alpha1+1/α (Theorem 2.1), which is at least 2 for every fixed α\alphaα. The improvement needs Lemma 2.3. There the charge to each job depends on how much of it was done by CiPC^P_iCiP​ relative to α\alphaα, and the idle time TiT_iTi​ is not inflated at all. Proving Lemma 2.3 requires reasoning about a preemptive schedule as a measure on time, and about how moving pieces of jobs changes completion times. A proof that treats the preemptive schedule as a finite list of pieces must first show that nothing is lost by this discretization.

The averaging step needs the expectation over α\alphaα to be an honest integral. The map α↦Ciα\alpha\mapsto C^\alpha_iα↦Ciα​ must be shown integrable, which requires a fixed rule for ties between equal α\alphaα-points.

Formalization scope

  • Model. Jobs are Fin n, time is real, pj>0p_j>0pj​>0 and rj≥0r_j\ge0rj​≥0. The paper admits pj=0p_j=0pj​=0 only in its tightness instances.
    • A preemptive schedule is a function σ:R→\sigma:\mathbb R\toσ:R→ Option (Fin n) (none = idle). Each job's run set is measurable, lies in [max⁡(0,rj),∞)[\max(0,r_j),\infty)[max(0,rj​),∞), is bounded above, and has Lebesgue measure pjp_jpj​.
    • Completion times and α\alphaα-points are infima of nonempty sets that are bounded below.
    • TiT_iTi​ is the measure of the idle set in [0,CiP)[0,C^P_i)[0,CiP​).
    • The paper's sums over β\betaβ are sums over jobs, weighted by the fraction xijx_{ij}xij​.
  • List scheduling is strict: jobs never overtake the list order, and the machine is free from time 000.
    • Lemma 2.3, Theorem 2.1, Theorem 2.6.2 and the goal hold for every tie-break among equal α\alphaα-points.
    • The expectations (Lemma 2.5, Theorem 2.6.1 and 2.6.3) use the tie-break by job index. They assert integrability as part of the conclusion.
  • Optimality. "Approximation ratio ccc" is stated as an inequality against every feasible nonpreemptive schedule, never against an infimum.
    • The optimality of PPP among preemptive schedules is the paper's standing assumption for its upper bounds (p. 151). It appears as a hypothesis of Theorem 2.6 and of the goal.
    • The lemmas hold for arbitrary PPP and do not carry it.
    • An existence statement shows the hypothesis can be met.
  • Lemma 2.5's δ\deltaδ is replaced by any upper bound of the integrals over β∈(0,1]\beta\in(0,1]β∈(0,1]. This is equivalent, and it avoids assuming that the maximum is attained.
  • Not stated:
    • the running time O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) of Best-α\alphaα and the optimality of SRPT;
    • the tightness parts of Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.4, and the lower bounds of Theorem 2.9, which use zero-length jobs;
    • the on-line Theorem 2.8, which needs a model of on-line algorithms.
  • Trivializing formalization ruled out. Dropping the optimality of PPP from the goal would turn it into a statement about arbitrary preemptive schedules, which is Lemma 2.5, not Corollary 2.7. Comparing against ∑jCjP\sum_jC^P_j∑j​CjP​ instead of every nonpreemptive schedule would likewise remove the content of the corollary.

Contributions are welcome at every level. The calculus milestone and Lemma 2.2 are good first targets.

Selected references

  • C. Chekuri, R. Motwani, B. Natarajan, C. Stein, Approximation Techniques for Average Completion Time Scheduling, SIAM J. Comput. 31(1):146–166, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539797327180
  • C. Phillips, C. Stein, J. Wein, Scheduling jobs that arrive over time, Proc. 4th Workshop on Algorithms and Data Structures (WADS), 1995, pp. 86–97 (reference [25] of the paper; no link verified).
  • J. A. Hoogeveen, A. P. A. Vestjens, Optimal on-line algorithms for single-machine scheduling, Proc. 5th IPCO, 1996, pp. 404–414 (reference [21]; no link verified).
  • M. X. Goemans, Improved approximation algorithms for scheduling with release dates, Proc. 8th ACM-SIAM SODA, 1997, pp. 591–598 (reference [12]; no link verified).
  • F. Afrati et al., Approximation schemes for minimizing average weighted completion time with release dates, Proc. 40th FOCS, 1999 (reference [2]; no link verified).
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Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

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