Secretary Problems: Weights and Discounts 1: An (8+3e)-Competitive Algorithm for the Weighted Secretary ProblemResearch Paper
Motivation
The classical secretary problem asks how to select one valuable candidate when candidates arrive in random order and a decision must be made when each candidate appears. Many allocation settings have several goods of unequal quality instead of a single position. An employer may have roles of different desirability, or a seller may have placements with different visibility. In the weighted secretary problem, an agent's value is multiplied by the weight of the good assigned to that agent. The algorithm must decide irrevocably as agents arrive, while the benchmark sees every value before assigning goods. Babaioff, Dinitz, Gupta, Immorlica and Talwar study this model with arbitrary fixed agent values and a uniformly random arrival order, and give a constant competitive ratio independent of the number of agents and goods (authors' version, §§2–3).
The paper also studies time discounts and matroid constraints. This mission concerns its weighted-goods result, Theorem 3.4. The result combines an online allocation rule for several comparably valuable agents with the familiar one-choice secretary rule for an unusually valuable agent. These are distinct ways in which the sorted offline assignment can earn value; both are present even when the weights are fixed in advance. The weighted model matters because matching a valuable agent to an unsuitable good can lose value despite accepting the right agent.
Setting
There are agents , each with a nonnegative value , and goods indexed in decreasing order of nonnegative weight:
An assignment gives each good to at most one agent, and each agent receives at most one good. A good may remain unassigned, represented by with . Its value is . Agent values are arbitrary, not drawn independently from a distribution. The uncertainty is the arrival order , chosen uniformly from all permutations; an agent's value becomes visible on arrival, and an allocation decision cannot be revised.
The offline optimum, , assigns the heaviest good to the highest-valued agent, the next good to the next agent, and so on. If , the extra goods remain unassigned. A consistent tie break makes the ordering unique without changing the numerical value. This sorted assignment is defined directly; the mission does not replace it with an unconstrained variable said to be optimal.
The reservation algorithm draws a sample size , observes the first agents without allocation, and retains the best sampled agents. Positive values are grouped into value classes for integer . A sampled agent in class reserves one good in that class's contiguous block, with higher classes receiving heavier blocks. A later agent receives the heaviest unassigned good reserved for its class when one is available. The classical secretary rule instead observes the first agents, then selects the first later arrival better than every predecessor; its winner receives good .
Formalization targets
The mission's goal is the exact guarantee of Theorem 3.4 for Algorithm , which runs the reservation algorithm with probability and the classical rule with probability :
Here the expectation covers the uniform arrival permutation, the independent binomial sample size used by the reservation branch, and the mixing coin. The multiplicative inequality expresses competitiveness even when an expected payoff is zero. It uses the explicit constant in the paper's proof rather than an instance-dependent or unspecified constant.
Four source results form the milestones. The classical secretary rule selects the maximum with probability at least . Lemma 3.2 compares the starting indices and of class- blocks in the reservation and optimum assignments. Lemma 3.1 says that if the optimum assigns at least two agents from class , the reservation rule assigns at least agents from that class in expectation. Lemma 3.3 converts this to expected value at least . The target retains the paper's class condition and both numerical fractions (authors' version, pp. 4–5).
Significance
Theorem 3.4 supplies a constant factor guarantee for irrevocable allocation when goods have different weights and agents arrive in random order. The factor does not grow with or . It separates the effects of uncertain arrivals from the offline matching of high values to high weights, and it supplies a benchmark for later variants with more complicated feasibility constraints. The paper extends the reservation idea to additional combinatorial settings, including partition-matroid variants in Appendix C (authors' version, Appendix C).
The theorem is proved in the source paper, while the Lean statements in this mission are proof obligations. Formalizing them requires checking that the random-order model, sample distribution, tie convention and assignments jointly express the same algorithm. A complete development will also establish reusable finite-average facts for random permutations and binomial samples, and structural facts about sorted assignments and reserved blocks. Those pieces can support other secretary problems in the series; the mission's specific promise remains the weighted algorithm's exact bound.
Difficulty
A count of how many agents a class receives does not by itself control the weighted value of those goods. Goods have unequal weights, and the value of assigning the next good changes with its position in a block. A class whose offline optimum receives several agents can also lose all its sampled members from the allocation phase. Thus a direct comparison of expected class counts with expected class values is insufficient. The paper's separate count, block-position and value statements identify the claims a solver must establish; the final theorem must also account for classes represented only once in the offline assignment (authors' version, p. 5).
Formalization scope
Agents and goods are Fin n and Fin K; their indices start at zero in Lean, so paper time corresponds to Lean index . An arrival permutation maps time to agent. Values and weights are real and explicitly nonnegative, and weights are antitone in the good index. The finite sums defining expectations are normalized by for permutations and by for sample sizes. No measurability or integration convention is needed. For the goal, makes the heaviest good available; is allowed.
Equal values are ordered by smaller original agent index throughout the sorted optimum, the sample's top agents and the classical rule. The classical rule observes exactly arrivals, and zero-valued agents reserve no value-class goods. Positive values below one use negative integer class indices. The paper says only that class holds the values “between” and (p. 4, and again in Appendix C, p. 12); the mission fixes the half-open interval , so that the classes partition the positive reals (authors' version, pp. 4, 12). A reservation assignment is built from each post-sample agent's rank within its class, so a good is offered to at most one such agent. The theorem is about this concrete algorithm and the concrete sorted offline assignment; an arbitrary favorable policy or an optimum supplied as a hypothesis would not express the source result.
The development needs a finite assignment interface, a tie-aware rank order, value classes, the two online rules, and normalized finite expectations. The assignment and finite-average definitions are reusable. Contributions that prove the structural validity of the reservation assignment, the classical success guarantee, Lemmas 3.1–3.3, or the final combination all advance the stated target.
Selected references
- Moshe Babaioff, Michael Dinitz, Anupam Gupta, Nicole Immorlica and Kunal Talwar, Secretary Problems: Weights and Discounts, Proceedings of SODA 2009; authors' full version, proceedings DOI.