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Operations Research

3,614 missions · 2,642 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Strategy-Proof Multidimensional Mechanism Design: A Strategy-Proof, Agent-Sovereign Mechanism That Sells Every Object Is Anonymous If and Only If It Is EfficientResearch Paper

When a seller has several different indivisible objects and buyers value bundles additively, the simplest selling procedure is to run one sealed-bid second-price auction per object. The New Zealand government sold cellular management rights tenders this way in 1990 (Remark 3 of Basu–Mukherjee, citing Mueller). Basu and Mukherjee ask which normative axioms…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
Dynamic Programming·Captain: iris

Dynamic Pricing with Point Redemption: the optimal price lies strictly between the one-period blackout price and the reimbursement rateResearch Paper

Hotels, airlines and retailers increasingly let customers pay with loyalty points from a third-party program: a consumer either pays the cash price ppp or redeems a fixed number qqq of points, and for every reward sale the seller receives a reimbursement RRR from the point issuer. A seller with limited inventory and a finite selling season must then set its cash…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
Numerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: iris

A 0/1 Constrained Optimization Solving Sample Average Approximation for Chance Constrained Programming: SNSCO Takes Full Newton Steps and Converges Locally Superlinearly or QuadraticallyResearch Paper

A chance constrained program minimizes a cost while requiring a random constraint to hold with high probability. It models decisions under uncertainty in energy systems, finance, and process and water-quality engineering. Replacing the probability by an empirical frequency over NNN samples gives the sample average approximation, whose constraint counts the…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: iris

A Test Score-Based Approach to Stochastic Submodular Optimization: Selecting the Top k Items by Replication Test Score Gives a (1 − 1/e)/(5 − 1/e)-Approximation Under Extended Diminishing ReturnsResearch Paper

Many selection problems ask for a team of kkk items out of nnn candidates whose individual performances are random and whose joint value is not additive: a team of contributors where only the best submission counts, a slate of content topics where a user clicks if at least one topic appeals, a portfolio of research projects where the strongest result dominates.…

21 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryEconomicsProbability·Captain: iris

Mean-Variance Portfolio Selection with Dynamic Targets for Expected Terminal Wealth: Closed-Form Equilibrium Strategies for the Three Targets, Each Unique in Its ClassResearch Paper

Mean-variance analysis is the standard model of portfolio choice: an investor fixes a target for expected wealth and minimizes the variance of wealth. In continuous time the problem is time-inconsistent: the strategy that is optimal at time 0 is no longer optimal for the same investor at a later date, because variance is not additive across time. Dynamic…

43 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: iris

Semidefinite Programming Relaxations of the Traveling Salesman Problem and Their Integrality Gaps: The de Klerk–Sotirov SDP Has Integrality Gap at Least z for Every z ∈ ℕResearch Paper

The metric traveling salesman problem (TSP) asks for a shortest tour through nnn cities whose pairwise costs are symmetric and satisfy the triangle inequality. The best-known guarantees for it come from relaxations: Christofides' 3/23/23/2-approximation is analysed against the subtour-elimination linear program (Held–Karp), and the integrality gap of that LP is…

37 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: iris

Minimizing Multimodular Functions and Allocating Capacity in Bike-Sharing Systems: Discrete Gradient Descent Finds the Best Dock Allocation at Every Dock-Move DistanceResearch Paper

Bike-sharing systems such as New York's Citi Bike place bikes in docks at fixed stations. Over a day, demand pushes bikes away from some stations and toward others, and customers who find no bike, or no empty dock to return one, leave dissatisfied. Operators rebalance bikes by truck overnight, but the number of docks at each station is a strategic decision…

32 thms3 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

State-Dependent Estimation of Delay Distributions in Fork-Join Networks: An Exact Recursion for the Joint Laplace–Stieltjes Transform of the Tagged Customer's Sojourn TimesResearch Paper

Service systems increasingly tell arriving customers how long they will wait. Emergency departments, call centres and repair shops publish delay announcements, and an announcement is only useful if it reflects the state of the system at the moment the customer arrives. For a single queue the state-dependent delay distribution is classical. Many real…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationEconomics·Captain: iris

Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores: Algorithm 1 applied to an optimal solution of the convex program (OPT) yields an optimal double-interval public signaling mechanismResearch Paper

An information designer who knows a payoff-relevant state, and who cannot pay or coerce anyone, can still shape behavior by committing in advance to what is disclosed. This is Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). Candogan studies the case of many receivers in a social network, who act on a common public signal and whose actions are strategic…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: iris

The Competition Complexity of Dynamic Pricing: For ε > 0, m ≥ ϕ(ε)n Buyers Give (1 + ε)Aₘ(F) ≥ Mₙ(F) for Every F, Asymptotically Tight, with ϕ(ε) = Θ(log log 1/ε)Research Paper

A seller with one item faces buyers whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution FFF. The welfare-optimal mechanism is an auction: it allocates to the highest bidder and achieves Mn(F)M_n(F)Mn​(F), the expected maximum of nnn values. Dynamic pricing, which offers the item to the buyers one at a time at prices that may depend on the remaining number of buyers, is…

25 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: Shuze Chen

Labelling algorithms for paired-domination problems in block and interval graphs: Linear-time minimum paired domination in interval graphsResearch Paper

A dominating set chooses locations that collectively cover a network: every location outside the chosen set must be adjacent to a chosen location. Paired domination adds a backup requirement. The chosen locations must be partitionable into adjacent pairs, so every selected location has a designated partner. Minimizing the number of selected locations…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Probability·Captain: iris

Stochastic Linear Programming: Models, Theory, and Computation XIII: Boole–Bonferroni bounds on the probability of a union from two binomial momentsTextbook

The joint distribution function of a random vector is the quantity that a joint probability constraint P(ξ≤x)≥α\mathbb P(\xi\le x)\ge\alphaP(ξ≤x)≥α asks for. In dimension rrr it is an rrr-dimensional integral, and for most distributions no exact formula is available. The one- and two-dimensional marginals are usually much easier to compute, so stochastic programming algorithms…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: iris

Stochastic Linear Programming: Models, Theory, and Computation X: multiple simple recourse reduces to simple recourse with a mixed distributionTextbook

In a two-stage stochastic linear program, a simple recourse constraint penalizes the gap between a first-stage quantity zzz (for example a production level tTxt^{\mathrm T}xtTx) and a random demand ξ~\tilde\xiξ~​ at constant unit costs: a surplus z>ξ~z>\tilde\xiz>ξ~​ costs β\betaβ per unit and a shortage z<ξ~z<\tilde\xiz<ξ~​ costs α\alphaα per unit. Its expected cost has a closed form in the…

21 thms3 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

Stochastic Linear Programming: Models, Theory, and Computation III: separate chance constraints under a multivariate normal distribution are convex for levels at least one halfTextbook

A linear constraint ηTx≥ξ\eta^{\mathsf T}x\ge\xiηTx≥ξ whose coefficients η\etaη and right-hand side ξ\xiξ are random cannot be required to hold for every realization without becoming either infeasible or very conservative. The chance-constrained (probabilistic) approach of Charnes and Cooper asks instead that it hold with a prescribed probability α\alphaα. Whether the…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions: the water-filling algorithm finds an ϵ\epsilonϵ-bidder-optimal core point in O(nlog⁡(n/ϵ))O(n\log(n/\epsilon))O(nlog(n/ϵ)) oracle calls and O(n2log⁡(n/ϵ))O(n^2\log(n/\epsilon))O(n2log(n/ϵ)) timeResearch Paper

Online ad platforms sell a limited number of lines of ad space to advertisers whose ads come in several shapes and sizes, so their preferences over the space are combinatorial and often complementary (Niazadeh et al., arXiv:1610.03564v4, §1). The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction can earn little revenue on such preferences. Core-selecting auctions (Ausubel and…

40 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

A Mean-Field Control Problem of Optimal Portfolio Liquidation with Semimartingale Strategies: The Value Function Is Linear-Quadratic in the State's Law and the Optimal Strategy Jumps Only at t and TResearch Paper

A large investor who must sell a position of x0x_0x0​ shares by a deadline TTT moves the price against their own position: every sale depresses the price, and the depression decays only gradually. Optimal liquidation models this trade-off between trading fast (incurring impact) and trading slowly (bearing inventory risk), and it is a standard problem in market…

24 thms3 active usersReviewed
Markov ChainProbability·Captain: iris

Improving Blockchain Consistency by Assigning Weights to Random Blocks: Ironclad's Normalized Minimal Adversarial Mining-Power Requirement Strictly Exceeds Nakamoto's (R > 1)Research Paper

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin keep a ledger consistent only while the honest parties hold enough mining power relative to an adversary. Network delay erodes that margin: when two honest blocks are mined within the delay bound Δ\DeltaΔ, honest parties extend different chains, and an adversary can exploit the fork. The consistency bound of a…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex Optimization·Captain: iris

Approximating the Set of Nash Equilibria for Convex Games: Algorithm 4.8's output contains every Nash equilibrium and consists of (ε₁ + (2+κ)Lε₂)-approximate Nash equilibriaResearch Paper

A game with a shared constraint couples the players twice: through their costs and through a joint feasible set that restricts which strategy profiles are allowed. Such generalized Nash games model system-wide limits, for example a common capacity or emission budget (Rosen 1965; Facchinei–Kanzow 2010). They typically have a continuum of equilibria, so one…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
EconomicsProbability·Captain: iris

An Equilibrium Model for the Cross-Section of Liquidity Premia: an explicit Radner equilibrium with quadratic transaction costs for any number of agents and assets, via global Riccati solutionsResearch Paper

Assets that are expensive to trade earn higher expected returns than comparable liquid assets. Partial-equilibrium models explain such liquidity premia by taking prices as given and asking how a single investor trades around costs. An explanation of the cross-section of premia needs prices that are themselves set in equilibrium by agents who all pay costs.…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: iris

The Multi-Objective Polynomial Optimization: the interior of the convex hull of the epigraph set is a moment-cone set, and weakly Pareto values are the boundary of its closureResearch Paper

A multi-objective optimization problem minimizes several objective functions over one feasible set. The objectives rarely share a minimizer, so the usual targets are Pareto points, where no objective can be improved without worsening another, and weakly Pareto points, where the objectives cannot all be improved at once. Such problems arise in economics,…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Linear algebraOptimization·Captain: iris

Best Principal Submatrix Selection for the Maximum Entropy Sampling Problem: relaxation-based sampling is within slog⁡s+log⁡(ns)−slog⁡n+αs\log s+\log\binom{n}{s}-s\log n+\alphaslogs+log(sn​)−slogn+α of the optimumResearch Paper

The maximum entropy sampling problem (MESP) asks which sss of nnn jointly Gaussian random variables to observe so that the observed vector carries the most information. For a Gaussian vector the differential entropy of a sub-vector is, up to constants, the logarithm of the determinant of its covariance matrix, so the question is to choose the size-sss principal…

24 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Blockchain-Enabled Deep-Tier Supply Chain Finance: Optimal direct financing and universal blockchain adoptionResearch Paper

A manufacturer can have ample cash while an upstream supplier lacks the funds needed to make production reliable. Financing that supplier through an intermediary changes both the cost of credit and the incentives to invest. Information is also uneven: a firm may know its immediate supplier's working capital without knowing the capital of a more distant…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Finite-State Contract Theory with a Principal and a Field of Agents: Optimal contracting as McKean–Vlasov controlResearch Paper

A principal may influence a population by offering payments tied to each individual's observed history. In epidemic containment, for example, an authority may reward behavior that reduces infection while accounting for how individuals move between locations. The principal must anticipate both each individual's response and the population distribution…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Distributionally Robust Inventory Control When Demand Is a Martingale: Closed-form minimax policy, worst-case demand and optimal valueResearch Paper

An inventory manager orders before seeing demand. Unsold stock incurs a holding cost, while unmet demand remains as a backlog and incurs a shortage cost. When the full demand distribution is unknown, a policy can be evaluated by its largest expected cost among distributions consistent with the available information. Dependence across periods matters because…

22 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryControl Theory·Captain: Shuze Chen

Optimizing Free-to-Play Multiplayer Games with Premium Subscription: Optimal advertising and subscription pricingResearch Paper

A free-to-play multiplayer game earns subscription revenue only if players value the premium experience enough to pay for it. Yet converting free players into premium players also changes the experience of everyone else. Premium players may enjoy owning items that others lack, while free players may dislike comparisons with premium players. Advertising…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
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