Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

Mechanism Design

269 missions · 158 completed

Often called reverse game theory, the branch of economics and game theory that designs the rules of a game so that self-interested agents, acting on private information, are led to a desired collective outcome. Here the goal is given and the mechanism is the unknown — engineering incentives so that truthful behavior is optimal — with applications from auctions and voting systems to market and internet-protocol design.

Missions

Open111Completed158All269
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives 2: The Producer's First-Best Value in Closed FormResearch Paper

Electricity demand response asks consumers to lower their consumption during price events, when generation is expensive or scarce. Field trials such as the Low Carbon London experiment showed that consumers do react to price signals, but that the reaction is erratic: the average consumption falls while its variability stays high, and a producer that has to…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design VIII: A Truthful Approximation Scheme for Bounded Scheduling with VerificationResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design asks for algorithms whose inputs are held by self-interested agents: the designer can pay the agents, and must choose payments so that each agent's own interest leads it to reveal what the algorithm needs. Nisan and Ronen introduced the framework with task scheduling on unrelated machines as the running example (Nisan–Ronen 2001)…

16 thms3 active users
Captain: mikedeng1

Information Pricing with Independent State-Contingent Payoffs: Simple vs. Optimal MechanismsResearch Paper

An information seller can tell a decision maker something about an uncertain state before she chooses an action. The seller's revenue depends on the buyer's private payoffs and on what she can already do without buying information. For a buyer choosing between acting and not acting, the ability to act using her prior knowledge creates a free alternative…

42 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Power and Limits of Money Burning in Bilateral TradeResearch Paper

In bilateral trade a seller owns one indivisible good and a buyer may want it. Each trader privately knows their own value. A mechanism asks both for reports and decides whether to trade and what each trader pays or receives. A mechanism is strongly budget-balanced (SBB) when the buyer's payment always equals the seller's receipt. It is weakly…

38 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Optimal Multi-Item Auctions with I.I.D. ValuesResearch Paper

A seller with several items and several buyers who wants the largest expected revenue faces the multi-item version of Myerson's problem. For one item, Myerson (1981) gives the answer in closed form for every prior. For several items, explicit optimal mechanisms are known only in special cases: two items under analytic conditions, a few uniform or…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The No-Menu Complexity of Revenue-Maximizing AuctionsResearch Paper

A revenue guarantee for an auction does not by itself say how much the seller and buyer must communicate. A familiar way to describe a deterministic auction is to give its menu of bundles and prices. That description treats the menu as already available to the buyer. When the seller chooses the menu using information unavailable to the buyer, learning…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: iris

How Many Votes Is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through Resource AugmentationResearch Paper

By the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975), every non-dictatorial voting rule with at least three possible winners can be manipulated: some voter, at some profile, obtains a strictly better winner by misreporting her ranking. The theorem says that manipulation is possible, but not how much it is worth. Berker, Conitzer, Hartman,…

54 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

At What Cost? (In)efficiency in First-Price Procurement AuctionsResearch Paper

A first-price procurement auction purchases one good or service by asking suppliers to submit prices simultaneously. The supplier quoting the lowest price wins and receives that price. A buyer concerned with productive efficiency cares about the selected supplier's actual cost, rather than the payment alone. The two can differ because suppliers bid…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Truthful Approximation for House Allocation and Rank-Maximal Matchings with TiesResearch Paper

In house allocation, agents rank objects and each agent can receive at most one object. A rule that chooses an allocation from reported rankings must account for the possibility that agents misreport. The mathematical question is how much allocation quality an incentive requirement necessarily costs. Zhang, Zhao, Xu, Xi and Zhao study this question both for…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Captain: mikedeng1

On the Menu Complexity of Consumer Utility MaximizationResearch Paper

Allocating a scarce service can require a recipient to incur a cost without giving the provider revenue: waiting, paperwork and other costly participation requirements are examples. Consumer utility measures the value of an allocation after subtracting those costs. A designer maximizing it must consider both who receives a service and what recipients must…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: iris

Convergent Dynamics in Second Price Autobidding GamesResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms sell impressions through repeated auctions in which advertisers do not bid by hand: an autobidder scales each value by a pacing multiplier αi∈[0,1]\alpha_i\in[0,1]αi​∈[0,1] so that the advertiser's spending stays within its budget. When every advertiser paces at once, the multipliers interact, and the natural steady state is a second-price…

68 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: iris

Second-Best Gains from Trade in Matching MarketsResearch Paper

Two-sided markets match buyers with sellers: labor markets, ride-sharing, advertising exchanges, procurement. If every buyer's value and every seller's cost were public, a designer would choose the feasible set of trades with the largest total surplus, the first best. Values and costs are private, and the Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem (Myerson and…

60 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: iris

The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent ItemsResearch Paper

A seller with mmm heterogeneous items faces nnn bidders. The revenue-optimal mechanism for this multi-item setting is in general randomized, hard to compute, and only Bayesian incentive compatible. Competition complexity measures how much a simple mechanism loses by asking a different question from approximation ratios: how many extra bidders must a simple…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism with Constant Maximin-Share GuaranteeResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods among agents with private additive valuations is a basic problem of algorithmic game theory: the agents' reports are the only input, so a rule that rewards misreporting cannot be fair with respect to the true values. A randomized mechanism is truthful in expectation (TIE) if no agent can raise her expected true value by…

43 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Lipschitz Stable Combinatorial AuctionsResearch Paper

Welfare-maximizing auctions are discontinuous. With two bidders and one item, the values (1+δ,1)(1+\delta,1)(1+δ,1) send the item to the first bidder and the values (1,1+δ)(1,1+\delta)(1,1+δ) send it to the second, however small δ\deltaδ is. Reports are often estimates, and sellers and buyers act on the probabilities of an allocation before it is realized, so such a jump makes plans…

57 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Price of Anarchy of Draft AuctionsResearch Paper

The draft auction of Devanur, Morgenstern and Syrgkanis (arXiv:1311.2820) sells mmm items in rounds. In each round every bidder names one per-item price and a set of remaining items, and the highest bidder takes her set at her price. It sits between two simple formats: the single-bid auction of Devanur, Morgenstern, Syrgkanis and Weinberg (doi:10.1145/2764468.…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design, RevisitedResearch Paper

In a combinatorial auction, mmm items are allocated among nnn bidders, each holding a private valuation of bundles, and the goal is high welfare ∑ivi(Si)\sum_i v_i(S_i)∑i​vi​(Si​). Two obstacles interact: the bidders must communicate for a good allocation to be found, and they may manipulate the protocol. A mechanism is truthful when following the prescribed strategy is an…

29 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Sharp Bounds for Truthful-in-Expectation SchedulingResearch Paper

In scheduling on unrelated machines, each of mmm indivisible jobs takes a possibly different processing time on each of nnn machines, and the goal is to minimize the makespan, the largest machine load. When the processing times are known, Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos give a polynomial-time 2-approximation. Nisan and Ronen (NR01) introduced the strategic version:…

48 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: iris

Optimal Auctions for Anchored Bidders under a Rational Revenue GuaranteeResearch Paper

Auctions are increasingly run on behalf of users by automated agents. Some of these agents behave like textbook rational bidders and play a Bayes–Nash equilibrium; others are anchored: they submit their user's value as the bid, whatever the mechanism. A seller facing both populations wants a mechanism that earns as much as possible from anchored bidders…

68 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

Tight bounds for fractional and randomized truthful schedulingResearch Paper

In scheduling on unrelated machines, mmm tasks are assigned to nnn machines, machine iii needs time tijt_{ij}tij​ for task jjj, and the goal is to minimize the makespan, the largest total processing time of a machine. Nisan and Ronen proposed this as the canonical problem of algorithmic mechanism design (NR01): each machine privately knows its row tit_iti​ and is paid by the…

36 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions: γ-Competitive Buyers in First-Price Auctions Get Liquid Welfare ≥ (LW* − O(n)(Reg+1))/(γ + 1/2 + O(1/γ))Research Paper

Most online advertising is sold through sequential auctions: one impression at a time, millions of times a day, and since 2019 increasingly by first-price rules (Won21). The advertisers who bid are budget-constrained, and they do not compute equilibria; their bids are set by learning algorithms that adjust a shading or pacing multiplier from round to round.…

27 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Distributionally Robust Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification: Under Markov Ambiguity, a Type-(ii) Favored-Agent Mechanism with Threshold at Its Maximal Type Is Pareto Robustly OptimalResearch Paper

A principal has one indivisible good to give to one of several agents. Each agent would put the good to a use whose value to the principal is that agent's private type; money cannot change hands, but the principal can inspect an agent at a cost and so learn his true type. Allocation problems of this kind arise wherever a budget, a slot or a license is…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing up Your Home?: The Core Respects Improvement, and an Allocation Proving It Is Found in Linear TimeResearch Paper

In a housing market, introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J. Math. Econ. 1974), every agent owns one indivisible good and the agents reallocate the goods among themselves. The model underlies kidney exchange programmes, where a patient–donor pair "owns" its donor and pairs exchange donors along cycles (Roth, Sönmez, Ünver, QJE 2004). A natural design…

23 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation: The Logit Transaction Fee Mechanism Is U-BNIC and 1-SCP, and UIR, Budget Feasible and Sybil-Proof for n ≥ λ₀kResearch Paper

A blockchain confirms a limited number of transactions per block. Users attach fees (bids) to their transactions; the block producer (the miner) chooses which transactions to include and collects some of the fees. The rule that maps bids to confirmations, payments and miner revenue is a transaction fee mechanism (TFM). Because the miner is itself a…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored Products: The Prior-Independent Competitive Ratio of Truthful Deterministic Mechanisms Is 1/nResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon, Walmart and Alibaba let sellers pay to have their products shown in sponsored slots. The platform decides which assortment of sellers to display to an arriving consumer, and the consumer then chooses among the displayed products. Unlike a standard ad auction, a seller's value from being shown depends on who else is shown:…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
PreviousPage 2 of 5Next

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me