Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

Mechanism Design

269 missions · 158 completed

Often called reverse game theory, the branch of economics and game theory that designs the rules of a game so that self-interested agents, acting on private information, are led to a desired collective outcome. Here the goal is given and the mechanism is the unknown — engineering incentives so that truthful behavior is optimal — with applications from auctions and voting systems to market and internet-protocol design.

Missions

Open111Completed158All269
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Generalization Guarantees for Multi-Item Profit Maximization: Pricing, Auctions, and Randomized Mechanisms: (d,t)-Delineable Classes Have Generalization Guarantee 120U√(9d ln(4dt)/N) + 4U√(2ln(4/δ)/N)Research Paper

A seller who knows the distribution of buyers' values can, in principle, compute a profit-maximizing mechanism. In practice the seller has data: past bids, or past purchases. Sample-based mechanism design picks a mechanism from a parameterized class using NNN samples from the unknown distribution. The output is only useful if profit on the samples predicts…

11 thms5 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: iris

Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: deferred acceptance is the only mechanism that is minimal-access stable, strategy-proof and minimal-access monotonicResearch Paper

In many school choice systems a school's priority over applicants has two layers: an absolute priority (an exam score, a grade point average, a lottery number) and a set of minimal-access rights (a sibling at the school, living in its walk zone). The standard practice is to merge the two into adjusted priorities: at each school, every student holding a…

21 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryFunctional AnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 1: A Value Pacing-Based Symmetric First Price Equilibrium ExistsResearch Paper

Most online advertising is sold by auction, one impression at a time, to advertisers who manage a budget over many auctions rather than a value for a single one. Since 2019 the major ad exchanges have moved from second price to first price auctions, in which the winner pays its own bid. A budget-constrained advertiser in a first price auction must therefore…

20 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large SupplyResearch Paper

Auctions that sell many identical units to many bidders, such as treasury bills, emission permits and advertising slots, are often run as multi-unit first-price auctions: the highest bids win and each winner pays its own bid. Bidders then shade their bids below their values. In equilibrium, a bidder with a higher value can lose to one with a lower value, so…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

A Constant-Factor Approximation to Multidimensional Consumer UtilityResearch Paper

In many allocation problems the designer cares about the welfare of the participants, not revenue: public housing, school seats, medical resources, or platforms that screen users through effort or waiting rather than money. Payments in these settings are "burned": they screen buyers but reach nobody. The designer then maximizes consumer utility, also called …

17 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryComplexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Mixed Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Correlated PriorsResearch Paper

A first-price auction awards a single item to a highest bidder and charges that bidder her own bid. Choosing a bid therefore involves predicting competitors' behavior. Researchers studying auction computation ask whether an equilibrium can be found efficiently from the publicly available description of bidders' information. The setting here allows their…

31 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuasion by PartsResearch Paper

An information designer may know the distribution of a system's total benefit while each observer sees only one contribution. A supplier can grade its own component; a regional office can evaluate its own market. A receiver combines these reports before deciding whether the total justifies action. The designer can commit to reporting rules in advance, but…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: iris

From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive ValuationsResearch Paper

A buyer with budget B>0B>0B>0 wants to buy services from nnn strategic sellers, each holding a private cost, so as to maximize a value function of the set it buys. This is budget-feasible mechanism design, introduced by Singer (2010). It models procurement in data markets, crowdsourcing and content ecosystems, and it departs from the classical setting because VCG…

58 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Supply-Sensitive Revenue Recovery under Unknown Buyer OrderResearch Paper

A seller with one copy of each of mmm items posts personalized item prices to independent buyers. Revenue benchmarks for this setting usually give every buyer full stock and bound expected allocations; the ex ante capped benchmark of Chawla, Rezvan, Teng and Tzamos (arXiv:2204.01962) and the buy-many benchmark of Chawla, Teng and Tzamos (arXiv:1902.10315) are…

29 thms4 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Power of Two Choices in Dynamic Pricing: As Good As Full Feedback, Instance-WiseResearch Paper

A seller with an unlimited supply of one product meets TTT customers in sequence. Each customer's value is drawn independently from a distribution FFF on [0,1][0,1][0,1] that the seller does not know, and the seller wants to earn, over the TTT rounds, nearly as much as the monopoly price pF∗p^*_FpF∗​ would earn if FFF were known. This dynamic pricing problem is a basic model of…

37 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryInformation TheoryMachine Learning·Captain: iris

Query-Sample Tradeoffs for Revenue MaximizationResearch Paper

A seller posting a price for a single item to a buyer with an unknown value distribution FFF wants a price whose revenue is close to optimal. Two kinds of data are available. A value sample reveals a buyer's value v∼Fv\sim Fv∼F exactly, as in historical bid data or surveys. A pricing query posts a price ppp and reveals only whether a fresh buyer buys, the bit …

36 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal Approximation: Taxes From the Poisson Relaxation of Minimum Social Cost Have Price of Anarchy at Most the Worst Hardness Factor sup ρ_ℓResearch Paper

In an atomic congestion game (Rosenthal, 1973) each of NNN agents chooses a set of resources, such as the edges of a route, and the cost of a resource depends on how many agents use it. Selfish choices are inefficient: the price of anarchy (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999) compares the social cost of the worst equilibrium with the minimum social cost, and…

39 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Pareto Frontier of Inefficiency in Mechanism Design: Second-Price Mechanisms with Relative Reserves Exactly Attain the PoA/PoS Frontier of Anonymous Task-Independent SchedulingResearch Paper

Scheduling tasks on unrelated machines is the problem with which algorithmic mechanism design began (Nisan and Ronen, 1999). The machines are selfish: each one knows its own processing times and may misreport them, and a mechanism must allocate the tasks and pay the machines so that the makespan stays low. For two decades the field studied truthful…

36 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryComplexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions: Computing a Welfare-Maximizing Core Outcome Is Σ₂ᵖ-HardResearch Paper

Many markets trade packages of indivisible goods between several buyers and several sellers at once: airport time slots, spectrum licences, transport capacity, emission permits. Such a market is a combinatorial exchange. Its operator chooses who trades which package and at which prices, and wants the outcome to be stable: no group of participants should be…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Shapley–Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange: With Strict Preferences the Unique Strong Core Allocation Respects ImprovementResearch Paper

In a kidney exchange programme a patient arrives with a willing but incompatible donor, and patients swap donors along cycles so that each patient receives a compatible kidney. The standard model of such swaps is the housing market of Shapley and Scarf (Shapley–Scarf 1974): each agent owns one indivisible object and the agents reallocate the objects among…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: iris

Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination, and Incentives: For Any Valuation Class Containing All Additive Valuations, No Feasible Share Dominates Every Self-Maximizing Feasible ShareResearch Paper

When indivisible goods are divided among nnn agents without money, a standard way to say what each agent deserves is a share: a number s(v,n)s(v,n)s(v,n) computed from the agent's own valuation vvv alone, with the promise that she receives a bundle worth at least that much. The best-known share is the maximin share (MMS) of Budish (2011): the value an agent could guarantee…

23 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: iris

On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items: for an Additive Buyer Whose Values Form a Markov Random Field, (2e4Δ+2) SRev+8(e4Δ+1) BRev≥Rev(D)(2e^{4\Delta}+\sqrt2)\,\mathrm{SRev}+8(e^{4\Delta}+1)\,\mathrm{BRev}\ge\mathrm{Rev}(D)(2e4Δ+2​)SRev+8(e4Δ+1)BRev≥Rev(D)Research Paper

A seller with nnn heterogeneous items faces one buyer whose values for the items are private and drawn from a known joint distribution DDD. The revenue-optimal mechanism for this problem is in general randomized, hard to describe, and sensitive to the details of DDD. Two simple mechanisms are used in practice: selling every item separately at its own posted price…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Pacing Equilibrium in First Price Auction Markets: Existence, uniqueness, and revenue maximization of first price pacing equilibriaResearch Paper

An advertiser buying many impressions must decide how to distribute a limited budget across auctions. Bidding the full value in every auction can exhaust the budget before all opportunities have been considered. A pacing multiplier scales an advertiser's bids by one common factor. The resulting allocation depends on other advertisers' multipliers as well as…

15 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Pricing with a Single Point: Closed-Form Maximin Ratio and Optimal Deterministic Price Against Regular and MHR DistributionsResearch Paper

A seller who has posted a price www for some time usually knows one number about demand: the conversion rate qqq, the fraction of customers who bought at www. Whether that single number is enough to price well, and how well, is a basic question of data-driven pricing. Allouah, Bahamou and Besbes (arXiv:2103.05611, Management Science 2023) answer it in a robust,…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Simple and Approximately Optimal Contracts for Payment for Ecosystem Services: A Linear Contract with Per-Unit Price k/2 Achieves at Least Half of the Optimal Contract PayoffResearch Paper

Payments for ecosystem services compensate landowners for conservation that a program values but cannot directly provide. A contract designer must decide how to pay when landowners differ in the amount of forest they would conserve without a payment. That baseline conservation type is privately known, so a contract can pay for forest that would have…

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization II: Under O-Learning, the Cheap-Signaling Separating Equilibrium Exists If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΛResearch Paper

Firms that customize products, especially in business-to-business and service markets, need to learn what each customer wants before designing for that customer. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (SSRN 3994319; published in Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025) compares two ways a seller can learn a customer's preference.…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 3: Mod-Cut&Choose Always Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium and Every One Is MMS and EFXResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods asks how to split a set of items among agents with different tastes so that nobody has a strong reason to complain. Fairness notions such as envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) and the maximin share (MMS) have been studied extensively as algorithmic targets: given the agents' valuations, compute an allocation satisfying the…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions V: A Posted-Price Mechanism Achieves an O(log n)-Approximation for Symmetric Submodular ValuationsResearch Paper

In budget-feasible procurement an auctioneer with a fixed budget BBB wants to buy services from strategic sellers whose costs are private. The auctioneer values sets of services through a valuation function vvv, and wants a mechanism that pays the sellers at most BBB in total while acquiring a set of nearly maximal value. The model was introduced by Singer (FOCS…

9 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design IV: The Fixed-Reserve Second-Price Auction Has Worst-Case Regret (n/(n+1))ⁿ at Its Best Reserve 1/(n+1)Research Paper

A seller who must auction one item without knowing how buyers value it needs a mechanism that performs acceptably against every plausible value distribution. Anunrojwong, Balseiro and Besbes (arXiv:2204.10478, Operations Research 2025) measure performance by regret: the expected revenue lost relative to a seller who knows the realized valuations and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 2: Selling Two I.I.D. Goods Separately Guarantees at Least e/(e + 1) ≈ 73% of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller with several goods can sell them one at a time or offer a mechanism that links allocation and payment across goods. Separate selling asks the seller to solve a one-good pricing problem for each item. A general mechanism can offer lotteries and menus whose outcomes depend on the buyer's whole valuation vector. The difference matters because the…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
PreviousPage 1 of 11Next

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me