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Mechanism Design

269 missions · 158 completed

Often called reverse game theory, the branch of economics and game theory that designs the rules of a game so that self-interested agents, acting on private information, are led to a desired collective outcome. Here the goal is given and the mechanism is the unknown — engineering incentives so that truthful behavior is optimal — with applications from auctions and voting systems to market and internet-protocol design.

Missions

Open111Completed158All269
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Online Advertising: Auction-Adjusted Greedy Deals Earn a Third of the Optimal Revenue, a Half Under Independent Valuations, at Non-Increasing PricesResearch Paper

Online publishers sell display-ad impressions in two ways: by real-time auction, and by preferred deals, contracts that give a buyer first look at impressions at a fixed price. Google's Preferred Deals service (Google Ad Exchange) is the model: a buyer who joins a deal may buy an impression at the agreed price before it reaches the open auction, and is…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

An Equivalence Between Wagering and Fair-Division Mechanisms: Allocation Mechanisms Are Exactly Weakly Budget-Balanced Wagering Mechanisms, with IC, Proportionality and Pareto Optimality PreservedResearch Paper

Two literatures study how to split a resource among agents who report private information. Fair division of divisible goods asks for allocations that are proportional, efficient and resistant to misreporting (Steinhaus 1948; Cole, Gkatzelis and Goel 2013). Wagering mechanisms let bettors with subjective beliefs about a future event bet against each other,…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities: A Strongly Budget-Balanced, Truthful, Individually Rational 1/3-Approximation for Matroid Double AuctionsResearch Paper

A two-sided market has sellers who hold goods and buyers who want them, each with a private value. A mechanism that reallocates the goods should be truthful (no agent gains by misreporting her value), individually rational (no agent is worse off for participating) and budget-balanced (the mechanism neither injects nor keeps money). Myerson and Satterthwaite…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes: Some Posted Price Mechanism Has Regret O(T^{(1+CW/(CW+1))/2}·√log|Γ|) on Every DRACC InstanceResearch Paper

A seller who allocates resources that appear and expire over time (machine slots in a cloud, rooms on given nights, edges of a matching market that change from round to round) often cannot run an auction for every user. A posted price mechanism announces prices before the user arrives and lets the user buy her preferred bundle; it is truthful for myopic…

20 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round: Oblivious Rounding Turns a (λ,μ)(\lambda, \mu)(λ,μ)-Smooth Exact Relaxation into a (λ/(2α),μ)(\lambda/(2\alpha), \mu)(λ/(2α),μ)-Smooth MechanismResearch Paper

Many welfare-maximization problems in mechanism design are NP-hard: combinatorial auctions, packing integer programs, unsplittable flow, maximum traveling salesman. The standard algorithmic answer is relax-and-round: solve a fractional relaxation exactly, then round the fractional solution to a feasible one. Turning such an algorithm into a mechanism is the…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance: The Rai Algorithm Has O(√(T log T)) Regret with High ProbabilityResearch Paper

In Bayesian persuasion a sender who observes a random state commits to a rule that maps states to recommendations, and a receiver who knows the state distribution follows a recommendation only when it is optimal given what it reveals (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011; Bergemann and Morris 2019). When the distribution is known, the sender's best rule solves a…

33 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

Audit and Remediation Strategies in the Presence of Evasion Capabilities: Under Perfect Evasion, Cyclic Cost Sharing with Exponential Random Audits Is the Optimal Audit PolicyResearch Paper

Regulators and large buyers must discover violations that firms prefer to hide: an emissions defeat device, a supplier's noncompliance, an environmental spill. They can audit, which is costly, or pay for voluntary disclosure through reduced penalties or remediation assistance, as in the U.S. EPA's audit policy. The question is how to combine the two when…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: iris

A Theory of Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of School Quality: Strategy-Proofness for Schools Implies the First-Choice Design Extracts a Random AssignmentResearch Paper

Many school districts assign seats through a centralized mechanism that breaks priority ties with lotteries, and a large empirical literature uses that randomness to estimate the effect of attending a school on test scores, college attendance and earnings. The first-choice research design has been applied to data from the Charlotte mechanism and from DA…

36 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Allocating Inventory Risk in Retail Supply Chains: Risk Aversion, Information Asymmetry, and Outside Opportunity: when the pre-order menu out-orders the consignment contractResearch Paper

A manufacturer selling through a retailer has to decide who carries the inventory risk. Under a push (pre-order) contract the retailer buys before demand is known and bears the risk of unsold units. Under a pull (consignment) contract the manufacturer keeps ownership and bears it. The operations literature generally finds that pull contracts lead to larger…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Non-Truthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification: The α-GSP Mechanism Has an Efficient Nash Equilibrium Whenever the α-VCG Mechanism DoesResearch Paper

Search engines sell the ad slots next to their results in position auctions: advertisers bid, the highest bidder gets the top slot, the second highest the next one, and so on. A slot higher on the page is clicked more often, and the ratio of click rates between slots is described by a vector of relative position values. The textbook truthful mechanism,…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Pick-an-Object Mechanisms: an individually rational rule is pick-an-object implementable in perfect ex-post equilibrium iff it is strategy-proof and monotonically discoverableResearch Paper

Many allocation procedures used in practice — school choice, university admissions, course allocation — are run as one-shot direct mechanisms: every participant submits a full ranking, and an algorithm such as deferred acceptance or top trading cycles computes the assignment. Sequential alternatives, in which participants repeatedly pick one option from a…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings: the unique legal set of assignments is the set of stable assignments of a subinstanceResearch Paper

Stable assignments are the standard output of centralized school choice, but insisting on stability can leave many students worse off than necessary (Faenza–Zhang, §1). Morrill (2016) proposed legality as a relaxation motivated by legal standing: a student who forms a blocking pair has a complaint only if the remedy, the assignment of that student to that…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

The Strategic Role of Supplier Learning: the optimal two-period procurement contract under private cost and private learning outcomesResearch Paper

Learning curves are a standard fact of manufacturing: unit cost falls with cumulative output, so a buyer who orders more today buys cheaper tomorrow (Yelle 1979). Procurement contracts with an outside supplier then face a second problem: the supplier knows its own cost and learning ability better than the buyer does, and it also observes privately how…

70 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Capacity Games with Supply Function Competition: under submodularity, at-cost bids with marginal-contribution margins are a supply-chain-optimal Nash equilibriumResearch Paper

A buyer facing uncertain demand often secures supply in two stages: it first reserves capacity from several suppliers, and after demand is observed it decides how much of the reserved capacity to use. Electricity procurement (reserve markets), contract manufacturing and logistics all have this shape. In practice each supplier quotes a reservation price for…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation: every k-ticket lottery equilibrium allocation is (2 − 1/k)-trade efficientResearch Paper

Alaska allocates scarce big-game hunting permits through a draw in which each applicant may buy up to six tickets and spread them across the permit lotteries of her choice; an applicant drawn in several lotteries keeps the permit she ranks highest. Designs of this kind, parallel lotteries, are simple to run and give applicants freedom to express intensity…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Budget-Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions: At Symmetric System Equilibria, Reserve Pricing Earns at Least the Profit of Thresholding, and Thresholding at Least That of Bid ShadingResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms sell impressions through repeated auctions, and advertisers typically buy them under a budget: a cap on what they spend over a campaign. Because the advertisers cannot re-optimize their bids in every auction, the platform usually manages their budgets for them, adjusting how each advertiser participates so that spending tracks…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms: The STP Mechanism Is Subgame-Perfect Incentive Compatible, Welfare-Optimal, Envy-Free and Core-Selecting from Any HistoryResearch Paper

Ridesharing platforms set prices and dispatch drivers over a road network whose demand changes within minutes: a stadium empties, rush hour starts, a neighbourhood goes quiet. Drivers are not employees. They may decline a dispatch, drive somewhere else, or stop working, and the platform pays no one in advance for staying in place. Prices that look only at…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements: Every Additive Instance Has an Allocation Giving Each Agent max{3/5, 1/(2−b_i)} of Her AnyPrice ShareResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods asks how to split a set of items among agents who value them differently, with no money changing hands. Many allocation problems are not symmetric: partners in a venture hold different stakes, heirs inherit different fractions of an estate, and countries or departments receive budgets in proportion to size. Such settings…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Square Root Agreement Rule for Incentivizing Truthful Feedback on Online Platforms: Strict Truthful Equilibrium Approximately Payoff-Dominating All Symmetric Equilibria for Many TasksResearch Paper

Online platforms (labor marketplaces, review sites, crowdsourcing services) rely on feedback from their users: did the plumber arrive on time, is this image labelled correctly. The answers cannot be checked against ground truth, so a platform that rewards feedback must reward it by comparing it with other users' answers. This is the problem of peer…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Towards a Functional Fee Market for Cryptocurrencies: Truthful Bidding Is Not Dominant, but the Expected Gain from Strategic Bidding Converges to 0 as the Number of Users DivergesResearch Paper

A cryptocurrency user can attach a fee to a transaction, and a miner can choose which waiting transactions enter the next block. When the most valuable waiting transactions compete for a limited number of places, the fee rule affects both the user's bid and the amount the user expects to pay. Basu, Easley, O'Hara and Sirer study a protocol that charges…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Polyhedral Clinching Auctions for Two-Sided Markets: An Incentive-Compatible, Individually Rational, Budget-Balanced, Pareto-Optimal Mechanism ExistsResearch Paper

Auctions in which bidders face budget constraints do not fit the classical quasi-linear theory: a bidder cannot pay more than a fixed amount, however much the goods are worth to him. For a single divisible good, Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan showed that the adaptive clinching auction of Ausubel is incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal,…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program Does Not Provide the Right Incentives: Issues and Remedies: Under HRRP-I a Symmetric Equilibrium Exists and Every One Over-Invests in Readmission ReductionResearch Paper

The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), created by the US Affordable Care Act and run by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services since 2012, cuts the Medicare payments of hospitals whose 30-day readmission rates exceed a benchmark computed from other hospitals. It is a form of yardstick competition in the sense of Shleifer (1985): a…

14 thms2 active users
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning: The Personalized Buy/Wait/No Mechanism Is Optimal and Strictly Beats Public SignalingResearch Paper

A seller who sells over two periods, at a full price now and a discount later, loses revenue to strategic customers who wait for the discount. Waiting is costly to the customer only through availability risk: if inventory is scarce, the product may be gone by the second period. Inventory is usually known to the firm and not to its customers, so the firm can…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 3: Pacing-Based Equilibria Have Liquid Welfare Price of Anarchy at Least 1/2Research Paper

Advertising platforms repeatedly sell opportunities to show an advertisement. The opportunity's features, such as audience and placement, affect each advertiser differently, while advertisers limit their average spending. This makes the efficiency of an auction a question about both heterogeneous values and budgets. The paper by Balseiro, Kroer, and Kumar st…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Guarantees in Fair Division: General or Monotone Preferences 1: Kuhn's Divide & Choose Rule Guarantees Every Agent Her minMax Utility for Continuous Non-Atomic PreferencesResearch Paper

Fair division asks how to share a resource among nnn agents with different preferences so that each agent can be promised a minimum level of welfare, whatever the preferences of the others. Classical cake cutting treats a good cake, valued additively or at least monotonically. Many real problems mix goods and bads: a plot of land with both fertile and…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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