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Mechanism Design

269 missions · 158 completed

Often called reverse game theory, the branch of economics and game theory that designs the rules of a game so that self-interested agents, acting on private information, are led to a desired collective outcome. Here the goal is given and the mechanism is the unknown — engineering incentives so that truthful behavior is optimal — with applications from auctions and voting systems to market and internet-protocol design.

Missions

Open111Completed158All269
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Generalization Guarantees for Multi-Item Profit Maximization: Pricing, Auctions, and Randomized Mechanisms: (d,t)-Delineable Classes Have Generalization Guarantee 120U√(9d ln(4dt)/N) + 4U√(2ln(4/δ)/N)Research Paper

A seller who knows the distribution of buyers' values can, in principle, compute a profit-maximizing mechanism. In practice the seller has data: past bids, or past purchases. Sample-based mechanism design picks a mechanism from a parameterized class using NNN samples from the unknown distribution. The output is only useful if profit on the samples predicts…

11 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryFunctional AnalysisOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 1: A Value Pacing-Based Symmetric First Price Equilibrium ExistsResearch Paper

Most online advertising is sold by auction, one impression at a time, to advertisers who manage a budget over many auctions rather than a value for a single one. Since 2019 the major ad exchanges have moved from second price to first price auctions, in which the winner pays its own bid. A budget-constrained advertiser in a first price auction must therefore…

20 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large SupplyResearch Paper

Auctions that sell many identical units to many bidders, such as treasury bills, emission permits and advertising slots, are often run as multi-unit first-price auctions: the highest bids win and each winner pays its own bid. Bidders then shade their bids below their values. In equilibrium, a bidder with a higher value can lose to one with a lower value, so…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuasion by PartsResearch Paper

An information designer may know the distribution of a system's total benefit while each observer sees only one contribution. A supplier can grade its own component; a regional office can evaluate its own market. A receiver combines these reports before deciding whether the total justifies action. The designer can commit to reporting rules in advance, but…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: iris

Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination, and Incentives: For Any Valuation Class Containing All Additive Valuations, No Feasible Share Dominates Every Self-Maximizing Feasible ShareResearch Paper

When indivisible goods are divided among nnn agents without money, a standard way to say what each agent deserves is a share: a number s(v,n)s(v,n)s(v,n) computed from the agent's own valuation vvv alone, with the promise that she receives a bundle worth at least that much. The best-known share is the maximin share (MMS) of Budish (2011): the value an agent could guarantee…

23 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Pricing with a Single Point: Closed-Form Maximin Ratio and Optimal Deterministic Price Against Regular and MHR DistributionsResearch Paper

A seller who has posted a price www for some time usually knows one number about demand: the conversion rate qqq, the fraction of customers who bought at www. Whether that single number is enough to price well, and how well, is a basic question of data-driven pricing. Allouah, Bahamou and Besbes (arXiv:2103.05611, Management Science 2023) answer it in a robust,…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Simple and Approximately Optimal Contracts for Payment for Ecosystem Services: A Linear Contract with Per-Unit Price k/2 Achieves at Least Half of the Optimal Contract PayoffResearch Paper

Payments for ecosystem services compensate landowners for conservation that a program values but cannot directly provide. A contract designer must decide how to pay when landowners differ in the amount of forest they would conserve without a payment. That baseline conservation type is privately known, so a contract can pay for forest that would have…

6 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization II: Under O-Learning, the Cheap-Signaling Separating Equilibrium Exists If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΛResearch Paper

Firms that customize products, especially in business-to-business and service markets, need to learn what each customer wants before designing for that customer. Liang Guo's paper The Voice of Customers in Customization (SSRN 3994319; published in Management Science, DOI 10.1287/mnsc.2021.04025) compares two ways a seller can learn a customer's preference.…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 3: Mod-Cut&Choose Always Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium and Every One Is MMS and EFXResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods asks how to split a set of items among agents with different tastes so that nobody has a strong reason to complain. Fairness notions such as envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) and the maximin share (MMS) have been studied extensively as algorithmic targets: given the agents' valuations, compute an allocation satisfying the…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions V: A Posted-Price Mechanism Achieves an O(log n)-Approximation for Symmetric Submodular ValuationsResearch Paper

In budget-feasible procurement an auctioneer with a fixed budget BBB wants to buy services from strategic sellers whose costs are private. The auctioneer values sets of services through a valuation function vvv, and wants a mechanism that pays the sellers at most BBB in total while acquiring a set of nearly maximal value. The model was introduced by Singer (FOCS…

9 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design IV: The Fixed-Reserve Second-Price Auction Has Worst-Case Regret (n/(n+1))ⁿ at Its Best Reserve 1/(n+1)Research Paper

A seller who must auction one item without knowing how buyers value it needs a mechanism that performs acceptably against every plausible value distribution. Anunrojwong, Balseiro and Besbes (arXiv:2204.10478, Operations Research 2025) measure performance by regret: the expected revenue lost relative to a seller who knows the realized valuations and…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 2: Selling Two I.I.D. Goods Separately Guarantees at Least e/(e + 1) ≈ 73% of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller with several goods can sell them one at a time or offer a mechanism that links allocation and payment across goods. Separate selling asks the seller to solve a one-good pricing problem for each item. A general mechanism can offer lotteries and menus whose outcomes depend on the buyer's whole valuation vector. The difference matters because the…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 5: Bundling Is Optimal for Two I.I.D. Goods Whose Density on [a, ∞) Satisfies x f′(x) + (3/2) f(x) ≤ 0Research Paper

A seller with several goods and a single buyer of unknown, additive valuation faces the multi-dimensional revenue maximization problem. For one good the answer is classical: by Myerson's theorem (Myerson 1981) a single posted price is optimal. For two or more goods no such simplification exists in general: optimal mechanisms may randomize, may offer menus…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions 1: A Strict Voting Procedure with at Least Three Possible Outcomes Is Strategy-Proof Iff It Is DictatorialResearch Paper

A committee that chooses one alternative by voting would like a voting procedure under which no member can gain by misreporting their preferences. Such a procedure is called strategy-proof. Gibbard (Econometrica 41, 1973) and Satterthwaite (J. Econ. Theory 10, 1975) proved independently that, once at least three outcomes are possible, the only…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem I: The Incentive-Feasible Set Is Compact and Convex, and the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution over It Exists and Is UniqueResearch Paper

An arbitrator choosing an outcome for several people can ask them about their preferences, but the answer to that question may affect the outcome. A person who expects to gain from a false report may give one. Roger Myerson's 1979 paper puts this incentive problem inside a bargaining model: the arbitrator may randomize over collective choices, and an…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 2: Sequential Posted Prices e/(e−1)-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Partition Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

A seller who knows the distributions of buyers' values can maximise expected revenue with Myerson's optimal mechanism (Myerson 1981): collect bids, compute virtual values, serve a feasible set of maximum virtual surplus, and charge threshold payments. Real sellers seldom run such auctions. They post prices: a buyer is offered a take-it-or-leave-it price and…

21 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 1: Sequential Posted Prices 2-Approximate the Optimal Revenue under a Matroid ConstraintResearch Paper

A seller who must decide whom to serve among several buyers with private values can, in principle, run Myerson's revenue-optimal mechanism: collect bids, compute virtual values, serve the feasible set of largest virtual surplus, and charge threshold payments (Myerson 1981). In practice sellers rarely do this. Retail, ticketing and online platforms mostly…

21 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design I: MinWork Is a Strongly Truthful n-Approximation Mechanism for Task Scheduling on Unrelated MachinesResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design asks for algorithms whose inputs are held by self-interested parties. Each party reports its private data, the algorithm computes an outcome, and payments are arranged so that no party gains by misreporting. Nisan and Ronen introduced the field in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001). Their running example…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders IV: A Truthful Value-Query Mechanism for Subadditive BiddersResearch Paper

In a combinatorial auction a seller offers several indivisible items at once, and bidders value bundles of items rather than items one at a time. Allocating the items to maximize total value is the central optimization problem of the area, and it arises in spectrum licensing, procurement and transport contracting (Cramton, Shoham and Steinberg, Combinatorial…

8 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Bargaining under Incomplete Information I: Class A Equilibrium Offer Strategies Satisfy the Linked Differential EquationsResearch Paper

A buyer and a seller negotiate over a single indivisible good. Each knows how much the good is worth to them, but not how much it is worth to the other side. Whether the two will trade, and at what price, then depends on how each party shades its offer to exploit the other's uncertainty. Chatterjee and Samuelson (Bargaining under Incomplete Information,…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Transparency in Team ContractsResearch Paper

A principal who delegates a project often knows more about its prospects than the people whose effort makes it succeed. Revealing that information changes agents’ incentives and therefore changes the payments needed to obtain their effort. The question is whether a principal can lose substantially by disclosing everything, even when she remains free to…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Stratifying Markets for Efficient TradeResearch Paper

In bilateral trade a seller owns one item and a buyer wants it; each knows only their own cost or value. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed that no incentive-compatible, individually rational, budget-balanced mechanism trades efficiently whenever the supports of the value and the cost overlap, so the question becomes which simple mechanisms capture a…

30 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Fair Team ContractsResearch Paper

A firm, a research group or an open-source project often pays a team for a joint outcome it cannot observe in detail: it sees whether the project succeeded, not who worked. Combinatorial contract theory models this as a principal who offers each hired agent a linear contract, a share of the success reward, and lets the agents decide whether to exert costly…

28 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing with Samples: Posting 0.76 Times a Single Sample Earns at Least 64% of the Optimal Revenue Against Every Monotone Hazard Rate DistributionResearch Paper

A seller who knows the distribution FFF of a buyer's value can post the revenue-maximizing price. In practice the seller rarely knows FFF; often it has only a handful of past observations. Pricing with samples asks how much revenue such data can guarantee: the seller sees NNN independent draws from FFF, posts a price that depends on them, and is judged by the…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Monopoly Mechanisms with Demand Uncertainty: When All Consumers Find the Low-Demand State More Likely, State-by-State Monopoly Pricing Is an Optimal BIC and EIR MechanismResearch Paper

A monopolist selling to a large market of unit-demand consumers with a known demand curve cannot do better than posting a single price (Myerson 1981; Bulow and Roberts 1989). When the demand curve itself is uncertain, consumers' valuations are correlated through the aggregate state, and the picture changes. Crémer and McLean (1985, 1988) showed that with…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
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