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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Mean-only Prophet InequalitiesResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees independent random values X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ one at a time and may accept at most one of them, with a prophet who sees all of them and receives X∗=max⁡iXiX^*=\max_i X_iX∗=maxi​Xi​. The classical guarantees assume that the distribution of every value is known. In pricing applications this is rarely the case: a seller…

31 thms3 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Caccetta-Häggkvist Conjecture and Percentile Distortion: An Equivalence via Asymmetric Maximal LotteriesResearch Paper

Metric distortion measures how much a voting rule loses by seeing only ordinal preferences. Voters and candidates sit in an unknown metric space; each voter ranks candidates by distance, and the rule sees only the rankings. The distortion of a rule is the worst case, over elections and over metrics consistent with the rankings, of the ratio between the cost…

45 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Polynomial-Time Approximate EFX for Chores via Flow and MatchingResearch Paper

Fair allocation of indivisible chores asks how to divide burdens among agents whose costs for those burdens differ. It is studied in algorithmic game theory and social choice (Aziz, Li, Moulin, Wu, 2022). The natural target is envy-freeness up to any chore (EFX): an agent's envy must disappear after any single chore is removed from her own bundle. Exact EFX…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Existence of Maximin Share Allocations is Δ2P\Delta_2^PΔ2P​-completeResearch Paper

The maximin share (MMS) is a fairness benchmark for dividing indivisible goods among agents with different valuations. Agent iii's maximin share is the best value she could guarantee if she split all the goods into nnn bundles herself and then received the worst bundle. An allocation that gives every agent at least her maximin share is an MMS allocation. The…

40 thms3 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Nash Equilibria, Variational Inequalities, and Fixed Points: Beating Brute Force via Smoothed AnalysisResearch Paper

Computing a Nash equilibrium of a finite game is a basic problem of algorithmic game theory, and in the worst case it is hard: finding an approximate equilibrium of a normal-form game is PPAD-complete even for two players (Daskalakis–Goldberg–Papadimitriou 2009; Chen–Deng–Teng 2009), and under the exponential time hypothesis even constant-approximate…

43 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Almost-MMS allocations with small agent redundancyResearch Paper

The maximin share (MMS), introduced by Budish (JPE 2011), is the standard share-based fairness notion for indivisible goods: an agent's benchmark is the value that agent could guarantee by splitting all the goods into as many bundles as there are agents and receiving the worst one. Exact MMS allocations need not exist for additive agents (Kurokawa,…

35 thms3 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

A Better-than-e1/ee^{1/e}e1/e Approximation Algorithm for Nash Social Welfare under Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods among agents is a basic problem in fair division and in the design of allocation mechanisms. Among the objectives one can maximize, the Nash social welfare (the geometric mean of the agents' utilities) is singled out because it balances efficiency and fairness: it is scale-invariant in each agent's valuation and its maximizers…

90 thms3 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

Strategyproof Aggregation in Euclidean Spaces: Rigidity and Median OptimalityResearch Paper

In single-facility location, nnn agents report ideal points x1,…,xn∈Rdx_1,\dots,x_n\in\mathbb R^dx1​,…,xn​∈Rd and a mechanism selects one location yyy. Each agent's cost is its Euclidean distance ∥xi−y∥\|x_i-y\|∥xi​−y∥, and the planner wants to keep the total distance small. Agents may misreport, so the mechanism is required to be strategyproof: no agent can move the outcome closer to its true…

46 thms3 active usersReviewed
Information TheoryMachine LearningMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Query-Sample Tradeoffs for Revenue MaximizationResearch Paper

A seller posting a price for a single item to a buyer with an unknown value distribution FFF wants a price whose revenue is close to optimal. Two kinds of data are available. A value sample reveals a buyer's value v∼Fv\sim Fv∼F exactly, as in historical bid data or surveys. A pricing query posts a price ppp and reveals only whether a fresh buyer buys, the bit …

36 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Adwords with Unknown Budgets and Beyond: Generalized Perturbed Greedy, Blind to Budgets, Is 0.522/(1+γ)0.522/(1+\gamma)0.522/(1+γ)-Competitive at β=1.15\beta = 1.15β=1.15 and 0.508/(1+γ)0.508/(1+\gamma)0.508/(1+γ)-Competitive at β=1\beta = 1β=1Research Paper

In Adwords (Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani and Vazirani, 2007, doi), a platform has advertisers with budgets. Queries arrive one at a time, advertisers bid on each query, and the platform shows at most one ad immediately and irrevocably. The winner pays their bid, up to their remaining budget, and the goal is to maximize the total budget used, against an arbitrary…

22 thms3 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

On the Power of Determinism in Multi-Item AuctionsResearch Paper

A seller with mmm items faces one buyer whose values for the items are private and drawn from a known distribution. The revenue-optimal mechanism for a single item is a posted price (Myerson 1981). For two or more items the optimal mechanism can require lotteries, an infinite menu, and can be non-monotone in the value distribution (Hart and Reny 2015), so the…

23 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Computing Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games via Best-Responses: A Polynomial-Time Best-Response Algorithm Reaches a dd+o(d)d^{d+o(d)}dd+o(d)-Approximate EquilibriumResearch Paper

Weighted congestion games model players who share resources (links of a network, machines, servers) and whose cost on a resource grows with the total weight using it. They are standard models of selfish routing and load balancing. Unlike unweighted congestion games, they need not have a pure Nash equilibrium once costs are polynomials of degree d≥2d\ge2d≥2 (Harks–…

58 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Online Saddle Point Problem and Online Convex Optimization with Knapsacks: Saddle-Point Follow-the-Leader Has SP-Regret at Most 8G2/H⋅(1+log⁡T)8G^2/H\cdot(1+\log T)8G2/H⋅(1+logT) on Strongly Convex-Concave Lipschitz GamesResearch Paper

Many decisions are made by two parties with opposed interests who interact repeatedly while the game between them changes: a seller and a buyer facing shifting demand, a planner and an adversarial environment, or the primal and dual players of a constrained online optimization problem. Rivera Cardoso, Wang and Xu (arXiv:1806.08301v3) formalize this as the on…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsGraph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Stability of Procurement Networks: A Network Is Rationalizable as Pairwise Stable with k-Anonymous Preferences If and Only If It Satisfies k-WARPSResearch Paper

Procurement data record who buys from whom: public agencies and their contractors, manufacturers and their tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers. A basic question about such a network is whether it is stable, meaning that no firm would drop an existing relationship and no pair of unlinked firms would jointly gain from forming one. The standard notion is pairwise…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsMarkov ChainProbability·Captain: iris

Sampling from the Gibbs Distribution in Congestion Games: Relaxed Logit Dynamics in Extension Parallel Congestion Games Mix within n3(log⁡(nlog⁡∣P∣+TΦmax⁡)+log⁡(1/(2ϵ2)))n^3(\log(n\log|P|+T\Phi_{\max})+\log(1/(2\epsilon^2)))n3(log(nlog∣P∣+TΦmax​)+log(1/(2ϵ2))) StepsResearch Paper

Logit dynamics is the standard model of noisy best-response play: repeatedly, a uniformly random player revises their strategy, choosing each option with probability proportional to e−T⋅coste^{-T\cdot\text{cost}}e−T⋅cost, where the temperature T≥0T\ge0T≥0 measures rationality. In a potential game the dynamics is a reversible Markov chain whose stationary law is the Gibbs…

41 thms3 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Core Pricing in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers: Computational Hardness and Algorithmic Solutions: Computing a Welfare-Maximizing Core Outcome Is Σ₂ᵖ-HardResearch Paper

Many markets trade packages of indivisible goods between several buyers and several sellers at once: airport time slots, spectrum licences, transport capacity, emission permits. Such a market is a combinatorial exchange. Its operator chooses who trades which package and at which prices, and wants the outcome to be stable: no group of participants should be…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Prophet Inequality for Bipartite Matching: Merits of Being Simple and Nonadaptive: Static Vertex Prices Earn One Third of the Prophet's Expected Matching ValueResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees random values one at a time and must decide irrevocably, with a prophet who sees every value in advance. The classical single-item version (Krengel–Sucheston, Samuel-Cahn) shows that a single threshold earns half of the prophet's expected maximum. These guarantees are the analytic core of poste…

18 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: iris

Quantitative Convergence for Displacement Monotone Mean Field Games with Controlled Volatility: Open-Loop Nash Equilibria Converge to the Mean Field Equilibrium at Rate 1/NResearch Paper

Mean field games describe Nash equilibria of stochastic differential games with very many symmetric players, each of whom interacts with the others only through the empirical distribution of their states. The limiting model, introduced by Lasry and Lions and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines, replaces the population by a measure flow and the NNN-player equilibrium…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Designing Information to Engage Customers: Under Observable Engagement the Seller-Optimal Signal Reveals Everything, Exaggerates a Low Prior or Downplays a High OneResearch Paper

Firms increasingly let customers take part in designing the product they will buy: configurators, prototypes, trial versions and co-design platforms. Two features of these settings interact. The firm controls what the customer learns about the product's basic value (it can tune a trial, a simulation or a test), and the customer can invest costly engagement t…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Static Pricing for Multi-unit Prophet Inequalities: The Static Price Equalizing E[min(Xₚ,k)]/k and P[Xₚ ≤ k − 1] Earns at Least φₖ, Its Poisson Value, of the Expected Optimal WelfareResearch Paper

A seller has kkk identical units and faces nnn buyers who arrive one at a time. Each buyer's value is drawn independently from a known distribution, but the arrival order is adversarial and unknown. The simplest selling policy posts one static price to every buyer until the units run out. Prophet inequalities compare such a policy with a prophet who sees all…

23 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

Pandora’s Problem with Combinatorial Cost: Under a Submodular Cost Function Some Fixed-Order Threshold Strategy Is OptimalResearch Paper

Pandora's problem is the basic model of costly sequential search: a decision maker faces nnn closed boxes with independent random prizes, may open them one at a time at a cost, and keeps the best prize found. It models job and house search, the selection of research projects, and the sampling stages of auctions and pricing mechanisms. Weitzman (Weitzman 1979)…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Playing Divide-and-Choose Given Uncertain Preferences: For Independent Normal Priors, Algorithm 1 Is a Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme for the Divider's UtilityResearch Paper

Divide-and-choose is the oldest fair-division protocol: one player cuts, the other picks. With known preferences its analysis is classical: the chooser always gets at least half of her value (proportionality), and the divider, knowing her values, cuts so that she is indifferent and keeps everything above half that the difference in tastes allows. In…

31 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchReinforcement LearningStatistics·Captain: iris

Model-Based Reinforcement Learning for Offline Zero-Sum Markov Games: VI-LCB-Game Returns an ε-Nash Policy Pair with Probability 1−δ from c₁·C⋆_clipped·S(A+B)·log(N/δ)/((1−γ)³ε²) Offline SamplesResearch Paper

Many sequential decision problems with two adversaries are modelled as zero-sum Markov games (Shapley, 1953; Littman, 1994): two players act simultaneously in a shared state, one maximizes and the other minimizes the same discounted reward. In applications such as games, security and robust control, interaction with the system is expensive or unsafe, and…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets: Open-Access Cournot Competition Has Price of Anarchy at Most (3/2)(1−1/(3n+6))(3/2)(1 - 1/(3n+6))(3/2)(1−1/(3n+6)), Tight When All Markets Share One Willingness to PayResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as eBay, Etsy, Amazon and Alibaba, ride-sharing services and electricity markets are platforms: they stand between many producers and many geographically or logically separate markets, and they decide which producer may serve which market. A basic design question is how much welfare is lost when the platform simply lets everyone…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Strategy-Proof Multidimensional Mechanism Design: A Strategy-Proof, Agent-Sovereign Mechanism That Sells Every Object Is Anonymous If and Only If It Is EfficientResearch Paper

When a seller has several different indivisible objects and buyers value bundles additively, the simplest selling procedure is to run one sealed-bid second-price auction per object. The New Zealand government sold cellular management rights tenders this way in 1990 (Remark 3 of Basu–Mukherjee, citing Mueller). Basu and Mukherjee ask which normative axioms…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
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