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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

Open323Completed525All848
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Private Signaling in Nonatomic Routing GamesResearch Paper

A traffic principal can know more about road conditions than individual drivers. Sending every driver the same report is one option; sending different private route recommendations is another. The computational question is whether a principal can find private recommendations with low expected total latency while keeping each recommendation approximately…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Optimal Multi-Item Auctions with I.I.D. ValuesResearch Paper

A seller with several items and several buyers who wants the largest expected revenue faces the multi-item version of Myerson's problem. For one item, Myerson (1981) gives the answer in closed form for every prior. For several items, explicit optimal mechanisms are known only in special cases: two items under analytic conditions, a few uniform or…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The No-Menu Complexity of Revenue-Maximizing AuctionsResearch Paper

A revenue guarantee for an auction does not by itself say how much the seller and buyer must communicate. A familiar way to describe a deterministic auction is to give its menu of bundles and prices. That description treats the menu as already available to the buyer. When the seller chooses the menu using information unavailable to the buyer, learning…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Captain: mikedeng1

Draw, Then Draw: The Metric Distortion of Random-Size Stable LotteriesResearch Paper

A voting rule often receives rankings even when the quality of its decision depends on numerical costs. In metric social choice, voters and candidates occupy a common distance space. Each voter ranks closer candidates ahead of farther candidates, but the rule sees only those rankings. Its task is to choose a candidate, possibly at random, whose average…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Computation of Sparse Equilibria in Normal-Form GamesResearch Paper

Correlated equilibria (CE) and coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) of a normal-form game are computable in polynomial time by linear programming, and no-regret dynamics converge to them. The price is the representation: an equilibrium found this way may correlate the players arbitrarily, through a joint distribution over action profiles whose support grows…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Power and Limitations of Multiple Intermediaries for Single-Item AuctionsResearch Paper

A seller may be unable to receive buyers' bids directly. Intermediaries can control access to its auction and charge bidders for the right to participate. Competition between those intermediaries might reduce exclusion, but it need not transfer their revenue back to the seller. These are different questions: whether the item reaches the buyer who values it…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

As Easy as Rank One: Optimal Algorithms for Matroid Secretary and Single-Sample Matroid ProphetResearch Paper

In the classical secretary problem (Dynkin 1963; Lindley 1961) nnn distinct values arrive in uniformly random order and the decision maker must accept or reject each one immediately and irrevocably. The aim is to select the largest. Rejecting about the first n/en/en/e values and then taking the first value larger than all earlier ones succeeds with probability…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Harmonic AnalysisMachine Learning·Captain: Shuze Chen

High-Dimensional Online Calibration from Harmonic WeightsResearch Paper

A calibrated forecaster is one whose forecasts can be taken at face value: among the rounds on which it announced a forecast ppp, the outcomes average to ppp. Calibration is what a downstream decision maker needs in order to best-respond to forecasts with vanishing regret, and in the vector-valued case it drives Blackwell approachability and swap-regret…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Captain: Shuze Chen

On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms: Impossibility of truthful proportional cake cuttingResearch Paper

Cake cutting is the model of fair division of a single divisible, heterogeneous resource, the interval [0,1][0,1][0,1], among agents whose preferences over its parts differ. The classical fairness notions are proportionality (each of nnn agents receives at least 1/n1/n1/n of the whole by her own measure) and envy-freeness (no agent prefers another agent's share). Protocols…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

A Strongly Polynomial-Time 7/9-Approximation Algorithm for Maximin Share AllocationsResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods fairly among agents with additive valuations is a central problem of fair division. Proportionality and envy-freeness can fail for indivisible goods, so the standard benchmark is the maximin share (MMS), introduced by Budish (Budish 2011): the largest value an agent can guarantee by splitting all goods into as many bundles as…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robustly Obedient Data Driven Persuasion under State-dependent Sender PayoffsResearch Paper

In Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590), a Sender commits to a signaling policy that maps the state of the world to recommendations, and a Receiver who knows the prior updates on the recommendation and acts. The standard analysis assumes the Sender knows the prior. In many applications the Sender instead…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Nearly Tight Bounds for Proportional Group Fair Divisions and One-Sided DiscrepancyResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods fairly is a basic problem of computational social choice (survey: Amanatidis et al., 2023). In group fair division the agents are organized into kkk groups, every group receives one common bundle, and the members of a group may value the goods very differently, as with families sharing an inheritance or departments sharing…

23 thms2 active usersReviewed
Captain: mikedeng1

How Much Can Approximate Equilibria Change the Social Cost of Selfish Routing?Research Paper

Routing models compare what individual users prefer with the total delay experienced by all users. Exact optimization of a user's route is a strong behavioral requirement: users may accept alternatives whose delay is only slightly worse than the best available. The resulting relaxation raises a quantitative question even when demands, available routes, and…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Tarski Fixed Points in Quasi-FPT QueriesResearch Paper

Tarski's fixed point theorem says that every monotone map on a complete lattice has a fixed point. On the finite grid [n]k={1,…,n}k[n]^k=\{1,\dots,n\}^k[n]k={1,…,n}k with the coordinatewise order, finding such a fixed point captures several problems whose complexity is open: pure Nash equilibria of supermodular games, and the reductions of parity games, mean-payoff games, Condon's…

27 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Weakly Stable Roommates with Two Master Lists: Tractable Existence and Hard OptimizationResearch Paper

A roommates matching partitions a population into pairs. Each person ranks possible partners, and a proposed arrangement is stable when no two people both strictly prefer one another to their assigned partners. Preferences may contain ties. A person who is indifferent does not participate in a blocking pair on that comparison. This distinction matters when…

28 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Truthful Approximation for House Allocation and Rank-Maximal Matchings with TiesResearch Paper

In house allocation, agents rank objects and each agent can receive at most one object. A rule that chooses an allocation from reported rankings must account for the possibility that agents misreport. The mathematical question is how much allocation quality an incentive requirement necessarily costs. Zhang, Zhao, Xu, Xi and Zhao study this question both for…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Complexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Hardness Amplification of Approximate Nash Equilibrium with Constantly Many PlayersResearch Paper

Computing a Nash equilibrium asks for a probability distribution over each player's actions such that no player benefits from changing its own distribution. An approximate equilibrium permits a specified additive improvement. The approximation parameter matters: when payoffs lie between zero and one, allowing improvement one makes every profile acceptable.…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

Convergent Dynamics in Second Price Autobidding GamesResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms sell impressions through repeated auctions in which advertisers do not bid by hand: an autobidder scales each value by a pacing multiplier αi∈[0,1]\alpha_i\in[0,1]αi​∈[0,1] so that the advertiser's spending stays within its budget. When every advertiser paces at once, the multipliers interact, and the natural steady state is a second-price…

68 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

Second-Best Gains from Trade in Matching MarketsResearch Paper

Two-sided markets match buyers with sellers: labor markets, ride-sharing, advertising exchanges, procurement. If every buyer's value and every seller's cost were public, a designer would choose the feasible set of trades with the largest total surplus, the first best. Values and costs are private, and the Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem (Myerson and…

60 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Sublinear Metric Distortion for MatchingResearch Paper

One-sided matching assigns nnn agents to nnn items, one item each. In many settings the cost an agent incurs from an item is a distance (a commute, a mismatch of skills, a travel time), but a mechanism can only ask agents to rank items, not to report distances. Metric distortion measures the price of this restriction: agents and items lie in an unknown metric…

28 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent ItemsResearch Paper

A seller with mmm heterogeneous items faces nnn bidders. The revenue-optimal mechanism for this multi-item setting is in general randomized, hard to compute, and only Bayesian incentive compatible. Competition complexity measures how much a simple mechanism loses by asking a different question from approximation ratios: how many extra bidders must a simple…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOptimization·Captain: iris

A Quasipolynomial Algorithm for ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ ContractionsResearch Paper

Many equilibrium and value computations reduce to finding the fixed point of a map that contracts the ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ norm. Shapley's discounted stochastic games [Sha53], Condon's simple stochastic games [Con92], and, through the reductions of Andersson and Miltersen [AM09a], turn-based stochastic parity, mean-payoff and discounted-payoff games are all of this…

49 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism with Constant Maximin-Share GuaranteeResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods among agents with private additive valuations is a basic problem of algorithmic game theory: the agents' reports are the only input, so a rule that rewards misreporting cannot be fair with respect to the true values. A randomized mechanism is truthful in expectation (TIE) if no agent can raise her expected true value by…

43 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algebraic TopologyCombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: iris

Balanced Fair Division and Generalized Kneser GraphsResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide indivisible goods between groups rather than individuals: households sharing what they receive, teams, or departments. Every member of a group gets the same bundle, but each member judges it with her own preferences, so a bundle that one member finds fair another may envy. Exact envy-freeness is impossible already for a…

32 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Fair Team ContractsResearch Paper

A firm, a research group or an open-source project often pays a team for a joint outcome it cannot observe in detail: it sees whether the project succeeded, not who worked. Combinatorial contract theory models this as a principal who offers each hired agent a linear contract, a share of the success reward, and lets the agents decide whether to exert costly…

28 thms2 active usersReviewed
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