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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments V: Stackelberg Matroid Pricing Is an Assortment Problem Under a Regular Choice ModelResearch Paper

In Stackelberg network pricing a leader sets prices on some resources, and a follower then buys the cheapest structure available to them, paying the leader for the priced resources they use. The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree problem, introduced by Cardinal, Demaine, Fiorini, Joret, Langerman, Newman and Weimann (Algorithmica 2011), is the version in…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Purchasing, Pricing, and Quick Response in the Presence of Strategic Consumers: Under Condition (6), Quick Response Is More Valuable with Strategic Consumers than with Only Myopic OnesResearch Paper

Fashion and consumer-electronics retailers sell a product at full price early in a season and mark down what is left. Consumers learn the pattern, and some of them wait for the markdown. Such strategic consumers lower the revenue of the full-price period, and the retailer's stocking decision affects how deep the markdown is expected to be. Quick response —…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management with Forward-Looking Buyers: Under Weakly Decreasing Demand the Deterministic Optimal Cutoffs Fall over Time and Satisfy One-Period Look-AheadResearch Paper

Retailers of seasonal goods (fashion, electronics, airline seats) sell a fixed stock over a finite season to customers who arrive over time, and those customers know that prices may fall. A customer who expects a markdown waits, and a seller who ignores this loses revenue. The classical revenue-management literature (Gallego and van Ryzin 1994; Talluri and…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Impulse Controls: A Verification Theorem with Applications 2: An Explicit Family of Nash Equilibria for the Linear Impulse GameResearch Paper

Impulse control models an agent who acts on a random system through discrete interventions, each with a fixed cost: inventory replenishment, cash management, exchange-rate interventions by a central bank. With two agents whose objectives conflict, the problem becomes a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with impulse controls. Before the work of Aïd,…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation II: Two Players with a Common Terminal in an Undirected Graph Have Price of Stability at Most 4/3, and This Is TightResearch Paper

In network design games, selfish users build a shared network and split the cost of every edge among the users of that edge. Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler and Roughgarden (SIAM J. Comput. 38 (2008), DOI 10.1137/070680096) studied the fair connection game, in which the cost of an edge is shared equally (the Shapley value) among its users.…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation IV: In Weighted Games with a Common Source and Sink, Best-Response Dynamics Converge to a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

In a network design game each player must connect its terminals in a graph whose edges carry fixed costs, and the cost of an edge is split among the players that use it. Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler and Roughgarden (SIAM J. Comput. 38 (2008)) studied the fair (Shapley) split, in which the users of an edge pay equal shares. That game is a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation III: Weighted Games in Which Each Edge Serves at Most Two Players Have a Potential and a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

In a network design game each of kkk players must connect its own terminals in a shared graph, and the cost of every edge that is bought is split among the players who use it. Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler and Roughgarden (SIAM J. Comput. 2008) studied the fair (Shapley) split, in which the xex_exe​ users of an edge each pay ce/xec_e/x_ece​/xe​. That game…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretary Problems: Weights and Discounts 1: An (8+3e)-Competitive Algorithm for the Weighted Secretary ProblemResearch Paper

The classical secretary problem asks how to select one valuable candidate when candidates arrive in random order and a decision must be made when each candidate appears. Many allocation settings have several goods of unequal quality instead of a single position. An employer may have roles of different desirability, or a seller may have placements with…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Blackwell Approachability and No-Regret Learning are Equivalent 2: A No-Regret Algorithm and a Valid Halfspace Oracle Approach a Compact Convex Set at Rate 2·Regret_T/TResearch Paper

Blackwell approachability is the vector-payoff analogue of von Neumann's minimax theorem. In a repeated game where each round's outcome is a vector u(xt,yt)∈Rdu(x_t, y_t) \in \mathbb R^du(xt​,yt​)∈Rd, a player wants the running average of these vectors to converge to a target set SSS, whatever the opponent does. Blackwell (1956) showed when this is possible, and approachability has…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing 4: A 6.75-Approximate Truthful Posted-Price Menu for Unit-Demand Buyers of Multiple ItemsResearch Paper

A hotel sells rooms of several types, in limited numbers, to guests who each want one room. The revenue-optimal way to sell is known only in special cases: for buyers with several private values, optimal mechanisms can be randomized, involve lotteries, and lack a closed form (Manelli–Vincent 2007; Chawla, Hartline, Kleinberg 2007). In practice sellers post…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality II: Two-Person Correlated Equilibrium Distributions Are the Solutions of Linear InequalitiesResearch Paper

A correlated equilibrium is the equilibrium notion that arises when the players of a game take their actions on the advice of a common randomizing device, each player seeing only his own recommendation. It was introduced by Aumann in 1974 (Aumann 1974). Aumann's 1987 paper (Aumann 1987) gives the simple, finite form of the definition used today (Definition…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Impulse Controls: A Verification Theorem with Applications 3: The Continuation Region Widens as the Fixed Intervention Cost GrowsResearch Paper

In an impulse control problem a controller does not steer a process continuously: at times of its choosing it shifts the state by a finite jump, paying a fixed cost plus a cost proportional to the jump. Such models describe central-bank interventions on an exchange rate, inventory replenishment and cash management. Aïd, Basei, Callegaro, Campi and Vargiolu (…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Impulse Controls: A Verification Theorem with Applications 1: Regular Solutions of the Quasi-Variational Inequalities Give Nash Equilibrium PayoffsResearch Paper

Many economic and engineering systems are steered by agents who act at discrete instants rather than continuously: a central bank intervenes on an exchange rate, two energy producers adjust a shared stock, a firm rebalances inventory. Each action has a fixed cost, so continuous control is not realistic. The mathematical model is impulse control: the state…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Blackwell Approachability and No-Regret Learning are Equivalent 1: Any Approachability Algorithm Yields Online Linear Optimization with Regret/T at Most 2κ Times Its Approachability RateResearch Paper

Online decision makers often have to choose an action before seeing the cost assigned to it. A no-regret algorithm performs almost as well, in total, as the best single action that could have been chosen after the costs were known. In a related repeated-game problem, Blackwell approachability asks a player to keep the average of vector payoffs close to a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Understanding and Using Linear Programming VI: The Minimax Theorem for Zero-Sum GamesTextbook

A two-player zero-sum game models any situation in which one party's gain is exactly the other party's loss: a military allocation in the spirit of Colonel Blotto, a sealed-bid contest, rock–paper–scissors. The central question is what each player should do when the opponent is also reasoning about them. John von Neumann answered it in 1928 with the minimax…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design VIII: Dominant-Strategy Implementation of Efficient Decision Rules Is VCGTextbook

A group of agents must choose one alternative from a set AAA (whether to build a public project, who receives an object, which of several policies to adopt). Each agent privately knows how much each alternative is worth to them, and money can be transferred. A designer who wants the welfare-maximizing alternative must ask the agents for their valuations, and…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design VI: Rochet's Theorem — Implementability Is Cyclical MonotonicityTextbook

Almost every screening, auction and regulation model asks the same preliminary question: which allocation rules can be made incentive-compatible by some choice of payments? In the one-dimensional models of auction theory and nonlinear pricing the answer is monotonicity: higher types must receive higher allocations. Many applications are not one-dimensional,…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design V: Dominant-Strategy Public Goods Mechanisms for Two Agents Are Fixed Cost SharesTextbook

Bayesian mechanism design assumes that the designer knows a common prior from which every agent's beliefs about the others are derived. Chapter 4 of Börgers' An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (Oxford University Press, 2015, DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001) drops that assumption. The designer is unwilling to rely on anything…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design IV: The Myerson–Satterthwaite TheoremTextbook

Stock exchanges, commodity markets and trading platforms are institutions for trade between parties who each know something the other does not. The simplest version is bilateral trade: one seller, one buyer, one indivisible good, and each side privately knows its own value. The question is whether any trading institution can make the two trade exactly when…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design III: Impossibility of First-Best Public Goods ProvisionTextbook

Whether a community can finance a shared project out of voluntary contributions, when each member knows only her own benefit from it, is one of the founding questions of mechanism design. Bayesian mechanism design began with mechanisms for the provision of public goods: d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979) showed that the efficient decision…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design II: Myerson's Optimal Single-Unit AuctionTextbook

A seller with one indivisible good and several potential buyers, each of whom privately knows how much the good is worth to them, has to choose a selling procedure: a posted price, an English auction, a sealed-bid auction with a reserve price, or something more elaborate. Which procedure raises the most expected revenue? Myerson's answer (Myerson 1981) is…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Functional AnalysisMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design I: Screening and the Optimality of a Posted PriceTextbook

A seller with one good and one buyer whose valuation she does not know faces the simplest problem of mechanism design: choose a selling procedure, anticipating that the buyer will act in his own interest given what he knows. The textbook answer, "post the monopoly price", is usually derived by optimizing over prices alone. The question that opens Börgers' An…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy Iteration Is Strongly Polynomial for 2-Player Turn-Based Stochastic Games with a Constant Discount Factor: Explicit Iteration Bound for Strategy IterationResearch Paper

Two-player turn-based stochastic games (2TBSGs) model a zero-sum contest on a finite graph with random transitions: in each state one player chooses an action, pays its cost, and a lottery chooses the next state. The minimizer and the maximizer both evaluate the total discounted cost. The model contains Markov decision processes (one player), simple…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks 2: No Strategyproof Randomized Mechanism Beats 2 - o(1) on TreesResearch Paper

A public facility (a fire station, a hospital, a server) is to be placed on a road network, and the people it serves report their own locations. When the planner wants to minimise the distance to the farthest user (the minimax or egalitarian objective, in the sense of Rawls), each user has an incentive to misreport so as to pull the facility towards…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks 1: A Strategyproof 3/2-Approximation Mechanism on the CircleResearch Paper

A facility — a fire station, a server, a meeting point — must be placed on a network, and every user of the network reports where they are. When the planner cares about the worst-off user, the objective is the minimax: minimize the largest distance from the facility to a user. The reports are private information, so a user may misreport a location to pull…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
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