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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Long-Term Behavior of Dynamic Equilibria in Fluid Queuing Networks: A Dynamic Equilibrium Reaches a Steady State in Finite Time When the Inflow Is at Most the Minimum Cut CapacityResearch Paper

Traffic and packet networks are congested over time, not only on average. The fluid queuing model (Vickrey's bottleneck model on a network) captures this: every arc of a network is a bottleneck queue followed by a link of fixed length. Users entering at a source choose routes so as to arrive at the destination as early as possible, given the queues that the…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Games with General Payoff Functions: For Every ε > 0, Every Multiplayer Stochastic Game with Bounded Borel-Measurable Payoffs Has an ε-Solvable SubgameResearch Paper

A stochastic game (Shapley, 1953) is a dynamic game in which the players' actions influence the evolution of a state variable. Whether every multiplayer stochastic game admits an ε\varepsilonε-equilibrium for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 is open even for finitely many states and the long-run average payoff; it is open as well for the general class in which each…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Posted Price Mechanisms and Optimal Threshold Strategies for Random Arrivals II: For I.I.D. Variables, Adaptive Thresholds Achieve E[max Xᵢ] ≤ β*·E[X_t] with β* ≈ 1.341Research Paper

A prophet inequality compares a gambler who sees nonnegative random rewards X1,…,XnX_1,\ldots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ one at a time, and must accept or reject each on arrival, with a prophet who knows all values in advance and simply takes max⁡iXi\max_i X_imaxi​Xi​. For independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) rewards the question is the best constant β\betaβ such that some online rule always…

17 thms4 active usersReviewed
Differential GeometryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria: For an Open Dense Set of C² Payoffs, Nash Equilibria Are Finite, an Efficient One Has a Player at a Vertex, and a Strong One Has at Most One Player off a VertexResearch Paper

That noncooperative play usually wastes something is part of the folklore of game theory, with the Prisoner's Dilemma as its emblem: each player's best reply leads to an outcome that both would trade for another. Pradeep Dubey's paper turns this folklore into a theorem about smooth games. For games whose payoffs are twice continuously differentiable, and…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment II: Under Quality Differentiation the Direct Channel Carries the High-Quality Product, the Manufacturer Gains and the Retailer LosesResearch Paper

Manufacturers increasingly sell directly to consumers while continuing to supply independent retailers, a practice known as supply chain encroachment. The direct channel competes with the retailer for the same consumers, and the conventional advice for easing that conflict is to sell different products in the two channels. Ha, Long and Nasiry (MSOM 18(2),…

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

On Synchronous, Asynchronous, and Randomized Best-Response Schemes for Stochastic Nash Games 3: Asynchronous Inexact Best Response with Delays Reaches an ϵ-NE in Explicitly Bounded SG StepsResearch Paper

Many equilibrium problems in operations research have the form of a stochastic Nash game: each of NNN players minimizes an expected cost that depends on the strategies of the others, and the expectation can only be sampled. The paper's introduction lists applications in generation-capacity and power markets and in communication networks (Abada, de Maere…

19 thms4 active usersReviewed
Dynamical SystemsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play III: Almost Sure Convergence to Linearly Stable Rest Points in Potential GamesResearch Paper

Stochastic fictitious play is a basic model of learning in repeated games. Each period every player best responds to the empirical frequencies of the opponents' past play, after the player's payoffs have been hit by a fresh random shock. It was introduced by Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), is a standard object in the theory of learning in games (Fudenberg and…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Correlated Forest Rounding for Unweighted Nash Social WelfareResearch Paper

In the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem, mmm indivisible items are divided among nnn agents with valuations vi:2M→R≥0v_i:2^M\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}vi​:2M→R≥0​, and the goal is to maximize the geometric mean (∏ivi(Si))1/n\big(\prod_i v_i(S_i)\big)^{1/n}(∏i​vi​(Si​))1/n of the agents' values. The objective sits between utilitarian welfare and max-min fairness and is invariant under rescaling any single valuation,…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Settling the Complexity of Hylland–Zeckhauser EquilibriaResearch Paper

Assigning dormitory rooms to students or shifts to workers is a one-sided matching market: nnn agents must share nnn indivisible goods, each agent receives exactly one good, and money cannot change hands. Randomization restores fairness when several agents want the same good: a random assignment gives each agent a probability of receiving each good, and by the…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Colonel Blotto GamesResearch Paper

The Colonel Blotto game (Borel, 1921) is the basic model of competitive resource allocation: two players divide fixed budgets among several contests, and each contest goes to the larger allocation. It models military and security planning, elections and R&D races. In the continuous version, allocations are arbitrary nonnegative reals, so each player has a…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsComplexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning and Optimisation of Rank Ordered Gain Functions and with Modular CostsResearch Paper

A principal choosing a group of workers must compare the group's collective value with the cost of engaging its members. Individual competencies give useful ordering information, but a ranking alone does not describe how participation costs interact with collective performance. Etesami, Liu and Sahitaj study this distinction through augmented rank-ordered…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Complexity of Exact Autobidding EquilibriaResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms increasingly bid on behalf of advertisers. An autobidder controls one scalar per advertiser — a pacing multiplier that scales all of its bids, or a participation probability with which it enters auctions — and adjusts it so that an aggregate constraint holds: total payment within a budget, or total payment at most total acquired…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Truthful-in-Expectation MMS Allocations for ChoresResearch Paper

Allocating household tasks, maintenance duties or other undesirable indivisible jobs requires comparing costs that different people experience differently. A fair allocation rule must also account for the possibility that someone exaggerates a cost to avoid a task. With no monetary transfers, these requirements can conflict. Randomization permits incentive…

28 thms3 active usersReviewed
OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Breaking the One-Player Extension Barrier: History-Aware Repair for Multiplayer Approximate Nash EquilibriaResearch Paper

Every finite game has a Nash equilibrium, but computing one is PPAD-complete already for two players (Chen–Deng–Teng 2009; Daskalakis–Goldberg–Papadimitriou 2009) and FIXP-complete for three or more (Etessami–Yannakakis 2010). For payoffs normalized to [0,1][0,1][0,1] the computational question therefore becomes: how small an error ε\varepsilonε can a polynomial-time…

35 thms3 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Money Burning Mechanism Design: From Welfare to SurplusResearch Paper

Waiting time and effort can screen people for access to a service, but their costs do not become revenue available to someone else. In such settings, the value of the selected outcome alone misses part of the social cost. The relevant objective is residual surplus: the agents' total value minus the payments they incur. A mechanism can improve its allocation…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair Share Allocations for Almost All AgentsResearch Paper

Allocating indivisible goods creates a conflict between an agent's individual fairness benchmark and the requirement that different agents receive disjoint bundles. With divisible goods, a proportional allocation can give each agent her entitlement fraction of every good. Indivisibility removes that option. A benchmark must account for the sizes and values…

31 thms3 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Information in a Forest: Algorithmic AspectsResearch Paper

An informed sender can influence several decision makers by choosing what to reveal about a common unknown state. When some decision makers observe messages addressed to others, an information policy must account for those observations. A policy designed for independent private messages may have a different effect once the messages become visible elsewhere.…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Improved Impossibility Bounds for Maximin Share AllocationsResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations is a central problem of fair division, and the maximin share (MMS) is its most studied fairness benchmark: an agent's MMS is the value she can guarantee herself by partitioning all goods into nnn bundles and receiving the worst one. Kurokawa, Procaccia and Wang showed that an allocation giving…

21 thms3 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Complexity of Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form GamesResearch Paper

A correlated equilibrium (CE) is a distribution over strategy profiles from which no player gains by applying any swap deviation, a map that replaces each recommended strategy by another one. In normal-form games (finitely many pure strategies) CE are the solutions of a linear program, and in games of polynomial type exact CE can be computed in polynomial…

48 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: iris

Approximation and Hardness in Optimization GamesResearch Paper

Deciding the winner of a two-player alternating-turn game with perfect information is typically PSPACE-hard, which raises the question of which natural games admit tractable strategies. A classical exception is the Shannon switching game and its matroid generalization: Lehman (1964) characterized the winner and gave polynomial-time winning strategies, and…

48 thms3 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Learning vs. Optimizing Players in Budgeted GamesResearch Paper

Repeated games between a strategic optimizer and a learning algorithm model settings where one side automates its decisions: an advertiser's bidding agent, for example, faces a platform or a rival that can adapt to it. Without budgets one property settles the matter. Low swap regret guarantees the learner sublinear regret and also caps the optimizer at its…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Price of Stability in Undirected Network Design: Lower Bounds and Structural GuaranteesResearch Paper

In a network design game with equal cost sharing, players connect their terminals through a shared network and split the cost of every edge equally among its users. An optimal network can be unstable: one player may lower her own share by rerouting while the total cost rises. The price of stability (PoS) measures how much a stable outcome must cost: the…

28 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Mean-only Prophet InequalitiesResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares an online decision maker, who sees independent random values X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​ one at a time and may accept at most one of them, with a prophet who sees all of them and receives X∗=max⁡iXiX^*=\max_i X_iX∗=maxi​Xi​. The classical guarantees assume that the distribution of every value is known. In pricing applications this is rarely the case: a seller…

31 thms3 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Caccetta-Häggkvist Conjecture and Percentile Distortion: An Equivalence via Asymmetric Maximal LotteriesResearch Paper

Metric distortion measures how much a voting rule loses by seeing only ordinal preferences. Voters and candidates sit in an unknown metric space; each voter ranks candidates by distance, and the rule sees only the rankings. The distortion of a rule is the worst case, over elections and over metrics consistent with the rankings, of the ratio between the cost…

45 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Polynomial-Time Approximate EFX for Chores via Flow and MatchingResearch Paper

Fair allocation of indivisible chores asks how to divide burdens among agents whose costs for those burdens differ. It is studied in algorithmic game theory and social choice (Aziz, Li, Moulin, Wu, 2022). The natural target is envy-freeness up to any chore (EFX): an agent's envy must disappear after any single chore is removed from her own bundle. Exact EFX…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
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