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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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Complexity TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Mixed Equilibria in First-Price Auctions with Correlated PriorsResearch Paper

A first-price auction awards a single item to a highest bidder and charges that bidder her own bid. Choosing a bid therefore involves predicting competitors' behavior. Researchers studying auction computation ask whether an equilibrium can be found efficiently from the publicly available description of bidders' information. The setting here allows their…

31 thms4 active usersReviewed
OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Complexity of Continuous Contract Design over PolymatroidsResearch Paper

In a principal–agent problem, a principal delegates work to an agent whose effort is not observed and pays the agent according to the outcome. Linear contracts, which pay the agent a fixed share α\alphaα of the reward, are the simplest and most widely used class; for binary outcomes they are without loss of generality. Algorithmic contract theory asks when…

49 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

From Compensation Design to Budget-Feasible Mechanisms: A Constant Approximation for Subadditive ValuationsResearch Paper

A buyer with budget B>0B>0B>0 wants to buy services from nnn strategic sellers, each holding a private cost, so as to maximize a value function of the set it buys. This is budget-feasible mechanism design, introduced by Singer (2010). It models procurement in data markets, crowdsourcing and content ecosystems, and it departs from the classical setting because VCG…

58 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Exploring the Tractability Frontier of Hylland–Zeckhauser ModelsResearch Paper

The Hylland–Zeckhauser (HZ) mechanism allocates indivisible goods without money, for instance dormitory rooms to students: each of NNN buyers receives one unit of artificial money and buys probability shares of NNN goods, each available in one copy, and equilibrium prices clear the market. The resulting doubly stochastic allocation is a lottery over assignments…

47 thms4 active usersReviewed
Statistics·Captain: iris

Robust Forecast Aggregation via Additional QueriesResearch Paper

A principal wants to combine the forecasts of nnn experts into one forecast, with a guarantee that holds without knowing how the experts' information is correlated. This is the robust forecast aggregation problem of Arieli, Babichenko and Smorodinsky (2018). The standard benchmark is pessimistic: Neyman and Roughgarden (2022) show that, even under natural…

65 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

FIXP-Completeness via Reciprocal Gates: Applications to Second-Price AuctionsResearch Paper

Fixed-point theorems guarantee that equilibria exist without saying how to find them. Two-player Nash equilibria have rational solutions of polynomial encoding length, and computing them is PPAD-complete (Chen, Deng, Teng 2009). Games with three or more players may have only irrational equilibria, so exact computation does not fit a discrete class. FIXP,…

33 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

On Existence and Computational Complexity of Quasi-strict EquilibriaResearch Paper

A Nash equilibrium of a two-player game may leave some best responses unplayed: a player is indifferent between several pure strategies and puts weight on only some of them. Harsanyi (1973) introduced quasi-strict equilibria, the refinement in which every pure best response is played with positive probability, and proved that in almost all finite games…

80 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Finite-Memory Search: Rational Compilation and Arithmetic Lower BoundsResearch Paper

A searcher repeatedly examines two locations, AAA and BBB, until it finds a stationary target. A search at the correct location fails with a known probability; a search at the wrong location always fails, and before success the searcher observes nothing but failure. The unrestricted problem is classical: greedy index rules go back to Blackwell and to Matula (Mat…

28 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Supply-Sensitive Revenue Recovery under Unknown Buyer OrderResearch Paper

A seller with one copy of each of mmm items posts personalized item prices to independent buyers. Revenue benchmarks for this setting usually give every buyer full stock and bound expected allocations; the ex ante capped benchmark of Chawla, Rezvan, Teng and Tzamos (arXiv:2204.01962) and the buy-many benchmark of Chawla, Teng and Tzamos (arXiv:1902.10315) are…

29 thms4 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOptimization·Captain: iris

Optimal Learning in Games with Arbitrary Delays: Best-of-Both-Worlds for Self-Play and Adversarial OpponentsResearch Paper

Two players repeatedly playing a zero-sum game with no-regret learning algorithms approach a Nash equilibrium: a social regret of RTR_TRT​ makes the averaged strategies an (RT/T)(R_T/T)(RT​/T)-approximate equilibrium (Freund–Schapire 1999). Standard algorithms have regret O(T)O(\sqrt T)O(T​), but optimistic algorithms, which predict the next gradient, reach constant regret, and hence…

53 thms4 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningProbability·Captain: iris

Non-manipulability and Approachability Beyond Two-Player GamesResearch Paper

Online learning algorithms are routinely deployed against a single strategic party that sees how they behave: buyers bidding through autobidders on an ad platform, sellers pricing against a marketplace's matching rule, agents trained by self-play. The learners are usually asked for a worst-case guarantee, no regret, which protects each of them whatever the…

15 thms4 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Pure Nash Equilibria: Hard and Easy Games: Deciding Whether a Game Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium Is NP-Complete, Even for Graphical Games with 3-Bounded Neighborhood and Three ActionsResearch Paper

A pure Nash equilibrium is a choice of one action per player from which no player can gain by changing only her own action. Unlike mixed equilibria, which exist in every finite game by Nash's theorem, pure equilibria may fail to exist, so deciding whether one exists is a basic algorithmic question about any game model. It matters most for games with many…

30 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal Approximation: Taxes From the Poisson Relaxation of Minimum Social Cost Have Price of Anarchy at Most the Worst Hardness Factor sup ρ_ℓResearch Paper

In an atomic congestion game (Rosenthal, 1973) each of NNN agents chooses a set of resources, such as the edges of a route, and the cost of a resource depends on how many agents use it. Selfish choices are inefficient: the price of anarchy (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999) compares the social cost of the worst equilibrium with the minimum social cost, and…

39 thms4 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Complexity of Pacing for Second-Price Auctions: Finding an Approximate Pacing Equilibrium Is PPAD-HardResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms sell billions of impressions through auctions, and most advertisers face a budget for a whole campaign rather than for a single auction. Ad platforms handle this with budget pacing: each advertiser's bids are scaled down by a multiplier so that spending tracks the budget. When every advertiser paces at once, the multipliers…

26 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Pareto Frontier of Inefficiency in Mechanism Design: Second-Price Mechanisms with Relative Reserves Exactly Attain the PoA/PoS Frontier of Anonymous Task-Independent SchedulingResearch Paper

Scheduling tasks on unrelated machines is the problem with which algorithmic mechanism design began (Nisan and Ronen, 1999). The machines are selfish: each one knows its own processing times and may misreport them, and a mechanism must allocate the tasks and pay the machines so that the makespan stays low. For two decades the field studied truthful…

36 thms4 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Constrained Trading Networks: Under an Integral Polymatroid Constraint on Trades, the Efficient-Allocation Relaxation with Separable M♮-Concave/Linear Valuations Has an Integral OptimumResearch Paper

In a trading network agents sit at the vertices of a directed multigraph and every arc is a bilateral trade: its source sells, its sink buys, and an outcome records how many copies of each trade are executed. When valuations satisfy a gross-substitutes condition (M♯^\sharp♯-concavity), competitive equilibria exist and efficient outcomes can be computed by a…

26 thms4 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryProbabilityReinforcement Learning+1·Captain: iris

Exploration Noise for Learning Linear-Quadratic Mean Field Games: With Common Noise, the Tilted Geometric Fictitious Play Converges to the Equilibrium at Rate ϖ−nexp⁡(C/ε2)\varpi^{-n}\exp(C/\varepsilon^2)ϖ−nexp(C/ε2)Research Paper

A mean field game (MFG) describes a continuum of identical players, each controlling its own state and paying a cost that depends on the statistical distribution of the population. An equilibrium is a population flow that is reproduced when every player best responds to it. Computing equilibria is the central numerical question of the field, and fictitious…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningProbabilityReinforcement Learning·Captain: iris

Learning Zero-Sum Simultaneous-Move Markov Games Using Function Approximation and Correlated Equilibrium: Offline OMNI-VI Has Total Duality Gap O(√(d³H³Tι²)) with Probability 1−pResearch Paper

Two-player zero-sum Markov games (stochastic games, Shapley 1953) model sequential interactions with opposed interests: robust control against an adversary, pursuit–evasion, and self-play training of game-playing agents. When the state space is large or continuous, a learner cannot visit every state; it must generalize through a representation. The question…

31 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Shapley–Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange: With Strict Preferences the Unique Strong Core Allocation Respects ImprovementResearch Paper

In a kidney exchange programme a patient arrives with a willing but incompatible donor, and patients swap donors along cycles so that each patient receives a compatible kidney. The standard model of such swaps is the housing market of Shapley and Scarf (Shapley–Scarf 1974): each agent owns one indivisible object and the agents reallocate the objects among…

14 thms4 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

Tight Guarantees for Static Threshold Policies in the Prophet Secretary Problem: A Threshold With Expected Utilization γₖ Earns at Least γₖ = 1 − e⁻ᵏkᵏ/k! Times the Prophet's ValueResearch Paper

In the prophet secretary problem, a decision-maker holds kkk identical items and meets nnn applicants one at a time. Each applicant's value is drawn independently from a known distribution, and the applicants arrive in a uniformly random order. On seeing a value, the decision-maker must immediately accept the applicant or reject them for good. The model…

33 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignProbability·Captain: iris

On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items: for an Additive Buyer Whose Values Form a Markov Random Field, (2e4Δ+2) SRev+8(e4Δ+1) BRev≥Rev(D)(2e^{4\Delta}+\sqrt2)\,\mathrm{SRev}+8(e^{4\Delta}+1)\,\mathrm{BRev}\ge\mathrm{Rev}(D)(2e4Δ+2​)SRev+8(e4Δ+1)BRev≥Rev(D)Research Paper

A seller with nnn heterogeneous items faces one buyer whose values for the items are private and drawn from a known joint distribution DDD. The revenue-optimal mechanism for this problem is in general randomized, hard to describe, and sensitive to the details of DDD. Two simple mechanisms are used in practice: selling every item separately at its own posted price…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Efficient Black-Box Reductions for Separable Cost Sharing: In Matroid Games with Subadditive Costs, Algorithm 1 Turns Any Profile into a No Costlier Enforceable Profile Within n·m·rk IterationsResearch Paper

In a cost sharing game each player chooses a set of resources, and the cost of every resource has to be divided among the players who use it. A designer who wants a cheap outcome to be stable chooses the division rule, the cost sharing protocol, so that the cheap outcome becomes a pure Nash equilibrium. Practical protocols should be separable: the share a…

13 thms4 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Minimax Property in Infinite Two-Person Win-Lose Games: a game is totally minimax if and only if it has no subgame isomorphic to the larger number gameResearch Paper

Von Neumann's minimax theorem says that in a finite two-person zero-sum game, committing first to a mixed strategy costs nothing: max⁡pmin⁡qπmix(p,q)=min⁡qmax⁡pπmix(p,q)\max_p\min_q\pi_{\mathrm{mix}}(p,q)=\min_q\max_p\pi_{\mathrm{mix}}(p,q)maxp​minq​πmix​(p,q)=minq​maxp​πmix​(p,q). Once the players have infinitely many pure strategies this can fail. In the larger number game, where each player names a positive integer and the larger…

16 thms4 active usersReviewed
AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: iris

Existence and Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Polynomial Games of Degree d With No α-PNE for Any α < α(d), Where α(d) ≥ √d/(2 ln d) for Large dResearch Paper

Weighted congestion games model players of different sizes sharing resources whose cost grows with load: traffic of different volumes on network links, jobs of different lengths on machines. Rosenthal (1973) showed that unweighted congestion games always have a pure Nash equilibrium, but weighted games may have none, already with polynomial costs. The…

28 thms4 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Pacing Equilibrium in First Price Auction Markets: Existence, uniqueness, and revenue maximization of first price pacing equilibriaResearch Paper

An advertiser buying many impressions must decide how to distribute a limited budget across auctions. Bidding the full value in every auction can exhaust the budget before all opportunities have been considered. A pacing multiplier scales an advertiser's bids by one common factor. The resulting allocation depends on other advertisers' multipliers as well as…

15 thms4 active usersReviewed
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