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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Retention or Acquisition? Behavior-Based Quality Disclosure II: Behavior-Based Disclosure Raises Total Two-Period Profits Exactly When the Disclosure Cost Exceeds a CutoffResearch Paper

Firms that sell to the same customers over time learn who bought from whom. Behavior-based pricing (BBP) — charging a firm's own past customers one price and the rival's past customers another — has been studied since Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Villas-Boas (1999). A second instrument is the disclosure of product quality: free samples, demonstrations…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Correlated Equilibria for Mean Field Games with Progressive Strategies: Correlated MFG Solutions Yield ε_N-Correlated Equilibria of the N-Player Game Against Progressive Deviations, ε_N → 0Research Paper

A correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) is an equilibrium of a game with a mediator: the mediator draws a profile of recommendations from a known distribution and tells each player privately what to play. The distribution is an equilibrium if no player gains by deviating from the recommendation they receive. Correlated equilibria can give higher payoffs…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management IV: With Disjoint Supports, Full Disclosure Is Optimal When 2(b₀ − a₀) ≥ b₁ − a₁, Else No Disclosure at p₀ ≥ p̃ and Partial BelowResearch Paper

A retailer usually knows more about her future demand than the supplier who has to produce for her. If the supplier must commit to a production quantity before the order arrives, the retailer bears the cost of every unit he fails to produce. She cannot pay him or contract on quantities, but she can decide how much of her demand information to share, and she…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria 3: For Submodular Valuations Every α-Approximate Pure Nash Equilibrium of Round-Robin Is α/3-EF1Research Paper

Round-Robin is the simplest allocation rule for indivisible goods: agents take turns, in a fixed order, picking their favourite remaining good. When agents have additive valuations and report them truthfully, the outcome is envy-free up to one good (EF1) — every agent values its own bundle at least as much as any other bundle with one good removed, a notion…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management II: Under Partial Disclosure the Value of Information Is Unimodal in p₀ and Falling in ξ Against No Disclosure, the Reverse Against FullResearch Paper

A retailer often knows more about her own demand than the supplier who produces for her. When the supplier must commit to a production quantity before demand is realized, what the retailer tells him shapes how much he produces, and therefore how much demand she can serve. Information design (Bayesian persuasion, Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) asks how a…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management I: With Nested Uniform Demand Supports, Full, No or Two-Message Partial Disclosure Is Optimal According to Critical-Ratio ThresholdsResearch Paper

A retailer who sees her own demand before her supplier does can decide how much of that knowledge to pass upstream. Sharing everything is not obviously best: the supplier uses the information to set his production quantity for his own benefit, and the retailer bears a cost when he under-produces. Candogan and Gurkan (SSRN 4378997; published in Management…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: LG

Rural Hospitals Theorem (Wikipedia): All Stable Matchings Fill the Same PositionsTextbook

In centralized labour markets such as the US National Resident Matching Program, doctors are assigned to hospital residency positions by a mechanism that produces a stable matching. There are more positions than doctors, so some hospitals end up with empty positions; these are typically rural hospitals, which are less sought after than urban ones. This…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsEconomics·Captain: LG

Stable Matching Problem (Wikipedia) I: The Gale–Shapley AlgorithmTextbook

The stable matching problem asks for a pairing between two equally sized groups in which no two participants would both rather be matched with each other than with their assigned partners. It was posed and solved by Gale and Shapley in 1962 in the context of college admissions and marriage (Gale–Shapley 1962). Their deferred acceptance algorithm underlies…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Secretary Through Blind Strategies 1: A Nonincreasing Blind Strategy Earns at Least 0.669 of the Prophet's Expected Maximum When Values Arrive in Uniformly Random OrderResearch Paper

In the prophet inequality a gambler observes independent nonnegative random values V1,…,VnV_1,\dots,V_nV1​,…,Vn​ with known laws one at a time and must decide irrevocably, after seeing each one, whether to stop and keep it. Her expected reward is compared with that of a prophet who knows all realizations and earns E(max⁡iVi)\mathbb E(\max_i V_i)E(maxi​Vi​). When the values arrive in a fixed…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Case Study on Stochastic Games on Large Graphs in Mean Field and Sparse Regimes I: An Explicit Markovian Nash Equilibrium on Every Finite Transitive GraphResearch Paper

Mean field games describe Nash equilibria of large populations in which every player interacts with every other player symmetrically, through the empirical distribution of all states. Many systems of interest are not of this kind: agents in a network interact only with their neighbours, and the interaction structure is a graph rather than a complete graph.…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning and Strategic Consumers 1: Under Pre-Announced Pricing, Social Learning Raises Optimal Expected Profit When Consumers Are Impatient or PatientResearch Paper

Online reviews let consumers learn about a new product from the experience of earlier buyers. For a firm selling to strategic consumers, who time their purchases, this social learning (SL) cuts two ways. Reviews reveal quality, which can raise second-period demand; but a consumer who expects reviews also has a new reason to wait, and every consumer who…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Algorithms for Aggregative Games on Graphs III: Equal-Stepsize Gossip under Strong Monotonicity, limsup E‖x^k − x*‖² ≤ (α/μ)(2C²N + BC√(2nN)/(1 − √λ))Research Paper

In an aggregative game, each player's decision affects a common quantity, such as total production or total demand. An agent may be able to calculate its own preferred response while lacking direct access to that aggregate. Koshal, Nedić, and Shanbhag study how agents can estimate it by exchanging information only with neighbours on a communication graph.…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Algorithms for Aggregative Games on Graphs II: The Gossip Algorithm with Stepsizes 1/Γ_k(i) Converges Almost Surely to the Unique EquilibriumResearch Paper

In an aggregative game, each player's cost depends on its own decision and on the sum of all players' decisions. That form appears in resource sharing, production, and network games: a player may know its own choice while lacking a central feed of the aggregate. A distributed algorithm therefore has to estimate the aggregate through local communication as…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 2: Generalized Weighted Shapley Value Rules Yield Generalized Weighted Potential GamesResearch Paper

In a welfare sharing game, several players choose resources and receive shares of each resource's welfare. A rule for splitting welfare is useful only if the resulting players' incentives admit stable choices. The paper by Gopalakrishnan, Marden, and Wierman characterizes the distribution rules that guarantee a pure Nash equilibrium for every game formed…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Sharing in Competing Supply Chains with Production Cost Reduction: Under Cournot Competition Both Chains Share Below k_N, Both or Neither Between k_N and k_S, and Neither Above k_SResearch Paper

Retailers observe demand signals (point-of-sale data, local forecasts) that their suppliers do not. Whether a retailer should pass such a signal upstream is a central question of the supply chain information-sharing literature. In a single chain, sharing helps the manufacturer plan, but the retailer may lose from it. Competition between chains adds a second…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 4: Intersecting the Families of (b, c₁)- and (b, c₂)-Selectable Greedy OCRSs Is (b, c₁c₂)-SelectableResearch Paper

Online selection problems ask an algorithm to accept or reject elements as they arrive, while keeping the accepted set feasible. The decisions are irrevocable, and the arrival order can be chosen after the random activity of the elements is known. A guarantee for one constraint is therefore useful only if it remains meaningful when several constraints apply…

15 thms2 active users
🏆Completed
Functional AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Graphon Games: I. The Static Case 2: Under Condition (17) the Unique Nash Equilibrium of a Graphon Game Moves by at Most κ‖W − W′‖ When the Graphon ChangesResearch Paper

Large network games can be described by a graphon, a measurable kernel that assigns an interaction weight to each pair of players in a continuum. This representation is useful when a finite network is viewed as an approximation to a limiting network. A basic question is whether a small change in interaction weights can cause a large change in equilibrium…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs III: Under a Consistent Allocation Rule, (α, β)-Balanced Prices Are Closed Under Maxima of ValuationsResearch Paper

Posted prices turn an offline allocation problem into a sequential choice process: each agent sees a menu of outcomes and prices, then chooses an outcome without revealing its full valuation. The balanced prices framework of Dütting, Feldman, Kesselheim, and Lucier gives welfare guarantees by comparing the revenue collected from an allocation with the…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Disruption and Rerouting in Supply Chain Networks I: Every Supply Chain Network Has a Unique General Equilibrium of Rerouting Prices, Switching Costs and Default CascadesResearch Paper

A failed buyer can leave a supplier with goods it can no longer sell through an existing order. A failed supplier can leave a buyer without inputs for future production. In a network, either loss can weaken another firm and start a sequence of defaults. Birge, Capponi and Chen model these effects together with two responses: suppliers reroute unsold goods…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets 2: Every Competitive Equilibrium Gives Each Agent Her ℓ-out-of-d Maximin Share for Every Rational ℓ/d at Most Her BudgetResearch Paper

Competitive equilibrium is a way to divide goods when each participant has a budget reflecting her entitlement. With divisible goods, proportional value is a natural fairness target. Indivisible goods make that target unavailable in some markets: a single item cannot give two agents positive fractions of its value. The question becomes what fairness a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets 1: Two Additive Agents with Almost Equal but Unequal Budgets Have a Competitive Equilibrium Giving Each Agent Her Truncated ShareResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide indivisible goods among agents who are entitled to different shares but cannot pay with real money: course seats among students, shifts among workers, inherited items among heirs. A standard mechanism gives each agent a budget of artificial currency and lets a market run. When budgets are equal this is the competitive…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Mean Field Game of Optimal Portfolio Liquidation 3: The Mean-Field Equilibrium Strategies Form an O(1/√N)-Nash Equilibrium of the N-Player Liquidation GameResearch Paper

A trader who must sell a large position within a fixed horizon faces a trade-off: selling fast moves the price against her (temporary price impact), selling slowly exposes her to price risk. Since Almgren and Chriss, this optimal liquidation problem has been studied as a stochastic control problem with a terminal state constraint: the remaining position…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment III: With a Fixed Cost of Quality, the Encroaching Manufacturer Does Not Differentiate Quality Across ChannelsResearch Paper

A manufacturer that sells through a retailer can also open a direct sales channel. The direct channel lets the manufacturer reach consumers, but it competes with the retailer, whose orders generate wholesale revenue. The manufacturer can further choose whether the two channels carry products of the same quality. These decisions interact because quality…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Probabilistic Weak Formulation of Mean Field Games and Applications 2: Under Unique Hamiltonian Maximizers and Lasry–Lions Monotonicity, the Mean Field Game Has at Most One SolutionResearch Paper

Mean field games, introduced independently by Lasry and Lions (Mean field games, Jpn. J. Math. 2007) and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines (2006), describe the Nash equilibria of games with a very large number of symmetric players, each of whom reacts only to the empirical distribution of the others. In the limit, an equilibrium is a fixed point: a flow of…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment IV: Without Quality Commitment in the Direct Channel, Quality Differentiation Across Channels Is Always OptimalResearch Paper

A manufacturer that sells through an independent retailer may also open its own direct channel, an online store or a factory outlet. This is called supply chain encroachment. The operations literature has asked whether encroachment helps or hurts the two firms. The usual approach compares the double-marginalization cost of a pure retail channel with the…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
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