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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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Convex OptimizationEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and Cores: Algorithm 1 applied to an optimal solution of the convex program (OPT) yields an optimal double-interval public signaling mechanismResearch Paper

An information designer who knows a payoff-relevant state, and who cannot pay or coerce anyone, can still shape behavior by committing in advance to what is disclosed. This is Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011). Candogan studies the case of many receivers in a social network, who act on a common public signal and whose actions are strategic…

20 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

The Competition Complexity of Dynamic Pricing: For ε > 0, m ≥ ϕ(ε)n Buyers Give (1 + ε)Aₘ(F) ≥ Mₙ(F) for Every F, Asymptotically Tight, with ϕ(ε) = Θ(log log 1/ε)Research Paper

A seller with one item faces buyers whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution FFF. The welfare-optimal mechanism is an auction: it allocates to the highest bidder and achieves Mn(F)M_n(F)Mn​(F), the expected maximum of nnn values. Dynamic pricing, which offers the item to the buyers one at a time at prices that may depend on the remaining number of buyers, is…

25 thms3 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions: the water-filling algorithm finds an ϵ\epsilonϵ-bidder-optimal core point in O(nlog⁡(n/ϵ))O(n\log(n/\epsilon))O(nlog(n/ϵ)) oracle calls and O(n2log⁡(n/ϵ))O(n^2\log(n/\epsilon))O(n2log(n/ϵ)) timeResearch Paper

Online ad platforms sell a limited number of lines of ad space to advertisers whose ads come in several shapes and sizes, so their preferences over the space are combinatorial and often complementary (Niazadeh et al., arXiv:1610.03564v4, §1). The Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction can earn little revenue on such preferences. Core-selecting auctions (Ausubel and…

40 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

When Nash Meets Stackelberg: The Enumeration Algorithm Returns a Mixed Nash Equilibrium or Correctly Certifies That None ExistsResearch Paper

Many markets are organised as competition among firms that each anticipate the reaction of a group of followers. Electricity producers decide capacities while the system operator and consumers clear the market; carriers set prices while shippers choose routes. Operations research models these settings as equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints…

23 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: iris

Approximating the Set of Nash Equilibria for Convex Games: Algorithm 4.8's output contains every Nash equilibrium and consists of (ε₁ + (2+κ)Lε₂)-approximate Nash equilibriaResearch Paper

A game with a shared constraint couples the players twice: through their costs and through a joint feasible set that restricts which strategy profiles are allowed. Such generalized Nash games model system-wide limits, for example a common capacity or emission budget (Rosen 1965; Facchinei–Kanzow 2010). They typically have a continuum of equilibria, so one…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationEconomics·Captain: iris

The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies: every κ-core allocation of a replica economy is an ε-Walrasian allocationResearch Paper

Edgeworth (1881) conjectured that as an exchange economy grows, the outcomes that no group of traders can improve upon by trading among themselves shrink to the competitive (Walrasian) outcomes. Debreu and Scarf (DS63) proved this for replica economies: an allocation that lies in the core of the nnn-fold replica En\mathcal E^nEn for every nnn is a Walrasian…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsLinear Optimization·Captain: iris

Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-duality: every bipartite instance with strict preferences has a max-utility popular mixed matching {(M0,1/2),(M1,1/2)}, pure if a stable matching is perfectResearch Paper

In a two-sided matching market, applicants and jobs rank their acceptable partners, and a planner wants an assignment that is both acceptable to the participants and good for some external objective, such as total value. Stability (no applicant–job pair prefers each other to their assignments) is the classical acceptability notion, but it is restrictive:…

24 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Signaling Service Quality Through Queue Disclosure: with uninformed customers, the unique pure perfect sequential equilibrium pools on concealment below λ^\hat\lambdaλ^, on revelation above itResearch Paper

Whether a service provider should show customers its queue is a classical question in the economics of queues. When customers know the quality of service, the answer is a threshold in market size: Hassin (1986) and Chen and Frank (2004) showed that a revenue-maximizing server conceals the queue when the potential arrival rate is small and reveals it when it…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Blockchain-Enabled Deep-Tier Supply Chain Finance: Optimal direct financing and universal blockchain adoptionResearch Paper

A manufacturer can have ample cash while an upstream supplier lacks the funds needed to make production reliable. Financing that supplier through an intermediary changes both the cost of credit and the incentives to invest. Information is also uneven: a firm may know its immediate supplier's working capital without knowing the capital of a more distant…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Optimizing Free-to-Play Multiplayer Games with Premium Subscription: Optimal advertising and subscription pricingResearch Paper

A free-to-play multiplayer game earns subscription revenue only if players value the premium experience enough to pay for it. Yet converting free players into premium players also changes the experience of everyone else. Premium players may enjoy owning items that others lack, while free players may dislike comparisons with premium players. Advertising…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryGraph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

Fair Division of a Graph: Maximin-share allocations on trees exist and can be computed in polynomial timeResearch Paper

An allocation of rooms to research groups may be impractical if one group receives rooms scattered throughout a building. The same issue appears when indivisible land plots must form a connected holding. In these examples, adjacency constrains which bundles can be allocated, while different participants may value the same items differently. Connected fair…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms: No OSP Mechanism for Scheduling Identical Jobs on Related Machines with Three-Value Domains Is Better Than √n-ApproximateResearch Paper

A mechanism is strategyproof when truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every agent. Experimental and theoretical work has found that this guarantee is fragile in practice: agents faced with a sealed-bid second-price auction often misreport, while the same agents bid truthfully in the strategically equivalent ascending clock auction. Li (Obviously…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentive-Compatible Forecasting Competitions: the Independent-Event Lotteries mechanism is strictly incentive compatible under belief independence and limit accurate for independent eventsResearch Paper

Forecasting competitions ask many forecasters to report probabilities for many future binary events and award a single prize to one of them. They are used to identify and reward accurate forecasters: the Good Judgment Project gave "superforecaster" status to the top 2% by quadratic score, and data-science platforms run similar leaderboards. The usual rule…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

“Sherlocking” and Platform Information Policy: The Full-Commitment Outcome Is Implementable by an Information Policy If and Only If the No-Entry Obedience Constraint (OC0) HoldsResearch Paper

Large online marketplaces are hybrid platforms: they host third-party sellers and also sell their own products. Running the marketplace gives the platform access to sellers' sales data, and it can use that data to identify successful products and launch imitations of its own. The practice is colloquially called "Sherlocking". It has drawn regulatory…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Tracking Truth with Liquid Democracy: Upward Delegation Satisfies Probabilistic Do No Harm and Positive GainResearch Paper

Liquid democracy lets each voter either vote directly or delegate the vote to another voter, who may delegate it further. It has been used in practice, for example by the German Pirate Party on the LiquidFeedback platform and in the Google Votes experiment, and has been studied in computational social choice as a way to give more weight to better-informed…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Surge Pricing and Its Spatial Supply Response: Within an Attraction Region, Supply Fills the Congestion Bound Outward from the Sink at Locally Optimal Prices Without Loss of RevenueResearch Paper

Ride-hailing platforms change prices by location in real time, and drivers respond by moving. A price increase at one location changes where drivers go, how congested each location becomes, and therefore what every driver earns everywhere else. Besbes, Castro and Lobel, Surge Pricing and its Spatial Supply Response (SSRN 3124571, version of May 17, 2019;…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias–Variance Trade-offs in Data Acquisition: The Minimax-Optimal Allocation Rule Is Constant Then Inversely Proportional to the Square Root of the Virtual CostResearch Paper

Data marketplaces buy personal data from many individuals to estimate population statistics. Two features set such pricing apart from an ordinary procurement auction. First, each data owner has a private cost of sharing, so the buyer must design a menu of payments that elicits these costs truthfully. Second, data are correlated across people: an individual…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Classical Search Game in Discrete Locations: for any optimal hiding strategy, the searcher has an optimal strategy mixing at most n Gittins search sequences that each break all ties by one orderResearch Paper

An object is hidden in one of nnn boxes. Each search of box iii costs time tit_iti​, and if the object is there it is found with probability qiq_iqi​, independently of all earlier searches. When the searcher knows the probabilities pip_ipi​ with which the object was placed, the problem has a classical index solution. Norris (1962), Bram (1963), Blackwell (reported by Matula,…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Learning and Market Making in Spread Betting Markets with Informed Bettors: the inertial policy deters bluffing, drives the spread line to the median and has O(log T) regretResearch Paper

In a spread betting market a market maker quotes a line sss for a quantity whose outcome XXX is not yet known (a point spread in sports, a price level in finance), and bettors wager on either side of it. The market maker earns a commission on every bet and would like her line to sit at the median of XXX, where both sides are equally likely and she carries no…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Regularity of the Value Function of Repeated Games with Switching Costs: The Value Is Continuous, Increasing, Concave, Piecewise Linear and Eventually Constant in the Switching-Cost WeightResearch Paper

Many repeated interactions charge a player not only for what is played at each stage but also for changing what is played: a firm that reconfigures production, a defender that relocates patrols, a server that migrates jobs. Switching costs model this. In a zero-sum repeated game with switching costs, player 2 pays player 1 a stage payoff that depends on the…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Queueing Dynamics and State Space Collapse in Fragmented Limit Order Book Markets: every equilibrium is the lifting of a one-dimensional workload equilibriumResearch Paper

US equities trade on many exchanges at once. Each exchange keeps its own limit order book, and at the national best bid the same price is offered in several queues that differ in the rebate the exchange pays a liquidity provider and in how long a resting order waits to be filled. An investor who posts a limit order chooses an exchange, or decides to cross…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs Converge to the Feasible and Individually Rational Set as Players Become PatientResearch Paper

Repeated games model long-run relationships: the same players meet stage after stage, observe what was played, and can condition today's behavior on the past. The folk theorem describes what such relationships can sustain. When players are patient, every payoff vector that is feasible and gives each player at least what the others can force on them is the…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Technical Note—Global Robust Stability in a General Price and Assortment Competition Model: Robust Best-Response Price Dynamics Contract Geometrically to the Special Equilibrium from Any StartResearch Paper

Retailers that sell many products set prices against one another, and the demand for each product depends on the prices of all of them. Affine demand models, q(p)=a−Rpq(p)=a-Rpq(p)=a−Rp, are the standard starting point for this kind of multi-product price competition in operations management and industrial organization. Two questions follow once an equilibrium is known to…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators: Optimal Tolls Bounded by the Marginal Tolls Are (Strong) Cap EquilibriaResearch Paper

Congestion pricing charges road users for the delay they impose on others. The classical theory, going back to Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten (1956), assumes a single benevolent authority that sets every toll: charging each link its marginal toll makes the selfish (Wardrop) traffic pattern socially optimal. Many real networks are different. Roads, bridges…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Game of Thrones: Fully Distributed Learning for Multiplayer Bandits: Without Communication, the Game of Thrones Algorithm Has Expected Total Regret O(log^{1+δ} T)Research Paper

In a multiplayer multi-armed bandit, several agents repeatedly choose among the same finite set of arms, and two agents that choose the same arm collide and receive nothing. The model comes from cognitive radio and wireless networks: users share channels, a channel used by two users at once carries neither transmission, and the quality of a channel differs…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
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