Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

Operations Research

3,614 missions · 2,642 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

Open972Completed2642All3614
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 1: Random Sampling Vickrey Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a 2(d+1)-Approximation to Welfare for d-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

In an auction with interdependent values, a bidder's value can depend on information held by other bidders. An estimate of a shared resource's usefulness, for example, may improve when another participant reports a stronger signal. The auctioneer must decide whom to serve using reported signals, while each participant has an incentive to report a signal…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? II: With a Single Voter, Voting for the k Candidates Most Likely to Be Honest Is OptimalResearch Paper

Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every token holder take part in consensus. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol. EOS, for instance, elects 21 producers by an up-to-30-vote approval ballot (paper, p. 9, citing EOS voting guide 2018). Byzantine agreement protocols…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Climate Impact Investing 1: With an Average-Emissions Interaction Effect the Unique Equilibrium Emission Schedule Is ψ* − ε/(2n+ε)·(ψ* + 2n²ψ̄*/(2n+(n+1)ε)), Below the Schedule Without InteractionResearch Paper

Green investors hold a growing share of financial wealth, and the stated purpose of much of this capital is to change how companies behave, not only to avoid exposure to climate risk. Whether exclusionary or impact-oriented portfolios actually move corporate emissions is an equilibrium question: investors' preferences shift the cost of capital, and…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Load Balancing Under Strict Compatibility Constraints 1: On Proportionally Sparse Subcritical Compatibility Graphs, JSQ(d) Has the Fully Flexible Mean-Field Limit and Steady StateResearch Paper

In large server farms and cloud platforms, not every server can process every task. Data locality, licences, hardware and security rules restrict each task type to a subset of servers. Such compatibility constraints are modelled by a bipartite compatibility graph between task types (dispatchers) and servers. Classical mean-field results for load balancing,…

28 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management in Crowdfunding 1: Optimal Pledge Level and Campaign Duration Under Triangular Valuations When Independent or Herding Backers DominateResearch Paper

Reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter let a project creator collect pledges from the public for a fixed period. Two numbers are fixed before launch and cannot be changed afterwards: the pledge level ppp each backer pays, and the campaign duration TTT. A high pledge level earns more per backer but deters backers with low valuations; a long…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Number TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Integer Factorization: Why Two-Item Joint Replenishment Is Hard 1: For Odd Composite M, Every Optimal Plan of an Explicit Two-Item Aperiodic JRP Instance Has q₂ = M and 1 < gcd(q₁, M) < MResearch Paper

The joint replenishment problem (JRP) is one of the basic models of multi-item inventory control. Each item follows the economic order quantity (EOQ) model of Harris (1913): ordering costs a fixed amount, holding stock costs a rate proportional to the stock, and the classical trade-off between the two determines how often to reorder. In a JRP, items…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition I: Comparative Statics of an Unconstrained Monopoly's Optimal R&D IntensityResearch Paper

Firms deciding how much to spend on research and development face two different kinds of return to spending. More money can make the eventual innovation more valuable, or it can make the innovation arrive sooner. Lin (Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4503) calls these two properties scalability and accelerability, and shows that they predict…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Probability·Captain: mikedeng1

Lightning Network Economics: Channels I: The Expected Discounted Cost of a Bidirectional Payment Channel in Closed FormResearch Paper

Blockchains such as Bitcoin settle every transaction on a public ledger. Each on-chain transaction pays a fee and waits for confirmation, so frequent small payments are expensive. The Lightning Network moves such payments off-chain: two parties lock funds in a shared payment channel and pay each other by updating the channel's balance, touching the…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Selection and Ordering Policies for Hiring Pipelines via Linear Programming 1: A Non-Adaptive, Committed LP-Rounding Policy for ProbeTop-k Earns at Least (1 − e^{−k}k^k/k!) Times the LP BoundResearch Paper

Hiring is a pipeline: a firm with kkk openings and a large pool of applicants cannot interview everyone, so it must decide whom to interview, in what order, and whether to hire on the spot. The ProbeTop-k problem models this. Each applicant has a random value with a known distribution, an interview reveals the value, at most TTT interviews may be conducted, and…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 2: Under Local α-Power Envelopes, ε-IC Mechanisms Gain at Most Õ(ε^(α/(2α−1))) RevenueResearch Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents optimize exactly: a buyer facing a menu picks the option that maximizes his utility, however small the advantage over the next-best option. In many settings this is implausible. Agents may face cognitive or computational costs, or the designer may only be able to certify incentives approximately, as in…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 1: The Mining Game Has a Unique Equilibrium Whose Number of Active Miners Is Fixed by an Explicit Cost ConditionResearch Paper

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin keep their ledger secure by a contest: miners spend computing power ("hash rate") to solve a cryptographic puzzle, and the miner who solves it first earns the block reward. The probability of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total hash rate, so mining is a rent-seeking contest in the sense of…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 2: Signs of the Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates and Hash Rate Shares to Mining CostsResearch Paper

In a proof-of-work cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, miners spend computing power (hash rate) to win the right to add the next block and collect a reward. Whether this competition stays decentralized depends on how individual hash rates react to differences in mining costs: if a cost advantage translates into an ever larger share of the total hash rate,…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 3: Hard/Soft Floor Mechanisms Are Optimal Among Deterministic ε-IC Mechanisms and Gain Θ(ε)Research Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents best-respond exactly: a buyer who gains even an infinitesimal amount by misreporting will misreport. In practice agents face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may ignore a deviation that gains less than some small amount ε\varepsilonε. A seller facing such a buyer only needs to satisfy the incentive…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? I: With a Vote-Probability Gap δ, an Honest Committee Is Elected with Probability at Least 1 − 2m²e^{−δ²n/2}Research Paper

Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every participant produce blocks. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol among itself. EOS, for example, elects 21 producers by approval voting: each token holder approves a set of candidates, and the 21 candidates with the most…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 1: Nisan's Rounding Bounds the Revenue Gain of ε-IC Mechanisms by O(ε^(1/2))Research Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents are perfect optimizers: a mechanism is incentive compatible if no buyer gains anything, however small, by misreporting. In practice buyers face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may not bother to deviate for a gain below some threshold ε\varepsilonε. Balseiro, Besbes and Castro, Mechanism Design…

5 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsGraph TheoryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret II: In (SPP)-Acyclic Networks the Static Planning Solution Is Given by Surplus Vectors in {−1, 0, 1}ⁿResearch Paper

Centralized markets such as kidney exchanges, ride-sharing platforms and online labor markets match agents who arrive over time. Kerimov, Ashlagi and Gurvich (SSRN 3824407; Management Science, 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.01215) study such a market with nnn agent types and ddd feasible multi-way matches. Their main result is that, when a fluid linear program…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Offline Multi-Action Policy Learning: Generalization and Optimization 2: Depth-L Decision Trees Satisfy log N_H(ε,Π_L) ≤ (2^L−1)log p + 2^L log d + (2^L−1)log(L/ε+1)Research Paper

Offline policy learning chooses a treatment rule from logged data: given nnn observations of features XiX_iXi​, the action AiA_iAi​ taken and the reward obtained, pick a policy π:X→{1,…,d}\pi:\mathcal X\to\{1,\dots,d\}π:X→{1,…,d} from a class Π\PiΠ whose expected reward is close to the best in the class. Zhou, Athey and Wager (arXiv:1810.04778v2) bound the regret of their cross-fitted…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 2: Anonymity, Order Preservation, Winner Strict Endowment Monotonicity and Local Consistency Characterize Single-Parametric RulesResearch Paper

Tournaments, races, poker finals and sports leagues end with a ranking of the participants and a sum of prize money to be split among them. The split is usually fixed by a published schedule, and different events use very different schedules: some pay almost everything to the winner, some pay many places, some decay geometrically from one place to the next.…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 3: Anonymity, Order Preservation, Winner Strict Endowment Monotonicity and Top Consistency Characterize Parametric RulesResearch Paper

Rank-order competitions — sports tournaments, poker final tables, golf tours, crowdsourcing contests, sales leagues — end with a ranking of the participants and a pot of prize money that has to be split according to that ranking. Organisers publish prize tables that change with the number of entrants and with the size of the purse, and these tables are…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisControl TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Punish Underperformance with Suspension: Optimal Dynamic Contracts in the Presence of Switching Cost II: Condition 2, High Switching Cost, Not-Hiring Value Functions Meet the Optimality ConditionsResearch Paper

Firms that outsource work to an agent whose effort they cannot observe often punish poor performance by suspending the relationship for a while, even though restarting costs money: a new set-up, re-training, re-mobilisation. Cao, Sun and Tian (Management Science, 2024) study this trade-off in a continuous-time principal–agent model with Poisson arrivals and…

5 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Pricing in On-Demand and One-Way Vehicle-Sharing Networks 1: Static Prices Earn at Least K/(N+K−1+Λ/μ) of the Fluid Optimum, via Increasingly Tight Availability BoundsResearch Paper

In one-way car sharing, bike sharing and ride hailing, a vehicle that serves a trip from location iii to location jjj ends up at jjj. Prices therefore do two jobs: they collect revenue and they steer the fleet. The best dynamic (state-dependent) pricing policy reacts to where every vehicle is, but computing it is a Markov decision problem over a state space that…

28 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Minimum Earnings Regulation and the Stability of Marketplaces I: The Marketplace Is Stable Exactly When M ≤ w* Under Tight Labor Supply (p* ≤ w*) and M ≤ H(R(p*)) Under Loose SupplyResearch Paper

Minimum hourly earnings rules for ride-hailing drivers are meant to protect income during periods when drivers spend part of their time idle. A platform pays a wage per hour carrying riders, yet drivers care about earnings per hour logged onto the platform. When many drivers enter after a wage increase, utilization can fall and offset the increase. A…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
OptimizationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Design and Analysis of Switchback Experiments 1: With m-Period Carryover and T = nm, n ≥ 4, the Unique Minimax-Optimal Regular Design Flips Fair Coins at 1, 2m+1, 3m+1, …, (n−2)m+1Research Paper

Online platforms such as ride-hailing, delivery and advertising marketplaces routinely test new pricing or matching policies on a single market. Randomizing over users is often impossible there: every rider and driver in a city shares one supply pool, so treating some users and not others contaminates the control group. The standard alternative is a switchba…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Superstar Exclusivity in Two-Sided Markets: Exclusivity Draws Consumers and Complementors to the Favored Platform and Raises Complementors' Total SurplusResearch Paper

Platform markets often feature a Superstar: a single complement whose presence moves consumers, such as a blockbuster game on a console or a star streamer on a video platform. Whether such a Superstar signs an exclusive deal with one platform or stays available on both is a recurring question for competition authorities and for platform managers. Empirical…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 1: A Prize Allocation Rule Satisfies Order Preservation, Endowment Monotonicity and Consistency iff It Is an Interval RuleResearch Paper

Sports leagues, tournaments, esports events and research competitions all end with a ranking of the participants and a sum of prize money to divide among them. How the money is split according to the ranking is a design choice with visible consequences: Winner-Takes-All schemes reward only the top, equal division ignores the ranking, and most real prize…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
PreviousPage 39 of 106Next

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me