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Operations Research

3,614 missions · 2,642 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

Open972Completed2642All3614
OptimizationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Offline Pricing and Demand Learning with Censored Data: a data-driven pricing problem is identifiable if and only if the optimistic and pessimistic prices coincideResearch Paper

A retailer who sets a price for a product with limited inventory usually learns about demand from past sales. When the shelf runs empty, sales record the inventory level rather than the demand. Demand above the stock is lost and never observed. This demand censoring is pervasive in retail and inventory data, and it biases naive estimators of demand curves…

17 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Stochastic Networks XII: Implied Costs and Sensitivity in Loss NetworksTextbook

An accepted call earns revenue but occupies circuits that could serve later calls. In a network, those consequences extend beyond the links used by the original call: a change in blocking on one link changes the traffic reaching other links. Network planning therefore needs a marginal value that accounts for these indirect effects. Chapter 4 of Kelly and…

9 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Stochastic Networks XI: Gaussian Limits for Large Loss NetworksTextbook

A loss network accepts a request only when all resources needed by that request are available. An accepted telephone call, for example, occupies circuits on several links at once. A blocked request leaves immediately. Resource sharing makes route occupancies dependent, even when the arrival streams are independent. For a large network, its exact equilibrium…

15 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Robust Optimization VI: The Matrix Cube Bound for Robust Least SquaresTextbook

A least-squares constraint limits the Euclidean length of a residual. When the coefficients of that residual are uncertain, checking the constraint at nominal data does not ensure that it holds for the data that actually occur. A robust constraint requires the same decision to satisfy the bound for every allowed perturbation. Such constraints arise…

10 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Robust Optimization VIII: Rank-Sensitive Approximation of Robust LMIsTextbook

A linear matrix inequality requires a symmetric matrix, whose entries depend affinely on design variables, to be positive semidefinite. Such constraints express many optimization and control requirements. When coefficients are uncertain, a design must satisfy a whole family of matrix inequalities. Checking each possible perturbation separately is generally…

12 thms6 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsGraph TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A (Slightly) Improved Approximation Algorithm for Metric TSP: Max-Entropy Spanning Tree Plus Odd-Vertex Matching Costs at Most (3/2 − ε)·OPT in Expectation, ε > 10⁻³⁶Research Paper

The metric traveling salesperson problem asks for the cheapest tour through a finite set of cities whose pairwise costs are symmetric and satisfy the triangle inequality. The classical Christofides–Serdyukov algorithm combines a spanning tree with a matching on its odd-degree vertices and has a worst-case guarantee of 3/23/23/2 times the optimal tour cost.…

20 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Numeraire-Invariant Quadratic Hedging and Mean–Variance Portfolio Allocation: Explicit Oblique-Projection Formulas for the Optimal Adjustment Process and Pure HedgeResearch Paper

Quadratic hedging chooses a self-financing trading strategy that minimizes the expected squared difference between its terminal value and a payoff HHH; with HHH constant it becomes mean–variance portfolio selection. The classical theory works in discounted prices: one asset is a risk-free numeraire, and optimal strategies are written in terms of the remaining…

15 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Information Regimes in Financial Markets: For Any Fraction Informed, a Market Equilibrium with Linear Prices and a Self-Consistent Price Variance ExistsResearch Paper

Investors pay for information, and the amount of information they produce changes over time. In periods when many investors are informed, more information becomes available, which makes being informed cheaper and attracts still more informed investors; when few are informed, the reverse happens. Glasserman, Mamaysky and Shen, Dynamic Information Regimes in…

11 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Interior Point Algorithms VIII: The Semidefinite Relaxation Bounds Quadratic Programs within π/2Textbook

Many problems in combinatorial optimization, control and signal processing reduce to minimizing a nonconvex quadratic form over a box. Max-cut and other boolean quadratic programs are special cases. Computing the global minimum of such a program is NP-hard in general, so the practical question is how well a tractable convex problem can bound it. The semidefi…

16 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games: Binary Search Finds a Nash Equilibrium of a Rank-1 Game in Polynomial TimeResearch Paper

A Nash equilibrium of a two-player game is a pair of choices from which neither player can improve by changing their own choice alone. Computing one equilibrium is a central task in algorithmic game theory. For unrestricted bimatrix games, their payoff tables may encode difficult equilibrium computations. The structure of a rank-one bimatrix game gives a…

21 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Experimental DesignProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Pigeonhole Design: Balancing Sequential Experiments from an Online Matching Perspective 2: Every Pigeonhole Design on [0,1] Has Worst-Case Expected Discrepancy Ω(T^(1/4))Research Paper

Online platforms run experiments on subjects that arrive one at a time: a user opens an app, a customer reaches a checkout page, a patient enters a trial. Each subject must be assigned to control or treatment at once, before the next one arrives, and the quality of the final estimate depends on how well the two groups resemble each other in their observed…

14 thms6 active users
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning and Optimization with Seasonal Patterns 2: Regret Lower Bound for Periodic Multi-Armed Bandits with Known PeriodsResearch Paper

Demand, prices and click-through rates often follow seasonal cycles: weekly, monthly, yearly. A decision maker who repeatedly chooses among options whose expected payoffs repeat in time faces a non-stationary multi-armed bandit. Chen, Wang and Wang (arXiv:2005.08088v4, Operations Research, 2025) study the model in which each arm's mean reward is periodic…

15 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Product Price, Quality and Service Decisions under Consumer Choice Models III: The Optimal Uniform Service Duration Is the Shortest or the LongestResearch Paper

Firms that sell durable goods compete on price, on product quality and on the services bundled with the product: a factory warranty, free maintenance, technical support. Wang, Ke and Cui (SSRN 3766191; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2022, doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0947) study the joint choice of all three when consumers choose among the firm's…

18 thms6 active users
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Distribution-Free Contextual Dynamic Pricing 1: The DIP Policy Has Expected Regret at Most C T^(2/3) log T Plus 4 p_max L Times the Episode-Weighted ℓ₁ Estimation ErrorsResearch Paper

In contextual dynamic pricing a seller posts a price for each arriving customer, observes only whether the customer buys, and must learn the demand from these binary responses while selling. The problem arises in e-commerce, insurance and consumer lending, where every customer comes with features (product attributes, customer characteristics) that shift the…

18 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games II: If Every Player Runs Optimistic FTRL with Step Size (n−1)^{−1/2}T^{−1/4}, Each Player's Regret Is at Most (R+4)√(n−1)·T^{1/4}Research Paper

When every participant in a repeated game runs a no-regret learning algorithm, the time-averaged play converges to a coarse correlated equilibrium, and in smooth games the average welfare approaches the price-of-anarchy guarantee. These facts are a standard justification for equilibrium predictions in auctions, routing and markets, where agents learn rather…

15 thms6 active users
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems V: Symmetric Monotonic Strategies Draw the Suboptimal Arms Collectively a Linear Number of TimesResearch Paper

In a stochastic multi-armed bandit, a player repeatedly chooses one of KKK arms and receives a random reward drawn from the chosen arm's unknown distribution. The classical lower bounds of Lai and Robbins (1985) and Burnetas and Katehakis (1996) describe the regret of good strategies when the horizon TTT tends to infinity: it grows like ln⁡T\ln TlnT, with a constant…

15 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems VI: Uniformly Super-Fast Convergent Strategies Draw Each Suboptimal Arm ln T / K_inf Times up to Explicit Lower-Order TermsResearch Paper

In a stochastic multi-armed bandit, a decision maker repeatedly chooses one of several unknown reward sources. Sampling an arm reveals its reward but uses a round that could have been spent on a better arm. A good strategy must therefore reduce sampling of inferior arms, yet it cannot stop sampling them too early: it must still distinguish the current…

14 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems IV: Under Pairwise Symmetry a Suboptimal Arm Is Drawn T/K Times or Almost as Often as an Optimal ArmResearch Paper

Lower bounds for stochastic multi-armed bandits are usually stated for a large horizon: Lai and Robbins (1985) and Burnetas and Katehakis (1996) show that a consistent strategy pulls a suboptimal arm at least about ln⁡T/Kinf⁡\ln T / \mathcal{K}_{\inf}lnT/Kinf​ times. These bounds say nothing about the small-horizon regime, the first rounds in which a strategy has not yet had…

11 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems II: Uniformly Fast Convergent Strategies Draw Every Suboptimal Arm at Least ln T / K_inf Times AsymptoticallyResearch Paper

In a stochastic multi-armed bandit, a player repeatedly chooses one of finitely many arms and sees only the reward from the chosen arm. To earn a high reward, the player must favor arms that appear best. Yet an arm that currently appears inferior might be best under another plausible reward law. That uncertainty forces any strategy with uniformly strong…

11 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic First- and Zeroth-Order Methods for Nonconvex Stochastic Programming 3: The Two-Phase RSG Method Finds an (ε, Λ)-Solution within S(Λ)[N(ε) + T(ε, Λ)] Oracle CallsResearch Paper

Stochastic optimization methods often see only noisy gradients. For a nonconvex objective, a useful guarantee is that an output point has a small gradient: this is a first-order stationarity certificate, even when there is no claim that the point is globally optimal. A guarantee on the expected squared gradient leaves open how often one particular run…

14 thms6 active users
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed Points 3: In Every Nash Equilibrium of Bubelis's Gadget the Primary Player Plays 0 with Probability α, the Unique Root of f in [0, 1]Research Paper

For games with three or more players, Nash equilibria can be irrational, so they cannot in general be computed exactly. Bubelis made this precise: any real root of any univariate polynomial arises as the probability of a particular strategy, or the payoff of a particular player, in a Nash equilibrium of a three-player game whose payoffs depend on the…

11 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Complexity TheoryOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Problems with Two Competing Agents 6: PARTITION Reduces to Two Agents Each Bounding Their Own Total Completion Time on One MachineResearch Paper

In many production and service settings a single resource is shared by parties with different goals: two departments sending orders to the same machine, two customers of a contract manufacturer, or two classes of requests on one processor. Multi-agent scheduling models this directly. Each agent owns its own jobs and its own objective, and a schedule is…

16 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Complexity TheoryOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Scheduling Problems with Two Competing Agents 2: KNAPSACK Reduces to Minimizing One Agent's Total Weighted Completion Time Under a Makespan Bound for the OtherResearch Paper

In many production and logistics settings a single resource is shared by parties with different goals: two departments of a plant that send orders to the same machine, two customers of a contract manufacturer, or two classes of traffic on one processor. Multi-agent scheduling models this directly. Each agent owns its own jobs and its own objective, and a…

14 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 3: In Every Harmonic Game the Uniformly Mixed Strategy Profile Is a Mixed Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Finite games in strategic form are the basic model of strategic interaction in economics, engineering and computer science. Potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, DOI 10.1006/game.1996.0044) are the class with the most tractable equilibrium behaviour: every finite potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium, and simple learning dynamics converge to one.

13 thms6 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Consumer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance 1: With Valuations Learned after Purchase, the Seller's Optimal Policy Is p* = E max(V, s), F̄(q*) = (c − s)/(p* − s), r* = sResearch Paper

Retailers accept large volumes of returned merchandise, and a common default is the full refund: a buyer who is unhappy with a product brings it back and gets the whole price back. Many consumers only learn how much they value a product after they have it at home — clothes that do not fit, a gadget that does not suit the buyer's needs. A returns policy…

15 thms6 active users
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