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Operations Research

1,094 missions · 576 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

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CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis IV: Discrete Separation for L-Convex SetsTextbook

Motivation

The classical separating hyperplane theorem says that any two disjoint convex sets in Rn\mathbb R^nRn can be separated by a hyperplane with an arbitrary real normal vector. When the sets in question are not arbitrary convex sets but the integer points of specially structured discrete sets, one can sometimes ask for much more: not merely that a separator exists, but that it can be chosen from a small, structured, dimension-independent family regardless of the size or shape of the sets being separated. Results of this kind — "discrete separation theorems" — are a recurring and often surprising theme in combinatorial optimization, playing the role that the ordinary separation theorem plays in continuous convex analysis, but with genuinely combinatorial content beyond it.

L-convex sets, introduced by Murota as part of the discrete convex analysis framework, are one of the two dual families of well-behaved discrete convex sets studied in the book (the other being M-convex sets, chunk 04 of this series). They are defined by a lattice-closure axiom together with translation invariance, and they correspond one-to-one to integer-valued distance functions satisfying the triangle inequality — objects long familiar from network flow theory and shortest-path duality, even though the L-convexity terminology is not traditionally used there. This mission formalizes the chapter's central results, culminating in Theorem 5.9: two disjoint L-convex sets can always be separated by a vector with entries in {−1,0,1}\{-1, 0, 1\}{−1,0,1}, no matter how large or complicated the sets are.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set. A nonempty set D⊆ZVD \subseteq \mathbb Z^VD⊆ZV is an L-convex set if it satisfies the sublattice axiom (SBS[Z]) — p,q∈D  ⟹  p∨q, p∧q∈Dp, q \in D \implies p \vee q,\ p \wedge q \in Dp,q∈D⟹p∨q, p∧q∈D, where ∨,∧\vee, \wedge∨,∧ are componentwise maximum and minimum — and the translation axiom (TRS[Z]) — p∈D  ⟹  p±1∈Dp \in D \implies p \pm \mathbf 1 \in Dp∈D⟹p±1∈D, where 1\mathbf 11 is the all-ones vector. A distance function γ:V×V→R∪{+∞}\gamma : V \times V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}γ:V×V→R∪{+∞} satisfies γ(v,v)=0\gamma(v,v) = 0γ(v,v)=0 for every vvv; it satisfies the triangle inequality if γ(v1,v2)+γ(v2,v3)≥γ(v1,v3)\gamma(v_1,v_2) + \gamma(v_2,v_3) \ge \gamma(v_1,v_3)γ(v1​,v2​)+γ(v2​,v3​)≥γ(v1​,v3​) for all v1,v2,v3v_1, v_2, v_3v1​,v2​,v3​. The admissible-potential polyhedron of γ\gammaγ is

D(γ)={p∈RV:p(v)−p(u)≤γ(u,v) (∀u≠v)}.D(\gamma) = \{p \in \mathbb R^V : p(v) - p(u) \le \gamma(u,v)\ (\forall u \ne v)\}.D(γ)={p∈RV:p(v)−p(u)≤γ(u,v) (∀u=v)}.

The convex hull of a discrete set D⊆ZVD \subseteq \mathbb Z^VD⊆ZV is written Dˉ⊆RV\bar D \subseteq \mathbb R^VDˉ⊆RV.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 5.9 (discrete separation for L-convex sets)

If D1,D2⊆ZVD_1, D_2 \subseteq \mathbb Z^VD1​,D2​⊆ZV are disjoint L-convex sets, there exists x∗∈{−1,0,1}Vx^* \in \{-1,0,1\}^Vx∗∈{−1,0,1}V such that

inf⁡{⟨p,x∗⟩:p∈D1}−sup⁡{⟨p,x∗⟩:p∈D2}≥1.\inf\{\langle p, x^*\rangle : p \in D_1\} - \sup\{\langle p, x^*\rangle : p \in D_2\} \ge 1.inf{⟨p,x∗⟩:p∈D1​}−sup{⟨p,x∗⟩:p∈D2​}≥1.

Dropping the {−1,0,1}V\{-1,0,1\}^V{−1,0,1}V restriction and allowing an arbitrary real separator would recover the classical separation theorem for convex sets, which holds regardless of L-convexity and carries no discrete-convexity content; the three-valued restriction is the weakest correct strengthening and is kept in full.

Milestones: Theorems 5.2, 5.5, 5.7

Theorem 5.2: an L-convex set is hole free (D=Dˉ∩ZVD = \bar D \cap \mathbb Z^VD=Dˉ∩ZV) — its integer points are exactly the integer points of its own convex hull. Theorem 5.5: DDD is L-convex if and only if D=D(γ)∩ZVD = D(\gamma) \cap \mathbb Z^VD=D(γ)∩ZV for some integer-valued distance function γ\gammaγ satisfying the triangle inequality — L-convex sets and such distance functions are two descriptions of the same object, the discrete analogue of chunk 04's M-convex-set / submodular- function correspondence. Theorem 5.7 (parts (1), (4)): L-convex sets are closed under intersection in the strongest sense — the convex hulls intersect exactly where the sets do, and a nonempty intersection of L-convex sets is again L-convex.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 5.9 packs two claims into one, as the book itself points out: the separator is forced into {−1,0,1}V\{-1,0,1\}^V{−1,0,1}V (explicit in the statement), and disjoint L-convex sets satisfy "convexity in intersection" — their convex hulls are already disjoint whenever the sets themselves are (implicit, and necessary for the stated inequality to be possible at all). The {−1,0,1}\{-1,0,1\}{−1,0,1} structure connects directly to combinatorial duality in network flows: L-convex polyhedra are, without the name, a familiar object there, and a {−1,0,1}\{-1,0,1\}{−1,0,1}-separator corresponds to a signed cut or a negative-cost cycle in an associated graph. Theorem 5.5's correspondence is the L-convex mirror of chunk 04's M-convex/submodular correspondence, and the book explicitly flags that the two will be unified into a single conjugacy relationship in a later chapter (Note 5.6) — this mission's formalization of the L-side is a prerequisite for that later unification.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform (searches for "L-convex", "distance function", and "negative cycle" return only unrelated results — number-theoretic distance estimates, polytope graph metrics, shortest-path graph structures — none matching the combinatorial L-convexity/discrete-separation content here). This mission gives the first formal statement of L-convex sets and their central separation theorem. Notably, Theorem 5.9's own statement — unlike the analogous M-convex Theorem 4.18 — needs none of the distance-function machinery that its proof uses; only the L-convexity axiom itself appears in the goal, making its formal statement comparatively lean even though the underlying mathematics is just as deep.

Difficulty

The natural first attempt at Theorem 5.9 is to try to construct x∗x^*x∗ directly from the structure of D1,D2D_1, D_2D1​,D2​ — for instance, from a normal vector to a real separating hyperplane, rounded coordinatewise. This does not work: rounding an arbitrary real separator gives no control over its entries, and there is no reason a rounded vector should still separate. The book's actual proof instead represents D1,D2D_1, D_2D1​,D2​ via distance functions γ1,γ2\gamma_1, \gamma_2γ1​,γ2​ (Theorem 5.5), combines them into γ12=min⁡(γ1,γ2)\gamma_{12} = \min(\gamma_1, \gamma_2)γ12​=min(γ1​,γ2​), and extracts the separator from a shortest negative cycle in the associated graph: the vertices of the cycle alternate between the two sets' "tight" arcs, and the alternating ±1\pm 1±1 pattern around the cycle is exactly the {−1,0,1}\{-1,0,1\}{−1,0,1} vector x∗x^*x∗ — with the cycle's negativity translating directly into the required gap of at least 111. Locating the right combinatorial object (a shortest negative cycle, not an arbitrary one) is what pins the separator down to a vector supported on a single alternating cycle rather than an arbitrary {−1,0,1}\{-1,0,1\}{−1,0,1} pattern, and is the step a naive rounding or linear-algebra argument has no analogue of.

Formalization scope

The ground set VVV is a Fintype with DecidableEq; D⊆ZVD \subseteq \mathbb Z^VD⊆ZV is a Set (V → ℤ). Distance functions take values in WithTop ℝ; the goal's infimum and supremum are taken in EReal (a complete lattice), since L-convex sets are always infinite (translation invariance along the all-ones direction), so an ℝ-valued supremum/infimum would silently return a junk value on an unbounded set. The conclusion is stated as sup⁡D2⟨p,x∗⟩+1≤inf⁡D1⟨p,x∗⟩\sup_{D_2}\langle p,x^*\rangle + 1 \le \inf_{D_1}\langle p,x^*\ranglesupD2​​⟨p,x∗⟩+1≤infD1​​⟨p,x∗⟩, an addition-based reformulation of the book's subtraction inequality that avoids EReal's ⊤ - ⊤ ambiguity while remaining equivalent whenever both sides are finite.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would drop the {−1,0,1}V\{-1,0,1\}^V{−1,0,1}V constraint on x∗x^*x∗ (recovering the classical, L-convexity-independent separation theorem) or fix a single coordinate pattern rather than asserting existence over the full three-valued family; neither is done here. Theorem 5.5 is stated existentially rather than via the book's named bijection Φ,Ψ\Phi, \PsiΦ,Ψ (a documented scope reduction, parallel to chunk 04's treatment of Theorem 4.15), and Theorem 5.7 is drafted with only its two representation-independent clauses (parts (1) and (4); see MODERATION_NOTES.md). Contributions building the distance-function/admissible- potential apparatus needed for Theorem 5.7's remaining clauses, or the L-convex/integrally-convex bridge (Theorem 5.10, needing chunk 03's vocabulary), are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy II: Equilibrium Exists When Every Consumer Can Supply Productive LaborResearch Paper

Motivation

A competitive equilibrium is a list of production plans, consumption plans and prices at which every firm maximizes profit, every consumer maximizes utility within the budget, and no market has excess demand. Whether such prices exist at all is the consistency question behind general equilibrium theory, the welfare theorems, and applied equilibrium models used in policy analysis. Arrow and Debreu gave the first proof of existence for a model with production, private ownership and general convex preferences (Econometrica 22, 1954), using Debreu's existence theorem for abstract economies (PNAS 38, 1952).

Their Theorem I assumes that every consumer initially holds a positive amount of every commodity (Assumption IV.a). The authors call this "clearly unrealistic" (p. 280): a household does not hold every good, and most households own little beyond their labor. Theorem II, the subject of this mission, removes that assumption. It only asks that every consumer be able to supply some type of labor that is always productive of a commodity everyone desires. This is the version of the existence theorem that allows a wage-earner economy.

Timeline. Wald (1935–36) proved existence for special production models. Nash (1950) proved existence of equilibrium points for finite games, and Debreu (1952) extended it to abstract economies, in which each player's feasible set depends on the others' choices. Arrow and Debreu (1954) proved Theorems I and II. McKenzie's independent existence proof was published the same year (Econometrica 22, 1954).

Setting

There are lll commodities, nnn producers and mmm consumers; vectors live in Rl\mathbb R^lRl and x≦yx\leqq yx≦y is componentwise. Producer jjj has a production set YjY_jYj​. Consumer iii has a consumption set XiX_iXi​, a utility uiu_iui​ on XiX_iXi​, an endowment ζi\zeta_iζi​ and profit shares αij\alpha_{ij}αij​. Write Y=∑jYjY=\sum_jY_jY=∑j​Yj​, X=∑iXiX=\sum_iX_iX=∑i​Xi​, ζ=∑iζi\zeta=\sum_i\zeta_iζ=∑i​ζi​, and let P={p≧0, ∑hph=1}P=\{p\geqq0,\ \sum_hp_h=1\}P={p≧0, ∑h​ph​=1} be the price simplex. A competitive equilibrium (x1∗,…,xm∗,y1∗,…,yn∗,p∗)(x_1^*,\dots,x_m^*,y_1^*,\dots,y_n^*,p^*)(x1∗​,…,xm∗​,y1∗​,…,yn∗​,p∗) satisfies four conditions. Each yj∗y_j^*yj∗​ maximizes p∗⋅yjp^*\cdot y_jp∗⋅yj​ on YjY_jYj​. Each xi∗x_i^*xi∗​ maximizes uiu_iui​ on {xi∈Xi:p∗⋅xi≤p∗⋅ζi+∑jαijp∗⋅yj∗}\{x_i\in X_i: p^*\cdot x_i\le p^*\cdot\zeta_i+\sum_j\alpha_{ij}p^*\cdot y_j^*\}{xi​∈Xi​:p∗⋅xi​≤p∗⋅ζi​+∑j​αij​p∗⋅yj∗​}. The price vector satisfies p∗∈Pp^*\in Pp∗∈P. Finally z∗=∑xi∗−∑yj∗−ζ≦0z^*=\sum x_i^*-\sum y_j^*-\zeta\leqq0z∗=∑xi∗​−∑yj∗​−ζ≦0 and p∗⋅z∗=0p^*\cdot z^*=0p∗⋅z∗=0.

The assumptions of Theorem II are as follows. I: production sets are closed, convex and contain 000; Y∩Ω={0}Y\cap\Omega=\{0\}Y∩Ω={0} (no output without input); Y∩(−Y)={0}Y\cap(-Y)=\{0\}Y∩(−Y)={0} (no reversible production). II: each XiX_iXi​ is closed, convex and bounded below. III: uiu_iui​ is continuous, has no satiation point, and satisfies ui(tx+(1−t)x′)>ui(x′)u_i(tx+(1-t)x')>u_i(x')ui​(tx+(1−t)x′)>ui​(x′) whenever ui(x)>ui(x′)u_i(x)>u_i(x')ui​(x)>ui​(x′) and 0<t<10<t<10<t<1. IV.b: shares are nonnegative and sum to one for each firm. Two sets of commodities are defined from the data. The set D\mathcal DD contains the commodities always desired by every consumer: from any xi∈Xix_i\in X_ixi​∈Xi​, adding some positive amount of the commodity stays in XiX_iXi​ and raises uiu_iui​. The set P\mathcal PP contains the types of productive labor: for every y∈Yy\in Yy∈Y, (a) yh≤0y_h\le0yh​≤0, and (b) some y′∈Yy'\in Yy′∈Y satisfies yh′′≥yh′y'_{h'}\ge y_{h'}yh′′​≥yh′​ for all h′≠hh'\ne hh′=h and yh′′′>yh′′y'_{h''}>y_{h''}yh′′′​>yh′′​ for some h′′∈Dh''\in\mathcal Dh′′∈D. The remaining assumptions are:

  • IV′.a: each consumer has some xi∈Xix_i\in X_ixi​∈Xi​ with xi≦ζix_i\leqq\zeta_ixi​≦ζi​ and xhi<ζhix_{hi}<\zeta_{hi}xhi​<ζhi​ for some h∈Ph\in\mathcal Ph∈P;
  • V: some x∈Xx\in Xx∈X and y∈Yy\in Yy∈Y satisfy xh<yh+ζhx_h<y_h+\zeta_hxh​<yh​+ζh​ for every hhh;
  • VI: D≠∅\mathcal D\ne\emptysetD=∅;
  • VII: P≠∅\mathcal P\ne\emptysetP=∅.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem II (§4.5, p. 281)

Assumptions I–III, IV′, V–VII ⟹ ∃ (x∗,y∗,p∗) satisfying Conditions 1–4.\text{Assumptions I–III, IV}',\ \text{V–VII}\ \Longrightarrow\ \exists\,(x^*,y^*,p^*)\ \text{satisfying Conditions 1–4.}Assumptions I–III, IV′, V–VII ⟹ ∃(x∗,y∗,p∗) satisfying Conditions 1–4.

Milestones (§5, pp. 282–287)

They follow the paper's proof. Let π=∣P∣\pi=|\mathcal P|π=∣P∣ and Pε={p∈P:ph≥ε ∀h∈P}P^\varepsilon=\{p\in P: p_h\ge\varepsilon\ \forall h\in\mathcal P\}Pε={p∈P:ph​≥ε ∀h∈P} for 0<ε≤1/(2π)0<\varepsilon\le1/(2\pi)0<ε≤1/(2π). Let EεE^\varepsilonEε be the abstract economy in which consumers maximize utility under budget constraints, producers maximize profit, and a market participant chooses p∈Pεp\in P^\varepsilonp∈Pε to maximize p⋅zp\cdot zp⋅z. The milestones are:

  1. §5.0 (1). On PεP^\varepsilonPε every consumer can spend strictly less than p⋅ζip\cdot\zeta_ip⋅ζi​.
  2. §5.1.1 (5). Equilibrium points of EεE^\varepsilonEε satisfy x∗−y∗≦ζ′x^*-y^*\leqq\zeta'x∗−y∗≦ζ′ for a vector ζ′\zeta'ζ′ independent of ε\varepsilonε.
  3. §5.2.0. The attainable sets relative to ζ′\zeta'ζ′ are bounded.
  4. §5.2.1. The truncated economy E~ε\tilde E^\varepsilonE~ε has an equilibrium point.
  5. §5.2.2 (3)–(5). An equilibrium point of E~ε\tilde E^\varepsilonE~ε is one of EεE^\varepsilonEε.
  6. §5.3.0 (2). If ph∗>εp^*_h>\varepsilonph∗​>ε for all h∈Ph\in\mathcal Ph∈P, the point is a competitive equilibrium.
  7. §5.3.2 (1). Limits of equilibrium points as ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0 are quasi-equilibria for consumers.
  8. §5.3.4 (3). If the floors bind, some desired commodity has limit price 000.
  9. §5.3.4 (6). If the floors bind, limit consumption minimizes expenditure over XiX_iXi​.
  10. §5.3.5. For some ε\varepsilonε the floor does not bind.

Significance

Theorem II is the existence theorem for a competitive economy in which consumers may own nothing but their labor. It shows that the survival assumption IV.a can be traded for conditions on labor, desirability and the possibility of an overall excess supply. Section 5.3.3 of the paper also isolates the quasi-equilibrium, in which utility maximization under the budget is replaced by cost minimization at a given utility level. That notion is used in later existence and welfare arguments.

The theorem has been proved since 1954; this mission does not reopen it. The work here is the machine-checked proof. The companion mission on Theorem I formalizes the shared model and Debreu's lemma. As of September 2026 neither theorem has a Lean formalization on the platform, and Mathlib contains no general equilibrium theory.

Difficulty

The obvious approach reuses the proof of Theorem I: build the abstract economy of consumers, producers and a price-choosing participant, and apply Debreu's lemma. That fails at the boundary of the price simplex. Without IV.a, a consumer's cheapest point in XiX_iXi​ can cost as much as the endowment at some prices, so the budget correspondence is not continuous there and the lemma does not apply. The paper therefore keeps prices of productive labor at least ε\varepsilonε and must then show that the floor does not bind for some ε\varepsilonε. That is a limit argument as ε→0\varepsilon\to0ε→0 which uses Assumptions V, VI and VII together, and each of the milestones 7–9 is a step of it. Debreu's lemma itself needs a Kakutani-type fixed point theorem for correspondences, which Mathlib does not provide.

Formalization scope

Commodity vectors are Fin l → ℝ. Consumers are indexed by Fin m and producers by Fin n. The inner product is ⬝ᵥ. The paper's x<yx<yx<y is strict in every component and is written componentwise, never as Lean's < on functions. D\mathcal DD and P\mathcal PP are computed from the economy, not supplied as parameters. Utilities are total functions, but every assumption on uiu_iui​ quantifies over XiX_iXi​ only. "Maximizes" is membership plus an inequality against every feasible alternative; no supremum is used. EEE, EεE^\varepsilonEε and E~ε\tilde E^\varepsilonE~ε are built by one constructor over the players Fin m ⊕ Fin n ⊕ Unit. The vector ζ′\zeta'ζ′ takes the lower bounds ξi\xi_iξi​ of Assumption II as an explicit argument. The milestones of §5.3 are stated for the limit of a sequence of equilibrium points, which is how the paper constructs them. Assumption V is dropped from every milestone except §5.3.5 and the goal. With V, the case assumption of §5.3.1 is contradictory and those milestones would hold vacuously.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out as follows. The assumptions are satisfiable with IV.a failing: a sorry-free check covers two goods, one consumer who owns nothing and can only supply labor, and one firm turning labor into the desired good. The goal therefore does not hold vacuously.

Needed infrastructure includes a Kakutani fixed point theorem or Debreu's lemma, compactness of truncated action sets, and sequential compactness arguments in Rl\mathbb R^lRl. AGT.brouwer_fixed_point is on the platform and can serve as a starting point. The lemma is reusable well beyond this mission. Contributions to any milestone, to the lemma, or to the boundedness results shared with Theorem I are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. J. Arrow and G. Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, Econometrica 22(3), 265–290, 1954. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907353
  • G. Debreu, A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 38(10), 886–893, 1952. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.38.10.886
  • L. W. McKenzie, On Equilibrium in Graham's Model of World Trade and Other Competitive Systems, Econometrica 22(2), 147–161, 1954. https://doi.org/10.2307/1907352
  • J. F. Nash, Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36(1), 48–49, 1950. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.36.1.48
16 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Markov Decision Processes XI: Bayesian Decision Models and Finite-Horizon BanditsTextbook

Motivation

A decision maker who does not know the true parameters of the system they are controlling — the success probability of a slot machine, the drift of an asset, the failure rate of a machine — faces a genuinely different problem from one who knows them: every action taken has two effects, an immediate payoff and a change in what is known. Formalizing this "explore versus exploit" tension precisely is the subject of Bayesian sequential decision theory, whose best-known instance is the multi-armed bandit problem (Robbins, 1952; Gittins and Jones, 1974). Bäuerle and Rieder's treatment (Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Springer, 2011, Chapter 5) gives the finite-horizon Bayesian theory its cleanest general form: rather than analyzing each bandit variant from scratch, it builds one reduction — from a Markov Decision Model with an unknown parameter to an ordinary, fully observed Markov Decision Model on an enlarged "information state" — and one structural theorem that turns primitive monotonicity hypotheses on the original ingredients into monotonicity of the optimal policy in the information state. Two classical finite-horizon bandit results (Theorems 5.5.1, 5.5.2) then follow as applications, not separate proofs.

Setting

A Bayesian Model is a Markov Decision Model whose unobservable component is a single, never-changing, unknown parameter θ\thetaθ, drawn once from a prior distribution Q0Q_0Q0​ on a parameter space Θ\ThetaΘ. Concretely: an observable state space EXE_XEX​, an action space AAA, a disturbance space ZZZ with reference measure ν\nuν, a feasible set D⊆EX×AD \subseteq E_X \times AD⊆EX​×A, a deterministic transition TX:EX×A×Z→EXT^X : E_X \times A \times Z \to E_XTX:EX​×A×Z→EX​, a disturbance density qZ(x,θ,a,z)q_Z(x,\theta,a,z)qZ​(x,θ,a,z), a reward r(x,θ,a)r(x,\theta,a)r(x,θ,a), a terminal reward g(x,θ)g(x,\theta)g(x,θ), and a discount β∈(0,1]\beta \in (0,1]β∈(0,1].

Because θ\thetaθ is never observed directly, the decision maker's state of knowledge at stage nnn is the posterior μn(⋅∣h~n)\mu_n(\cdot \mid \tilde h_n)μn​(⋅∣h~n​), the conditional law of θ\thetaθ given the full observable history h~n=(x0,a0,z1,…,xn)\tilde h_n = (x_0,a_0,z_1,\dots,x_n)h~n​=(x0​,a0​,z1​,…,xn​). Bayes' rule updates this posterior one disturbance at a time; unrolling the update gives μn\mu_nμn​ an explicit closed form as a product of likelihoods against the prior (Lemma 5.4.1), and the process μn(C∣⋅)\mu_n(C\mid \cdot)μn​(C∣⋅), for any fixed event CCC, is a martingale (Lemma 5.4.2) — it is, after all, a sequence of conditional expectations of the same random variable 1θ∈C\mathbf 1_{\theta \in C}1θ∈C​ against a refining amount of information.

Often the whole posterior is not needed to act optimally: a sufficient statistic tnt_ntn​ compresses h~n\tilde h_nh~n​ into a value in some space III from which μn\mu_nμn​ can still be recovered, and it is sequential if tn+1t_{n+1}tn+1​ updates from only (xn,tn,an,zn+1)(x_n, t_n, a_n, z_{n+1})(xn​,tn​,an​,zn+1​). Given a sequential sufficient statistic, the information-based Markov Decision Model replaces the never-observed θ\thetaθ by the always-computable tnt_ntn​ as the second state coordinate, giving an ordinary Markov Decision Model on EX×IE_X \times IEX​×I whose reward, terminal reward, and transition law are the original ones averaged against the current posterior μ^(⋅∣i)\hat\mu(\cdot\mid i)μ^​(⋅∣i).

Formalization targets

Theorem 5.4.10.Given: D(⋅) increasing; qZ(⋅∣θ,a)≤lrqZ(⋅∣θ′,a) for θ≤θ′; (x,z)↦TX(x,a,z),(θ,x)↦r(θ,x,a), (θ,x)↦g(θ,x) increasing; every increasing v∈IBb+ has a maximizer in Δ.Then: IM:={v∈IBb+∣v increasing} and Δ satisfy the Structure Assumption.\textbf{Theorem 5.4.10.} \quad \begin{aligned} &\text{Given: } D(\cdot) \text{ increasing; } q_Z(\cdot\mid\theta,a) \le_{lr} q_Z(\cdot\mid\theta',a) \text{ for } \theta \le \theta'\text{; } (x,z)\mapsto T^X(x,a,z),\\ &(\theta,x)\mapsto r(\theta,x,a),\ (\theta,x)\mapsto g(\theta,x) \text{ increasing; every increasing } v \in IB_b^+ \text{ has a maximizer in } \Delta.\\ &\text{Then: } IM := \{v \in IB_b^+ \mid v \text{ increasing}\} \text{ and } \Delta \text{ satisfy the Structure Assumption.} \end{aligned}Theorem 5.4.10.​Given: D(⋅) increasing; qZ​(⋅∣θ,a)≤lr​qZ​(⋅∣θ′,a) for θ≤θ′; (x,z)↦TX(x,a,z),(θ,x)↦r(θ,x,a), (θ,x)↦g(θ,x) increasing; every increasing v∈IBb+​ has a maximizer in Δ.Then: IM:={v∈IBb+​∣v increasing} and Δ satisfy the Structure Assumption.​

This is the weakest, most reusable form of the result: it names exactly the primitive hypotheses on the original model's ingredients under which the reduced model's Bellman equation holds and its value function and an optimal policy are monotone in the information state — without fixing which bandit or estimation problem those ingredients come from. Theorems 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 are downstream applications kept as milestones, not additional goals: proving the general theorem subsumes verifying its hypotheses in each concrete case.

Significance

Every one of the classical finite-horizon two-armed-bandit results — "switch to the arm with higher posterior mean once the advantage function is nonnegative," "never abandon a winning arm," "once you commit to the known arm, never leave it" — is, in this book's organization, a one-page corollary of Theorem 5.4.10 plus a routine (if occasionally fiddly) check of its five hypotheses on a two- or four-dimensional concrete state space. The theorem is what makes the qualitative behavior of an optimal bandit policy provable in general, rather than re-derived by induction for each new bandit variant.

Formalizing it also isolates, in one place, exactly which comparison of distributions (likelihood-ratio order, not the weaker stochastic order) makes the reduction go through, and exactly which practically checkable joint-density condition (MTP2) implies it (Lemma 5.4.9) — a genuinely reusable piece of probability theory beyond Markov decision theory.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea — "the information state's order is defined via the likelihood ratio order on posteriors, so just check the transition kernel is stochastically monotone and invoke the general increasing-model theorem of Chapter 2" — hides the actual difficulty: the state space of the reduced model is EX×IE_X \times IEX​×I, and III is itself a space of posterior distributions, so "the transition kernel is monotone" is a statement about how the whole posterior moves when a new observation arrives, not a fact about EXE_XEX​ alone. The crux is showing that the sequential-sufficient-statistic update Φ^\hat\PhiΦ^ is jointly increasing in the current information state and the new disturbance — and this is exactly where Lemma 5.4.9's MTP2 characterization does the real work: MTP2 of the disturbance density in (z,θ)(z,\theta)(z,θ) is what turns "a good disturbance is more likely under a good θ\thetaθ" into "an increasing information state produces an increasing posterior update," without which the hypotheses on DDD, TXT^XTX, rrr, ggg alone would not propagate to the enlarged state space at all.

Formalization scope

The Bayesian Model, its posterior, and the information-based model are formalized as they are introduced in the book: BayesModel bundles the primitive data (disturbance density, prior, reward, discount); Posterior bundles the filter (μn)(\mu_n)(μn​) as data satisfying its defining one-step Bayes update, rather than constructed from a canonical probability space, matching how MDPFinance.POMDP.FilterData (chunk 05a) treats the general Bayes operator; the Structure Assumption, Bellman operators, and bounding-function machinery of Chapter 2 are restated specialized to the stationary form the information-based model needs. "Θ,Z⊆R\Theta, Z \subseteq \mathbb RΘ,Z⊆R" and "qZq_ZqZ​ independent of xxx" (the "Monotonicity Results" subsection's own standing simplifications) are carried as explicit hypotheses of Lemma 5.4.9 and the goal, not silently dropped. A formalization that merely assumed the reduced model's disturbance kernel monotone, rather than deriving it via Lemma 5.4.9 from the checkable hypothesis on qZq_ZqZ​, would trivialize the theorem; this one keeps hypothesis (ii) exactly as the book states it. The two bandit applications (Theorems 5.5.1, 5.5.2) are formalized as self-contained concrete finite (countable-state, finite-action) Markov Decision Models, since the book itself reduces them to explicit recursions before stating the results — no general measure-theoretic machinery is needed there. Reusable beyond this mission: the likelihood-ratio order and MTP2 definitions (LikelihoodRatioOrder, IsMTP2), applicable to any Bayesian comparison result.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9.
  • H. Robbins, "Some aspects of the sequential design of experiments," Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 58(5), 1952, 527-535.
  • J. C. Gittins and D. M. Jones, "A dynamic allocation index for the sequential design of experiments," in Progress in Statistics, 1974.
  • A. Müller and D. Stoyan, Comparison Methods for Stochastic Models and Risks, Wiley, 2002 (the book's own reference for the likelihood-ratio order and MTP2 functions, Appendices A.3, B.3).
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CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis III: Edmonds's Intersection TheoremTextbook

Motivation

Matroid intersection is one of the founding results of combinatorial optimization: given two matroids on a common ground set, the largest common independent set can be found in polynomial time, and its size equals the minimum of a natural upper bound ranging over all subsets — a min-max theorem in the spirit of König's theorem and Menger's theorem, but for a strictly richer combinatorial structure. Jack Edmonds proved this in 1970, and Jack Edmonds and Rick Giles's subsequent generalization to submodular flows, together with André Frank's discrete separation theorem for submodular and supermodular set functions (1982), placed matroid intersection inside a single unifying framework: submodular function duality. This framework explains, in one stroke, matroid intersection, the base-exchange structure of matroids, and a family of other combinatorial min-max theorems that had previously seemed unrelated.

Murota's Discrete Convex Analysis develops this framework as the theory of M-convex sets: sets of integer vectors satisfying a lattice-exchange axiom that turns out to be exactly equivalent to being the integer points of a base polyhedron of an integer-valued submodular set function. This mission formalizes the chapter's central results: the equivalence of four variant forms of the exchange axiom (Theorem 4.3), the M-convex set / submodular function correspondence (Theorem 4.15), Frank's discrete separation theorem (Theorem 4.17), and Edmonds's intersection theorem itself (Theorem 4.18) — the deepest duality result in the theory of submodular functions and the historical origin of the M-convexity concept that the rest of the book generalizes to real-valued functions.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set. A set function ρ:2V→R∪{+∞}\rho : 2^V \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}ρ:2V→R∪{+∞} with ρ(∅)=0\rho(\emptyset) = 0ρ(∅)=0 and ρ(V)<+∞\rho(V) < +\inftyρ(V)<+∞ is submodular (the class S[R]S[\mathbb R]S[R]) if

ρ(X)+ρ(Y)≥ρ(X∪Y)+ρ(X∩Y)(X,Y⊆V).\rho(X) + \rho(Y) \ge \rho(X \cup Y) + \rho(X \cap Y) \qquad (X, Y \subseteq V).ρ(X)+ρ(Y)≥ρ(X∪Y)+ρ(X∩Y)(X,Y⊆V).

Its base polyhedron and submodular polyhedron are

B(ρ)={x∈RV:x(X)≤ρ(X) (∀X⊆V), x(V)=ρ(V)},P(ρ)={x∈RV:x(X)≤ρ(X) (∀X⊆V)},B(\rho) = \{x \in \mathbb R^V : x(X) \le \rho(X)\ (\forall X \subseteq V),\ x(V) = \rho(V)\}, \qquad P(\rho) = \{x \in \mathbb R^V : x(X) \le \rho(X)\ (\forall X \subseteq V)\},B(ρ)={x∈RV:x(X)≤ρ(X) (∀X⊆V), x(V)=ρ(V)},P(ρ)={x∈RV:x(X)≤ρ(X) (∀X⊆V)},

where x(X)=∑v∈Xx(v)x(X) = \sum_{v \in X} x(v)x(X)=∑v∈X​x(v); a supermodular function μ\muμ is one with −μ-\mu−μ submodular. A nonempty set B⊆ZVB \subseteq \mathbb Z^VB⊆ZV is an M-convex set if it satisfies the exchange axiom (B-EXC[Z]): for x,y∈Bx, y \in Bx,y∈B and uuu in the positive support of x−yx-yx−y, there is vvv in the negative support of x−yx-yx−y with both x−χu+χv∈Bx - \chi_u + \chi_v \in Bx−χu​+χv​∈B and y+χu−χv∈By + \chi_u - \chi_v \in By+χu​−χv​∈B, where χu\chi_uχu​ is the characteristic vector of uuu. A polyhedron P⊆RVP \subseteq \mathbb R^VP⊆RV is integral if P=conv⁡(P∩ZV)P = \operatorname{conv}(P \cap \mathbb Z^V)P=conv(P∩ZV).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.18 (Edmonds's intersection theorem)

For submodular set functions ρ1,ρ2∈S[R]\rho_1, \rho_2 \in S[\mathbb R]ρ1​,ρ2​∈S[R],

max⁡{x(V):x∈P(ρ1)∩P(ρ2)}=min⁡{ρ1(X)+ρ2(V∖X):X⊆V},\max\{x(V) : x \in P(\rho_1) \cap P(\rho_2)\} = \min\{\rho_1(X) + \rho_2(V \setminus X) : X \subseteq V\},max{x(V):x∈P(ρ1​)∩P(ρ2​)}=min{ρ1​(X)+ρ2​(V∖X):X⊆V},

with both sides attained. If ρ1,ρ2\rho_1, \rho_2ρ1​,ρ2​ are integer valued, P(ρ1)∩P(ρ2)P(\rho_1) \cap P(\rho_2)P(ρ1​)∩P(ρ2​) is an integral polyhedron and the maximum is attained at an integer point. Dropping the integrality clause and stating only the real max-min equality would leave ordinary LP duality with no discrete content at all; this mission keeps it in the goal at every strength the book proves it.

Milestones: Theorems 4.3, 4.15, 4.17

Theorem 4.3: the exchange axiom (B-EXC[Z]) is equivalent to three variants that impose the exchange condition asymmetrically or only for distinct vectors — groundwork establishing that M-convexity does not depend on which variant is taken as primitive. Theorem 4.15: BBB is M-convex if and only if B=B(ρ)∩ZVB = B(\rho) \cap \mathbb Z^VB=B(ρ)∩ZV for some integer-valued submodular ρ\rhoρ — M-convex sets and integer-valued submodular set functions are two descriptions of the same combinatorial object. Theorem 4.17 (Frank): if a submodular ρ\rhoρ dominates a supermodular μ\muμ pointwise, a single vector x∗x^*x∗ separates them (ρ≥x∗≥μ\rho \ge x^* \ge \muρ≥x∗≥μ pointwise on every subset), integrally when ρ,μ\rho, \muρ,μ are integer valued — derived, in the book, as a direct corollary of the goal theorem.

Significance

The result itself. Edmonds's intersection theorem is the min-max theorem underlying polynomial-time matroid intersection (a matroid's rank function is submodular, so the classical matroid intersection theorem is the special case ρ1,ρ2\rho_1, \rho_2ρ1​,ρ2​ both matroid rank functions), and its generality — arbitrary submodular set functions, not just matroid ranks — is what lets Frank's discrete separation theorem, and through it a wide range of combinatorial duality results in network flows, scheduling, and matroid theory, be derived as corollaries rather than proved from scratch each time. The integrality clause specifically is the fact that makes these duality theorems combinatorial: it guarantees that optimal fractional solutions to the underlying linear program can always be taken integral, without which the connection to discrete optimization would be lost.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform (searches for "submodular set function", "base polyhedron", "matroid intersection" return no relevant hits; Mathlib's Combinatorics/Matroid/ develops matroid rank functions, a special case, but not general submodular set functions or their polyhedra). This mission gives the first formal statement of the theorem at its natural generality, together with the M-convex-set viewpoint that motivates the rest of the book, and Frank's separation theorem as an explicit worked corollary.

Difficulty

The real-valued half of Theorem 4.18 is ordinary LP duality applied to a cleverly chosen primal program (maximize ⟨p,x⟩\langle p, x\rangle⟨p,x⟩ over P(ρ1)∩P(ρ2)P(\rho_1) \cap P(\rho_2)P(ρ1​)∩P(ρ2​)) and its dual — routine once the right LP is written down. The integrality half is where the combinatorics enters: an optimal dual solution can always be chosen supported on a chain in each ρi\rho_iρi​'s effective domain (an extremal argument maximizing a strictly convex potential over the optimal dual face), and the incidence matrix of a chain of subsets is totally unimodular — this is the fact, external to ordinary LP theory, that forces an integral optimal solution to exist whenever the data (ρ1,ρ2\rho_1, \rho_2ρ1​,ρ2​) are integral. A proof that stops at real-valued LP duality, however carefully done, misses this step entirely and cannot produce the integrality clause; total unimodularity of a chain's incidence matrix is the one piece of combinatorics doing all the discrete work in an otherwise classical convex-duality argument.

Formalization scope

The ground set VVV is a Fintype with DecidableEq; subsets are Finset V, vectors are V → ℝ/V → ℤ. Submodular functions take values in WithTop ℝ (exactly R∪{+∞}\mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}); supermodular functions in WithBot ℝ; comparisons across the two use an explicit embedding into EReal. The max/min in the goal are stated via IsGreatest/IsLeast sharing a common EReal witness, so that "both sides attained, at the same value" — not merely "sup equals inf" — is what the Lean statement asserts, which is essential since the integrality clause's whole content is about which point attains the maximum.

A trivializing formalization of the goal would drop the integrality clause (leaving unqualified LP duality) or replace IsGreatest/IsLeast with a bare supremum/infimum equality (losing the "is attained" content the second half of the theorem needs); both are avoided. Theorem 4.15 is stated as the existential "iff" (some integer submodular ρ\rhoρ realizes BBB) rather than reifying the book's own named bijection Φ,Ψ\Phi, \PsiΦ,Ψ explicitly — a deliberate, documented scope reduction of that one milestone (see MODERATION_NOTES.md), not of the goal. Contributions building the explicit Φ\PhiΦ map, the Lovász extension (needed for Theorem 4.16, not drafted here), or M-convex-set infrastructure reusable by chunks 06–07 (M-convex functions, which build on this chapter's vocabulary) are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • J. Edmonds, "Submodular functions, matroids, and certain polyhedra," in Combinatorial Structures and Their Applications, Gordon and Breach, 1970, pp. 69–87.
  • A. Frank, "An algorithm for submodular functions on graphs," Annals of Discrete Mathematics, 16, 1982, pp. 97–120.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Markov Decision Processes X: Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes and FilteringTextbook

Motivation

Every model in Chapters 2-4 assumed the controller sees the whole state before acting. Real control problems rarely offer that: a machine's true wear level, a customer's private valuation, a hidden regime driving asset returns — these are exactly the situations a decision-maker must act on despite never observing them directly, learning about them only through their effect on what is observed. This is the subject of Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs), introduced independently in operations research (K. J. Åström, Optimal Control of Markov Processes with Incomplete State Information, 1965) and studied extensively since as the right model for sequential decisions under hidden state. The central difficulty such a process raises is structural, not just computational: the state includes a component the controller never sees, so the very theory built in Chapter 2 — which assumes the controller's policies can depend on the full current state — does not apply. Bäuerle and Rieder's Chapter 5 resolves this by an idea with a long pedigree in stochastic control (Bayesian filtering, going back to R. E. Kalman and R. S. Bucy's filtering theory, and D. Blackwell's 1965 discounted-dynamic-programming treatment of the "state of information"): replace the unobservable state by the controller's own belief about it — a probability distribution, updated at every step by Bayes' rule — and show the resulting belief-state process is once again an ordinary, fully observed Markov Decision Model.

Setting

A Partially Observable Markov Decision Model (Definition 5.1.1) has data (EX×EY,A,D,Q,Q0,r,g,β)(E_X\times E_Y, A, D, Q, Q_0, r, g, \beta)(EX​×EY​,A,D,Q,Q0​,r,g,β): state (x,y)∈EX×EY(x,y)\in E_X\times E_Y(x,y)∈EX​×EY​ with xxx observable and yyy unobservable; feasible actions D(x)D(x)D(x) depending only on xxx; a stochastic kernel QQQ giving the joint law of the next state; initial law Q0Q_0Q0​ of Y0Y_0Y0​; rewards r,gr,gr,g; discount β\betaβ. A policy π=(f0,…,fN−1)∈ΠN\pi=(f_0,\dots,f_{N-1})\in\Pi_Nπ=(f0​,…,fN−1​)∈ΠN​ (Definition 5.1.3) is a sequence of decision rules fn:Hn→Af_n:H_n\to Afn​:Hn​→A, each depending only on the observable history Hn=(x0,a0,…,xn)H_n=(x_0,a_0,\dots,x_n)Hn​=(x0​,a0​,…,xn​) — never on any yky_kyk​. The objective

JNπ(x):=∫Exyπ[∑n=0N−1βnr(Xn,Yn,An)+βNg(XN,YN)]Q0(dy),JN(x):=sup⁡π∈ΠNJNπ(x)J_N^\pi(x) := \int \mathbb{E}_{xy}^\pi\Big[\sum_{n=0}^{N-1}\beta^n r(X_n,Y_n,A_n) + \beta^N g(X_N,Y_N)\Big] Q_0(dy), \qquad J_N(x):=\sup_{\pi\in\Pi_N} J_N^\pi(x)JNπ​(x):=∫Exyπ​[n=0∑N−1​βnr(Xn​,Yn​,An​)+βNg(XN​,YN​)]Q0​(dy),JN​(x):=π∈ΠN​sup​JNπ​(x)

(Equation (5.2)) carries an extra expectation over the unknown Y0Y_0Y0​ that Chapter 2's objective never had.

Assuming QQQ has a density qqq against reference measures, the Bayes operator Φ\PhiΦ and the filter recursion μ0:=Q0\mu_0:=Q_0μ0​:=Q0​, μn+1(⋅∣hn,an,xn+1):=Φ(xn,μn(⋅∣hn),an,xn+1)\mu_{n+1}(\cdot\mid h_n,a_n,x_{n+1}):=\Phi(x_n,\mu_n(\cdot\mid h_n),a_n,x_{n+1})μn+1​(⋅∣hn​,an​,xn+1​):=Φ(xn​,μn​(⋅∣hn​),an​,xn+1​) (Equations (5.3)-(5.4)) compute the posterior law of YnY_nYn​ given everything observed, purely from the observable history. Theorem 5.2.1 confirms μn\mu_nμn​ is genuinely this conditional law. The filtered Markov Decision Model (Definition 5.3.1) then treats (x,μn)∈E:=EX×P(EY)(x,\mu_n)\in E:=E_X\times\mathbb{P}(E_Y)(x,μn​)∈E:=EX​×P(EY​) as an ordinary, fully-observed state, with its own kernel Q′Q'Q′ (built from Φ\PhiΦ and the marginal QXQ^XQX), reward r′(x,ρ,a):=∫r(x,y,a)ρ(dy)r'(x,\rho,a):=\int r(x,y,a)\rho (dy)r′(x,ρ,a):=∫r(x,y,a)ρ(dy), and terminal reward g′(x,ρ):=∫g(x,y)ρ(dy)g'(x,\rho):=\int g(x,y)\rho(dy)g′(x,ρ):=∫g(x,y)ρ(dy).

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 5.3.3

J0′(x,ρ)=g′(x,ρ),Jn′(x,ρ)=sup⁡a∈D(x)[r′(x,ρ,a)+β∫Jn−1′(x′,ρ′) Q′(d(x′,ρ′)∣x,ρ,a)](1≤n≤N),J_0'(x,\rho) = g'(x,\rho), \qquad J_n'(x,\rho) = \sup_{a\in D(x)}\Big[r'(x,\rho,a) + \beta\int J_{n-1}'(x',\rho')\,Q'(d(x',\rho')\mid x,\rho,a)\Big] \quad (1\le n\le N),J0′​(x,ρ)=g′(x,ρ),Jn′​(x,ρ)=a∈D(x)sup​[r′(x,ρ,a)+β∫Jn−1′​(x′,ρ′)Q′(d(x′,ρ′)∣x,ρ,a)](1≤n≤N),

under the Structure Assumption of Theorem 2.3.8; and if fn′f_n'fn′​ maximizes Jn−1′J_{n-1}'Jn−1′​ for each nnn, then fn∗(hn):=fN−n′(xn,μn(⋅∣hn))f_n^*(h_n):=f_{N-n}'(x_n,\mu_n(\cdot\mid h_n))fn∗​(hn​):=fN−n′​(xn​,μn​(⋅∣hn​)) defines a policy optimal for the original NNN-stage POMDP. This is where the reduction pays off: an ordinary Bellman equation, of exactly the form Chapter 2 already solves, for a problem that had no Bellman equation at all in its original, partially-observed form.

Milestones

Lemma 5.2.2 (the filter-recursion identity, the technical engine behind everything that follows), Theorem 5.2.1 (the filter is truly the conditional law — without this, μn\mu_nμn​ would be merely a formula, not a meaningful belief), and Theorem 5.3.2 (the value of the filtered model exactly equals the value of the original POMDP, policy for policy — without this, solving the filtered model would solve a different problem).

Significance

Theorem 5.3.3 is the standard justification, made precise, for the single most common technique in applied sequential decision-making under uncertainty: replace an unknown parameter or hidden state by a running Bayesian estimate, and optimize as if that estimate were the true state. This technique underlies applications from inventory control with unknown demand to adaptive clinical trial design, and Chapter 5's own closing application (two-armed Bernoulli bandits, taken up in chunk 05b) is a direct instance. The reduction also has real content beyond convenience: it shows the value is unchanged (Theorem 5.3.2), not merely that a good heuristic policy exists — the filtered model's optimum is the true POMDP optimum, not an approximation to it.

No result of this chapter has a machine-checked proof on Prove2Me at the time of writing, and no substrate exists for POMDPs, filtering, or Bayes-operator constructions on the platform. Formalizing this mission means building, from Mathlib's general kernel and probability-measure infrastructure, the first POMDP/filtering vocabulary on the platform: a policy class restricted to observable histories, a recursively-computable posterior, and the value-equality between a partially and a fully observed reformulation.

Difficulty

The obstacle is not any single hard inequality but a representational one: an admissible policy for the original problem is a function of a growing observable history, not of a fixed-size state, so the value function JNπJ_N^\piJNπ​ cannot be written as a simple recursion over a Markov chain the way every earlier chapter's could. The chapter's insight is that the belief μn\mu_nμn​ — even though it is a probability-measure-valued object, not a point in a fixed Euclidean space — is itself Markov: μn+1\mu_{n+1}μn+1​ depends on the observable history only through (xn,μn)(x_n,\mu_n)(xn​,μn​), never on more of the past. Recognizing this, and giving P(EY)\mathbb{P}(E_Y)P(EY​) the right measurable structure to serve as a genuine Borel state space, is what makes Definition 5.3.1's reformulation a legitimate Markov Decision Model rather than an informal analogy. A formalization that let μn\mu_nμn​'s type be an unstructured "distribution object" with no Borel structure, or that quietly assumed the value functions of the filtered model already satisfy the Bellman equation, would miss this content entirely.

Formalization scope

EX,EY,AE_X,E_Y,AEX​,EY​,A are abstract measurable spaces; the transition kernel QQQ is a genuine MeasureTheory.Kernel, not assumed to arise from an i.i.d.-noise-driven transition function (the form every earlier finance chapter's market used) — the chapter's own examples (Hidden Markov Models, Bayesian models) do not have that special form in general. Observable histories are represented as (junk-padded) sequences N→EX\mathbb{N}\to E_XN→EX​, N→A\mathbb{N}\to AN→A rather than dependent finite tuples, with a decision rule's dependence on only the first n+1n{+}1n+1/nnn coordinates stated as an explicit locality condition; this avoids Fin-indexed-tuple bookkeeping while remaining exactly equivalent to the book's own Hn→AH_n\to AHn​→A typing. The belief state ρ\rhoρ is MeasureTheory.ProbabilityMeasure E_Y, giving EX×P(EY)E_X\times\mathbb{P}(E_Y)EX​×P(EY​) a genuine measurable structure via its standard weak-topology Borel σ-algebra — the formalization scope this chunk's own pitfall demands, ruling out an ad hoc encoding of "the space of distributions." The Bayes operator Φ\PhiΦ and the filtered kernel Q′Q'Q′ are carried as data (functions landing genuinely in ProbabilityMeasure/Kernel types) characterized by their defining ratio-of-integrals or pushforward formulas, rather than constructed by normalizing a raw measure inline — proving that normalization is a routine Fubini calculation the book itself does not spell out, and would be proof content misplaced in a definition. Theorem 5.2.1's conditional-probability statement is formalized via the book's own Equation (5.5) test-function identity rather than Mathlib's conditional-expectation-with-respect-to-a-sub-σ-algebra machinery, since the two are equivalent by the standard characterization of conditional expectation and the test-function form is what the book's own proofs actually use. The Structure Assumption of Theorem 2.3.8 is restated locally (existential value-function and decision-rule classes with its three defining clauses), per this project's rule against importing another chunk's copy of shared machinery. Reusable beyond this mission: the kernel-based expectation recursion (Ex/Vpi) is natural substrate for any later mission needing a Markov Decision Process driven by a genuinely abstract stochastic kernel rather than an i.i.d.-noise transition function. Contributions completing any milestone's sorry, or the goal's, are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. J. Åström, Optimal Control of Markov Processes with Incomplete State Information, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 10(1), 1965, https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-247X(65)90154-X
  • D. Blackwell, Discounted Dynamic Programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36(1), 1965, https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177700285
  • R. E. Kalman, R. S. Bucy, New Results in Linear Filtering and Prediction Theory, Journal of Basic Engineering 83(1), 1961, https://doi.org/10.1115/1.3658902
  • N. Bäuerle, U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9, Chapter 5, §§5.1-5.3
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Convex OptimizationNumerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Globally Convergent Type-I Anderson Acceleration for Nonsmooth Fixed-Point Iterations: The Stabilized Type-I Anderson Acceleration Converges to a Fixed Point of Every Nonexpansive MapResearch Paper

Motivation

Many first-order methods in optimization are fixed-point iterations xk+1=f(xk)x^{k+1}=f(x^k)xk+1=f(xk) of a nonexpansive map f:Rn→Rnf:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^nf:Rn→Rn: proximal gradient descent, projected gradient descent, alternating projections, ISTA and Douglas–Rachford splitting (with the conic solver SCS as an instance) all have this form (Zhang, O'Donoghue, Boyd 2020, §4.2). The averaged (Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann) iteration xk+1=(1−α)xk+αf(xk)x^{k+1}=(1-\alpha)x^k+\alpha f(x^k)xk+1=(1−α)xk+αf(xk) converges to a fixed point whenever one exists, but it is often slow in its terminal phase. Anderson acceleration (AA) combines the last few iterates through a quasi-Newton update of an approximate Jacobian; it is used for electronic-structure computations and, in the stabilized form studied here, in the solver SCS 2.1. Its type-I variant (AA-I) is often faster in practice than the more studied type-II variant, but it can be numerically unstable, and no global convergence guarantee existed for it on nonsmooth problems.

Timeline (as recounted in the paper's related-work section):

  • 1965. Anderson introduces the method for nonlinear integral equations (J. ACM 12).
  • 1978. Gay and Schnabel prove local Q-superlinear convergence of a full-memory AA-I-type method (Broyden with projected updates), assuming fff continuously differentiable near the solution.
  • 2009. Fang and Saad connect AA with multisecant Broyden methods and distinguish the two types (Numer. Linear Algebra Appl. 16).
  • 2011. Walker and Ni show the essential equivalence of full-memory AA with GMRES for affine fff (SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 49); Rohwedder and Schneider prove local Q-linear convergence of limited-memory AA-II for differentiable fff.
  • 2015. Toth and Kelley give local linear convergence of AA-II for contractive fff (SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 53).
  • 2020. Zhang, O'Donoghue and Boyd introduce a stabilized AA-I method (Powell-type regularization, restart checking, safeguarding) and prove global convergence for every nonexpansive map with a fixed point, without differentiability (SIAM J. Optim. 30(4), 3170–3197; longer version arXiv:1808.03971).

Setting

Let f:Rn→Rnf:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R^nf:Rn→Rn satisfy ∥f(x)−f(y)∥2≤∥x−y∥2\|f(x)-f(y)\|_2\le\|x-y\|_2∥f(x)−f(y)∥2​≤∥x−y∥2​ for all x,yx,yx,y (the Euclidean norm), and assume the solution set X={x⋆∣x⋆=f(x⋆)}X=\{x^\star\mid x^\star=f(x^\star)\}X={x⋆∣x⋆=f(x⋆)} is nonempty. The residual is g(x)=x−f(x)g(x)=x-f(x)g(x)=x−f(x), gk=g(xk)g_k=g(x^k)gk​=g(xk), and the averaged operator is fα(x)=(1−α)x+αf(x)f_\alpha(x)=(1-\alpha)x+\alpha f(x)fα​(x)=(1−α)x+αf(x).

Powell's weight. For θˉ∈(0,1)\bar\theta\in(0,1)θˉ∈(0,1), ϕθˉ(η)=1\phi_{\bar\theta}(\eta)=1ϕθˉ​(η)=1 if ∣η∣≥θˉ|\eta|\ge\bar\theta∣η∣≥θˉ and ϕθˉ(η)=(1−sign⁡(η)θˉ)/(1−η)\phi_{\bar\theta}(\eta)=(1-\operatorname{sign}(\eta)\bar\theta)/(1-\eta)ϕθˉ​(η)=(1−sign(η)θˉ)/(1−η) otherwise, with sign⁡(0)=1\operatorname{sign}(0)=1sign(0)=1.

Window matrices. For vectors s0,…,smk−1s_0,\dots,s_{m_k-1}s0​,…,smk​−1​ and y0,…,ymk−1y_0,\dots,y_{m_k-1}y0​,…,ymk​−1​, let s^i\hat s_is^i​ be their unnormalized Gram–Schmidt orthogonalization (3.2), B0=IB^0=IB0=I, and

Bi+1=Bi+(y~i−Bisi)s^iTs^iTsi,y~i=θiyi+(1−θi)Bisi,θi=ϕθˉ(s^iT(Bi)−1yi∥s^i∥22).B^{i+1}=B^i+\frac{(\tilde y_i-B^is_i)\hat s_i^T}{\hat s_i^Ts_i},\qquad \tilde y_i=\theta^iy_i+(1-\theta^i)B^is_i,\qquad \theta^i=\phi_{\bar\theta}\Bigl(\frac{\hat s_i^T(B^i)^{-1}y_i}{\|\hat s_i\|_2^2}\Bigr).Bi+1=Bi+s^iT​si​(y~​i​−Bisi​)s^iT​​,y~​i​=θiyi​+(1−θi)Bisi​,θi=ϕθˉ​(∥s^i​∥22​s^iT​(Bi)−1yi​​).

The matrix norm ∥⋅∥2\|\cdot\|_2∥⋅∥2​ is the induced ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​ operator norm.

Algorithm 3.1 (AA-I-S-m). With parameters θˉ,τ,α∈(0,1)\bar\theta,\tau,\alpha\in(0,1)θˉ,τ,α∈(0,1), D,ϵ>0D,\epsilon>0D,ϵ>0 and max-memory m≥1m\ge1m≥1: start from H0=IH_0=IH0​=I, m0=0m_0=0m0​=0, nAA=0n_{AA}=0nAA​=0, Uˉ=∥g0∥2\bar U=\|g_0\|_2Uˉ=∥g0​∥2​ and x1=x~1=fα(x0)x^1=\tilde x^1=f_\alpha(x^0)x1=x~1=fα​(x0). At iteration k≥1k\ge1k≥1, set sk−1=x~k−xk−1s_{k-1}=\tilde x^k-x^{k-1}sk−1​=x~k−xk−1 and yk−1=g(x~k)−g(xk−1)y_{k-1}=g(\tilde x^k)-g(x^{k-1})yk−1​=g(x~k)−g(xk−1), orthogonalize sk−1s_{k-1}sk−1​ against the current window, and restart the window (memory back to 111, Hk−1H_{k-1}Hk−1​ replaced by III) if the memory would exceed mmm or ∥s^k−1∥2<τ∥sk−1∥2\|\hat s_{k-1}\|_2<\tau\|s_{k-1}\|_2∥s^k−1​∥2​<τ∥sk−1​∥2​. Then apply one Powell-regularized rank-one update to obtain HkH_kHk​ and the trial point x~k+1=xk−Hkgk\tilde x^{k+1}=x^k-H_kg_kx~k+1=xk−Hk​gk​. The trial point is accepted if ∥gk∥2≤DUˉ(nAA+1)−(1+ϵ)\|g_k\|_2\le D\bar U(n_{AA}+1)^{-(1+\epsilon)}∥gk​∥2​≤DUˉ(nAA​+1)−(1+ϵ) (and nAAn_{AA}nAA​ increases); otherwise xk+1=fα(xk)x^{k+1}=f_\alpha(x^k)xk+1=fα​(xk).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1

for every run of Algorithm 3.1:lim⁡k→∞xk=x⋆for some x⋆=f(x⋆).\text{for every run of Algorithm 3.1:}\qquad \lim_{k\to\infty}x^k=x^\star\quad\text{for some } x^\star=f(x^\star).for every run of Algorithm 3.1:k→∞lim​xk=x⋆for some x⋆=f(x⋆).

The only hypotheses are nonexpansiveness of fff, X≠∅X\ne\emptysetX=∅ and the parameter ranges. The limit is not specified: it depends on x0x^0x0 and the parameters.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3.2. Well-defined updates give ∣det⁡Bmk∣≥θˉmk>0|\det B^{m_k}|\ge\bar\theta^{m_k}>0∣detBmk​∣≥θˉmk​>0.
  2. Lemma 3.3. If ∥yi∥2≤2∥si∥2\|y_i\|_2\le2\|s_i\|_2∥yi​∥2​≤2∥si​∥2​, ∥s^i∥2≥τ∥si∥2\|\hat s_i\|_2\ge\tau\|s_i\|_2∥s^i​∥2​≥τ∥si​∥2​ and mk≤mm_k\le mmk​≤m, then ∥Bmk∥2≤3((1+θˉ+τ)/τ)m−2\|B^{m_k}\|_2\le3((1+\bar\theta+\tau)/\tau)^m-2∥Bmk​∥2​≤3((1+θˉ+τ)/τ)m−2.
  3. Corollary 3.4. ∥Hk∥2≤(3((1+θˉ+τ)/τ)m−2)n−1/θˉm\|H_k\|_2\le(3((1+\bar\theta+\tau)/\tau)^m-2)^{n-1}/\bar\theta^m∥Hk​∥2​≤(3((1+θˉ+τ)/τ)m−2)n−1/θˉm (3.8).
  4. Corollary 3.5. Along the algorithm, unless a solution is hit, (3.8) holds and cond(Hk)≤(3((1+θˉ+τ)/τ)m−2)n/θˉm\mathrm{cond}(H_k)\le(3((1+\bar\theta+\tau)/\tau)^m-2)^n/\bar\theta^mcond(Hk​)≤(3((1+θˉ+τ)/τ)m−2)n/θˉm.
  5. Eq. (4.3). ∥xk−y∥2≤∥x0−y∥2+CDUˉ∑i≥0(i+1)−(1+ϵ)\|x^k-y\|_2\le\|x^0-y\|_2+CD\bar U\sum_{i\ge0}(i+1)^{-(1+\epsilon)}∥xk−y∥2​≤∥x0−y∥2​+CDUˉ∑i≥0​(i+1)−(1+ϵ) for every y∈Xy\in Xy∈X.
  6. Eq. (4.6). lim⁡k∥gk∥2=0\lim_k\|g_k\|_2=0limk​∥gk​∥2​=0.
  7. Eq. (4.7). ∥xk+1−y∥22≤∥xk−y∥22+ϵk\|x^{k+1}-y\|_2^2\le\|x^k-y\|_2^2+\epsilon_k∥xk+1−y∥22​≤∥xk−y∥22​+ϵk​ with ϵk≥0\epsilon_k\ge0ϵk​≥0 summable.
  8. §4.1, Step 2. ∥xk−y∥2\|x^k-y\|_2∥xk−y∥2​ converges for every y∈Xy\in Xy∈X.

Significance

The theorem places a quasi-Newton acceleration scheme under the same hypotheses as the plain averaged iteration: nonexpansiveness and existence of a fixed point. It therefore applies at once to the nonexpansive examples of §4.2 of the paper (proximal gradient, projected gradient, alternating projections, ISTA, Douglas–Rachford splitting and SCS), with no smoothness, strong convexity or local assumption. The matrix bounds of Lemma 3.3 and Corollaries 3.4–3.5 are also of independent use: they give explicit, iteration-independent control of the approximate inverse Jacobians of a limited-memory type-I method, an assumption that other globalization frameworks (for example SuperMann) have to impose.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge none of it is machine-checked. Mathlib has neither the Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann iteration, nor Fejér monotonicity, nor any Anderson-type method. A formalization provides these pieces, checks the index bookkeeping of the restart and safeguard steps, and makes explicit the one place where the printed algorithm and the analysis disagree (line 9 at a window start; see below).

Difficulty

The accelerated step x~k+1=xk−Hkgk\tilde x^{k+1}=x^k-H_kg_kx~k+1=xk−Hk​gk​ need not decrease the distance to the solution set, so the Fejér argument for averaged iterations does not apply to it directly. The naive fix, bounding ∥Hkgk∥2\|H_kg_k\|_2∥Hk​gk​∥2​, requires a bound on ∥Hk∥2\|H_k\|_2∥Hk​∥2​ that holds uniformly along the run; without the Powell regularization BkB_kBk​ can be singular, and without the restart rule ∥Bk∥2\|B_k\|_2∥Bk​∥2​ can grow without bound as the window becomes nearly linearly dependent. The determinant and norm bounds of Lemmas 3.2–3.3 have to be established for arbitrary windows and then connected to the run of the algorithm, where the window, its orthogonalization and the matrices are defined by an intertwined recursion with resets. The safeguard then turns the uniform bound into a summable perturbation of a Fejér-monotone sequence, and the final step needs an Opial-type argument to pass from convergence of distances to convergence of the iterates.

Formalization scope

Rn\mathbb R^nRn is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), so all vector norms are Euclidean; matrices are continuous linear maps with the operator norm; us^Tu\hat s^Tus^T is rankOne ℝ u ŝ; det⁡\detdet is LinearMap.det; inverses are Ring.inverse (zero on singular maps, excluded by Lemma 3.2). The orthogonalization (3.2) is InnerProductSpace.gramSchmidt. Nonexpansive is LipschitzWith 1 f. The algorithm is the predicate IsAAISRun, a deterministic recursion: every run is determined by fff, the parameters and x0x^0x0, and a sorry-free check that runs exist (for f=idf=\mathrm{id}f=id) was built locally. The reset of Hk−1H_{k-1}Hk−1​ in line 8 is local to its iteration. sign(0)=1\mathrm{sign}(0)=1sign(0)=1 is encoded explicitly. Constants are the paper's explicit expressions; no milestone replaces them with an existential constant.

Line 9. The paper prints y~k−1=θk−1yk−1−(1−θk−1)gk−1\tilde y_{k-1}=\theta_{k-1}y_{k-1}-(1-\theta_{k-1})g_{k-1}y~​k−1​=θk−1​yk−1​−(1−θk−1​)gk−1​, derived from (3.3) through Bk−1sk−1=−gk−1B_{k-1}s_{k-1}=-g_{k-1}Bk−1​sk−1​=−gk−1​, which fails when the window starts afresh (mk=1m_k=1mk​=1). The mission uses (3.3) there: y~k−1=θk−1yk−1+(1−θk−1)sk−1\tilde y_{k-1}=\theta_{k-1}y_{k-1}+(1-\theta_{k-1})s_{k-1}y~​k−1​=θk−1​yk−1​+(1−θk−1​)sk−1​ when mk=1m_k=1mk​=1, and the printed formula when mk≥2m_k\ge2mk​≥2.

Milestones of §4.1 and Corollary 3.5 carry the hypothesis f(xk)≠xkf(x^k)\ne x^kf(xk)=xk for all kkk, as the paper does ("we temporarily assume for simplicity that a solution to (1.1) is not found in finite steps"); the goal does not. A goal proved from an unsatisfiable run predicate, or one that assumes a bound on ∥Hk∥2\|H_k\|_2∥Hk​∥2​, contractivity of fff, or that the accelerated step is never taken, is not this theorem. Division by zero in Lean can only occur once a fixed point has been reached, after which all later iterates coincide.

Useful reusable infrastructure includes the Krasnosel'skiĭ–Mann inequality ∥fα(x)−y∥22≤∥x−y∥22−α(1−α)∥g(x)∥22\|f_\alpha(x)-y\|_2^2\le\|x-y\|_2^2-\alpha(1-\alpha)\|g(x)\|_2^2∥fα​(x)−y∥22​≤∥x−y∥22​−α(1−α)∥g(x)∥22​, quasi-Fejér monotone sequences and their convergence, and determinant and norm identities for rank-one updates (the matrix determinant lemma and Sherman–Morrison). Proofs of the window lemmas, of the run invariants (the window matrices coincide with the algorithm's Hk−1H_k^{-1}Hk−1​) and of the convergence steps are all welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Zhang, B. O'Donoghue, S. Boyd, Globally Convergent Type-I Anderson Acceleration for Nonsmooth Fixed-Point Iterations, SIAM J. Optim. 30(4), 3170–3197, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1137/18M1232772
  • J. Zhang, B. O'Donoghue, S. Boyd, longer version, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.03971
  • D. M. Gay, R. B. Schnabel, Solving systems of nonlinear equations by Broyden's method with projected updates, in Nonlinear Programming 3, Academic Press, 245–281, 1978 (reference [20] of the paper). https://doi.org/10.1137/18M1232772
  • D. G. Anderson, Iterative procedures for nonlinear integral equations, J. ACM 12(4), 547–560, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1145/321296.321305
  • H. Fang, Y. Saad, Two classes of multisecant methods for nonlinear acceleration, Numer. Linear Algebra Appl. 16(3), 197–221, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1002/nla.617
  • H. F. Walker, P. Ni, Anderson acceleration for fixed-point iterations, SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 49(4), 1715–1735, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1137/10078356X
  • A. Toth, C. T. Kelley, Convergence analysis for Anderson acceleration, SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 53(2), 805–819, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1137/130919398
  • H. H. Bauschke, P. L. Combettes, Convex Analysis and Monotone Operator Theory in Hilbert Spaces, Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9467-7
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Markov Decision Processes IX: Index Tracking and Utility Indifference PricingTextbook

Motivation

Two more portfolio problems round out Bäuerle and Rieder's finance chapter, each raising a question the earlier sections do not. First: a fund manager is mandated to track an index — replicate its value as closely as possible — but the index itself is often built from assets the fund cannot trade directly (a broad benchmark, a proprietary basket). This is the multiperiod, statistical analogue of index-fund management, and it turns out to be a classical linear-quadratic control problem (R. E. Kalman, A New Approach to Linear Filtering and Prediction Problems, 1960, for the deterministic-coefficient case that Bäuerle and Rieder's §2.6.3 first generalizes to random coefficients) rather than requiring a new dynamic-programming argument at all. Second: how should a contingent claim be priced when it depends on an asset that cannot be traded, so that perfect replication is simply impossible? This is the market-incompleteness question at the heart of mathematical finance since the 1970s options-pricing literature, and §4.9 develops the utility indifference pricing approach (M. H. A. Davis, Option Pricing in Incomplete Markets, in Mathematics of Derivative Securities, 1997; also traceable to the zero-utility premium principle of classical insurance mathematics): price a claim at the amount that leaves an expected-utility-maximizing investor indifferent between holding it and not.

Setting

Index tracking (§4.8): state (x,s^)∈E:=R×R(x,\hat s)\in E:=\mathbb{R}\times\mathbb{R}(x,s^)∈E:=R×R (wealth, value of the non-traded index S^\hat SS^), action a∈A:=Rda\in A:=\mathbb{R}^da∈A:=Rd (amounts in ddd traded assets), transition Tn((x,s^),a,(z1,z2)):=((1+in+1)(x+a⋅z1), s^ z2)T_n((x,\hat s),a,(z_1,z_2)) := ((1+i_{n+1})(x+a\cdot z_1),\ \hat s\,z_2)Tn​((x,s^),a,(z1​,z2​)):=((1+in+1​)(x+a⋅z1​), s^z2​). The objective is Vn(x,s^):=inf⁡πE[∑k=nN(Xk−S^k)2]V_n(x,\hat s) := \inf_\pi \mathbb{E}[\sum_{k=n}^N (X_k-\hat S_k)^2]Vn​(x,s^):=infπ​E[∑k=nN​(Xk​−S^k​)2] (Eq. (4.36)): minimize the expected sum of squared tracking errors. Chapter 2's stochastic linear-quadratic theory (§2.6.3, Theorem 2.6.3) already solves any problem of this shape — linear dynamics with random coefficient matrices An+1,Bn+1A_{n+1},B_{n+1}An+1​,Bn+1​, quadratic cost with fixed matrix QQQ — via a backward Riccati-type recursion Q~N:=QN\tilde Q_N:=Q_NQ~​N​:=QN​, Q~n:=Qn+E[An+1⊤Q~n+1An+1]−E[An+1⊤Q~n+1Bn+1](E[Bn+1⊤Q~n+1Bn+1])−1E[Bn+1⊤Q~n+1An+1]\tilde Q_n := Q_n + \mathbb{E}[A_{n+1}^\top \tilde Q_{n+1}A_{n+1}] - \mathbb{E}[A_{n+1}^\top\tilde Q_{n+1}B_{n+1}](\mathbb{E}[B_{n+1}^\top \tilde Q_{n+1}B_{n+1}])^{-1}\mathbb{E}[B_{n+1}^\top\tilde Q_{n+1}A_{n+1}]Q~​n​:=Qn​+E[An+1⊤​Q~​n+1​An+1​]−E[An+1⊤​Q~​n+1​Bn+1​](E[Bn+1⊤​Q~​n+1​Bn+1​])−1E[Bn+1⊤​Q~​n+1​An+1​], so §4.8's content is identifying this problem's own An+1,Bn+1,QA_{n+1},B_{n+1},QAn+1​,Bn+1​,Q.

Indifference pricing (§4.9): a one-period market with a traded asset SSS and an untradeable asset S^\hat SS^, four states of the world with probabilities p1,…,p4p_1,\dots,p_4p1​,…,p4​, relative returns (R~,R^)∈{(u,u^),(u,d^),(d,u^),(d,d^)}(\tilde R,\hat R)\in\{(u,\hat u),(u,\hat d),(d,\hat u),(d,\hat d)\}(R~,R^)∈{(u,u^),(u,d^),(d,u^),(d,d^)}, an exponential-utility investor U(x)=−e−γxU(x)=-e^{-\gamma x}U(x)=−e−γx, and a claim H=h(S1,S^1)H=h(S_1,\hat S_1)H=h(S1​,S^1​). The investor's value with the claim sold short is V0H(x,s,s^):=sup⁡aE[−e−γx−γa(R~−1)+γH]V_0^H(x,s,\hat s) := \sup_a \mathbb{E}[-e^{-\gamma x-\gamma a(\tilde R-1)+\gamma H}]V0H​(x,s,s^):=supa​E[−e−γx−γa(R~−1)+γH] (Eq. (4.37)); Definition 4.9.1 sets the indifference price v0(H,s,s^)v_0(H,s,\hat s)v0​(H,s,s^) as the amount solving V00(x,s,s^)=V0H(x+v0,s,s^)V_0^0(x,s,\hat s) = V_0^H(x+v_0,s,\hat s)V00​(x,s,s^)=V0H​(x+v0​,s,s^) for every wealth xxx. The multiperiod extension (unnumbered display, p. 138) replaces the one period by NNN i.i.d. periods and defines vn(H,s,s^)v_n(H,s,\hat s)vn​(H,s,s^) at every time nnn the same way, now for VnHV_n^HVnH​ a genuine dynamic value function.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 4.9.4

VnH(x,s,s^)=−e−γxdn(s,s^),dN(s,s^):=eγh(s,s^),dn(s,s^):=inf⁡aE[e−γa(R~n+1−1) dn+1(sR~n+1,s^R^n+1)],V_n^H(x,s,\hat s) = -e^{-\gamma x}d_n(s,\hat s), \qquad d_N(s,\hat s):=e^{\gamma h(s,\hat s)}, \qquad d_n(s,\hat s) := \inf_{a} \mathbb{E}\big[e^{-\gamma a(\tilde R_{n+1}-1)}\,d_{n+1}(s\tilde R_{n+1},\hat s\hat R_{n+1})\big],VnH​(x,s,s^)=−e−γxdn​(s,s^),dN​(s,s^):=eγh(s,s^),dn​(s,s^):=ainf​E[e−γa(R~n+1​−1)dn+1​(sR~n+1​,s^R^n+1​)], vn(H,s,s^)=1γlog⁡(dn(s,s^)vN−n),vn(vn+1(H,sR~n+1,s^R^n+1),s,s^)=vn(H,s,s^),v_n(H,s,\hat s) = \frac{1}{\gamma}\log\Big(\frac{d_n(s,\hat s)}{v^{N-n}}\Big), \qquad v_n\big(v_{n+1}(H,s\tilde R_{n+1},\hat s\hat R_{n+1}),s,\hat s\big) = v_n(H,s,\hat s),vn​(H,s,s^)=γ1​log(vN−ndn​(s,s^)​),vn​(vn+1​(H,sR~n+1​,s^R^n+1​),s,s^)=vn​(H,s,s^),

where v:=inf⁡aE[e−γa(R~1−1)]v:=\inf_a\mathbb{E}[e^{-\gamma a(\tilde R_1-1)}]v:=infa​E[e−γa(R~1​−1)] (Eq. (4.39)). This is the genuine multiperiod solution: no closed form is available in general (unlike the one-period case), only this explicit backward recursion for dnd_ndn​, obtained by folding the claim's payoff into the terminal reward of the exponential-utility Bellman recursion (Theorem 4.2.15). The consistency condition (part c) says the indifference-pricing operator is itself "time-consistent": pricing at time nnn a claim whose payoff at n+1n+1n+1 is the already-computed time-(n+1)(n+1)(n+1) price of HHH recovers HHH's own time-nnn price directly.

Milestones

Theorem 4.8.1 (index-tracking's explicit LQ solution: quadratic value functions via the Riccati recursion, linear optimal policy) and Theorem 4.9.2 (the one-period special case of the goal, with a genuinely closed-form price, obtained by directly minimizing a convex one-variable objective). Definition 4.9.1 (the indifference price's defining equation) is needed by both and is a formalization target in its own right, but — being a definition, not a numbered theorem — is never a milestone.

Significance

Theorem 4.8.1 shows that a statistically-motivated portfolio criterion (tracking error, the industry-standard measure of an index fund's fidelity) reduces exactly to a textbook control problem, so every qualitative feature of LQ control — the value function's quadratic form, the policy's linearity in the state, off-line computability of the feedback gain — transfers immediately; the content is the reduction, not a new proof technique. The indifference-pricing results answer a question ordinary arbitrage-free pricing cannot: when a claim's payoff depends on an asset that literally cannot be traded, no replicating portfolio exists, so the no-arbitrage pricing theory of Chapter 3 gives no unique price at all. Theorem 4.9.4 shows the utility-based alternative is nonetheless computable to the same degree of explicitness as ordinary dynamic programming allows: a backward recursion, not a closed form, but a genuine algorithm.

None of these results have machine-checked proofs on Prove2Me at the time of writing. The platform's BertsekasDP.riccati_completion_of_square and related Riccati-family theorems were checked and are not reusable for Theorem 4.8.1: their system matrices are deterministic, with no expectation anywhere in the statement, while this chapter's An+1,Bn+1A_{n+1},B_{n+1}An+1​,Bn+1​ are random and every term of the recursion is an expectation — a genuinely more general result that happens to specialize to the deterministic case, not an instance of it. No substrate at all exists for utility indifference pricing.

Difficulty

For index tracking, the obstacle is not mathematical but representational: recognizing that (x−s^)2(x-\hat s)^2(x−s^)2 is a quadratic form (x,s^)Q(x,s^)⊤(x,\hat s)Q(x,\hat s)^\top(x,s^)Q(x,s^)⊤ in the augmented state that includes the untradeable index's own value, and that the transition is linear in this augmented state with coefficient matrices that are random only through next period's returns — once this identification is made, Theorem 2.6.3 is already proved and there is nothing further to argue. For indifference pricing, the obstacle is conceptual: Definition 4.9.1 characterizes v0v_0v0​ implicitly, by an equation relating two suprema, not by a formula, so nothing prevents a formalization from simply asserting the closed-form answer as the definition and making the theorem vacuous. A faithful formalization must keep the two apart, proving that the printed formula is a solution of the defining equation rather than building the formula into what "indifference price" means.

Formalization scope

The index-tracking Riccati recursion is restated locally in this chunk's namespace (per the project's rule against importing another chunk's machinery), instantiated to this problem's own 2×22\times22×2 cost matrix and random 2×22\times22×2/2×d2\times d2×d system matrices, using Mathlib's general Matrix inverse (Bᵀ Q B is inverted directly; positive-definiteness making the inverse genuine is not separately hypothesized in the Riccati recursion's own statement, matching how the book treats it as automatic under Assumption (FM)). The one-period and multiperiod indifference-pricing markets are formalized as separate structures (the one-period model's four-atom probability space is pinned down by explicit measure equations on the pair (R~,R^)(\tilde R,\hat R)(R~,R^), not by an assumed Fin 4 state space, matching the pattern used for the binomial model in chunk 04c). The multiperiod value function VHAt carries an explicit maturity argument distinct from the model's own horizon NNN, needed only to state the goal's consistency condition (part c), which prices a claim maturing one period early. A formalization that defines the indifference price directly as a closed-form expression, rather than as the solution of Definition 4.9.1's equation, would be a trivializing formalization of Theorem 4.9.2 and 4.9.4(b) and is explicitly ruled out. Reusable beyond this mission: the local Riccati-recursion definitions are natural substrate for any later mission needing a stochastic LQ argument with random coefficients (the book's own §2.6.3 general theorem is a natural target for a future chunk). Contributions completing either milestone's sorry, or the goal's, are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. E. Kalman, A New Approach to Linear Filtering and Prediction Problems, Journal of Basic Engineering 82(1), 1960, https://doi.org/10.1115/1.3662552
  • M. H. A. Davis, Option Pricing in Incomplete Markets, in M. A. H. Dempster, S. R. Pliska (eds.), Mathematics of Derivative Securities, Cambridge University Press, 1997
  • N. Bäuerle, U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9, Chapter 4, §§4.8-4.9
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XVII: Fenchel Duality and Linear-Programming IntegralityTextbook

Motivation

Duality is the organizing principle of convex optimization: a minimization problem's optimal value equals a maximization problem's optimal value, and this coincidence, rather than being a lucky accident, follows from a separating-hyperplane argument that applies whenever the two problems' feasible regions are shaped compatibly enough. Werner Fenchel formalized this in the 1950s for pairs of convex and concave functions related by the Legendre-Fenchel transform, and the resulting Fenchel duality theorem specializes, for linear objectives over polyhedral feasible regions, to linear programming duality — the fact, central to the entire theory of combinatorial optimization, that a linear program's optimal value can always be certified from above and below by a pair of primal and dual feasible solutions. Murota's Discrete Convex Analysis (SIAM, 2003) collects this classical machinery, together with the integrality theory that lets it produce combinatorial (integer-valued) certificates rather than merely real ones, as the technical foundation the rest of the book builds its discrete theory on top of.

Setting

For f:Rn→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb R^n \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:Rn→R∪{+∞}, the epigraph is epi⁡f={(x,Y):Y≥f(x)}\operatorname{epi} f = \{(x,Y) : Y \ge f(x)\}epif={(x,Y):Y≥f(x)}, and fff is convex iff epi⁡f\operatorname{epi} fepif is a convex set; fff is proper if additionally its effective domain dom⁡f={x:f(x)<+∞}\operatorname{dom} f = \{x : f(x) < +\infty\}domf={x:f(x)<+∞} is nonempty, and closed if epi⁡f\operatorname{epi} fepif is topologically closed. A function h:Rn→R∪{−∞}h : \mathbb R^n \to \mathbb R \cup \{-\infty\}h:Rn→R∪{−∞} is concave, proper, closed analogously via its hypograph. The convex conjugate is f∙(p)=sup⁡x{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)}f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x\{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)\}f∙(p)=supx​{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)}, and the concave conjugate h∘(p)=inf⁡x{⟨p,x⟩−h(x)}h^\circ(p) = \inf_x\{\langle p,x\rangle - h(x)\}h∘(p)=infx​{⟨p,x⟩−h(x)}. The relative interior ri⁡S\operatorname{ri} SriS of a set SSS is the interior of SSS relative to its affine hull. A function is polyhedral if its epigraph (or hypograph) is a finite intersection of half-spaces. Given an m×nm \times nm×n matrix AAA, b∈Rmb \in \mathbb R^mb∈Rm, c∈Rnc \in \mathbb R^nc∈Rn, the primal and dual linear programs are min⁡{c⊤x:Ax=b, x≥0}\min\{c^\top x : Ax=b,\ x\ge0\}min{c⊤x:Ax=b, x≥0} and max⁡{b⊤y:A⊤y≤c}\max\{b^\top y : A^\top y \le c\}max{b⊤y:A⊤y≤c}, with feasible regions PPP, DDD. A matrix is totally unimodular if every square submatrix has determinant 000, 111, or −1-1−1. A discrete set S⊆ZnS \subseteq \mathbb Z^nS⊆Zn is hole free if S=Sˉ∩ZnS = \bar S \cap \mathbb Z^nS=Sˉ∩Zn, where Sˉ\bar SSˉ is the convex hull of SSS's real embedding; the discrete Minkowski sum is S1+S2={x1+x2:x1∈S1,x2∈S2}S_1+S_2 = \{x_1+x_2 : x_1\in S_1, x_2\in S_2\}S1​+S2​={x1​+x2​:x1​∈S1​,x2​∈S2​}.

Formalization targets

Goal (Theorem 3.6, Fenchel duality). For proper convex fff and proper concave hhh satisfying at least one of four alternative conditions — a relative-interior condition on dom⁡f∩dom⁡h\operatorname{dom} f \cap \operatorname{dom} hdomf∩domh, a polyhedrality condition on the same, or the analogous pair of conditions on dom⁡f∙∩dom⁡h∘\operatorname{dom} f^\bullet \cap \operatorname{dom} h^\circdomf∙∩domh∘ together with closedness of fff, hhh —

inf⁡x{f(x)−h(x)}=sup⁡p{h∘(p)−f∙(p)},\inf_x\{f(x)-h(x)\} = \sup_p\{h^\circ(p)-f^\bullet(p)\},xinf​{f(x)−h(x)}=psup​{h∘(p)−f∙(p)},

with the extremum on the appropriate side attained whenever the common value is finite. This is the mission's capstone: the four alternative hypotheses make it the most broadly applicable statement of the four convex-duality results in this mission, each of the other three being either a special case in substance (Theorem 3.5, separation, which 3.6 is proved from) or a literal specialization to linear data (Theorem 3.10, LP duality).

Supporting milestones. Theorem 3.2 (biconjugation: f∙f^\bulletf∙ is always closed proper convex, and g∙∙=gg^{\bullet\bullet}=gg∙∙=g for closed proper convex ggg); Theorem 3.5 (the separation theorem for convex/concave functions, under two of Theorem 3.6's four hypotheses); Theorem 3.9 (the Farkas lemma, equality form); Theorem 3.10 (LP duality: weak duality, strong duality with attainment, and complementary slackness); Theorem 3.13 (total unimodularity of the constraint matrix guarantees an integral optimal solution whenever an optimal solution exists); Proposition 3.14 (an explicit potential function certifying a minimum-weight bipartite perfect matching, via the totally unimodular incidence-matrix LP); and Proposition 3.16 (for a translation-invariant family of hole-free discrete sets, the property that discrete disjointness implies closure disjointness is equivalent to the discrete Minkowski sum matching the integer points of the closures' Minkowski sum).

Significance

Fenchel duality is the single result from which the separation theorem, LP duality, and (via the totally-unimodular incidence matrix of a bipartite graph) the combinatorial duality underlying weighted bipartite matching all descend, in one unbroken chain of specialization; formalizing this chain in one mission exhibits that structure directly, rather than treating each result as an independent fact. Proposition 3.16 plays a different role: it is the chapter's warning that naive discrete analogues of convexity (hole-freeness) do not automatically inherit convexity's good closure properties under Minkowski sums, which is exactly the gap the book's later M-convexity and L-convexity machinery is built to close — this mission's Proposition 3.16 is therefore the motivating negative result for the rest of the book's positive theory, not a loose end. So far as a platform search shows, no existing formalization matches this chunk's specific combination of extended-valued (possibly ±∞\pm\infty±∞) functions, the four-alternative Fenchel duality hypothesis, or the bipartite-matching-via-total-unimodularity argument; the one related platform result (VectorSpaceOpt.fenchel_duality, from Luenberger) is for real-valued functions on general normed spaces under a single relative-interior-and-solidness hypothesis, a different generality from the extended-valued, four-hypothesis statement here.

Difficulty

The naive approach to Theorem 3.6 tries to prove the duality gap is zero directly from the definitions of the two conjugates, which only gives the easy inequality inf⁡≥sup⁡\inf \ge \supinf≥sup (a one-line computation, shown in the book's own proof in three lines); the substantive content is the reverse inequality, and it genuinely fails without a constraint-qualification hypothesis like (a1)-(b2) — Example 3.8 in the book exhibits a convex/concave pair with inf⁡=0≠−1=sup⁡\inf = 0 \ne -1 = \supinf=0=−1=sup when none of the four conditions hold. The book's actual route reduces Theorem 3.6 to the separation theorem (Theorem 3.5) applied to fff shifted down by the (assumed finite) infimum, which produces the separating affine function directly; this is why Theorem 3.5, although logically a special case in spirit, earns its own milestone rather than being subsumed silently.

Formalization scope

All convex and concave functions are represented uniformly as (V → ℝ) → EReal-valued (Fintype V), rather than mixing WithTop ℝ for convex and WithBot ℝ for concave functions, so that Theorem 3.2's biconjugate — whose properness is a conclusion, not an assumption — has a well-defined codomain without extra casts. Convexity is defined via the epigraph being a convex subset of the ordinary real vector space (V→R)×R(V\to\mathbb R)\times\mathbb R(V→R)×R (Mathlib's Convex ℝ), following the book's own equivalent characterization, rather than unfolding the direct inequality definition, which would require a extended-arithmetic scalar-multiplication convention (0\cdot(+\infty)=0) that Mathlib does not provide for EReal. The relative interior is defined directly from the book's own metric-ball-intersected-with-affine-hull description, since Mathlib has no relative-interior primitive at the pinned revision. Polyhedra are finite intersections of explicit half-spaces. A bipartite perfect matching is represented as a bijection between the two vertex sides restricted to the edge set — a faithful, not narrower, representation since every perfect matching between equal-size parts arises this way. The formalization does not trivialize: Theorem 3.6's four hypotheses are carried in full (not reduced to the easiest single case), and no result is stated only for finite-valued (never ±∞\pm\infty±∞) functions, which would discard the entire point of the extended-value convex-analysis framework this chapter sets up for the rest of the book. Infrastructure needed beyond Mathlib's Convex, Matrix, and EReal API: all epigraph/hypograph, conjugate, relative-interior, and polyhedral apparatus is defined fresh in DiscreteConvex.IntegralConvexityB; a contribution proving any of the seven milestones independently, or supplying Mathlib-quality relative-interior lemmas, would be a natural entry point.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003, DOI 10.1137/1.9780898718508, Chapter 3.
  • R. T. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1970.
  • A. Schrijver, Theory of Linear and Integer Programming, Wiley, 1986.
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🏆Completed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Value of Mix Flexibility and Dual Sourcing in Unreliable Newsvendor Networks 2: Under Perfect Reliability the Flexibility Premium Is Nonnegative for Every Nondecreasing UtilityResearch Paper

Motivation

A manufacturer that makes several products must decide, before demand is known, how much capacity to buy. It can buy dedicated capacity, one resource per product, or a single flexible resource that can make every product. Flexible capacity pools demand: a surplus of one product's demand can be served by capacity that would otherwise sit idle. A common intuition in the operations literature holds that a flexible strategy is preferable to a dedicated one when the unit costs are equal, and much of that literature therefore assumes the flexible resource costs more (for example Van Mieghem 1998).

Tomlin and Wang (2005) examine when this intuition is valid for firms that are not risk neutral and whose resources may fail. Their answer has two halves. A risk-neutral firm always values flexibility, whatever the reliability of its resources (their Proposition 1). A firm with perfectly reliable resources also always values flexibility, whatever its attitude to risk, as long as it prefers more wealth to less (their Proposition 4). When neither condition holds, dedicated capacity can be strictly preferred (their Remark 1 and numerical study). This mission formalizes the second half.

Setting

There are NNN products with a common contribution margin p>0p>0p>0. The random demand vector is X~=(X~1,…,X~N)\tilde X=(\tilde X_1,\dots,\tilde X_N)X~=(X~1​,…,X~N​), nonnegative, with an arbitrary joint distribution on a probability space. The firm has initial wealth w0w_0w0​.

  • In the dedicated network SD, the firm invests Kn≥0K_n\ge 0Kn​≥0 in a resource that can make only product nnn, at marginal total cost c>0c>0c>0 per unit. With perfectly reliable resources the whole investment is delivered, and the terminal wealth is
wSD(K)=w0+p∑n=1Nmin⁡{X~n,Kn}−c∑n=1NKn.w^{SD}(K)=w_0+p\sum_{n=1}^N\min\{\tilde X_n,K_n\}-c\sum_{n=1}^N K_n .wSD(K)=w0​+pn=1∑N​min{X~n​,Kn​}−cn=1∑N​Kn​.
  • In the flexible network SF, the firm invests KN+1≥0K_{N+1}\ge0KN+1​≥0 in one resource that can make every product, at marginal total cost cN+1c_{N+1}cN+1​, and the terminal wealth is
wSF(KN+1)=w0+pmin⁡{∑n=1NX~n,KN+1}−cN+1KN+1.w^{SF}(K_{N+1})=w_0+p\min\Big\{\sum_{n=1}^N\tilde X_n,K_{N+1}\Big\}-c_{N+1}K_{N+1}.wSF(KN+1​)=w0​+pmin{n=1∑N​X~n​,KN+1​}−cN+1​KN+1​.

The firm chooses its investment to maximize one of three objectives of terminal wealth WWW, with profit W~=W−w0\tilde W=W-w_0W~=W−w0​:

  1. an expected utility E[u(W)]E[u(W)]E[u(W)], where uuu ranges over U1U_1U1​, the set of utility functions that are nondecreasing in wealth;
  2. the loss-averse objective VLA=w0+E[W~+−βW~−]V_{LA}=w_0+E[\tilde W^+-\beta\tilde W^-]VLA​=w0​+E[W~+−βW~−] with β≥1\beta\ge 1β≥1;
  3. the CVaR objective VCVaRη=w0+max⁡v{v+1ηE[min⁡{W~−v,0}]}V_{CVaR_\eta}=w_0+\max_v\{v+\tfrac1\eta E[\min\{\tilde W-v,0\}]\}VCVaRη​​=w0​+maxv​{v+η1​E[min{W~−v,0}]} with η∈(0,1]\eta\in(0,1]η∈(0,1], the mean of the left η\etaη-tail of wealth.

SF is (weakly) preferred when its optimal objective value is at least that of SD. The flexibility premium is Δ=(cN+1I−c)/c\Delta=(c^I_{N+1}-c)/cΔ=(cN+1I​−c)/c, where the indifference cost cN+1Ic^I_{N+1}cN+1I​ is a flexible cost at which the firm is indifferent between the networks; the firm prefers SF as long as cN+1≤(1+Δ)cc_{N+1}\le(1+\Delta)ccN+1​≤(1+Δ)c.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4

With perfectly reliable resources and any demand distribution, Δ≥0\Delta\ge 0Δ≥0 for every u∈U1u\in U_1u∈U1​, for the loss-averse objective and for the CVaR objective. In the formalization: for every cN+1≤cc_{N+1}\le ccN+1​≤c,

∀K≥0 ∃KN+1≥0:VSD(K)≤VSF(KN+1)\forall K\ge 0\ \exists K_{N+1}\ge 0:\quad \mathcal V^{SD}(K)\le\mathcal V^{SF}(K_{N+1})∀K≥0 ∃KN+1​≥0:VSD(K)≤VSF(KN+1​)

for V\mathcal VV each expected utility with uuu nondecreasing, and the loss-averse objective; for CVaR the same with the threshold vvv quantified jointly with the investment.

Milestones

  1. (A-4)–(A-6): at equal cost, investing ∑nKn\sum_nK_n∑n​Kn​ in the flexible resource gives a terminal wealth at least that of SD, for every demand realization.
  2. The SF wealth first-order stochastically dominates the SD wealth: FWSF≤FWSDF_{W^{SF}}\le F_{W^{SD}}FWSF​≤FWSD​.
  3. E[u(wSD(K))]≤E[u(wSF(∑nKn))]E[u(w^{SD}(K))]\le E[u(w^{SF}(\sum_nK_n))]E[u(wSD(K))]≤E[u(wSF(∑n​Kn​))] for every nondecreasing uuu.
  4. The loss-averse objective is the expected utility of a nondecreasing piecewise-linear utility with breakpoint w0w_0w0​.
  5. The CVaR comparison VCVaRSD(K)≤VCVaRSF(∑nKn)V^{SD}_{CVaR}(K)\le V^{SF}_{CVaR}(\sum_nK_n)VCVaRSD​(K)≤VCVaRSF​(∑n​Kn​).

Significance

Proposition 4 shows that the intuition "flexibility is worth at least as much as dedicated capacity at the same price" survives any monotone risk attitude and any demand distribution, provided supply is reliable. Combined with Proposition 1 it isolates the interaction of risk aversion and unreliable supply as the only source of a negative flexibility premium, which is the paper's Remark 1 and the organizing message of its numerical study. The result requires no concavity, differentiability or distributional assumption, so it applies to the loss-averse and CVaR objectives used throughout the paper.

The result is proved in the paper (Appendix A); no machine-checked version is known. A formalization produces a reusable statement of the model, a pathwise pooling inequality, and the passage from a pathwise comparison of two random variables on one probability space to comparisons of expected utilities and of CVaR, which recurs in capacity-pooling and inventory-pooling arguments.

Difficulty

The pathwise inequality is elementary. The work lies in the passage from it to the objectives. The paper cites Levy (1992) for both the expected-utility and the CVaR comparison; the first holds for every nondecreasing uuu, including discontinuous ones, and the second concerns a maximum over a real threshold that is not a priori attained. A formal proof must also make sure every expectation involved is a genuine integral: the utility is arbitrary, so the expected utility is finite only because, for a fixed nonnegative investment and nonnegative demand, both wealths are confined to a bounded interval. Finally, "Δ≥0\Delta\ge 0Δ≥0" is a statement about optimal values, and the optimal SD investment need not exist; the argument has to be run for every SD investment, not for an optimal one.

Formalization scope

All declarations live in the namespace MixFlex.Reliable. The probability space is (Ω, μ) with IsProbabilityMeasure μ; demand is a measurable X : Ω → Fin N → ℝ with each coordinate almost surely nonnegative, and no density, independence or integrability is assumed. Expectations are Bochner integrals. Perfect reliability (θ=1\theta=1θ=1) is built into the wealths (A-4)–(A-5), so the committed-cost fraction λ\lambdaλ does not appear. Standing parameters: p>0p>0p>0, c>0c>0c>0, β≥1\beta\ge 1β≥1, 0<η≤10<\eta\le10<η≤1, w0w_0w0​ arbitrary. The requirements p,c>0p,c>0p,c>0 and nonnegative, measurable demand are made explicit; the page treats them as part of the model.

The premium Δ\DeltaΔ and the indifference cost are not defined as real numbers, since the indifference cost need not be unique. "Δ≥0\Delta\ge0Δ≥0" is encoded as "SF is weakly preferred for every cN+1≤cc_{N+1}\le ccN+1​≤c", and "weakly preferred" as "every nonnegative SD investment is matched or beaten by a nonnegative SF investment", with no real suprema. For CVaR the maximum in (8) over the investment and the threshold is encoded in the same matching form. The milestones compare the objectives at the flexible cost ccc, as (A-5) is printed.

A formalization in which the expected utility of a non-integrable wealth defaults to zero, or in which η=0\eta=0η=0 makes the CVaR bracket w0+vw_0+vw0​+v, would make the comparisons meaningless; the statements exclude both (K≥0K\ge0K≥0 with nonnegative demand bounds the wealths; η>0\eta>0η>0). "Δ≥0\Delta\ge0Δ≥0" is also not trivially true: for a flexible cost above ccc SF can be strictly worse.

Out of scope: Propositions 1–3 and 5–8 (Proposition 1 is the companion mission on the risk-neutral premium), Remark 1's negative-premium claim and the numerical study. Welcome contributions: a general lemma that an almost-sure inequality between bounded random variables transfers to expected utilities of monotone functions, and a proof of the CVaR bracket comparison.

Selected references

  • B. Tomlin, Y. Wang, On the value of mix flexibility and dual sourcing in unreliable newsvendor networks, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(1):37–57, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1040.0063
  • H. Levy, Stochastic dominance and expected utility: survey and analysis, Management Science 38(4):555–593, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.38.4.555
  • R. T. Rockafellar, S. Uryasev, Conditional value-at-risk for general loss distributions, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(7):1443–1471, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00271-6
  • J. A. Van Mieghem, Investment strategies for flexible resources, Management Science 44(8):1071–1078, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1071
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Markov Decision Processes VII: Consumption-Investment Problems and Regime SwitchingTextbook

Motivation

Real investors do not merely accumulate wealth for a single terminal payoff; they consume along the way, and the market they invest in is rarely a single fixed statistical regime for years at a time — bull and bear markets, business cycles, and volatility regimes shift the distribution of returns. Bäuerle and Rieder's §4.3 extends the terminal-wealth theory of chunk 04a by adding a consumption choice at every stage (the Ramsey/Merton consumption-investment problem), and §4.4 extends it again by letting the return distribution itself depend on a hidden, Markov-modulated environment state. Both extensions are shown to be genuine instances of the same abstract finite-horizon Markov Decision Process machinery from Chapter 2 — the joint consumption-investment choice and the extra regime coordinate change the state and action spaces, but not the proof strategy, which is exactly the point.

Setting

The consumption-investment problem: state E:=dom UpE := \mathrm{dom}\,U_pE:=domUp​ (wealth), action R≥0×Rd\mathbb{R}_{\ge0}\times\mathbb{R}^dR≥0​×Rd (consumption ccc, amounts aaa invested), transition Tn(x,c,a,z)=(1+in+1)(x−c+a⋅z)T_n(x,c,a,z) = (1+i_{n+1})(x-c+a\cdot z)Tn​(x,c,a,z)=(1+in+1​)(x−c+a⋅z), reward rn(x,c,a):=Uc(c)r_n(x,c,a) := U_c(c)rn​(x,c,a):=Uc​(c), terminal reward gN:=Upg_N := U_pgN​:=Up​. Value functions Vn(x):=sup⁡πEn,xπ[∑k=nN−1Uc(ck(Xk))+Up(XN)]V_n(x) := \sup_\pi \mathbb{E}^\pi_{n,x}[\sum_{k=n}^{N-1} U_c(c_k(X_k)) + U_p(X_N)]Vn​(x):=supπ​En,xπ​[∑k=nN−1​Uc​(ck​(Xk​))+Up​(XN​)]. The one-period sub-problem: D(x):={(c,a):0≤c≤x, (1+i)(x−c+a⋅R)∈dom Up a.s.}D(x) := \{(c,a) : 0\le c\le x,\ (1+i)(x-c+a\cdot R)\in\mathrm{dom}\,U_p \text{ a.s.}\}D(x):={(c,a):0≤c≤x, (1+i)(x−c+a⋅R)∈domUp​ a.s.}, u(x,c,a):=Uc(c)+E[Up((1+i)(x−c+a⋅R))]u(x,c,a) := U_c(c) + \mathbb{E}[U_p((1+i)(x-c+a\cdot R))]u(x,c,a):=Uc​(c)+E[Up​((1+i)(x−c+a⋅R))], v(x):=sup⁡(c,a)∈D(x)u(x,c,a)v(x) := \sup_{(c,a)\in D(x)} u(x,c,a)v(x):=sup(c,a)∈D(x)​u(x,c,a).

The regime-switching extension (§4.4): an environment process (Yn)(Y_n)(Yn​), a finite-state Markov chain with transition probabilities pjkp_{jk}pjk​, modulates the risky-asset return law: given Yn=jY_n=jYn​=j, the next relative risk Rn+1R_{n+1}Rn+1​ has law QjQ_jQj​, and (Rn+1,Yn+1)(R_{n+1},Y_{n+1})(Rn+1​,Yn+1​) has joint law Qj(dz)pjkQ_j(dz)p_{jk}Qj​(dz)pjk​ given Yn=jY_n=jYn​=j, Yn+1=kY_{n+1}=kYn+1​=k. The augmented state is (x,j)∈[0,∞)×EY(x,j) \in [0,\infty)\times E_Y(x,j)∈[0,∞)×EY​; value functions Jn(x,j)J_n(x,j)Jn​(x,j) are defined analogously, with the recursion incorporating a finite sum over the next regime.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 4.3.3

VN=Up,Vn(x)=sup⁡(c,a)∈Dn(x)[Uc(c)+E Vn+1((1+in+1)(x−c+a⋅Rn+1))],V_N = U_p, \qquad V_n(x) = \sup_{(c,a)\in D_n(x)} \bigl[U_c(c) + \mathbb{E}\,V_{n+1}\bigl((1+ i_{n+1})(x-c+a\cdot R_{n+1})\bigr)\bigr],VN​=Up​,Vn​(x)=(c,a)∈Dn​(x)sup​[Uc​(c)+EVn+1​((1+in+1​)(x−c+a⋅Rn+1​))],

with VnV_nVn​ strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuous, and an optimal strategy realized by per-stage maximizers. This is chunk 04a's Theorem 4.2.2 with consumption added, and every closed-form corollary below specializes it.

Eight milestones: the one-period existence/regularity theorem (Theorem 4.3.1); the zero-mean special case (Theorem 4.3.5); power- and logarithmic-utility closed forms (Theorems 4.3.6, 4.3.7); the regime-switching generalization of the goal itself (Theorem 4.4.1), its power-utility closed form (Theorem 4.4.2), and two comparative-statics results on how the optimal policy moves across regimes under a stochastic order (Theorems 4.4.4, 4.4.5).

Significance

Theorem 4.3.3's consumption-investment structure theorem is the basis for every result about optimal spending and saving under uncertainty; its power/log closed forms (Theorems 4.3.6/4.3.7) recover the classical facts that a power-utility investor consumes and invests constant fractions of current wealth (myopic, wealth-independent policy fractions) while a log-utility investor's optimal consumption fraction, 1/(N−n+1)1/(N-n+1)1/(N−n+1), is the textbook "consume your remaining horizon's worth" rule. The regime-switching extension (§4.4) is the discrete-time analogue of Hamilton's regime-switching models, now standard in empirical finance; Theorems 4.4.4-4.4.5 give a rigorous comparative-statics answer to "does a riskier regime call for more or less stock exposure," using the increasing-concave stochastic order rather than a first- moment heuristic — the mathematically correct notion of "regime kkk's returns dominate regime jjj's for every risk-averse (concave, monotone) preference," not merely "regime kkk has a higher mean."

No result of this chunk was found on the platform (searched "consumption investment", "regime switching", "stochastic order"). The proofs largely mirror chunk 04a's (the book itself says so explicitly for Theorems 4.3.1, 4.3.7, 4.4.2), so this mission's contribution is the precise joint-choice statement of each result and, for the comparative-statics theorems, the correct increasing-concave order (≤_icv, Definition B.3.9c) rather than the plain concave order (≤_cv) chunk 02c already needed for a different theorem — the two are genuinely different relations and must not be conflated.

Difficulty

The naive approach to the goal decouples the consumption and investment choices into two independent optimizations; the book's own proof shows they do separate at the level of the per-stage optimization (Theorem 4.3.6's proof: the transformed problem factors into a consumption fraction ζ\zetaζ and an investment fraction α\alphaα optimized independently once the wealth scale is normalized out), but the admissible sets remain jointly constrained (0≤c≤x0\le c\le x0≤c≤x interacts with the investable amount x−cx-cx−c), so treating them as literally independent unconstrained problems would silently solve an easier, different problem. For the regime-switching comparative statics (Theorem 4.4.5), the natural first attempt tries to prove monotonicity of dn(j)d_n(j)dn​(j) in jjj directly from Qj≤icvQkQ_j\le_{\mathrm{icv}}Q_kQj​≤icv​Qk​ alone; the book's own induction needs both hypotheses simultaneously (the environment chain's own stochastic monotonicity, governing how the regime itself evolves, and the return-distribution order, governing the one-period objective) — Theorem 4.4.4's monotonicity of α∗(j)\alpha^*(j)α∗(j) handles the second factor of the induction's product (Eq. (4.22)) while the chain's stochastic monotonicity handles the first; dropping either hypothesis breaks the induction step.

Formalization scope

The consumption-investment vocabulary (ConsumptionInvestmentMarket, its value function, the one-period sub-problem) mirrors chunk 04a's pure-investment TerminalWealthMarket pattern exactly, extended to a joint (c,a)(c,a)(c,a) action. The regime-switching model (RegimeSwitchingMarket) represents the finite regime set EYE_YEY​ abstractly (a Fintype with a row-stochastic transition matrix p : EY → EY → ℝ, not a PMF/product-measure construction on the joint disturbance): the book's own formula for JnπJ_n^\piJnπ​ is already a finite sum over the next regime of an integral against QjQ_jQj​, so this is the direct, faithful representation and needs no additional measure-theoretic machinery — Jpi/J are built via an accumulator recursing through this finite-sum-of-integrals at each step (the natural generalization of chunk 04a's EFromToAcc pattern to a kernel that depends on an evolving state coordinate, rather than an exogenous process). Theorem 4.4.4/4.4.5 introduce LEIncreasingConcaveOrder (Definition B.3.9c) fresh, since chunk 02c's stochastic-order triple (≤_st/≤_cv/≤_cx) does not include the increasing-concave order this chunk's theorems actually use — reusing one of those three would silently substitute a different hypothesis, exactly the trap the chunk brief warns against. IsStochasticallyMonotoneChain (Definition B.3.13) is likewise restated fresh for a finite chain given by its transition matrix.

No trivializing formalization: D_n(x) is a genuine joint constraint on (c,a) (not two independent unconstrained choices); the six closed-form theorems (4.3.6, 4.3.7, 4.4.2, plus the comparative-statics pair) each state their own explicit recursion for dnd_ndn​ — matching the brief's own note that the index-base convention is not uniform across them (Theorem 4.3.6 gives dNd_NdN​ and recurses backward; Theorem 4.4.2 gives d0(j)d_0(j)d0​(j) and recurses forward) — encoded exactly as each theorem states it, not standardized to one direction.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9
  • J. D. Hamilton, "A new approach to the economic analysis of nonstationary time series and the business cycle", Econometrica, 1989 (the regime-switching framework §4.4 specializes to a portfolio-choice setting).
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

An Analysis of Several Heuristics for the Traveling Salesman Problem III: Nearest and Cheapest Insertion Are Within a Factor of TwoResearch Paper

Motivation

The traveling salesman problem (TSP) asks for a shortest closed route through a finite set of points. It is NP-hard, and in practice tours are built by fast constructive heuristics whose output is then improved or used as is. A central question in the analysis of algorithms, raised in this form by Rosenkrantz, Stearns and Lewis in 1977, is how far such a heuristic can be from optimal in the worst case, as a function of the number of points nnn, when the distances satisfy the triangle inequality.

The paper (SIAM J. Comput. 6(3), 1977) answers this for several heuristics. For the general class of insertion methods it proves a logarithmic bound (Theorem 3); for two specific rules, nearest insertion and cheapest insertion, it proves a bound that does not grow with nnn: the tour is less than twice the optimal (Theorem 4), and more precisely at most 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) times the optimal (Corollary, eq. (4.12)). Theorem 5 of the same paper shows the constant 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) is attained, so this is the exact worst case of both rules. These results, with Christofides' 3/2 bound of 1976, are the classical reference points for approximation ratios of TSP construction heuristics and appear in standard OR and approximation-algorithm texts.

Setting

A traveling salesman graph (N,d)(N,d)(N,d) has a finite node set NNN with ∣N∣=n|N| = n∣N∣=n and a distance d:N×N→Rd : N\times N\to\mathbb Rd:N×N→R that is symmetric, nonnegative and satisfies the triangle inequality d(i,k)≤d(i,j)+d(j,k)d(i,k)\le d(i,j)+d(j,k)d(i,k)≤d(i,j)+d(j,k). A tour is a circuit visiting every node exactly once; its length is the sum of its edge lengths, and OPTIMAL is the least tour length.

A subtour TTT is a tour on a subset of NNN (a one-node subtour has no edges). For k∉Tk\notin Tk∈/T, TOUR(T,k)\mathrm{TOUR}(T,k)TOUR(T,k) inserts kkk into TTT where it is cheapest: if TTT has at least two nodes, choose an edge (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) of TTT minimizing d(x,k)+d(k,y)−d(x,y)d(x,k)+d(k,y)-d(x,y)d(x,k)+d(k,y)−d(x,y) and replace it by (x,k),(k,y)(x,k),(k,y)(x,k),(k,y); if T={i}T=\{i\}T={i}, form the two-node tour on i,ki,ki,k. COST(T,k)\mathrm{COST}(T,k)COST(T,k) is the length of TOUR(T,k)\mathrm{TOUR}(T,k)TOUR(T,k) minus the length of TTT.

An insertion method builds subtours T1,…,TnT_1,\dots,T_nT1​,…,Tn​ with T1={a0}T_1=\{a_0\}T1​={a0​} and Ti+1=TOUR(Ti,ai)T_{i+1}=\mathrm{TOUR}(T_i,a_i)Ti+1​=TOUR(Ti​,ai​) for some ai∉Tia_i\notin T_iai​∈/Ti​, 1≤i<n1\le i<n1≤i<n; INSERT is the length of TnT_nTn​. With d(T,p)=min⁡x∈Td(x,p)d(T,p)=\min_{x\in T}d(x,p)d(T,p)=minx∈T​d(x,p):

  • nearest insertion chooses each aia_iai​ with d(Ti,ai)=min⁡{d(Ti,x):x∈N−Ti}d(T_i,a_i)=\min\{d(T_i,x): x\in N-T_i\}d(Ti​,ai​)=min{d(Ti​,x):x∈N−Ti​};
  • cheapest insertion chooses each aia_iai​ with COST(Ti,ai)=min⁡{COST(Ti,x):x∈N−Ti}\mathrm{COST}(T_i,a_i)=\min\{\mathrm{COST}(T_i,x): x\in N-T_i\}COST(Ti​,ai​)=min{COST(Ti​,x):x∈N−Ti​}.

The start node a0a_0a0​ and every tie (between candidate nodes, and between candidate edges) are arbitrary. TREE denotes the length of a minimal spanning tree of (N,d)(N,d)(N,d).

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary to Theorem 4, eq. (4.12)

For every traveling salesman graph on n≥1n\ge1n≥1 nodes and every run of nearest insertion or of cheapest insertion,

INSERT  ≤  2(1−1n)⋅OPTIMAL.\mathrm{INSERT}\;\le\;2\Bigl(1-\frac1n\Bigr)\cdot\mathrm{OPTIMAL}.INSERT≤2(1−n1​)⋅OPTIMAL.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2, (3.3): COST(T,k)≤2 d(k,j)\mathrm{COST}(T,k)\le 2\,d(k,j)COST(T,k)≤2d(k,j) for k∉Tk\notin Tk∈/T, j∈Tj\in Tj∈T.
  2. Eq. (3.7): for every insertion method, INSERT=∑i=1n−1COST(Ti,ai)\mathrm{INSERT}=\sum_{i=1}^{n-1}\mathrm{COST}(T_i,a_i)INSERT=∑i=1n−1​COST(Ti​,ai​).
  3. Eqs. (4.9)–(4.10): nearest insertion satisfies COST(Ti,ai)≤2 d(p,q)\mathrm{COST}(T_i,a_i)\le 2\,d(p,q)COST(Ti​,ai​)≤2d(p,q) for all p∈Tip\in T_ip∈Ti​, q∉Tiq\notin T_iq∈/Ti​ (4.5).
  4. Proof of Theorem 4: cheapest insertion satisfies (4.5) as well.
  5. Lemma 3: every insertion run satisfying (4.5) has INSERT≤2⋅TREE\mathrm{INSERT}\le 2\cdot\mathrm{TREE}INSERT≤2⋅TREE (4.6).
  6. Eq. (4.11): TREE≤(1−1/n)⋅OPTIMAL\mathrm{TREE}\le(1-1/n)\cdot\mathrm{OPTIMAL}TREE≤(1−1/n)⋅OPTIMAL.

Theorem 4 itself, INSERT<2⋅OPTIMAL\mathrm{INSERT}<2\cdot\mathrm{OPTIMAL}INSERT<2⋅OPTIMAL when ddd is not identically zero, is included as a companion statement.

Significance

The bound says that two simple O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) and O(n2log⁡n)O(n^2\log n)O(n2logn) construction rules are never worse than a factor 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) from optimal on any metric instance, a guarantee independent of nnn, in contrast with nearest neighbor and with arbitrary insertion orders, whose ratios the same paper shows can grow logarithmically. Lemma 3 is reusable on its own: any insertion rule satisfying the local inequality (4.5) inherits the bound 2⋅TREE2\cdot\mathrm{TREE}2⋅TREE, and the paper notes that similar arguments apply to nearest addition and nearest merger.

The result has been proved since 1977. The Prove2Me library has a machine-checked proof of the weaker statement for nearest insertion only with constant 222 (SupplyChainTheory.nearest_insertion_bound, from Snyder–Shen, Theorem 10.7) and of TREE≤OPTIMAL\mathrm{TREE}\le\mathrm{OPTIMAL}TREE≤OPTIMAL (SupplyChainTheory.mst_lower_bound). This mission asks for the paper's full statement: both rules, the exact constant 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n), and the general Lemma 3 via its correspondence between insertion steps and spanning-tree edges. Paired with the tightness result of the companion mission (Theorem 5), it would give a formally verified exact worst-case ratio for both heuristics.

Difficulty

Lemma 2 and inequality (4.5) are local consequences of the triangle inequality; the difficulty is global. The obvious attempt at Lemma 3 charges step iii to the tree edge joining aia_iai​ to its nearest node of TiT_iTi​, but distinct steps can then be charged to the same tree edge, and the sum of the charges no longer bounds 2⋅TREE2\cdot\mathrm{TREE}2⋅TREE. Any correct argument must control how the insertion order interacts with the structure of an arbitrary spanning tree, which in Lean means reasoning about paths in SimpleGraph together with the evolving subtours. For cheapest insertion the chosen node need not be a nearest node, so (4.5) is not immediate from the rule. Finally, the goal's constant 2(1−1/n)2(1-1/n)2(1−1/n) is sharper than the bound 2⋅OPTIMAL2\cdot\mathrm{OPTIMAL}2⋅OPTIMAL obtained from TREE≤OPTIMAL\mathrm{TREE}\le\mathrm{OPTIMAL}TREE≤OPTIMAL, so the weaker spanning-tree bound already in the library does not suffice.

Formalization scope

Nodes are Fin n with n≥1n\ge1n≥1 (the paper's nodes 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n shifted to 0,…,n−10,\dots,n-10,…,n−1). The distance satisfies the paper's three axioms plus the normalization d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0, which never affects a tour, subtour or tree length. Tours are permutations; OPTIMAL is a minimum over all of them (Finset.inf'). Subtours are lists of distinct nodes with closed length. TOUR(T,k)\mathrm{TOUR}(T,k)TOUR(T,k) is encoded as insertion of kkk at a list position whose resulting length is minimal over all ∣T∣+1|T|+1∣T∣+1 positions, which is the minimization of (3.1) over the edges of TTT; COST is the corresponding minimum increase. The subtour index is 1-based as printed (T1={a0}T_1=\{a_0\}T1​={a0​}, TnT_nTn​ final). The distance d(T,p)d(T,p)d(T,p) is taken in R∪{+∞}\mathbb R\cup\{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}, so no default value enters the nearest rule. Spanning trees are SimpleGraph (Fin n) with IsTree; statements about TREE are phrased over every spanning tree (upper bounds) or some spanning tree (bounds on TREE), which is equivalent. Ratios are multiplied out, so the goal needs no nontriviality hypothesis; Theorem 4's strict form carries the paper's exclusion of the identically zero distance (p. 564).

A formalization in which TOUR inserts at an arbitrary rather than a cheapest position, or in which the run fixes the start node or the tie-breaking, would state a different (and, for arbitrary positions, false) theorem; the statements here quantify over every run.

A complete development needs subtour-length lemmas for List.insertIdx, the telescoping identity (3.7), and a spanning-tree edge-assignment argument on Mathlib's SimpleGraph paths; the last two are reusable for other insertion rules and for the companion missions of this series. Proofs of any milestone are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • D. J. Rosenkrantz, R. E. Stearns, P. M. Lewis II, An Analysis of Several Heuristics for the Traveling Salesman Problem, SIAM Journal on Computing 6(3):563–581, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1137/0206041
  • N. Christofides, Worst-Case Analysis of a New Heuristic for the Travelling Salesman Problem, Report 388, GSIA, Carnegie Mellon University, 1976. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43069-021-00101-z (reprint in Operations Research Forum 3, 2022)
  • L. V. Snyder, Z.-J. M. Shen, Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2019, Chapter 10 (Theorem 10.7). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119584445
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Value of Mix Flexibility and Dual Sourcing in Unreliable Newsvendor Networks 1: The Risk-Neutral Flexibility Premium Is Nonnegative for Every ReliabilityResearch Paper

Motivation

A firm that sells several products must decide, before demand is known, how much production capacity to build and of what kind. Dedicated capacity makes one product; flexible capacity makes any of them. The classic argument for flexibility is demand pooling: capacity that can follow demand to whichever product needs it wastes less than capacity locked to one product (Fine and Freund 1990; Van Mieghem 1998).

When capacity itself is unreliable, as with a supplier that may fail to deliver, a plant that may be disrupted, or a batch that may be rejected, flexibility has a second face. A single flexible resource concentrates the firm's supply in one place, so one failure removes all of it, whereas several dedicated resources rarely fail together. This resource-aggregation effect works against flexibility. Tomlin and Wang (2005) set up a newsvendor network in which both effects are present and ask when a firm should pay more for flexible capacity than for dedicated capacity. Their first answer (Proposition 1) is that a risk-neutral firm facing equal reliabilities and costs never loses by choosing flexibility, whatever the joint distribution of demand. This mission formalizes that answer.

Setting

There are NNN products with a common unit contribution margin p>0p>0p>0. The demand vector X~=(X~1,…,X~N)\tilde X=(\tilde X_1,\dots,\tilde X_N)X~=(X~1​,…,X~N​) is random, nonnegative and integrable; its total is X~N+1=X~1+⋯+X~N\tilde X_{N+1}=\tilde X_1+\dots+\tilde X_NX~N+1​=X~1​+⋯+X~N​.

Two networks are compared. In the dedicated network SD, resource n∈{1,…,N}n\in\{1,\dots,N\}n∈{1,…,N} makes only product nnn and has marginal total cost c>0c>0c>0. In the flexible network SF, a single resource, labelled N+1N+1N+1, makes every product and has marginal total cost cN+1c_{N+1}cN+1​.

Every resource jjj is unreliable with a Bernoulli yield Y~j∈{0,1}\tilde Y_j\in\{0,1\}Y~j​∈{0,1}, P(Y~j=1)=θ\mathbb P(\tilde Y_j=1)=\thetaP(Y~j​=1)=θ. The common reliability is θ∈[0,1]\theta\in[0,1]θ∈[0,1], the yields are mutually independent, and they are independent of demand. Investing Kj≥0K_j\ge 0Kj​≥0 in resource jjj delivers capacity Y~jKj\tilde Y_jK_jY~j​Kj​ and costs (λ+(1−λ)Y~j)cjKj(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\tilde Y_j)c_jK_j(λ+(1−λ)Y~j​)cj​Kj​: the firm pays the committed cost λcj\lambda c_jλcj​ per unit ordered and a further (1−λ)cj(1-\lambda)c_j(1−λ)cj​ per unit delivered, with λ∈[0,1]\lambda\in[0,1]λ∈[0,1].

The realized profits are

WSD(K)=∑n=1N(−(λ+(1−λ)Y~n)cKn+pmin⁡{X~n,Y~nKn}),W^{SD}(K)=\sum_{n=1}^N\Big(-(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\tilde Y_n)cK_n+p\min\{\tilde X_n,\tilde Y_nK_n\}\Big),WSD(K)=n=1∑N​(−(λ+(1−λ)Y~n​)cKn​+pmin{X~n​,Y~n​Kn​}), WSF(KN+1)=−(λ+(1−λ)Y~N+1)cN+1KN+1+pmin⁡{X~N+1,Y~N+1KN+1},W^{SF}(K_{N+1})=-(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\tilde Y_{N+1})c_{N+1}K_{N+1}+p\min\{\tilde X_{N+1},\tilde Y_{N+1}K_{N+1}\},WSF(KN+1​)=−(λ+(1−λ)Y~N+1​)cN+1​KN+1​+pmin{X~N+1​,Y~N+1​KN+1​},

and a risk-neutral firm maximizes the expected profit VRNSD(K)=E[WSD(K)]V^{SD}_{RN}(K)=\mathbb E[W^{SD}(K)]VRNSD​(K)=E[WSD(K)] or VRNSF(KN+1)=E[WSF(KN+1)]V^{SF}_{RN}(K_{N+1})=\mathbb E[W^{SF}(K_{N+1})]VRNSF​(KN+1​)=E[WSF(KN+1​)] over nonnegative investments. Let VSD,∗V^{SD,*}VSD,∗ and VSF,∗V^{SF,*}VSF,∗ be the optimal values. SF is (weakly) preferred if VSF,∗≥VSD,∗V^{SF,*}\ge V^{SD,*}VSF,∗≥VSD,∗.

The indifference cost cN+1Ic^I_{N+1}cN+1I​ is a value of cN+1c_{N+1}cN+1​ at which VSF,∗=VSD,∗V^{SF,*}=V^{SD,*}VSF,∗=VSD,∗, and the flexibility premium is Δ=(cN+1I−c)/c\Delta=(c^I_{N+1}-c)/cΔ=(cN+1I​−c)/c. The firm prefers SF as long as cN+1≤(1+Δ)cc_{N+1}\le(1+\Delta)ccN+1​≤(1+Δ)c.

The α\alphaα-expected shortfall of a random variable ZZZ is, for α∈(0,1)\alpha\in(0,1)α∈(0,1) and the lower quantile x(α)=inf⁡{x:P(Z≤x)≥α}x_{(\alpha)}=\inf\{x:\mathbb P(Z\le x)\ge\alpha\}x(α)​=inf{x:P(Z≤x)≥α},

ESα(Z)=−1α(E[Z1{Z≤x(α)}]+x(α)(α−P(Z≤x(α)))).ES_\alpha(Z)=-\frac1\alpha\Big(\mathbb E\big[Z\mathbf 1\{Z\le x_{(\alpha)}\}\big]+x_{(\alpha)}\big(\alpha-\mathbb P(Z\le x_{(\alpha)})\big)\Big).ESα​(Z)=−α1​(E[Z1{Z≤x(α)​}]+x(α)​(α−P(Z≤x(α)​))).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 1

For any demand random vector X~\tilde XX~:

  1. ΔRN≥0\Delta_{RN}\ge 0ΔRN​≥0 for all 0≤θ≤10\le\theta\le 10≤θ≤1, that is, SF is preferred whenever cN+1≤cc_{N+1}\le ccN+1​≤c;
0≤θ≤λcp−(1−λ)c ⟹ ΔRN=0;0\le\theta\le\frac{\lambda c}{p-(1-\lambda)c}\ \Longrightarrow\ \Delta_{RN}=0;0≤θ≤p−(1−λ)cλc​ ⟹ ΔRN​=0;
  1. ΔRN=0\Delta_{RN}=0ΔRN​=0 if ρX=1\rho_X=\mathbf 1ρX​=1, i.e. all pairwise demand correlations equal 111.

No distributional form of demand is fixed and no constant is hard-coded beyond the paper's threshold.

Milestones

  • (9): the closed form of VRNSFV^{SF}_{RN}VRNSF​.
  • (10)–(11), (12)–(13): the optimal investments are critical fractiles
FXN+1(KN+1∗)=1−(λ+(1−λ)θ)cN+1θp,FXn(Kn∗)=1−(λ+(1−λ)θ)cθp,F_{X_{N+1}}(K^*_{N+1})=1-\frac{(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\theta)c_{N+1}}{\theta p},\qquad F_{X_n}(K^*_n)=1-\frac{(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\theta)c}{\theta p},FXN+1​​(KN+1∗​)=1−θp(λ+(1−λ)θ)cN+1​​,FXn​​(Kn∗​)=1−θp(λ+(1−λ)θ)c​,

and the optimal values are θp\theta pθp times partial expectations of demand.

  • (A-1) in expected-shortfall form: with α=1−(λ+(1−λ)θ)c/(θp)∈(0,1)\alpha=1-(\lambda+(1-\lambda)\theta)c/(\theta p)\in(0,1)α=1−(λ+(1−λ)θ)c/(θp)∈(0,1),
VSF,∗≥VSD,∗ at cN+1=c  ⟺  α(∑nESα(X~n)−ESα(∑nX~n))≥0.V^{SF,*}\ge V^{SD,*}\ \text{at}\ c_{N+1}=c\iff \alpha\Big(\sum_n ES_\alpha(\tilde X_n)-ES_\alpha\Big(\sum_n\tilde X_n\Big)\Big)\ge 0 .VSF,∗≥VSD,∗ at cN+1​=c⟺α(n∑​ESα​(X~n​)−ESα​(n∑​X~n​))≥0.
  • Subadditivity of ESαES_\alphaESα​ (Acerbi and Tasche 2002).
  • The positivity threshold of part 2: investing is worthwhile iff θ>λc/(p−(1−λ)c)\theta>\lambda c/(p-(1-\lambda)c)θ>λc/(p−(1−λ)c).
  • Correlation 111 implies X~n=aX~1+b\tilde X_n=a\tilde X_1+bX~n​=aX~1​+b with a>0a>0a>0, and ESα(aX+b)=aESα(X)−bES_\alpha(aX+b)=aES_\alpha(X)-bESα​(aX+b)=aESα​(X)−b.

Significance

Proposition 1 separates the two effects of flexibility under unreliable supply. It shows that for a risk-neutral firm the demand-pooling benefit together with an upside effect of aggregation (one flexible resource succeeds more often than all dedicated ones together) always outweighs the downside aggregation risk. Even with no pooling benefit at all (perfectly correlated demand) the firm is indifferent, not averse. The later results of the paper (loss aversion, CVaR, dual sourcing) are measured against this baseline: a negative premium can appear only once the firm is risk-averse. The expected-shortfall form links newsvendor optimal values to a coherent risk measure, a connection that recurs in inventory risk analysis.

The result is proved in the paper, with a proof that cites Acerbi and Tasche (2002) for two properties of expected shortfall. No machine-checked version exists. A formalization adds three things: a proof for general demand distributions (the paper assumes a joint density and uses the continuous form of expected shortfall); a Lean development of Acerbi–Tasche expected shortfall for general integrable random variables, including subadditivity and affine equivariance; and a reusable model of newsvendor networks with Bernoulli yields and committed costs.

Difficulty

The newsvendor steps (9)–(13) are single-variable concave optimization, but they must be done without a density: the distribution function of total demand may have atoms and flat pieces, so the critical fractile need not be attained or may be attained on an interval, and optimal values must be expressed through lower quantiles. Subadditivity of expected shortfall is the heart of part 1 and is not elementary in the general (atomic) case, which is exactly why the correction term x(α)(α−P(Z≤x(α)))x_{(\alpha)}(\alpha-\mathbb P(Z\le x_{(\alpha)}))x(α)​(α−P(Z≤x(α)​)) appears. Part 3 requires identifying correlation 111 with almost-sure positive affine dependence, which rests on the equality case of the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality in L2L^2L2, and then handling nonnegativity constraints on the investments that the affine change of variables may violate. The obvious shortcut of computing everything from densities is not available, because the goal is stated for every demand vector and part 3 is incompatible with a joint density when N≥2N\ge 2N≥2.

Formalization scope

Randomness lives on one probability space (Ω,μ)(\Omega,\mu)(Ω,μ); demand is X : Ω → Fin N → ℝ and yields are Y : Ω → Fin (N + 1) → ℝ, where dedicated resource nnn is Fin.castSucc n and the flexible resource N+1N+1N+1 is Fin.last N. Expectations are Bochner integrals and probabilities are μ.real. The standing assumptions are: p>0p>0p>0, c>0c>0c>0, λ,θ∈[0,1]\lambda,\theta\in[0,1]λ,θ∈[0,1]; demands measurable, almost surely nonnegative and integrable (integrability is needed for expected shortfall and makes every profit integrable); yields measurable, {0,1}\{0,1\}{0,1}-valued almost surely with P(Y~j=1)=θ\mathbb P(\tilde Y_j=1)=\thetaP(Y~j​=1)=θ, mutually independent, and independent of demand (the paper states the last in Appendix E). The paper's joint density of demand is deliberately not assumed.

The premium Δ\DeltaΔ and the indifference cost are not defined as real numbers, because Definition 1's indifference cost need not exist or be unique (for θ\thetaθ below the threshold both optimal values are 000 for every cN+1c_{N+1}cN+1​ near ccc). "Δ≥0\Delta\ge 0Δ≥0" is encoded as "SF is weakly preferred for every cN+1≤cc_{N+1}\le ccN+1​≤c", and "Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0" as "SF and SD are each weakly preferred to the other at cN+1=cc_{N+1}=ccN+1​=c". Weak preference VSF,∗≥VSD,∗V^{SF,*}\ge V^{SD,*}VSF,∗≥VSD,∗ is stated as: every nonnegative SD investment is matched by some nonnegative SF investment; no real supremum is taken. Quantiles F−1F^{-1}F−1 in (10) and (12) appear only as parameters with the hypothesis F(K∗)=F(K^*)=F(K∗)= fractile. Part 3 adds square integrability and positive variances, the conditions under which correlation coefficients exist; the threshold milestone adds almost surely positive demand and N≥1N\ge 1N≥1 for its "if" direction. When p≤(1−λ)cp\le(1-\lambda)cp≤(1−λ)c the Lean value of the threshold is ≤0\le 0≤0, so part 2 then covers only θ=0\theta=0θ=0, where it is true.

A formalization that assumed a joint density, took Δ\DeltaΔ as a free real satisfying Definition 1, or defined optimal values as real suprema over all of RN\mathbb R^NRN would make parts of the goal vacuous or trivial; each is ruled out above.

Needed infrastructure: single-variable newsvendor optimality for general distributions; the Acerbi–Tasche expected shortfall with subadditivity and affine equivariance; the equality case of Cauchy–Schwarz for correlation. The expected-shortfall and correlation lemmas are reusable well beyond this mission, and contributions of them are especially welcome. Out of scope: the loss-averse and CVaR analyses (Propositions 2–3, §3.2–3.3), the perfect-reliability result (Proposition 4, a separate mission), the dual-sourcing networks (§4) and all numerical results.

Selected references

  • B. Tomlin and Y. Wang, On the value of mix flexibility and dual sourcing in unreliable newsvendor networks, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(1):37–57, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1040.0063
  • C. Acerbi and D. Tasche, On the coherence of expected shortfall, Journal of Banking & Finance 26(7):1487–1503, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00283-2
  • C. H. Fine and R. M. Freund, Optimal investment in product-flexible manufacturing capacity, Management Science 36(4):449–466, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.4.449
  • J. A. Van Mieghem, Investment strategies for flexible resources, Management Science 44(8):1071–1078, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1071
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Markov Decision Processes VI: Multiperiod Terminal Wealth ProblemsTextbook

Motivation

An investor with a fixed planning horizon, an initial fortune, and a personal attitude toward risk (a utility function) wants to allocate wealth between a riskless bond and several risky assets, rebalancing at each of NNN periods, to maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth. This is the oldest and most basic problem of mathematical finance's dynamic-programming tradition, going back to Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969, continuous time). Bäuerle and Rieder's Chapter 4 is where the abstract finite-horizon Markov Decision Process theory built up in Chapter 2 — the Bellman equation, existence of optimal policies under compactness and continuity, propagation of concavity through the value function — is first put to genuine financial work: the multiperiod terminal-wealth problem is shown to be exactly an instance of that general theory, and the reduction pays off immediately in six closed-form solutions for the standard families of utility functions used throughout the literature (power, HARA, logarithmic, exponential).

Setting

An investor with utility function U:dom U→RU : \mathrm{dom}\,U \to \mathbb{R}U:domU→R (Definition 3.4.1: strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuous) and wealth xxx invests in a bond (interest rate in+1i_{n+1}in+1​ on [n,n+1)[n,n+1)[n,n+1)) and ddd risky assets with relative risk Rn+1R_{n+1}Rn+1​ (Chapter 3). The one-period problem: admissible investments D(x):={a∈Rd:(1+i)(x+a⋅R)∈dom U a.s.}D(x) := \{a \in \mathbb{R}^d : (1+i)(x+a\cdot R) \in \mathrm{dom}\,U \text{ a.s.}\}D(x):={a∈Rd:(1+i)(x+a⋅R)∈domU a.s.}, u(x,a):=E[U((1+i)(x+a⋅R))]u(x,a) := \mathbb{E}[U((1+i)(x+a\cdot R))]u(x,a):=E[U((1+i)(x+a⋅R))], v(x):=sup⁡a∈D(x)u(x,a)v(x) := \sup_{a \in D(x)} u(x,a)v(x):=supa∈D(x)​u(x,a). The multiperiod problem is the NNN-stage Markov Decision Model with state space E:=dom UE := \mathrm{dom}\,UE:=domU (wealth), action space Rd\mathbb{R}^dRd, transition Tn(x,a,z)=(1+in+1)(x+a⋅z)T_n(x,a,z) = (1+i_{n+1})(x+a\cdot z)Tn​(x,a,z)=(1+in+1​)(x+a⋅z), zero one-stage reward, terminal reward gN:=Ug_N := UgN​:=U; its value functions are Vn(x):=sup⁡πEn,xπ[U(XN)]V_n(x) := \sup_\pi \mathbb{E}^\pi_{n,x}[U(X_N)]Vn​(x):=supπ​En,xπ​[U(XN​)] over Markov portfolio strategies π\piπ.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 4.2.2

VN=U,Vn(x)=sup⁡a∈Dn(x)E[Vn+1((1+in+1)(x+a⋅Rn+1))],V_N = U, \qquad V_n(x) = \sup_{a \in D_n(x)} \mathbb{E}\bigl[V_{n+1}\bigl((1+i_{n+1})(x+a\cdot R_{n+1})\bigr)\bigr],VN​=U,Vn​(x)=a∈Dn​(x)sup​E[Vn+1​((1+in+1​)(x+a⋅Rn+1​))],

with VnV_nVn​ strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuous, and an optimal portfolio strategy (f0∗,…,fN−1∗)(f_0^*,\dots,f_{N-1}^*)(f0∗​,…,fN−1∗​) realized by maximizers of the recursion. This is the structural result every closed-form solution below specializes.

Eight milestones: the one-period existence/regularity theorem the induction step reduces to (Theorem 4.1.1); the upper bounding function that makes Chapter 2's existence machinery apply (Proposition 4.2.1); the zero-mean special case (Theorem 4.2.4); and four utility-specific closed forms plus the binomial-model comparative-statics lemma (Theorems 4.2.6, 4.2.11, 4.2.13, 4.2.15; Lemma 4.2.9).

Significance

Theorem 4.2.2 is the template for every dynamic portfolio problem in the rest of this book (consumption-investment in Chapter 4 §4.3-4.4, mean-variance and index tracking later in Chapter 4, and the partially-observed and jump-market analogues in Chapters 6 and 9): check a handful of structural conditions on the market data, and the existence, regularity, and recursive computability of the optimal policy follow automatically from Chapter 2's general theory rather than needing a bespoke argument each time. The six closed-form corollaries are the results practitioners actually use: the power/HARA/log/exponential-utility feedback rules are the standard textbook portfolio formulas (the logarithmic case is Kelly betting; the exponential case's wealth-independent optimal amount is the CARA-utility hallmark used throughout insurance and reinsurance mathematics), and Lemma 4.2.9's monotonicity result is the discrete-time analogue of the Merton ratio's dependence on the market's risk premium.

No result of this chunk was found on the platform (searched "terminal wealth", "portfolio optimization", "power utility", "HARA utility"). The proofs are complete in the book and mostly short (each utility-specific theorem reduces to checking the Structure Assumption via a transformation to a fraction-of-wealth variable); this mission's contribution is the precise formal statement of each closed form, with its own explicit recursion for dnd_ndn​, since the six theorems share a structure but genuinely differ in which one-period sub-problem and which scaling variable (xxx, x+bSn0/SN0x+bS^0_n/S^0_Nx+bSn0​/SN0​, or a wealth-independent constant) each uses.

Difficulty

The obvious shortcut for the goal is to prove existence of an optimal policy and its concavity/monotonicity properties by separate, ad hoc arguments at each stage; the actual content of Theorem 4.2.2 is that both reduce, via Theorem 4.1.1, to a single one-period fact applied identically at every stage — the induction step is exactly "if v∈I ⁣Mn+1v \in \mathrm{I\!M}_{n+1}v∈IMn+1​ [strictly increasing/concave/continuous with linear growth], then vvv is a utility function on EEE up to the growth bound, so Theorem 4.1.1 applies directly to TnvT_n vTn​v." Missing this reduction leads to reproving compactness/upper-semicontinuity arguments from Chapter 2 by hand at every stage instead of invoking Theorem 4.1.1 once per stage. For the six closed-form theorems, the shared trap is conflating the different one-period sub-problems: the power- and HARA-utility theorems solve the same sub-problem (4.7) after a wealth-shift transformation, while the exponential-utility theorem's sub-problem (4.13) has a fundamentally different scaling (the optimal amount, not fraction, is wealth-independent) — collapsing these into one "utility-agnostic" statement would hide exactly the distinction the book is making.

Formalization scope

The multiperiod value function V is defined as an explicit supremum over admissible Markov portfolio strategies (not the Bellman recursion itself, and not full history-dependent strategies), following the book's own citation of Theorem 2.2.3 to justify restricting to Markov strategies for this model; this keeps the goal's parts (b)/(c) genuine content rather than restatements of the value function's own definition. The one-period vocabulary (OnePeriodD/OnePeriodU/OnePeriodV, NoArbitrageOnePeriod) is a self-contained restatement matching §4.1's own notation (a single iii, RRR, no time index), independent of chunk 03's full market/portfolio apparatus, since Theorem 4.1.1's own content is exactly this one-period reduction. Proposition 4.2.1's proof cites two facts as already established elsewhere in the book (a concave function is dominated by an affine function; no-arbitrage bounds admissible actions linearly in wealth) — both are taken as explicit hypotheses of the Lean statement rather than re-derived, since re-deriving them is not this proposition's own content. HARA and power utility share one sub-problem definition (Afrac/vPower, Eq. (4.7)); logarithmic and exponential utility each need their own (AfracLog/vLog, vExp, Eqs. (4.11), (4.13)) since their admissibility sets and objective functions genuinely differ (a strict vs. non-strict inequality; a fraction vs. an absolute amount).

No trivializing formalization: each of the six closed-form theorems states its own explicit recursion for dnd_ndn​ (a finite product or sum over k=n,…,N−1k=n,\dots,N-1k=n,…,N−1 of genuinely different per-stage terms) rather than a shared abstract "some sequence dnd_ndn​ exists with Vn=dn⋅(shape)V_n = d_n \cdot (\text{shape})Vn​=dn​⋅(shape)" — the latter would hide exactly which recursion each utility function produces, the actual content the brief for this chunk flags as the point of having six near-identical theorems rather than one parametrized statement. Optimal strategies are stated in their exact feedback form (fn∗(x)=αn∗xf_n^*(x) = \alpha_n^* xfn∗​(x)=αn∗​x, or the HARA-specific affine shift, or the wealth-independent exponential-utility amount), not merely asserted to exist.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9
  • R. C. Merton, "Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: the continuous-time case", Review of Economics and Statistics, 1969 (the continuous-time analogue this discrete-time theory approximates, per Chapter 3's binomial-to-Black-Scholes convergence result).
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Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis II: Local Optimality for Integrally Convex FunctionsTextbook

Motivation

For a convex function on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, a point is a global minimizer as soon as it is a local minimizer — this is one of the earliest and most consequential facts of convex analysis, and it underlies why local-search and gradient methods can certify global optimality in convex programs. The discrete analogue is not automatic: a function on the integer lattice Zn\mathbb Z^nZn can be "locally optimal" with respect to any fixed finite neighborhood system and still fail to be a global minimizer, unless the function's discrete structure is compatible with that neighborhood in the right way. Identifying exactly which classes of lattice functions admit a local-to-global optimality principle, and with respect to which neighborhood, is one of the organizing questions of discrete convex analysis.

Integrally convex functions, introduced by Favati and Tardella (1990) and developed systematically by Murota, are the most general class of Zn\mathbb Z^nZn-valued functions for which such a principle holds. They are defined purely in terms of the classical convex closure of a real relaxation, which lets one import theorems from ordinary convex analysis, but the resulting notion of local optimality — checking only the 3n−13^n - 13n−1 neighbors obtained by independently nudging each coordinate by −1-1−1, 000, or +1+1+1 (excluding the trivial no-change case) — is a genuinely discrete, dimension-independent statement about functions whose domain can be arbitrarily large. Almost every discrete convex function class studied later in the book, including M-convex and L-convex functions, is a special case of integral convexity, and this mission's goal theorem is the direct ancestor of the optimality criteria (Theorems 6.26 and 7.14) that drive the algorithms in the rest of the book.

Setting

Let f:Zn→R∪{+∞}f : \mathbb Z^n \to \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}f:Zn→R∪{+∞} be a function with nonempty effective domain dom⁡Zf={x∈Zn:f(x)≠+∞}\operatorname{dom}_{\mathbb Z} f = \{x \in \mathbb Z^n : f(x) \ne +\infty\}domZ​f={x∈Zn:f(x)=+∞}. The convex closure of fff is

fˉ(x)=sup⁡p∈Rn, α∈R{⟨p,x⟩+α:⟨p,y⟩+α≤f(y) ∀y∈Zn}(x∈Rn),\bar f(x) = \sup_{p \in \mathbb R^n,\, \alpha \in \mathbb R} \{\langle p,x\rangle + \alpha : \langle p,y\rangle + \alpha \le f(y)\ \forall y \in \mathbb Z^n\} \qquad (x \in \mathbb R^n),fˉ​(x)=p∈Rn,α∈Rsup​{⟨p,x⟩+α:⟨p,y⟩+α≤f(y) ∀y∈Zn}(x∈Rn),

the pointwise supremum of every affine function minorizing fff on all of Zn\mathbb Z^nZn. If fˉ\bar ffˉ​ agrees with fff on integer points, fff is convex extensible. The integral neighborhood of x∈Rnx \in \mathbb R^nx∈Rn is

N(x)={y∈Zn:⌊xi⌋≤yi≤⌈xi⌉, 1≤i≤n},N(x) = \{y \in \mathbb Z^n : \lfloor x_i \rfloor \le y_i \le \lceil x_i \rceil,\ 1 \le i \le n\},N(x)={y∈Zn:⌊xi​⌋≤yi​≤⌈xi​⌉, 1≤i≤n},

and the local convex extension f~\tilde ff~​ relaxes fˉ\bar ffˉ​'s definition by requiring the affine minorant condition only on N(x)N(x)N(x) rather than on all of Zn\mathbb Z^nZn. Always f~≥fˉ\tilde f \ge \bar ff~​≥fˉ​ pointwise, and the two agree on Zn\mathbb Z^nZn. A function fff is integrally convex if f~=fˉ\tilde f = \bar ff~​=fˉ​ everywhere on Rn\mathbb R^nRn — equivalently, if f~\tilde ff~​ is a convex function on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn (it is automatically convex on every unit cube [z,z+1]n[z, z+1]^n[z,z+1]n with z∈Znz \in \mathbb Z^nz∈Zn, but need not be convex globally without this extra condition).

A discrete set S⊆ZnS \subseteq \mathbb Z^nS⊆Zn is hole free if SSS equals the set of integer points in its own real convex hull, and arg⁡min⁡f[−p]\arg\min f[-p]argminf[−p] denotes the minimizer set, over Zn\mathbb Z^nZn, of the linearly perturbed function f[−p](x)=f(x)−⟨p,x⟩f[-p](x) = f(x) - \langle p,x\ranglef[−p](x)=f(x)−⟨p,x⟩.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.21 (local optimality characterizes global optimality)

For integrally convex fff and x∈dom⁡Zfx \in \operatorname{dom}_{\mathbb Z} fx∈domZ​f:

f(x)≤f(y) (∀y∈Zn)  ⟺  f(x)≤f(x+χY−χZ) (∀ Y,Z⊆{1,…,n}),f(x) \le f(y)\ (\forall y \in \mathbb Z^n) \iff f(x) \le f(x + \chi_Y - \chi_Z)\ (\forall\, Y, Z \subseteq \{1,\dots,n\}),f(x)≤f(y) (∀y∈Zn)⟺f(x)≤f(x+χY​−χZ​) (∀Y,Z⊆{1,…,n}),

where χY∈{0,1}n\chi_Y \in \{0,1\}^nχY​∈{0,1}n is the indicator vector of YYY. The right-hand side is a check over at most 3n−13^n - 13n−1 points (each coordinate independently unchanged, incremented, or decremented), regardless of how large dom⁡Zf\operatorname{dom}_{\mathbb Z} fdomZ​f is; this uniform, dimension-only bound is the entire content of the theorem, and is the weakest correct formulation — restricting to a single (Y,Z)(Y,Z)(Y,Z) or letting the right-hand side range over all of Zn\mathbb Z^nZn would trivialize or falsify the equivalence.

Milestones: Propositions 3.18 and 3.19

Proposition 3.18: fff convex extensible   ⟹  \implies⟹ arg⁡min⁡f[−p]\arg\min f[-p]argminf[−p] hole free for every ppp (and conversely, when dom⁡Zf\operatorname{dom}_{\mathbb Z} fdomZ​f is bounded). Proposition 3.19: fff is integrally convex if and only if every restriction f[a,b]f_{[a,b]}f[a,b]​ to a finite integer interval is integrally convex — integral convexity is detectable by looking at bounded pieces of fff one at a time.

Significance

The result itself. Theorem 3.21 is what makes integrally convex functions tractable: without it, verifying global optimality on an infinite or exponentially large integer domain would require checking every point. The theorem reduces this to a check whose size depends only on the dimension nnn, not on the size of the domain, and it does so for the widest class of lattice functions for which such a reduction is possible — the class is defined precisely so that this property holds and no wider natural class enjoys it. Every specialized local-optimality theorem later in the book (for M-convex, M♮^\natural♮-convex, L-convex, and L♮^\natural♮-convex functions) restricts this same neighborhood-checking principle to a class where the local check can be made even smaller (a single-element exchange rather than a full sign pattern) precisely because those classes are integrally convex plus more.

Formalizing it. No matching item exists on the platform: a direct search for "integrally convex" returns no results, and the theorem's own proof leans on results (Theorem 1.1's local-to-global principle for ordinary convex functions on Rn\mathbb R^nRn, and an LP-duality-based alternate formula for f~\tilde ff~​) that are either classical convex analysis or belong to a different chapter of this same book. The remaining work is therefore to give a complete, correct account of the definitional chain — convex closure, local convex extension, integral convexity — in a form a solver can build a proof from directly, and to state the finite local-check equivalence itself exactly at the strength the book proves it, not a plausible-looking weakening of it.

Difficulty

The natural first attempt is to try to prove the "⇐\Leftarrow⇐" direction of Theorem 3.21 by a direct induction on the ℓ1\ell^1ℓ1-distance to a global minimizer, moving one coordinate at a time. This fails in general lattice functions (a function that is only "coordinatewise convex" can have strict local minima that are not global), and the theorem's actual proof instead routes through the real relaxation: it shows the neighborhood-check hypothesis forces xxx to be a local minimizer of the local convex extension f~\tilde ff~​ restricted to the unit ball around xxx, then invokes ordinary convex analysis (local minimality implies global minimality for a convex function on Rn\mathbb R^nRn) to conclude xxx globally minimizes fˉ\bar ffˉ​, and finally uses integral convexity (f~=fˉ\tilde f = \bar ff~​=fˉ​) to transfer this back to fff on Zn\mathbb Z^nZn. The identification of fff's local behavior with f~\tilde ff~​'s convexity on a single unit cube — rather than any coordinatewise or separable argument — is the step that makes the class of integrally convex functions exactly the right one for this theorem, and is where a naive combinatorial argument breaks down.

Formalization scope

The ground set is Zn\mathbb Z^nZn, represented as Fin n → ℤ; fff's codomain is WithTop ℝ (exactly R∪{+∞}\mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}R∪{+∞}), while the convex closure fˉ\bar ffˉ​ and local convex extension f~\tilde ff~​ take values in EReal (exactly R∪{±∞}\mathbb R \cup \{\pm\infty\}R∪{±∞}, a complete lattice, so their defining suprema are total functions with no side conditions). A trivializing formalization of the goal would quantify the right-hand side over a single fixed (Y,Z)(Y,Z)(Y,Z) pair, or over all of Zn\mathbb Z^nZn instead of the sign-pattern neighbors; both are excluded by keeping Y,ZY, ZY,Z universally quantified Finset (Fin n) ranging over the full 3n3^n3n sign-pattern space (minus the trivial case, which the equivalence still holds through vacuously).

Checked against the platform (GET /theorems?q=integrally convex, 0 hits) and against Mathlib's Analysis/Convex/ for the classical facts this chapter's proof would eventually need (ordinary convex-function local-to-global optimality, LP duality): these are broadly available in Mathlib's convex-analysis library in some form, but none of them is imported here, since none appears in the statement of any item this mission drafts — they belong to a proof this pass does not attempt. Contributions to a shared DiscreteConvex.IntegralConvexity definitions layer are welcome from chunks 06–09, which specialize integral convexity to M-convex and L-convex functions and will need the same convex-closure/local-extension vocabulary.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003. DOI: 10.1137/1.9780898718508.
  • P. Favati, F. Tardella, "Convexity in nonlinear integer programming," Ricerca Operativa, 53, 1990, pp. 3–44.
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

An Interactive Weighted Tchebycheff Procedure for Multiple Objective Programming II: The Lexicographic Weighted Tchebycheff Program Characterizes the Nondominated SetResearch Paper

Motivation

A multiple objective program asks to maximize kkk objectives f1(x),…,fk(x)f_1(x),\dots,f_k(x)f1​(x),…,fk​(x) simultaneously over a feasible set SSS. There is usually no point that is best in every objective, so the object of interest is the set of nondominated criterion vectors: those that cannot be improved in one objective without being worsened in another. Interactive procedures for multiple criteria decision making work by computing nondominated vectors one at a time, by solving a single-objective scalarization, and presenting them to a decision maker.

A scalarization is useful for this purpose only if it is complete (every nondominated vector is the solution of some instance of it) and sound (every solution is nondominated). The weighted-sum scalarization is sound for positive weights but not complete when the feasible region is nonconvex. R. E. Steuer and E.-U. Choo (Math. Programming 26 (1983) 326–344) built their interactive procedure on weighted Tchebycheff distances to an ideal point, following Bowman (1976) and Choo and Atkins (1983). In §3 they treat finite feasible regions with an augmented metric, which requires choosing a small parameter ρ>0\rho>0ρ>0. In §4 (pp. 334–336) they show that a lexicographic version of the weighted Tchebycheff program is complete and sound for any feasible region, including nonconvex continuous ones, with no parameter to estimate. This mission formalizes that result, Theorems 4.5 and 4.6.

Setting

Let Z⊆RkZ\subseteq\mathbb R^kZ⊆Rk, k≥1k\ge1k≥1, be the set of feasible criterion vectors (the image of SSS under f=(f1,…,fk)f=(f_1,\dots,f_k)f=(f1​,…,fk​)). A vector zzz dominates zˉ\bar zzˉ if zi≥zˉiz_i\ge\bar z_izi​≥zˉi​ for all iii and zi>zˉiz_i>\bar z_izi​>zˉi​ for at least one iii. The nondominated set N⊆ZN\subseteq ZN⊆Z consists of the zˉ∈Z\bar z\in Zzˉ∈Z dominated by no z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z.

An ideal criterion vector is a z∗∈Rkz^*\in\mathbb R^kz∗∈Rk with

zi∗=max⁡{zi∣z∈Z}+εi,z^*_i=\max\{z_i\mid z\in Z\}+\varepsilon_i,zi∗​=max{zi​∣z∈Z}+εi​,

where εi≥0\varepsilon_i\ge0εi​≥0, and εi>0\varepsilon_i>0εi​>0 is required whenever (i) more than one nondominated vector maximizes objective iii, or (ii) the only nondominated vector maximizing objective iii also maximizes another objective. So z∗z^*z∗ may touch ZZZ in coordinate iii only in a controlled way.

The weight set is the simplex Λˉ={λ∈Rk∣λi≥0, ∑iλi=1}\bar\Lambda=\{\lambda\in\mathbb R^k\mid\lambda_i\ge0,\ \sum_i\lambda_i=1\}Λˉ={λ∈Rk∣λi​≥0, ∑i​λi​=1}. For λ∈Λˉ\lambda\in\bar\Lambdaλ∈Λˉ the weighted Tchebycheff program minimizes α\alphaα subject to α≥λi(zi∗−zi)\alpha\ge\lambda_i(z^*_i-z_i)α≥λi​(zi∗​−zi​) for all iii and z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z; its value at a fixed zzz is

tλ(z)=max⁡1≤i≤kλi(zi∗−zi).t_\lambda(z)=\max_{1\le i\le k}\lambda_i(z^*_i-z_i).tλ​(z)=1≤i≤kmax​λi​(zi∗​−zi​).

The lexicographic weighted Tchebycheff program first minimizes tλt_\lambdatλ​ over ZZZ and then, among the first-stage minimizers, minimizes eT(z∗−z)=∑i(zi∗−zi)e^{\mathsf T}(z^*-z)=\sum_i(z^*_i-z_i)eT(z∗−z)=∑i​(zi∗​−zi​). The paper writes it as min⁡{P1α+P2eT(z∗−z)}\min\{P_1\alpha+P_2e^{\mathsf T}(z^*-z)\}min{P1​α+P2​eT(z∗−z)} with pre-emptive priority factors. Finally, for zˉ∈Rk\bar z\in\mathbb R^kzˉ∈Rk the weights λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ of eq. (4.3) are λˉi∝1/(zi∗−zˉi)\bar\lambda_i\propto1/(z^*_i-\bar z_i)λˉi​∝1/(zi∗​−zˉi​), normalized to sum to one, when zˉj≠zj∗\bar z_j\ne z^*_jzˉj​=zj∗​ for all jjj. When some zˉj=zj∗\bar z_j=z^*_jzˉj​=zj∗​, λˉi\bar\lambda_iλˉi​ is 111 on the coordinates with zˉi=zi∗\bar z_i=z^*_izˉi​=zi∗​ and 000 elsewhere.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.6 (p. 336)

For compact ZZZ, an ideal vector z∗z^*z∗ and zˉ∈Z\bar z\in Zzˉ∈Z,

zˉ∈N  ⟺  ∃ λ∈Λˉ such that zˉ minimizes the lexicographic weighted Tchebycheff program with weights λ.\bar z\in N\iff\exists\,\lambda\in\bar\Lambda\ \text{such that}\ \bar z\ \text{minimizes the lexicographic weighted Tchebycheff program with weights }\lambda .zˉ∈N⟺∃λ∈Λˉ such that zˉ minimizes the lexicographic weighted Tchebycheff program with weights λ.

Milestones

  1. Proof of Theorem 4.5 (pp. 335–336). For zˉ∈N\bar z\in Nzˉ∈N, λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ as in (4.3) and α^\hat\alphaα^ the minimal first-stage value,
zˉ∈Φ(α^),N∩Φ(α^)={zˉ},Φ(α^)={z∣zi≥zi∗−α^/λˉi when λˉi>0}.\bar z\in\Phi(\hat\alpha),\qquad N\cap\Phi(\hat\alpha)=\{\bar z\},\qquad \Phi(\hat\alpha)=\{z\mid z_i\ge z^*_i-\hat\alpha/\bar\lambda_i\ \text{when}\ \bar\lambda_i>0\}.zˉ∈Φ(α^),N∩Φ(α^)={zˉ},Φ(α^)={z∣zi​≥zi∗​−α^/λˉi​ when λˉi​>0}.
  1. Theorem 4.5 (p. 335). For zˉ∈N\bar z\in Nzˉ∈N: λˉ∈Λˉ\bar\lambda\in\bar\Lambdaλˉ∈Λˉ, and zˉ\bar zzˉ is the unique minimizer of the lexicographic program with weights λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ.
  2. Remark after Theorem 4.6 (p. 336). For every λ∈Λˉ\lambda\in\bar\Lambdaλ∈Λˉ the lexicographic program has a minimizer when ZZZ is compact and nonempty, and every minimizer is nondominated.

The goal is the characterization; Theorem 4.5 is the stronger half with uniqueness and an explicit weight.

Significance

Theorem 4.6 says that, as λ\lambdaλ ranges over the simplex, the lexicographic weighted Tchebycheff program returns exactly the nondominated set, for any feasible region: no convexity, no finiteness, no polyhedral structure. Theorem 4.5 adds that each nondominated vector is the unique output for a weight vector computable from the vector itself, which is what an interactive procedure needs to sample NNN reliably. The price, as the paper notes, is two optimization stages instead of one; the gain is that no augmentation parameter ρ\rhoρ must be estimated. The result is a standard entry in the textbook treatment of Tchebycheff scalarizations (Steuer, Multiple Criteria Optimization, 1986; Ehrgott, Multicriteria Optimization, 2005).

The result is proved on paper. To our knowledge no machine-checked version exists in Lean or Mathlib, which has no material on Tchebycheff scalarization of multiple objective programs. The formal statements below also pin down two points the printed text leaves loose: the direction of the priority factors, and a closedness assumption that the proof uses without stating it.

Difficulty

The ⇐ direction and the soundness remark are short: a dominating vector is at least as good in the first stage and strictly better in the second. The work is in Theorem 4.5. The obvious argument is that zˉ\bar zzˉ is the unique minimizer of the first stage with weights λˉ\bar\lambdaλˉ; the paper says so. That is true when zˉ<z∗\bar z<z^*zˉ<z∗ in every coordinate, but false when zˉj=zj∗\bar z_j=z^*_jzˉj​=zj∗​ for some jjj: then λˉ=ej\bar\lambda=e_jλˉ=ej​, and every z∈Zz\in Zz∈Z with zj=zj∗z_j=z^*_jzj​=zj∗​ ties with zˉ\bar zzˉ, dominated vectors included. For example, with Z={(5,3),(5,1),(1,10)}Z=\{(5,3),(5,1),(1,10)\}Z={(5,3),(5,1),(1,10)} and z∗=(5,10)z^*=(5,10)z∗=(5,10), the vectors (5,3)(5,3)(5,3) and (5,1)(5,1)(5,1) tie. Only the second stage separates them. Showing that it always selects zˉ\bar zzˉ requires every tied vector to lie below a nondominated vector attaining zj∗z^*_jzj∗​, which by the ideal-vector rule must be zˉ\bar zzˉ. That existence step fails for sets that are not closed.

Formalization scope

Criterion vectors are Fin k → ℝ with [NeZero k] (k≥1k\ge1k≥1); objectives are indexed from 000. SSS, the objectives fif_ifi​ and the program's variable α\alphaα are eliminated: ZZZ is a Set (Fin k → ℝ) and the first-stage value is tλ(z)t_\lambda(z)tλ​(z) above (the paper's metric uses ∣zi∗−zi∣|z^*_i-z_i|∣zi∗​−zi​∣, which agrees with zi∗−ziz^*_i-z_izi∗​−zi​ on ZZZ). Λˉ\bar\LambdaΛˉ is Mathlib's stdSimplex ℝ (Fin k). "Minimizes" is global minimization over ZZZ; "uniquely minimizes" means every lexicographic minimizer equals zˉ\bar zzˉ as a criterion vector.

Conventions and added hypotheses:

  • The lexicographic program is encoded as the two-stage minimization IsLexMin. The printed "P1<<<P2P_1<<<P_2P1​<<<P2​" read literally gives the second stage priority; the paper's text on p. 336 and the goal-programming convention it cites give α\alphaα priority. The two-stage reading is encoded, and the program is not replaced by a weighted sum P1α+P2eT(z∗−z)P_1\alpha+P_2e^{\mathsf T}(z^*-z)P1​α+P2​eT(z∗−z) with fixed numbers, which would be the augmented program of §3.
  • ZZZ compact is an added hypothesis in Theorem 4.5, in the goal, and in the existence half of milestone 3. The paper assumes only that SSS is bounded, and its "max" in the ideal vector presupposes attainment. Without closedness the weight (4.3) can fail: for Z={(5,3,0),(0,10,0),(0,0,6)}∪{(5,0,4+t):0≤t<1}Z=\{(5,3,0),(0,10,0),(0,0,6)\}\cup\{(5,0,4+t):0\le t<1\}Z={(5,3,0),(0,10,0),(0,0,6)}∪{(5,0,4+t):0≤t<1}, z∗=(5,10,6)z^*=(5,10,6)z∗=(5,10,6) and zˉ=(5,3,0)∈N\bar z=(5,3,0)\in Nzˉ=(5,3,0)∈N, the program with λˉ=(1,0,0)\bar\lambda=(1,0,0)λˉ=(1,0,0) has no lexicographic minimizer. Closedness is needed by the theorem itself, not only by this proof: adding the points (5−s2, 3+s, 0)(5-s^2,\,3+s,\,0)(5−s2,3+s,0), 0<s≤10<s\le10<s≤1, to that ZZZ (still bounded, ε=0\varepsilon=0ε=0 still admissible) leaves zˉ=(5,3,0)∈N\bar z=(5,3,0)\in Nzˉ=(5,3,0)∈N a lexicographic minimizer for no λ∈Λˉ\lambda\in\bar\Lambdaλ∈Λˉ, so Theorems 4.5 and 4.6 are false for a bounded, non-closed ZZZ. The ⇐ direction, soundness and milestone 1 hold without compactness and are stated without it.
  • The ideal vector keeps the paper's ε\varepsilonε-rule exactly. Replacing it with a strictly dominating z∗z^*z∗ (ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 in every coordinate) would remove the case zˉj=zj∗\bar z_j=z^*_jzˉj​=zj∗​ and weaken both theorems; such a formalization does not count.
  • In (4.3) and in Φ\PhiΦ, division occurs only where the denominator is nonzero. That λˉ∈Λˉ\bar\lambda\in\bar\Lambdaλˉ∈Λˉ for zˉ∈N\bar z\in Nzˉ∈N is part of Theorem 4.5's conclusion, not an assumption.
  • The paper's sentence "the associated weighted Tchebycheff program has a unique solution" (p. 336) is not formalized, since it fails in the tie described above.

Infrastructure needed: dominance and nondominated sets, the ideal vector, the weighted Tchebycheff value, the weights (4.3), and the lexicographic minimizer, all provided as definitions. Proofs will need existence of minimizers of continuous functions on compact sets and a maximal-element argument in the product order on a compact set. Both are reusable for other multiobjective results. Proofs of any item, and faithful statements of Corollaries 4.1 and 4.4 (polyhedral SSS), are welcome.

Selected references

  • R. E. Steuer and E.-U. Choo, An interactive weighted Tchebycheff procedure for multiple objective programming, Mathematical Programming 26 (1983) 326–344. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02591870
  • V. J. Bowman, On the relationship of the Tchebycheff norm and the efficient frontier of multiple-criteria objectives, in: Multiple Criteria Decision Making (Jouy-en-Josas 1975), Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 130, Springer, 1976, 76–86. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-87563-2_5
  • E.-U. Choo and D. R. Atkins, Proper efficiency in nonconvex multicriteria programming, Mathematics of Operations Research 8 (1983) 467–470. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.3.467
  • A. M. Geoffrion, Proper efficiency and the theory of vector maximization, Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 22 (1968) 618–630. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-247X(68)90201-1
  • M. Ehrgott, Multicriteria Optimization, 2nd ed., Springer, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27659-9
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Markov Decision Processes V: No-Arbitrage in Discrete-Time Financial MarketsTextbook

Motivation

Every financial application in the rest of this book — terminal wealth maximization, portfolio choice with consumption, index tracking, hedging — takes as given that the underlying market admits no risk-free profit: an arbitrage opportunity. Ruling this out is not a modeling nicety but a structural necessity, since a market with arbitrage has no sensible notion of a fair price at all. Bäuerle and Rieder's Chapter 3 fixes the discrete- and continuous-time market vocabulary the rest of the book builds on, and proves the one structural fact about no-arbitrage that the later chapters actually invoke: that the whole-horizon, global absence of arbitrage is equivalent to a much simpler one-period condition, checked separately at each stage. This reduction — not the deeper fundamental theorem of asset pricing (existence of an equivalent martingale measure), which the book does not prove in this section — is what turns a statement about strategies over the whole time horizon into something checkable stage by stage, exactly the form needed to embed a no-arbitrage assumption into a dynamic-programming argument.

Setting

An NNN-period financial market with ddd risky assets consists of a probability space (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal{F},\mathbb{P})(Ω,F,P) with filtration (Fn)n=0N(\mathcal{F}_n)_{n=0}^N(Fn​)n=0N​, F0\mathcal{F}_0F0​ trivial; a riskless bond with deterministic interest rate ini_nin​ on [n−1,n)[n-1,n)[n−1,n) (so Sn0=Sn−10(1+in)S^0_n = S^0_{n-1}(1+i_n)Sn0​=Sn−10​(1+in​)); and ddd risky assets with relative price changes R~n=(R~n1,…,R~nd)\tilde R_n = (\tilde R^1_n,\dots,\tilde R^d_n)R~n​=(R~n1​,…,R~nd​), Fn\mathcal{F}_nFn​-measurable and a.s. strictly positive (Snk=Sn−1kR~nkS^k_n = S^k_{n-1}\tilde R^k_nSnk​=Sn−1k​R~nk​). A portfolio (trading strategy) is an (Fn)(\mathcal{F}_n)(Fn​)-adapted process φ=(φn0,φn)\varphi = (\varphi^0_n,\varphi_n)φ=(φn0​,φn​), φn0∈R\varphi^0_n \in \mathbb{R}φn0​∈R, φn∈Rd\varphi_n \in \mathbb{R}^dφn​∈Rd; φnk\varphi^k_nφnk​ is the money invested in asset kkk on [n,n+1)[n,n+1)[n,n+1). Its value before/after trading at time nnn is Xn−:=φn−10(1+in)+φn−1⋅R~nX_n^- := \varphi^0_{n-1}(1+i_n) + \varphi_{n-1}\cdot\tilde R_nXn−​:=φn−10​(1+in​)+φn−1​⋅R~n​, Xn+:=φn0+φn⋅eX_n^+ := \varphi^0_n + \varphi_n\cdot eXn+​:=φn0​+φn​⋅e; φ\varphiφ is self-financing if Xn−=Xn+X_n^- = X_n^+Xn−​=Xn+​ a.s. for every interior nnn. An arbitrage opportunity is a self-financing φ\varphiφ with X0φ=0X_0^\varphi = 0X0φ​=0, XNφ≥0X_N^\varphi \geq 0XNφ​≥0 a.s., XNφ>0X_N^\varphi > 0XNφ​>0 with positive probability. The relative risk process Rnk:=R~nk/(1+in)−1R_n^k := \tilde R_n^k/(1+i_n) - 1Rnk​:=R~nk​/(1+in​)−1 is the excess return of asset kkk over the riskless rate.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 3.1.5

No arbitrage  ⟺  ∀ n<N, ∀ Fn-measurable φn∈Rd:φn⋅Rn+1≥0 a.s.  ⟹  φn⋅Rn+1=0 a.s.\text{No arbitrage} \iff \forall\, n < N,\ \forall\, \mathcal{F}_n\text{-measurable } \varphi_n \in \mathbb{R}^d: \quad \varphi_n \cdot R_{n+1} \geq 0 \text{ a.s.} \implies \varphi_n \cdot R_{n+1} = 0 \text{ a.s.}No arbitrage⟺∀n<N, ∀Fn​-measurable φn​∈Rd:φn​⋅Rn+1​≥0 a.s.⟹φn​⋅Rn+1​=0 a.s.

This is the weakest stable statement that captures the reduction: it asserts the equivalence of the global, whole-horizon absence of arbitrage strategies with a one-period static condition on the relative risk vector, without asserting the stronger (and here unproved) existence of a martingale measure.

No further milestone is formalized in this mission: this chapter's only other theorem, Theorem 3.3.1 (binomial-tree weak convergence to Black-Scholes), needs the Skorokhod topology on the space of càdlàg paths, absent from Mathlib and out of scope to construct here — see the Formalization scope section and HARD.md.

Significance

Theorem 3.1.5 is the tool that lets every later chapter's "assume the market has no arbitrage" hypothesis be checked and used one period at a time rather than as a global existential statement over an intractably large space of strategies. It is also the precise, minimal claim this section proves: contrasted with the full fundamental theorem of asset pricing (no arbitrage   ⟺  \iff⟺ existence of an equivalent martingale measure, due to Harrison–Kreps 1979 and Dalang–Morton–Willinger 1990 in this discrete-time generality), Theorem 3.1.5 is a strictly weaker, purely measure-theoretic reduction that requires no separating-hyperplane or martingale-measure construction to state (only to prove). The definitions this chunk formalizes alongside it — portfolios, self-financing, arbitrage, and utility functions with the Arrow-Pratt risk-aversion coefficient — are the vocabulary every financial mission of this book (Chapters 4, 6, 9, 11) is built from.

Formalizing it contributes the exact discrete-time, filtration-indexed statement of the reduction — a result absent from the platform (searched "arbitrage", "self-financing", "martingale measure", "utility function"; the one related hit, LinearOptimization.no_arbitrage_iff_state_prices, is a static single-period linear-programming duality statement — no-arbitrage iff nonnegative state prices exist for a fixed return matrix — a different equivalence for a different, non-stochastic model, not reused here).

Difficulty

The direction "local no-free-lunch at every stage ⇒\Rightarrow⇒ no arbitrage" is the easy one: an arbitrage strategy, unwound via the recursive wealth formula, forces a violation of the local condition at some stage by a stopping-time argument on the first period where the wealth increment is a.s. nonnegative and not a.s. zero. The converse, "an arbitrage opportunity forces the local condition to fail somewhere," is the direction that needs the reduction of the whole-horizon problem to a single period: the natural first attempt (induct forward from n=0n=0n=0) does not directly work, because whether a strategy is an arbitrage is a statement about the terminal wealth XNX_NXN​, and a violation at an early stage does not obviously propagate; the book's proof instead identifies, from an arbitrage strategy, the last stage at which the one-period condition fails and constructs a genuinely one-period arbitrage there — an argument that needs care with the a.s.-qualifiers at every step (the difference between "X≥0X \geq 0X≥0 a.s." failing to imply "X<0X < 0X<0 with positive probability" only up to null sets is exactly where the measure-theoretic bookkeeping matters).

Formalization scope

The market is represented via DiscreteFinancialMarket, bundling the probability space, filtration, and the two primitives (iii, R~\tilde RR~) actually used; price processes S0,SkS^0, S^kS0,Sk are not separately represented, since they would only be running products of these two primitives with no further role once the relative risk process RRR is derived. Filtration is represented directly as a monotone family of sub-σ\sigmaσ-algebras with a trivial Fam 0, not via Mathlib's Filtration structure, to avoid instance-juggling that would add no content here. Adaptedness/predictability and the a.s. conditions of every definition are exactly the book's own. Definitions 3.2.1-3.2.2 (the continuous-time portfolio and its self-financing condition, needed by chunk 09b's jump-market model) use an abstract StochasticIntegral operator taken as given data, since Mathlib has no general theory of integration against an arbitrary càdlàg semimartingale (only specific constructions such as Itô integration against Brownian motion); this is a deliberate infrastructure gap flagged for whoever eventually needs to instantiate it, not a hidden simplification of the definition's own content, which states the self-financing equation exactly as the book writes it.

Theorem 3.3.1 is not formalized in this mission and is recorded in HARD.md. The theorem asserts weak convergence of the whole path of the binomial-tree price process to the Black-Scholes-Merton stock price on the Skorokhod space D[0,T]D[0,T]D[0,T] of càdlàg functions with the Skorokhod topology — a materially stronger and more setup-heavy claim than finite-dimensional convergence in distribution, and the book explicitly names this topology (it is not left implicit). Mathlib has no formalization of D[0,T]D[0,T]D[0,T] or the Skorokhod topology, and building either from scratch (the space of càdlàg functions, the Skorokhod metric via time-warpings, the tightness criteria needed for Donsker-type invariance principles) is a substantial undertaking outside the scope of a single milestone; weakening the claim to convergence of finite-dimensional distributions, or silently substituting an unnamed alternative topology (e.g. uniform convergence, under which the claim would in fact be false, since the discretized paths have jumps the limit does not), would misstate the theorem rather than state a smaller piece of it faithfully. A general-purpose Skorokhod-space/Skorokhod-topology formalization in Mathlib — reusable well beyond this book — is the prerequisite contribution that would unlock this result.

No trivializing formalization: NoArbitrage quantifies over all self-financing portfolios (Portfolio M, an unrestricted adapted process, not a finite or parametrized family), and the one-period condition of part b) quantifies over all Fn\mathcal{F}_nFn​-measurable φn∈Rd\varphi_n \in \mathbb{R}^dφn​∈Rd — narrowing either quantifier (e.g. to strategies with bounded positions) would state a weaker, easier claim than the book's own theorem.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9
  • J. M. Harrison and D. M. Kreps, "Martingales and arbitrage in multiperiod securities markets", Journal of Economic Theory, 1979 (the discrete-time fundamental theorem of asset pricing this chapter's Theorem 3.1.5 is a structural lemma toward, not itself proved in this section).
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Control TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Supervisory Control of a Class of Discrete Event Processes II: Every Reduced, Trim Supervisor Is the Quotient of a Supervisor Built on a Recognizer for Its Closed-Loop LanguageResearch Paper

Motivation

Supervisory control theory, introduced by Ramadge and Wonham (SIAM J. Control Optim. 25(1), 1987), models a manufacturing cell, a communication protocol or a resource-sharing system as an automaton whose transitions are events, some of which an external controller may disable. A controller, the supervisor, is itself an automaton that watches the event sequence and, in each of its states, decides which controllable events are currently allowed. The framework is the standard model for logical (untimed) control of discrete event systems and is the subject of textbooks such as Cassandras and Lafortune (Springer, 2008) and Wonham and Cai (Springer, 2019).

A practical concern is supervisor size. The synthesis procedure of the paper (§9) produces a supervisor whose automaton records exactly as much of the past as the desired closed-loop language requires, but there are many other supervisors realising the same behaviour. The paper's second main result, the quotient structure theorem (Theorem 10.1, p. 223), explains how they are related: any supervisor with two natural economy properties is obtained from a canonical one, built on a recognizer of the closed-loop language, by lumping states. This is the structural starting point of the later literature on supervisor reduction.

Setting

A generator is G=(Q,Σ,δ,q0,Qm)\mathcal G = (Q, \Sigma, \delta, q_0, Q_m)G=(Q,Σ,δ,q0​,Qm​): a state set QQQ, a finite alphabet Σ\SigmaΣ of events, a partial transition function δ:Σ×Q→Q\delta : \Sigma \times Q \to Qδ:Σ×Q→Q, an initial state q0q_0q0​ and marker states Qm⊆QQ_m \subseteq QQm​⊆Q. Extending δ\deltaδ to strings gives the generated language L(G)L(\mathcal G)L(G) (strings along which δ\deltaδ is defined from q0q_0q0​) and the marked language Lm(G)L_m(\mathcal G)Lm​(G) (those that end in QmQ_mQm​). The closure Kˉ\bar KKˉ of a language KKK is its set of prefixes. Throughout, G\mathcal GG is trim: L(G)=Lˉm(G)L(\mathcal G) = \bar L_m(\mathcal G)L(G)=Lˉm​(G). A recognizer for a language KKK is an accessible generator whose marked language is KKK.

A subset Σc⊆Σ\Sigma_c \subseteq \SigmaΣc​⊆Σ of events is controllable. A supervisor is S=(S,ϕ)\mathcal S = (S, \phi)S=(S,ϕ) where S=(X,Σ,ξ,x0,Xm)S = (X, \Sigma, \xi, x_0, X_m)S=(X,Σ,ξ,x0​,Xm​) is an accessible deterministic automaton with possibly infinite state set and ϕ:X→{0,1}Σc\phi : X \to \{0,1\}^{\Sigma_c}ϕ:X→{0,1}Σc​ is a state feedback map; events outside Σc\Sigma_cΣc​ are always enabled. The closed loop S/G\mathcal S/\mathcal GS/G runs SSS and G\mathcal GG in lockstep and allows σ\sigmaσ from (x,q)(x, q)(x,q) iff ξ(σ,x)\xi(\sigma, x)ξ(σ,x) and δ(σ,q)\delta(\sigma, q)δ(σ,q) are defined and ϕ(x)(σ)=1\phi(x)(\sigma) = 1ϕ(x)(σ)=1. Its languages are L(S/G)L(\mathcal S/\mathcal G)L(S/G), Lm(S/G)L_m(\mathcal S/\mathcal G)Lm​(S/G) (marker set Xm×QmX_m \times Q_mXm​×Qm​) and Lc(S/G)=L(S/G)∩Lm(G)L_c(\mathcal S/\mathcal G) = L(\mathcal S/\mathcal G) \cap L_m(\mathcal G)Lc​(S/G)=L(S/G)∩Lm​(G).

S\mathcal SS is complete if SSS never refuses an event that the plant can execute and ϕ\phiϕ enables: s∈L(S/G)s \in L(\mathcal S/\mathcal G)s∈L(S/G), sσ∈L(G)s\sigma \in L(\mathcal G)sσ∈L(G) and ϕ(ξ(s,x0))(σ)=1\phi(\xi(s, x_0))(\sigma) = 1ϕ(ξ(s,x0​))(σ)=1 imply sσ∈L(S/G)s\sigma \in L(\mathcal S/\mathcal G)sσ∈L(S/G). It is proper if it is complete and Lˉm(S/G)=Lˉc(S/G)=L(S/G)\bar L_m(\mathcal S/\mathcal G) = \bar L_c(\mathcal S/\mathcal G) = L(\mathcal S/\mathcal G)Lˉm​(S/G)=Lˉc​(S/G)=L(S/G).

A projection π:S→S^\pi : \mathcal S \to \hat{\mathcal S}π:S→S^ is a surjection X→X^X \to \hat XX→X^ with π(x0)=x^0\pi(x_0) = \hat x_0π(x0​)=x^0​, Xm=π−1(X^m)X_m = \pi^{-1}(\hat X_m)Xm​=π−1(X^m​), ξ^(σ,π(x))=π(ξ(σ,x))\hat\xi(\sigma, \pi(x)) = \pi(\xi(\sigma, x))ξ^​(σ,π(x))=π(ξ(σ,x)) wherever ξ(σ,x)\xi(\sigma, x)ξ(σ,x) is defined, and ϕ^∘π=ϕ\hat\phi \circ \pi = \phiϕ^​∘π=ϕ.

For a language KKK, strings s,s′s, s's,s′ are Kˉ\bar KKˉ-equivalent if st∈Kˉ  ⟺  s′t∈Kˉst \in \bar K \iff s't \in \bar Kst∈Kˉ⟺s′t∈Kˉ for all ttt. The automaton SSS is Kˉ\bar KKˉ-reduced if Kˉ\bar KKˉ-equivalent strings of Kˉ\bar KKˉ lead to the same state, and Kˉ\bar KKˉ-trim if every state is reached by a string of Kˉ\bar KKˉ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 10.1 (quotient structure theorem)

Let S=(S,ϕ)\mathcal S = (S, \phi)S=(S,ϕ) be complete, K1:=Lm(S/G)K_1 := L_m(\mathcal S/\mathcal G)K1​:=Lm​(S/G), K3:=L(S/G)K_3 := L(\mathcal S/\mathcal G)K3​:=L(S/G), with SSS K3K_3K3​-reduced and K3K_3K3​-trim, and let S^0=(X0,Σ,ξ0,x00,X0)\hat S^0 = (X^0, \Sigma, \xi^0, x^0_0, X^0)S^0=(X0,Σ,ξ0,x00​,X0) be a trim recognizer for K3K_3K3​. Then there are Xm0⊆X0X^0_m \subseteq X^0Xm0​⊆X0 and ϕ0\phi^0ϕ0 such that S0=((X0,Σ,ξ0,x00,Xm0),ϕ0)\mathcal S^0 = ((X^0, \Sigma, \xi^0, x^0_0, X^0_m), \phi^0)S0=((X0,Σ,ξ0,x00​,Xm0​),ϕ0) satisfies

S0 complete,Lm(S0/G)=K1,L(S0/G)=K3,∃ π:S0→S,S proper⇒S0 proper.\mathcal S^0 \text{ complete},\quad L_m(\mathcal S^0/\mathcal G) = K_1,\quad L(\mathcal S^0/\mathcal G) = K_3,\quad \exists\, \pi : \mathcal S^0 \to \mathcal S,\quad \mathcal S \text{ proper} \Rightarrow \mathcal S^0 \text{ proper}.S0 complete,Lm​(S0/G)=K1​,L(S0/G)=K3​,∃π:S0→S,S proper⇒S0 proper.

Milestones

Proposition 8.1 (p. 219): for complete S\mathcal SS and a projection π:S→S^\pi : \mathcal S \to \hat{\mathcal S}π:S→S^, (i) π\piπ is unique; (ii) (Lm,Lc,L)(S/G)=(Lm,Lc,L)(S^/G)(L_m, L_c, L)(\mathcal S/\mathcal G) = (L_m, L_c, L)(\hat{\mathcal S}/\mathcal G)(Lm​,Lc​,L)(S/G)=(Lm​,Lc​,L)(S^/G); (iii) S^\hat{\mathcal S}S^ is complete; (iv) nonblocking, nonrejecting and proper transfer in both directions.

The displayed steps of the proof of Theorem 10.1 (pp. 223–224): π(ξ0(s,x00)):=ξ(s,x0)\pi(\xi^0(s, x^0_0)) := \xi(s, x_0)π(ξ0(s,x00​)):=ξ(s,x0​) is well defined on X0X^0X0; it is a projection once Xm0:=π−1(Xm)X^0_m := \pi^{-1}(X_m)Xm0​:=π−1(Xm​) and ϕ0:=ϕ∘π\phi^0 := \phi \circ \piϕ0:=ϕ∘π; L(S0/G)=K3L(\mathcal S^0/\mathcal G) = K_3L(S0/G)=K3​ follows from two enablement conditions; S0\mathcal S^0S0 is complete; and Lm(S0/G)=K1L_m(\mathcal S^0/\mathcal G) = K_1Lm​(S0/G)=K1​.

Significance

Theorem 10.1 says that the reduction properties the synthesis procedure of §9 guarantees are exactly what makes a supervisor a quotient of the canonical supervisor on a recognizer of K3K_3K3​. Combined with Proposition 8.1, which shows that a projection preserves every closed-loop language, completeness and properness, it identifies supervisors with the same behaviour up to state lumping. This is the basis on which supervisor reduction and the comparison of supervisor realisations rest.

The result is proved in the paper. What this mission produces is a machine-checked version of the model (generators with partial transitions, supervisors with infinite state sets, the closed loop, completeness and properness) and of the two results above. No formalization of Ramadge–Wonham supervisory control was found on Prove2Me at the time of drafting; the definitions of this mission are reusable by any later mission on the theory, including the synthesis results of the first mission of the series.

Difficulty

The mathematics is elementary; the difficulty is bookkeeping with partial functions. Every step compares runs of three automata (the plant, SSS and the recognizer) that may be undefined at different strings, and a proof must track at each string which of them is defined. The tempting shortcut of treating the projection condition as full commutation, ξ^(σ,π(x))=π(ξ(σ,x))\hat\xi(\sigma, \pi(x)) = \pi(\xi(\sigma, x))ξ^​(σ,π(x))=π(ξ(σ,x)) for all σ,x\sigma, xσ,x, is not available: the page asks for it only where ξ(σ,x)\xi(\sigma, x)ξ(σ,x) is defined, and Proposition 8.1 (ii) holds only because completeness of S\mathcal SS compensates for transitions that ξ^\hat\xiξ^​ has and ξ\xiξ lacks. Likewise, the map π\piπ of Theorem 10.1 is defined through arbitrary representatives, and its well-definedness uses both that S^0\hat S^0S^0 recognizes K3K_3K3​ with all states marked and that SSS is K3K_3K3​-reduced.

Formalization scope

The alphabet is a Lean type α with [Fintype α] (the page's Σ\SigmaΣ, which is Lean syntax); strings are List α, sσs\sigmasσ is s ++ [σ]. A generator is a structure with its own state type in Type and a partial transition δ : α → Q → Option Q; its extended transition is the left fold. The feedback map has type X → Ec → Bool, and "σ\sigmaσ enabled at xxx" means σ∉Σc\sigma \notin \Sigma_cσ∈/Σc​ or ϕ(x)(σ)=1\phi(x)(\sigma) = 1ϕ(x)(σ)=1; the page's ϕ:X→{0,1}Σ\phi : X \to \{0,1\}^\Sigmaϕ:X→{0,1}Σ is the same object under this extension. The closed loop is run from (x0,q0)(x_0, q_0)(x0​,q0​) without forming its accessible part, which changes none of its languages. Existential statements over supervisors quantify over state types in Type.

Standing assumptions that are hypotheses of every theorem: Σ\SigmaΣ finite; G\mathcal GG trim, stated as 𝒢.L = pre 𝒢.Lm; every supervisor automaton accessible. Theorem 10.1 and its proof steps also assume S\mathcal SS complete, SSS K3K_3K3​-reduced and K3K_3K3​-trim, and a trim recognizer RRR for K3K_3K3​ with all states marked, and S0\mathcal S^0S0 is built on that given RRR rather than on a recognizer chosen by the prover. The conclusion names K1K_1K1​ and K3K_3K3​ as the languages of S\mathcal SS, not as free variables. A projection predicate that drops π(x0)=x^0\pi(x_0) = \hat x_0π(x0​)=x^0​, surjectivity or the marker equation would make the goal's clause (ii) trivially satisfiable by a constant map; the sanity check shipped with the mission rules this out on the primitive plant of §2.3.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, lemmas relating the fold-based extended transition to concatenation, and a reusable library for closed-loop runs.

Selected references

  • P. J. Ramadge and W. M. Wonham, Supervisory Control of a Class of Discrete Event Processes, SIAM J. Control Optim. 25(1):206–230, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1137/0325013
  • C. G. Cassandras and S. Lafortune, Introduction to Discrete Event Systems, 2nd ed., Springer, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-68612-7
  • W. M. Wonham and K. Cai, Supervisory Control of Discrete-Event Systems, Springer, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77452-7
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Markov Decision Processes IV: Stationary Markov Decision Models and Three Worked ExamplesTextbook

Motivation

Most concrete applications of Markov Decision Theory — inventory control, cash management, linear-quadratic regulation, sequential games — have data that does not change from one period to the next: the same state space, action space, transition mechanism and reward apply at every stage, only discounted by a fixed factor β\betaβ per period. Bäuerle and Rieder's Chapter 2, §2.5 specializes the general finite-horizon theory of the previous sections to this stationary case, and §2.6 shows the specialization at work on three classical models: a card game with a famously boring answer, a firm's cash-management problem, and stochastic linear-quadratic control. Together they demonstrate the payoff of the abstract theory: once the Structure Assumption is checked for a stationary model, the general machinery (the Forward Induction Algorithm) produces the concrete optimal policy — a critical-level (s,S)(s,S)(s,S)-type control for cash management, a linear feedback law for LQ control — with no further case-specific argument.

Setting

A stationary Markov Decision Model is a Markov Decision Model (E,A,D,Q,r,g)(E,A,D,Q,r,g)(E,A,D,Q,r,g) (Definition 2.1.1) whose data does not depend on the stage: the reward at absolute time nnn is βnr\beta^n rβnr and the terminal reward at time NNN is βNg\beta^N gβNg, for a fixed discount β∈(0,1]\beta \in (0,1]β∈(0,1]. For a policy sequence π=(f0,…,fn−1)∈Fn\pi = (f_0,\dots,f_{n-1}) \in F^nπ=(f0​,…,fn−1​)∈Fn (each fkf_kfk​ a decision rule E→AE \to AE→A with fk(x)∈D(x)f_k(x) \in D(x)fk​(x)∈D(x)), the reward-to-go is Jnπ(x):=Exπ[∑k=0n−1βkr(Xk,fk(Xk))+βng(Xn)]J_n^\pi(x) := \mathbb{E}^\pi_x\bigl[\sum_{k=0}^{n-1} \beta^k r(X_k,f_k(X_k)) + \beta^n g(X_n)\bigr]Jnπ​(x):=Exπ​[∑k=0n−1​βkr(Xk​,fk​(Xk​))+βng(Xn​)] and the value function is Jn(x):=sup⁡π∈FnJnπ(x)J_n(x) := \sup_{\pi \in F^n} J_n^\pi(x)Jn​(x):=supπ∈Fn​Jnπ​(x). The operators (Lv)(x,a):=r(x,a)+β∫v(x′) Q(dx′∣x,a)(Lv)(x,a) := r(x,a) + \beta\int v(x')\,Q(dx'\mid x,a)(Lv)(x,a):=r(x,a)+β∫v(x′)Q(dx′∣x,a), (Tv)(x):=sup⁡a∈D(x)(Lv)(x,a)(Tv)(x) := \sup_{a \in D(x)} (Lv)(x,a)(Tv)(x):=supa∈D(x)​(Lv)(x,a), (Tfv)(x):=(Lv)(x,f(x))(T^f v)(x) := (Lv)(x,f(x))(Tfv)(x):=(Lv)(x,f(x)) are the stationary counterparts of §2.3's non-stationary operators. The (stationary) Structure Assumption (SAN) asks for sets I ⁣M⊆I ⁣M(E)\mathrm{I\!M} \subseteq \mathrm{I\!M}(E)IM⊆IM(E), Δ⊆F\Delta \subseteq FΔ⊆F with g∈I ⁣Mg \in \mathrm{I\!M}g∈IM, v∈I ⁣M⇒Tv∈I ⁣Mv \in \mathrm{I\!M} \Rightarrow Tv \in \mathrm{I\!M}v∈IM⇒Tv∈IM, and every v∈I ⁣Mv \in \mathrm{I\!M}v∈IM having a maximizer in Δ\DeltaΔ.

Formalization targets

Goal — Theorem 2.6.2 (the cash balance problem)

A firm's cash level x∈Rx \in \mathbb{R}x∈R moves under i.i.d. shocks; each period the firm transfers to a new level aaa at linear cost c(a−x)=cu(a−x)++cd(a−x)−c(a-x) = c_u(a-x)^+ + c_d(a-x)^-c(a−x)=cu​(a−x)++cd​(a−x)−, pays a convex, coercive holding cost L(a)L(a)L(a) (L(0)=0L(0)=0L(0)=0), and the level becomes a−Zn+1a - Z_{n+1}a−Zn+1​. Modeled as a stationary MDM with E=A=RE=A=\mathbb{R}E=A=R, r(x,a)=−c(a−x)−L(a)r(x,a) = -c(a-x) - L(a)r(x,a)=−c(a−x)−L(a), g≡0g \equiv 0g≡0:

∃ Sn−≤Sn+ (depending on n):Jn(x)={(Sn−−x)cu+L(Sn−)+β E[Jn−1(Sn−−Z)]x<Sn−L(x)+β E[Jn−1(x−Z)]Sn−≤x≤Sn+(x−Sn+)cd+L(Sn+)+β E[Jn−1(Sn+−Z)]x>Sn+,\exists\, S_n^- \le S_n^+ \ \text{(depending on $n$)}: \quad J_n(x) = \begin{cases} (S_n^- - x)c_u + L(S_n^-) + \beta\,\mathbb{E}[J_{n-1}(S_n^- - Z)] & x < S_n^- \\ L(x) + \beta\,\mathbb{E}[J_{n-1}(x-Z)] & S_n^- \le x \le S_n^+ \\ (x-S_n^+)c_d + L(S_n^+) + \beta\,\mathbb{E}[J_{n-1}(S_n^+ - Z)] & x > S_n^+, \end{cases}∃Sn−​≤Sn+​ (depending on n):Jn​(x)=⎩⎨⎧​(Sn−​−x)cu​+L(Sn−​)+βE[Jn−1​(Sn−​−Z)]L(x)+βE[Jn−1​(x−Z)](x−Sn+​)cd​+L(Sn+​)+βE[Jn−1​(Sn+​−Z)]​x<Sn−​Sn−​≤x≤Sn+​x>Sn+​,​

with J0≡0J_0 \equiv 0J0​≡0, and the optimal policy transfers up to Sn−S_n^-Sn−​ below it, down to Sn+S_n^+Sn+​ above it, and does nothing in between. This is the weakest stable statement: it asserts the existence of critical levels with the stated recursive characterization, not any closed form for Sn±S_n^\pmSn±​ itself (which depends on LLL's exact shape and is not computable in general).

Three milestones build toward and alongside it: the Reward Iteration theorem and stationary Structure Theorem (Theorems 2.5.3-2.5.4, the general machinery instantiated), the trivial-but- sharp red-and-black card game (Theorem 2.6.1), and the stochastic linear-quadratic problem (Theorem 2.6.3, a Riccati-type recursion with random coefficients).

Significance

Theorem 2.6.2 is the textbook derivation of (s,S)(s,S)(s,S)-type control, the dominant policy structure in inventory theory and cash management: a firm should act only when its state leaves a band, and should act to bring it exactly to the band's edge, never further. Its proof pattern — verify (SAN) with I ⁣M\mathrm{I\!M}IM the convex functions of at most linear growth, extract the critical levels from the derivative conditions of a one-stage minimization — is the template used across the inventory-control literature for essentially every variant of this problem. Theorem 2.6.1's answer ("no strategy beats stopping immediately") is a genuine, if minimal, comparative-statics fact: a positive-content instance of I ⁣M\mathrm{I\!M}IM collapsing to functions constant on the game's absorbing set, forcing every action to be a maximizer. Theorem 2.6.3's Riccati-type recursion, with random transition coefficients, generalizes the classical deterministic-coefficient LQR (linear-quadratic regulator) of control theory; the recursion governs mean-variance and quadratic-hedging problems return to in later chapters of this book (Chapters 4 and 6).

None of the three examples' specific results were found on the platform (searched for "comparative statics", "convex Markov decision", the exact model names, and "bang-bang"/"LQR" adjacent terms). BertsekasDP.riccati_completion_of_square is the platform's one close relative to Theorem 2.6.3: it solves the deterministic-coefficient LQR by a completion-of-squares argument, not the random-coefficient recursion here, so it is cited as related work rather than reused. The proofs themselves are complete and self-contained in the book (a few pages each, using only single-variable convex analysis and elementary linear algebra); this mission contributes the formal statement of each, in its full generality (general convex LLL, general random (A,B)(A,B)(A,B) coefficient pairs), as the task for a sorry-free proof.

Difficulty

The cash-balance proof's central step is showing the minimizer of the one-stage problem is of critical-level form for every vvv in the candidate class I ⁣M\mathrm{I\!M}IM — not just for the particular sequence J0,J1,…J_0, J_1, \dotsJ0​,J1​,… that eventually arises. The obvious shortcut, guessing the form of JnJ_nJn​ directly and verifying it solves the Bellman equation by substitution, fails because Sn−,Sn+S_n^-, S_n^+Sn−​,Sn+​ are themselves defined only implicitly, via one-sided derivative conditions on L(x)+βE[v(x−Z)]L(x) + \beta\mathbb{E}[v(x-Z)]L(x)+βE[v(x−Z)]; there is no closed form to substitute except in degenerate special cases (e.g. LLL quadratic). The genuine content is the general argument (convexity of the one-stage objective forces a unique critical-level minimizer structure, and this structure is preserved under TTT) that lets the induction go through for an arbitrary convex, coercive LLL. For Theorem 2.6.3, the natural first attempt — solve the deterministic LQR recursion and substitute expected coefficient matrices for the random ones — is not obviously valid, since E[B⊤QB]≠(E[B])⊤Q E[B]\mathbb{E}[B^\top Q B] \ne (\mathbb{E}[B])^\top Q\,\mathbb{E}[B]E[B⊤QB]=(E[B])⊤QE[B] in general; the correct recursion genuinely involves the joint second moments of (A,B)(A,B)(A,B), which is exactly what the standing positive-definiteness assumption on E[B⊤QB]\mathbb{E}[B^\top Q B]E[B⊤QB] (not on E[B]\mathbb{E}[B]E[B] itself) is there to make precise.

Formalization scope

The stationary vocabulary (StationaryMarkovDecisionModel, its operators, J, (SAN)) is restated independently of chunk 02a's non-stationary vocabulary — drafts in this series cannot import one another, and the book itself keeps the two notationally separate (JnJ_nJn​ vs. VnV_nVn​, related by Vn(x)=βnJN−n(x)V_n(x) = \beta^n J_{N-n}(x)Vn​(x)=βnJN−n​(x), a relation this mission does not separately formalize since no listed result needs it). Theorem 2.6.3's stochastic LQ problem is explicitly non-stationary in the book's own text, so a second, NS-prefixed restatement of the non- stationary model and value function (via the Bellman recursion established as Theorem 2.3.8, not the sup-over-policies primitive — the same simplification chunk 02c makes for its own V) is introduced solely for that one theorem. The card game (Theorem 2.6.1) is formalized on the concrete state space N×N\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}N×N and action space Bool, with the model's exact transition density, reward and terminal reward given as hypotheses on an abstract StationaryMarkovDecisionModel, matching the book's own discrete-density notation q(x′∣x,a):=Q({x′}∣x,a)q(x'\mid x,a) := Q(\{x'\}\mid x,a)q(x′∣x,a):=Q({x′}∣x,a) (introduced in the text following Theorem 2.5.4) rather than built from an explicit PMF/Kernel construction — a lighter-weight but equally precise formalization, since the density equations pin the kernel exactly. The stochastic LQ problem uses Matrix (Fin m) (Fin m) ℝ and needs a MeasurableSpace (Matrix m n α) instance Mathlib does not provide (Matrix is a non-reducible def for m → n → α); this mission supplies it by transport across the definitional equality. Random matrix moments E[F(A,B)]\mathbb{E}[F(A,B)]E[F(A,B)] are computed entrywise as ordinary Bochner integrals against the joint law of (A,B)(A,B)(A,B).

A trivializing formalization is ruled out on two fronts: the cash-balance critical levels Sn−,Sn+S_n^-, S_n^+Sn−​,Sn+​ are existentially quantified as functions of nnn, not fixed constants (dropping the index would silently claim a single band works for every horizon length, which is false in general); and the card game's "every strategy is optimal" is stated as a universally-quantified claim over all policy sequences, not weakened to mere existence of an optimal one. Reusable infrastructure: the jointMatMean/xQx helpers and the MeasurableSpace (Matrix m n α) instance are generic and available to any later chunk needing random-matrix moments (none of the remaining chunks' briefs currently list one, but Chapter 4's mean-variance and LQ-flavored missions may). sorry-free proofs of all five items are welcome contributions; Theorem 2.5.3's short inductive proof (unwinding the accumulator definition against the operator-composition recursion) is likely the easiest entry point.

Selected references

  • N. Bäuerle and U. Rieder, Markov Decision Processes with Applications to Finance, Universitext, Springer, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18324-9
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Vol. I, 3rd ed., Athena Scientific, 2005 (the classical deterministic-coefficient LQR, BertsekasDP.riccati_completion_of_square on the platform).
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

An n Job, One Machine Sequencing Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Late Jobs II: The Due-Date Schedule at the Least Feasible Cost Level Minimizes the Maximum Deferral CostResearch Paper

Motivation

Single-machine sequencing with deferral costs asks how to order jobs when the price of finishing a job depends on when it finishes. A job completed at time sss incurs the cost Pi(s)P_i(s)Pi​(s); lateness penalties, holding costs and service-level penalties are special cases. Two objectives are standard: the sum of the costs, studied by McNaughton (Management Science 6(1), 1959) and Lawler (Management Science 11(2), 1964), and the maximum cost, the bottleneck objective, which asks that no single job be charged too much.

At the end of his 1968 paper on minimizing the number of late jobs (Moore, Management Science 15(1)), J. M. Moore added a short section, suggested by E. L. Lawler, showing that the maximum-cost problem reduces to a family of feasibility problems with due-dates. Each such problem is settled by one sort, by Jackson's earliest-due-date rule (J. R. Jackson, Scheduling a Production Line to Minimize Maximum Tardiness, UCLA Research Report 43, 1955). This reduction is the unconstrained case of what later became Lawler's algorithm for 1∣prec∣fmax⁡1|\mathrm{prec}|f_{\max}1∣prec∣fmax​ (Lawler, Management Science 19(5), 1973).

Timeline:

  • 1955: Jackson shows that ordering jobs by due-date minimizes the maximum tardiness, so a schedule with no late jobs exists iff the due-date order has none.
  • 1959, 1964: McNaughton and Lawler study the sum of deferral costs.
  • 1968: Moore (this paper) reduces the maximum deferral cost to Jackson's lemma through the generalized inverses Pi∗P_i^*Pi∗​.
  • 1973: Lawler's backward rule handles general non-decreasing costs with precedence constraints.

Setting

A finite nonempty set JJJ of jobs is processed on one machine that starts at time 000 and runs without idle time or preemption. Job jjj has processing time tj≥0t_j \ge 0tj​≥0. A schedule SSS is an ordering of JJJ with each job appearing exactly once, and CjSC_j^SCjS​ is the completion time of jjj in SSS: the sum of the processing times of jjj and of every job before it.

Each job has a deferral cost Pj:R→RP_j : \mathbb R \to \mathbb RPj​:R→R, which is continuous, bounded and non-decreasing. The maximum deferral cost of SSS is

maxCost(S)=max⁡j∈JPj(CjS).\mathrm{maxCost}(S) = \max_{j \in J} P_j(C_j^S).maxCost(S)=j∈Jmax​Pj​(CjS​).

For a cost level yyy, the generalized inverse Pj∗(y)∈R∪{+∞}P_j^*(y) \in \mathbb R \cup \{+\infty\}Pj∗​(y)∈R∪{+∞} is the latest time at which job jjj can be completed at cost at most yyy. Following the paper's definition (p. 108), with times s≥0s \ge 0s≥0:

  • Pj∗(y)=max⁡{s≥0:Pj(s)=y}P_j^*(y) = \max\{s \ge 0 : P_j(s) = y\}Pj∗​(y)=max{s≥0:Pj​(s)=y} if that level set is nonempty (this includes the paper's case of an existing inverse);
  • Pj∗(y)=0P_j^*(y) = 0Pj∗​(y)=0 if Pj(s)>yP_j(s) > yPj​(s)>y for all s≥0s \ge 0s≥0;
  • Pj∗(y)=+∞P_j^*(y) = +\inftyPj∗​(y)=+∞ if Pj(s)<yP_j(s) < yPj​(s)<y for all s≥0s \ge 0s≥0.

For each y>0y > 0y>0, SD(y)S_D(y)SD​(y) is a schedule ordered by the "due-dates" Dj=Pj∗(y)D_j = P_j^*(y)Dj​=Pj∗​(y), with ties broken arbitrarily. SD(y)S_D(y)SD​(y) has no late jobs if CjSD(y)≤Pj∗(y)C_j^{S_D(y)} \le P_j^*(y)CjSD​(y)​≤Pj∗​(y) for every jjj.

In Lean these are IsSchedule, completionTime, Pstar, NoLateAt and maxCost in the namespace MooreLateJobs.MaxDeferral.

Formalization targets

Goal: SD(y∗)S_D(y^*)SD​(y∗) is optimal

Let y∗>0y^* > 0y∗>0 satisfy: (1) SD(y∗)S_D(y^*)SD​(y∗) has no late jobs; (2) for every 0<y<y∗0 < y < y^*0<y<y∗, SD(y)S_D(y)SD​(y) has at least one late job. Then for every schedule SSS of JJJ,

maxCost(SD(y∗))≤maxCost(S).\mathrm{maxCost}\bigl(S_D(y^*)\bigr) \le \mathrm{maxCost}(S).maxCost(SD​(y∗))≤maxCost(S).

This is the last sentence of the section (p. 109). The goal takes y∗y^*y∗ with its two properties as given, so it needs no hypothesis beyond the model.

Milestones

  1. Lemma (Jackson), p. 105: a schedule with no late jobs exists iff every due-date ordering has none. It is stated for extended-real due-dates, which is how the section uses it.
  2. Monotonicity of Pj∗P_j^*Pj∗​, p. 109: y1≤y2⇒Pj∗(y1)≤Pj∗(y2)y_1 \le y_2 \Rightarrow P_j^*(y_1) \le P_j^*(y_2)y1​≤y2​⇒Pj∗​(y1​)≤Pj∗​(y2​).
  3. A feasible level exists, pp. 108–109: for bounded costs there is y>0y > 0y>0 with SD(y)S_D(y)SD​(y) on time.
  4. Existence of y∗y^*y∗, p. 109 with footnote 3. If some SD(y1)S_D(y_1)SD​(y1​) is on time and some SD(y0)S_D(y_0)SD​(y0​) is not, a level y∗y^*y∗ with properties (1) and (2) exists.

Significance

The result. The theorem turns a min–max problem over all n!n!n! schedules into a monotone one-parameter feasibility question. Each value of yyy is checked by a single sort, and the optimal level is the threshold where feasibility switches on. The same threshold structure underlies bottleneck scheduling and the backward rule for 1∣prec∣fmax⁡1|\mathrm{prec}|f_{\max}1∣prec∣fmax​. Special cases include minimizing the maximum lateness, Pj(s)=s−djP_j(s) = s - d_jPj​(s)=s−dj​, clipped to be bounded, and minimizing the maximum weighted tardiness.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and proved on paper, but no machine-checked proof of it, or of Jackson's lemma, is known to exist. The mission would produce a checked Jackson lemma for extended-real due-dates, a verified generalized inverse of a monotone continuous function with the paper's case analysis, and the threshold argument connecting them. Jackson's lemma is shared with part I of this series (minimizing the number of late jobs).

Difficulty

The reduction is short on paper. The work is in the edge cases that the paper passes over:

  • The generalized inverse. The comparison Cj≤Pj∗(y)C_j \le P_j^*(y)Cj​≤Pj∗​(y) agrees with Pj(Cj)≤yP_j(C_j) \le yPj​(Cj​)≤y only away from the corner case Cj=0C_j = 0Cj​=0 with Pj(0)>yP_j(0) > yPj​(0)>y. That job is never "late", yet its cost exceeds yyy. The goal must still hold when such jobs exist.
  • Monotonicity. The monotonicity of Pj∗P_j^*Pj∗​ needs continuity. It fails if times range over all of R\mathbb RR instead of s≥0s \ge 0s≥0.
  • Attainment. The feasible levels form an up-set of (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). That its infimum is attained, so that y∗y^*y∗ exists, needs right-continuity in yyy of the feasibility of each of the finitely many schedules.
  • Jackson's lemma. The exchange argument must handle due-dates equal to 000 or +∞+\infty+∞ and zero processing times.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in Lean:

  • Jobs form a type ι with decidable equality, and the job set is J : Finset ι, assumed nonempty in the goal. Processing times are t : ι → ℝ with 0 ≤ t i: this is added, because the page never states it but processing times are durations.
  • Costs are P : ι → ℝ → ℝ, each continuous, bounded (∃ M, ∀ s, |P i s| ≤ M) and monotone, as on p. 108. The Introduction's assumption ti≤Dit_i \le D_iti​≤Di​ has no counterpart, since the problem has no given due-dates, and it is not assumed.
  • A schedule is a duplicate-free list whose elements are exactly JJJ. Completion times are prefix sums of processing times, starting at 000.
  • Pstar f y : EReal, with every time in the definition ranging over s≥0s \ge 0s≥0. If the level set {s≥0:f(s)=y}\{s \ge 0 : f(s) = y\}{s≥0:f(s)=y} is unbounded, its "max" does not exist, and the value is fixed to +∞+\infty+∞. The final case is "otherwise", which for continuous monotone fff is the paper's case (c).
  • The family SDS_DSD​ is any SD : ℝ → List ι such that SD y is a due-date-ordered schedule for every y>0y > 0y>0. Theorems hold for every such family, so every tie-break is covered.
  • "For all y<y∗y < y^*y<y∗" is read as 0<y<y∗0 < y < y^*0<y<y∗, because SD(y)S_D(y)SD​(y) is defined only for y>0y > 0y>0.
  • The existence milestone takes footnote 3's hypothesis (some feasible level) in place of boundedness. It also takes the added hypothesis that some level y0>0y_0 > 0y0​>0 is infeasible: with all costs identically 000, every SD(y)S_D(y)SD​(y) is on time and no y∗>0y^* > 0y∗>0 has property (2).

The goal is not the trivializing statement "every on-time SD(y)S_D(y)SD​(y) is optimal", which is false for large yyy. It concerns exactly the threshold level y∗y^*y∗. The minimum is over all schedules of JJJ, not over the SD(y)S_D(y)SD​(y) only.

The needed infrastructure is list permutations, prefix sums and Finset.sup', plus basic facts about sSup of closed sets bounded above in ℝ, and the intermediate value theorem. The Jackson lemma and the generalized inverse are reusable beyond this mission. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, in any order. The goal depends only on the Jackson lemma and on properties of Pstar.

Not in scope: the remark that y∗y^*y∗ "can be found to whatever accuracy is desired by a binary search technique" (computational), and the sum-of-costs problem the section contrasts itself with.

Selected references

  • J. M. Moore, An n Job, One Machine Sequencing Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Late Jobs, Management Science 15(1):102–109, 1968. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.1.102
  • J. R. Jackson, Scheduling a Production Line to Minimize Maximum Tardiness, Research Report 43, Management Sciences Research Project, UCLA, 1955.
  • E. L. Lawler, On Scheduling Problems with Deferral Costs, Management Science 11(2):280–288, 1964. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.11.2.280
  • R. McNaughton, Scheduling with Deadlines and Loss Functions, Management Science 6(1):1–12, 1959. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.1.1
  • E. L. Lawler, Optimal Sequencing of a Single Machine Subject to Precedence Constraints, Management Science 19(5):544–546, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.19.5.544
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Convex OptimizationDiscrete GeometryOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Discrete Convex Analysis XV: Conjugacy of Quadratic Forms and Symmetric M-MatricesTextbook

Motivation

Quadratic minimization problems with a combinatorial sign pattern in their Hessian arise throughout applied mathematics: discretizations of elliptic boundary-value problems such as the Poisson equation, resistor-network energy functionals, and the Dirichlet forms of Markov-process potential theory all produce a symmetric matrix whose off-diagonal entries are nonpositive and whose rows are diagonally dominant (Fukushima, Oshima, and Takeda, Dirichlet Forms and Symmetric Markov Processes, De Gruyter, 1994). Such matrices are exactly the diagonally dominant symmetric M-matrices of classical numerical linear algebra (Berman and Plemmons, Nonnegative Matrices in the Mathematical Sciences, SIAM, 1994). Murota's Discrete Convex Analysis (SIAM, 2003) identifies the combinatorial content of this sign pattern with a discrete convexity property — submodularity, and its strengthening translation submodularity — of the associated quadratic form, and shows that passing to the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate of such a quadratic form (i.e., inverting the matrix) transports this property to a dual combinatorial property, an exchange axiom, on the conjugate side. This mission formalizes that correspondence for the special, matrix-algebraic case of quadratic forms — the case in which Murota's book gives a self-contained proof using only the classical Farkas lemma, before generalizing the same conjugacy to a much broader class of functions in Chapter 8.

Setting

Let VVV be a finite ground set (identified with {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n} in the book) and let L=(ℓij)i,j∈VL = (\ell_{ij})_{i,j\in V}L=(ℓij​)i,j∈V​ be a symmetric real matrix. LLL has off-diagonal nonpositivity if ℓij≤0\ell_{ij}\le 0ℓij​≤0 for all i≠ji\ne ji=j, and diagonal dominance if ∑jℓij≥0\sum_{j} \ell_{ij}\ge 0∑j​ℓij​≥0 for every row iii. The associated quadratic form is g(p)=12p⊤Lpg(p) = \tfrac12 p^\top L pg(p)=21​p⊤Lp for p∈RVp \in \mathbb R^Vp∈RV. For p,q∈RVp,q\in\mathbb R^Vp,q∈RV write p∨qp\vee qp∨q, p∧qp\wedge qp∧q for the componentwise maximum and minimum. A function g:RV→Rg:\mathbb R^V\to\mathbb Rg:RV→R is submodular if g(p)+g(q)≥g(p∨q)+g(p∧q)g(p)+g(q)\ge g(p\vee q)+g(p\wedge q)g(p)+g(q)≥g(p∨q)+g(p∧q) for all p,qp,qp,q, and has translation submodularity if the stronger inequality g(p)+g(q)≥g((p−α1)∨q)+g(p∧(q+α1))g(p)+g(q)\ge g((p-\alpha\mathbf 1)\vee q)+g(p\wedge(q+\alpha\mathbf 1))g(p)+g(q)≥g((p−α1)∨q)+g(p∧(q+α1)) holds for every α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0, where 1\mathbf 11 is the all-ones vector (ordinary submodularity is the case α=0\alpha=0α=0).

On the conjugate side, for x∈RVx\in\mathbb R^Vx∈RV write supp⁡+(x)={i:xi>0}\operatorname{supp}^+(x)=\{i : x_i>0\}supp+(x)={i:xi​>0}, supp⁡−(x)={i:xi<0}\operatorname{supp}^-(x)=\{i:x_i<0\}supp−(x)={i:xi​<0}, and let χi\chi_iχi​ denote the iii-th unit vector (χ0\chi_0χ0​ denotes the zero vector). A function f:RV→Rf:\mathbb R^V\to\mathbb Rf:RV→R has the exchange property if for all x,y∈RVx,y\in\mathbb R^Vx,y∈RV and i∈supp⁡+(x−y)i\in\operatorname{supp}^+(x-y)i∈supp+(x−y) there exist j∈supp⁡−(x−y)∪{0}j \in \operatorname{supp}^-(x-y)\cup\{0\}j∈supp−(x−y)∪{0} and α0>0\alpha_0>0α0​>0 such that f(x)+f(y)≥f(x−α(χi−χj))+f(y+α(χi−χj))f(x)+f(y)\ge f(x-\alpha(\chi_i-\chi_j))+f(y+\alpha(\chi_i-\chi_j))f(x)+f(y)≥f(x−α(χi​−χj​))+f(y+α(χi​−χj​)) for every α∈[0,α0]\alpha\in[0,\alpha_0]α∈[0,α0​]. The Legendre-Fenchel conjugate of fff is f∙(p)=sup⁡x{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)}f^\bullet(p) = \sup_x\{\langle p,x\rangle - f(x)\}f∙(p)=supx​{⟨p,x⟩−f(x)}; two functions g,fg,fg,f are conjugate to each other when g=f∙g=f^\bulletg=f∙ and f=g∙f=g^\bulletf=g∙. For positive-definite symmetric M,LM,LM,L, the quadratic forms f(x)=12x⊤Mxf(x)=\tfrac12x^\top Mxf(x)=21​x⊤Mx and g(p)=12p⊤Lpg(p)=\tfrac12p^\top Lpg(p)=21​p⊤Lp are conjugate to each other exactly when MMM and LLL are matrix inverses of one another.

Formalization targets

Goal (Theorem 2.11). For conjugate strictly convex quadratic forms ggg and fff as above,

g has translation submodularity  ⟺  f has the exchange property.g \text{ has translation submodularity} \iff f \text{ has the exchange property.}g has translation submodularity⟺f has the exchange property.

This is the mission's capstone: the statement leaves the correspondence at the level of the two named combinatorial properties, without hard-coding which of the two properties is verified in a given application, so it survives exactly as strongly as the underlying conjugacy fact does.

Supporting milestones, in the order the book develops them: Proposition 2.4 (off-diagonal nonpositivity plus diagonal dominance implies positive semidefiniteness); Proposition 2.6 (off-diagonal nonpositivity is equivalent to plain submodularity of ggg); Theorem 2.7 (the full sign pattern is equivalent to translation submodularity of ggg); Proposition 2.9 (conjugate quadratic forms correspond exactly to inverse matrix pairs); Theorem 2.12 (a nine-way equivalence, for a nonsingular symmetric MMM, among membership in the matrix class L−1\mathcal L^{-1}L−1, two sign-consistency inequalities on the columns of MMM together with their strict forms, two directional-derivative reformulations of the exchange property together with their strict forms, and the exchange property itself together with its strict form); Proposition 2.13 (the Farkas lemma in equality form, together with the strict variant valid for a nonsingular coefficient matrix); and Proposition 2.14 (the class L−1\mathcal L^{-1}L−1 is closed under taking principal submatrices).

Significance

The M-natural exchange property is the function-level analogue of the base-exchange axiom for matroids, and translation submodularity is the analogue, on the "primal" side, of ordinary submodularity for set functions; Chapter 2's quadratic-form case is the historical and pedagogical entry point for the general conjugacy Chapter 8 proves for the full M-convex/ L-convex function classes. Establishing it here, in the self-contained matrix-algebraic setting, isolates exactly which properties of a quadratic form are combinatorial (tied to the coordinate axes) rather than purely convex-analytic (rotation-invariant): submodularity and the exchange property are not preserved by an orthogonal change of variables, in contrast to ordinary convexity, which Proposition 2.4 shows the same sign pattern also implies.

Formalizing this mission produces the first Lean statement, in this project's namespace, of a genuine conjugacy theorem between a primal-side and a dual-side combinatorial convexity property for a concrete function class; nothing of this kind is yet proved (or, so far as the platform's own search shows, formalized at all) elsewhere on the platform. The nine-way equivalence of Theorem 2.12 is a substantial independent contribution beyond the goal itself, since it is what makes the goal's proof possible via elementary linear algebra rather than the general convex-analytic machinery Chapter 8 needs.

Difficulty

The naive approach to Theorem 2.11 tries to derive the exchange property for fff directly from the defining supremum in the conjugate relation f=g∙f = g^\bulletf=g∙, differentiating under the sup; this fails because the exchange property compares fff along a specific combinatorial direction χi−χj\chi_i - \chi_jχi​−χj​ tied to two coordinates, not along an arbitrary direction, and no naive first-order argument isolates the right pair (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) without already knowing the sign pattern of M=L−1M = L^{-1}M=L−1. The book's actual route is Theorem 2.12: it reduces the exchange property to a column-wise sign-consistency statement on MMM itself (conditions (b)/(c)) via the identity f′(x;d)=x⊤Mdf'(x;d) = x^\top Mdf′(x;d)=x⊤Md, and closes the loop back to membership in L−1\mathcal L^{-1}L−1 using the Farkas lemma applied to the linear system ML=IML = IML=I — a genuinely matrix-algebraic argument that does not generalize verbatim to non-quadratic M-/L-convex functions, which is exactly why Chapter 8 needs a different (convex-analytic) proof for the general case.

Formalization scope

Vectors and matrices are indexed by a general finite type V ([Fintype V] [DecidableEq V]) rather than a fixed Fin n, matching this project's convention elsewhere and letting Proposition 2.14's principal-submatrix statement reuse the class predicate at the restricted index type directly. Quadratic forms are real-valued ((V → ℝ) → ℝ, using Matrix.mulVec and dotProduct) since this chapter's functions are always finite everywhere; the Legendre-Fenchel conjugate is EReal-valued via sSup, since a supremum over an infinite domain need not be finite in general even though it is finite here. Every min(0, \dots)-based condition in Theorem 2.12 and the exchange axioms is unfolded as the logically equivalent disjunction over the finitely many terms achieving the minimum, rather than reified via Finset.inf/WithTop machinery — a faithful, checked-equivalent simplification, not a narrowing (see MODERATION_NOTES.md). "Nonsingular" is Matrix.det ≠ 0. No numeric constant needs instantiation anywhere in this mission. The formalization does not trivialize: the goal's exchange property is stated for the specific combinatorial direction χi−χj\chi_i - \chi_jχi​−χj​ with i∈supp⁡+(x−y)i\in \operatorname{supp}^+(x-y)i∈supp+(x−y), j∈supp⁡−(x−y)∪{0}j \in \operatorname{supp}^-(x-y)\cup\{0\}j∈supp−(x−y)∪{0} — not an arbitrary direction, which would reduce the exchange property to a restatement of ordinary convexity and discard the entire combinatorial content the mission is about.

Infrastructure needed: Matrix.PosDef/Matrix.PosSemidef/Matrix.IsSymm (present in Mathlib); everything else (submodularity, translation submodularity, the exchange axioms, the sign-consistency conditions) is defined fresh in DiscreteConvex.CombinatorialB. A solution to the goal will likely want Proposition 2.9, Theorem 2.12, and the Farkas lemma (Proposition 2.13) as lemmas; contributions completing any of the seven milestones independently, or supplying the Schur-complement induction behind Proposition 2.4, are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Murota, Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, 2003, DOI 10.1137/1.9780898718508, Chapter 2.
  • A. Berman, R. J. Plemmons, Nonnegative Matrices in the Mathematical Sciences, SIAM, 1994.
  • M. Fukushima, Y. Oshima, M. Takeda, Dirichlet Forms and Symmetric Markov Processes, De Gruyter, 1994.
  • J. Farkas, Theorie der einfachen Ungleichungen, J. Reine Angew. Math. 124 (1902), 1–27.
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Convex OptimizationNumerical AnalysisOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Golden Ratio Algorithms for Variational Inequalities II: The Explicit Golden Ratio Algorithm Converges for Locally Lipschitz Monotone OperatorsResearch Paper

Motivation

Monotone variational inequalities cover convex minimisation, convex–concave saddle-point problems, Nash equilibria of monotone games and complementarity problems, and they are the standard model for these in optimization and operations research. First-order methods for them (extragradient, forward–backward–forward, reflected and projected gradient methods) need a stepsize below 1/L1/L1/L, where LLL is a global Lipschitz constant of the operator. That constant is often unknown, too pessimistic, or nonexistent: in composite minimisation with a locally smooth term, or in saddle-point problems with bilinear-plus-nonlinear couplings, the operator is only locally Lipschitz. The usual remedy is a linesearch, which costs extra operator or prox evaluations per iteration and complicates the complexity accounting.

Y. Malitsky, Golden Ratio Algorithms for Variational Inequalities (preprint 2018, Optimization Online 6598; published in Mathematical Programming, 2020, doi:10.1007/s10107-019-01416-w) proposes the Explicit Golden Ratio Algorithm (EGRAAL): its stepsizes are computed in closed form from the last two iterates, it uses one evaluation of FFF and one proximal step per iteration, and it needs neither a Lipschitz constant nor a linesearch. This mission formalizes its main convergence theorem, Theorem 2 of the preprint.

Setting

Let E\mathcal EE be a finite-dimensional real inner product space with norm ∥⋅∥=⟨⋅,⋅⟩\|\cdot\|=\sqrt{\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle}∥⋅∥=⟨⋅,⋅⟩​. Let g:E→(−∞,+∞]g:\mathcal E\to(-\infty,+\infty]g:E→(−∞,+∞] with domain dom⁡g={x:g(x)<+∞}\operatorname{dom} g=\{x: g(x)<+\infty\}domg={x:g(x)<+∞}, and F:dom⁡g→EF:\operatorname{dom} g\to\mathcal EF:domg→E. The variational inequality (1) asks for

z∗∈Ewith⟨F(z∗),z−z∗⟩+g(z)−g(z∗)≥0∀z∈E.(1)z^*\in\mathcal E\quad\text{with}\quad \langle F(z^*),z-z^*\rangle+g(z)-g(z^*)\ge0\quad\forall z\in\mathcal E. \tag{1}z∗∈Ewith⟨F(z∗),z−z∗⟩+g(z)−g(z∗)≥0∀z∈E.(1)

Its solution set is SSS. The standing assumptions are: (C1) S≠∅S\ne\emptysetS=∅; (C2) ggg is proper, convex and lower semicontinuous; (C3) FFF is monotone on dom⁡g\operatorname{dom} gdomg, ⟨F(u)−F(v),u−v⟩≥0\langle F(u)-F(v),u-v\rangle\ge0⟨F(u)−F(v),u−v⟩≥0 for u,v∈dom⁡gu,v\in\operatorname{dom}gu,v∈domg.

The proximal operator is prox⁡g(w)=argmin⁡x{g(x)+12∥x−w∥2}\operatorname{prox}_g(w)=\operatorname{argmin}_x\{g(x)+\tfrac12\|x-w\|^2\}proxg​(w)=argminx​{g(x)+21​∥x−w∥2}. Write φ=5+12\varphi=\frac{\sqrt5+1}{2}φ=25​+1​ for the golden ratio. Algorithm 1 (EGRAAL) takes z0,z1∈Ez^0,z^1\in\mathcal Ez0,z1∈E, λ0>0\lambda_0>0λ0​>0, a parameter ϕ∈(1,φ]\phi\in(1,\varphi]ϕ∈(1,φ] and a cap λˉ>0\bar\lambda>0λˉ>0, sets zˉ0=z1\bar z^0=z^1zˉ0=z1, θ0=1\theta_0=1θ0​=1, ρ=1ϕ+1ϕ2\rho=\frac1\phi+\frac1{\phi^2}ρ=ϕ1​+ϕ21​, and for k≥1k\ge1k≥1 computes

λk=min⁡{ρλk−1, ϕθk−14λk−1∥zk−zk−1∥2∥F(zk)−F(zk−1)∥2, λˉ},zˉk=(ϕ−1)zk+zˉk−1ϕ,\lambda_k=\min\Big\{\rho\lambda_{k-1},\ \frac{\phi\theta_{k-1}}{4\lambda_{k-1}}\frac{\|z^k-z^{k-1}\|^2}{\|F(z^k)-F(z^{k-1})\|^2},\ \bar\lambda\Big\},\qquad \bar z^k=\frac{(\phi-1)z^k+\bar z^{k-1}}{\phi},λk​=min{ρλk−1​, 4λk−1​ϕθk−1​​∥F(zk)−F(zk−1)∥2∥zk−zk−1∥2​, λˉ},zˉk=ϕ(ϕ−1)zk+zˉk−1​, zk+1=prox⁡λkg(zˉk−λkF(zk)),θk=λkλk−1ϕ,z^{k+1}=\operatorname{prox}_{\lambda_k g}\big(\bar z^k-\lambda_kF(z^k)\big),\qquad \theta_k=\frac{\lambda_k}{\lambda_{k-1}}\phi,zk+1=proxλk​g​(zˉk−λk​F(zk)),θk​=λk−1​λk​​ϕ,

with the convention 0/0=+∞0/0=+\infty0/0=+∞ in the middle term. The paper uses the bifunction Ψ(u,v)=⟨F(u),v−u⟩+g(v)−g(u)\Psi(u,v)=\langle F(u),v-u\rangle+g(v)-g(u)Ψ(u,v)=⟨F(u),v−u⟩+g(v)−g(u).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2

If FFF is locally Lipschitz continuous and (C1)–(C3) hold, then for every run of Algorithm 1 there is z∗∈Sz^*\in Sz∗∈S with

zk→z∗andzˉk→z∗.z^k\to z^*\qquad\text{and}\qquad \bar z^k\to z^*.zk→z∗andzˉk→z∗.

Nothing is fixed beyond the paper's parameter ranges: ϕ∈(1,φ]\phi\in(1,\varphi]ϕ∈(1,φ], λˉ>0\bar\lambda>0λˉ>0, λ0>0\lambda_0>0λ0​>0 and the starting points are arbitrary. The two sequences share one limit.

Milestones

  1. Eq. (4), the prox-inequality: xˉ=prox⁡gw  ⟺  ⟨xˉ−w,x−xˉ⟩≥g(xˉ)−g(x)\bar x=\operatorname{prox}_g w\iff\langle\bar x-w,x-\bar x\rangle\ge g(\bar x)-g(x)xˉ=proxg​w⟺⟨xˉ−w,x−xˉ⟩≥g(xˉ)−g(x) for all xxx.
  2. Eq. (18), the estimates the step rule gives: λk≤ρλk−1\lambda_k\le\rho\lambda_{k-1}λk​≤ρλk−1​, θk≤1+1ϕ\theta_k\le1+\frac1\phiθk​≤1+ϕ1​, and λk2∥F(zk)−F(zk−1)∥2≤θkθk−14∥zk−zk−1∥2\lambda_k^2\|F(z^k)-F(z^{k-1})\|^2\le\frac{\theta_k\theta_{k-1}}4\|z^k-z^{k-1}\|^2λk2​∥F(zk)−F(zk−1)∥2≤4θk​θk−1​​∥zk−zk−1∥2.
  3. Eq. (24), an identity that follows from the averaging step: ∥zk+1−z∥2=ϕϕ−1∥zˉk+1−z∥2−1ϕ−1∥zˉk−z∥2+1ϕ∥zk+1−zˉk∥2\|z^{k+1}-z\|^2=\frac\phi{\phi-1}\|\bar z^{k+1}-z\|^2-\frac1{\phi-1}\|\bar z^k-z\|^2+\frac1\phi\|z^{k+1}-\bar z^k\|^2∥zk+1−z∥2=ϕ−1ϕ​∥zˉk+1−z∥2−ϕ−11​∥zˉk−z∥2+ϕ1​∥zk+1−zˉk∥2.
  4. Eq. (27), the energy inequality, for z∈dom⁡gz\in\operatorname{dom}gz∈domg and k≥2k\ge2k≥2.
  5. Lemma 2: along bounded runs, (λk)(\lambda_k)(λk​) and (θk)(\theta_k)(θk​) are bounded and bounded away from 000.
  6. Lemma 1 (Bauschke–Combettes, Theorem 5.5): a Fejér monotone sequence whose cluster points lie in a nonempty set CCC converges to a point of CCC.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 shows that a monotone variational inequality with a locally Lipschitz operator can be solved by a method whose stepsizes adapt to the local curvature of FFF at no extra cost: one FFF evaluation and one prox step per iteration, and no global constant and no backtracking. Because FFF is only ever evaluated at the prox outputs zk∈dom⁡gz^k\in\operatorname{dom}gzk∈domg, the method also applies when FFF is undefined or badly behaved outside the feasible set, where reflected-gradient methods can fail. The same analysis gives an ergodic O(1/k)O(1/k)O(1/k) rate and, under an error bound, an RRR-linear rate (§2.2 of the preprint; not part of this mission). The paper also derives fixed-point algorithms for demi-contractive operators from it.

Formalizing it. The theorem has a published proof; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists, and Mathlib has no proximal operator, no theory of monotone variational inequalities and no Fejér-monotonicity lemma. This mission produces a formal convergence proof for an adaptive first-order method with a nonsmooth convex term, together with reusable pieces: the prox-inequality for extended-real-valued convex functions, a finite-dimensional Fejér convergence lemma, and a formal model of an adaptive-step algorithm with the 0/0=+∞0/0=+\infty0/0=+∞ rule.

Difficulty

The usual convergence argument for projected or extragradient methods bounds the cross term ⟨F(zk)−F(zk−1),zk−zk+1⟩\langle F(z^k)-F(z^{k-1}),z^k-z^{k+1}\rangle⟨F(zk)−F(zk−1),zk−zk+1⟩ using a global Lipschitz constant and a fixed stepsize. Here neither exists. The stepsize at iteration kkk depends on the iterates, and the energy that decreases changes from step to step, since it involves θk−1\theta_{k-1}θk−1​. Local Lipschitz continuity gives a usable constant only once the iterates are known to be bounded, and boundedness has to come from the energy inequality. Stepsizes that tend to 000 would also break the argument (Lemma 2 excludes this for bounded runs). The last step, identifying cluster points as solutions, needs lower semicontinuity of ggg and a limit in the prox-inequality along a subsequence with convergent stepsizes.

Formalization scope

E\mathcal EE is a real InnerProductSpace with FiniteDimensional ℝ E. ggg is a map E → EReal; (C2) is a structure: ggg never takes the value ⊥\bot⊥, is finite somewhere, has a convex epigraph in E×RE\times\mathbb RE×R, and is LowerSemicontinuous on EEE. FFF is a total map E → E, and every hypothesis on it (monotonicity, Lipschitz bounds) is restricted to dom⁡g\operatorname{dom}gdomg. The variational inequality is stored as g(z∗)≤⟨F(z∗),z−z∗⟩+g(z)g(z^*)\le\langle F(z^*),z-z^*\rangle+g(z)g(z∗)≤⟨F(z∗),z−z∗⟩+g(z), with z∗∈dom⁡gz^*\in\operatorname{dom}gz∗∈domg, which avoids extended-real subtraction. prox⁡λg\operatorname{prox}_{\lambda g}proxλg​ is an argmin predicate, so it never produces a junk value. The algorithm is a predicate on the four sequences, written for index k+1k+1k+1. The rule 0/0=+∞0/0=+\infty0/0=+∞ is a case split: if F(zk)=F(zk−1)F(z^k)=F(z^{k-1})F(zk)=F(zk−1) the step is min⁡{ρλk−1,λˉ}\min\{\rho\lambda_{k-1},\bar\lambda\}min{ρλk−1​,λˉ}. No condition such as F(z1)≠F(z0)F(z^1)\ne F(z^0)F(z1)=F(z0) or λ0≤λˉ\lambda_0\le\bar\lambdaλ0​≤λˉ is imposed.

"Locally Lipschitz" is formalized as Lipschitz on every bounded subset of dom⁡g\operatorname{dom}gdomg. This is the property the proof of Lemma 2 uses. It agrees with local Lipschitz continuity when dom⁡g\operatorname{dom}gdomg is closed (for example g=δCg=\delta_Cg=δC​ for a closed convex CCC, or ggg finite everywhere) and is stronger otherwise. Eq. (27) is stated for z∈dom⁡gz\in\operatorname{dom}gz∈domg, where F(z)F(z)F(z) and Ψ(z,zk)\Psi(z,z^k)Ψ(z,zk) are defined. Lemma 1 carries the hypothesis C≠∅C\ne\emptysetC=∅ of its cited source, without which it is false.

The statements are not vacuous: g≡0g\equiv0g≡0, F≡0F\equiv0F≡0 satisfy (C1)–(C3) and the Lipschitz hypothesis, and admit a run of Algorithm 1 with λk=min⁡{ρλk−1,λˉ}\lambda_k=\min\{\rho\lambda_{k-1},\bar\lambda\}λk​=min{ρλk−1​,λˉ}. A proof of Theorem 2 must hold for every run with the paper's parameters, not only for such degenerate data.

Contributions welcome: the prox-inequality and the existence of the prox for proper convex lsc ggg (both reusable beyond this mission), the Fejér lemma, the algebraic estimates (18) and (24), and the energy inequality (27). Once these are in place, Lemma 2 and the cluster-point argument complete Theorem 2.

Selected references

  • Y. Malitsky, Golden Ratio Algorithms for Variational Inequalities, preprint, Optimization Online 6598, 2018. https://optimization-online.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/6598.pdf ; published in Mathematical Programming 184 (2020), 383–410. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-019-01416-w
  • H. H. Bauschke, P. L. Combettes, Convex Analysis and Monotone Operator Theory in Hilbert Spaces, Springer, 2011 (Theorem 5.5). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9467-7
  • G. M. Korpelevich, The extragradient method for finding saddle points and other problems, Ekonomika i Matematicheskie Metody 12 (1976), 747–756.
  • Y. Malitsky, Projected reflected gradient methods for monotone variational inequalities, SIAM Journal on Optimization 25 (2015), 502–520. https://doi.org/10.1137/14097238X
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cubic Regularization of Newton Method and Its Global Performance III: Linear-Then-Superlinear Rate on Gradient-Dominated Functions of Degree TwoResearch Paper

Motivation

Newton's method converges quadratically near a non-degenerate minimum, but on its own it has no global guarantee: far from a minimizer the Newton step may increase the objective, and at points where the Hessian is indefinite it may not even be a descent direction. For most of the method's history, the global behaviour of second-order methods was controlled by line searches or trust regions whose worst-case complexity was not quantified.

Nesterov and Polyak (Math. Program. Ser. A 108 (2006) 177–205) proposed regularizing the Newton model by a cubic term and proved global worst-case rates for the resulting method on several problem classes. This mission is the third in a series formalizing that paper. It concerns the class of gradient dominated functions of degree two, for which the gap to the optimal value is bounded by a multiple of the squared gradient norm. For this class the paper shows that the method first converges linearly and then superlinearly, with explicit constants and without convexity.

The class itself predates the paper by four decades. Polyak (USSR Comput. Math. Math. Phys. 3 (1963)) introduced the inequality f(x)−f∗≤τ∥f′(x)∥2f(x) - f^* \le \tau\|f'(x)\|^2f(x)−f∗≤τ∥f′(x)∥2 to prove linear convergence of gradient descent without convexity; related inequalities are due to Łojasiewicz. Under the name Polyak–Łojasiewicz condition it has become a standard assumption in the analysis of first-order methods, for example in Karimi, Nutini and Schmidt (2016). Theorem 7 of Nesterov and Polyak is the corresponding result for a second-order method.

Setting

Let F⊆RnF \subseteq \mathbb{R}^nF⊆Rn be a closed convex set, and let fff be twice differentiable on FFF with gradient f′(x)f'(x)f′(x) and Hessian f′′(x)f''(x)f′′(x). The Euclidean norm is ∥⋅∥\|\cdot\|∥⋅∥, and on matrices it is the spectral norm. The standing assumptions of the paper are:

  1. Lipschitz Hessian. For some L>0L > 0L>0, ∥f′′(x)−f′′(y)∥≤L∥x−y∥\|f''(x) - f''(y)\| \le L\|x - y\|∥f′′(x)−f′′(y)∥≤L∥x−y∥ for all x,y∈Fx, y \in Fx,y∈F.
  2. Starting point. x0x_0x0​ lies in the interior of FFF, and so does the whole level set {x:f(x)≤f(x0)}\{x : f(x) \le f(x_0)\}{x:f(x)≤f(x0​)}.

For M>0M > 0M>0 the cubic model of fff at xxx is

mM,x(y)=⟨f′(x),y−x⟩+12⟨f′′(x)(y−x),y−x⟩+M6∥y−x∥3.m_{M,x}(y) = \langle f'(x), y - x\rangle + \tfrac12\langle f''(x)(y-x), y-x\rangle + \tfrac M6\|y - x\|^3 .mM,x​(y)=⟨f′(x),y−x⟩+21​⟨f′′(x)(y−x),y−x⟩+6M​∥y−x∥3.

A cubic-regularized Newton step TM(x)T_M(x)TM​(x) is any global minimizer of mM,xm_{M,x}mM,x​ over Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn. Write rM(x)=∥x−TM(x)∥r_M(x) = \|x - T_M(x)\|rM​(x)=∥x−TM​(x)∥ and fˉM(x)=f(x)+min⁡ymM,x(y)\bar f_M(x) = f(x) + \min_y m_{M,x}(y)fˉ​M​(x)=f(x)+miny​mM,x​(y).

Method (3.3). Fix L0∈(0,L]L_0 \in (0, L]L0​∈(0,L]. At iteration k≥0k \ge 0k≥0, choose Mk∈[L0,2L]M_k \in [L_0, 2L]Mk​∈[L0​,2L] such that f(TMk(xk))≤fˉMk(xk)f(T_{M_k}(x_k)) \le \bar f_{M_k}(x_k)f(TMk​​(xk​))≤fˉ​Mk​​(xk​), and set xk+1=TMk(xk)x_{k+1} = T_{M_k}(x_k)xk+1​=TMk​​(xk​). The choice Mk=LM_k = LMk​=L always passes this test.

Gradient domination of degree two (Definition 3 with p=2p = 2p=2). The function fff attains its minimum over FFF at some x∗∈Fx^* \in Fx∗∈F, and for a constant τf>0\tau_f > 0τf​>0

f(x)−f(x∗)≤τf ∥f′(x)∥2for all x∈F.f(x) - f(x^*) \le \tau_f\,\|f'(x)\|^2 \qquad \text{for all } x \in F .f(x)−f(x∗)≤τf​∥f′(x)∥2for all x∈F.

The minimizer need not be unique. Two examples:

  • Every γ\gammaγ-strongly convex function is in the class, with τf=1/(2γ)\tau_f = 1/(2\gamma)τf​=1/(2γ).
  • So is 12∑igi(x)2\frac12\sum_i g_i(x)^221​∑i​gi​(x)2 when the system g(x)=0g(x) = 0g(x)=0 with m≤nm \le nm≤n equations has a solution and a uniformly non-degenerate Jacobian on FFF. Its minima form a manifold, and the Hessian is singular there.

Two quantities appear in the targets. With Δk=f(xk)−f(x∗)\Delta_k = f(x_k) - f(x^*)Δk​=f(xk​)−f(x∗), they are

ω~=L04324 (L+L0)6 τf3,σ=ω~1/4ω~1/4+Δ01/4.\tilde\omega = \frac{L_0^4}{324\,(L + L_0)^6\,\tau_f^3}, \qquad \sigma = \frac{\tilde\omega^{1/4}}{\tilde\omega^{1/4} + \Delta_0^{1/4}} .ω~=324(L+L0​)6τf3​L04​​,σ=ω~1/4+Δ01/4​ω~1/4​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7

For every run of method (3.3) on a gradient dominated function of degree two, both of the following hold.

  1. If Δ0≥ω~\Delta_0 \ge \tilde\omegaΔ0​≥ω~ (4.14), then during the first phase, meaning every kkk with Δj≥ω~\Delta_j \ge \tilde\omegaΔj​≥ω~ for all j<kj < kj<k,
Δk≤Δ0 e−kσ.(4.15)\Delta_k \le \Delta_0\, e^{-k\sigma} . \tag{4.15}Δk​≤Δ0​e−kσ.(4.15)
  1. From any iteration k0k_0k0​ with Δk0<ω~\Delta_{k_0} < \tilde\omegaΔk0​​<ω~ on,
Δk+1≤ω~ (Δkω~)4/3.(4.16)\Delta_{k+1} \le \tilde\omega\,\Big(\frac{\Delta_k}{\tilde\omega}\Big)^{4/3} . \tag{4.16}Δk+1​≤ω~(ω~Δk​​)4/3.(4.16)

The constants 324324324, L04L_0^4L04​, (L+L0)6(L+L_0)^6(L+L0​)6 and τf3\tau_f^3τf3​ are the paper's, and neither weakened nor improved.

Milestones

In the order a proof would use them:

  1. The Taylor bound for the gradient, Lemma 1 (2.2).
  2. The stationarity equation (2.5) of TM(x)T_M(x)TM​(x).
  3. The second-order condition of Proposition 1.
  4. Lemma 2 (2.8).
  5. The model decrease, Lemma 4 (2.11).
  6. The gradient bound at the new point, Lemma 3 (2.9).
  7. The per-step decrease along a run, Lemma 7 (4.10):
f(xk)−f(xk+1)≥L0 ∥f′(xk+1)∥3/232 (L+L0)3/2.f(x_k) - f(x_{k+1}) \ge \frac{L_0\,\|f'(x_{k+1})\|^{3/2}}{3\sqrt2\,(L + L_0)^{3/2}} .f(xk​)−f(xk+1​)≥32​(L+L0​)3/2L0​∥f′(xk+1​)∥3/2​.
  1. The scalar recursion (4.17). With δk=Δk/ω~\delta_k = \Delta_k/\tilde\omegaδk​=Δk​/ω~, it reads δk≥δk+1+δk+13/4\delta_k \ge \delta_{k+1} + \delta_{k+1}^{3/4}δk​≥δk+1​+δk+13/4​.

Significance

The result shows that on the Polyak–Łojasiewicz class, cubic regularization has two properties at once.

  • Globally, it converges linearly with no convexity assumption.
  • Once the gap falls below ω~\tilde\omegaω~, it converges superlinearly, of order 4/34/34/3. This holds even when the minimizers are not isolated and the Hessian is singular at them, which is exactly the situation of Example 3, where the classical local quadratic convergence of Newton's method does not apply.

As the authors note, this is the only class in the paper where the initial gap Δ0\Delta_0Δ0​ enters the complexity of the first phase polynomially, through σ\sigmaσ.

The result has been proved on paper since 2006. As far as the platform's catalog shows, none of the paper's statements has a machine-checked proof. This mission produces:

  • a checked version of the Section 2 toolkit for the cubic step (Lemmas 1–4 and Proposition 1), which is shared by every theorem of the paper;
  • the per-step decrease of Lemma 7;
  • the two-phase rate itself.

Difficulty

Once Lemma 7 and the recursion (4.17) are in hand, deriving the two rates is elementary scalar analysis. The difficulty sits upstream.

The second-order condition. Proposition 1 is a statement about the global minimizer of a nonconvex function of nnn variables. The first-order condition (2.5) alone does not give it: a stationary point of the cubic model that is not a global minimizer can violate it. The inequality (2.11) on which every rate rests needs Proposition 1.

Lemma 7 needs two facts. First, the new iterate stays in FFF, where the Lipschitz bound applies. Second, the monotonicity of M↦M/(L+M)3/2M \mapsto M/(L+M)^{3/2}M↦M/(L+M)3/2 on (0,2L](0, 2L](0,2L], which lets the unknown MkM_kMk​ be replaced by L0L_0L0​.

The phases. Both need bookkeeping with nonnegative quantities under fractional powers. Along a run, the gap Δk\Delta_kΔk​ must be shown to be nonnegative and non-increasing before any power of it is taken.

Formalization scope

The following conventions are fixed:

  • Space and derivatives. The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) with arbitrary nnn. The gradient and Hessian are maps g and H, with HasGradientAt f (g x) x and HasFDerivAt g (H x) x at every x∈Fx \in Fx∈F. At boundary points these are two-sided derivatives. The Lipschitz condition uses the operator norm on E →L[ℝ] E, which is the spectral norm.
  • The step and the model value. TM(x)T_M(x)TM​(x) is represented by the predicate "T is a global minimizer of the cubic model", and every lemma about TM(x)T_M(x)TM​(x) is stated for every such T. The value fˉM(x)\bar f_M(x)fˉ​M​(x) is written as f(x)f(x)f(x) plus the model at that minimizer, with no infimum over an expression.
  • Runs. A run is a structure recording, for each kkk: x0x_0x0​, Mk∈[L0,2L]M_k \in [L_0, 2L]Mk​∈[L0​,2L], the global-minimizer property of xk+1x_{k+1}xk+1​, and the acceptance test. Indices start at 000.
  • Gradient domination. It is required on FFF, with τf>0\tau_f > 0τf​>0, and with x∗∈Fx^* \in Fx∗∈F minimizing fff over FFF. Under the level-set assumption this is the same as minimizing over Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn.
  • Phases. They are encoded literally. Item 2 is asserted from every k0k_0k0​ with Δk0<ω~\Delta_{k_0} < \tilde\omegaΔk0​​<ω~, which is equivalent to asserting it from the first such k0k_0k0​ because Δk\Delta_kΔk​ is non-increasing.
  • Fractional powers. They are Real.rpow of nonnegative numbers.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out. Using a stationary point in place of a global minimizer of the model, allowing τf≤0\tau_f \le 0τf​≤0, or requiring the domination inequality on all of Rn\mathbb{R}^nRn rather than on FFF would each change the theorem. None of these is done. A worked instance (f(x)=∥x∥2f(x) = \|x\|^2f(x)=∥x∥2, τf=1/4\tau_f = 1/4τf​=1/4) checks that the hypotheses are satisfiable.

A complete development needs Taylor estimates for a map with Lipschitz derivative on a convex set, the optimality conditions of the cubic subproblem (Section 5 of the paper characterizes its global minimizers through a one-dimensional dual problem), and some real-power arithmetic. The Section 2 lemmas are reusable for every other mission in the series and for any analysis of cubic-regularized or trust-region methods. Contributions are welcome at every level:

  • proofs of individual milestones;
  • alternative proofs of Proposition 1;
  • general Mathlib-style lemmas on second-order Taylor bounds.

Selected references

  • Yu. Nesterov and B. T. Polyak, Cubic regularization of Newton method and its global performance, Mathematical Programming Ser. A 108 (2006) 177–205. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-006-0706-8
  • B. T. Polyak, Gradient methods for minimizing functionals, USSR Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics 3 (1963) 864–878. https://doi.org/10.1016/0041-5553(63)90382-3
  • H. Karimi, J. Nutini and M. Schmidt, Linear convergence of gradient and proximal-gradient methods under the Polyak–Łojasiewicz condition, ECML PKDD 2016. https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.04636
  • C. Cartis, N. I. M. Gould and Ph. L. Toint, Adaptive cubic regularisation methods for unconstrained optimization. Part I: motivation, convergence and numerical results, Mathematical Programming 127 (2011) 245–295. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-009-0286-5
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Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cubic Regularization of Newton Method and Its Global Performance II: The Global Rate on Star-Convex FunctionsResearch Paper

Motivation

Newton's method converges quadratically near a non-degenerate minimizer, but classical theory says little about its behaviour far from one: the pure Newton step can move uphill, diverge, or be undefined when the Hessian is singular. For decades the global analysis of Newton-type methods consisted of convergence statements without rates. Nesterov and Polyak (Math. Program. 108, 2006) replaced the quadratic model of Newton's method by a cubic-regularized model and proved, for the first time, global worst-case complexity bounds for a second-order method on several problem classes, including classes of non-convex functions.

This mission covers one of these results: on star-convex functions, the method reduces the optimality gap at the rate O(1/k2)O(1/k^2)O(1/k2) (Theorem 4 of the paper). Star-convexity is a weakening of convexity that only asks for convexity along segments towards the global minimizers. It includes non-convex functions such as f(x)=∣x∣(1−e−∣x∣)f(x)=|x|(1-e^{-|x|})f(x)=∣x∣(1−e−∣x∣) on R\mathbb RR, and, as the paper notes, it arises in sum-of-squares problems such as f(x,y)=x2y2+x2+y2f(x,y)=x^2y^2+x^2+y^2f(x,y)=x2y2+x2+y2.

Timeline.

  • 1981: Griewank studies Newton's method modified by bounding cubic terms (Cambridge DAMTP technical report NA/12), without complexity bounds.
  • 2006: Nesterov and Polyak introduce method (3.3) and prove global rates: O(k−2/3)O(k^{-2/3})O(k−2/3) for a second-order stationarity measure on general functions with Lipschitz Hessian, O(1/k2)O(1/k^2)O(1/k2) on star-convex functions, and linear-then-superlinear rates on gradient-dominated functions.
  • 2008: Nesterov accelerates the method on convex functions to O(1/k3)O(1/k^3)O(1/k3) (Math. Program. 112).
  • 2011: Cartis, Gould and Toint develop adaptive cubic regularization (ARC), with inexact subproblem solves and adaptive regularization parameters (Math. Program. 127).
  • 2020: Hinder, Sidford and Sohoni give near-optimal first-order methods for star-convex and quasar-convex functions (arXiv:1906.11985).

Setting

Let F⊆RnF\subseteq\mathbb R^nF⊆Rn be a closed convex set with nonempty interior, and let f:Rn→Rf:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb Rf:Rn→R be twice differentiable on FFF, with gradient f′(x)f'(x)f′(x) and Hessian f′′(x)f''(x)f′′(x). A starting point x0∈int⁡Fx_0\in\operatorname{int}Fx0​∈intF is fixed, and FFF is assumed large enough to contain the level set {x:f(x)≤f(x0)}\{x: f(x)\le f(x_0)\}{x:f(x)≤f(x0​)} in its interior. Assumption 1 is that the Hessian is Lipschitz continuous on FFF with constant L>0L>0L>0:

∥f′′(x)−f′′(y)∥≤L∥x−y∥for all x,y∈F,\|f''(x)-f''(y)\|\le L\|x-y\|\qquad\text{for all }x,y\in F,∥f′′(x)−f′′(y)∥≤L∥x−y∥for all x,y∈F,

where the matrix norm is the spectral norm.

For a parameter M>0M>0M>0 and a point xxx, the cubic model is

mM,x(y)=⟨f′(x),y−x⟩+12⟨f′′(x)(y−x),y−x⟩+M6∥y−x∥3.m_{M,x}(y)=\langle f'(x),y-x\rangle+\tfrac12\langle f''(x)(y-x),y-x\rangle+\tfrac M6\|y-x\|^3 .mM,x​(y)=⟨f′(x),y−x⟩+21​⟨f′′(x)(y−x),y−x⟩+6M​∥y−x∥3.

The cubic step TM(x)T_M(x)TM​(x) is any global minimizer of mM,xm_{M,x}mM,x​ over Rn\mathbb R^nRn (Eq. (2.4)), and fˉM(x)=f(x)+min⁡ymM,x(y)\bar f_M(x)=f(x)+\min_y m_{M,x}(y)fˉ​M​(x)=f(x)+miny​mM,x​(y) is the model value.

Method (3.3) takes parameters 0<L0≤L0<L_0\le L0<L0​≤L. At iteration k≥0k\ge0k≥0 it finds Mk∈[L0,2L]M_k\in[L_0,2L]Mk​∈[L0​,2L] such that f(TMk(xk))≤fˉMk(xk)f(T_{M_k}(x_k))\le\bar f_{M_k}(x_k)f(TMk​​(xk​))≤fˉ​Mk​​(xk​), and sets xk+1=TMk(xk)x_{k+1}=T_{M_k}(x_k)xk+1​=TMk​​(xk​). The choice Mk≡LM_k\equiv LMk​≡L always passes the test.

A function fff is star-convex (Definition 1) if its set X∗X^*X∗ of global minimizers is nonempty and, for every x∗∈X∗x^*\in X^*x∗∈X∗, every x∈Fx\in Fx∈F and every α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1],

f(αx∗+(1−α)x)≤αf(x∗)+(1−α)f(x).f(\alpha x^*+(1-\alpha)x)\le\alpha f(x^*)+(1-\alpha)f(x).f(αx∗+(1−α)x)≤αf(x∗)+(1−α)f(x).

Write f∗=f(x∗)f^*=f(x^*)f∗=f(x∗) for the optimal value, and D=diam⁡FD=\operatorname{diam}FD=diamF when FFF is bounded.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4, item 2, inequality (4.2)

Assume fff is star-convex, FFF is bounded with diam⁡F=D\operatorname{diam}F=DdiamF=D, and f(x0)−f∗≤32LD3f(x_0)-f^*\le\tfrac32LD^3f(x0​)−f∗≤23​LD3. Then every run of method (3.3) satisfies

f(xk)−f(x∗)≤3LD32(1+13k)2,k≥0.f(x_k)-f(x^*)\le\frac{3LD^3}{2\left(1+\tfrac13k\right)^2},\qquad k\ge0 .f(xk​)−f(x∗)≤2(1+31​k)23LD3​,k≥0.

The constants are those printed on p. 189. The bound depends on the problem only through LLL and DDD; the lower parameter L0L_0L0​ and the choice of MkM_kMk​ within [L0,2L][L_0,2L][L0​,2L] are free.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1, (2.3): the cubic Taylor bound ∣f(y)−f(x)−⟨f′(x),y−x⟩−12⟨f′′(x)(y−x),y−x⟩∣≤L6∥y−x∥3|f(y)-f(x)-\langle f'(x),y-x\rangle-\tfrac12\langle f''(x)(y-x),y-x\rangle|\le\tfrac L6\|y-x\|^3∣f(y)−f(x)−⟨f′(x),y−x⟩−21​⟨f′′(x)(y−x),y−x⟩∣≤6L​∥y−x∥3 for x,y∈Fx,y\in Fx,y∈F.
  2. Lemma 4, (2.10): fˉM(x)≤min⁡y∈F[f(y)+L+M6∥y−x∥3]\bar f_M(x)\le\min_{y\in F}\big[f(y)+\tfrac{L+M}{6}\|y-x\|^3\big]fˉ​M​(x)≤miny∈F​[f(y)+6L+M​∥y−x∥3] for x∈Fx\in Fx∈F.
  3. Monotonicity of (3.3) (Section 3, p. 184): f(xk+1)≤f(xk)f(x_{k+1})\le f(x_k)f(xk+1​)≤f(xk​).
  4. Theorem 4, item 1: if f(x0)−f∗≥32LD3f(x_0)-f^*\ge\tfrac32LD^3f(x0​)−f∗≥23​LD3, then f(x1)−f∗≤12LD3f(x_1)-f^*\le\tfrac12LD^3f(x1​)−f∗≤21​LD3.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 gives a global function-value rate for a second-order method on a class that contains non-convex functions, with no assumption on the Hessian at the minimizer. The method needs no knowledge of the class: the same iteration (3.3) that yields second-order stationarity rates on general functions yields O(1/k2)O(1/k^2)O(1/k2) on star-convex ones. This adaptivity is the paper's main message for Section 4. The analysis also serves as the template for Theorems 5, 8 and 9 of the paper (star-convex with a non-degenerate minimum, and the convex case).

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved in the paper, and to our knowledge it has not been machine-checked. A complete formalization produces:

  • a reusable Lean statement of the cubic-regularized Newton step and of method (3.3);
  • the Taylor estimates under a Lipschitz Hessian in Rn\mathbb R^nRn;
  • a verified O(1/k2)O(1/k^2)O(1/k2) recursion argument.

These are the pieces needed for the paper's other rates and for later variants (accelerated and adaptive cubic regularization).

Difficulty

The argument has three parts, and each needs some care.

The first is the Taylor bound (2.3) on a convex set FFF, under a Hessian that is Lipschitz only on FFF. The Hessian is given as the derivative of a gradient map, not as a smooth function on all of Rn\mathbb R^nRn.

The second is keeping the iterates inside FFF. Lemma 4 and the diameter bound ∥x∗−xk∥≤D\|x^*-x_k\|\le D∥x∗−xk​∥≤D apply only to points of FFF. So the iterates must be shown to stay in the level set, and the points αx∗+(1−α)xk\alpha x^*+(1-\alpha)x_kαx∗+(1−α)xk​ used in the estimate must also lie in FFF.

The third is the passage from the one-step inequality to the explicit constant in (4.2). The one-step inequality is a minimum over α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1] of a cubic in α\alphaα. It has two regimes (the unconstrained minimizer αk\alpha_kαk​ lies inside [0,1][0,1][0,1] or beyond it), and the recursion for αk\alpha_kαk​ must be carried through without losing the constant 3LD3/23LD^3/23LD3/2 or the factor 13\tfrac1331​. A generic "sublinear recursion" lemma gives the rate only up to a constant, which is not the printed theorem.

Formalization scope

  • Space and derivatives. The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n) with nnn arbitrary. The gradient and Hessian are maps g and H with HasGradientAt f (g x) x and HasFDerivAt g (H x) x at every x∈Fx\in Fx∈F. These are two-sided derivatives, also at boundary points of FFF; the iterates lie in int⁡F\operatorname{int}FintF. The Hessian norm is the operator norm.
  • The cubic step. TM(x)T_M(x)TM​(x) is any global minimizer of the cubic model (IsCubicStep). Every statement about it holds for every such minimizer.
  • The model value. fˉM(x)\bar f_M(x)fˉ​M​(x) is written as f(x)+mM,x(T)f(x)+m_{M,x}(T)f(x)+mM,x​(T) at the chosen minimizer TTT.
  • The run. A run of (3.3) is the predicate IsCubicNewtonRun, with a 0-based index.
  • Star-convexity. IsStarConvexFn quantifies xxx over FFF, as in display (4.1). It requires X∗≠∅X^*\neq\emptysetX∗=∅ and the inequality for every global minimizer.
  • The diameter. DDD is Metric.diam F, with Bornology.IsBounded F as a hypothesis. It is the diameter of FFF itself, not of the level set.
  • The optimal value. f∗f^*f∗ is f(x∗)f(x^*)f(x∗) for a global minimizer x∗x^*x∗, not an arbitrary lower bound.

Ruling out trivial formalizations. Without the boundedness hypothesis, Metric.diam F is 000, and the goal would assert f(xk)=f∗f(x_k)=f^*f(xk​)=f∗ outright. The formalization keeps boundedness, the nonemptiness of X∗X^*X∗ and the global-minimizer reading of TM(x)T_M(x)TM​(x), so that the hypotheses describe the paper's class and not a degenerate one. The hypotheses are satisfiable: for example, f(y)=12∥y∥2f(y)=\tfrac12\|y\|^2f(y)=21​∥y∥2 on R1\mathbb R^1R1 with FFF the closed unit ball, x0=0x_0=0x0​=0 and Mk≡L=1M_k\equiv L=1Mk​≡L=1.

Contributions are welcome at every level: proofs of the milestones, and general-purpose lemmas on Taylor bounds with a Lipschitz Hessian on convex sets. Those lemmas are reusable for missions I, III and IV of this series, which formalize the paper's other rates.

Selected references

  • Yu. Nesterov and B. T. Polyak, Cubic regularization of Newton method and its global performance, Mathematical Programming Ser. A 108 (2006) 177–205. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-006-0706-8
  • Yu. Nesterov, Accelerating the cubic regularization of Newton's method on convex problems, Mathematical Programming Ser. B 112 (2008) 159–181. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-006-0089-x
  • C. Cartis, N. I. M. Gould and Ph. L. Toint, Adaptive cubic regularisation methods for unconstrained optimization. Part I: motivation, convergence and numerical results, Mathematical Programming 127 (2011) 245–295. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-009-0286-5
  • O. Hinder, A. Sidford and N. Sohoni, Near-optimal methods for minimizing star-convex functions and beyond, COLT 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.11985
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Bargaining under Incomplete Information II: The Linear Equilibrium of the Sealed-Offer Rule for Uniform ValuesResearch Paper

Motivation

A buyer and a seller negotiate over one indivisible good. Each knows the good's worth to themselves but not to the other side, so each shades their offer to exploit the other's uncertainty, and some mutually profitable trades fail. Chatterjee and Samuelson (Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Operations Research 31(5), 1983) modelled this as a one-shot game of simultaneous sealed offers and computed its equilibria in closed form for uniformly distributed values.

That closed-form equilibrium became the reference example of bilateral trade with two-sided private information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (J. Econ. Theory 29, 1983) proved that no mechanism can guarantee efficient trade in this setting and showed that, for uniform values, the equilibrium of the sealed-offer game with k=1/2k = 1/2k=1/2 attains the largest expected gains from trade of any incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanism. The later literature on the kkk-double auction (Satterthwaite and Williams, J. Econ. Theory 48, 1989; Leininger, Linhart and Radner, J. Econ. Theory 48, 1989) studies the same game and uses the linear equilibrium as its benchmark.

Setting

A seller has reservation price vsv_svs​ and a buyer has reservation price vbv_bvb​, both in [0,vˉ][0, \bar v][0,vˉ] with vˉ>0\bar v > 0vˉ>0. Each knows their own value. Each believes the other's value is uniformly distributed on [0,vˉ][0, \bar v][0,vˉ]: the distribution functions are Fs(v)=Fb(v)=v/vˉF_s(v) = F_b(v) = v/\bar vFs​(v)=Fb​(v)=v/vˉ on [0,vˉ][0, \bar v][0,vˉ]. In Lean this belief is the measure unif v̄, Lebesgue measure conditioned on [0,vˉ][0, \bar v][0,vˉ].

Under the Bargaining Rule, the seller asks sss and the buyer offers bbb simultaneously. If b≥sb \ge sb≥s the good is sold at P=kb+(1−k)sP = kb + (1-k)sP=kb+(1−k)s for a fixed k∈[0,1]k \in [0, 1]k∈[0,1]; if b<sb < sb<s there is no sale. On a sale the seller earns P−vsP - v_sP−vs​ and the buyer vb−Pv_b - Pvb​−P; otherwise both earn zero. The case k=1k = 1k=1 gives the buyer the right to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, k=0k = 0k=0 gives it to the seller, and k=1/2k = 1/2k=1/2 splits the difference.

An offer strategy maps values to offers: SSS for the seller, BBB for the buyer. Against SSS, a buyer with value vvv who offers bbb earns in expectation

πb(b,v)=∫1{S(vs)≤b} (v−kb−(1−k)S(vs)) d unifvˉ(vs),\pi_b(b, v) = \int \mathbf 1\{S(v_s) \le b\}\,\bigl(v - kb - (1-k)S(v_s)\bigr)\,d\,\mathrm{unif}_{\bar v}(v_s),πb​(b,v)=∫1{S(vs​)≤b}(v−kb−(1−k)S(vs​))dunifvˉ​(vs​),

and against BBB a seller with value vvv asking sss earns πs(s,v)=∫1{s≤B(vb)} (kB(vb)+(1−k)s−v) d unifvˉ(vb)\pi_s(s, v) = \int \mathbf 1\{s \le B(v_b)\}\,(kB(v_b) + (1-k)s - v)\,d\,\mathrm{unif}_{\bar v}(v_b)πs​(s,v)=∫1{s≤B(vb​)}(kB(vb​)+(1−k)s−v)dunifvˉ​(vb​). These are buyerProfit and sellerProfit. The pair (S,B)(S, B)(S,B) is an equilibrium (IsEquilibrium) if, for every value in [0,vˉ][0, \bar v][0,vˉ], each player's prescribed offer maximises their expected profit over all real offers.

Formalization targets

Goal: Example 1(a)

Write Slin(v)=v2−k+1−k2vˉS_{\mathrm{lin}}(v) = \frac{v}{2-k} + \frac{1-k}{2}\bar vSlin​(v)=2−kv​+21−k​vˉ and Blin(v)=v1+k+k(1−k)2(1+k)vˉB_{\mathrm{lin}}(v) = \frac{v}{1+k} + \frac{k(1-k)}{2(1+k)}\bar vBlin​(v)=1+kv​+2(1+k)k(1−k)​vˉ. If SSS and BBB are measurable and

S(vs)=Slin(vs)for 0≤vs≤2−k2vˉ,S(vs)≥Slin(vs)for 2−k2vˉ<vs≤vˉ,B(vb)≤Blin(vb)for 0≤vb<1−k2vˉ,B(vb)=Blin(vb)for 1−k2vˉ≤vb≤vˉ,\begin{aligned} S(v_s) &= S_{\mathrm{lin}}(v_s) && \text{for } 0 \le v_s \le \tfrac{2-k}{2}\bar v, &\qquad S(v_s) &\ge S_{\mathrm{lin}}(v_s) && \text{for } \tfrac{2-k}{2}\bar v < v_s \le \bar v,\\ B(v_b) &\le B_{\mathrm{lin}}(v_b) && \text{for } 0 \le v_b < \tfrac{1-k}{2}\bar v, &\qquad B(v_b) &= B_{\mathrm{lin}}(v_b) && \text{for } \tfrac{1-k}{2}\bar v \le v_b \le \bar v, \end{aligned}S(vs​)B(vb​)​=Slin​(vs​)≤Blin​(vb​)​​for 0≤vs​≤22−k​vˉ,for 0≤vb​<21−k​vˉ,​S(vs​)B(vb​)​≥Slin​(vs​)=Blin​(vb​)​​for 22−k​vˉ<vs​≤vˉ,for 21−k​vˉ≤vb​≤vˉ,​

then (S,B)(S, B)(S,B) is an equilibrium. The statement leaves the no-trade branches free, as the paper does: a seller whose value exceeds every serious bid may ask anything at least SlinS_{\mathrm{lin}}Slin​, and a buyer whose value is below every serious ask may bid anything at most BlinB_{\mathrm{lin}}Blin​.

Milestones

  1. The linear rules solve (3a)–(3b). The paper's own justification of Example 1(a): with Fb=Fs=v/vˉF_b = F_s = v/\bar vFb​=Fs​=v/vˉ and densities 1/vˉ1/\bar v1/vˉ, the pair (Slin,Blin)(S_{\mathrm{lin}}, B_{\mathrm{lin}})(Slin​,Blin​) satisfies the linked differential equations of the paper's Theorem 2, kFb(y)S′(y)+fb(y)S(y)=B−1(S(y))fb(y)kF_b(y)S'(y) + f_b(y)S(y) = B^{-1}(S(y))f_b(y)kFb​(y)S′(y)+fb​(y)S(y)=B−1(S(y))fb​(y) and (1−k)(1−Fs(x))B′(x)−fs(x)B(x)=−S−1(B(x))fs(x)(1-k)(1 - F_s(x))B'(x) - f_s(x)B(x) = -S^{-1}(B(x))f_s(x)(1−k)(1−Fs​(x))B′(x)−fs​(x)B(x)=−S−1(B(x))fs​(x).
  2. Seller half. For every seller value v∈[0,vˉ]v \in [0, \bar v]v∈[0,vˉ] and every real ask sss, πs(s,v)≤πs(S(v),v)\pi_s(s, v) \le \pi_s(S(v), v)πs​(s,v)≤πs​(S(v),v).
  3. Buyer half. For every buyer value v∈[0,vˉ]v \in [0, \bar v]v∈[0,vˉ] and every real offer bbb, πb(b,v)≤πb(B(v),v)\pi_b(b, v) \le \pi_b(B(v), v)πb​(b,v)≤πb​(B(v),v).

The goal is the conjunction of milestones 2 and 3, by definition of equilibrium. Milestone 1 is the step the paper actually writes down; it records the necessary first-order conditions and does not by itself give the global best-response property.

Significance

The result. Example 1(a) is the explicit equilibrium from which the paper derives the probability of trade, (−k2+k+2)/8(-k^2 + k + 2)/8(−k2+k+2)/8, and each party's ex ante profit as a function of kkk (Example 1(b)–(c)). It is the equilibrium shown by Myerson and Satterthwaite to be second-best efficient at k=1/2k = 1/2k=1/2, and it is the standard test case against which other double-auction equilibria and mechanisms for bilateral trade are compared.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the literature but, to our knowledge, has not been machine-checked. The paper itself only observes that the linear branches satisfy the first-order conditions; the global statement (no deviation to any real offer is profitable, including deviations that reach the other side's no-trade types) is left to the reader. A formal proof closes that gap and yields reusable facts about expected profits under uniform beliefs. The two companion missions of this series formalize the paper's Theorem 2 (the linked differential equations in general) and Example 1(b)–(c) (trade probability and expected profits).

Difficulty

First-order conditions do not suffice. A seller can ask below the lowest serious ask 1−k2vˉ\frac{1-k}{2}\bar v21−k​vˉ and trade with buyers on the free lower branch, whose bids are only bounded above; a buyer can bid above 2−k2vˉ\frac{2-k}{2}\bar v22−k​vˉ and meet sellers on the free upper branch, whose asks are only bounded below. The best-response inequality must hold for every such deviation and for every admissible choice of the free branches, so it cannot be read off from the linear strategies alone. The expected profit is a piecewise function of the offer, with the pieces determined by where the offer meets the opponent's linear branch and the free branches, and the inequality must be shown on each piece and at the boundaries, uniformly in k∈[0,1]k \in [0, 1]k∈[0,1] including the endpoints k=0k = 0k=0 and k=1k = 1k=1, where one of the free ranges is empty.

Formalization scope

Values and offers are real numbers; strategies are functions R→R\mathbb R \to \mathbb RR→R, and their values outside [0,vˉ][0, \bar v][0,vˉ] are irrelevant because the beliefs give that set measure zero. Beliefs are the probability measure unif v̄ = volume[|Icc 0 v̄]; expected profits are Bochner integrals against it, written over the opponent's value rather than against an offer density. The value intervals are closed; ties b=sb = sb=s trade; deviations range over all of R\mathbb RR; kkk ranges over the closed interval [0,1][0, 1][0,1].

The strategies SSS and BBB are assumed measurable. Without this a deviation's expected profit could be the junk value 000 of a non-integrable Bochner integral; with it, all integrands are bounded on the trade event. The inline coefficient (k(1−k)/2(1+k))vˉ(k(1-k)/2(1+k))\bar v(k(1−k)/2(1+k))vˉ of the page is read as k(1−k)2(1+k)vˉ\frac{k(1-k)}{2(1+k)}\bar v2(1+k)k(1−k)​vˉ, the reading under which the buyer's lowest serious bid equals the seller's lowest serious ask, as in the paper's Figure 1.

The claim is the sufficiency direction only; the paper states that other equilibria exist, and a statement that every equilibrium has the linear form would be false. The canonical linear pair satisfies all hypotheses, so the goal is not vacuous.

Useful infrastructure includes integrals of piecewise-affine functions against the uniform measure on an interval and the distribution function of volume[|Icc 0 v̄]. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and lemmas computing πs\pi_sπs​ and πb\pi_bπb​ in closed form on each piece.

Selected references

  • K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson, Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Operations Research 31(5):835–851, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.31.5.835
  • R. B. Myerson and M. A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, Journal of Economic Theory 29(2):265–281, 1983. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
  • M. A. Satterthwaite and S. R. Williams, Bilateral Trade with the Sealed Bid k-Double Auction: Existence and Efficiency, Journal of Economic Theory 48(1):107–133, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90120-8
  • W. Leininger, P. B. Linhart and R. Radner, Equilibria of the Sealed-Bid Mechanism for Bargaining with Incomplete Information, Journal of Economic Theory 48(1):63–106, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90121-X
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CombinatoricsOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions III: Guarantees of Deterministic Local SearchResearch Paper

Motivation

Many optimization problems ask for a subset of a finite ground set that maximizes a function with diminishing returns: the cut of a graph or a directed graph, the value of a facility-location configuration, the entropy of a set of random variables, or a welfare function in combinatorial auctions. These functions are submodular but typically non-monotone: adding elements can decrease the value. Max Cut and Max Directed Cut are the textbook special cases. Unconstrained maximization of a nonnegative non-monotone submodular function is NP-hard, and before Feige, Mirrokni and Vondrák (SIAM J. Comput. 40(4), 2011) no constant-factor approximation was known for general such functions in the value-oracle model.

The paper gives several algorithms. A uniformly random set achieves 1/41/41/4 of the optimum (a separate mission of this series). This mission concerns the paper's first deterministic algorithm: a local search that repeatedly adds or removes a single element while the value improves by a factor larger than 1+ϵ/n21 + \epsilon/n^21+ϵ/n2, and returns the better of the final set and its complement. The key structural fact behind it, that a local optimum of a submodular function dominates all its subsets and supersets, goes back to Cherenin (1962) and Goldengorin, Tijssen and Tso (1999).

Timeline. Cherenin (1962) and Goldengorin–Tijssen–Tso (1999): local optima dominate comparable sets. Schäffer and Yannakakis (SIAM J. Comput. 1991): finding an exact local optimum of Max Cut is PLS-complete, which is why the algorithm here uses an approximate improvement threshold. Feige–Mirrokni–Vondrák (FOCS 2007; SIAM J. Comput. 2011): the 1/31/31/3 and 1/21/21/2 guarantees of this mission, and 2/52/52/5 for a randomized "smooth" local search. Buchbinder, Feldman, Naor and Schwartz (SIAM J. Comput. 2015): a randomized double-greedy 1/21/21/2-approximation, which is optimal in the value-oracle model by the lower bound of the same 2011 paper.

Setting

Let XXX be a finite ground set with n=∣X∣n = |X|n=∣X∣ elements. A set function assigns a real number f(S)f(S)f(S) to every S⊆XS \subseteq XS⊆X. It is submodular (Definition 1.1) if

f(S∪T)+f(S∩T)≤f(S)+f(T)for all S,T⊆X,f(S \cup T) + f(S \cap T) \le f(S) + f(T) \qquad \text{for all } S, T \subseteq X,f(S∪T)+f(S∩T)≤f(S)+f(T)for all S,T⊆X,

and symmetric if f(X∖S)=f(S)f(X \setminus S) = f(S)f(X∖S)=f(S) for all SSS. Throughout the section of the paper formalized here, fff is nonnegative. The algorithm may query f(S)f(S)f(S) for any SSS (a value oracle). The optimum is OPT=max⁡S⊆Xf(S)\mathrm{OPT} = \max_{S \subseteq X} f(S)OPT=maxS⊆X​f(S).

A set SSS is a local optimum if f(S∪{a})≤f(S)f(S \cup \{a\}) \le f(S)f(S∪{a})≤f(S) for every a∉Sa \notin Sa∈/S and f(S∖{a})≤f(S)f(S \setminus \{a\}) \le f(S)f(S∖{a})≤f(S) for every a∈Sa \in Sa∈S. It is a (1+α)(1+\alpha)(1+α)-approximate local optimum (Definition 3.2) if (1+α)f(S)≥f(S∖{v})(1+\alpha)f(S) \ge f(S \setminus \{v\})(1+α)f(S)≥f(S∖{v}) for v∈Sv \in Sv∈S and (1+α)f(S)≥f(S∪{v})(1+\alpha)f(S) \ge f(S \cup \{v\})(1+α)f(S)≥f(S∪{v}) for v∉Sv \notin Sv∈/S.

Algorithm LS with parameter ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0 and c=1+ϵ/n2c = 1 + \epsilon/n^2c=1+ϵ/n2:

  1. Let S:={v}S := \{v\}S:={v}, where f({v})f(\{v\})f({v}) is the maximum over all singletons.
  2. If some a∈X∖Sa \in X \setminus Sa∈X∖S has f(S∪{a})>c f(S)f(S \cup \{a\}) > c\,f(S)f(S∪{a})>cf(S), let S:=S∪{a}S := S \cup \{a\}S:=S∪{a} and repeat step 2.
  3. If some a∈Sa \in Sa∈S has f(S∖{a})>c f(S)f(S \setminus \{a\}) > c\,f(S)f(S∖{a})>cf(S), let S:=S∖{a}S := S \setminus \{a\}S:=S∖{a} and go back to step 2.
  4. Return max⁡{f(S),f(X∖S)}\max\{f(S), f(X \setminus S)\}max{f(S),f(X∖S)}.

In Lean these are Submodular, SymmetricSetFun, OPT, IsLocalOptimum, IsApproxLocalOptimum, lsStep, IsLSRun, IsLSTerminal and lsOutput in NonmonotoneSubmod.LocalSearch.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4 (p. 1141)

For nonnegative submodular fff on a nonempty XXX and ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0, every run of Algorithm LS, with any choice of starting singleton and of improving elements, satisfies:

at termination at S:max⁡{f(S),f(X∖S)}≥(13−ϵn)OPT;\text{at termination at } S:\qquad \max\{f(S), f(X\setminus S)\} \ge \Big(\frac13 - \frac{\epsilon}{n}\Big)\mathrm{OPT};at termination at S:max{f(S),f(X∖S)}≥(31​−nϵ​)OPT; if f is symmetric, at termination at S:f(S)≥(12−ϵn)OPT;\text{if } f \text{ is symmetric, at termination at } S:\qquad f(S) \ge \Big(\frac12 - \frac{\epsilon}{n}\Big)\mathrm{OPT};if f is symmetric, at termination at S:f(S)≥(21​−nϵ​)OPT; if n≥2, after any k steps:(1+ϵn2)k≤n.\text{if } n \ge 2, \text{ after any } k \text{ steps}:\qquad \Big(1 + \frac{\epsilon}{n^2}\Big)^k \le n.if n≥2, after any k steps:(1+n2ϵ​)k≤n.

The last line is the explicit content of the printed bound of O(1ϵn3log⁡n)O(\frac1\epsilon n^3 \log n)O(ϵ1​n3logn) oracle calls: it gives k=O(1ϵn2log⁡n)k = O(\frac1\epsilon n^2 \log n)k=O(ϵ1​n2logn) steps of at most 2n2n2n queries each, and in particular termination.

Milestones, in attack order

  1. Lemma 3.1: a local optimum SSS of a submodular fff satisfies f(T)≤f(S)f(T) \le f(S)f(T)≤f(S) whenever T⊆ST \subseteq ST⊆S or T⊇ST \supseteq ST⊇S.
  2. Lemma 3.3: for a (1+α)(1+\alpha)(1+α)-approximate local optimum, f(T)≤(1+nα)f(S)f(T) \le (1 + n\alpha) f(S)f(T)≤(1+nα)f(S) for such TTT.
  3. Termination bridge (sentence after Algorithm LS): a set at which LS has terminated is a (1+ϵ/n2)(1+\epsilon/n^2)(1+ϵ/n2)-approximate local optimum.
  4. First display of the proof: 2(1+nα)f(S)+f(X∖S)≥f(C)2(1+n\alpha)f(S) + f(X\setminus S) \ge f(C)2(1+nα)f(S)+f(X∖S)≥f(C) for every CCC.
  5. Second display, symmetric case: 2(1+nα)f(S)≥f(C)2(1+n\alpha)f(S) \ge f(C)2(1+nα)f(S)≥f(C) for every CCC.
  6. OPT≤nf({v})\mathrm{OPT} \le n f(\{v\})OPT≤nf({v}) for a maximum-value singleton, when n≥2n \ge 2n≥2.
  7. Growth along a run: f(Sk)≥(1+ϵ/n2)kf({v})f(S_k) \ge (1+\epsilon/n^2)^k f(\{v\})f(Sk​)≥(1+ϵ/n2)kf({v}).

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.4 is the deterministic constant-factor approximation of the paper that first gave guaranteed approximation factors for maximizing general nonnegative submodular functions ("Prior to our work, to the best of our knowledge, no guaranteed approximation factor was known", p. 1135), and the 1/21/21/2 bound for symmetric functions matches the value-oracle lower bound proved in the same paper (so it is optimal for symmetric functions among algorithms using polynomially many queries). Local search with a multiplicative acceptance threshold was subsequently used for constrained non-monotone submodular maximization (matroid and knapsack constraints, Lee–Mirrokni–Nagarajan–Sviridenko 2010).

Formalizing it. The result is proved; to our knowledge neither the theorem nor Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 has a machine-checked proof. The mission produces a reusable finite model of set functions and single-element local search over Finset, with the algorithm stated as a nondeterministic step relation, so that the guarantee is proved for every tie-breaking rule. The same model is the starting point for formalizing other local-search guarantees.

Difficulty

The natural first idea, to argue from an exact local optimum via Lemma 3.1, does not apply: LS stops at an approximate local optimum, and the error α\alphaα per element must be accumulated along a chain of up to nnn single-element changes between SSS and S∩CS \cap CS∩C or S∪CS \cup CS∪C. This accumulation is where the nonnegativity of fff enters (the lemma fails for negative-valued fff), and where the factor nα=ϵ/nn\alpha = \epsilon/nnα=ϵ/n in the final ratio comes from. The running-time bound requires relating OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT to the best singleton, which uses submodularity on sets of all sizes and breaks down on a one-element ground set. A further bookkeeping difficulty is the algorithm itself: its steps are ordered (removals only when no addition applies), and the termination bridge must use that order.

Formalization scope

  • Ground set: X : Type with [Fintype X] [DecidableEq X]; subsets are Finset X; fff is Finset X → ℝ; complements are Sᶜ. nnn is (Fintype.card X : ℝ).
  • Nonnegativity is the hypothesis ∀ S, 0 ≤ f S (standing assumption of §3); Lemma 3.1 and the termination bridge are stated without it, as they need none.
  • OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT is the maximum over all subsets (Finset.sup'), never a supremum with a default value.
  • The algorithm is a relation: a run is a sequence S : ℕ → Finset X with S 0 = {v} for any maximum-value singleton v and consecutive sets related by an LS step; the theorems quantify over all runs. Steps use strict inequalities, termination their negation, exactly as printed.
  • Added hypotheses, each disclosed in the item statements: ϵ>0\epsilon > 0ϵ>0 (implicit in the paper); X≠∅X \neq \emptysetX=∅ for the goal; α≥0\alpha \ge 0α≥0 and f≥0f \ge 0f≥0 for Lemma 3.3 and the displays; n≥2n \ge 2n≥2 for OPT≤nf({v})\mathrm{OPT} \le n f(\{v\})OPT≤nf({v}) and the step bound (both false for n=1n = 1n=1: f(∅)=5f(\emptyset) = 5f(∅)=5, f({v})=0f(\{v\}) = 0f({v})=0). The displays are stated for every set CCC, not only an optimal one.
  • The printed O(1ϵn3log⁡n)O(\frac1\epsilon n^3 \log n)O(ϵ1​n3logn) oracle-call bound, an asymptotic statement with an unquantified constant, is replaced by the explicit step bound (1+ϵ/n2)k≤n(1+\epsilon/n^2)^k \le n(1+ϵ/n2)k≤n that its proof establishes.
  • Ruling out trivialization: the goal names the algorithm (its start at a maximum singleton, its ordered step rules, termination, and the returned maximum). A statement "for every (1+α)(1+\alpha)(1+α)-approximate local optimum" is a milestone, not the theorem; an exact local optimum (α=0\alpha = 0α=0) is a different algorithm.
  • Not in scope: the tight example of pp. 1141–1142, the randomized local search of §3.2, and the hardness results of §4.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, general lemmas about chains of single-element changes in Finset, and the derivation of the goal from them.

Selected references

  • U. Feige, V. S. Mirrokni, J. Vondrák, Maximizing Non-Monotone Submodular Functions, SIAM J. Comput. 40(4):1133–1153, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1137/090779346
  • V. Cherenin, Solving some combinatorial problems of optimal planning by the method of successive calculations, Novosibirsk, 1962 (in Russian).
  • B. Goldengorin, G. Tijssen, M. Tso, The Maximization of Submodular Functions: Old and New Proofs for the Correctness of the Dichotomy Algorithm, SOM report, University of Groningen, 1999.
  • A. A. Schäffer, M. Yannakakis, Simple local search problems that are hard to solve, SIAM J. Comput. 20(1):56–87, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1137/0220004
  • J. Lee, V. S. Mirrokni, V. Nagarajan, M. Sviridenko, Maximizing nonmonotone submodular functions under matroid or knapsack constraints, SIAM J. Discrete Math. 23(4):2053–2078, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1137/090750020
  • N. Buchbinder, M. Feldman, J. Naor, R. Schwartz, A tight linear time (1/2)-approximation for unconstrained submodular maximization, SIAM J. Comput. 44(5):1384–1402, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1137/130929205
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