Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality II: Two-Person Correlated Equilibrium Distributions Are the Solutions of Linear InequalitiesResearch Paper
Motivation
A correlated equilibrium is the equilibrium notion that arises when the players of a game take their actions on the advice of a common randomizing device, each player seeing only his own recommendation. It was introduced by Aumann in 1974 (Aumann 1974). Aumann's 1987 paper (Aumann 1987) gives the simple, finite form of the definition used today (Definition 2.1) and shows that the notion is what Bayesian rationality with a common prior predicts. On the way it records, as Proposition 2.3, the fact that makes correlated equilibrium tractable in practice: for a finite two-person game, the distributions over action pairs that come from correlated equilibria are exactly the solutions of an explicit finite system of linear inequalities.
That characterization is the starting point of the computational theory of correlated equilibria. Because the set is a polyhedron, an optimal correlated equilibrium can be found by linear programming, and no-swap-regret learning dynamics converge to this set (Foster and Vohra 1997; Hart and Mas-Colell 2000). In each of these works the linear-inequality description is taken as the definition; the paper's Proposition 2.3 is the bridge back to the strategic definition.
Setting
Player 1 has a finite set of actions and player 2 a finite set . For and , and are the two players' payoffs at the action pair .
A correlated strategy pair is a pair of functions , on a finite probability space : a finite set with nonnegative weights summing to . Chance draws and suggests the action to player . The pair is a correlated equilibrium (Definition 2.1, condition (2.2)) if no player gains by a deviation that depends only on his own suggestion: for every ,
and the analogous inequality holds for player 2 and every .
A distribution is a family with and . The distribution of a correlated strategy pair assigns to the probability . A correlated equilibrium distribution (c.e.d.) is the distribution of some correlated equilibrium on some finite probability space.
In the Lean development these are IsDistribution p, IsProbVec μ, IsCE h₁ h₂ μ f₁ f₂, distr μ f₁ f₂ and IsCED h₁ h₂ p, with h₁ j k and p j k .
Formalization targets
Goal: Proposition 2.3
For every distribution : is a correlated equilibrium distribution if and only if
Milestones
- Identification with distributions (Sect. 2, p. 4). A correlated strategy pair is a correlated equilibrium if and only if its distribution satisfies for all , and the analogous condition for player 2.
- Conditioning on possible suggestions (proof of Prop. 2.3, p. 6). For a distribution, player 1's condition holds if and only if for every suggestion of positive probability and every , where ; likewise for player 2.
- Player 1 gives (2.4): player 1's condition on is equivalent to (2.4).
- Player 2 gives (2.5): player 2's condition on is equivalent to (2.5).
A further statement, not a milestone, records the paper's example on p. 5: in the game of chicken (Figure 4) the distribution of Figure 5 is a c.e.d. with expected payoff .
Significance
The result. Proposition 2.3 turns an existential statement — there is some probability space and some correlated strategy pair that is an equilibrium and has distribution — into finitely many linear inequalities on alone. Consequently the set of c.e.d.'s is a compact convex polyhedron, membership is decidable by evaluating linear forms, and optimizing a linear objective over it is a linear program. The paper states the two-person case and remarks that "the principle, however, is no different in the general case".
Formalizing it. The proposition is classical and its proof is short; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The platform already has the linear-inequality (swap) form of correlated equilibrium for two-player games on Fin m × Fin n (Foster–Vohra 1997 missions) and Aumann's 1974 randomizing-structure model, but no statement that connects the strategic definition over arbitrary finite probability spaces with the linear system. This mission supplies that connection, so that results proved about the polyhedron apply to equilibria in Aumann's sense and conversely.
Difficulty
The mathematics is elementary; the care is in the statement. Two points need attention. First, the direction from the inequalities to a c.e.d. requires constructing a probability space and a correlated strategy pair whose distribution is the given ; the c.e.d. notion quantifies over probability spaces, not over distributions. Second, the paper's argument divides by the probability of a suggestion, which may be zero; the conditional formulation (milestone 2) holds only over possible suggestions, while (2.4) and (2.5) quantify over all actions and hold trivially at impossible ones. Deviations must be functions of the player's own suggestion: restricting to constant deviations gives coarse correlated equilibrium, which (2.4)–(2.5) do not characterize, and allowing arbitrary functions of gives a stronger notion.
Formalization scope
Two players with finite action types S₁ S₂ : Type* (Fintype, DecidableEq); payoffs h₁ h₂ : S₁ → S₂ → ℝ; distributions p : S₁ → S₂ → ℝ with the sign and sum conditions as an explicit hypothesis of every statement about distributions. Finite probability spaces are finite types Γ : Type with a probability vector μ : Γ → ℝ; deviations are compositions φ ∘ f₁ with φ : S₁ → S₁. The conditional payoffs , use Lean's x / 0 = 0 and are only ever used at possible suggestions. Empty action sets admit no distribution, so the statements are then vacuous, exactly as in the paper.
A trivializing formalization is ruled out: "c.e.d." is the existential notion over finite probability spaces with a genuine probability vector and an equilibrium in the sense of Definition 2.1, not the inequalities themselves or the swap form on .
No infrastructure beyond finite sums and Finset.filter is needed. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and the -player generalization the paper alludes to.
Selected references
- R. J. Aumann, Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality, Econometrica 55 (1987), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911154
- R. J. Aumann, Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974), 67–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8
- D. P. Foster and R. V. Vohra, Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium, Games and Economic Behavior 21 (1997), 40–55. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0595
- S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium, Econometrica 68 (2000), 1127–1150. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00153