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Operations Research

911 missions · 543 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Power and Limitations of Affine Policies in Two-Stage Adaptive Optimization I: An Affine Policy Is Optimal When the Uncertainty Set Is a SimplexResearch Paper

Motivation

Two-stage adaptive optimization models decisions taken in two rounds: a first-stage decision xxx is fixed before an uncertain parameter is revealed, and a second-stage decision y(b)y(b)y(b) is chosen after the parameter bbb is observed, so that the second stage may depend on bbb arbitrarily. The objective is the worst case over an uncertainty set U\mathcal UU of possible parameters. Such models arise in robust network design, capacity planning and two-stage covering problems, and they generalize the two-stage robust combinatorial problems (set cover, facility location) studied by Dhamdhere, Goyal, Ravi and Singh.

Optimizing over all functions y(⋅)y(\cdot)y(⋅) is intractable in general: Bertsimas and Goyal note that the optimal second stage is piecewise linear in bbb with possibly exponentially many pieces (Bemporad, Borrelli and Morari, 2003). A standard remedy, introduced for robust linear programs by Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer and Nemirovski (2004), restricts the second stage to affine policies (linear decision rules) y(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+q; the best affine policy is computable by a single convex program and performs well empirically. The question is when this restriction loses nothing.

Timeline of the relevant results:

  • 2004. Ben-Tal, Goryashko, Guslitzer and Nemirovski introduce affinely adjustable robust counterparts and show that the best affine policy is tractable for many uncertainty sets (doi:10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y).
  • 2010. Bertsimas, Iancu and Parrilo prove that affine policies are optimal for a class of multistage robust problems with one-dimensional uncertainty per stage and box uncertainty sets (doi:10.1287/moor.1100.0444).
  • 2012. Bertsimas and Goyal, the source of this mission, prove that an affine policy is optimal for model (1) whenever U\mathcal UU is a simplex (Theorem 1), and show that this exactness breaks down for slightly larger sets (doi:10.1007/s10107-011-0444-4).

Setting

Let A∈Rm×n1A\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_1}A∈Rm×n1​, B∈Rm×n2B\in\mathbb R^{m\times n_2}B∈Rm×n2​, c∈R+n1c\in\mathbb R^{n_1}_+c∈R+n1​​ and d∈R+n2d\in\mathbb R^{n_2}_+d∈R+n2​​. The problem ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U) of model (1) is

zAdapt(U)=min⁡ cTx+max⁡b∈UdTy(b)s.t.Ax+By(b)≥b,  x≥0,  y(b)≥0∀b∈U,z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)=\min\ c^Tx+\max_{b\in\mathcal U}d^Ty(b)\quad\text{s.t.}\quad Ax+By(b)\ge b,\ \ x\ge 0,\ \ y(b)\ge 0\quad\forall b\in\mathcal U,zAdapt​(U)=min cTx+b∈Umax​dTy(b)s.t.Ax+By(b)≥b,  x≥0,  y(b)≥0∀b∈U,

where inequalities between vectors are componentwise. A pair (x,y)(x,y)(x,y) satisfying the constraints is feasible; its worst-case cost is cTx+max⁡b∈UdTy(b)c^Tx+\max_{b\in\mathcal U}d^Ty(b)cTx+maxb∈U​dTy(b). A feasible pair is optimal when its worst-case cost equals zAdapt(U)z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAdapt​(U), and an affine policy is a second stage of the form y(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+qy(b)=Pb+q with P∈Rn2×mP\in\mathbb R^{n_2\times m}P∈Rn2​×m, q∈Rn2q\in\mathbb R^{n_2}q∈Rn2​, still required to be nonnegative on U\mathcal UU. The value zAff(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U) is the same minimum restricted to affine policies.

A simplex in Rm\mathbb R^mRm is the convex hull

U=conv⁡(b1,…,bm+1)\mathcal U=\operatorname{conv}(b^1,\dots,b^{m+1})U=conv(b1,…,bm+1)

of m+1m+1m+1 affinely independent points, that is, points for which b1−bm+1,…,bm−bm+1b^1-b^{m+1},\dots,b^m-b^{m+1}b1−bm+1,…,bm−bm+1 are linearly independent. The proof works with the m×mm\times mm×m matrix Q=[(b1−bm+1)⋯(bm−bm+1)]Q=[(b^1-b^{m+1})\cdots(b^m-b^{m+1})]Q=[(b1−bm+1)⋯(bm−bm+1)], the matrix Y=[(y∗(b1)−y∗(bm+1))⋯(y∗(bm)−y∗(bm+1))]Y=[(y^*(b^1)-y^*(b^{m+1}))\cdots(y^*(b^m)-y^*(b^{m+1}))]Y=[(y∗(b1)−y∗(bm+1))⋯(y∗(bm)−y∗(bm+1))] of display (2), and the affine rule y~(b)=YQ−1(b−bm+1)+y∗(bm+1)\tilde y(b)=YQ^{-1}(b-b^{m+1})+y^*(b^{m+1})y~​(b)=YQ−1(b−bm+1)+y∗(bm+1). In Lean these are Qmat v, Ymat v g and interpolant v g, with vertices v : Fin (m+1) → Fin m → ℝ.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

If U=conv⁡(b1,…,bm+1)\mathcal U=\operatorname{conv}(b^1,\dots,b^{m+1})U=conv(b1,…,bm+1) with affinely independent bj∈R+mb^j\in\mathbb R^m_+bj∈R+m​ and ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U) is feasible, then there exist x^\hat xx^, P∈Rn2×mP\in\mathbb R^{n_2\times m}P∈Rn2​×m and q∈Rn2q\in\mathbb R^{n_2}q∈Rn2​ such that

(x^, y^),y^(b)=Pb+q  (b∈U),(\hat x,\ \hat y),\qquad \hat y(b)=Pb+q\ \ (b\in\mathcal U),(x^, y^​),y^​(b)=Pb+q  (b∈U),

is an optimal solution of ΠAdapt(U)\Pi_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)ΠAdapt​(U), optimal among all (not only affine) two-stage solutions. In particular zAff(U)=zAdapt(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)=z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U)=zAdapt​(U).

Milestones

The proof of Theorem 1 has no numbered lemma; the milestones are its displayed steps, in attack order:

  1. QQQ is invertible (PDF p. 6).
  2. For b=∑jαjbjb=\sum_j\alpha_jb^jb=∑j​αj​bj with ∑jαj=1\sum_j\alpha_j=1∑j​αj​=1: Q−1(b−bm+1)=(α1,…,αm)TQ^{-1}(b-b^{m+1})=(\alpha_1,\dots,\alpha_m)^TQ−1(b−bm+1)=(α1​,…,αm​)T (PDF p. 6).
  3. y~(∑jαjbj)=∑jαj y∗(bj)\tilde y\big(\sum_j\alpha_jb^j\big)=\sum_j\alpha_j\,y^*(b^j)y~​(∑j​αj​bj)=∑j​αj​y∗(bj) (PDF pp. 6–7).
  4. Displays (3)–(5): for any feasible (x∗,y∗)(x^*,y^*)(x∗,y∗), the pair (x∗,y~)(x^*,\tilde y)(x∗,y~​) is feasible and every bound on the worst-case cost of (x∗,y∗)(x^*,y^*)(x∗,y∗) also bounds that of (x∗,y~)(x^*,\tilde y)(x∗,y~​) (PDF p. 7).

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 identifies a class of uncertainty sets on which the tractable affine restriction is exact, for every constraint matrix AAA and BBB and every nonnegative cost. It is the positive anchor of the paper: Sections 3 and 4 show that with m+3m+3m+3 extreme points the best affine policy can already be worse by a factor 2−δ2-\delta2−δ, and that on sets with exponentially many extreme points the gap can be Ω(m1/2−δ)\Omega(m^{1/2-\delta})Ω(m1/2−δ); Section 6 uses a dominating simplex, on which affine policies are exact, to build an O(m)O(\sqrt m)O(m​)-approximation for general U\mathcal UU. The theorem also says that on a simplex the whole adaptive problem reduces to m+1m+1m+1 scenario copies of a linear program.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper; no machine-checked version is known on Prove2Me. This mission produces the model (1) in Lean, the barycentric-coordinate identity for a simplex in matrix form, and a statement of optimality that asserts attainment of the minimum in (1), which the paper's proof takes for granted.

Difficulty

Two steps are not routine to formalize. First, the paper starts from "an optimal solution x∗,y∗(b)x^*,y^*(b)x∗,y∗(b)", that is, it assumes the minimum in (1) is attained. Over arbitrary functions y(⋅)y(\cdot)y(⋅) this is not automatic; on a simplex it follows because the problem reduces to a finite linear program on the vertices, whose optimum is attained, but Mathlib has no theory of linear-programming attainment, so this reduction has to be built. Second, the affine-independence step needs the passage from affine independence of m+1m+1m+1 points to invertibility of the m×mm\times mm×m matrix QQQ, and the identity Q−1(b−bm+1)=αQ^{-1}(b-b^{m+1})=\alphaQ−1(b−bm+1)=α requires the barycentric coordinates and the inverse matrix to be matched index by index. The naive idea of comparing zAffz_{Aff}zAff​ and zAdaptz_{Adapt}zAdapt​ as real infima does not prove the goal: equality of the two infima says nothing about the existence of an optimal solution.

Formalization scope

Vectors in Rm\mathbb R^mRm are Fin m → ℝ, with the componentwise order; matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ. The paper's indices start at 111, Lean's at 000: bjb^jbj is v (j-1) and bm+1b^{m+1}bm+1 is v (Fin.last m). The simplex is convexHull ℝ (Set.range v); it is compact, convex and, by affine independence, full-dimensional, so these standing assumptions of (1) are not stated separately. Nonnegativity of U\mathcal UU is the hypothesis that all m+1m+1m+1 vertices are nonnegative (the page writes j=1,…,mj=1,\dots,mj=1,…,m, a slip for m+1m+1m+1). Feasibility of (1) is a hypothesis, as the paper assumes. Optimality (IsOptimalAdapt) means: feasible, and every worst-case cost bound achieved by any feasible two-stage solution is achieved by this one. The values zAdaptz_{Adapt}zAdapt​ and zAffz_{Aff}zAff​ are infima of the sets of achievable bounds; they are provided for reference and the goal does not depend on them.

The goal must not be replaced by zAff(U)≤zAdapt(U)z_{Aff}(\mathcal U)\le z_{Adapt}(\mathcal U)zAff​(U)≤zAdapt​(U), by optimality among affine policies only, or by a version that assumes an optimal solution exists: each of these drops the content "there is an optimal solution and it is affine". The goal does not mention QQQ, YYY or the interpolant.

A complete development needs: linear-programming attainment for a finite system of linear inequalities with a cost bounded below (reusable well beyond this mission), the linear-algebra lemmas relating affine independence to an invertible edge matrix (reusable for barycentric coordinates in general), and the convex-hull representation of points of a simplex. Contributions of any of these as separate lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Goyal, On the power and limitations of affine policies in two-stage adaptive optimization, Math. Program. Ser. A, 2012. doi:10.1007/s10107-011-0444-4
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Goryashko, E. Guslitzer, A. Nemirovski, Adjustable robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Math. Program. 99(2), 351–376, 2004. doi:10.1007/s10107-003-0454-y
  • D. Bertsimas, D. A. Iancu, P. A. Parrilo, Optimality of affine policies in multistage robust optimization, Math. Oper. Res. 35(2), 363–394, 2010. doi:10.1287/moor.1100.0444
  • A. Bemporad, F. Borrelli, M. Morari, Min–max control of constrained uncertain discrete-time linear systems, IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 48(9), 1600–1606, 2003. doi:10.1109/TAC.2003.816984
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Convex OptimizationLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Robust Solutions of Uncertain Linear Programs I: Under Constraint-wise Uncertainty and the Boundedness Assumption the Robust Counterpart Is No Worse Than the Worst InstanceResearch Paper

Motivation

A linear program is solved with data that, in practice, is rarely known exactly: coefficients come from measurements, estimates or forecasts. Robust optimization asks for a solution that remains feasible for every realization of the data in a prescribed uncertainty set, and among those the one with the best guaranteed objective value. Ben-Tal and Nemirovski introduced this framework for linear programming in Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs (Oper. Res. Lett. 25, 1999), following their treatment of robust convex optimization (Math. Oper. Res. 23, 1998) and Soyster's earlier work on inexact linear programming (Oper. Res. 21, 1973). The robust counterpart has since become the starting point of a large literature on uncertainty sets, budgets of uncertainty and adjustable policies.

A natural first objection is that the robust counterpart might be needlessly conservative: by demanding feasibility for all realizations simultaneously, it could be infeasible, or have a worse value, even when every individual realization is perfectly well behaved. This mission formalizes the paper's answer (§2.2): under two structural hypotheses, the robust counterpart is no worse than the worst realization.

Setting

Fix c,f∈Rnc, f \in \mathbb R^nc,f∈Rn and write a linear program in the homogeneous form (6)

(P)min⁡{cTx∣Ax≥0, fTx=1},(P)\qquad \min\{c^{T}x \mid Ax \ge 0,\ f^{T}x = 1\},(P)min{cTx∣Ax≥0, fTx=1},

where AAA is a real m×nm\times nm×n matrix and Ax≥0Ax\ge0Ax≥0 is componentwise. Every linear program can be put in this form. The matrix AAA is uncertain: it is only known to lie in an uncertainty set U\mathcal UU of m×nm\times nm×n matrices. Each A∈UA\in\mathcal UA∈U gives an instance (P)(P)(P) with feasible set {x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1}\{x\mid Ax\ge0,\ f^{T}x = 1\}{x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1} and optimal value c∗(P)c^*(P)c∗(P); the family of instances is P\mathcal PP. The robust counterpart (7) is

(PU)min⁡{cTx∣x∈GU},GU={x∣Ax≥0  ∀A∈U; fTx=1},(P_{\mathcal U})\qquad \min\{c^{T}x \mid x \in G_{\mathcal U}\},\qquad G_{\mathcal U} = \{x\mid Ax\ge0\ \ \forall A\in\mathcal U;\ f^{T}x = 1\},(PU​)min{cTx∣x∈GU​},GU​={x∣Ax≥0  ∀A∈U; fTx=1},

and its optimal value is c∗c^*c∗. Since GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ does not change when U\mathcal UU is replaced by its closed convex hull, the paper assumes throughout that U\mathcal UU is convex and closed.

Let Ui⊆Rn\mathcal U_i\subseteq\mathbb R^nUi​⊆Rn be the set of all realizations of the iii-th row, the projection of U\mathcal UU onto the data of the iii-th constraint. The uncertainty is constraint-wise if U=U1×⋯×Um\mathcal U = \mathcal U_1\times\dots\times\mathcal U_mU=U1​×⋯×Um​: the rows vary independently. The Boundedness Assumption asks for a convex compact set Q⊆RnQ\subseteq\mathbb R^nQ⊆Rn that contains the feasible set of every instance.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 2.1 (p. 5)

If the uncertainty is constraint-wise and the Boundedness Assumption holds, then

  1. (PU)(P_{\mathcal U})(PU​) is infeasible if and only if some instance is infeasible:
GU=∅  ⟺  ∃A∈U: {x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1}=∅;G_{\mathcal U} = \emptyset \iff \exists A\in\mathcal U:\ \{x\mid Ax\ge0,\ f^{T}x=1\}=\emptyset;GU​=∅⟺∃A∈U: {x∣Ax≥0, fTx=1}=∅;
  1. if (PU)(P_{\mathcal U})(PU​) is feasible with optimal value c∗c^*c∗, then
c∗=sup⁡{c∗(P)∣(P)∈P}.(9)c^* = \sup\{c^*(P)\mid (P)\in\mathcal P\}. \tag{9}c∗=sup{c∗(P)∣(P)∈P}.(9)

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof: the row-wise description (8) of robust feasibility; the inclusion of GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ in every instance's feasible set; the reduction of the semi-infinite system (8) on QQQ to a finite subsystem; the statement that the finite system (10) A1x≥0,…,ANx≥0, fTx=1A_1x\ge0,\dots,A_Nx\ge0,\ f^{T}x=1A1​x≥0,…,AN​x≥0, fTx=1 then has no solution at all; the Farkas certificate (11); the construction of one infeasible instance from it; and part (i) alone, which part (ii) uses for an augmented program.

Companions

The §2.2 example (every instance has optimal value 1, the robust counterpart is infeasible), and the two invariance remarks: GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ is unchanged under passing to the closed convex hull of U\mathcal UU (§2.1) or to the product U1×⋯×Um\mathcal U_1\times\dots\times\mathcal U_mU1​×⋯×Um​ of its projections (§2.2).

Significance

Proposition 2.1 says that, for constraint-wise uncertainty, robustness costs nothing beyond what the worst realization already costs: the robust counterpart is feasible exactly when every instance is, and its optimal value equals the worst instance value. The §2.2 example shows the hypothesis cannot be dropped: there, correlated uncertainty in two rows makes every instance solvable with value 1 while the robust counterpart is infeasible. Together with the invariance of GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​ under passing to the product of projections, this explains why row-wise (constraint-wise) uncertainty sets are the standard modelling choice in robust linear optimization.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known to exist. Formalizing it produces a reusable development of semi-infinite linear systems: the compactness reduction to finite subsystems, a homogeneous Farkas alternative, and the row-averaging argument that uses convexity and the product structure of U\mathcal UU.

Difficulty

The robust counterpart has a continuum of constraints, one for each A∈UA\in\mathcal UA∈U, so Farkas' Lemma cannot be applied to it directly. The step that requires care is passing from infeasibility of this semi-infinite system to infeasibility of a single instance. Compactness yields only finitely many instances whose joint system has no solution in QQQ; those instances are in general all feasible individually, and the infeasible instance has to be manufactured from their rows. Without constraint-wise uncertainty the manufactured matrix need not lie in U\mathcal UU, which is exactly what the §2.2 example exploits. Part (ii) needs the optimal values of the instances to be attained on compact feasible sets, which is where the Boundedness Assumption enters again.

Formalization scope

Vectors are Fin n → ℝ, matrices Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ, and Ax≥0Ax\ge0Ax≥0 is 0 ≤ A *ᵥ x in the componentwise order. The iii-th row of AAA is A i and aTxa^{T}xaTx is a ⬝ᵥ x. The projections Ui\mathcal U_iUi​ are the images of U\mathcal UU under A↦AiA\mapsto A_iA↦Ai​, not free sets, and constraint-wise uncertainty is the inclusion U1×⋯×Um⊆U\mathcal U_1\times\dots\times\mathcal U_m\subseteq\mathcal UU1​×⋯×Um​⊆U (the reverse inclusion always holds). The Boundedness Assumption keeps both convexity and compactness of QQQ, as on the page.

Optimal values are infima: c∗c^*c∗ is the greatest lower bound (IsGLB) of cTxc^{T}xcTx over GUG_{\mathcal U}GU​, and (9) states that c∗c^*c∗ is the least upper bound (IsLUB) of the set of real optimal values of the instances. No real sInf/sSup is used, so no junk value can make the statement true.

The goal carries the paper's standing assumption that U\mathcal UU is convex and closed, and one disclosed addition: U\mathcal UU is nonempty. The paper takes this for granted; without it part (i) fails for f=0f = 0f=0 and the supremum in (9) ranges over the empty set. The goal does not assume that the robust counterpart or any instance attains its optimum, and it does not mention finite subsystems, multipliers or the averaged matrix; those appear only in the milestones. A formalization in which the uncertainty sets Ui\mathcal U_iUi​ are arbitrary sets with U=∏iUi\mathcal U = \prod_i\mathcal U_iU=∏i​Ui​, or in which optimal values are taken as sInf without boundedness, would not be faithful and is ruled out.

A complete development needs: compactness arguments for families of closed half-spaces, a Farkas alternative for homogeneous systems with one normalizing equation, and elementary convexity of linear images. These pieces are general and reusable beyond robust optimization. Proofs of the milestones, alternative arguments (for instance via LP duality for part (ii)) and proofs of the companion statements are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs, Operations Research Letters 25(1):1–13, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-6377(99)00016-4 (cited here by the pages of the authors' manuscript).
  • A. Ben-Tal, A. Nemirovski, Robust convex optimization, Mathematics of Operations Research 23(4):769–805, 1998. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.23.4.769
  • A. L. Soyster, Convex programming with set-inclusive constraints and applications to inexact linear programming, Operations Research 21(5):1154–1157, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.21.5.1154
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🏆Completed
CombinatoricsLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence 5: The Seven-Element Fano Matroid Corresponds to No Real MatrixResearch Paper

Motivation

Whitney's 1935 paper On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence introduced matroids: finite sets equipped with a rank function, or equivalently a family of independent sets, obeying a few postulates abstracted from the linear dependence of the columns of a matrix. The obvious first question about such an abstraction is whether it is genuinely more general than its model, that is, whether there are matroids that do not arise from any matrix. Section 16 of the paper answers it with a seven-element example, now called the Fano matroid F7F_7F7​, and proves that no real matrix corresponds to it.

The question has had a long life. Representability of matroids over a given field is a central theme of matroid theory: Tutte (1958) characterized the matroids representable over the field with two elements by a single excluded minor, the four-point line U2,4U_{2,4}U2,4​, and the regular matroids by three excluded minors, U2,4U_{2,4}U2,4​, F7F_7F7​ and its dual; and Seymour's decomposition of regular matroids (1980) rests on the same objects. Whitney's §16 is the starting point of this line: the first proof that the abstract postulates admit matroids outside linear algebra over R\mathbb RR.

Timeline:

  • 1935. Whitney defines matroids, the circuit matrix of a matrix, and proves (§16) that the seven-element matroid M′M'M′ corresponds to no real matrix; in a footnote he credits Saunders MacLane with finding that M′M'M′ corresponds to no matrix and identifying it with a finite projective geometry. On p. 533 he exhibits a matrix of integers mod 2 for M′M'M′.
  • 1958. Tutte characterizes binary and regular matroids by excluded minors; F7F_7F7​ appears as an excluded minor for regularity (Tutte 1958).

Setting

Let M=(aij)\mathbf M=(a_{ij})M=(aij​) be an m×nm\times nm×n matrix with columns C1,…,CnC_1,\dots,C_nC1​,…,Cn​. For a set NNN of columns, let r(N)r(N)r(N) be the rank of the submatrix formed by those columns. Regarding the columns as abstract elements gives a matroid MMM on {C1,…,Cn}\{C_1,\dots,C_n\}{C1​,…,Cn​} with rank function rrr: the matroid of M\mathbf MM. A matroid corresponds to M\mathbf MM if it is the matroid of M\mathbf MM, with elements matched to columns.

A circuit of a matroid is a minimal dependent set. For a circuit P={i1,…,ip}P=\{i_1,\dots,i_p\}P={i1​,…,ip​} of the matroid of M\mathbf MM, there are numbers b1,…,bnb_1,\dots,b_nb1​,…,bn​ with ∑jaijbj=0\sum_j a_{ij}b_j=0∑j​aij​bj​=0 for every row iii, and bj≠0b_j\neq 0bj​=0 exactly for j∈Pj\in Pj∈P; the set of such vectors is written Zi1⋯ipZ_{i_1\cdots i_p}Zi1​⋯ip​​ when only the support condition is meant. Stacking one such row per circuit gives the circuit matrix M′\mathbf M'M′ of M\mathbf MM, determined up to nonzero factors on its rows.

A fundamental set of circuits of a matroid MMM with nullity n(M)=ρ(M)−r(M)n(M)=\rho(M)-r(M)n(M)=ρ(M)−r(M) (ρ\rhoρ the number of elements) is a family of circuits P1,…,PqP_1,\dots,P_qP1​,…,Pq​ with q=n(M)q=n(M)q=n(M) such that the elements can be ordered e1,…,ene_1,\dots,e_ne1​,…,en​ with en−q+i∈Pie_{n-q+i}\in P_ien−q+i​∈Pi​ and en−q+j∉Pie_{n-q+j}\notin P_ien−q+j​∈/Pi​ for j>ij>ij>i; it is strict if en−q+j∉Pie_{n-q+j}\notin P_ien−q+j​∈/Pi​ for every j≠ij\neq ij=i.

The matroid M′M'M′ of §16 has elements 1,…,71,\dots,71,…,7; its bases (maximal independent sets) are all three-element sets except

124,135,167,236,257,347,456.(16.1)124,\quad 135,\quad 167,\quad 236,\quad 257,\quad 347,\quad 456. \qquad (16.1)124,135,167,236,257,347,456.(16.1)

Formalization targets

Goal: §16, pp. 529–530

∃ M′and∀m ∀ M∈Rm×7: M′ is not the matroid of M.\exists\,M' \quad\text{and}\quad \forall m\ \forall\,\mathbf M\in\mathbb R^{m\times 7}:\ M' \text{ is not the matroid of } \mathbf M .∃M′and∀m ∀M∈Rm×7: M′ is not the matroid of M.

The number of rows is arbitrary; the existence clause makes the non-existence statement non-vacuous.

Milestones

  1. §12. Every real matrix has a matroid: the ranks of column submatrices satisfy the rank postulates.
  2. §14, (14.1). Every real matrix has a circuit matrix.
  3. Theorem 29. The rows of a fundamental set of circuits form a base for the rows of the circuit matrix, so r(M′)=q=n(M)r(\mathbf M')=q=n(\mathbf M)r(M′)=q=n(M).
  4. Lemma 10. The support of a vector in the row space HHH of a circuit matrix is a union of circuits.
  5. Lemma 11. Two vectors of HHH with the same circuit as support are proportional.
  6. Theorem 32. For a circuit matrix normalised along a strict fundamental set, a minor DDD vanishes iff an associated q×qq\times qq×q minor D′D'D′ vanishes, iff some circuit avoids a prescribed set of columns.
  7. §16, rank of M′M'M′. The rank of a kkk-set is kkk for k≤2k\le 2k≤2, 333 for k≥4k\ge 4k≥4, and for k=3k=3k=3 it is 222 on (16.1) and 333 otherwise.
  8. p. 533. M′M'M′ is the matroid of an explicit 3×73\times 73×7 matrix of integers mod 2.

Significance

The result. The theorem separates the abstract notion of matroid from linear dependence over R\mathbb RR: some matroids are not real-representable. It also exhibits that representability depends on the field, because the same matroid is the matroid of a matrix over the integers mod 2 (milestone 8). Everything later written about representability over particular fields, excluded-minor characterizations, and the gap between abstract and linear matroids starts from this distinction. Theorem 32 is of independent interest: it translates statements about circuits of a represented matroid into the vanishing of minors of a normalised circuit matrix.

Formalizing it. The result is classical and its proof is short on paper, but it is not formalized in Mathlib, which has matroids (Matroid, circuits, ranks) but no column matroid of a matrix with a rank-of-submatrix characterization, no circuit matrix, and no Fano matroid. The mission produces those objects and the bridge lemmas (Theorem 29, Lemmas 10–11, Theorem 32) that connect matroid circuits with linear algebra of the circuit matrix. No machine-checked proof of the non-representability of the Fano matroid over R\mathbb RR in Lean is known to the curators.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt is a direct search: suppose a real m×7m\times 7m×7 matrix has M′M'M′ as its matroid and derive a contradiction from the seven dependent triples. This does not work as stated. Each rank condition is a determinantal (nonlinear) condition on the entries, the number of rows mmm is unbounded, and a representation is determined only up to row operations and column scalings, so there is no finite case check and no single linear computation that settles the question. The contradiction has to come from an argument that is invariant under these symmetries, and the milestones (circuit vectors determined up to scaling, fundamental sets spanning, circuits detected by minors) are what such an argument needs to be stated in. The field also matters: the argument must use that 2≠02\neq 02=0 in R\mathbb RR, since over a field of characteristic 2 the statement is false (milestone 8).

Formalization scope

  • Elements and matrices. Matroids are Mathlib Matroids whose ground set is the whole (finite) type. The Fano matroid lives on Fin 7, Whitney's element kkk being k - 1; the seven triples are written out literally. Matrices are Matrix (Fin m) ι K; "the matroid of M\mathbf MM" means: ground set everything, and the rank M.eRk N of every finite set NNN of columns equals Matrix.rank of the column submatrix.
  • Field. The goal and Lemmas 10–11, Theorems 29 and 32 are stated over R\mathbb RR, as in the paper; the predicate "matroid of a matrix" is stated over any field so that the mod-2 milestone uses the same notion.
  • Circuit matrix. Rows are determined up to nonzero factors, so "circuit matrix" is a predicate on a matrix together with a bijection between its rows and the circuits; every theorem holds for every such choice.
  • Nullity and indices. q=n(M)q=n(M)q=n(M) is written q+r(M)=ρ(M)q+r(M)=\rho(M)q+r(M)=ρ(M) in extended naturals, with no truncated subtraction. In Theorem 32, n=p+qn=p+qn=p+q, the complement of i1,…,isi_1,\dots,i_si1​,…,is​ is given as an order embedding of Fin t with s+t=qs+t=qs+t=q, and determinants are of square submatrices in the paper's row and column order.
  • Ruling out trivial readings. The goal includes the existence of M′M'M′; without it "every matroid with these bases has no real matrix" could hold vacuously. The goal quantifies over every number of rows; fixing m=3m=3m=3 would be a weaker statement.

Reusable beyond this mission: the matroid of a matrix over a field, the circuit matrix, fundamental sets of circuits, and the Fano matroid. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, and a proof of the goal by any route, including one that does not go through Theorem 32.

Selected references

  • H. Whitney, On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence, American Journal of Mathematics 57 (1935), 509–533. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371182
  • W. T. Tutte, A homotopy theorem for matroids, I, II, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 88 (1958), 144–174. https://doi.org/10.2307/1993244
  • J. Oxley, Matroid Theory, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198566946.001.0001
  • O. Veblen and J. W. Young, Projective Geometry, Vol. I, Ginn, 1910 (cited by Whitney for the finite projective geometry).
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CombinatoricsLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence 6: Every Matroid Satisfying (C*) Is Represented by a Matrix of Integers Mod 2Research Paper

Motivation

Whitney's 1935 paper introduced matroids as an abstraction of linear dependence among the columns of a matrix. Most of the paper works over the real numbers; its appendix asks which matroids arise from matrices of integers mod 2, that is, matrices with entries 0 and 1 in which rank and dependence are computed over the two-element field. These are today's binary matroids. They include the cycle matroids of graphs (Whitney closes the paper by noting that graphs correspond to mod-2 matrices with exactly two ones in each column) and they are the setting of several later structure theorems: Tutte's excluded-minor characterization of binary matroids (Tutte 1958), Seymour's decomposition of regular matroids (Seymour 1980) and Seymour's theory of binary clutters and max-flow min-cut (Seymour 1977), which underlies parts of combinatorial optimization.

Whitney's answer is an intrinsic postulate, (C*), on the circuits of the matroid, stated without reference to any matrix, and a constructive representation theorem (Theorem 37): a matroid satisfying (C*) is the matroid of a mod-2 matrix, and the matrix is unique once the columns of one base are fixed.

Setting

A matroid MMM on elements e1,…,ene_1, \dots, e_ne1​,…,en​ is given by its independent sets; its circuits are its minimal dependent sets, its rank r(M)r(M)r(M) is the size of a base, and its nullity is n(M)=n−r(M)n(M) = n - r(M)n(M)=n−r(M). Here MMM is a Mathlib Matroid (Fin n) whose ground set is all of Fin n.

Subsets of the elements are added mod 2: a sum of finitely many sets is the set of elements lying in an odd number of them (for two sets, the symmetric difference). A cycle is a sum mod 2 of circuits; the empty sum is the null cycle ∅\emptyset∅. A set is a true sum of sets that have no common elements and whose union it is. Postulate (C*) requires that each cycle be a true sum of circuits.

With n=r+qn = r + qn=r+q, a family P1,…,PqP_1, \dots, P_qP1​,…,Pq​ is a strict fundamental set of circuits with respect to en−q+1,…,ene_{n-q+1}, \dots, e_nen−q+1​,…,en​ if q=n(M)q = n(M)q=n(M), each PiP_iPi​ is a circuit, and PiP_iPi​ contains en−q+ie_{n-q+i}en−q+i​ but no other en−q+je_{n-q+j}en−q+j​.

For a matrix M\mathbf MM over the integers mod 2 with columns C1,…,CnC_1, \dots, C_nC1​,…,Cn​, columns are independent (mod 2) if no non-null subset of them sums to the zero column. The matroid corresponding to M\mathbf MM has the column indices as elements and these independent sets.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 37 (p. 533)

Let MMM satisfy (C*), with elements e1,…,ene_1, \dots, e_ne1​,…,en​ and base {e1,…,en−q}\{e_1, \dots, e_{n-q}\}{e1​,…,en−q​}. For every matrix M1\mathbf M_1M1​ mod 2 (any number of rows) whose n−qn - qn−q columns are independent mod 2,

∃! M=(M1∣Cn−q+1⋯Cn)  whose corresponding matroid is M.\exists!\ \mathbf M = (\mathbf M_1 \mid C_{n-q+1} \cdots C_n) \ \text{ whose corresponding matroid is } M.∃! M=(M1​∣Cn−q+1​⋯Cn​)  whose corresponding matroid is M.

Milestones

  1. Theorem 9 (p. 517): if e1,…,en−qe_1, \dots, e_{n-q}e1​,…,en−q​ is a base, there is a unique strict fundamental set of circuits with respect to en−q+1,…,ene_{n-q+1}, \dots, e_nen−q+1​,…,en​.
  2. Appendix, p. 531: (C*) implies the circuit postulate (C₂), for any family of sets.
  3. Theorem 33: under (C*), the circuits are exactly the minimal non-null cycles.
  4. Theorem 34: under (C*), the cycles are exactly the 2q2^q2q sums mod 2 of a strict fundamental set.
  5. Theorem 35: two (C*)-matroids with a common strict fundamental set have the same circuits.
  6. Theorem 36: any P1,…,PqP_1, \dots, P_qP1​,…,Pq​ with en−q+i∈Pi⊆{e1,…,en−q,en−q+i}e_{n-q+i} \in P_i \subseteq \{e_1, \dots, e_{n-q}, e_{n-q+i}\}en−q+i​∈Pi​⊆{e1​,…,en−q​,en−q+i​} is the strict fundamental set of exactly one (C*)-matroid.
  7. Appendix, p. 532: the matroid of a matrix mod 2 exists, satisfies (C*), and its cycles are the supports of the mod-2 dependencies among the columns.

Milestone 7 and the goal together characterize binary matroids as the matroids satisfying (C*).

Significance

The result. Theorem 37 and the p. 532 claim give an intrinsic, matrix-free description of the matroids representable over the two-element field, and Theorem 36 parametrizes all of them by qqq arbitrary subsets of a base. Uniqueness in Theorem 37 says that a binary representation is determined by the columns of one base; in modern terms, binary matroids are uniquely representable over GF(2) up to row operations. Every later theory of binary matroids, including graphic and cographic matroids, Tutte's excluded-minor theorem and Seymour's decomposition, starts from this equivalence.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper and in textbooks (e.g. Oxley, Matroid Theory, Ch. 9) but, at the Mathlib revision used here, there is no notion of a matroid represented by a matrix over a field, and no binary-matroid theory. On Prove2Me, the existing binary objects (SeymourMFMC.Binary.*) are binary clutters defined through blockers, not matroids represented by mod-2 matrices. This mission produces the representation predicate for mod-2 matrices, the cycle space of a matroid, and the equivalence between (C*) and binary representability.

Difficulty

Writing down candidate columns is not the hard part; showing that the matroid of the completed matrix is MMM itself, and not merely a matroid sharing some of its circuits, is. Whitney's example at the end of §9 exhibits two different matroids with a common strict fundamental set, so agreement on fundamental circuits does not by itself identify a matroid; any argument must use (C*) on both the given matroid and the matroid of the matrix. A naive comparison of independent sets column by column does not close this gap. Uniqueness likewise depends on the independence mod 2 of the prescribed columns: without it, different completions can give the same matroid.

Formalization scope

  • Matroids are Mathlib Matroid (Fin (r + q)) with ground set Set.univ; Whitney's eke_kek​ is k - 1, his e1,…,en−qe_1, \dots, e_{n-q}e1​,…,en−q​ is the range of Fin.castAdd q, and en−q+ie_{n-q+i}en−q+i​ is Fin.natAdd r (i - 1). Writing n=r+qn = r + qn=r+q removes natural-number subtraction; qqq is not a free parameter, since {e1,…,er}\{e_1, \dots, e_r\}{e1​,…,er​} is required to be a base.
  • Sums mod 2 count parity of membership (sumMod2); cycles are sums over finite sets of circuits; true sums are unions over finite pairwise-disjoint sets of circuits; (C*) is SatisfiesCStar on the circuit family {C | M.IsCircuit C}. These definitions take the circuit family as a parameter, so that the (C₂) milestone is posed for an arbitrary family of sets, as Whitney poses it.
  • A strict fundamental set includes the nullity condition r(M)+q=ρ(M)r(M) + q = \rho(M)r(M)+q=ρ(M), stated in N∞\mathbb N_\inftyN∞​.
  • Matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) (ZMod 2) with any mmm; independence mod 2 of columns is LinearIndepOn (ZMod 2) of the columns (the rows of the transpose). IsMatroidOf M A compares all independent sets, not only bases.
  • Ruled out: the goal is not satisfied by any statement that compares only the bases of one size, by an existence-only statement without uniqueness, or by real (instead of mod-2) independence.
  • Tacit hypotheses made explicit: the matroid's ground set is exactly e1,…,ene_1, \dots, e_ne1​,…,en​ (ρ(M)=n\rho(M) = nρ(M)=n); the elements and matroids are finite.

Contributions welcome: the general fact that the matroid of a vector family over a field exists (a reusable Matroid.ofFun-style construction over any field), the cycle-space lemmas, and proofs of the milestones in any order.

Selected references

  • H. Whitney, On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence, American Journal of Mathematics 57 (1935), 509–533. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371182
  • W. T. Tutte, A homotopy theorem for matroids, I, II, Transactions of the AMS 88 (1958), 144–174. https://doi.org/10.2307/1993244
  • P. D. Seymour, The matroids with the max-flow min-cut property, Journal of Combinatorial Theory Ser. B 23 (1977), 189–222. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(77)90031-4
  • P. D. Seymour, Decomposition of regular matroids, Journal of Combinatorial Theory Ser. B 28 (1980), 305–359. https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(80)90075-1
  • J. Oxley, Matroid Theory, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198566946.001.0001
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Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence 3: Two Elements Share a Component Iff Some Circuit Contains BothResearch Paper

Motivation

Hassler Whitney's 1935 paper On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence introduced matroids: finite sets of elements carrying an abstract rank function that behaves like the rank of a set of vectors. Part II of the paper opens with the decomposition of a matroid into components. The question it answers is basic to every later use of matroids: when does a matroid split into independent pieces, and how can the pieces be recognized?

For the matroid of a graph (elements = edges, rank = number of vertices minus number of connected pieces spanned) the components are the 2-connected blocks of the graph, and Whitney's theorem recovers the classical fact that two edges lie in a common block exactly when they lie on a common cycle. Whitney had studied separability of graphs in Non-separable and planar graphs (1932), and footnote 11 of the 1935 paper points out that the theorem identifies König's "Glieder" of a graph with components. Matroid connectivity built on this notion runs through later structure theory: Tutte's higher connectivity, Seymour's decomposition of regular matroids, and the matroid minors project all start from the separation of a matroid into components.

Setting

A matroid MMM on a finite ground set EEE is given here by Mathlib's Matroid structure, with rank function r(X)r(X)r(X) for X⊆EX\subseteq EX⊆E (Mathlib's M.eRk X) and circuits, the minimal dependent sets (M.IsCircuit). Whitney treats every subset X⊆EX\subseteq EX⊆E as a matroid in its own right, a submatroid, with the rank function of MMM restricted to subsets of XXX. For sets he writes M1+M2M_1+M_2M1​+M2​ for the union, ρ(N)\rho(N)ρ(N) for the number of elements of NNN, and

n(N)=ρ(N)−r(N)n(N) = \rho(N) - r(N)n(N)=ρ(N)−r(N)

for the nullity of NNN.

Rank is subadditive: r(X1+X2)≤r(X1)+r(X2)r(X_1+X_2)\le r(X_1)+r(X_2)r(X1​+X2​)≤r(X1​)+r(X2​). A submatroid XXX is separable if it can be divided into two disjoint groups X1,X2X_1, X_2X1​,X2​, each containing at least one element, with

r(X)=r(X1)+r(X2),r(X) = r(X_1) + r(X_2),r(X)=r(X1​)+r(X2​),

and non-separable otherwise. Every single element is non-separable. A component of MMM is a maximal non-separable part of MMM: a nonempty non-separable set K⊆EK\subseteq EK⊆E contained in no strictly larger non-separable subset of EEE.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 19

For two distinct elements e1≠e2e_1\neq e_2e1​=e2​ of EEE,

(∃K component of M: e1,e2∈K)  ⟺  (∃P circuit of M: e1,e2∈P).\bigl(\exists K \text{ component of } M:\ e_1, e_2\in K\bigr) \iff \bigl(\exists P \text{ circuit of } M:\ e_1, e_2\in P\bigr).(∃K component of M: e1​,e2​∈K)⟺(∃P circuit of M: e1​,e2​∈P).

Components are defined by the rank function, circuits by dependence; the goal asserts that the two descriptions agree.

Milestones (§10, in the paper's order)

  • Theorem 11. If r(M1+M2)=r(M1)+r(M2)r(M_1+M_2)=r(M_1)+r(M_2)r(M1​+M2​)=r(M1​)+r(M2​), M1′⊆M1M_1'\subseteq M_1M1′​⊆M1​ and M2′⊆M2M_2'\subseteq M_2M2′​⊆M2​, then r(M1′+M2′)=r(M1′)+r(M2′)r(M_1'+M_2')=r(M_1')+r(M_2')r(M1′​+M2′​)=r(M1′​)+r(M2′​).
  • Theorem 12. Under the same rank additivity, a non-separable M′⊆M1+M2M'\subseteq M_1+M_2M′⊆M1​+M2​ lies in M1M_1M1​ or in M2M_2M2​.
  • Theorem 13. Two non-separable sets with a common element have a non-separable union.
  • Theorem 14. Distinct components are disjoint.
  • Theorem 15. The components cover EEE, and no other family of components does.
  • Theorem 16. A set is non-separable of nullity 111 if and only if it is a circuit.
  • Lemma 9. If M1+M2M_1+M_2M1​+M2​ is non-separable, with M1,M2M_1, M_2M1​,M2​ nonempty and disjoint, some circuit inside M1+M2M_1+M_2M1​+M2​ meets both.
  • Theorem 17. A non-separable set of nullity n>0n>0n>0 is built from a circuit by n−1n-1n−1 steps, each adding a set of elements that forms a circuit with elements already present, through non-separable sets of nullity 1,2,…,n1,2,\dots,n1,2,…,n.
  • Theorem 18. For distinct nonempty non-separable M1,…,MpM_1,\dots,M_pM1​,…,Mp​ covering EEE, the following are equivalent: they are the components; they are pairwise disjoint and no circuit meets two of them; r(E)=∑ir(Mi)r(E)=\sum_i r(M_i)r(E)=∑i​r(Mi​).

Significance

The result. Theorem 19 makes the component decomposition computable from circuits alone and shows that "lying on a common circuit" is an equivalence relation on distinct elements, a fact that is not evident from the circuit axioms. Theorem 18 adds that the decomposition is the unique one with additive rank. Together they are the starting point of matroid connectivity: the direct-sum decomposition of a matroid, the reduction of many matroid problems (representability, duality of components, Whitney's own Theorems 24–26 on duals of components) to the connected case, and the higher-connectivity theory that followed.

Formalizing it. The results are classical and proved in the paper; nothing here is open. To our knowledge Mathlib at the pinned revision has no notion of matroid connectivity or components, so this mission produces the first machine-checked development of Whitney's §10: the rank-based definition of separability, the disjoint decomposition into components, the circuit characterization, and the ear-type construction of non-separable matroids (Theorem 17). These are reusable for any later formalization of matroid connectivity, including Whitney's results on duals of components.

Difficulty

The two directions of Theorem 19 rest on different machinery. That two elements on a common circuit lie in one component follows from the rank theory (Theorems 13 and 16). The converse is the substantial direction: a component is defined by the failure of rank additivity, which only says that every division of the component is crossed by some circuit (Lemma 9). It does not directly give one circuit through two prescribed elements. Combining circuits that cross different divisions into a single circuit through both e1e_1e1​ and e2e_2e2​ requires the circuit elimination property together with a minimality argument over subsets of the component; the naive attempt of chaining overlapping circuits from e1e_1e1​ to e2e_2e2​ gives a connected chain of circuits, not one circuit.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. A matroid is Mathlib's Matroid α with [M.Finite]; Whitney's matroids are finite. A submatroid is a subset X⊆X\subseteqX⊆ M.E with the rank M.eRk restricted to its subsets; results that Whitney states for "a matroid M=M1+M2M = M_1 + M_2M=M1​+M2​" are stated for subsets of an ambient finite matroid, which is the same statement applied to the submatroid M1+M2M_1+M_2M1​+M2​.
  • Ranks are Mathlib's ℕ∞-valued M.eRk, finite on a finite matroid, so (10.1) is an equation of natural numbers. Nullity is computed in Z\mathbb ZZ as the number of elements minus the rank.
  • Definitions. IsSeparable M X requires two nonempty, disjoint groups with union XXX and additive rank; without nonemptiness every set would be separable. IsNonSeparable M X adds X⊆X\subseteqX⊆ M.E. IsComponent M K requires KKK nonempty, non-separable, and maximal; nonemptiness excludes the empty set, which is vacuously non-separable.
  • Tacit hypotheses made explicit. In Theorem 19 the two elements are distinct: for e1=e2e_1=e_2e1​=e2​ a coloop is its own component and lies on no circuit. In Theorem 18 the sets M1,…,MpM_1,\dots,M_pM1​,…,Mp​ are distinct and nonempty: a loop listed twice would satisfy (3) but not (2), and an empty set would satisfy (2) and (3) but not (1). In Theorems 11 and 12 the two parts need not be disjoint, as Whitney's use of M1+M2M_1+M_2M1​+M2​ for overlapping sets in Theorem 13 indicates; the statements hold in that generality.
  • Ruled out. Components must not be defined as the classes of the relation "lie on a common circuit": that would make the goal a tautology. Here they are the rank-defined maximal non-separable sets of §10, and circuits are Mathlib's Matroid.IsCircuit.
  • Infrastructure. Solvers will need submodularity of M.eRk and circuit elimination (both in Mathlib), the relation between circuits of M ↾ X and circuits of M inside XXX (Matroid.restrict_isCircuit_iff), and finiteness arguments for maximal non-separable sets. Proofs of the milestones, alternative proofs of the goal, and lemmas relating components to Mathlib's direct sums of matroids are all welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Whitney, On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence, American Journal of Mathematics 57 (1935), 509–533. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371182
  • H. Whitney, Non-separable and planar graphs, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 34 (1932), 339–362. https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9947-1932-1501641-2
  • D. König, Acta Litterarum ac Scientiarum Szeged, vol. 6, pp. 155–179, as cited by Whitney in footnote 11 (p. 159 for the notion of "Glied").
  • J. Oxley, Matroid Theory, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2011, Chapter 4 (connectivity).
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Convex OptimizationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior 3: The Conditional Logit Likelihood Has a Maximum Exactly When No Direction Makes Every Observed Choice Weakly BestResearch Paper

Motivation

The conditional logit model is the workhorse of discrete choice analysis in transportation, marketing, labour and industrial organization. McFadden's 1974 chapter derived it from a theory of population choice behaviour and showed how to estimate it by maximum likelihood; this line of work was recognized by his 2000 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, awarded for theory and methods of discrete choice analysis. Every applied logit estimation rests on a basic question: does the maximum likelihood estimate exist for the sample at hand? In small samples it may not. When one alternative is always chosen whenever it is available, the likelihood keeps increasing as a parameter tends to infinity, and numerical optimizers report diverging coefficients. This failure is known in the binary case as complete or quasi-complete separation. McFadden's Lemma 3 gives the exact condition, for the multinomial conditional logit model with general alternative sets, under which a maximizer exists.

Timeline. Berkson (1951, 1955) popularized binomial logit; multinomial versions were developed by Gurland (1960), Bloch (1967), Rassam (1971), McFadden (1968) and Theil (1969, 1970). McFadden (1974) stated the existence criterion for the conditional logit likelihood (Lemma 3) together with a quadratic-programming test for it (Lemma 4). Albert and Anderson (1984) later classified separation patterns for binary and multinomial logistic regression, and Haberman (1974) treated existence for log-linear models.

Setting

A choice experiment has N≥1N \ge 1N≥1 trials. Trial nnn offers an alternative set of JnJ_nJn​ alternatives, indexed i=1,…,Jni = 1,\dots,J_ni=1,…,Jn​, each described by an attribute vector zin∈RKz_{in} \in \mathbb{R}^Kzin​∈RK (the values of KKK specified functions of the individual's and the alternative's characteristics). Trial nnn is repeated Rn≥1R_n \ge 1Rn​≥1 times, and alternative iii is chosen SinS_{in}Sin​ times, so Rn=∑jSjnR_n = \sum_{j} S_{jn}Rn​=∑j​Sjn​.

For a parameter θ∈RK\theta \in \mathbb{R}^Kθ∈RK, with zinθz_{in}\thetazin​θ the inner product, the selection probabilities are

Pin(θ)=ezinθ∑j=1Jnezjnθ(16)P_{in}(\theta) = \frac{e^{z_{in}\theta}}{\sum_{j=1}^{J_n} e^{z_{jn}\theta}} \qquad (16)Pin​(θ)=∑j=1Jn​​ezjn​θezin​θ​(16)

and the log-likelihood of the sample is

L(θ)=C−∑n=1N∑i=1JnSinlog⁡∑j=1Jne(zjn−zin)θ,C=∑n=1N[log⁡Rn!−∑j=1Jnlog⁡Sjn!].(18)L(\theta) = C - \sum_{n=1}^N \sum_{i=1}^{J_n} S_{in} \log \sum_{j=1}^{J_n} e^{(z_{jn} - z_{in})\theta}, \qquad C = \sum_{n=1}^N \Big[\log R_n! - \sum_{j=1}^{J_n}\log S_{jn}!\Big]. \qquad (18)L(θ)=C−n=1∑N​i=1∑Jn​​Sin​logj=1∑Jn​​e(zjn​−zin​)θ,C=n=1∑N​[logRn​!−j=1∑Jn​​logSjn​!].(18)

Write zˉn(θ)=∑izinPin(θ)\bar z_n(\theta) = \sum_i z_{in}P_{in}(\theta)zˉn​(θ)=∑i​zin​Pin​(θ) for the probability-weighted mean attribute vector of trial nnn.

Axiom 5 (Full Rank). The (∑nJn)×K\big(\sum_n J_n\big)\times K(∑n​Jn​)×K matrix with rows zin−zˉnz_{in} - \bar z_nzin​−zˉn​ has rank KKK.

Axiom 6. There is no nonzero γ∈RK\gamma \in \mathbb{R}^Kγ∈RK with Sin(zjn−zin)γ≤0S_{in}(z_{jn} - z_{in})\gamma \le 0Sin​(zjn​−zin​)γ≤0 for all i,j=1,…,Jni, j = 1,\dots,J_ni,j=1,…,Jn​ and n=1,…,Nn = 1,\dots,Nn=1,…,N. Equivalently, no nonzero direction makes every observed choice weakly best in its alternative set.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 3

Under Axiom 5,

(∃ θ^∈RK, ∀θ, L(θ)≤L(θ^))  ⟺  Axiom 6.\big(\exists\, \hat\theta \in \mathbb{R}^K,\ \forall \theta,\ L(\theta) \le L(\hat\theta)\big) \iff \text{Axiom 6}.(∃θ^∈RK, ∀θ, L(θ)≤L(θ^))⟺Axiom 6.

Milestones

  1. Equation (19): the gradient ∂L/∂θ=∑n∑j(Sjn−RnPjn)zjn\partial L/\partial\theta = \sum_n \sum_j (S_{jn} - R_nP_{jn}) z_{jn}∂L/∂θ=∑n​∑j​(Sjn​−Rn​Pjn​)zjn​.
  2. Equation (20): the Hessian ∂2L/∂θ ∂θ′=−∑nRn∑j(zjn−zˉn)′Pjn(zjn−zˉn)\partial^2L/\partial\theta\,\partial\theta' = -\sum_n R_n \sum_j (z_{jn} - \bar z_n)'P_{jn}(z_{jn} - \bar z_n)∂2L/∂θ∂θ′=−∑n​Rn​∑j​(zjn​−zˉn​)′Pjn​(zjn​−zˉn​).
  3. LLL is concave, and every critical point is a global maximizer.
  4. A Hessian that is nonsingular everywhere makes LLL strictly concave with at most one maximizer.
  5. Axiom 5 holds at θ\thetaθ if and only if the Hessian at θ\thetaθ is negative definite.
  6. Necessity: under Axiom 5, a maximizer forces Axiom 6.
  7. Equation (21): under Axiom 6, b(γ)=max⁡nmax⁡i,jSin(zjn−zin)γb(\gamma) = \max_n \max_{i,j} S_{in}(z_{jn}-z_{in})\gammab(γ)=maxn​maxi,j​Sin​(zjn​−zin​)γ has a positive lower bound b∗b^*b∗ on the unit sphere.
  8. The bound L(θ)−C≤−b∗∣θ∣L(\theta) - C \le -b^*|\theta|L(θ)−C≤−b∗∣θ∣ for all θ\thetaθ.
  9. Sufficiency: Axiom 6 gives a maximizer.

Significance

Lemma 3 tells the practitioner when the conditional logit maximum likelihood estimate exists, before any numerical optimization is attempted. It is a linear-inequality condition on the data alone, so it can be checked by linear or quadratic programming (Lemma 4 of the same paper). The existence of the estimator is also the first step of McFadden's asymptotic theory: Lemma 5 shows that Axiom 6 holds with probability tending to one, and Lemma 6, consistency and asymptotic normality, concerns the estimator whose existence Lemma 3 characterizes. The concavity and Hessian formulas (19)–(20) are the basis of the Newton–Raphson computation of the estimator and of its asymptotic covariance matrix.

The result has been proved since 1974 and is classical. To our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof; Mathlib has no statement about the existence of logit or softmax-regression maximum likelihood estimates. Formalizing it produces a verified existence criterion for the multinomial logit likelihood, verified gradient and Hessian formulas for log-sum-exp likelihoods with repeated observations, and a verified link between full column rank and strict concavity.

Difficulty

The likelihood is concave, and concave functions on RK\mathbb{R}^KRK need not attain their supremum. Concavity alone therefore gives nothing, and existence must come from a growth condition. The obvious approach, "the likelihood is bounded above by CCC, hence attains its maximum", fails: LLL is bounded but can approach its supremum only at infinity, which is exactly the separation case. Sufficiency needs a quantitative rate at which LLL decreases, uniform over all directions; a direction-by-direction argument does not suffice. Necessity requires strict concavity, which is where Axiom 5 and the requirement that every trial be observed enter. A trial with Rn=0R_n = 0Rn​=0 can supply the rank of Axiom 5 while contributing nothing to LLL, so with such a trial necessity fails. The calculus part, (19)–(20), involves differentiating sums of log-sum-exp terms over dependent index types and identifying the result with a weighted covariance operator.

Formalization scope

  • Representation. RK\mathbb{R}^KRK is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin K), so ∣θ∣=(θ′θ)1/2|\theta| = (\theta'\theta)^{1/2}∣θ∣=(θ′θ)1/2 is the Euclidean norm and zθz\thetazθ is the inner product ⟪z, θ⟫. Trials are Fin N, alternatives of trial nnn are Fin (J n), and the counts SinS_{in}Sin​ are natural numbers.
  • Data structure. The structure Data K bundles NNN, JJJ, zzz, SSS and the standing assumptions N≥1N \ge 1N≥1 and Rn=∑iSin≥1R_n = \sum_i S_{in} \ge 1Rn​=∑i​Sin​≥1 for every trial; these make the trial and alternative index sets nonempty.
  • Axioms 1–4 are built in. The model is the logit form (16) with vvv linear in θ\thetaθ (Axiom 4), so "Suppose Axioms 1–5 hold" becomes "Data plus Axiom 5".
  • Axiom 5 is read at every θ\thetaθ. The row space of the matrix does not depend on θ\thetaθ.
  • Hessian. The Hessian is the Fréchet derivative of the gradient vector field (19), as a continuous linear map.
  • The maximizer is global over all of RK\mathbb{R}^KRK. Neither a local maximizer nor "L(θ^)≥L(0)L(\hat\theta) \ge L(0)L(θ^)≥L(0)" is acceptable as the goal; that would make it trivial.
  • Infrastructure. Gradients and Hessians of log-sum-exp with dependent finite index types; positive definiteness from full column rank; attainment of the maximum of a coercive continuous function on a finite-dimensional space. The calculus lemmas are reusable for any multinomial logit or softmax likelihood. Missions 4 and 5 of this series reuse the same model. Contributions of general log-sum-exp lemmas, independent of this mission's definitions, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. McFadden, Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior, in P. Zarembka (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics, Academic Press, New York, 1974, pp. 105–142. https://eml.berkeley.edu/reprints/mcfadden/zarembka.pdf
  • A. Albert and J. A. Anderson, On the existence of maximum likelihood estimates in logistic regression models, Biometrika 71(1), 1984, pp. 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1093/biomet/71.1.1
  • S. J. Haberman, The Analysis of Frequency Data, University of Chicago Press, 1974.
  • J. Berkson, Maximum likelihood and minimum χ² estimates of the logistic function, Journal of the American Statistical Association 50, 1955, pp. 130–162. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1955.10501255
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Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence 1: The Rank Postulates and the Independence Postulates Are EquivalentResearch Paper

Motivation

In 1935 Hassler Whitney asked which properties of linear dependence among the columns of a matrix can be stated without reference to the matrix at all. His answer, On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence (American Journal of Mathematics 57, 1935), introduced the matroid: a finite set together with a rank function obeying three short postulates. The notion now underlies combinatorial optimization (the greedy algorithm is optimal exactly on matroids, and matroid intersection and partition generalize bipartite matching and arborescence packing), graph theory (graphic and cographic matroids), coding theory and the study of linear representations over finite fields.

A defining feature of the subject is that the same structure can be axiomatized in several apparently unrelated ways: by rank, by independent sets, by bases, by circuits. Each axiom system is convenient for different arguments, and passing between them, a so-called cryptomorphism, is routine in practice. Whitney's paper is where these equivalences first appear. Part I, §§2–4 and §6 (pp. 510–514), derives the basic properties of rank from the rank postulates, deduces from them the postulates for independent sets, and shows that the two systems are equivalent. This mission formalizes that first equivalence.

Setting

Let MMM be a finite set of elements e1,…,ene_1, \dots, e_ne1​,…,en​. Following Whitney, write N+eN + eN+e for N∪{e}N \cup \{e\}N∪{e}, M1+M2M_1 + M_2M1​+M2​ for the union and M1M2M_1 M_2M1​M2​ for the intersection of subsets; ρ(N)\rho(N)ρ(N) is the number of elements of NNN.

A rank system is a function rrr on the subsets of MMM satisfying

  • (R₁) r(∅)=0r(\emptyset) = 0r(∅)=0;
  • (R₂) for every subset NNN and element e∉Ne \notin Ne∈/N, r(N+e)=r(N)r(N + e) = r(N)r(N+e)=r(N) or r(N+e)=r(N)+1r(N + e) = r(N) + 1r(N+e)=r(N)+1;
  • (R₃) for every subset NNN and elements e1,e2∉Ne_1, e_2 \notin Ne1​,e2​∈/N, if r(N+e1)=r(N+e2)=r(N)r(N + e_1) = r(N + e_2) = r(N)r(N+e1​)=r(N+e2​)=r(N) then r(N+e1+e2)=r(N)r(N + e_1 + e_2) = r(N)r(N+e1​+e2​)=r(N).

The nullity of NNN is n(N)=ρ(N)−r(N)n(N) = \rho(N) - r(N)n(N)=ρ(N)−r(N), and NNN is independent when n(N)=0n(N) = 0n(N)=0. The increment of (3.1) is Δ(M′,N)=r(M′+N)−r(M′)\Delta(M', N) = r(M' + N) - r(M')Δ(M′,N)=r(M′+N)−r(M′), written Δ(M′,e)\Delta(M', e)Δ(M′,e) when N={e}N = \{e\}N={e}.

An independence system is a predicate "independent" on the subsets of MMM satisfying

  • (I₁) any subset of an independent set is independent;
  • (I₂) if NNN and N′N'N′ are independent and N′N'N′ has exactly one element more than NNN, then N+e′N + e'N+e′ is independent for some e′∈N′e' \in N'e′∈N′ with e′∉Ne' \notin Ne′∈/N.

From an independence system one recovers a rank by letting r(N)r(N)r(N) be the number of elements in a largest independent subset of NNN. In the Lean development these objects are IsRankSystem, nullity, Delta, indepOfRank, IsIndepSystem and rankOfIndep, all in the namespace WhitneyMatroid.RankIndep.

Formalization targets

Goal: (R) and (I) are equivalent (§6, p. 514)

  1. If rrr satisfies (R₁)–(R₃), then {N:ρ(N)=r(N)}\{N : \rho(N) = r(N)\}{N:ρ(N)=r(N)} satisfies (I₁), (I₂), contains ∅\emptyset∅, and
r(N)=max⁡{ρ(I):I⊆N, ρ(I)=r(I)}for every N.r(N) = \max\{\rho(I) : I \subseteq N,\ \rho(I) = r(I)\} \quad \text{for every } N.r(N)=max{ρ(I):I⊆N, ρ(I)=r(I)}for every N.
  1. If "independent" satisfies (I₁), (I₂) and ∅\emptyset∅ is independent, then r(N)=max⁡{ρ(I):I⊆N independent}r(N) = \max\{\rho(I) : I \subseteq N \text{ independent}\}r(N)=max{ρ(I):I⊆N independent} satisfies (R₁)–(R₃), and NNN is independent if and only if ρ(N)=r(N)\rho(N) = r(N)ρ(N)=r(N).

Both translations and both round trips are part of the goal: Whitney's conclusion is not only that each system implies the other but that "the definitions of the rank and the independence or dependence of any subset of MMM agree under the two systems".

Milestones

  • Lemma 1 (p. 510): r(N)≥0r(N) \ge 0r(N)≥0, n(N)≥0n(N) \ge 0n(N)≥0, and N⊆M′N \subseteq M'N⊆M′ implies r(N)≤r(M′)r(N) \le r(M')r(N)≤r(M′), n(N)≤n(M′)n(N) \le n(M')n(N)≤n(M′).
  • Lemma 2 (p. 510): any subset of an independent set is independent, which is (I₁).
  • Lemma 3 (p. 511): Δ(M+e2,e1)≤Δ(M,e1)\Delta(M + e_2, e_1) \le \Delta(M, e_1)Δ(M+e2​,e1​)≤Δ(M,e1​).
  • Lemma 4 (p. 511): Δ(M+N,e)≤Δ(M,e)\Delta(M + N, e) \le \Delta(M, e)Δ(M+N,e)≤Δ(M,e).
  • Theorem 3 (p. 511): Δ(M+N2,N1)≤Δ(M,N1)\Delta(M + N_2, N_1) \le \Delta(M, N_1)Δ(M+N2​,N1​)≤Δ(M,N1​); equivalently
r(M+N1+N2)≤r(M+N1)+r(M+N2)−r(M),r(M1+M2)≤r(M1)+r(M2)−r(M1M2).r(M + N_1 + N_2) \le r(M + N_1) + r(M + N_2) - r(M), \qquad r(M_1 + M_2) \le r(M_1) + r(M_2) - r(M_1 M_2).r(M+N1​+N2​)≤r(M+N1​)+r(M+N2​)−r(M),r(M1​+M2​)≤r(M1​)+r(M2​)−r(M1​M2​).
  • §4 (pp. 511–512): the independent sets of a rank system satisfy (I₂).

Significance

The equivalence makes the rank function and the family of independent sets two descriptions of one object. Every later result of Whitney's paper, and of matroid theory generally, moves between them without comment: the circuit postulates of §5 and §8, the base postulates of §7 and the duality of §§11–13 are all phrased through rank or independence as convenient. Theorem 3 is the submodularity of rank, the property that connects matroids to submodular function minimization and polymatroids; here it is derived from the purely local postulates (R₁)–(R₃), which constrain the rank only under the addition of one or two elements.

On the formal side, Mathlib defines Matroid through independent sets (with constructors from other axiom systems) and proves submodularity of its rank; the platform has submodularity for Mathlib matroids (FamousTheorems.matroid_rank_submodular_7a). Neither starts from Whitney's local rank postulates. What this mission adds is a machine-checked derivation of the global properties of rank from (R₁)–(R₃) and of Whitney's original equivalence, stated for his own postulates, so that the later missions of this series, which work from the same postulates, rest on a verified foundation. The result itself has been settled since 1935; the open work is the formal proof.

Difficulty

The postulates (R₂) and (R₃) are local: they speak about adding at most two elements to a set. Monotonicity and the bound r(N)≤ρ(N)r(N) \le \rho(N)r(N)≤ρ(N) follow by adding elements one at a time, but the submodular inequality relates arbitrary sets, and nothing in (R₃) mentions more than two new elements. The gap between the local and the global statement is the substance of Lemmas 3, 4 and Theorem 3, and the deduction of (I₂) depends on it.

In the converse direction the rank is defined as a maximum over independent subsets, while (I₂) only augments a set from an independent set with exactly one element more; (R₃) for the derived rank is a statement about three sets that are not given in that form. The round trips are where the two halves meet, and each depends on the global properties of the first half rather than on the postulates alone.

Formalization scope

Elements form a type α with [Fintype α] [DecidableEq α]; subsets are Finset α, and the matroid MMM is the whole type. Ranks, nullities and increments take values in ℤ, so differences never truncate; Whitney allows any number, but (R₁) and (R₂) force nonnegative integers. Postulate (I₂) is stated in Whitney's form with N'.card = N.card + 1, not the general augmentation for ρ(N)<ρ(N′)\rho(N) < \rho(N')ρ(N)<ρ(N′). Postulates (R₂), (R₃) keep their hypotheses e,e1,e2∉Ne, e_1, e_2 \notin Ne,e1​,e2​∈/N. Lemmas 3, 4 and Theorem 3 are stated for arbitrary subsets M,N,N1,N2M, N, N_1, N_2M,N,N1​,N2​; Lemma 1's monotonicity for arbitrary N⊆M′N \subseteq M'N⊆M′, the form in which the paper uses it. rankOfIndep is the supremum of cardinalities over the independent members of the powerset.

The paper takes for granted that the empty set is independent in system (I). Without that hypothesis, the predicate declaring nothing independent satisfies (I₁) and (I₂) vacuously, the supremum defining the rank returns 000, and the round trip fails; the goal therefore assumes ∅\emptyset∅ independent in part 2 and proves it in part 1. A formalization in terms of Mathlib's Matroid would make the goal a restatement of library facts, since Mathlib's matroids are independence systems by construction; the goal is deliberately about the postulates as predicates on functions and on families of sets.

A complete development needs only finite set combinatorics (Finset.card, induction on finite sets, Finset.sup). The derived lemmas (monotonicity, submodularity, (I₂)) are reusable for any later work from Whitney's rank postulates, including the circuit-postulate equivalence of the companion mission. A bridge from rank systems to Mathlib's Matroid (via IndepMatroid.ofFinset) would be a welcome addition but is not part of the goal. Proofs of the milestones in any order are welcome; Theorem 3 and the §4 deduction are the natural first targets.

Selected references

  • H. Whitney, On the Abstract Properties of Linear Dependence, American Journal of Mathematics 57 (1935), no. 3, 509–533. https://doi.org/10.2307/2371182
  • J. Oxley, Matroid Theory, 2nd ed., Oxford Graduate Texts in Mathematics 21, Oxford University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198566946.001.0001
  • J. Kung (ed.), A Source Book in Matroid Theory, Birkhäuser, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-9199-9
  • Mathlib, Mathlib.Data.Matroid (matroids via independent sets; IndepMatroid.ofFinset). https://leanprover-community.github.io/mathlib4_docs/Mathlib/Data/Matroid/Basic.html
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ProbabilityStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior 2: Random Utility Maximizers Choose by Logit Exactly When Taste Shocks Are Extreme-Value DistributedResearch Paper

Motivation

The conditional logit model assigns to an alternative iii in a finite choice set the probability eVi/∑jeVje^{V_i}/\sum_j e^{V_j}eVi​/∑j​eVj​, where VjV_jVj​ is a "representative utility" built from observed attributes of the alternative and the decision maker. It is the workhorse of discrete choice econometrics, transportation demand forecasting, marketing and revenue management, where it underlies multinomial logit assortment and pricing models. Its appeal for applied work is computational; its appeal for economics is that it can be read as the aggregate behaviour of a population of utility maximizers. This mission formalizes the result that makes that reading exact: Lemmas 1 and 2 of D. McFadden, Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior (1974), which show that, under a mild regularity condition, logit choice probabilities arise from random utility maximization exactly when the idiosyncratic taste shocks follow the extreme value (Gumbel) distribution.

Timeline:

  • 1959. J. Marschak gives a nonconstructive proof that i.i.d. extreme value shocks yield logit probabilities; R. D. Luce's choice axiom appears the same year.
  • 1965. Luce and Suppes publish the constructive argument, attributed to E. Holman and A. Marley, that is reproduced as the proof of Lemma 1.
  • 1974. McFadden proves the converse (Lemma 2): if i.i.d. shocks with a translation complete distribution produce logit probabilities, the distribution is extreme value.
  • Later. The random utility characterization was extended to correlated shocks (generalized extreme value models, McFadden 1978), which are not part of this mission.

Setting

An individual faces J≥1J \ge 1J≥1 alternatives with representative utilities V1,…,VJ∈RV_1, \dots, V_J \in \mathbb{R}V1​,…,VJ​∈R. The utility of alternative jjj is Uj=Vj+εjU_j = V_j + \varepsilon_jUj​=Vj​+εj​, where the taste shocks ε1,…,εJ\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_Jε1​,…,εJ​ are independent and identically distributed with a common law μ\muμ on R\mathbb{R}R and distribution function G(t)=μ((−∞,t])G(t) = \mu((-\infty, t])G(t)=μ((−∞,t]). The individual chooses the alternative of highest utility, so the selection probability of iii is (Equation (2) of the paper)

Pi(V)=Pr⁡[εj−εi<Vi−Vj  for all j≠i],P_i(V) = \Pr\big[\varepsilon_j - \varepsilon_i < V_i - V_j \ \text{ for all } j \ne i\big],Pi​(V)=Pr[εj​−εi​<Vi​−Vj​  for all j=i],

computed under the product law of the shocks. The logit formula (Equation (12)) is Li(V)=eVi/∑j=1JeVjL_i(V) = e^{V_i}/\sum_{j=1}^J e^{V_j}Li​(V)=eVi​/∑j=1J​eVj​. The extreme value law (Equation (13)) is G(ε)=e−e−εG(\varepsilon) = e^{-e^{-\varepsilon}}G(ε)=e−e−ε.

A law μ\muμ is translation complete if for every function hhh of bounded total variation on R\mathbb{R}R with h(±∞)=0h(\pm\infty) = 0h(±∞)=0, the condition ∫h(e+a) dμ(e)=0\int h(e + a)\, d\mu(e) = 0∫h(e+a)dμ(e)=0 for every real aaa forces h=0h = 0h=0 outside a Lebesgue-null set. Laws whose characteristic function never vanishes, the extreme value law among them, are translation complete (footnote 5 of the paper).

In Lean the law is μ : Measure ℝ with [IsProbabilityMeasure μ], GGG is ProbabilityTheory.cdf μ, the selection probability is selProb μ V i for V : Fin J → ℝ, and the logit formula is logitProb V i.

Formalization targets

Goal: the characterization

Fix a universe XXX of alternatives with a representative utility map u:X→Ru:X\to\mathbb Ru:X→R onto the real line. For a translation complete law μ\muμ normalized by G(0)=e−1G(0) = e^{-1}G(0)=e−1,

(for every finite B⊆X, i∈B: Pi(B)=eu(i)∑j∈Beu(j))  ⟺  (∀ε∈R: G(ε)=e−e−ε).\Big(\text{for every finite }B\subseteq X,\ i\in B:\ P_i(B) = \frac{e^{u(i)}}{\sum_{j\in B} e^{u(j)}}\Big) \iff \Big(\forall \varepsilon \in \mathbb{R}:\ G(\varepsilon) = e^{-e^{-\varepsilon}}\Big).(for every finite B⊆X, i∈B: Pi​(B)=∑j∈B​eu(j)eu(i)​)⟺(∀ε∈R: G(ε)=e−e−ε).

The normalization only fixes the location of the shocks: without it the conclusion is the one-parameter family of Lemma 2 below.

Milestones

  1. Equation (3) for i.i.d. shocks without atoms: Pi(V)=∫∏j≠iG(ε+Vi−Vj) dG(ε)P_i(V) = \int \prod_{j \ne i} G(\varepsilon + V_i - V_j)\, dG(\varepsilon)Pi​(V)=∫∏j=i​G(ε+Vi​−Vj​)dG(ε).
  2. The integrand of Lemma 1's proof: under (13), the density times the other distribution functions equals e−εexp⁡(−e−ε∑jeVj−Vi)e^{-\varepsilon} \exp\big(-e^{-\varepsilon} \sum_j e^{V_j - V_i}\big)e−εexp(−e−ε∑j​eVj​−Vi​).
  3. Lemma 1: extreme value shocks give Pi(V)=Li(V)P_i(V) = L_i(V)Pi​(V)=Li​(V) for every JJJ and VVV.
  4. The functional equation of Lemma 2's proof: G(v−log⁡K)=G(v)KG(v - \log K) = G(v)^KG(v−logK)=G(v)K for every positive integer KKK and real vvv.
  5. Values at logarithms of rationals: with α=−log⁡G(0)\alpha = -\log G(0)α=−logG(0), α>0\alpha > 0α>0 and G(log⁡(K/L))=e−αL/KG(\log(K/L)) = e^{-\alpha L / K}G(log(K/L))=e−αL/K for positive integers K,LK, LK,L.
  6. Lemma 2: G(ε)=e−αe−εG(\varepsilon) = e^{-\alpha e^{-\varepsilon}}G(ε)=e−αe−ε for some α>0\alpha > 0α>0, and G(0)=e−1G(0) = e^{-1}G(0)=e−1 gives (13).

Significance

The result separates two readings of the logit formula. Lemma 1 shows that it is consistent with utility maximization; Lemma 2 shows that, within the class of i.i.d. additive random utility models with translation complete shocks, the extreme value law is the only one consistent with it. Consequences drawn from the random utility reading, such as the log-sum formula for expected maximum utility used in welfare analysis, therefore apply to logit models without further distributional assumptions inside that class. The same reading supports the interpretation of multinomial logit demand in assortment optimization and revenue management.

Both lemmas are proved in the paper and in later textbooks; neither is open. As far as a search of the Prove2Me catalog shows, neither has a machine-checked proof. The mission provides Lean statements of the random utility model with i.i.d. shocks, of translation completeness and of the extreme value law that later discrete choice formalizations can reuse.

Difficulty

Lemma 1 is a computation with the extreme value density; its formal cost lies in passing from the product-measure probability (2) to the iterated integral (3) and evaluating an improper integral. Lemma 2 is harder. The natural first idea is to differentiate the logit identity in the utilities and solve a differential equation for GGG; this requires a density, which Lemma 2 does not assume. Without a density, the only handle on GGG is the logit identity itself, an equality of integrals against dGdGdG that holds for every utility vector; turning such integral identities into pointwise information about GGG is where the hypothesis of translation completeness enters, and it yields statements only outside a Lebesgue-null set, so one-sided continuity of distribution functions is needed to recover identities at every point. A second subtlety is that the paper's (14) is written with GGG while the event (2) is strict, so with a general law the integrals involve left limits of GGG.

Formalization scope

Alternatives are indexed by Fin J; the model is indexed by the utility vector, so the individual attributes sss and alternative attributes xjx_jxj​ enter only through VVV. The shocks have joint law Measure.pi (fun _ => μ), which is what "independently identically distributed" means; a general joint law is not allowed. The event in (2) uses strict inequalities, and the selection probability is defined for every law, with no density. Translation completeness quantifies over BoundedVariationOn h Set.univ with limits 000 at both ends; such hhh are bounded and measurable, so the integrals are genuine, and "measure zero" is Lebesgue measure.

Lemma 2's hypothesis is stated on every finite subset of the paper's alternative universe, with a surjective utility map. Distinct alternatives may have the same utility. The printed proof uses KKK equal-utility alternatives, which surjectivity alone need not supply; proving the stated theorem requires an additional continuity argument. A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the selection probability is a genuine product-measure probability, and the hypotheses of the goal are met by the extreme value law, which is translation complete with G(0)=e−1G(0) = e^{-1}G(0)=e−1.

A complete development needs: Fubini for Measure.pi over Fin J split at one coordinate; the Gumbel density and the improper integral ∫e−εe−ce−εdε=1/c\int e^{-\varepsilon} e^{-c e^{-\varepsilon}} d\varepsilon = 1/c∫e−εe−ce−εdε=1/c; the facts that bounded-variation functions are bounded and measurable and that distribution functions are right-continuous with left limits. The integral representation (milestone 1) and the Gumbel computations are reusable in any random utility formalization. Proofs of the milestones, of the footnote-5 fact that the extreme value law is translation complete, and alternative proofs of Lemma 2 are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. McFadden, Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior, in P. Zarembka (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics, Academic Press, New York, 1974, pp. 105–142.
  • J. Marschak, Binary choice constraints and random utility indicators, in K. Arrow, S. Karlin, P. Suppes (eds.), Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences, Stanford University Press, 1960 (Stanford Symposium, 1959).
  • R. D. Luce and P. Suppes, Preference, utility, and subjective probability, in R. D. Luce, R. Bush, E. Galanter (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. III, Wiley, 1965.
  • R. D. Luce, Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis, Wiley, 1959.
  • W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. II, Wiley, 1966, p. 479.
  • D. McFadden, Modelling the choice of residential location, in A. Karlqvist et al. (eds.), Spatial Interaction Theory and Planning Models, North-Holland, 1978, pp. 75–96.
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Linear OptimizationOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Solving Linear Programs in the Current Matrix Multiplication Time: The Stochastic Central Path Falls Back to a Classical Step with Probability at Most 10/n² per IterationResearch Paper

Motivation

Linear programming, min⁡{c⊤x:Ax=b, x≥0}\min\{c^\top x : Ax=b,\ x\ge0\}min{c⊤x:Ax=b, x≥0} with A∈Rd×nA\in\mathbb R^{d\times n}A∈Rd×n, is the basic model of operations research, and the complexity of solving it is a central question of algorithm theory. Interior-point methods follow the central path: primal–dual pairs (x,s)(x,s)(x,s) with x,s>0x,s>0x,s>0 and xisi=tx_is_i=txi​si​=t for every iii, as the path parameter ttt decreases to 000. A classical short-step method needs O(nlog⁡(n/δ))O(\sqrt n\log(n/\delta))O(n​log(n/δ)) iterations, each solving a linear system with the matrix AXSA⊤A\frac XSA^\topASX​A⊤, for a total of roughly n2.5n^{2.5}n2.5 operations or more.

Cohen, Lee and Song (J. ACM 68(1), 2021; arXiv:1810.07896) showed that linear programs can be solved in time nω+o(1)log⁡(n/δ)n^{\omega+o(1)}\log(n/\delta)nω+o(1)log(n/δ) (for the current values of the matrix multiplication exponent ω\omegaω and its dual α\alphaα), matching the cost of multiplying two n×nn\times nn×n matrices. The analysis has two halves: a data structure that maintains the projection matrix lazily, and the stochastic central path method, which replaces each Newton step by a sparse random step and proves that the iterates still stay close to the central path. This mission formalizes the second half.

Timeline: Karmarkar's projective method (1984) gave the first polynomial interior-point method; Renegar (1988) gave the O(nlog⁡(1/δ))O(\sqrt n\log(1/\delta))O(n​log(1/δ)) path-following bound; Vaidya (1989) reduced the per-iteration cost with low-rank updates; Lee and Sidford (2014–2015) reduced the iteration count to O~(d)\widetilde O(\sqrt d)O(d​); Cohen, Lee and Song (STOC 2019, J. ACM 2021) reached nωn^\omeganω; van den Brand (2020) derandomized the result.

Setting

Vectors are in Rn\mathbb R^nRn and products, quotients and roots of vectors are coordinatewise. For ϵ\epsilonϵ and vectors a,ba,ba,b, a≈ϵba\approx_\epsilon ba≈ϵ​b means (1−ϵ)bi≤ai≤(1+ϵ)bi(1-\epsilon)b_i\le a_i\le(1+\epsilon)b_i(1−ϵ)bi​≤ai​≤(1+ϵ)bi​ for all iii; a≈ϵta\approx_\epsilon ta≈ϵ​t for a scalar ttt is defined likewise. The number of variables is n≥10n\ge10n≥10 and AAA has full row rank d≤nd\le nd≤n.

The potential is Φλ(r)=∑i=1ncosh⁡(λri)\Phi_\lambda(r)=\sum_{i=1}^n\cosh(\lambda r_i)Φλ​(r)=∑i=1n​cosh(λri​), evaluated at r=μ/t−1r=\mu/t-1r=μ/t−1 with μ=xs\mu=xsμ=xs; it is small exactly when every xisix_is_ixi​si​ is close to ttt.

StochasticStep (Algorithm 1) takes positive x,sx,sx,s, a direction δμ\delta_\muδμ​, a sampling parameter kkk and the output v~\widetilde vv of a data structure with x/s≈ϵmpv~x/s\approx_{\epsilon_{\mathrm{mp}}}\widetilde vx/s≈ϵmp​​v. It rescales to x‾=xv~/w\overline x=x\sqrt{\widetilde v/w}x=xv/w​, s‾=sw/v~\overline s=s\sqrt{w/\widetilde v}s=sw/v​ (w=x/sw=x/sw=x/s), draws a sparse vector δ~μ\widetilde\delta_\muδμ​ with independent coordinates, δ~μ,i=δμ,i/pi\widetilde\delta_{\mu,i}=\delta_{\mu,i}/p_iδμ,i​=δμ,i​/pi​ with probability pi=min⁡(1,k(δμ,i2/∥δμ∥22+1/n))p_i=\min(1,k(\delta_{\mu,i}^2/\|\delta_\mu\|_2^2+1/n))pi​=min(1,k(δμ,i2​/∥δμ​∥22​+1/n)) and 000 otherwise, and computes the step (δ~x,δ~s)(\widetilde\delta_x,\widetilde\delta_s)(δx​,δs​) through the projection P‾=X‾/S‾A⊤(AX‾S‾A⊤)−1AX‾/S‾\overline P=\sqrt{\overline X/\overline S}A^\top(A\frac{\overline X}{\overline S}A^\top)^{-1}A\sqrt{\overline X/\overline S}P=X/S​A⊤(ASX​A⊤)−1AX/S​. The draw is repeated until ∥s‾−1δ~s∥∞\|\overline s^{-1}\widetilde\delta_s\|_\infty∥s−1δs​∥∞​ and ∥x‾−1δ~x∥∞\|\overline x^{-1}\widetilde\delta_x\|_\infty∥x−1δx​∥∞​ are at most 1/(100log⁡n)1/(100\log n)1/(100logn); the output is (x+δ~x,s+δ~s)(x+\widetilde\delta_x,s+\widetilde\delta_s)(x+δx​,s+δs​).

Main (Algorithm 2) sets ϵ=140000log⁡n\epsilon=\frac1{40000\log n}ϵ=40000logn1​, ϵmp=140000\epsilon_{\mathrm{mp}}=\frac1{40000}ϵmp​=400001​, k=1000ϵnlog⁡2n/ϵmpk=1000\epsilon\sqrt n\log^2n/\epsilon_{\mathrm{mp}}k=1000ϵn​log2n/ϵmp​, λ=40log⁡n\lambda=40\log nλ=40logn, starts at t=1t=1t=1, and in each iteration sets tnew=(1−ϵ3n)tt^{\mathrm{new}}=(1-\frac{\epsilon}{3\sqrt n})ttnew=(1−3n​ϵ​)t, takes the direction

δμ=(tnewt−1)xs−ϵ2tnew∇Φλ(μ/t−1)∥∇Φλ(μ/t−1)∥2,\delta_\mu=\Big(\frac{t^{\mathrm{new}}}{t}-1\Big)xs-\frac\epsilon2t^{\mathrm{new}}\frac{\nabla\Phi_\lambda(\mu/t-1)}{\|\nabla\Phi_\lambda(\mu/t-1)\|_2},δμ​=(ttnew​−1)xs−2ϵ​tnew∥∇Φλ​(μ/t−1)∥2​∇Φλ​(μ/t−1)​,

runs StochasticStep, and falls back to a deterministic ClassicalStep whenever Φλ(μnew/tnew−1)>n3\Phi_\lambda(\mu^{\mathrm{new}}/t^{\mathrm{new}}-1)>n^3Φλ​(μnew/tnew−1)>n3.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 4.14

For every iteration jjj, almost surely Assumption 4.1 holds for the input of iteration jjj (in particular xjsj≈0.1tjx^js^j\approx_{0.1}t_jxjsj≈0.1​tj​ and ∥δμ∥2≤ϵtj\|\delta_\mu\|_2\le\epsilon t_j∥δμ​∥2​≤ϵtj​), almost surely the resampling loop of iteration jjj succeeds with positive probability, and

P(ClassicalStep is used in iteration j)≤10n2.\mathbb P(\text{ClassicalStep is used in iteration }j)\le\frac{10}{n^2}.P(ClassicalStep is used in iteration j)≤n210​.

The paper writes O(1/n2)O(1/n^2)O(1/n2); its proof gives the constant 101010.

Milestones

Lemma A.1 (variance of a product), Lemma 4.12 (properties of Φλ\Phi_\lambdaΦλ​), Lemma 4.2 (explicit step), Lemma 4.3 and Claim 4.7 (moments and success probability of the sampled step), Lemma 4.8 (moments of μnew\mu^{\mathrm{new}}μnew), and Lemma 4.13:

E[Φλ(μnewtnew−1)]≤Φλ(μt−1)−λϵ15n(Φλ(μt−1)−10n).\mathbf E\Big[\Phi_\lambda\Big(\frac{\mu^{\mathrm{new}}}{t^{\mathrm{new}}}-1\Big)\Big]\le\Phi_\lambda\Big(\frac\mu t-1\Big)-\frac{\lambda\epsilon}{15\sqrt n}\Big(\Phi_\lambda\Big(\frac\mu t-1\Big)-10n\Big).E[Φλ​(tnewμnew​−1)]≤Φλ​(tμ​−1)−15n​λϵ​(Φλ​(tμ​−1)−10n).

Significance

Lemma 4.14 is what makes the randomized method usable: the iterates stay in the 0.10.10.1-neighbourhood of the central path along the whole run, and the expensive fallback is rare enough that its expected cost, O~(n2.5)⋅10/n2\widetilde O(n^{2.5})\cdot 10/n^2O(n2.5)⋅10/n2, is negligible. The paper's cost bound (Lemma 4.16) and its main theorem rest on it. The same potential-based "stochastic central path" analysis was reused in later solvers, for instance for empirical risk minimization (Lee, Song and Zhang, COLT 2019).

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version exists. A formalization pins down the probabilistic model that the paper leaves implicit (independence of the sampled coordinates, the law of the resampling loop, a data structure and fallback that see only the past) and checks the constants, several of which are tight against printed slack (Remark 4.4).

The running-time claims of the paper (Theorem 2.1's expected time nω+o(1)n^{\omega+o(1)}nω+o(1), Lemma 4.16, Section 5) are not part of this mission: they live in an arithmetic cost model that Lean does not have. The accuracy guarantee of Theorem 2.1 (Lemma A.6, ClassicalStep from [57]) is also outside the mission.

Difficulty

The obvious argument would bound each quantity under the product law of the sparse direction. But StochasticStep resamples, so the step actually taken is distributed according to that law conditioned on a success event, and expectations and variances shift. A second difficulty is that Φλ\Phi_\lambdaΦλ​ is controlled only in expectation, while Assumption 4.1 must hold surely at every iteration; this is reconciled by the deterministic ClassicalStep fallback, which caps Φλ\Phi_\lambdaΦλ​ at n3n^3n3, and by an induction over iterations of E[Φ]≤10n\mathbf E[\Phi]\le10nE[Φ]≤10n under the trajectory law. Claim 4.7 needs a Bernstein inequality, which Mathlib does not yet provide.

Formalization scope

Coordinates are Fin n, vectors Fin n → ℝ, AAA a Matrix (Fin d) (Fin n) ℝ with A.rank = d, and log⁡\loglog the natural logarithm. ∥⋅∥2\|\cdot\|_2∥⋅∥2​ is written out as ∑ivi2\sqrt{\sum_iv_i^2}∑i​vi2​​; ∥⋅∥∞≤c\|\cdot\|_\infty\le c∥⋅∥∞​≤c is stated coordinatewise. The sampled direction has law Measure.pi of two-point laws; the step taken by StochasticStep has that law conditioned (ProbabilityTheory.cond) on the success event, and every E\mathbf EE, Var\mathbf{Var}Var of Lemmas 4.3, 4.8 and 4.13 is under this conditioned law. mp.Query is replaced by its value P‾(X‾S‾)−1/2δ~μ\overline P(\overline X\overline S)^{-1/2}\widetilde\delta_\muP(XS)−1/2δμ​; the data structure and ClassicalStep are arbitrary measurable functions UjU_jUj​, CjC_jCj​ of the history with the only properties the paper uses. The trajectory is Mathlib's Ionescu-Tulcea measure, with kernels equal to the step law of Main. nnn is the number of variables of the program the loop runs on.

Deviations from the page, all recorded in the items: Assumption 4.1 is used with ϵ≤1/(40000log⁡n)\epsilon\le1/(40000\log n)ϵ≤1/(40000logn) instead of the printed <<<, because Main sets ϵ\epsilonϵ to exactly that value; O(1/n2)O(1/n^2)O(1/n2) is instantiated as 10/n210/n^210/n2, the constant of the paper's proof; the conclusions of Lemma 4.14 are stated for every iteration index rather than while t>δ2/(32n3)t>\delta^2/(32n^3)t>δ2/(32n3); at ∇Φλ=0\nabla\Phi_\lambda=0∇Φλ​=0 the second term of δμ\delta_\muδμ​ is 000. No hypothesis k≤nk\le nk≤n is imposed.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: every statement that integrates against the conditioned law also concludes that this law is a probability measure (so it cannot be the zero measure), the goal concludes that each resampling loop succeeds with positive probability, the oracles UjU_jUj​, CjC_jCj​ cannot see the coins of the current iteration, and the goal is about the whole iterated process from the initial point, not one step from an arbitrary law.

Contributions welcome: a Bernstein inequality for bounded independent sums, conditional-law lemmas for cond of Measure.pi, and Markov-kernel measurability for the step law; these are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • M. B. Cohen, Y. T. Lee, Z. Song, Solving Linear Programs in the Current Matrix Multiplication Time, J. ACM 68(1), Article 3, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1145/3424305 (arXiv:1810.07896, https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.07896)
  • N. Karmarkar, A new polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming, Combinatorica 4, 1984. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02579150
  • J. Renegar, A polynomial-time algorithm, based on Newton's method, for linear programming, Math. Programming 40, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01580724
  • P. M. Vaidya, Speeding-up linear programming using fast matrix multiplication, Proc. 30th FOCS, 1989.
  • Y. T. Lee, A. Sidford, Path finding methods for linear programming, FOCS 2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2014.52
  • Y. T. Lee, Z. Song, Q. Zhang, Solving Empirical Risk Minimization in the Current Matrix Multiplication Time, COLT 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.04447
  • J. van den Brand, A deterministic linear program solver in current matrix multiplication time, SODA 2020. https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975994.16
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks III: Open Networks of Queues with General Customer Routes Have Product-Form EquilibriumTextbook

Motivation

Networks of queues model systems in which jobs visit a sequence of service stations: items in a manufacturing job-shop, packets in a communication network, patients moving between hospital departments. The open migration process of Chapter 2 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979), and the job-shop networks of Jackson (Jackson 1963) route a customer leaving a queue at random, independently of where he has been. That rules out the most common situation in practice: an item that has passed machines 1 and 3 must next go to machine 4, while an item that has passed machines 2 and 3 must go to machine 5.

Section 3.1 of the book removes this restriction. Customers are divided into types, a type fixes a deterministic route through the queues, and a stochastic routing rule is recovered by using one type per possible route. Within each queue, the order of service is described by two position-dependent functions, which cover first-come first-served KKK-server queues, last-come first-served, processor sharing and service in random order. Theorem 3.1 states that, for every such network, the equilibrium distribution is a product of explicit single-queue factors. This is the result behind the "Kelly network" and "Kelly-type queue" terminology of later work (Kelly 1975; Baskett, Chandy, Muntz, Palacios 1975).

Setting

There are III customer types and JJJ queues. Customers of type iii enter the system in a Poisson stream of rate ν(i)>0\nu(i)>0ν(i)>0 and visit the queues r(i,1),r(i,2),…,r(i,S(i))r(i,1),r(i,2),\dots,r(i,S(i))r(i,1),r(i,2),…,r(i,S(i)) in that order before leaving; two successive stages of a route are at different queues.

Queue jjj holds its njn_jnj​ customers in positions 1,…,nj1,\dots,n_j1,…,nj​. Each customer needs an exponentially distributed amount of service with unit mean. The queue supplies total service effort at rate ϕj(nj)\phi_j(n_j)ϕj​(nj​), with ϕj(n)>0\phi_j(n)>0ϕj​(n)>0 for n>0n>0n>0; a proportion γj(l,nj)\gamma_j(l,n_j)γj​(l,nj​) goes to the customer in position lll. An arriving customer takes position lll with probability δj(l,nj+1)\delta_j(l,n_j+1)δj​(l,nj​+1). For each n≥1n\ge1n≥1, γj(⋅,n)\gamma_j(\cdot,n)γj​(⋅,n) and δj(⋅,n)\delta_j(\cdot,n)δj​(⋅,n) are probability vectors on {1,…,n}\{1,\dots,n\}{1,…,n}.

The class of the customer in position lll of queue jjj is cj(l)=(tj(l),sj(l))c_j(l)=(t_j(l),s_j(l))cj​(l)=(tj​(l),sj​(l)), his type and the stage of his route. The state of queue jjj is cj=(cj(1),…,cj(nj))\mathbf c_j=(c_j(1),\dots,c_j(n_j))cj​=(cj​(1),…,cj​(nj​)) and the state of the network is C=(c1,…,cJ)\mathbf C=(\mathbf c_1,\dots,\mathbf c_J)C=(c1​,…,cJ​). Its transition rates q(C,D)q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)q(C,D), displays (3.1)–(3.6), are the sums of the intensities of all events taking C\mathbf CC to D\mathbf DD: a departure from the system (intensity ϕj(nj)γj(l,nj)\phi_j(n_j)\gamma_j(l,n_j)ϕj​(nj​)γj​(l,nj​)), a move from position lll of queue jjj to position mmm of the next queue kkk (intensity ϕj(nj)γj(l,nj)δk(m,nk+1)\phi_j(n_j)\gamma_j(l,n_j)\delta_k(m,n_k+1)ϕj​(nj​)γj​(l,nj​)δk​(m,nk​+1)), and an arrival into position mmm of the first queue kkk of a route (intensity ν(i)δk(m,nk+1)\nu(i)\delta_k(m,n_k+1)ν(i)δk​(m,nk​+1)).

With αj(i,s)=ν(i)\alpha_j(i,s)=\nu(i)αj​(i,s)=ν(i) if r(i,s)=jr(i,s)=jr(i,s)=j and 000 otherwise, set

aj=∑i,sαj(i,s),bj−1=∑n=0∞ajn∏l=1nϕj(l),πj(cj)=bj∏l=1njαj(tj(l),sj(l))ϕj(l).a_j=\sum_{i,s}\alpha_j(i,s),\qquad b_j^{-1}=\sum_{n=0}^{\infty}\frac{a_j^n}{\prod_{l=1}^{n}\phi_j(l)},\qquad \pi_j(\mathbf c_j)=b_j\prod_{l=1}^{n_j}\frac{\alpha_j(t_j(l),s_j(l))}{\phi_j(l)}.aj​=i,s∑​αj​(i,s),bj−1​=n=0∑∞​∏l=1n​ϕj​(l)ajn​​,πj​(cj​)=bj​l=1∏nj​​ϕj​(l)αj​(tj​(l),sj​(l))​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.1 (p. 61)

If every series defining bj−1b_j^{-1}bj−1​ converges, then

π(C)=∏j=1Jπj(cj)\pi(\mathbf C)=\prod_{j=1}^{J}\pi_j(\mathbf c_j)π(C)=j=1∏J​πj​(cj​)

is positive, sums to 111 over all network states, and satisfies the equilibrium equations

π(C)∑Dq(C,D)=∑Dπ(D) q(D,C)for every C.\pi(\mathbf C)\sum_{\mathbf D}q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)=\sum_{\mathbf D}\pi(\mathbf D)\,q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)\quad\text{for every }\mathbf C.π(C)D∑​q(C,D)=D∑​π(D)q(D,C)for every C.

Milestones

  • Theorem 3.2 (p. 62). The time-reversed rates π(D)q(D,C)/π(C)\pi(\mathbf D)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)/\pi(\mathbf C)π(D)q(D,C)/π(C) are the rates of the reversed network: routes traversed backwards, γj\gamma_jγj​ and δj\delta_jδj​ interchanged.
  • Corollary 3.4 (p. 63). Queue jjj is independent of the rest of the network, is in state cj\mathbf c_jcj​ with probability πj(cj)\pi_j(\mathbf c_j)πj​(cj​), holds nnn customers with probability bjajn/∏l=1nϕj(l)b_ja_j^n/\prod_{l=1}^n\phi_j(l)bj​ajn​/∏l=1n​ϕj​(l) (3.7), and a customer in position lll is of class (i,s)(i,s)(i,s) with probability αj(i,s)/aj\alpha_j(i,s)/a_jαj​(i,s)/aj​.
  • Corollary 3.5 (p. 63). A type-iii customer reaching queue jjj at stage sss finds it in state cj\mathbf c_jcj​ with probability πj(cj)\pi_j(\mathbf c_j)πj​(cj​).
  • Lemma 3.13 (p. 89). For a multiclass queue with Poisson arrivals of rate ν(c)\nu(c)ν(c) and departure intensities ν(c)ϕc(n)\nu(c)\phi_c(\mathbf n)ν(c)ϕc​(n): reversible ⇔\Leftrightarrow⇔ quasi-reversible ⇔\Leftrightarrow⇔ Φ(n)=ϕc(n)Φ(n−ec)\Phi(\mathbf n)=\phi_c(\mathbf n)\Phi(\mathbf n-\mathbf e_c)Φ(n)=ϕc​(n)Φ(n−ec​) for some positive Φ\PhiΦ (3.26).

Significance

Theorem 3.1 gives the full joint law of a network in which routes carry memory, and its corollaries turn it into usable performance formulas: each queue behaves, in its marginal law and as seen by arriving customers, like an isolated queue fed by a Poisson stream of rate aja_jaj​, even though the actual arrival stream at queue jjj is not Poisson. Mean sojourn times along a route then follow from Little's result. Theorem 3.2 identifies the reversed process as a network of the same kind; it is the source of the departure-stream results (Corollary 3.3) and of the arrival theorem (Corollary 3.5). Lemma 3.13 isolates the condition (3.26) under which state-dependent arrival rates preserve the product form (Theorem 3.14).

The results are classical and proved in the book. None of them has a machine-checked proof: the Prove2Me catalogue holds the rate-level theorems for migration processes (Chapter 2 of Kelly–Yudovina), and open targets for the BCMP and Jackson models, which have different state descriptions. This mission adds a formal model of the position-structured multiclass network itself, with the summation over coinciding transitions that (3.2), (3.4) and (3.6) require, and product-form, reversal and arrival-theorem statements over it.

Difficulty

The obvious first attempt, detailed balance, fails: π(C)q(C,D)\pi(\mathbf C)q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)π(C)q(C,D) and π(D)q(D,C)\pi(\mathbf D)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)π(D)q(D,C) differ in general, because a customer's route cannot be run backwards inside the same network (q(D,C)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)q(D,C) is usually 000 when q(C,D)>0q(\mathbf C,\mathbf D)>0q(C,D)>0). The equilibrium equations therefore involve, for each state, all its predecessors at once. The rates are themselves sums over coinciding transitions, so a statement about individual events does not transfer to the rates without accounting for which positions lead to the same successor state. In Lean this brings in insertion into and deletion from position lists, the relabelling of stages, and the normalization of a product over a countable space of JJJ-tuples of lists, reorganized by queue length together with the identity ∑classes at jαj=aj\sum_{\text{classes at } j}\alpha_j=a_j∑classes at j​αj​=aj​.

Formalization scope

  • Finite types and queues. Types are Fin I, queues Fin J; the book allows countably many types with ∑iν(i)<∞\sum_i\nu(i)<\infty∑i​ν(i)<∞. A network state is a function assigning to each queue a list of classes (i,s)(i,s)(i,s) with r(i,s)=jr(i,s)=jr(i,s)=j; the state space is countable and all sums over it are tsum/HasSum.
  • Indexing. Stages and list positions are 000-based in Lean; γj(l,n)\gamma_j(l,n)γj​(l,n) and δj(l,n)\delta_j(l,n)δj​(l,n) keep the book's 111-based position argument.
  • Rate level. Equilibrium means: positive, summing to 111, and satisfying the equilibrium equations (the published KellyStochasticNetworks.FullBalance). The existence of the Markov process, irreducibility and non-explosion are not formalized. "The reversed process" (Theorem 3.2) is read through the reversed rates π(D)q(D,C)/π(C)\pi(\mathbf D)q(\mathbf D,\mathbf C)/\pi(\mathbf C)π(D)q(D,C)/π(C); "the probability he finds" (Corollary 3.5) is read as a ratio of equilibrium arrival fluxes; quasi-reversibility is its rate characterization (3.8), (3.10).
  • Normalizing constants. bjb_jbj​ is defined through a tsum, which Lean sets to 000 for a divergent series; every theorem assumes the series converges, the book's "none of b1,…,bJb_1,\dots,b_Jb1​,…,bJ​ is zero".
  • No trivial instance. The goal holds for arbitrary III, JJJ, ν\nuν, routes, ϕj\phi_jϕj​, γj\gamma_jγj​, δj\delta_jδj​ subject only to the book's constraints; a proof for a single queue, or for fixed γ=δ\gamma=\deltaγ=δ disciplines, does not prove it. In Lemma 3.13 the function Φ\PhiΦ is required to be positive, since Φ≡0\Phi\equiv0Φ≡0 satisfies (3.26) for every queue.

Infrastructure that a complete development needs: list insertion/deletion lemmas for position bookkeeping, sums of products over ∏jList(⋅)\prod_j \mathrm{List}(\cdot)∏j​List(⋅), and a bijection-of-events argument for summed rates. The quasi-reversibility predicate and the reversed-rate apparatus are reusable for the closed networks of §3.4 and the symmetric queues of §3.3. Contributions are welcome on any milestone, in any order.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, John Wiley & Sons, 1979. https://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues with customers of different types, Journal of Applied Probability 12 (1975), 542–554. https://doi.org/10.2307/3212785
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, closed, and mixed networks of queues with different classes of customers, Journal of the ACM 22 (1975), 248–260. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
  • J. R. Jackson, Jobshop-like queueing systems, Management Science 10 (1963), 131–142. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.10.1.131
  • F. P. Kelly, E. Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565363
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks IV: Symmetric Queues with Gamma-Mixture Service RequirementsTextbook

Why symmetric queues

The classical product-form results for queueing networks (Jackson, Kelly, Baskett–Chandy–Muntz–Palacios) assume exponentially distributed service requirements, because then the state of a queue need not record how much service each customer has received. Real service times are rarely exponential: telephone call lengths, job sizes in time-shared computers and web transfers are far from it. Symmetric queues, introduced in §3.3 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979), form the class of single queues for which the stationary distribution of the number of customers, and of their classes, depends on the service requirement distribution only through its mean. This property, insensitivity, is what makes Erlang's loss formula valid for arbitrarily distributed call lengths (Kelly, p. 79), and it is the reason processor-sharing, last-come-first-served preemptive and infinite-server stations may appear with general service in product-form networks.

Timeline. Sevastyanov (1957) proved that Erlang's loss formula holds for arbitrarily distributed call lengths. Kelly (1975, 1976) introduced queues with customers of different types whose effort and arrival-position functions coincide, and showed product form for networks of them with non-exponential service built from exponential stages; Barbour (1976) extended the method of stages; Baskett, Chandy, Muntz and Palacios (1975) gave product form for networks containing processor-sharing, LCFS-preemptive and infinite-server stations with phase-type service. Kelly's 1979 book presents the symmetric queue in the form formalized here.

Setting

A symmetric queue holds customers in positions 1,2,…,n1, 2, \dots, n1,2,…,n, where nnn is the number present. It operates as follows (Kelly, p. 72):

  1. the service requirement of a customer is a random variable whose distribution may depend on the class of the customer;
  2. a total service effort is supplied at rate ϕ(n)\phi(n)ϕ(n), with ϕ(n)>0\phi(n) > 0ϕ(n)>0 for n>0n > 0n>0;
  3. a proportion γ(l,n)\gamma(l, n)γ(l,n) of this effort, ∑l=1nγ(l,n)=1\sum_{l=1}^n \gamma(l, n) = 1∑l=1n​γ(l,n)=1, goes to the customer in position lll; when he leaves, the customers in positions l+1,…,nl+1, \dots, nl+1,…,n move down by one;
  4. an arriving customer moves into position l∈{1,…,n+1}l \in \{1, \dots, n+1\}l∈{1,…,n+1} with probability γ(l,n+1)\gamma(l, n+1)γ(l,n+1) — the same function — and the customers in positions l,…,nl, \dots, nl,…,n move up by one.

Server-sharing (γ(l,n)=1/n\gamma(l, n) = 1/nγ(l,n)=1/n), the stack (γ(n,n)=1\gamma(n, n) = 1γ(n,n)=1, last come first served preemptive), the queue with no waiting room and the infinite-server queue are examples (pp. 73–74).

Customers of class ccc arrive in a Poisson stream of rate ν(c)\nu(c)ν(c). On arrival a class-ccc customer receives a refined class (c,z)(c, z)(c,z) with probability p(c,z)p(c, z)p(c,z), ∑zp(c,z)=1\sum_z p(c, z) = 1∑z​p(c,z)=1, and then needs w(c,z)≥1w(c, z) \ge 1w(c,z)≥1 independent stages of service, each exponentially distributed with mean d(c,z)>0d(c, z) > 0d(c,z)>0. The class-ccc service requirement is therefore a mixture of gamma distributions with mean

a(c)=∑zp(c,z) w(c,z) d(c,z),a(c) = \sum_z p(c, z)\, w(c, z)\, d(c, z),a(c)=z∑​p(c,z)w(c,z)d(c,z),

and the work arriving per unit time is a=∑cν(c)a(c)a = \sum_c \nu(c) a(c)a=∑c​ν(c)a(c). The record of the customer in position lll is c(l)=(c(l),z(l),u(l))\mathbf c(l) = (c(l), z(l), u(l))c(l)=(c(l),z(l),u(l)), u(l)u(l)u(l) the stage in progress, and c=(c(1),…,c(n))\mathbf c = (\mathbf c(1), \dots, \mathbf c(n))c=(c(1),…,c(n)) is a Markov process. Its transitions are: an arrival of class (c,z)(c,z)(c,z) into position lll at stage 111, at rate ν(c)p(c,z)γ(l,n+1)\nu(c)p(c,z)\gamma(l, n+1)ν(c)p(c,z)γ(l,n+1); and, at rate ϕ(n)γ(l,n)/d(c(l),z(l))\phi(n)\gamma(l,n)/d(c(l),z(l))ϕ(n)γ(l,n)/d(c(l),z(l)), completion of the current stage of the customer in position lll, which moves him to the next stage or, after stage w(c(l),z(l))w(c(l), z(l))w(c(l),z(l)), out of the queue. The normalizing constant is

b−1=∑n=0∞an∏l=1nϕ(l).(3.15)b^{-1} = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{a^n}{\prod_{l=1}^n \phi(l)}. \tag{3.15}b−1=n=0∑∞​∏l=1n​ϕ(l)an​.(3.15)

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.8

When (3.15) converges, the distribution

π(c)=b∏l=1nν(c(l)) p(c(l),z(l)) d(c(l),z(l))ϕ(l)(3.18)\pi(\mathbf c) = b \prod_{l=1}^n \frac{\nu(c(l))\, p(c(l), z(l))\, d(c(l), z(l))}{\phi(l)} \tag{3.18}π(c)=bl=1∏n​ϕ(l)ν(c(l))p(c(l),z(l))d(c(l),z(l))​(3.18)

is the equilibrium distribution of c\mathbf cc, and under it

P(n customers)=b an∏l=1nϕ(l),P(classes c1,…,cn∣n)=∏l=1nν(cl) a(cl)a,\mathbb P(n \text{ customers}) = \frac{b\,a^n}{\prod_{l=1}^n \phi(l)}, \qquad \mathbb P(\text{classes } c_1, \dots, c_n \mid n) = \prod_{l=1}^n \frac{\nu(c_l)\, a(c_l)}{a},P(n customers)=∏l=1n​ϕ(l)ban​,P(classes c1​,…,cn​∣n)=l=1∏n​aν(cl​)a(cl​)​,

and the queue is quasi-reversible with respect to the classification ccc and to (c,z)(c, z)(c,z): from every state, the rate of arrivals of each class does not depend on the state, both for the process and its time reversal (relations (3.8) and (3.10) of p. 67).

Milestones

  • Eqs. (3.14)–(3.15): the case of one refinement per class, π(c)=b∏lν(c(l))d(c(l))/ϕ(l)\pi(\mathbf c) = b\prod_l \nu(c(l))d(c(l))/\phi(l)π(c)=b∏l​ν(c(l))d(c(l))/ϕ(l) with a=∑cν(c)d(c)w(c)a = \sum_c \nu(c)d(c)w(c)a=∑c​ν(c)d(c)w(c).
  • Eqs. (3.16)–(3.17): in that case, the law of nnn, and given nnn independent positions of class ccc with probability ν(c)d(c)w(c)/a\nu(c)d(c)w(c)/aν(c)d(c)w(c)/a and uniform stage.
  • Eq. (3.18): the equilibrium distribution under gamma-mixture service.
  • Lemma 3.9: mixtures of gamma distributions approximate, at continuity points, the distribution function of any positive random variable.

Significance

Theorem 3.8 gives the stationary law of a symmetric queue in closed form and shows that it depends on the service requirement distributions only through their means a(c)a(c)a(c). Quasi-reversibility (part (iii)) is the property that lets symmetric queues be placed in networks: Kelly's §3.2 shows that a network of quasi-reversible queues has a product-form equilibrium, so Theorem 3.8 is the single-queue input to product-form networks with processor-sharing, LCFS-preemptive and infinite-server stations and class-dependent, non-exponential service. Lemma 3.9 is the approximation step behind the extension to arbitrary service distributions (Theorem 3.10).

These results are classical and proved in the book. To our knowledge none of them is machine-checked; Mathlib has the gamma distribution and distribution functions but no queueing theory. The mission produces a formal model of the symmetric queue as a countable-state Markov process, its equilibrium distribution, the insensitive marginals and the rate characterization of quasi-reversibility, all reusable by the chapter on networks of quasi-reversible queues.

Difficulty

The obvious first attempt, detailed balance, fails: the stage process is not reversible in general, since an intermediate stage completion has no transition back. The equilibrium equations must be verified in full, over a countable state space in which a single state is reached from infinitely many others. The symmetry condition γ≡δ\gamma \equiv \deltaγ≡δ is essential and must enter the argument: without it (for first-come-first-served, say) the distribution (3.18) is false for non-exponential service. Positions shift on every arrival and departure, so the bookkeeping of which list results from which event, including coincidences when neighbouring customers have identical records, is the main formal burden. The marginal computations sum (3.18) over lists of records, where convergence must be tracked, and Lemma 3.9 needs an explicit construction of approximating gamma mixtures.

Formalization scope

  • The state is a List of customer records (class, refined class, stage); list index iii is position l=i+1l = i + 1l=i+1, and γ(l,n)\gamma(l, n)γ(l,n), ϕ(n)\phi(n)ϕ(n) keep the book's 111-based indexing. The state space consists of the lists whose records have ν(c)p(c,z)>0\nu(c)p(c,z) > 0ν(c)p(c,z)>0 and 1≤u≤w(c,z)1 \le u \le w(c, z)1≤u≤w(c,z): records of a refined class arriving at rate zero are unreachable and excluded.
  • Classes C\mathcal CC and refinements Z\mathcal ZZ are arbitrary countable types. All infinite sums are HasSum or tsum with explicit convergence hypotheses: ∑cν(c)<∞\sum_c \nu(c) < \infty∑c​ν(c)<∞ (finite exit rates, the book's standing assumption of §1.1), convergence of a(c)a(c)a(c), of aaa, and of (3.15). "Equilibrium distribution" means positive, summing to one, and satisfying the equilibrium equations with convergent series.
  • The statement is rate level: (3.18) is shown to satisfy the equilibrium equations of the stage process, and quasi-reversibility is its rate characterization (3.8), (3.10). That these describe the stationary process and its time reversal is the book's Chapter 1 and is not reformalized.
  • Trivializing readings ruled out: the goal keeps ppp, www and ddd general (not w≡1w \equiv 1w≡1, which would make the result Section 3.1's exponential case); the arrival position uses the same γ\gammaγ as the service split; and in Lemma 3.9 the approximants must be genuine gamma mixtures with integer shapes, which a point mass is not.
  • Not planned: Theorem 3.10 (arbitrary service distributions; only an outline of proof and a continuous state space the book does not construct) and Theorem 3.11 (reversibility of the number in queue, a non-Markov process).

Welcome contributions: proofs of the milestones, lemmas about List.insertIdx/List.eraseIdx bookkeeping for queues with positions, and summation over lists of records.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley, Chichester, 1979, §3.3, pp. 72–82. https://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues with customers of different types, Journal of Applied Probability 12 (1975), 542–554. https://www.jstor.org/journal/japplprob
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues, Advances in Applied Probability 8 (1976), 416–432. https://www.jstor.org/journal/advaapplprob
  • A. D. Barbour, Networks of queues and the method of stages, Advances in Applied Probability 8 (1976), 584–591. https://www.jstor.org/journal/advaapplprob
  • B. A. Sevastyanov, An ergodic theorem for Markov processes and its application to telephone systems with refusals, Theory of Probability and its Applications 2 (1957), 104–112.
  • F. Baskett, K. M. Chandy, R. R. Muntz, F. G. Palacios, Open, closed, and mixed networks of queues with different classes of customers, Journal of the ACM 22 (1975), 248–260. https://doi.org/10.1145/321879.321887
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems I: Pseudo-Regret of (α, ψ)-UCBTextbook

Motivation

The stochastic multi-armed bandit is the basic model of sequential decisions under uncertainty with partial feedback: a forecaster repeatedly picks one of KKK options and observes only the reward of the option it picked. It models clinical trials, ad placement, routing and dynamic pricing, and is the building block of many reinforcement-learning algorithms. The question is how much reward is lost, compared with always playing the best option, through having to learn which option is best.

Chapter 2 of Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi's monograph (arXiv:1204.5721v2) answers this for upper confidence bound (UCB) strategies.

  • Lai and Robbins (1985) introduced upper confidence bounds and proved that the number of pulls of a suboptimal arm must grow at least logarithmically, with an explicit constant, for consistent strategies (doi:10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8).
  • Agrawal (1995) gave simpler sample-mean-based index policies with logarithmic regret (doi:10.2307/1427934).
  • Auer, Cesa-Bianchi and Fischer (2002) gave the finite-time analysis of UCB1 for bounded rewards (doi:10.1023/A:1013689704352).
  • Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi (2012) present the (α,ψ)(\alpha,\psi)(α,ψ)-UCB family, whose analysis needs only a bound ψ\psiψ on the cumulant generating function of the rewards, and the Lai–Robbins lower bound for Bernoulli rewards.

Setting

There are K≥2K\ge2K≥2 arms. Arm iii has an unknown reward distribution νi\nu_iνi​ with mean μi\mu_iμi​. At each round t=1,2,…t=1,2,\dotst=1,2,… the forecaster selects an arm ItI_tIt​ based on the past and receives a reward drawn from νIt\nu_{I_t}νIt​​, independently of the past. Write μ∗=max⁡iμi\mu^*=\max_i\mu_iμ∗=maxi​μi​, Δi=μ∗−μi\Delta_i=\mu^*-\mu_iΔi​=μ∗−μi​ for the gap of arm iii, and Ti(n)T_i(n)Ti​(n) for the number of times arm iii is selected in rounds 1,…,n1,\dots,n1,…,n. The pseudo-regret is

R‾n=nμ∗−E∑t=1nμIt=∑i=1KΔi E Ti(n).\overline R_n=n\mu^*-\mathbb E\sum_{t=1}^n\mu_{I_t}=\sum_{i=1}^K\Delta_i\,\mathbb E\,T_i(n).Rn​=nμ∗−Et=1∑n​μIt​​=i=1∑K​Δi​ETi​(n).

Moment condition (2.2). There is a convex ψ:R→R\psi:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rψ:R→R with ln⁡E eλ(X−EX)≤ψ(λ)\ln\mathbb E\,e^{\lambda(X-\mathbb EX)}\le\psi(\lambda)lnEeλ(X−EX)≤ψ(λ) and ln⁡E eλ(EX−X)≤ψ(λ)\ln\mathbb E\,e^{\lambda(\mathbb EX-X)}\le\psi(\lambda)lnEeλ(EX−X)≤ψ(λ) for all λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0 and every arm's reward XXX. Its Legendre–Fenchel transform is ψ∗(ε)=sup⁡λ∈R(λε−ψ(λ))\psi^*(\varepsilon)=\sup_{\lambda\in\mathbb R}(\lambda\varepsilon-\psi(\lambda))ψ∗(ε)=supλ∈R​(λε−ψ(λ)). For [0,1][0,1][0,1] rewards one may take ψ(λ)=λ2/8\psi(\lambda)=\lambda^2/8ψ(λ)=λ2/8, for which ψ∗(ε)=2ε2\psi^*(\varepsilon)=2\varepsilon^2ψ∗(ε)=2ε2.

(α,ψ)(\alpha,\psi)(α,ψ)-UCB. With μ^i,s\hat\mu_{i,s}μ^​i,s​ the mean of the first sss rewards of arm iii, at round ttt select

It∈argmax⁡i[μ^i,Ti(t−1)+(ψ∗)−1(αln⁡tTi(t−1))].I_t\in\operatorname*{argmax}_{i}\Big[\hat\mu_{i,T_i(t-1)}+(\psi^*)^{-1}\Big(\frac{\alpha\ln t}{T_i(t-1)}\Big)\Big].It​∈iargmax​[μ^​i,Ti​(t−1)​+(ψ∗)−1(Ti​(t−1)αlnt​)].

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.1 (p. 11)

If the rewards satisfy (2.2), then (α,ψ)(\alpha,\psi)(α,ψ)-UCB with α>2\alpha>2α>2 satisfies, for every nnn,

R‾n≤∑i:Δi>0Δi(αln⁡nψ∗(Δi/2)+αα−2).\overline R_n\le\sum_{i:\Delta_i>0}\Delta_i\Big(\frac{\alpha\ln n}{\psi^*(\Delta_i/2)}+\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-2}\Big).Rn​≤i:Δi​>0∑​Δi​(ψ∗(Δi​/2)αlnn​+α−2α​).

This is the bound the book's proof establishes. The printed statement has α/(α−2)\alpha/(\alpha-2)α/(α−2) in place of Δi α/(α−2)\Delta_i\,\alpha/(\alpha-2)Δi​α/(α−2); see Formalization scope.

Milestones

  • The decomposition R‾n=∑iΔi E Ti(n)\overline R_n=\sum_i\Delta_i\,\mathbb E\,T_i(n)Rn​=∑i​Δi​ETi​(n) (p. 9).
  • The Cramér–Chernoff bound (2.3): P(μi−μ^i,s>ε)≤e−sψ∗(ε)\mathbb P(\mu_i-\hat\mu_{i,s}>\varepsilon)\le e^{-s\psi^*(\varepsilon)}P(μi​−μ^​i,s​>ε)≤e−sψ∗(ε).
  • The three-event lemma (2.5)–(2.7) from the proof of Theorem 2.1.
  • The bounded-reward bound (2.4): R‾n≤∑i:Δi>0(2αΔiln⁡n+αα−2)\overline R_n\le\sum_{i:\Delta_i>0}\big(\frac{2\alpha}{\Delta_i}\ln n+\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-2}\big)Rn​≤∑i:Δi​>0​(Δi​2α​lnn+α−2α​).
  • The comparison (2.8): 2(p−q)2≤kl(p,q)≤(p−q)2/(q(1−q))2(p-q)^2\le\mathrm{kl}(p,q)\le(p-q)^2/(q(1-q))2(p−q)2≤kl(p,q)≤(p−q)2/(q(1−q)).
  • Theorem 2.2: for every strategy with E Ti(n)=o(na)\mathbb E\,T_i(n)=o(n^a)ETi​(n)=o(na) on all Bernoulli instances, lim inf⁡nR‾n/ln⁡n≥∑i:Δi>0Δi/kl(μi,μ∗)\liminf_n\overline R_n/\ln n\ge\sum_{i:\Delta_i>0}\Delta_i/\mathrm{kl}(\mu_i,\mu^*)liminfn​Rn​/lnn≥∑i:Δi​>0​Δi​/kl(μi​,μ∗).

Significance

Theorem 2.1 says that the cost of learning grows only logarithmically in the horizon, with a constant set by how well each suboptimal arm can be told apart from the best one. Theorem 2.2 shows that, up to constants, this cannot be improved: for Bernoulli rewards any strategy that is good on every instance must pay ln⁡n\ln nlnn per suboptimal arm, with constant Δi/kl(μi,μ∗)\Delta_i/\mathrm{kl}(\mu_i,\mu^*)Δi​/kl(μi​,μ∗). By (2.8) this constant is at least of order 1/Δi1/\Delta_i1/Δi​, matching (2.4). Together they are the template for the analysis of most optimistic algorithms: KL-UCB, linear and contextual UCB, and UCB-style reinforcement learning.

All results of the chapter are classical and proved on paper. This mission makes them machine-checked in a common model. That model has an explicit pseudo-regret, an explicit (generalized) inverse of ψ∗\psi^*ψ∗, an explicit initialization rule for the algorithm, and a randomized-strategy model for the lower bound. Later chapters of the series and later papers on optimistic algorithms can build on it.

Difficulty

The deterministic part of the upper bound is short, so the main difficulty is probabilistic. The sample mean μ^i,Ti(t−1)\hat\mu_{i,T_i(t-1)}μ^​i,Ti​(t−1)​ is taken over a random number of samples that depends on the algorithm's past. A Chernoff bound for a fixed sample size does not apply to it directly. The proof needs a union bound over all possible sample sizes, together with the representation in which the sss-th reward of each arm is a fixed random variable. Summing the resulting tail t1−αt^{1-\alpha}t1−α over rounds is where α>2\alpha>2α>2 enters.

The lower bound needs a change-of-measure argument between two Bernoulli instances, applied to a forecaster that may be randomized and never knows the horizon. Expressing "the forecaster cannot distinguish the instances" requires the law of the whole interaction under two environments.

Formalization scope

Model. Arms are Fin K with 2≤K2\le K2≤K, rounds are 1,2,…1,2,\dots1,2,…, and the natural logarithm is used. Rewards are a stack: Xi,kX_{i,k}Xi,k​ is the reward of the (k+1)(k+1)(k+1)-st pull of arm iii, all mutually independent, identically distributed per arm. For every strategy this gives the same law of arms and rewards as the book's protocol. μ∗\mu^*μ∗, Δi\Delta_iΔi​ and Ti(t)T_i(t)Ti​(t) are the published definitions of ImprovedLinBandits.UCBDelta.armModel. The pseudo-regret is (2.1), nμ∗−E∑tμItn\mu^*-\mathbb E\sum_t\mu_{I_t}nμ∗−E∑t​μIt​​, not the expected regret. The arms played are measurable random variables, so that every expectation is genuine.

ψ∗\psi^*ψ∗ and its inverse. ψ∗\psi^*ψ∗ takes values in the extended reals. (ψ∗)−1(y)=inf⁡{ε≥0:ψ∗(ε)≥y}(\psi^*)^{-1}(y)=\inf\{\varepsilon\ge0:\psi^*(\varepsilon)\ge y\}(ψ∗)−1(y)=inf{ε≥0:ψ∗(ε)≥y}.

Algorithm. The index is undefined while Ti(t−1)=0T_i(t-1)=0Ti​(t−1)=0. Unplayed arms are therefore played first, so each arm is played once in rounds 1,…,K1,\dots,K1,…,K. Ties are broken arbitrarily.

Corrected misprint. The book prints Theorem 2.1 with constant term α/(α−2)\alpha/(\alpha-2)α/(α−2). Its proof yields Δi α/(α−2)\Delta_i\,\alpha/(\alpha-2)Δi​α/(α−2) (bound on E Ti(n)\mathbb E\,T_i(n)ETi​(n) times Δi\Delta_iΔi​). The printed form is false for Gaussian rewards with large gaps. The goal states the proof's version. (2.4) is correct as printed because Δi≤1\Delta_i\le1Δi​≤1.

Constants. No O(·) appears in the chapter's statements. The constants are the book's: α/(α−2)\alpha/(\alpha-2)α/(α−2) in Theorem 2.1 and (2.4), and the factor 222 in (2.4) and (2.8).

Conventions made explicit.

  1. ψ(λ)≥ψ(0)\psi(\lambda)\ge\psi(0)ψ(λ)≥ψ(0) for λ≤0\lambda\le0λ≤0. Condition (2.2) constrains ψ\psiψ only on λ≥0\lambda\ge0λ≥0, while ψ∗\psi^*ψ∗ takes the supremum over all of R\mathbb RR. Without this convention, (2.3) and Theorem 2.1 are false (for example ψ(λ)=cλ+λ2/8\psi(\lambda)=c\lambda+\lambda^2/8ψ(λ)=cλ+λ2/8 with large ccc).
  2. ψ∗\psi^*ψ∗ is finite on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).
  3. ψ∗(Δi/2)>0\psi^*(\Delta_i/2)>0ψ∗(Δi​/2)>0 for suboptimal arms.
  4. ε≥0\varepsilon\ge0ε≥0 in (2.3).
  5. q∈(0,1)q\in(0,1)q∈(0,1) in (2.8).

Conventions 1–3 hold for every ψ\psiψ the book uses.

Theorem 2.2. The forecaster is a measurable rule from the history and a fresh uniform seed to an arm. It does not depend on the horizon. Consistency is required on every Bernoulli instance, every suboptimal arm and every a>0a>0a>0. A term with μ∗=1\mu^*=1μ∗=1 (kl=+∞\mathrm{kl}=+\inftykl=+∞) is 000, and the lim inf⁡\liminfliminf is taken in the extended reals. The book proves only K=2K=2K=2.

Ruled out. The algorithm cannot see unplayed rewards (its index uses only the sample means of rewards already received). Non-measurable arm choices, which would make the expectations vanish in Lean, are excluded. Consistency cannot be assumed only on the instance of the conclusion.

Needed infrastructure. Cramér–Chernoff bounds for sums of i.i.d. variables, Hoeffding's lemma, the stack representation of bandit interactions, and the divergence decomposition for randomized strategies. All are reusable beyond this mission, and contributions of any of them are welcome.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012. arXiv:1204.5721v2, doi:10.1561/2200000024
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules, Advances in Applied Mathematics 6, 1985. doi:10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
  • R. Agrawal, Sample mean based index policies with O(log n) regret for the multi-armed bandit problem, Advances in Applied Probability 27, 1995. doi:10.2307/1427934
  • P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, P. Fischer, Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem, Machine Learning 47, 2002. doi:10.1023/A:1013689704352
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 3: The Optimal Wholesale-Price Contract with R′(q) = 1 − q^α Has Efficiency (2+α)/(1+α)^((1+α)/α)Research Paper

Motivation

A supplier who sells to a retailer at a per-unit wholesale price above her own production cost induces the retailer to order less than an integrated firm would. This effect, double marginalization, goes back to Spengler (1950) and is the standard benchmark against which supply chain contracts are judged: a contract coordinates the channel if it makes the decentralized decisions coincide with the integrated optimum. Revenue-sharing contracts, as used in the video-rental industry, coordinate the channel; the plain wholesale-price contract does not. Whether a supplier should bother with the administrative cost of revenue sharing depends on how much the wholesale-price contract actually loses and how much of the remaining profit the supplier keeps.

Cachon and Lariviere answer that question for a retailer whose revenue depends only on the quantity ordered, in Section 4.1.1 of their working paper Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations (June 2000; the 2005 Management Science version renumbers and revises the material). They show that the answer is governed by the curvature of the marginal revenue curve, and they compute it exactly for a one-parameter family. The source is the June 2000 working paper, whose results are unnumbered; every item cites its section, page and display.

Setting

A supplier produces at unit cost c>0c > 0c>0 and sells to a single retailer. The retailer's expected revenue from qqq units is R(q)R(q)R(q), where R(0)=0R(0) = 0R(0)=0, RRR is strictly concave and differentiable on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) with derivative R′R'R′ (the marginal revenue), R′R'R′ is differentiable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) with derivative R′′R''R′′, the product is viable (R′(0)>cR'(0) > cR′(0)>c), and a finite quantity is optimal (R′(q)<cR'(q) < cR′(q)<c for some qqq). The supply chain profit is Π(q)=R(q)−qc\Pi(q) = R(q) - qcΠ(q)=R(q)−qc; the integrated quantity qIq_IqI​ maximizes Π\PiΠ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0.

Under a wholesale-price contract with price www, the retailer orders qqq to maximize R(q)−wqR(q) - wqR(q)−wq. Each order q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 is induced by exactly one price, w(q)=R′(q)w(q) = R'(q)w(q)=R′(q), so the supplier can be thought of as choosing qqq. Her profit, the retailer's profit, and their sum are then

πs(q)=q (R′(q)−c),πr(q)=R(q)−qR′(q),πs(q)+πr(q)=Π(q).\pi_s(q) = q\,(R'(q) - c), \qquad \pi_r(q) = R(q) - qR'(q), \qquad \pi_s(q) + \pi_r(q) = \Pi(q).πs​(q)=q(R′(q)−c),πr​(q)=R(q)−qR′(q),πs​(q)+πr​(q)=Π(q).

Following the paper, q↦R′(q)+qR′′(q)q \mapsto R'(q) + qR''(q)q↦R′(q)+qR′′(q) is assumed decreasing, which makes πs\pi_sπs​ unimodal. The supplier's optimal quantity to induce q∗q^*q∗ maximizes πs\pi_sπs​ over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0, and w(q∗)w(q^*)w(q∗) is her optimal wholesale price. The efficiency of the contract and the supplier's profit share are

πs(q∗)+πr(q∗)Π(qI)andπs(q∗)Π(q∗).\frac{\pi_s(q^*) + \pi_r(q^*)}{\Pi(q_I)} \qquad\text{and}\qquad \frac{\pi_s(q^*)}{\Pi(q^*)} .Π(qI​)πs​(q∗)+πr​(q∗)​andΠ(q∗)πs​(q∗)​.

In the α-family, R(q)=q−qα+1/(α+1)R(q) = q - q^{\alpha+1}/(\alpha+1)R(q)=q−qα+1/(α+1) for α>0\alpha > 0α>0 and q∈[0,1]q \in [0,1]q∈[0,1], so R′(q)=1−qαR'(q) = 1 - q^\alphaR′(q)=1−qα: marginal revenue is convex for α<1\alpha < 1α<1, linear for α=1\alpha = 1α=1 and concave for α>1\alpha > 1α>1.

Formalization targets

Goal: the α-family

For α>0\alpha > 0α>0 and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1, the quantities q∗=(1−c1+α)1/αq^* = \left(\frac{1-c}{1+\alpha}\right)^{1/\alpha}q∗=(1+α1−c​)1/α and qI=(1−c)1/αq_I = (1-c)^{1/\alpha}qI​=(1−c)1/α are the unique maximizers of πs\pi_sπs​ and Π\PiΠ on [0,1][0,1][0,1], the profit share is (1+α)/(2+α)(1+\alpha)/(2+\alpha)(1+α)/(2+α), and

πs(q∗)+πr(q∗)Π(qI)=2+α(1+α)1+αα,\frac{\pi_s(q^*) + \pi_r(q^*)}{\Pi(q_I)} = \frac{2+\alpha}{(1+\alpha)^{\frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha}}},Π(qI​)πs​(q∗)+πr​(q∗)​=(1+α)α1+α​2+α​,

a quantity that does not depend on ccc, is strictly increasing in α\alphaα, tends to 2/e2/e2/e as α→0+\alpha \to 0^+α→0+ and to 111 as α→∞\alpha \to \inftyα→∞.

Milestones for a general revenue function

  1. The price w(q)=R′(q)w(q) = R'(q)w(q)=R′(q) makes qqq the retailer's unique optimum (Eq. (9)).
  2. 0<q∗<qI0 < q^* < q_I0<q∗<qI​.
  3. w(q∗)=c−q∗R′′(q∗)w(q^*) = c - q^*R''(q^*)w(q∗)=c−q∗R′′(q∗), and w(q∗)>cw(q^*) > cw(q∗)>c.
  4. The profit share is at most (at least) 2/32/32/3 when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).
  5. 2q∗≤qI2q^* \le q_I2q∗≤qI​ (≥qI\ge q_I≥qI​) when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).
  6. Π(qI)−Π(q∗)=∫q∗qI(R′(z)−c) dz\Pi(q_I) - \Pi(q^*) = \int_{q^*}^{q_I}(R'(z) - c)\,dzΠ(qI​)−Π(q∗)=∫q∗qI​​(R′(z)−c)dz is at least (at most) 12πs(q∗)\tfrac12\pi_s(q^*)21​πs​(q∗) when R′R'R′ is convex (concave), strictly under strict convexity (concavity).

Milestones for the α-family

  1. The closed forms of q∗q^*q∗, qIq_IqI​, πr(q∗)\pi_r(q^*)πr​(q∗), πs(q∗)\pi_s(q^*)πs​(q∗) and Π(qI)\Pi(q_I)Π(qI​).
  2. E(α)=(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/αE(\alpha) = (2+\alpha)/(1+\alpha)^{(1+\alpha)/\alpha}E(α)=(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α is strictly increasing on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) with limits 2/e2/e2/e and 111.

Significance

The general milestones turn the paper's area argument (the triangle under the tangent to marginal revenue at q∗q^*q∗) into three comparisons: convex marginal revenue makes the wholesale-price contract worse for the chain and leaves the supplier at most two thirds of a smaller pie, concave marginal revenue the opposite. The α-family makes the trade-off exact: efficiency never falls below 2/e≈0.7362/e \approx 0.7362/e≈0.736, while the supplier's share (1+α)/(2+α)(1+\alpha)/(2+\alpha)(1+α)/(2+α) moves much faster than efficiency, which is the paper's argument for why revenue sharing is most attractive when marginal revenue is convex.

These results are proved on paper but, to our knowledge, not machine-checked anywhere; Mathlib has no supply chain contract theory. The formalization provides a reusable single-retailer wholesale-price model, a checked version of the convex/concave tangent comparisons, and a corrected statement of the α-family's monotonicity (see the scope section).

Difficulty

The general comparisons are short on paper but rest on a picture: they need the first-order condition at an interior maximizer, the tangent-line inequality for a convex or concave derivative, and the fundamental theorem of calculus for a function whose derivative is known only on a half-line and one-sided at 000. Strictness needs a strictly positive integrand on a nondegenerate interval.

The α-family is where the analysis is not routine. The closed forms involve real powers with exponents 1/α1/\alpha1/α and (1+α)/α(1+\alpha)/\alpha(1+α)/α, which must be combined carefully. The limit (1+α)1/α→e(1+\alpha)^{1/\alpha} \to e(1+α)1/α→e as α→0+\alpha \to 0^+α→0+ is classical, but the monotonicity of log⁡(2+α)−1+ααlog⁡(1+α)\log(2+\alpha) - \frac{1+\alpha}{\alpha}\log(1+\alpha)log(2+α)−α1+α​log(1+α) on all of (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) is not a one-line derivative sign check: the derivative mixes log⁡(1+α)/α2\log(1+\alpha)/\alpha^2log(1+α)/α2 with rational terms, and its sign has to be established uniformly near 000 and near ∞\infty∞.

Formalization scope

Quantities and prices are real numbers. "Optimal" always means a maximizer over all admissible quantities (IsMaxOn on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), or on [0,1][0,1][0,1] in the α-family, as the page restricts), never a root of a first-order condition. The derivative R′R'R′ of the general model is linked to RRR by a one-sided derivative hypothesis on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞); R′′R''R′′ is required only on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞), since for α<1\alpha < 1α<1 it blows up at 000. In the α-family the marginal revenue is deriv of RRR, not a separate function, and 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 is assumed (implicit on the page: c>0c > 0c>0 and R′(0)=1>cR'(0) = 1 > cR′(0)=1>c). Efficiency and profit share are real divisions; their denominators are positive at the optimal quantities.

Deviations from the page, all disclosed in the items:

  • R(0)=0R(0) = 0R(0)=0 is added to the model. It is implicit in the paper's area reading of the retailer's profit, and the 2/32/32/3 comparison fails without it.
  • The paper states the curvature comparisons strictly ("less (more) than 2/3rds", "q∗>qI/2q^* > q_I/2q∗>qI​/2 (<qI/2< q_I/2<qI​/2)", "more (less) than 50%") under convexity (concavity). Linear marginal revenue is both and gives equality, so each item states the weak inequality under convexity or concavity and the strict one under strict convexity or concavity.
  • Printed slip. The page says "Efficiency is a decreasing function of α, i.e., efficiency improves as the marginal revenue curve becomes more concave". EEE is in fact strictly increasing (E(0+)=2/e≈0.7358E(0^+) = 2/e \approx 0.7358E(0+)=2/e≈0.7358, E(1)=0.75E(1) = 0.75E(1)=0.75, E(10)≈0.858E(10) \approx 0.858E(10)≈0.858), as the second half of the sentence and the two limits say. The Lean states the increasing form; the milestone text is kept verbatim. The numerical gloss "2/e≈0.732/e \approx 0.732/e≈0.73" is not formalized.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the efficiency in the goal is the ratio of profits computed from RRR at the maximizers, not a definition equal to (2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α(2+\alpha)/(1+\alpha)^{(1+\alpha)/\alpha}(2+α)/(1+α)(1+α)/α, and the maximizers are characterized as unique argmaxes rather than assumed.

Welcome contributions: proofs of the general tangent comparisons, which are reusable for any concave revenue model; the real-analysis lemmas on (1+α)1/α(1+\alpha)^{1/\alpha}(1+α)1/α; and the α-family closed forms.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • J. J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, Journal of Political Economy 58(4):347–352, 1950. https://doi.org/10.1086/256964
  • M. A. Lariviere and E. L. Porteus, Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 3(4):293–305, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.3.4.293.9971
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations 4: With Retailer Effort, the Supplier Prefers the Wholesale-Price Contract Exactly When τ > 1/√2Research Paper

Motivation

A revenue-sharing contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} lets a supplier charge a retailer a wholesale price www per unit and, in addition, collect the share 1−ϕ1 - \phi1−ϕ of the retailer's revenue. The video-rental industry adopted such contracts at scale in the late 1990s, and Cachon and Lariviere showed that in a broad class of models they coordinate the supply chain: the retailer's privately optimal decisions coincide with those that maximize total channel profit, and the profit can be split arbitrarily between the firms (missions 1 and 2 of this series).

The same authors also studied where revenue sharing breaks down. The most practically relevant limitation is retailer effort: shelf space, service, store cleanliness and promotion raise demand, cost the retailer money, and cannot be written into a contract. Once the retailer gives away part of its revenue, it earns only a share of the return on its effort while still paying the whole cost. This mission formalizes Section 4.2 of the authors' working paper, which shows that revenue sharing then cannot coordinate the channel while leaving the supplier any profit, and, in an explicit linear-demand example, determines exactly when the supplier is better off with the plain wholesale-price contract.

The source is the June 2000 working paper (Cachon and Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations), whose results are displayed claims inside numbered sections rather than numbered theorems; the milestones cite section, printed page and display. The published version appeared in Management Science 51(1), 2005.

Setting

General model (Sec. 4.2.1). A supplier produces at unit cost c>0c > 0c>0. The retailer chooses an order quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0 and an effort level e≥0e \ge 0e≥0 after observing the contract {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w}. Expected revenue R(q,e)R(q, e)R(q,e) is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing in eee and concave in qqq; effort costs the retailer g(e)g(e)g(e), where ggg is continuous, increasing, differentiable and convex with g(0)=0g(0) = 0g(0)=0. The profits of the integrated channel, the retailer and the supplier are

Π(q,e)=R(q,e)−g(e)−qc,πr(q,e)=ϕR(q,e)−g(e)−qw,(1−ϕ)R(q,e)+q(w−c).\Pi(q, e) = R(q, e) - g(e) - qc,\qquad \pi_r(q, e) = \phi R(q, e) - g(e) - qw,\qquad (1-\phi)R(q, e) + q(w - c).Π(q,e)=R(q,e)−g(e)−qc,πr​(q,e)=ϕR(q,e)−g(e)−qw,(1−ϕ)R(q,e)+q(w−c).

The integrated solution (qI,eI)(q_I, e_I)(qI​,eI​) maximizes Π\PiΠ over q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0.

Linear example (Sec. 4.2.2). Inverse demand is P(q,e)=1−q+2τeP(q, e) = 1 - q + 2\tau eP(q,e)=1−q+2τe with an effort-impact parameter τ≥0\tau \ge 0τ≥0, revenue is R(q,e)=qP(q,e)R(q, e) = qP(q, e)R(q,e)=qP(q,e) and effort costs g(e)=e2g(e) = e^2g(e)=e2. For a share ϕ\phiϕ the supplier's profit when the retailer responds optimally to {ϕ,w}\{\phi, w\}{ϕ,w} is πs(w,ϕ)\pi_s(w, \phi)πs​(w,ϕ), and the supplier's optimal profit is

V(ϕ)=sup⁡w≥0πs(w,ϕ).V(\phi) = \sup_{w \ge 0} \pi_s(w, \phi).V(ϕ)=w≥0sup​πs​(w,ϕ).

The share ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1 is the wholesale-price contract.

Formalization targets

Goal: the supplier's choice of contract

For 0≤τ<10 \le \tau < 10≤τ<1, 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1 and every ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1], the supremum defining V(ϕ)V(\phi)V(ϕ) is attained at the price w(ϕ)=ϕ((1−τ2)ϕ+c(1−ϕτ2))/(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))w(\phi) = \phi\big((1-\tau^2)\phi + c(1-\phi\tau^2)\big)/\big(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)w(ϕ)=ϕ((1−τ2)ϕ+c(1−ϕτ2))/(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)), and

V(ϕ)=(1−c)24(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)).V(\phi) = \frac{(1 - c)^2}{4\big(1 + \phi(1 - 2\tau^2)\big)} .V(ϕ)=4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))(1−c)2​.

Consequently VVV is strictly increasing on (0,1](0, 1](0,1] if τ>1/2\tau > 1/\sqrt 2τ>1/2​ (the wholesale-price contract is the supplier's unique best share), constant if τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​, and strictly decreasing if τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​, with V(ϕ)→(1−c)2/4V(\phi) \to (1-c)^2/4V(ϕ)→(1−c)2/4 as ϕ→0+\phi \to 0^+ϕ→0+.

Milestones

  1. Sec. 4.2.1, p. 22: with w=ϕcw = \phi cw=ϕc and ϕ<1\phi < 1ϕ<1 the retailer's optimal effort at qIq_IqI​ is below eIe_IeI​.
  2. Sec. 4.2.1, p. 22: if (qI,eI)(q_I, e_I)(qI​,eI​) is optimal for the retailer, then ϕ=1\phi = 1ϕ=1, w=cw = cw=c, and the supplier earns nothing.
  3. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 23: the retailer's unique optimal effort at quantity qqq is e(q)=ϕτqe(q) = \phi\tau qe(q)=ϕτq.
  4. Sec. 4.2.2, pp. 23–24: the retailer's reduced profit q[ϕ−q(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)−w]q[\phi - q(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2) - w]q[ϕ−q(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)−w], its unique joint optimum (q(w,ϕ),e(q(w,ϕ)))\big(q(w,\phi), e(q(w,\phi))\big)(q(w,ϕ),e(q(w,ϕ))) with q(w,ϕ)=(ϕ−w)/(2(ϕ−ϕ2τ2))q(w, \phi) = (\phi - w)/(2(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2))q(w,ϕ)=(ϕ−w)/(2(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)) for w<ϕw < \phiw<ϕ and 000 otherwise, and the optimal profit (ϕ−w)2/(4(ϕ−ϕ2τ2))(\phi - w)^2/(4(\phi - \phi^2\tau^2))(ϕ−w)2/(4(ϕ−ϕ2τ2)).
  5. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: the integrated retail price pI=(1+c(1−2τ2))/(2(1−τ2))p_I = (1 + c(1-2\tau^2))/(2(1-\tau^2))pI​=(1+c(1−2τ2))/(2(1−τ2)), increasing in ccc if τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​ and decreasing if τ>1/2\tau > 1/\sqrt 2τ>1/2​.
  6. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: πs(⋅,ϕ)\pi_s(\cdot, \phi)πs​(⋅,ϕ) is strictly concave where the retailer orders, and w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) is its unique maximizer over w≥0w \ge 0w≥0.
  7. Sec. 4.2.2, p. 24: πs(w(ϕ),ϕ)=(1−c)2/(4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2)))\pi_s(w(\phi), \phi) = (1-c)^2/\big(4(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2))\big)πs​(w(ϕ),ϕ)=(1−c)2/(4(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))).

Significance

The general result (milestones 1–2) is a clean impossibility statement: with non-contractible effort, the only contract in the revenue-sharing family that coordinates the channel is the wholesale-price contract at marginal cost, which leaves the supplier zero profit. It marks the boundary of the coordination results of the earlier sections, and contrasts with the price-dependent newsvendor, where revenue sharing does coordinate price and quantity because the cost of expanding demand is captured in the revenue function and shared by both firms.

The example turns the impossibility into a design rule. Because coordination is out of reach, the supplier compares contracts by her own profit, and the threshold τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​ separates two regimes: when effort matters a lot she should leave the retailer all revenue and charge only a wholesale price ("a smaller share of a larger pie"); when it matters little she should take as much revenue as possible. The same threshold governs the counterintuitive comparative static that the integrated channel's retail price falls as production cost rises.

All results are proved on paper in the source. None has a machine-checked proof; this mission produces the first. The example is a fully explicit two-stage optimization problem, so the formal development also yields a verified computation of a Stackelberg equilibrium with moral hazard that other contract-design missions can reuse.

Difficulty

The individual calculations are elementary, and the work lies in getting the optimization statements right. The page solves the retailer's problem sequentially (effort first, then quantity) and writes the supplier's objective by substituting closed forms. A faithful proof must instead show that these closed forms are global optima over the constrained domains: the retailer optimizes jointly over the quadrant q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0, the corner q=0q = 0q=0 is optimal whenever w≥ϕw \ge \phiw≥ϕ, and the supplier's objective is a quadratic on w≤ϕw \le \phiw≤ϕ glued to the zero function on w≥ϕw \ge \phiw≥ϕ, which is not concave on all of w≥0w \ge 0w≥0. The first-order-condition argument of the general model similarly needs an interior integrated optimum and a strictly positive marginal effect of effort, which "strictly increasing in eee" alone does not provide.

Formalization scope

All quantities are real numbers. The general model is a structure RevShareCoord.Effort.Model carrying RRR, its partial derivatives, ggg, g′g'g′ and ccc; derivatives are one-sided within [0,∞)[0, \infty)[0,∞), and joint differentiability of RRR is replaced by its partial derivatives and joint continuity. The example lives in RevShareCoord.Effort.Linear. "Optimal" always means a maximizer over the whole admissible set (q,e≥0q, e \ge 0q,e≥0 for the retailer, w≥0w \ge 0w≥0 for the supplier), and the supplier's value V(ϕ)V(\phi)V(ϕ) is defined as the supremum of her attainable profits, not by the printed formula.

Deviations from the page, each disclosed in the item's Formalization Note:

  • τ<1\tau < 1τ<1 instead of τ∈[0,1]\tau \in [0, 1]τ∈[0,1]: at τ=1\tau = 1τ=1 the integrated problem is unbounded and pIp_IpI​ divides by zero. The page's "jointly concave in qqq and τ\tauτ" is read as qqq and eee.
  • 0<c<10 < c < 10<c<1: c>0c > 0c>0 is the standing assumption of Sec. 1, and c<1c < 1c<1 is needed for a positive integrated quantity.
  • ϕ∈(0,1]\phi \in (0, 1]ϕ∈(0,1] in the example: at ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0 the retailer keeps no revenue and q(w,ϕ)q(w, \phi)q(w,ϕ) divides by zero. The page's optimal share "ϕ=0\phi = 0ϕ=0" for τ<1/2\tau < 1/\sqrt 2τ<1/2​ is stated as strict decrease on (0,1](0, 1](0,1] with the limit at 0+0^+0+.
  • The printed second derivative −(1−ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2)-\big(1 - \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)/\big(2\phi^2(1-\phi\tau^2)^2\big)−(1−ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2) has a sign slip in the numerator; the Lean states −(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2)-\big(1 + \phi(1-2\tau^2)\big)/\big(2\phi^2(1-\phi\tau^2)^2\big)−(1+ϕ(1−2τ2))/(2ϕ2(1−ϕτ2)2).
  • "Otherwise decreasing" fails at τ=1/2\tau = 1/\sqrt 2τ=1/2​, where VVV and pIp_IpI​ are constant; the trichotomy is stated.
  • In the general model, the integrated optimum is interior, ∂R/∂e>0\partial R/\partial e > 0∂R/∂e>0 at it, and, for milestone 1, πr(qI,⋅)\pi_r(q_I, \cdot)πr​(qI​,⋅) is strictly concave in eee (the page asserts this but it does not follow from the assumptions).

Plugging the printed w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) into πs\pi_sπs​ and comparing across ϕ\phiϕ would turn the dichotomy into a statement about an arbitrary price schedule; the goal instead asserts that w(ϕ)w(\phi)w(ϕ) attains the supremum over all w≥0w \ge 0w≥0, with the retailer best-responding jointly in (q,e)(q, e)(q,e).

No external library beyond Mathlib's real analysis and convexity is needed. Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, reusable lemmas on maximizing strictly concave quadratics over orthants, and a generalization of milestone 2 to non-interior optima.

Selected references

  • G. P. Cachon, M. A. Lariviere, Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue-Sharing Contracts: Strengths and Limitations, working paper, June 2000. Published version: Management Science 51(1):30–44, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215
  • G. P. Cachon, Supply Chain Coordination with Contracts, in Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science 11, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7
  • S. Desiraju, S. Moorthy, Managing a Distribution Channel under Asymmetric Information with Performance Requirements, Management Science 43(12), 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.43.12.1628
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Discounted Dynamic Programming: An Optimal Stationary Plan Exists When the Action Set Is Essentially FiniteResearch Paper

Motivation

Sequential decisions often change the distribution of future states. A planner choosing an action today must account for both its immediate reward and the later rewards made possible by the resulting state. The mathematical question is whether an optimal rule can be chosen once and reused at every stage, even when a competing plan may randomize and use the entire observed history. In Discounted Dynamic Programming, Blackwell studies this question on general Borel state and action spaces, beyond the finite models in which a direct comparison of actions is available.

The paper distinguishes several strengths of optimality. For each distribution of the initial state, an approximately optimal stationary plan exists, but a single plan that is approximately optimal at every initial state need not exist in a general Borel problem. Essential countability of the actions restores uniform approximate stationary optimality; essential finiteness yields exact stationary optimality. These are different mathematical claims, and the mission keeps their different quantifiers visible. Blackwell 1965, pp. 227, 229, 232–234.

Setting

A state is an element sss of a nonempty standard Borel space SSS, and an action is an element aaa of a nonempty standard Borel space AAA. The transition kernel q(⋅∣s,a)q(\cdot\mid s,a)q(⋅∣s,a) gives a probability distribution for the next state after action aaa in state sss. The reward r(s,a,s′)∈Rr(s,a,s')\in\mathbb Rr(s,a,s′)∈R may depend on that next state s′s's′; it is bounded and Borel measurable. Future rewards are discounted by β\betaβ with 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1. These are the objects of Blackwell’s Sections 2–3. Blackwell 1965, pp. 227–228.

A plan π=(π1,π2,…)\pi=(\pi_1,\pi_2,\ldots)π=(π1​,π2​,…) assigns a probability distribution of actions to each possible history before a decision. At stage nnn, that history contains n−1n-1n−1 completed state-action pairs and the current state. Thus plans may randomize and depend on earlier states and actions. A Markov plan instead uses a Borel function fn:S→Af_n:S\to Afn​:S→A at each stage; a stationary plan uses the same function fff at every stage and is denoted f(∞)f^{(\infty)}f(∞). Starting from state sss, the plan has discounted expected return

I(π)(s)=∑n=1∞βn−1 Esπ[r(σn,αn,σn+1)].I(\pi)(s)=\sum_{n=1}^{\infty}\beta^{n-1}\,\mathbb E_s^\pi\bigl[r(\sigma_n,\alpha_n,\sigma_{n+1})\bigr].I(π)(s)=n=1∑∞​βn−1Esπ​[r(σn​,αn​,σn+1​)].

Here σn\sigma_nσn​ and αn\alpha_nαn​ are the state and action at stage nnn. The comparison class for an optimal plan is all such plans, including randomized and history-dependent ones. Blackwell 1965, pp. 228–229.

Two actions are equivalent at state sss when they have the same reward r(s,a,s′)r(s,a,s')r(s,a,s′) for every next state s′s's′ and the same transition measure q(⋅∣s,a)q(\cdot\mid s,a)q(⋅∣s,a). An action set is essentially countable by a Markov plan (f1,f2,…)(f_1,f_2,\ldots)(f1​,f2​,…) if, for every (s,a)(s,a)(s,a), one of the actions fn(s)f_n(s)fn​(s) is equivalent to aaa at sss. It is essentially finite by that plan if SSS has a countable Borel partition (Sn)(S_n)(Sn​) such that, for s∈Sns\in S_ns∈Sn​, one of f1(s),…,fn(s)f_1(s),\ldots,f_n(s)f1​(s),…,fn​(s) is equivalent to every action aaa at sss. A finite action set is a special case. Blackwell 1965, pp. 233–234.

Formalization targets

For a probability distribution ppp on SSS and ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0, (p,ε)(p,\varepsilon)(p,ε)-optimality asks for a stationary fff with

p{s:I(π)(s)>I(f(∞))(s)+ε}=0for every plan π.p\{s:I(\pi)(s)>I(f^{(\infty)})(s)+\varepsilon\}=0\qquad\text{for every plan }\pi.p{s:I(π)(s)>I(f(∞))(s)+ε}=0for every plan π.

Theorem 6(b) asserts that such an fff always exists. Under essential countability, Theorem 7(a) obtains a stronger, uniform ε\varepsilonε-optimality statement: for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is a stationary fff with I(π)(s)≤I(f(∞))(s)+εI(\pi)(s)\le I(f^{(\infty)})(s)+\varepsilonI(π)(s)≤I(f(∞))(s)+ε for all π,s\pi,sπ,s. Its other targets identify the optimal return with the fixed point of the operator Uπu=sup⁡nTfnuU_\pi u=\sup_nT_{f_n}uUπ​u=supn​Tfn​​u and with the unique bounded solution of the optimality equation u=sup⁡a∈ATauu=\sup_{a\in A}T_auu=supa∈A​Ta​u. Blackwell 1965, pp. 232–234.

The mission’s goal is Theorem 7(b). Under essential finiteness, it asks for a stationary fff with exact optimality:

I(π)(s)≤I(f(∞))(s)for every plan π and state s.I(\pi)(s)\le I(f^{(\infty)})(s)\qquad\text{for every plan }\pi\text{ and state }s.I(π)(s)≤I(f(∞))(s)for every plan π and state s.

The milestone list also includes the paper’s operator identity, approximate selection result, contraction criterion, generated-plan comparison, and upper-bound criterion. Each has its own source index and statement. Blackwell 1965, pp. 231–234.

Significance

The exact result says that, under a condition weaker than a globally finite action set, repeated use of one measurable state-based rule matches or exceeds the return of every adaptive randomized plan. It is a structural result about what information and randomization can add to discounted control. The preceding approximate results specify what can still be guaranteed when that condition is relaxed; Blackwell’s examples show that the distinctions cannot simply be ignored. Blackwell 1965, pp. 229–230, 234.

Blackwell proved these statements in 1965. The formalization work here is to give machine-checked proofs for the Borel-space model and its full comparison class, together with reusable definitions of history-dependent kernels, returns, stationary rules, and Bellman operators. The draft theorem statements compile as Lean declarations, but their proofs remain open. The milestone results are intended to make both the final theorem and its supporting measure-theoretic objects independently usable.

Difficulty

On an uncountable Borel action space, the pointwise supremum of available action values does not automatically come with a Borel action selector. Choosing a maximizing action separately at each state may fail to define a measurable rule, and a supremum need not be attained. Also, a Markov or stationary comparison cannot by itself certify optimality against plans that depend on full histories. These issues are real in the paper’s examples: general Borel problems may lack an ε\varepsilonε-optimal plan, and a given plan need not be uniformly approximated by a Markov plan. Blackwell 1965, pp. 229–230.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses nonempty StandardBorelSpace types for SSS and AAA. “Baire function” is read as Borel measurable on these metrizable spaces. The problem stores a Markov transition kernel, a bounded measurable real reward on S×A×SS\times A\times SS×A×S, and 0≤β<10\le\beta<10≤β<1; β=0\beta=0β=0 is included. A plan contains a probability kernel on each finite history, and the return is the actual absolutely convergent series of expected one-stage rewards. The first decision is indexed by 000 in Lean, corresponding to the paper’s index 111. The finite history law is assembled through kernel composition products, and a stationary rule is represented by deterministic kernels. The integrals and series therefore express the paper’s expected return, including the cases where the reward depends on the next state.

For the operator results, M(S)M(S)M(S) means bounded and measurable real functions. The suprema defining UπU_\piUπ​ and the optimal return are real suprema over nonempty families bounded by the reward and discount; they are used only in that setting. The abstract operator in Theorem 5 maps M(S)M(S)M(S) into itself. The action equivalence predicate uses the paper’s explicit equality of reward functions and transition laws; the later “i.e.” phrasing on p. 234 is weaker when interpreted as equality of operators alone. A partition piece may be empty, and Lean’s piece nnn corresponds to the paper’s Sn+1S_{n+1}Sn+1​, with rules f1,…,fn+1f_1,\ldots,f_{n+1}f1​,…,fn+1​.

An optimality claim here always compares with every randomized history-dependent plan. Restricting that quantifier to Markov or stationary plans would trivialize the target. A complete development needs measure-theoretic facts about history laws and their bounded integrals, the discounted series, measurable partitions and selections, and the sup-norm contraction of bounded Borel functions. The history-law and bounded-function infrastructure can be reused outside this mission. Contributions to those foundations and to the numbered milestone theorems are welcome.

Selected references

  • David Blackwell, Discounted Dynamic Programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 36(1), 226–235, 1965. DOI: 10.1214/aoms/1177700285.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation II: Two Players with a Common Terminal in an Undirected Graph Have Price of Stability at Most 4/3, and This Is TightResearch Paper

Motivation

In network design games, selfish users build a shared network and split the cost of every edge among the users of that edge. Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler and Roughgarden (SIAM J. Comput. 38 (2008), DOI 10.1137/070680096) studied the fair connection game, in which the cost of an edge is shared equally (the Shapley value) among its users. In this game the worst equilibrium can cost kkk times the optimum, so the relevant measure is the price of stability: the ratio between the cheapest pure Nash equilibrium and the optimal centralized design. Their Theorem 2.1 bounds it by the harmonic number H(k)=1+12+⋯+1kH(k)=1+\frac12+\dots+\frac1kH(k)=1+21​+⋯+k1​ in every directed graph, and that bound is tight for directed graphs.

For undirected graphs the paper notes that H(k)H(k)H(k) is not tight and calls the correct bound "an interesting open problem". Its Section 4 settles the smallest case: two players with a common terminal. The general theorem gives H(2)=3/2H(2)=3/2H(2)=3/2 there; Claim 4.1 improves this to 4/34/34/3, and a three-node example shows that 4/34/34/3 is the right value.

Timeline. Rosenthal (1973) showed that congestion games have pure Nash equilibria through a potential function. Anshelevich et al. (FOCS 2004; journal version 2008) introduced the price of stability for the fair connection game, proved the H(k)H(k)H(k) bound and the two-player undirected bound 4/34/34/3 treated here. Subsequent work studied the undirected multi-player case, which remains without a matching upper and lower bound in general.

Setting

Let G=(V,E)G=(V,E)G=(V,E) be a finite undirected simple graph, with a cost ce≥0c_e\ge0ce​≥0 on every edge eee. There are two players, a common terminal s∈Vs\in Vs∈V and personal terminals t1,t2∈Vt_1,t_2\in Vt1​,t2​∈V. A strategy of player iii is a set of edges Si⊆ES_i\subseteq ESi​⊆E that connects tit_iti​ with sss: in the graph (V,Si)(V,S_i)(V,Si​), tit_iti​ and sss lie in the same connected component. A profile is a pair S=(S1,S2)S=(S_1,S_2)S=(S1​,S2​) of strategies.

Under fair cost sharing each edge is paid for equally by the players using it. With xe∈{1,2}x_e\in\{1,2\}xe​∈{1,2} the number of players whose strategy contains eee, player iii pays

Ci(S)=∑e∈Sicexe.C_i(S)=\sum_{e\in S_i}\frac{c_e}{x_e}.Ci​(S)=e∈Si​∑​xe​ce​​.

A pure Nash equilibrium is a profile in which no player can lower its payment by switching to another strategy while the other player's strategy stays fixed. The total cost of a profile is the cost of the network it builds,

cost(S)=∑e∈S1∪S2ce.\mathrm{cost}(S)=\sum_{e\in S_1\cup S_2}c_e .cost(S)=e∈S1​∪S2​∑​ce​.

For a set FFF of edges write cost(F)=∑e∈Fce\mathrm{cost}(F)=\sum_{e\in F}c_ecost(F)=∑e∈F​ce​. For a profile (S1,S2)(S_1,S_2)(S1​,S2​), the quantities x1=cost(S1∖S2)x_1=\mathrm{cost}(S_1\setminus S_2)x1​=cost(S1​∖S2​), x2=cost(S2∖S1)x_2=\mathrm{cost}(S_2\setminus S_1)x2​=cost(S2​∖S1​) and x3=cost(S1∩S2)x_3=\mathrm{cost}(S_1\cap S_2)x3​=cost(S1​∩S2​) split the total cost into the private and the shared parts.

The game is an instance of a congestion game, with per-user latency ce/xc_e/xce​/x on edge eee; the mission builds on the published congestion-game layer CongestionPoA.AsymSum.Model.

Formalization targets

Goal: Claim 4.1 and its tightness

If the game has a profile, then some pure Nash equilibrium SSS satisfies

cost(S) ≤ 43 cost(P)for every profile P.\mathrm{cost}(S)\ \le\ \tfrac43\,\mathrm{cost}(P)\qquad\text{for every profile }P.cost(S) ≤ 34​cost(P)for every profile P.

Moreover, in the three-node example (nodes s,t1,t2s,t_1,t_2s,t1​,t2​, edges (s,t1),(s,t2)(s,t_1),(s,t_2)(s,t1​),(s,t2​) of cost 222, edge (t1,t2)(t_1,t_2)(t1​,t2​) of cost 1+ε1+\varepsilon1+ε, with 0<ε<10<\varepsilon<10<ε<1) the cheapest pure Nash equilibrium costs exactly 444 and the optimum costs exactly 3+ε3+\varepsilon3+ε, so the ratio 4/(3+ε)4/(3+\varepsilon)4/(3+ε) approaches 4/34/34/3.

Milestones

  1. (4.1). From every profile (S1,S2)(S_1,S_2)(S1​,S2​), some pure Nash equilibrium (S1′,S2′)(S'_1,S'_2)(S1′​,S2′​) has y1+y2+32y3≤x1+x2+32x3y_1+y_2+\frac32y_3\le x_1+x_2+\frac32x_3y1​+y2​+23​y3​≤x1​+x2​+23​x3​, where yiy_iyi​ are the quantities of (S1′,S2′)(S'_1,S'_2)(S1′​,S2′​).
  2. Deviation inequalities. If (S1′,S2′)(S'_1,S'_2)(S1′​,S2′​) is a Nash equilibrium and each SiS_iSi​ is an inclusion-minimal strategy, then y1+y32≤x1+x2+y22+y32y_1+\frac{y_3}2\le x_1+x_2+\frac{y_2}2+\frac{y_3}2y1​+2y3​​≤x1​+x2​+2y2​​+2y3​​ and symmetrically for player 2.
  3. (4.2). Under the same hypotheses, y12+y22≤2x1+2x2\frac{y_1}2+\frac{y_2}2\le 2x_1+2x_22y1​​+2y2​​≤2x1​+2x2​.
  4. The three-node example, as in the second half of the goal.

Significance

The result shows that the price of stability of fair cost sharing depends on the network: the H(k)H(k)H(k) bound, tight for directed graphs, is not tight for undirected ones even with two players. It is the first undirected bound below H(k)H(k)H(k) and the starting point for the later study of undirected fair network design, where the question for many players is still open.

The theorem is proved in the paper; this mission formalizes it. A search of the Prove2Me library found no formalization of the price of stability of fair connection games. Beyond the theorem itself, the mission produces a reusable undirected layer over the congestion-game library: connectivity strategies stated with Mathlib's graph reachability, fair cost sharing as a congestion game, and the total-cost functional. A checked proof of the potential inequality (4.1) is the two-player case of the potential argument behind Theorem 2.1.

Difficulty

The obvious argument starts from an optimal solution, follows improving moves to an equilibrium and compares potentials. For two players this only yields the factor H(2)=3/2H(2)=3/2H(2)=3/2: the potential counts shared edges with weight 3/23/23/2, so a potential inequality alone cannot rule out an equilibrium in which both players share expensive edges. The improvement to 4/34/34/3 needs a second inequality, (4.2), obtained from a specific deviation of each player in the equilibrium, and that deviation is valid only because of the undirected structure: the private parts of the two optimal paths together connect t1t_1t1​ with t2t_2t2​, and the deviating player can then follow the other player's equilibrium route to sss. Making this connectivity claim precise for edge sets rather than drawn paths is where the formal work lies. It holds when the optimal strategies are inclusion-minimal, which is why the deviation milestones carry that hypothesis.

Formalization scope

  • Vertices form a Fintype with decidable equality; edges are unordered pairs Sym2 V; the graph is a SimpleGraph V. Edge costs are a real function c with 0 ≤ c e for every e.
  • A strategy of player i : Fin 2 (the paper's players 1 and 2 are 0 and 1) is a Finset of edges contained in G.edgeSet such that t i and s are Reachable in SimpleGraph.fromEdgeSet. Strategies are not restricted to paths.
  • The game is a CongestionGame from CongestionPoA.AsymSum.Model with latency ce/xc_e/xce​/x; profiles, player costs and pure Nash equilibria are that library's IsProfile, cost and IsPureNash.
  • "Price of stability at most 4/34/34/3" is stated in existence form: some pure Nash equilibrium costs at most 43\frac4334​ times every profile. A formalization quantifying over all equilibria would be false (the price of anarchy is 222), and one dropping the Nash condition would be trivial; neither is acceptable. The tightness half fixes a concrete instance and asserts both that an equilibrium of cost 444 exists and that every equilibrium costs at least 444.
  • The deviation inequalities and (4.2) assume inclusion-minimal reference strategies; this hypothesis is implicit in the paper and does not appear in the goal, which quantifies over all profiles.

Contributions welcome: a proof of the potential inequality (finite improvement paths in the two-player fair game), the graph-theoretic lemma that the symmetric difference of two simple paths with a common endpoint connects their other endpoints, and a computation of the three-node example.

Selected references

  • E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, É. Tardos, T. Wexler, T. Roughgarden, The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation, SIAM Journal on Computing 38(4):1602–1623, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/070680096
  • R. W. Rosenthal, A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory 2:65–67, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential games, Games and Economic Behavior 14(1):124–143, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, The price of anarchy of finite congestion games, STOC 2005, 67–73. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060600
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Control TheoryDynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case I: Finite-Horizon Abstract Dynamic Programming — the DP Algorithm Yields the N-Stage Optimal CostTextbook

Motivation

Dynamic programming (DP) solves sequential decision problems by backward recursion: compute the optimal cost of the last stage, then of the last two stages, and so on. For problems with finitely many states and controls and real-valued costs, the recursion obviously gives the optimal cost. Applications are rarely like that. Control spaces are continuous, costs can be unbounded or infinite, the criterion can be multiplicative (risk-sensitive exponential cost) or worst-case (minimax), and the set of policies is an infinite product of function spaces. In this setting the DP recursion can fail to produce the optimal cost.

Bertsekas and Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case (Academic Press 1978; Athena Scientific 1996), Part I, separates the order-theoretic content of DP from the measure theory. It works with an abstract monotone mapping HHH that covers deterministic, stochastic, multiplicative-cost and minimax problems at once, following Bertsekas, Monotone mappings with application in dynamic programming, SIAM J. Control Optim. 15 (1977). Chapter 3 answers the finite-horizon questions: when does the DP algorithm give the NNN-stage optimal cost, and when do optimal or nearly optimal policies exist? This mission is the first of a series formalizing the book. Later chapters (contraction models, monotone increase and decrease models, the Borel models of Part II) are built on the model fixed here.

Setting

Let SSS (states) and CCC (controls) be sets, and for each x∈Sx\in Sx∈S let U(x)⊆CU(x)\subseteq CU(x)⊆C be a nonempty control constraint set. Write R∗=[−∞,∞]R^*=[-\infty,\infty]R∗=[−∞,∞] and let FFF be the set of all functions J:S→R∗J:S\to R^*J:S→R∗, ordered pointwise. A mapping H:S×C×F→R∗H:S\times C\times F\to R^*H:S×C×F→R∗ is given, subject to the Monotonicity Assumption: J≤J′J\le J'J≤J′ implies H(x,u,J)≤H(x,u,J′)H(x,u,J)\le H(x,u,J')H(x,u,J)≤H(x,u,J′) for all x∈Sx\in Sx∈S, u∈U(x)u\in U(x)u∈U(x).

A selector is a function μ:S→C\mu:S\to Cμ:S→C with μ(x)∈U(x)\mu(x)\in U(x)μ(x)∈U(x) for all xxx. A policy is a sequence π=(μ0,μ1,… )\pi=(\mu_0,\mu_1,\dots)π=(μ0​,μ1​,…) of selectors. Define

Tμ(J)(x)=H[x,μ(x),J],T(J)(x)=inf⁡u∈U(x)H(x,u,J),T_\mu(J)(x)=H[x,\mu(x),J],\qquad T(J)(x)=\inf_{u\in U(x)}H(x,u,J),Tμ​(J)(x)=H[x,μ(x),J],T(J)(x)=u∈U(x)inf​H(x,u,J),

and let TkT^kTk be the kkk-fold composition of TTT. A terminal function J0∈FJ_0\in FJ0​∈F with J0(x)>−∞J_0(x)>-\inftyJ0​(x)>−∞ for all xxx is fixed. The NNN-stage cost of π\piπ and the NNN-stage optimal cost are

JN,π=(Tμ0Tμ1⋯TμN−1)(J0),JN∗(x)=inf⁡πJN,π(x).J_{N,\pi}=(T_{\mu_0}T_{\mu_1}\cdots T_{\mu_{N-1}})(J_0),\qquad J^*_N(x)=\inf_{\pi}J_{N,\pi}(x).JN,π​=(Tμ0​​Tμ1​​⋯TμN−1​​)(J0​),JN∗​(x)=πinf​JN,π​(x).

A policy is uniformly NNN-stage optimal if each tail (μi,μi+1,… )(\mu_i,\mu_{i+1},\dots)(μi​,μi+1​,…) is (N−i)(N-i)(N−i)-stage optimal, and NNN-stage ε\varepsilonε-optimal if JN,π(x)≤JN∗(x)+εJ_{N,\pi}(x)\le J^*_N(x)+\varepsilonJN,π​(x)≤JN∗​(x)+ε where JN∗(x)>−∞J^*_N(x)>-\inftyJN∗​(x)>−∞ and JN,π(x)≤−1/εJ_{N,\pi}(x)\le-1/\varepsilonJN,π​(x)≤−1/ε where JN∗(x)=−∞J^*_N(x)=-\inftyJN∗​(x)=−∞.

The three conditions on HHH used in the chapter are F.1 (continuity of HHH along nonincreasing sequences JkJ_kJk​ with H(x,u,J1)<∞H(x,u,J_1)<\inftyH(x,u,J1​)<∞), F.2 (there is α>0\alpha>0α>0 with H(x,u,J)≤H(x,u,J+r)≤H(x,u,J)+αrH(x,u,J)\le H(x,u,J+r)\le H(x,u,J)+\alpha rH(x,u,J)≤H(x,u,J+r)≤H(x,u,J)+αr for all r>0r>0r>0), and F.3 (a quantitative selection property with a constant β>0\beta>0β>0).

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 3.1

Under F.1, if Jk,π(x)<∞J_{k,\pi}(x)<\inftyJk,π​(x)<∞ for all x,πx,\pix,π and k=1,…,Nk=1,\dots,Nk=1,…,N; or under F.2, if Jk∗(x)>−∞J^*_k(x)>-\inftyJk∗​(x)>−∞ for all xxx and k=1,…,Nk=1,\dots,Nk=1,…,N:

JN∗=TN(J0),J^*_N=T^N(J_0),JN∗​=TN(J0​),

and under F.2, for every ε>0\varepsilon>0ε>0 there is πε\pi_\varepsilonπε​ with JN∗≤JN,πε≤JN∗+εJ^*_N\le J_{N,\pi_\varepsilon}\le J^*_N+\varepsilonJN∗​≤JN,πε​​≤JN∗​+ε.

Milestones

  • Proposition 3.3: π∗\pi^*π∗ is uniformly NNN-stage optimal iff (Tμk∗TN−k−1)(J0)=TN−k(J0)(T_{\mu^*_k}T^{N-k-1})(J_0)=T^{N-k}(J_0)(Tμk∗​​TN−k−1)(J0​)=TN−k(J0​) for k<Nk<Nk<N. Needs monotonicity only.
  • Corollary 3.3.1: a uniformly NNN-stage optimal policy exists iff every infimum Tk+1(J0)(x)=inf⁡uH[x,u,Tk(J0)]T^{k+1}(J_0)(x)=\inf_{u}H[x,u,T^k(J_0)]Tk+1(J0​)(x)=infu​H[x,u,Tk(J0​)] is attained, and then JN∗=TN(J0)J^*_N=T^N(J_0)JN∗​=TN(J0​).
  • Proposition 3.4: if CCC is Hausdorff and every sublevel set {u∈U(x)∣H[x,u,Tk(J0)]≤λ}\{u\in U(x)\mid H[x,u,T^k(J_0)]\le\lambda\}{u∈U(x)∣H[x,u,Tk(J0​)]≤λ} is compact, then JN∗=TN(J0)J^*_N=T^N(J_0)JN∗​=TN(J0​) and a uniformly NNN-stage optimal policy exists.
  • Proposition 3.7: the minimax mapping H(x,u,J)=sup⁡w∈W(x,u){g+αJ[f]}H(x,u,J)=\sup_{w\in W(x,u)}\{g+\alpha J[f]\}H(x,u,J)=supw∈W(x,u)​{g+αJ[f]} satisfies F.2 with constant α\alphaα.
  • Proposition 3.6: the multiplicative mapping H(x,u,J)=E{g J[f]∣x,u}H(x,u,J)=E\{g\,J[f]\mid x,u\}H(x,u,J)=E{gJ[f]∣x,u} over a countable disturbance set satisfies F.1, and F.2 with constant bbb when 0≤g≤b0\le g\le b0≤g≤b.
  • Proposition 3.2: under F.3 and the finiteness of Jk,πJ_{k,\pi}Jk,π​, JN∗=TN(J0)J^*_N=T^N(J_0)JN∗​=TN(J0​) and, for εn↓0\varepsilon_n\downarrow0εn​↓0, policies with {εn}\{\varepsilon_n\}{εn​}-dominated convergence to optimality exist.
  • Corollary 3.7.1(a): for minimax control with J0=0J_0=0J0​=0 and Jk∗>−∞J^*_k>-\inftyJk∗​>−∞, the DP algorithm gives JN∗J^*_NJN∗​ and NNN-stage ε\varepsilonε-optimal policies exist.

Significance

The identity JN∗=TN(J0)J^*_N=T^N(J_0)JN∗​=TN(J0​) says that an infimum over an infinite-dimensional policy space equals NNN nested one-dimensional infima. Every numerical use of finite-horizon DP depends on it, and so do the infinite-horizon results of later chapters, which pass to the limit in TN(J0)T^N(J_0)TN(J0​). Corollary 3.3.1 and Proposition 3.4 give the existence of optimal policies, and Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 verify the abstract hypotheses for two models outside standard expected additive cost.

These results are proved in the book; none of them is formalized. Mathlib has no abstract DP model, and the platform's finite-horizon results (Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control, Prop. 1.3.1 and the minimax DP algorithm) assume finite disturbance and constraint sets and real costs. They are special cases, not this theory. The finite-horizon results of the 1977 paper (Lemma 3.1 here, on compact sublevel sets, and Corollary 3.1.1, the F.1′ case) are already posed on the platform and are not posed again.

Difficulty

The obvious argument interchanges the infimum over policies with the composition of operators: inf⁡πTμ0(⋯ )=T(inf⁡π′⋯ )\inf_\pi T_{\mu_0}(\cdots)=T(\inf_{\pi'}\cdots)infπ​Tμ0​​(⋯)=T(infπ′​⋯). The inequality TN(J0)≤JN∗T^N(J_0)\le J^*_NTN(J0​)≤JN∗​ follows from monotonicity alone. The reverse inequality is the content. Taking a near-minimizing selector at each stage requires either passing a limit inside HHH (F.1) or bounding how errors at later stages propagate through HHH (F.2, F.3). Both steps break at infinite values. With Jk∗(x)=−∞J^*_k(x)=-\inftyJk∗​(x)=−∞ there may be no ε\varepsilonε-optimal policy at all (Counterexample 4 of the book). Without F.1 or F.2 the identity itself fails (Counterexamples 1–3). A proof must therefore track separately the states where the optimal cost is −∞-\infty−∞, which is why F.3 and the definition of ε\varepsilonε-optimality have two cases.

Formalization scope

The model is a structure Model S C with fields U, U_nonempty, H : S → C → (S → EReal) → EReal and the monotonicity proof. Policies are ℕ → Selector, with selectors as a subtype of S → C. TNT^NTN is m.T^[N], and (Tμ0⋯TμN−1)(J)(T_{\mu_0}\cdots T_{\mu_{N-1}})(J)(Tμ0​​⋯TμN−1​​)(J) is a recursion that applies TμN−1T_{\mu_{N-1}}TμN−1​​ first. All values lie in EReal. The book's convention ∞−∞=∞\infty-\infty=\infty∞−∞=∞ never arises in Propositions 3.1–3.4, which only add real numbers to extended reals. The minimax and multiplicative mappings implement it explicitly (badd, and an expectation that returns +∞+\infty+∞ when the positive part diverges). Every theorem assumes J0>−∞J_0>-\inftyJ0​>−∞ and N≥1N\ge1N≥1. Assumptions F.1–F.3 are predicates on the model. F.2 is also available with a named constant (F2With) so that Propositions 3.6 and 3.7 can carry the book's constants bbb and α\alphaα.

JN∗J^*_NJN∗​ is defined as an infimum over policies of the composed operators, never through TTT, so the goal is not true by definition. A formalization in which JN,πJ_{N,\pi}JN,π​ already contains an infimum over controls would make Proposition 3.1 hold by rfl, and this one rules that out.

Proving the goal needs elementary EReal order arithmetic, iterated infima over subtypes, and pointwise selection of near-minimizers via choice. Proposition 3.6 additionally needs monotone and dominated convergence for countable sums in ℝ≥0∞. The model and operator definitions are reusable by the later missions of the series (contraction, monotone increase and decrease models). Proofs of any milestone, and reusable EReal lemmas about shifting by real constants, are welcome.

Selected references

  • D. P. Bertsekas and S. E. Shreve, Stochastic Optimal Control: The Discrete-Time Case, Academic Press 1978; Athena Scientific 1996, Chapters 2–3. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/soc.html
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Monotone mappings with application in dynamic programming, SIAM J. Control Optim. 15(3) (1977) 438–464. https://doi.org/10.1137/0315031
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Dynamic Programming and Stochastic Control, Academic Press 1976.
  • D. P. Bertsekas, Abstract Dynamic Programming, 3rd ed., Athena Scientific 2022. https://web.mit.edu/dimitrib/www/abstractdp_MIT.html
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OptimizationProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dimensioning Large Call Centers III: Asymptotically Optimal Staffing in the Quality-Driven RegimeResearch Paper

Motivation

How many agents should a call center staff? Telephone call centers employ millions of people, and staffing is their largest cost, so the question is asked every half hour of every day (Gans, Koole & Mandelbaum, 2003). The classical model is the M/M/N (Erlang-C) queue: calls arrive at rate λ\lambdaλ, service times are exponential with mean 1/μ1/\mu1/μ, and NNN agents serve in parallel. Practitioners use the square-root safety staffing rule N≈λ/μ+yλ/μN \approx \lambda/\mu + y\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}N≈λ/μ+yλ/μ​, which Halfin and Whitt (1981) justified in the regime where the probability of waiting stays bounded away from 000 and 111.

Borst, Mandelbaum and Reiman (CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000; published as Operations Research 52(1), 2004) asked when such a rule is actually optimal: given a staffing cost and a waiting cost, which staffing level minimizes total cost as the arrival rate grows? They identified three regimes according to how the two costs compare. This mission formalizes their third case, the quality-driven regime, in which waiting is so expensive relative to staffing that the optimal number of agents exceeds the offered load by more than any fixed multiple of its square root.

Setting

Fix a service rate μ>0\mu > 0μ>0. For every arrival rate λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0 a waiting-cost function DλD_\lambdaDλ​ assigns cost Dλ(t)D_\lambda(t)Dλ​(t) to a wait of ttt time units; it satisfies Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0) = 0Dλ​(0)=0, is strictly increasing, and t↦Dλ(t)e−θtt \mapsto D_\lambda(t)e^{-\theta t}t↦Dλ​(t)e−θt is integrable on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞) for every θ>0\theta > 0θ>0. A staffing cost FFF, defined for real N>0N > 0N>0, is convex and strictly increasing.

For an integer N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ the probability of waiting is the Erlang-C formula

π(N,ν)=νNN!{(1−ν/N)∑n=0N−1νnn!+νNN!}−1,ν=λ/μ,\pi(N,\nu) = \frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Bigl\{(1-\nu/N)\sum_{n=0}^{N-1}\frac{\nu^n}{n!} + \frac{\nu^N}{N!}\Bigr\}^{-1},\qquad \nu = \lambda/\mu,π(N,ν)=N!νN​{(1−ν/N)n=0∑N−1​n!νn​+N!νN​}−1,ν=λ/μ,

the expected waiting cost of a delayed customer is G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞Dλ(t)e−(Nμ−λ)t dtG(N,\lambda) = (N\mu-\lambda)\int_0^\infty D_\lambda(t)e^{-(N\mu-\lambda)t}\,dtG(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞​Dλ​(t)e−(Nμ−λ)tdt, and the total cost per unit time is C(N,λ)=F(N)+λ π(N,λ/μ) G(N,λ)C(N,\lambda) = F(N) + \lambda\,\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)\,G(N,\lambda)C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ). An optimal staffing level Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​ minimizes C(⋅,λ)C(\cdot,\lambda)C(⋅,λ) over the integers N>λ/μN > \lambda/\muN>λ/μ.

Write Nλ(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μN_\lambda(x) = \lambda/\mu + x\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}Nλ​(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μ​, and for x>0x > 0x>0 put Fλ(x)=F(Nλ(x))−F(λ/μ)F_\lambda(x) = F(N_\lambda(x)) - F(\lambda/\mu)Fλ​(x)=F(Nλ​(x))−F(λ/μ), Gλ(x)=λG(Nλ(x),λ)G_\lambda(x) = \lambda G(N_\lambda(x),\lambda)Gλ​(x)=λG(Nλ​(x),λ), and πλ(x)=H(Nλ(x),λ/μ)\pi_\lambda(x) = H(N_\lambda(x),\lambda/\mu)πλ​(x)=H(Nλ​(x),λ/μ), where H(M,α)={α∫0∞e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt}−1H(M,\alpha) = \{\alpha\int_0^\infty e^{-\alpha t}t(1+t)^{M-1}dt\}^{-1}H(M,α)={α∫0∞​e−αtt(1+t)M−1dt}−1 extends the Erlang-C formula to real MMM. The normalized cost is Cλ(x)=Fλ(x)+πλ(x)Gλ(x)C_\lambda(x) = F_\lambda(x) + \pi_\lambda(x)G_\lambda(x)Cλ​(x)=Fλ​(x)+πλ​(x)Gλ​(x), and a surrogate cost is C[z;F^,π^,G^]=F^(z)+π^(z)G^(z)C[z;\hat F,\hat\pi,\hat G] = \hat F(z) + \hat\pi(z)\hat G(z)C[z;F^,π^,G^]=F^(z)+π^(z)G^(z). Rounding is measured by Sλ(x)=min⁡{C(⌊Nλ(x)⌋,λ),C(⌈Nλ(x)⌉,λ)}S_\lambda(x) = \min\{C(\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor,\lambda), C(\lceil N_\lambda(x)\rceil,\lambda)\}Sλ​(x)=min{C(⌊Nλ​(x)⌋,λ),C(⌈Nλ​(x)⌉,λ)}.

Two special functions appear. The Halfin–Whitt delay function is P(x)=1/(1+x/h(−x))P(x) = 1/(1 + x/h(-x))P(x)=1/(1+x/h(−x)) with h=ϕ/(1−Φ)h = \phi/(1-\Phi)h=ϕ/(1−Φ) the standard normal hazard rate. The Stirling-type approximation is

Qλ(x)=exp⁡{Nλ(x)[1−rλ(x)+log⁡rλ(x)]}2πNλ(x) (1−rλ(x)),rλ(x)=λ/μNλ(x).Q_\lambda(x) = \frac{\exp\{N_\lambda(x)[1 - r_\lambda(x) + \log r_\lambda(x)]\}}{\sqrt{2\pi N_\lambda(x)}\,(1-r_\lambda(x))},\qquad r_\lambda(x) = \frac{\lambda/\mu}{N_\lambda(x)}.Qλ​(x)=2πNλ​(x)​(1−rλ​(x))exp{Nλ​(x)[1−rλ​(x)+logrλ​(x)]}​,rλ​(x)=Nλ​(x)λ/μ​.

Asymptotic relations are limits of ratios as λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞: aλ≈∞bλa_\lambda \stackrel{\infty}{\approx} b_\lambdaaλ​≈∞bλ​ means aλ/bλ→1a_\lambda/b_\lambda \to 1aλ​/bλ​→1, and aλ≪∞bλa_\lambda \stackrel{\infty}{\ll} b_\lambdaaλ​≪∞​bλ​ means aλ/bλ→0a_\lambda/b_\lambda \to 0aλ​/bλ​→0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.1

Assume the regime is quality-driven, display (27): Fλ(κ)≪∞Gλ(κ)F_\lambda(\kappa) \stackrel{\infty}{\ll} G_\lambda(\kappa)Fλ​(κ)≪∞​Gλ​(κ) for every κ>0\kappa > 0κ>0. Let yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​ minimize Fλ(y)+Qλ(y)Gλ(y)F_\lambda(y) + Q_\lambda(y)G_\lambda(y)Fλ​(y)+Qλ​(y)Gλ​(y) over y>0y > 0y>0. Then

lim⁡λ→∞Sλ(yλ∗)−F(λ/μ)C(Nλ∗,λ)−F(λ/μ)=1.\lim_{\lambda\to\infty}\frac{S_\lambda(y^*_\lambda) - F(\lambda/\mu)}{C(N^*_\lambda,\lambda) - F(\lambda/\mu)} = 1.λ→∞lim​C(Nλ∗​,λ)−F(λ/μ)Sλ​(yλ∗​)−F(λ/μ)​=1.

The statement fixes no constants and no rate; it asserts only that rounding the surrogate optimum loses a vanishing fraction of the excess cost.

Milestones

In attack order: Lemma C.1 (GλG_\lambdaGλ​ strictly convex decreasing); the identity H(N,ν)=π(N,ν)H(N,\nu) = \pi(N,\nu)H(N,ν)=π(N,ν) at integer NNN (Section 3, p. 12); Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2; Corollary 3.3 (the asymptotic optimality criterion); Lemma B.1 (PPP strictly convex decreasing); display (15); Lemma 4.1 (Halfin and Whitt); and the first statement of Lemma 4.2, πλ(xλ)≈∞Qλ(xλ)\pi_\lambda(x_\lambda) \stackrel{\infty}{\approx} Q_\lambda(x_\lambda)πλ​(xλ​)≈∞Qλ​(xλ​) whenever xλ→∞x_\lambda\to\inftyxλ​→∞.

Significance

Theorem 7.1 completes the paper's picture of optimal staffing. In the rationalized regime the square-root rule with the Halfin–Whitt function PPP is optimal; in the efficiency-driven regime staffing barely exceeds the load; in the quality-driven regime the staffing excess outgrows λ/μ\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}λ/μ​ and PPP must be replaced by the Stirling-type expression QλQ_\lambdaQλ​. The theorem gives a one-dimensional minimization whose solution is asymptotically optimal, which turns a discrete optimization over NNN into a smooth problem, and it marks the boundary of validity of square-root staffing.

The result is proved in the paper; it is not formalized anywhere to our knowledge. A complete development formalizes the Section 3 framework (shared with the other regimes of the same paper), the convexity of GλG_\lambdaGλ​ and of PPP, the Halfin–Whitt limit for the continuous extension πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​, and the Stirling-type asymptotics of the Erlang-C formula. Each of these is a reusable piece of queueing theory in Lean.

Difficulty

The regime theorem itself is short once the framework is in place; the weight lies in the analytic lemmas. Lemma 4.2 requires uniform asymptotics of πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ at a staffing excess xλx_\lambdaxλ​ that may grow at any rate, from barely faster than a constant to faster than λ\sqrt{\lambda}λ​, where neither the central-limit picture of Halfin and Whitt nor a single Stirling expansion covers all cases. Lemma 4.1 concerns the continuous extension πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ at non-integer server counts, whereas Halfin and Whitt's theorem is about integer ones. The natural first idea, that the goal follows from Corollary 3.3 by plugging in Lemma 4.2, does not apply directly: Lemma 4.2 only covers staffing excesses that tend to infinity, and nothing in the definition of the true optimum xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​ or the surrogate optimum yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​ says that they do.

Formalization scope

Lean represents λ\lambdaλ as a positive real, and λ→∞\lambda\to\inftyλ→∞ is the filter atTop on R\mathbb{R}R with μ\muμ fixed. The standing assumptions on μ\muμ and DλD_\lambdaDλ​ are the structure WaitModel; FFF is a function argument with hypotheses ConvexOn and StrictMonoOn on (0,∞)(0,\infty)(0,∞). Staffing levels NNN are natural numbers. Minimizers (Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​, xλ∗x^*_\lambdaxλ∗​, zλ∗z^*_\lambdazλ∗​, yλ∗y^*_\lambdayλ∗​) are function arguments with minimality hypotheses at every λ>0\lambda > 0λ>0, so every statement holds for every choice among ties. Liminf and limsup relations are stated through Filter.Frequently, avoiding boundedness side conditions.

The queue itself (Poisson arrivals, waiting-time law) is not formalized: the paper's analysis and all its theorems concern the closed-form cost C(N,λ)C(N,\lambda)C(N,λ) with the Erlang-C formula.

Conventions committed to: (i) the goal adds the hypothesis G(N,λ)→∞G(N,\lambda)\to\inftyG(N,λ)→∞ as N↓λ/μN\downarrow\lambda/\muN↓λ/μ, which the paper asserts on p. 12 to show the continuous optimum exists but which does not follow from its standing assumptions (it holds exactly when DλD_\lambdaDλ​ is unbounded); (ii) in SλS_\lambdaSλ​ the floor term is omitted when ⌊Nλ(x)⌋≤λ/μ\lfloor N_\lambda(x)\rfloor \le \lambda/\mu⌊Nλ​(x)⌋≤λ/μ, since the cost is undefined at unstable levels; (iii) the integrability of Dλ(t)e−θtD_\lambda(t)e^{-\theta t}Dλ​(t)e−θt is explicit, because a Lean integral of a non-integrable function is 000; (iv) P(0)=1P(0) = 1P(0)=1, the value of formula (11) at 000; (v) display (15) is stated for b>0b > 0b>0, since the ratio aλ/ba_\lambda/baλ​/b is undefined at b=0b = 0b=0. The instance μ=1\mu = 1μ=1, F(N)=cNF(N) = cNF(N)=cN, Dλ(t)=aλ tD_\lambda(t) = a\sqrt{\lambda}\,tDλ​(t)=aλ​t (Section 9) satisfies every hypothesis of the goal, so the goal is not vacuous; taking πλ\pi_\lambdaπλ​ or GλG_\lambdaGλ​ at Lean default values is ruled out by these explicit domain conditions.

Only the first statement of Lemma 4.2 is a milestone: the second, πλ(xλ)≈Q(xλ)\pi_\lambda(x_\lambda)\approx Q(x_\lambda)πλ​(xλ​)≈Q(xλ​) under xλ≤sup⁡λ1/6x_\lambda \stackrel{\sup}{\le} \lambda^{1/6}xλ​≤sup​λ1/6, fails as printed at xλ=λ1/6x_\lambda = \lambda^{1/6}xλ​=λ1/6. Contributions on the Erlang-C asymptotics, the normal hazard rate, and Laplace transforms of increasing functions are welcome and reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • S. Borst, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000 (the version formalized here; every index and page cited in this mission is the report's).
  • S. Borst, A. Mandelbaum, M. I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, Operations Research 52(1):17–34, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1030.0081
  • S. Halfin, W. Whitt, Heavy-Traffic Limits for Queues with Many Exponential Servers, Operations Research 29(3):567–588, 1981. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.29.3.567
  • N. Gans, G. Koole, A. Mandelbaum, Telephone Call Centers: Tutorial, Review, and Research Prospects, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 5(2):79–141, 2003. https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.5.2.79.16071
24 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Relaxation Method of Finding the Common Point of Convex Sets and Its Application to the Solution of Problems in Convex Programming 3: A Convergent Relaxation from Z Solves the Equality ProgramResearch Paper

Motivation

Many large convex programs have the form "minimize a strictly convex function fff subject to linear equations Ax=bAx=bAx=b". Examples are entropy maximization under moment constraints, the estimation of a matrix with prescribed row and column sums (the matrix-scaling or RAS problem of transportation and input–output analysis), and least-norm solutions of linear systems. When AAA is large and sparse, methods that touch one equation at a time are attractive: each step needs only one row of AAA.

L. M. Bregman's 1967 paper (doi:10.1016/0041-5553(67)90040-7) introduced such a method. §1 defines a "relaxation" for finding a common point of closed convex sets AiA_iAi​, in which each step replaces the current point by its DDD-projection onto one set: the minimizer of a distance-like function D(⋅,y)D(\cdot,y)D(⋅,y) over that set. §2 chooses DDD from the objective fff itself, D(x,y)=f(x)−f(y)−(g(y),x−y)D(x,y)=f(x)-f(y)-(g(y),x-y)D(x,y)=f(x)−f(y)−(g(y),x−y) with ggg the gradient of fff; this function is now called the Bregman divergence. Theorem 3 of the paper, the target of this mission, shows that with this choice the relaxation does more than find a feasible point: started at a suitable point, its limit minimizes fff over the feasible set. The resulting row-action methods underlie later work on entropy optimization and matrix balancing (Censor and Zenios, Parallel Optimization, 1997) and the Bregman-projection techniques of modern optimization.

Setting

Work in the Euclidean space EpE^pEp with inner product (⋅,⋅)(\cdot,\cdot)(⋅,⋅). Let S⊂EpS\subset E^pS⊂Ep be a convex set with closure Sˉ\bar SSˉ and interior int⁡S\operatorname{int}SintS. Let fff be strictly convex and continuously differentiable over SSS, with gradient g(x)g(x)g(x) at x∈Sx\in Sx∈S, and continuous over Sˉ\bar SSˉ. Let AAA be an m×pm\times pm×p matrix with nonzero rows A1,…,AmA_1,\dots,A_mA1​,…,Am​ and b∈Emb\in E^mb∈Em. The problem (2.1)–(2.3) is

minimize f(x)subject toAx=b, x∈Sˉ,\text{minimize } f(x)\quad\text{subject to}\quad Ax=b,\ x\in\bar S,minimize f(x)subject toAx=b, x∈Sˉ,

with feasible set R={x∈Ep∣Ax=b, x∈Sˉ}R=\{x\in E^p\mid Ax=b,\ x\in\bar S\}R={x∈Ep∣Ax=b, x∈Sˉ}, assumed nonempty. A point of RRR minimizing fff over RRR is a solution.

The function (1.4) is

D(x,y)=f(x)−f(y)−(g(y),x−y),D(x,y)=f(x)-f(y)-\bigl(g(y),x-y\bigr),D(x,y)=f(x)−f(y)−(g(y),x−y),

and AiA_iAi​ also denotes the hyperplane {x∣(Ai,x)=bi}\{x\mid (A_i,x)=b_i\}{x∣(Ai​,x)=bi​}. The paper assumes that DDD satisfies its conditions I–VI of §1 with respect to these hyperplanes; among them, condition II provides, for every y∈Sy\in Sy∈S, a DDD-projection Piy∈Ai∩SP_iy\in A_i\cap SPi​y∈Ai​∩S minimizing D(⋅,y)D(\cdot,y)D(⋅,y) over Ai∩SA_i\cap SAi​∩S. It also assumes condition (2): if yn∈Sy^n\in Syn∈S and yn→y∗∈Sˉy^n\to y^*\in\bar Syn→y∗∈Sˉ, then D(y∗,yn)→0D(y^*,y^n)\to 0D(y∗,yn)→0.

A relaxation sequence with control (in)n≥0(i_n)_{n\ge0}(in​)n≥0​ starts at x0∈Sx^0\in Sx0∈S and sets xn+1=Pinxnx^{n+1}=P_{i_n}x^nxn+1=Pin​​xn. The control is any sequence of row indices. Finally,

Z={x∈S∣g(x)=uA=∑iuiAi for some u∈Em}Z=\{x\in S\mid g(x)=uA=\textstyle\sum_i u_iA_i\ \text{for some } u\in E^m\}Z={x∈S∣g(x)=uA=∑i​ui​Ai​ for some u∈Em}

is the set of points of SSS at which the gradient lies in the row space of AAA.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3

Assume that the DDD-projection of every point of int⁡S\operatorname{int}SintS onto every AiA_iAi​ lies in int⁡S\operatorname{int}SintS. For every control and every relaxation sequence with x0∈Z∩int⁡Sx^0\in Z\cap\operatorname{int}Sx0∈Z∩intS that converges to a point x∗∈Rx^*\in Rx∗∈R,

f(x∗)≤f(y)for every y∈R.f(x^*)\le f(y)\qquad\text{for every } y\in R .f(x∗)≤f(y)for every y∈R.

Convergence of the sequence is a hypothesis; the theorem says what the limit is, whichever control produced it.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3. If y∗∈R∩Zˉy^*\in R\cap\bar Zy∗∈R∩Zˉ, then y∗y^*y∗ is a solution of (2.1)–(2.3).
  2. (2.7)–(2.8). For x∈int⁡Sx\in\operatorname{int}Sx∈intS there is λ∈R\lambda\in\mathbb Rλ∈R with g(Pix)=g(x)+λAig(P_ix)=g(x)+\lambda A_ig(Pi​x)=g(x)+λAi​ and (Ai,Pix)=bi(A_i,P_ix)=b_i(Ai​,Pi​x)=bi​.
  3. Invariance of ZZZ. PiP_iPi​ maps Z∩int⁡SZ\cap\operatorname{int}SZ∩intS into Z∩int⁡SZ\cap\operatorname{int}SZ∩intS.

An additional item states Note 2: the point and the multiplier in (2.7)–(2.8) are unique.

Significance

Theorem 3 converts a feasibility algorithm into an optimization algorithm for equality-constrained convex programs. Each step solves a one-dimensional problem (the multiplier λ\lambdaλ of a single equation), so the method scales to systems with very many equations, and with the controls of Theorems 1–2 of the same paper it gives a complete algorithm. Specializations include iterative proportional fitting for entropy objectives and Kaczmarz-type projections for f(x)=12∥x∥2f(x)=\tfrac12\|x\|^2f(x)=21​∥x∥2.

The theorem and its proof are classical and have been reproved many times, but no machine-checked proof is known to exist. A formalization produces a verified bridge between three standard pieces of convex analysis: first-order optimality on an affine set, the supporting-hyperplane inequality for a differentiable convex function extended to the closure of its domain, and the passage of a Lagrange condition to a limit. Each is reusable in other row-action and mirror-descent developments.

Difficulty

The obvious argument says: the limit is feasible, and the gradient at every iterate lies in the row space of AAA, so the limit satisfies the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions. Two steps of this argument fail as stated. First, the gradient is only known on SSS, the limit may lie on the boundary of SSS (or outside SSS, in Sˉ\bar SSˉ), and ggg need not extend continuously there, so the multipliers unu^nun need not converge and no Lagrange condition holds at the limit. Lemma 3 must therefore reach optimality without a gradient at y∗y^*y∗. Second, the Lagrange condition (2.7) at an iterate requires the projection to be an interior minimizer, which is why the theorem carries the hypothesis that PiP_iPi​ preserves int⁡S\operatorname{int}SintS; on the boundary of SSS a minimizer over Ai∩SA_i\cap SAi​∩S need not satisfy (2.7).

Formalization scope

The space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p), rows are vectors a i, and (Ai,x)(A_i,x)(Ai​,x) is the real inner product. The gradient ggg is explicit data tied to fff by HasGradientWithinAt f (g x) S x for x∈Sx\in Sx∈S and continuous on SSS; SSS is not assumed open, and Mathlib's gradient is not used. The relevant explicit choices are:

  • The DDD-projection is a fixed map PPP; condition II says PiyP_iyPi​y minimizes D(⋅,y)D(\cdot,y)D(⋅,y) over Ai∩SA_i\cap SAi​∩S, and condition III is stated for that map.
  • Condition IV is assumed in its one-sided directional form (implied by the paper's), so theorems under it are at least as strong as the paper's.
  • "Compact" in conditions V and VI is sequential compactness. Condition V is assumed for the points of R∩SR\cap SR∩S.
  • Condition (2) is assumed for limits y∗∈Sˉy^*\in\bar Sy∗∈Sˉ; the page prints y∗∈Sy^*\in Sy∗∈S, but its use at a feasible point needs Sˉ\bar SSˉ.
  • Translation slips are corrected in the statements and recorded: condition II's "D(z,x)D(z,x)D(z,x)" and "i∈Ti\in Ti∈T", (2.7)'s "g(xn−1)g(x^{n-1})g(xn−1)" (read g(xn+1)g(x^{n+1})g(xn+1)), and "Theorems 1 − 3" (read Theorems 1–2).
  • The control is an arbitrary sequence of indices in {0,…,m−1}\{0,\dots,m-1\}{0,…,m−1}; λ is named lam.
  • Note 2 is stated for candidate points y,z∈Sy,z\in Sy,z∈S, where ggg is meaningful.

The goal does not conclude that the relaxation converges; a statement asserting convergence is a different, unproved theorem. Equally, it must not be weakened to a fixed control, to an open SSS, or to a limit assumed to lie in ZZZ: any of these would trivialize the passage to the limit that the theorem is about.

A complete development needs the first-order condition for a local minimum on an affine hyperplane, the gradient inequality f(x)≥f(y)+(g(y),x−y)f(x)\ge f(y)+(g(y),x-y)f(x)≥f(y)+(g(y),x−y) for x∈Sˉx\in\bar Sx∈Sˉ, y∈Sy\in Sy∈S, and an induction along the relaxation sequence. Proofs of the milestones and of Note 2 are welcome independently.

Selected references

  • L. M. Bregman, The relaxation method of finding the common point of convex sets and its application to the solution of problems in convex programming, USSR Comput. Math. Math. Phys. 7(3) (1967) 200–217. doi:10.1016/0041-5553(67)90040-7
  • Y. Censor, S. A. Zenios, Parallel Optimization: Theory, Algorithms, and Applications, Oxford University Press, 1997. doi:10.1093/oso/9780195100624.001.0001
  • Y. Censor, A. Lent, An iterative row-action method for interval convex programming, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 34 (1981) 321–353. doi:10.1007/BF00934676
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Dimensioning Large Call Centers II: Asymptotically Optimal Staffing in the Efficiency-Driven RegimeResearch Paper

Why staffing large call centers is a mathematical question

A call center must choose enough servers to limit waiting while paying for every server it staffs. When arrivals are heavy, small changes in the number of servers can change the probability of delay substantially. Borst, Mandelbaum, and Reiman study how to make this choice when the arrival rate grows and the costs of staffing and waiting need not grow at the same rate. Their CWI report treats several regimes within one queueing model. This mission concerns the efficiency-driven regime, where the incremental staffing cost eventually dominates the conditional waiting cost at every fixed positive square-root staffing offset. The resulting rule chooses an offset by optimizing a simpler cost that treats the probability of waiting as one.

The result is useful when the staffing-cost and waiting-cost primitives change with system scale. It says that the simplified choice still attains the optimal total cost asymptotically, even though the actual staffing decision is an integer and the simplified problem uses a real variable. The report states this as Theorem 6.1 on printed page 19, with its interpretation of asymptotic optimality supplied by Corollary 3.3 on printed page 14.

The Erlang-C cost model

Customers arrive at rate λ>0\lambda>0λ>0 and receive exponential service at rate μ>0\mu>0μ>0 per server. The service rate μ\muμ is fixed as λ\lambdaλ grows. For an integer number of servers N>λ/μN>\lambda/\muN>λ/μ, the Erlang-C delay probability π(N,λ/μ)\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)π(N,λ/μ) is the explicit finite-sum expression in Section 2 of the report. A customer who waits has an exponential waiting time with rate Nμ−λN\mu-\lambdaNμ−λ. Let Dλ(t)D_\lambda(t)Dλ​(t) be the cost of a wait of length ttt. It is strictly increasing on t≥0t\ge0t≥0, satisfies Dλ(0)=0D_\lambda(0)=0Dλ​(0)=0, and has finite exponential expectation at every positive rate. The resulting conditional waiting cost is

G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞Dλ(t)e−(Nμ−λ)t dt.G(N,\lambda)=(N\mu-\lambda)\int_0^\infty D_\lambda(t)e^{-(N\mu-\lambda)t}\,dt.G(N,λ)=(Nμ−λ)∫0∞​Dλ​(t)e−(Nμ−λ)tdt.

The staffing cost F(N)F(N)F(N) is one fixed, convex, strictly increasing function of the server count. Its continuous extension is evaluated at real N>0N>0N>0. Total cost per unit of time at a stable integer level is

C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ).C(N,\lambda)=F(N)+\lambda\pi(N,\lambda/\mu)G(N,\lambda).C(N,λ)=F(N)+λπ(N,λ/μ)G(N,λ).

Write Nλ∗N^*_\lambdaNλ∗​ for any minimizing stable integer level. Ties are permitted. For a positive real offset xxx, define Nλ(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μN_\lambda(x)=\lambda/\mu+x\sqrt{\lambda/\mu}Nλ​(x)=λ/μ+xλ/μ​, Fλ(x)=F(Nλ(x))−F(λ/μ)F_\lambda(x)=F(N_\lambda(x))-F(\lambda/\mu)Fλ​(x)=F(Nλ​(x))−F(λ/μ), and Gλ(x)=λG(Nλ(x),λ)G_\lambda(x)=\lambda G(N_\lambda(x),\lambda)Gλ​(x)=λG(Nλ​(x),λ). The report extends Erlang-C continuously to πλ(x)\pi_\lambda(x)πλ​(x) and writes the incremental continuous objective as Cλ(x)=Fλ(x)+πλ(x)Gλ(x)C_\lambda(x)=F_\lambda(x)+\pi_\lambda(x)G_\lambda(x)Cλ​(x)=Fλ​(x)+πλ​(x)Gλ​(x). These definitions and the integer-extension identity are from Section 3, printed pages 11–12.

Formalization targets

The report defines the efficiency-driven regime by

for every κ>0,lim⁡λ→∞Fλ(κ)Gλ(κ)=+∞.\text{for every }\kappa>0,\qquad \lim_{\lambda\to\infty}\frac{F_\lambda(\kappa)}{G_\lambda(\kappa)}=+\infty.for every κ>0,λ→∞lim​Gλ​(κ)Fλ​(κ)​=+∞.

For each λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, choose yλ∗>0y^*_\lambda>0yλ∗​>0 to minimize Fλ(y)+Gλ(y)F_\lambda(y)+G_\lambda(y)Fλ​(y)+Gλ​(y) over y>0y>0y>0. Let Sλ(y)S_\lambda(y)Sλ​(y) be the smaller cost of the stable integer levels immediately below and above Nλ(y)N_\lambda(y)Nλ​(y); if the lower one is unstable, use the upper one. The goal, Theorem 6.1 together with Corollary 3.3, is

lim⁡λ→∞Sλ(yλ∗)−F(λ/μ)C(Nλ∗,λ)−F(λ/μ)=1.\lim_{\lambda\to\infty} \frac{S_\lambda(y^*_\lambda)-F(\lambda/\mu)} {C(N^*_\lambda,\lambda)-F(\lambda/\mu)}=1.λ→∞lim​C(Nλ∗​,λ)−F(λ/μ)Sλ​(yλ∗​)−F(λ/μ)​=1.

The milestone path includes the convexity of the conditional waiting cost (Lemma C.1), the agreement of the continuous Erlang-C extension with its integer formula, the two approximation lemmas and their corollary (Lemmas 3.1–3.2 and Corollary 3.3), the convex staffing-cost comparison of equation (13), and all three clauses of the Halfin–Whitt limit in Lemma 4.1. This ordering follows the objects each later statement uses.

What the result gives

The theorem certifies a staffing rule defined by a one-variable surrogate rather than the exact Erlang-C probability in the objective. Its guarantee concerns the incremental total cost above the unavoidable baseline F(λ/μ)F(\lambda/\mu)F(λ/μ), which is the economically relevant quantity when comparing two near-minimal stable staffing levels. The ratio tends to one, so the theorem is stronger than a claim that the two costs merely have the same growth order. The source also presents other regimes with different surrogates; their conclusions are separate targets in this series.

The paper proves the mathematical theorem. This mission asks for a Lean proof of its closed-form model and the surrounding lemmas. The complete development would make the report's approximation framework reusable for later results that combine a continuous queueing approximation, a surrogate minimizer, and integer rounding. It would also expose the exact assumptions needed to pass between real and integer staffing levels. No machine-checked proof of this report's Theorem 6.1 is claimed here.

Where the difficulty lies

The simple objective replaces the delay probability πλ(y)\pi_\lambda(y)πλ​(y) by one. That replacement is accurate near zero offset, but the minimizing offset itself changes with λ\lambdaλ. Pointwise asymptotics at a fixed positive offset do not directly control the value of an objective at its moving minimizer. The proof therefore has to relate the regime assumption to the location of the relevant minimizers before using the Halfin–Whitt limit. Integer rounding introduces another boundary issue: when Nλ(y)N_\lambda(y)Nλ​(y) is just above λ/μ\lambda/\muλ/μ, its floor need not be stable, so evaluating the ordinary Erlang-C formula there would compare the target against a meaningless cost. These difficulties are visible already in the statements of Theorem 6.1 and Lemma 3.2.

Formalization scope and conventions

Lean represents λ\lambdaλ, μ\muμ, offsets, and costs as real numbers; arrival-rate limits use the real filter at +∞+\infty+∞. Staffing counts are natural numbers. The service rate is positive and fixed. A WaitModel packages strict increase and normalization of DλD_\lambdaDλ​ on nonnegative waits together with integrability against every positive exponential rate. This integrability expresses the report's finiteness assumption for GGG and prevents a nonintegrable real integral from silently evaluating to zero. The hypotheses on FFF are convexity and strict increase on positive real staffing levels; FFF does not depend on λ\lambdaλ.

The report asserts that G(N,λ)G(N,\lambda)G(N,λ) diverges as NNN decreases to λ/μ\lambda/\muλ/μ, although the stated assumptions permit bounded increasing waiting penalties for which that assertion fails. The goal therefore includes this explicit divergence hypothesis, which also supports existence of the continuous minimizer used in the report's argument. The integer optimum and the surrogate optimum are functions constrained to be minimizers at every positive arrival rate. They cannot be arbitrary choices that make the conclusion vacuous. The continuous optimum appears only in the framework milestones; it is not a hypothesis of Theorem 6.1.

All formulas are total Lean functions. Their values at λ≤0\lambda\le0λ≤0, unstable integer counts, nonpositive offsets, or invalid parameters to the continuous Erlang-C integral have no queueing interpretation. Every theorem using them constrains its relevant inputs. The definition of SλS_\lambdaSλ​ ignores an unstable floor and uses the stable ceiling. At a positive offset and arrival rate this ceiling is above offered load. The Gaussian density, its cumulative integral, the hazard rate, and the delay function use the explicit formulas of Section 4; the value of the delay function at zero is the continuous extension needed by Lemma 4.1.

The queue's stochastic construction is outside this mission. The formal objects are the report's cost formulas and asymptotic comparisons, not a continuous-time Markov chain. Useful contributions include proofs of the special-function limit, convexity of conditional waiting cost, the integer-extension identity, and the reusable approximation lemmas. The regime condition is the full limit in equation (23); weakening it to an unrelated boundedness condition would change the theorem.

Selected references

  • Sem Borst, Avi Mandelbaum, and Martin I. Reiman, Dimensioning Large Call Centers, CWI Report PNA-R0015, 2000. Report PDF. Theorem 6.1, printed p. 19; Corollary 3.3, printed p. 14; Lemma 4.1, printed p. 15; Lemma C.1, printed p. 40.
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CombinatoricsOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization 2: Randomized Double Greedy Achieves 1/2 of the Optimum in ExpectationResearch Paper

Motivation

Many selection problems assign a value to each subset of a finite collection: the coverage supplied by chosen facilities, the influence reached by chosen seeds, or the value of a coalition. A submodular set function has diminishing returns in the precise sense that the combined value of two sets, counting their overlap once, does not exceed the sum of their separate values. When the function is also monotone, taking more elements never hurts. The unconstrained problem studied here permits nonmonotone functions, so both accepting and rejecting an element can matter. The question is what a single pass through the elements can guarantee when the function is available through value queries. Buchbinder et al., FOCS 2012

The randomized algorithm in this mission attains an expected one-half approximation for every nonnegative submodular function. The paper presents this as tight in the value-oracle setting: it recalls the earlier result of Feige, Mirrokni and Vondrák that a fixed improvement beyond one-half requires exponentially many queries. The contribution here is therefore both the guarantee and a short adaptive rule that attains it in a linear number of iterations. The local proposal follows the FOCS 2012 version of the paper; its theorem numbering differs from the later SIAM Journal on Computing article. Buchbinder et al., §I.A and Theorem I.2

Setting

Let N\mathcal NN be a finite ground set, and let f:2N→R≥0f:2^{\mathcal N}\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}f:2N→R≥0​ assign a nonnegative real value to every subset. The unconstrained submodular maximization problem asks for the largest value f(S)f(S)f(S) among all S⊆NS\subseteq\mathcal NS⊆N. Write OPTOPTOPT for that value when no confusion arises, and OOO for a set attaining it. Submodularity means

f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)≤f(A)+f(B)(A,B⊆N).f(A\cup B)+f(A\cap B)\le f(A)+f(B)\qquad(A,B\subseteq\mathcal N).f(A∪B)+f(A∩B)≤f(A)+f(B)(A,B⊆N).

There is no monotonicity or normalization assumption: f(∅)f(\varnothing)f(∅) and f(N)f(\mathcal N)f(N) may both be positive. A value oracle returns f(S)f(S)f(S) for a requested subset SSS. The paper's complexity claim counts such queries, assuming a query takes constant time. Buchbinder et al., §I and footnotes 1–2

Algorithm 2 visits the elements once in an arbitrary order u1,…,unu_1,\ldots,u_nu1​,…,un​. It keeps two sets, starting at X0=∅X_0=\varnothingX0​=∅ and Y0=NY_0=\mathcal NY0​=N. At step iii, it measures the gain aia_iai​ from adding uiu_iui​ to Xi−1X_{i-1}Xi−1​ and the gain bib_ibi​ from removing uiu_iui​ from Yi−1Y_{i-1}Yi−1​. It clips each gain at zero, giving ai′=max⁡(ai,0)a'_i=\max(a_i,0)ai′​=max(ai​,0) and bi′=max⁡(bi,0)b'_i=\max(b_i,0)bi′​=max(bi​,0). It adds uiu_iui​ to XXX with probability ai′/(ai′+bi′)a'_i/(a'_i+b'_i)ai′​/(ai′​+bi′​) and otherwise removes it from YYY. When both clipped gains vanish, the paper defines the add probability as one. After all elements have been processed, the two sets coincide, and the algorithm returns their common value. The state law is adaptive: its probability at step iii depends on the actual pair of sets produced by earlier choices. Buchbinder et al., Algorithm 2

Formalization targets

The main target is Theorem I.2 for this exact algorithm and for every enumeration of the ground set:

max⁡S⊆Nf(S)≤2 E[f(Xn)].\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal N}f(S)\le 2\,\mathbb E[f(X_n)].S⊆Nmax​f(S)≤2E[f(Xn​)].

The milestone statements retain the paper's key local quantities. For a comparison optimum OOO, set OPTi=(O∪Xi)∩YiOPT_i=(O\cup X_i)\cap Y_iOPTi​=(O∪Xi​)∩Yi​. Lemma II.1 asserts ai+bi≥0a_i+b_i\ge0ai​+bi​≥0. The endpoint statement identifies OPT0=OOPT_0=OOPT0​=O and OPTn=Xn=YnOPT_n=X_n=Y_nOPTn​=Xn​=Yn​. Inequality (3) bounds the conditional loss in the positive-gain case; Lemma III.1 compares the expected change of OPTiOPT_iOPTi​ with the expected combined change of XiX_iXi​ and YiY_iYi​. The telescoped display keeps the initial endpoint values f(∅)f(\varnothing)f(∅) and f(N)f(\mathcal N)f(N) before using nonnegativity. Buchbinder et al., Lemmas II.1 and III.1, inequality (3), proof of Theorem I.2

A companion target is Theorem I.4 via its second proof. For two normalized monotone submodular utilities f1,f2f_1,f_2f1​,f2​, let g(S)=f1(S)+f2(N∖S)g(S)=f_1(S)+f_2(\mathcal N\setminus S)g(S)=f1​(S)+f2​(N∖S). The maximum of ggg is exactly the optimal welfare of a two-player partition. Algorithm 2 on ggg is asked to satisfy

3max⁡S⊆Ng(S)≤4 E[g(Xn)].3\max_{S\subseteq\mathcal N}g(S)\le4\,\mathbb E[g(X_n)].3S⊆Nmax​g(S)≤4E[g(Xn​)].

This is the paper's three-quarter guarantee in its welfare application. Buchbinder et al., Theorem I.4 and Proof (2)

Significance

The main theorem gives a specific randomized rule whose expected value is at least half the best subset value, even when accepting an element can lower the objective. It applies without restricting the cardinality or shape of the chosen subset. The welfare corollary shows that keeping the initial endpoint values in the analysis yields a stronger guarantee for the objective formed from two monotone players. Buchbinder et al., Theorems I.2 and I.4

This mission formalizes the statement of the algorithm, its intermediate state laws, its comparison set, and the paper's numbered proof targets. The algorithmic guarantee is proved in the source paper; the local Lean theorem files are open statements with sorry and do not yet give machine-checked proofs of these results. A completed development would supply a reusable formal model of an adaptive finite random process over pairs of subsets, as well as the specific submodular inequalities. The published Submodular and OPT definitions from the earlier Feige–Mirrokni–Vondrák formalization are reused here.

Difficulty

The two possible updates cannot be assessed independently. The probability of each choice depends on the current state, and the comparison set OPTiOPT_iOPTi​ can gain or lose the processed element in a way that differs from the two algorithm sets. A bound on the expected value of XiX_iXi​ alone does not control the movement of OPTiOPT_iOPTi​. The proof must handle the clipped gains, including the case when both are zero, while preserving the exact joint law of (Xi,Yi)(X_i,Y_i)(Xi​,Yi​). Buchbinder et al., proof of Lemma III.1

Formalization scope

The ground set is a finite Lean type; subsets are Finset X, and values are real numbers. An order is a list with no repeated elements that covers the type, including the empty type. The run is an explicit finite mass function on pairs of subsets after every prefix of the list. Expectation is a finite weighted sum, so it has no integrability exception. The transition clips the two real marginal gains and handles 0/00/00/0 by assigning probability one to the add branch, exactly as Algorithm 2 specifies. The optimum is the published maximum over all subsets. No ratio divides by a possibly zero optimum.

The theorem fixes Algorithm 2 itself; an arbitrary process with nested sets or a process defined by its desired approximation property does not satisfy this scope. The Lean goal states the value bound and leaves the paper's linear-time claim outside the formal theorem. The algorithm uses four value evaluations per processed element in its printed rule; the Lean development represents those evaluations, not an implementation cost model. The statement that its two final sets coincide is a separate milestone.

The source's main-text decreasing-returns definition has an overbroad quantifier on the added element. This development uses the equivalent lattice inequality given in the paper's footnote, which permits nonmonotone functions. The proof of Lemma II.1 also has a set-index slip, and the proof of Theorem I.2 prints FFF for fff in one display; neither slip is copied into a formal statement. The one-step inequality (3) is stated for any nested pair with the processed element in Y∖XY\setminus XY∖X, a generalization of the conditioned reachable states in the paper. Contributions proving the endpoint invariant, conditional inequality, one-step expected estimate, and final bound are all within scope.

Selected references

  • Niv Buchbinder, Moran Feldman, Joseph Naor and Roy Schwartz, A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization, Proceedings of the 53rd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2012. FOCS version used here.
  • Niv Buchbinder, Moran Feldman, Joseph Naor and Roy Schwartz, A Tight Linear Time (1/2)-Approximation for Unconstrained Submodular Maximization, SIAM Journal on Computing 44(5), 2015. DOI: 10.1137/130929205. The cited statement indices above refer to the FOCS version.
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Dynamical SystemsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms 4: Subgaussian Martingale Noise with Σ exp(−c/γ_n) < ∞ for Every c > 0 Satisfies Assumption A1 Almost SurelyResearch Paper

Motivation

A stochastic approximation algorithm is a recursion

xn+1−xn=γn+1(F(xn)+Un+1)x_{n+1}-x_n=\gamma_{n+1}\big(F(x_n)+U_{n+1}\big)xn+1​−xn​=γn+1​(F(xn​)+Un+1​)

in Rd\mathbb R^dRd, where FFF is a vector field, γn\gamma_nγn​ are small step sizes and Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​ is noise. Such recursions go back to Robbins and Monro's root-finding scheme (Robbins–Monro 1951) and underlie stochastic gradient descent, temporal-difference learning, adaptive control and learning in games. The ODE method studies them by comparing the iterates with the trajectories of x˙=F(x)\dot x=F(x)x˙=F(x).

Benaïm's lecture notes (Benaïm 1999) organize the ODE method in two steps. A deterministic step, Proposition 4.1, shows that whenever the noise satisfies a condition called A1 (together with a boundedness condition on the iterates), the interpolated process is an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF. A probabilistic step then verifies A1 for concrete noise models. Proposition 4.2 does this for martingale difference noise with bounded qqq-th moments, at the price of step sizes with ∑nγn1+q/2<∞\sum_n\gamma_n^{1+q/2}<\infty∑n​γn1+q/2​<∞. This mission formalizes the second verification, Proposition 4.4: when the noise is subgaussian, A1 holds almost surely under the much weaker requirement that ∑ne−c/γn<∞\sum_ne^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty∑n​e−c/γn​<∞ for every c>0c>0c>0, which allows step sizes decaying only slightly faster than 1/log⁡n1/\log n1/logn. The notes attribute the result to Duflo (1997), see also Kushner and Yin (1997) and Benaïm and Hirsch (1996).

Setting

Let {γn}n≥1\{\gamma_n\}_{n\ge1}{γn​}n≥1​ be a deterministic sequence with γn≥0\gamma_n\ge0γn​≥0, ∑nγn=∞\sum_n\gamma_n=\infty∑n​γn​=∞ and γn→0\gamma_n\to0γn​→0 (a step sequence). Put τ0=0\tau_0=0τ0​=0, τn=∑i=1nγi\tau_n=\sum_{i=1}^n\gamma_iτn​=∑i=1n​γi​, and let

m(t)=sup⁡{k≥0: t≥τk}m(t)=\sup\{k\ge0:\ t\ge\tau_k\}m(t)=sup{k≥0: t≥τk​}

be the index of the step that contains time t≥0t\ge0t≥0. For a sequence {Un}n≥1\{U_n\}_{n\ge1}{Un​}n≥1​ define the piecewise constant processes Uˉ(t)=Um(t)+1\bar U(t)=U_{m(t)+1}Uˉ(t)=Um(t)+1​ and γˉ(t)=γm(t)+1\bar\gamma(t)=\gamma_{m(t)+1}γˉ​(t)=γm(t)+1​, so that step n+1n+1n+1 occupies the time interval [τn,τn+1)[\tau_n,\tau_{n+1})[τn​,τn+1​) of length γn+1\gamma_{n+1}γn+1​.

Assumption A1 asks that for every T>0T>0T>0

lim⁡n→∞sup⁡{∥∑i=nk−1γi+1Ui+1∥: k=n+1,…,m(τn+T)}=0,\lim_{n\to\infty}\sup\Big\{\Big\|\sum_{i=n}^{k-1}\gamma_{i+1}U_{i+1}\Big\|:\ k=n+1,\dots,m(\tau_n+T)\Big\}=0,n→∞lim​sup{​i=n∑k−1​γi+1​Ui+1​​: k=n+1,…,m(τn​+T)}=0,

or, in the form the notes call equivalent, lim⁡t→∞Δ(t,T)=0\lim_{t\to\infty}\Delta(t,T)=0limt→∞​Δ(t,T)=0 for every T>0T>0T>0, where

Δ(t,T)=sup⁡0≤h≤T∥∫tt+hUˉ(s) ds∥.\Delta(t,T)=\sup_{0\le h\le T}\Big\|\int_t^{t+h}\bar U(s)\,ds\Big\|.Δ(t,T)=0≤h≤Tsup​​∫tt+h​Uˉ(s)ds​.

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space with a nondecreasing sequence {Fn}\{\mathcal F_n\}{Fn​} of sub-σ\sigmaσ-algebras, and F:Rd→RdF:\mathbb R^d\to\mathbb R^dF:Rd→Rd continuous. A sequence {xn}\{x_n\}{xn​} given by the recursion above is a Robbins–Monro algorithm if γ\gammaγ is deterministic, UnU_nUn​ is Fn\mathcal F_nFn​-measurable, and E(Un+1∣Fn)=0E(U_{n+1}\mid\mathcal F_n)=0E(Un+1​∣Fn​)=0. The noise is subgaussian if there is a number Γ>0\Gamma>0Γ>0 such that for all nnn and all θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd

E(exp⁡⟨θ,Un+1⟩ ∣ Fn)≤exp⁡(Γ2∥θ∥2).E\big(\exp\langle\theta,U_{n+1}\rangle\,\big|\,\mathcal F_n\big)\le\exp\Big(\frac\Gamma2\|\theta\|^2\Big).E(exp⟨θ,Un+1​⟩​Fn​)≤exp(2Γ​∥θ∥2).

Bounded noise, ∥Un∥≤Γ\|U_n\|\le\sqrt\Gamma∥Un​∥≤Γ​, is an example.

Formalization targets

Goal: Proposition 4.4

For a Robbins–Monro algorithm with subgaussian noise and a deterministic step sequence such that

∑ne−c/γn<∞for each c>0,\sum_ne^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty\qquad\text{for each }c>0,n∑​e−c/γn​<∞for each c>0,

with probability one the realised noise sequence satisfies A1, in both of its forms, simultaneously for all T>0T>0T>0.

Milestones

  1. The exponential supermartingale. For every θ∈Rd\theta\in\mathbb R^dθ∈Rd,
Zn(θ)=exp⁡[∑i=1n⟨θ,γiUi⟩−Γ2∑i=1nγi2∥θ∥2]Z_n(\theta)=\exp\Big[\sum_{i=1}^n\langle\theta,\gamma_iU_i\rangle-\frac\Gamma2\sum_{i=1}^n\gamma_i^2\|\theta\|^2\Big]Zn​(θ)=exp[i=1∑n​⟨θ,γi​Ui​⟩−2Γ​i=1∑n​γi2​∥θ∥2]

is a supermartingale. 2. Directional maximal tail bound. For every unit vector eee, α>0\alpha>0α>0, nnn and T>0T>0T>0,

P(sup⁡n<k≤m(τn+T)⟨e,∑i=nk−1γi+1Ui+1⟩≥α)≤exp⁡(−α22Γ∑i=nm(τn+T)−1γi+12).P\Big(\sup_{n<k\le m(\tau_n+T)}\Big\langle e,\sum_{i=n}^{k-1}\gamma_{i+1}U_{i+1}\Big\rangle\ge\alpha\Big)\le\exp\Big(\frac{-\alpha^2}{2\Gamma\sum_{i=n}^{m(\tau_n+T)-1}\gamma_{i+1}^2}\Big).P(n<k≤m(τn​+T)sup​⟨e,i=n∑k−1​γi+1​Ui+1​⟩≥α)≤exp(2Γ∑i=nm(τn​+T)−1​γi+12​−α2​).
  1. Eq. (18). There are C,C′>0C,C'>0C,C′>0 depending only on ddd and Γ\GammaΓ with
P(Δ(t,T)≥α)≤Cexp⁡(−α2C′∫tt+Tγˉ(s) ds)(t≥0, T>0, α>0).P(\Delta(t,T)\ge\alpha)\le C\exp\Big(\frac{-\alpha^2}{C'\int_t^{t+T}\bar\gamma(s)\,ds}\Big)\qquad(t\ge0,\ T>0,\ \alpha>0).P(Δ(t,T)≥α)≤Cexp(C′∫tt+T​γˉ​(s)ds−α2​)(t≥0, T>0, α>0).
  1. Block comparison. Δ(t,T)≤2Δ(kT,T)+Δ((k+1)T,T)\Delta(t,T)\le2\Delta(kT,T)+\Delta((k+1)T,T)Δ(t,T)≤2Δ(kT,T)+Δ((k+1)T,T) for kT≤t<(k+1)TkT\le t<(k+1)TkT≤t<(k+1)T.

Significance

Proposition 4.4 is the sufficient condition for the ODE method when the noise has Gaussian-type tails. Its step-size condition holds whenever γnlog⁡n→0\gamma_n\log n\to0γn​logn→0, so it admits steps that decrease far more slowly than the ∑γn2<∞\sum\gamma_n^2<\infty∑γn2​<∞ of the classical L2L^2L2 theory; slowly decreasing steps are what practitioners use to keep algorithms responsive. Combined with Proposition 4.1 it shows that the interpolated process of such an algorithm, with bounded iterates, is almost surely an asymptotic pseudotrajectory of the flow of FFF, and the limit set theorems of the notes then locate the limit points of the algorithm.

The result is proved in the notes and in the cited literature; it has not, to our knowledge, been machine-checked. A formal proof would add reusable pieces: an exponential supermartingale and maximal inequality for vector-valued martingale differences with a conditional subgaussian bound (Mathlib's conditional subgaussian notion is scalar), a Borel–Cantelli argument along the grid kTkTkT, and the continuous-time bookkeeping of Uˉ\bar UUˉ, γˉ\bar\gammaγˉ​ and Δ\DeltaΔ shared with the other missions of this series.

Difficulty

The moment method of Proposition 4.2 does not reach this regime: any fixed polynomial moment of the window sums decays only polynomially in the window's step sizes, and under ∑e−c/γn<∞\sum e^{-c/\gamma_n}<\infty∑e−c/γn​<∞ alone polynomial bounds are not summable over windows. Exponential tail bounds are needed, and they must be maximal (uniform over the window) and must hold for the norm of a vector, not only for a scalar. The continuous-time deviation Δ(t,T)\Delta(t,T)Δ(t,T) involves partial steps at both ends of [t,t+h][t,t+h][t,t+h], so the bound must be stated in terms of ∫tt+Tγˉ\int_t^{t+T}\bar\gamma∫tt+T​γˉ​ rather than a sum over whole steps, with constants that do not depend on ttt, TTT or α\alphaα. Finally, A1 quantifies over all T>0T>0T>0: the almost-sure statement must hold on a single event of full probability for every TTT.

Formalization scope

The space is Rd\mathbb R^dRd as EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin d) (the paper writes Rm\mathbb R^mRm); time is real. The sequences γ\gammaγ and UUU are indexed by N\mathbb NN, and their values at 000 are unused, as the paper indexes them from 111. The filtration is a Mathlib Filtration ℕ; Un+1U_{n+1}Un+1​ is Fn+1\mathcal F_{n+1}Fn+1​-strongly measurable and integrable, and E(Un+1∣Fn)=0E(U_{n+1}\mid\mathcal F_n)=0E(Un+1​∣Fn​)=0 almost surely. The subgaussian condition requires exp⁡⟨θ,Un+1⟩\exp\langle\theta,U_{n+1}\rangleexp⟨θ,Un+1​⟩ to be integrable for every θ\thetaθ and nnn. The summand e−c/γne^{-c/\gamma_n}e−c/γn​ is taken to be 000 when γn=0\gamma_n=0γn​=0, its limiting value. The suprema in A1 and Δ\DeltaΔ are taken in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞]; the supremum over an empty range of kkk is 000. In Eq. (18) the constants are chosen before the probability space, the algorithm and t,T,αt,T,\alphat,T,α.

The following readings are excluded and are not acceptable formalizations: a subgaussian condition that holds vacuously because the exponential is not integrable (Lean's conditional expectation of a non-integrable function is 000); a summability condition made trivial or false by the convention c/0=0c/0=0c/0=0; and the conclusion "for each TTT, A1 holds almost surely" in place of "almost surely, A1 holds for all TTT". The second sentence of Proposition 4.4 (the asymptotic pseudotrajectory conclusion) is outside this mission.

All hypotheses are satisfiable: U=0U=0U=0, x=0x=0x=0, F=0F=0F=0, Γ=1\Gamma=1Γ=1 and γn=1/n\gamma_n=1/nγn​=1/n satisfy every one of them.

Contributions welcome: a maximal inequality for nonnegative supermartingales in the form needed here, vector subgaussian tail bounds for martingale transforms with deterministic weights (reusable well beyond this mission), lemmas on the step processes and Δ\DeltaΔ (measurability, local integrability, additivity), and the proofs of the milestones.

Selected references

  • M. Benaïm, Dynamics of Stochastic Approximation Algorithms, Séminaire de Probabilités XXXIII, Lecture Notes in Mathematics 1709, Springer, 1999, pp. 1–68. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0096509
  • M. Duflo, Random Iterative Models, Applications of Mathematics 34, Springer, 1997.
  • H. J. Kushner and G. G. Yin, Stochastic Approximation Algorithms and Applications, Springer, 1997.
  • M. Benaïm and M. W. Hirsch, Asymptotic pseudotrajectories and chain recurrent flows, with applications, Journal of Dynamics and Differential Equations 8 (1996), 141–176. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02218617
  • H. Robbins and S. Monro, A stochastic approximation method, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 22 (1951), 400–407. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177729586
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation IV: In Weighted Games with a Common Source and Sink, Best-Response Dynamics Converge to a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

In a network design game each player must connect its terminals in a graph whose edges carry fixed costs, and the cost of an edge is split among the players that use it. Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler and Roughgarden (SIAM J. Comput. 38 (2008)) studied the fair (Shapley) split, in which the users of an edge pay equal shares. That game is a congestion game in the sense of Rosenthal (Int. J. Game Theory 2 (1973)), so it has an exact potential and pure Nash equilibria always exist.

Section 6 of the same paper turns to weighted players: player iii has a weight wi≥1w_i \ge 1wi​≥1 (a traffic volume, a bandwidth demand, a share of ownership) and pays for each edge it uses a share proportional to its weight. The equal-split potential is then lost, and the paper notes that weighted games with three or more players need not have a pure Nash equilibrium at all (Chen and Roughgarden, Network design with weighted players, SPAA 2006). Theorem 6.3 identifies a natural class in which equilibria survive: all players share one source and one sink. For that class it shows more than existence. The simplest decentralized procedure, letting players in turn switch to a cheapest route, always stops, and where it stops is an equilibrium.

Setting

A finite directed multigraph DDD has a finite set EEE of arcs; each arc eee has a tail and a head vertex, and parallel arcs between the same two vertices are allowed. Fix a source sss and a sink ttt. A simple sss–ttt path is a sequence of arcs e1,…,eme_1,\dots,e_me1​,…,em​ (m≥1m\ge1m≥1), each starting where the previous one ends, beginning at sss, ending at ttt, and visiting no vertex twice; it is identified with its arc set P⊆EP\subseteq EP⊆E. Write Sst\mathcal S_{st}Sst​ for the finite set of these paths.

The weighted single-commodity game has a finite set of players; player iii has a weight wi≥1w_i\ge1wi​≥1, arc eee has a fixed cost ce≥0c_e\ge0ce​≥0, and every player's strategy set is Sst\mathcal S_{st}Sst​. In a profile S=(Si)iS=(S_i)_iS=(Si​)i​ let

We=∑i : e∈SiwiW_e=\sum_{i\,:\,e\in S_i} w_iWe​=i:e∈Si​∑​wi​

be the total weight on arc eee. Player iii pays

payi(S)=∑e∈SiwiWe ce.\mathrm{pay}_i(S)=\sum_{e\in S_i}\frac{w_i}{W_e}\,c_e .payi​(S)=e∈Si​∑​We​wi​​ce​.

A profile is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if no player can lower its payment by switching alone to another path.

A best-response move of player iii replaces SiS_iSi​ by a path TTT that minimises iii's payment given the other players' paths, provided this strictly lowers iii's payment. Best-response dynamics is any sequence of profiles in which each profile arises from the previous one by a best-response move of some player.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.3 (p. 1620)

For every such game with wi≥1w_i\ge1wi​≥1 and ce≥0c_e\ge0ce​≥0:

there is no infinite sequence S0,S1,… with Sn+1 a best-response move from Sn;\text{there is no infinite sequence } S^0,S^1,\dots \text{ with } S^{n+1} \text{ a best-response move from } S^n;there is no infinite sequence S0,S1,… with Sn+1 a best-response move from Sn; a profile admitting no best-response move is a Nash equilibrium;\text{a profile admitting no best-response move is a Nash equilibrium;}a profile admitting no best-response move is a Nash equilibrium; Sst≠∅  ⟹  a pure Nash equilibrium exists.\mathcal S_{st}\neq\emptyset \;\Longrightarrow\; \text{a pure Nash equilibrium exists.}Sst​=∅⟹a pure Nash equilibrium exists.

The goal asserts only termination and existence; it fixes no bound on the length of a run.

Milestones (proof of Theorem 6.3, p. 1620)

For a profile SSS define the marginal cost of a path, cS(P)=∑e∈Pce/We∈[0,+∞]c_S(P)=\sum_{e\in P}c_e/W_e\in[0,+\infty]cS​(P)=∑e∈P​ce​/We​∈[0,+∞], and the tuple P(S)P(S)P(S) of all values cS(P)c_S(P)cS​(P), P∈SstP\in\mathcal S_{st}P∈Sst​, sorted increasingly. With strictly positive arc costs:

  1. a player on path PPP pays wi cS(P)w_i\,c_S(P)wi​cS​(P) (this one needs only ce≥0c_e\ge0ce​≥0);
  2. inequality (6.1): if player iii makes a best-response move from P1P_1P1​ to P2P_2P2​ and P\mathcal PP is the set of paths sharing an arc with P1∪P2P_1\cup P_2P1​∪P2​, then min⁡P∈PcS′(P)<min⁡P∈PcS(P)\min_{P\in\mathcal P}c_{S'}(P)<\min_{P\in\mathcal P}c_S(P)minP∈P​cS′​(P)<minP∈P​cS​(P);
  3. every best-response move strictly decreases P(S)P(S)P(S) in the lexicographic order.

Significance

The theorem gives a guarantee about dynamics, not only about existence: in single-commodity weighted network design, any order in which players take turns playing best responses reaches a stable outcome in finitely many steps. This places the single-commodity case on the positive side of the boundary drawn by the nonexistence examples for general weighted games. The tuple of sorted path costs is a potential that is not a single number, a device that applies to other games without an exact potential.

The result is proved in the paper; it has no machine-checked proof that this mission is aware of. A formal development contributes a reusable layer for weighted cost-sharing games (payments, best responses, Nash equilibria on arbitrary strategy families), a treatment of simple directed paths in multigraphs as strategy sets, and a lexicographic termination argument over sorted lists of extended reals. The goal is stated for nonnegative costs, as in the paper's model, while the printed proof uses positive costs; closing that gap is part of the work.

Difficulty

The obvious route, finding a real-valued function that every improving move decreases, is unavailable: the paper notes that Rosenthal's potential Φ\PhiΦ is not a potential once weights are added, and that improving moves can increase it. Termination must instead come from an ordinal quantity, a whole sorted list compared lexicographically, and the move of one player changes the marginal costs of every path that shares an arc with the old or the new route, in both directions.

The argument also depends on the shape of the strategy sets. Two distinct simple sss–ttt paths are never nested as arc sets; with walks that repeat vertices, or with arbitrary strategy families, the comparison between a path's marginal cost before and after a deviation can fail. Arcs of cost zero create a further gap: ce/Wec_e/W_ece​/We​ is 0/00/00/0 on an unused free arc, and the strict inequalities of the proof degenerate, so the nonnegative-cost goal needs more than the printed argument.

Formalization scope

  • Players form a finite type; arcs form a finite type with tail and head maps into a vertex type. Parallel arcs are kept.
  • A strategy is a Finset of arcs; the strategy family of every player is the finite set of arc sets of simple sss–ttt paths (a list of consecutive arcs with distinct visited vertices). There are no paths when s=ts=ts=t.
  • Weights and costs are real numbers with wi≥1w_i\ge1wi​≥1, ce≥0c_e\ge0ce​≥0 (the predicate IsStandard); the milestones (6.1) and the lexicographic decrease assume ce>0c_e>0ce​>0.
  • Payments are real; on every used arc We≥wi≥1W_e\ge w_i\ge1We​≥wi​≥1, so the division is never by zero.
  • The marginal cost cS(P)c_S(P)cS​(P) is valued in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞] (ℝ≥0∞): an unused arc of positive cost contributes +∞+\infty+∞. Computing it in the reals, where x/0=0x/0=0x/0=0, would make unused paths free and the milestones false.
  • Termination is the well-foundedness of the relation "S′S'S′ is reached from SSS by one best-response move" with S′S'S′ below SSS; the reverse orientation is a different statement.
  • A best-response move requires a strict improvement and an exact minimiser; dropping either makes termination trivially true or false, and the second clause of the goal (no move possible implies Nash) guards against a move relation that is too narrow.

Contributions welcome: lemmas on simple paths in multigraphs (non-nestedness), the multiset-to-sorted-list lexicographic comparison, and the treatment of zero-cost arcs.

Selected references

  • E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, É. Tardos, T. Wexler, T. Roughgarden, The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation, SIAM Journal on Computing 38(4):1602–1623, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/070680096
  • R. W. Rosenthal, A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory 2:65–67, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential games, Games and Economic Behavior 14:124–143, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
  • H. Chen, T. Roughgarden, Network design with weighted players, Proceedings of the 18th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2006, pp. 28–37.
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OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Sequencing of a Single Machine Subject to Precedence Constraints: Repeatedly Placing Last a Least-Cost Eligible Job Yields a Minmax Optimal SequenceResearch Paper

Motivation

Single-machine sequencing is the base case of deterministic scheduling theory. Many multi-machine and shop problems are analysed by reduction to it, and many bounds and approximation algorithms for harder models use it as a subroutine. A central objective class is the bottleneck or minmax objective. Each job carries a nondecreasing cost of its completion time, and the schedule is judged by its worst job. Maximum lateness, maximum tardiness and maximum weighted tardiness are all special cases.

Before 1973 the minmax problem was solved without precedence constraints. Jackson (1955) showed that ordering by due date minimizes maximum lateness. Moore (1968, Management Science 15(1)) gave a procedure for general nondecreasing deferral costs, and Lawler and Moore (1969) gave a related method. In Lawler, Optimal Sequencing of a Single Machine Subject to Precedence Constraints, Management Science 19(5), 1973, Lawler showed that arbitrary precedence constraints can be added at no loss of efficiency. Jobs are chosen from last to first, by a single comparison of costs at a known time. The resulting O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) procedure is the standard algorithm for the problem written 1 ∣ prec ∣ fmax⁡1\,|\,\mathrm{prec}\,|\,f_{\max}1∣prec∣fmax​ in the classification of Graham, Lawler, Lenstra and Rinnooy Kan (1979). It is one of the first polynomial-time results for precedence-constrained scheduling that every survey of the field cites.

Setting

A finite, nonempty set JJJ of jobs is processed on a single machine, one job at a time and without interruption. Each job jjj has a processing time aj≥0a_j \ge 0aj​≥0 and a cost function cj:R→Rc_j : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}cj​:R→R that is monotone nondecreasing. The value cj(t)c_j(t)cj​(t) is the cost incurred when jjj is completed at time ttt.

The precedence constraints are an arbitrary relation ≺\prec≺ on jobs: i≺ji \prec ji≺j means that job iii is required to precede job jjj. A sequence π=(π1,…,πn)\pi = (\pi_1, \dots, \pi_n)π=(π1​,…,πn​) lists every job of JJJ once. It observes the precedence constraints if πq≺πp\pi_q \prec \pi_pπq​≺πp​ never holds for positions p<qp < qp<q. The machine starts at time 000 with no idle time, so the completion time of πm\pi_mπm​ is Cπm(π)=aπ1+⋯+aπmC_{\pi_m}(\pi) = a_{\pi_1} + \dots + a_{\pi_m}Cπm​​(π)=aπ1​​+⋯+aπm​​. The maximum incurred cost of π\piπ is

fmax⁡(π)=max⁡j∈Jcj(Cj(π)),f_{\max}(\pi) = \max_{j \in J} c_j\bigl(C_j(\pi)\bigr),fmax​(π)=j∈Jmax​cj​(Cj​(π)),

and a feasible π\piπ is minmax optimal if fmax⁡(π)≤fmax⁡(π′)f_{\max}(\pi) \le f_{\max}(\pi')fmax​(π)≤fmax​(π′) for every feasible π′\pi'π′.

For a set PPP of jobs, S(P)S(P)S(P) is the set of jobs of PPP that are not required to precede any other job of PPP, and TP=∑j∈PajT_P = \sum_{j \in P} a_jTP​=∑j∈P​aj​. Lawler's rule builds a sequence from the last position to the first. With PPP the jobs not yet placed, it chooses k∈S(P)k \in S(P)k∈S(P) with ck(TP)=min⁡j∈S(P)cj(TP)c_k(T_P) = \min_{j \in S(P)} c_j(T_P)ck​(TP​)=minj∈S(P)​cj​(TP​), places kkk in the latest open position and removes it from PPP. Ties are broken arbitrarily. In Lean the objects are IsFeasible, lastEligible (SSS), IsMinmaxOptimal and IsLawlerSequence, in namespace LawlerPrec.MinMax. They are built on the published MooreLateJobs.Shared.completionTime and MooreLateJobs.MaxDeferral.maxCost.

Formalization targets

Goal: the rule is optimal

Every sequence π\piπ that Lawler's rule can produce, under any tie-breaking, observes the precedence constraints and satisfies

fmax⁡(π)  ≤  fmax⁡(π′)for every sequence π′ of J observing the precedence constraints.f_{\max}(\pi) \;\le\; f_{\max}(\pi') \qquad \text{for every sequence } \pi' \text{ of } J \text{ observing the precedence constraints.}fmax​(π)≤fmax​(π′)for every sequence π′ of J observing the precedence constraints.

This is the statement of §3 (p. 545), "An efficient algorithm for finding a minmax optimal sequence follows immediately from the theorem above". It contains no constants.

Milestones

  1. §2 proof, third paragraph. Moving a job of S(J)S(J)S(J) to the end of a feasible sequence keeps it feasible.
  2. §2 proof, fourth paragraph, first sentence. After that move, no job other than kkk completes later, and kkk completes at T=∑j∈JajT = \sum_{j \in J} a_jT=∑j∈J​aj​.
  3. §2 proof, fourth paragraph. If ck(T)≤ck′(T)c_k(T) \le c_{k'}(T)ck​(T)≤ck′​(T), where k′k'k′ is the last job of the feasible sequence, the move does not raise fmax⁡f_{\max}fmax​.
  4. THEOREM (§2), p. 544. If some feasible sequence exists and k∈S(J)k \in S(J)k∈S(J) minimizes cj(T)c_j(T)cj​(T) over S(J)S(J)S(J), then some minmax optimal sequence has kkk last.
  5. §3, the reduction. A minmax optimal sequence of J∖{k}J \setminus \{k\}J∖{k}, followed by kkk, is minmax optimal for JJJ.
  6. §3, the procedure never stalls. If a feasible sequence exists, the rule produces a complete sequence. This shows the goal is not vacuous.

Significance

The result shows that 1 ∣ prec ∣ fmax⁡1\,|\,\mathrm{prec}\,|\,f_{\max}1∣prec∣fmax​ is solvable in polynomial time for every family of nondecreasing costs. The ordering of an optimal sequence depends on the costs only through their values at the nnn partial sums TPT_PTP​ along the way. The deadline problem is a corollary (§5): sequencing from last to first by latest deadline among the currently available jobs avoids tardiness whenever any sequence does. The last-to-first scheme is reused in later backward rules for fmax⁡f_{\max}fmax​ objectives. A formal statement of the rule, its feasibility and its optimality makes these extensions available for formal reuse.

The result is classical and its proof is short. No machine-checked proof of it is known to be in Mathlib. The work this mission asks for is a formal proof of the known exchange argument and of the induction that turns the Theorem into the algorithm's correctness. The induction needs the reduced problem's sets S(P)S(P)S(P) and times TPT_PTP​ to be the correct ones at each stage, which the definitions fix.

Difficulty

The exchange argument of §2 is elementary. The difficulty lies in stating the algorithm faithfully and carrying the induction. At each stage the eligible set S(P)S(P)S(P) and the time TPT_PTP​ must be recomputed on the remaining jobs, with constraints into already placed jobs ignored. The induction must also show that the rule's sequence is feasible, which is a conclusion and not an assumption.

A first attempt often proves only the Theorem, that some optimal sequence has kkk last. That statement says nothing about a sequence built entirely by the rule, because an optimal sequence of JJJ with kkk last need not restrict to an optimal sequence of J∖{k}J \setminus \{k\}J∖{k}. Optimality of the rule's whole sequence is the target, and milestone 5 isolates the corresponding step of the page.

Formalization scope

  • Jobs form a type ι with decidable equality, and the job set is J : Finset ι.
  • Processing times are a : ι → ℝ, costs are c : ι → ℝ → ℝ, and the precedence constraints are prec : ι → ι → Prop.
  • A sequence is a duplicate-free list whose elements are exactly J. Positions are 0-based, and completion times are prefix sums (MooreLateJobs.Shared.completionAt).
  • The relation prec is arbitrary: it is not assumed transitive, irreflexive or acyclic. A cycle among distinct jobs leaves no feasible sequence. A self-loop constrains nothing, both in feasibility and in SSS (the "others" of the page exclude the job itself).

The standing assumptions of §1 appear as hypotheses wherever they are used: monotone nondecreasing cjc_jcj​ for j∈Jj \in Jj∈J, and JJJ nonempty where the maximum is taken. Two hypotheses are added relative to the page and disclosed in each statement. Processing times are non-negative (aj≥0a_j \ge 0aj​≥0), since they are durations and the exchange argument fails without them. The Theorem also assumes the existence of a feasible sequence, which its conclusion presupposes.

The rule is the property IsLawlerSequence of a finished sequence. At each position mmm, the job there lies in SSS of the jobs in positions 0..m0..m0..m and minimizes the cost at their total processing time. Every tie-break is covered. The rule is not a deterministic function, and it is not an arbitrary choice function. Feasibility of the rule's output is part of the goal's conclusion, so the goal cannot be obtained by assuming it. A statement that compares the rule only with some sequence, or that asserts only that an optimal sequence exists, is weaker and is ruled out by the goal's form. Milestone 6 shows the goal's hypotheses are satisfiable whenever a feasible sequence exists.

The n2n^2n2 operation count of §4, the first-to-last rule of §5 and the deadline corollaries of §5 are not part of this mission. A development needs only finite lists and finsets from Mathlib. Lemmas about moving an element to the end of a duplicate-free list, and about prefix sums under that move, are reusable for other exchange arguments in single-machine scheduling.

Selected references

  • E. L. Lawler, Optimal Sequencing of a Single Machine Subject to Precedence Constraints, Management Science 19(5):544–546, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.19.5.544
  • J. M. Moore, An n Job, One Machine Sequencing Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Late Jobs, Management Science 15(1):102–109, 1968. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.1.102
  • E. L. Lawler and J. M. Moore, A Functional Equation and its Application to Resource Allocation and Sequencing Problems, Management Science 16(1):77–84, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.16.1.77
  • J. R. Jackson, Scheduling a Production Line to Minimize Maximum Tardiness, Research Report 43, Management Science Research Project, UCLA, 1955.
  • R. L. Graham, E. L. Lawler, J. K. Lenstra and A. H. G. Rinnooy Kan, Optimization and Approximation in Deterministic Sequencing and Scheduling: a Survey, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 5:287–326, 1979. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70356-X
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation III: Weighted Games in Which Each Edge Serves at Most Two Players Have a Potential and a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Motivation

In a network design game each of kkk players must connect its own terminals in a shared graph, and the cost of every edge that is bought is split among the players who use it. Anshelevich, Dasgupta, Kleinberg, Tardos, Wexler and Roughgarden (SIAM J. Comput. 2008) studied the fair (Shapley) split, in which the xex_exe​ users of an edge each pay ce/xec_e/x_ece​/xe​. That game is a congestion game in the sense of Rosenthal (Networks 1973), so it has an exact potential function and pure Nash equilibria always exist.

When players carry different amounts of traffic, the natural rule is to split an edge's cost in proportion to weight: a player of weight wiw_iwi​ on an edge whose users have total weight WeW_eWe​ pays (wi/We) ce(w_i/W_e)\,c_e(wi​/We​)ce​. The paper notes that this rule is analogous to weighted generalizations of the Shapley value (Monderer and Samet, Variations of the Shapley Value, Handbook of Game Theory III, 2002). The weighted model leaves Rosenthal's framework: the share depends on which players use an edge, not only on how many, and Chen and Roughgarden (SPAA 2006) showed that weighted games with three or more players need not have a pure Nash equilibrium at all. Section 6 of the paper identifies structural conditions under which equilibria do exist. This mission covers the first of them.

Timeline. Rosenthal (1973): every congestion game has a pure Nash equilibrium, via an exact potential. Monderer and Shapley (GEB 1996): potential and weighted potential games, and the equivalence of exact potential games with congestion games. Anshelevich et al. (FOCS 2004, journal 2008): Theorem 6.1, existence when every resource is shared by at most two players, and Theorem 6.3, existence when all players share a source and a sink. Chen and Roughgarden (2006): weighted network design games with three or more players may have no pure equilibrium.

Setting

A weighted cost-sharing game GGG consists of a finite set of players, a finite ground set EEE of edges (resources), and for each player iii:

  • a finite family Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ of feasible strategies, each a subset of EEE;
  • a weight wi≥1w_i \ge 1wi​≥1;

together with a fixed edge cost ce≥0c_e \ge 0ce​≥0 for every e∈Ee \in Ee∈E. A profile S=(Si)iS = (S_i)_iS=(Si​)i​ picks Si∈ΣiS_i \in \Sigma_iSi​∈Σi​ for every player. For an edge eee, WeW_eWe​ is the total weight of the players with e∈Sie \in S_ie∈Si​, and player iii's payment is

Ci(S)=∑e∈SiwiWe ce.C_i(S) = \sum_{e \in S_i} \frac{w_i}{W_e}\, c_e .Ci​(S)=e∈Si​∑​We​wi​​ce​.

A profile is a pure Nash equilibrium when no player iii has a T∈ΣiT \in \Sigma_iT∈Σi​ with Ci(S−i,T)<Ci(S)C_i(S_{-i}, T) < C_i(S)Ci​(S−i​,T)<Ci​(S), where (S−i,T)(S_{-i}, T)(S−i​,T) is the profile in which iii plays TTT and everyone else keeps their strategy.

The strategy space of player iii is the set of edges that occur in at least one strategy of Σi\Sigma_iΣi​. The hypothesis of Theorem 6.1 is that every edge lies in the strategy spaces of at most two players: no edge can ever be shared by three players, whatever they choose.

The network design game is the instance in which EEE is the edge set of a graph and Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ is the set of edge sets of paths connecting player iii's source sis_isi​ to its sink tit_iti​.

The paper's proof uses an explicit function Φ(S)=∑eΦe(S)\Phi(S) = \sum_e \Phi_e(S)Φ(S)=∑e​Φe​(S) with Φe(S)=0\Phi_e(S) = 0Φe​(S)=0 when eee is unused, cewic_e w_ice​wi​ when iii alone uses eee, and ceθijc_e\theta_{ij}ce​θij​ when iii and jjj both use it, where θij=wi+wj−wiwj/(wi+wj)\theta_{ij} = w_i + w_j - w_i w_j/(w_i + w_j)θij​=wi​+wj​−wi​wj​/(wi​+wj​). It is part of the definitions of this mission.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.1

If every edge lies in the strategy spaces of at most two players, there is a weighted potential: a real function Φ\PhiΦ on profiles with

Φ(S−i,T)−Φ(S)=wi (Ci(S−i,T)−Ci(S))for every profile S, player i, T∈Σi,\Phi(S_{-i}, T) - \Phi(S) = w_i\,\bigl(C_i(S_{-i}, T) - C_i(S)\bigr) \quad\text{for every profile } S,\ \text{player } i,\ T \in \Sigma_i ,Φ(S−i​,T)−Φ(S)=wi​(Ci​(S−i​,T)−Ci​(S))for every profile S, player i, T∈Σi​,

and, if every Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ is nonempty, a pure Nash equilibrium exists. The goal asserts the existence of such a Φ\PhiΦ rather than fixing the paper's formula, so it remains valid for any other weighted potential.

Milestones

  1. Joining a shared edge (proof of Theorem 6.1): when iii joins an edge already used by exactly one other player jjj, Φe\Phi_eΦe​ rises by cewi2/(wi+wj)c_e w_i^2/(w_i + w_j)ce​wi2​/(wi​+wj​), which is wiw_iwi​ times iii's new share of eee.
  2. The identity for the explicit potential: the displayed identity holds for the paper's Φ\PhiΦ.
  3. From a weighted potential to an equilibrium: in any weighted game with positive weights and nonempty strategy sets, a function satisfying the identity forces a pure Nash equilibrium to exist.

An extra item states Corollary 6.2: every two-player weighted game with nonempty strategy sets has a pure Nash equilibrium.

Significance

The result. Theorem 6.1 is one of the two existence results the paper proves for weighted cost sharing, a game that in general has no pure equilibrium. It shows that the obstruction found by Chen and Roughgarden needs resources shared by three or more players: whenever sharing is limited to pairs, the game is a weighted potential game, so improving moves cannot cycle and equilibria exist. Corollary 6.2 makes the two-player case unconditional, and the paper notes that the same potential gives a (weak) bound on the price of stability.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists. The mission produces a reusable Lean model of weight-proportional cost sharing (shared in form with the companion mission on single-source single-sink weighted games), an explicit weighted potential, and the general step from a weighted potential to a pure equilibrium, which applies to any finite game with positive weights.

Difficulty

The obvious approach, reusing Rosenthal's potential from the unweighted game, fails: the paper observes that in a weighted game improving moves can increase it. A player's share of an edge depends on the weights of the specific co-users, so no function of the edge loads alone can track all players' costs. The identity must therefore hold for every unilateral move, including moves that leave some edges and join others at the same time, and for every pair of possible co-users of an edge. The statement fails without the at-most-two hypothesis, so any argument has to use it in an essential way. The existence step needs the identity on all profiles reachable by feasible deviations, not only along a single path of moves.

Formalization scope

Lean namespace PriceOfStability.WeightedPotential. Players form a Fintype ι and edges a Fintype E; a game is a structure with strategies : ι → Finset (Finset E), weight : ι → ℝ and edgeCost : E → ℝ. Standing assumptions wᵢ ≥ 1 and c_e ≥ 0 are the predicate IsStandard. Profiles are functions ι → Finset E with the feasibility predicate IsProfile; every deviation is to a feasible strategy, via Function.update. Nash equilibria are pure and in cost form. The strategy-space hypothesis is a bound on the number of players whose strategy space (the union of their strategies) contains each edge — not a bound on the users in one profile, which would be a different statement. Φ_e is computed from the current users of e; its value with three or more users is a placeholder that never arises under the hypothesis. Strategies are arbitrary subsets of the ground set, as the paper's remark after the proof allows, so the network game is a special case.

The goal is not satisfiable trivially: the function Φ must satisfy the weighted identity for every feasible unilateral deviation from every profile, and an exact (unweighted) potential is not what is asserted. Nonempty strategy sets are added explicitly for the existence part, since without a profile there is no equilibrium.

Needed infrastructure: finite sums over filtered Finsets, the improvement-path argument over the finite set of profiles. The improvement-path lemma (milestone 3) is reusable for any weighted potential game. Contributions of proofs for any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, É. Tardos, T. Wexler, T. Roughgarden, The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation, SIAM Journal on Computing 38(4):1602–1623, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1137/070680096
  • R. W. Rosenthal, The network equilibrium problem in integers, Networks 3:53–59, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1002/net.3230030104
  • D. Monderer, L. S. Shapley, Potential games, Games and Economic Behavior 14:124–143, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0044
  • H.-L. Chen, T. Roughgarden, Network design with weighted players, Proc. 18th ACM SPAA, 28–37, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1145/1148109.1148114
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