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Mechanism Design

269 missions · 158 completed

Often called reverse game theory, the branch of economics and game theory that designs the rules of a game so that self-interested agents, acting on private information, are led to a desired collective outcome. Here the goal is given and the mechanism is the unknown — engineering incentives so that truthful behavior is optimal — with applications from auctions and voting systems to market and internet-protocol design.

Missions

Open111Completed158All269
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Nudges and Self-Control: An Optimal Incentive-Compatible Information Nudge Is a Cutoff MechanismResearch Paper

Warnings about health, financial or environmental risks are among the most common policy instruments: cigarette packs carry risk statements, doctors tell patients which risk group they belong to, and retirement planners report survival probabilities. Standard decision theory says that more accurate information can only help a decision maker. That conclusion…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms: No OSP Mechanism for Scheduling Identical Jobs on Related Machines with Three-Value Domains Is Better Than √n-ApproximateResearch Paper

A mechanism is strategyproof when truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every agent. Experimental and theoretical work has found that this guarantee is fragile in practice: agents faced with a sealed-bid second-price auction often misreport, while the same agents bid truthfully in the strategically equivalent ascending clock auction. Li (Obviously…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Sales-Based Rebate Design: No Increasing Sales-Based Reward Program Is ProfitableResearch Paper

Products with positive network effects (messaging apps, online games, social platforms) are known to support higher profits: a buyer's utility grows with the number of other buyers, and a seller can monetize that complementarity (Katz and Shapiro 1986; Candogan, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar 2012). Ajorlou and Jadbabaie ask whether a seller of a product without such…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentive-Compatible Forecasting Competitions: the Independent-Event Lotteries mechanism is strictly incentive compatible under belief independence and limit accurate for independent eventsResearch Paper

Forecasting competitions ask many forecasters to report probabilities for many future binary events and award a single prize to one of them. They are used to identify and reward accurate forecasters: the Good Judgment Project gave "superforecaster" status to the top 2% by quadratic score, and data-science platforms run similar leaderboards. The usual rule…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement: An English Auction with a Take-It-or-Leave-It Offer Attains the Optimal Complete-Contract Buyer SurplusResearch Paper

Public and private buyers often procure the same input over several periods from a pool of competing suppliers: road maintenance, defence supply, energy, and IT services are typical cases. Between periods, conditions change. Input prices, regulations or technology shift, and so does the cost of serving the contract. A buyer who can write a complete contract…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users: The Liquid Price of Anarchy of the Kelly Mechanism Is Exactly 2Research Paper

Resource allocation mechanisms distribute a divisible good among users who report numerical signals. In a network, the good can represent capacity; in a computing system, processing time. The mechanism sees the signals, allocates shares, and charges payments, but it does not know each user's value for a share or the most the user can pay. Those private…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Design of Optimal Pay-as-Bid Procurement Mechanisms: Every Optimal Equitable Assortment Mechanism Is Matched by a k-Soft-Reserve Rule in the Symmetric Two-Point Cost ModelResearch Paper

Public procurement agencies and group-buying platforms increasingly run framework agreements: suppliers post prices, and the agency then decides which suppliers' products appear in the catalogue from which buyers choose. Chile's ChileCompra framework agreements and drug formularies work this way. The agency faces a trade-off. Showing many products serves…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Budget Aggregation with Star-Shaped Preference Domains: With Leontief Utilities, the Nash Product Rule Is the Only Continuous Group-Strategyproof Mechanism Satisfying Core Fair ShareResearch Paper

In budget aggregation, a group has to split a fixed public budget among several projects, and each member proposes her own ideal split. A rule is needed to turn the proposals into one split. The question was studied for ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ preferences by Freeman, Pennock, Peters and Wortman Vaughan (2021), who asked whether strategyproofness, efficiency and…

18 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency: The Algorithmic IIVCG Contract Is Limited-Liability and Individually Rational Whenever Such an IIVCG Contract ExistsResearch Paper

In the principal–agent model a single agent takes a costly action on behalf of a principal who sees only the action's stochastic outcome, and pays the agent according to that outcome. Many practical relationships have one agent and several principals: a manager and the shareholders, a freelancer and several employers, a marketing agency that bids for ad…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Voting with Time Commitment for Decentralized Governance: Bond Voting as a Sybil-Resistant Mechanism: Bond Voting Is Robustly v-ImplementableResearch Paper

Blockchain platforms and decentralized autonomous organizations take governance decisions by token-weighted voting: an account's influence grows with the governance tokens it stakes. Two problems are associated with this design (Buterin 2021). The first is plutocracy: holders of many tokens control decisions. The second is the Sybil attack (Douceur 2002):…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Rationale for Imperfect Reporting Standards: With a Low Payoff Threshold and a High Prior, a Conservative Report Beats a Perfectly Informative OneResearch Paper

Financial reports help investors value a firm, but a firm can also learn and voluntarily disclose information outside the report. A regulator who makes mandatory reports more precise changes the firm's incentive to acquire that other information. Friedman, Hughes and Michaeli's 2020 preprint, Proposition 1, studies whether a reporting rule that is less…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Fair Division of a Random Object: The Bottom-Heavy Rule Dominates Every Other Symmetric Almost Prior-Independent Rule for Bads Satisfying Fair ShareResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide an object whose value to the participants is uncertain at the time the division rule is designed: computing time on a shared cluster, a recurring chore, the cost of a service used jointly. If the rule must be fixed before the realizations are known, and must treat everyone fairly in expectation, the designer faces a tradeoff…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryConvex OptimizationOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Commissions and Subscriptions in Networked Markets: The Convex Relaxation Is Tight and Characterizes All Revenue-Optimal FeesResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Airbnb, Upwork and eBay match buyers and sellers but do not set transaction prices. They earn revenue through commissions (a fraction of the transaction price) and subscription fees (a fixed charge per transaction), and they often differentiate these fees by participant type. Prices then form endogenously, as a competitive…

23 thms3 active users
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization III: Under O-Learning, No Separating Equilibrium Exists When θH/θL < ΛResearch Paper

When customers request a customized product, their requests can reveal information about what they value. A seller can use that information when setting a price, while a customer can choose a request with the resulting price in mind. The question is whether customers with different preferences can make different requests in equilibrium. Liang Guo's The…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 5: For Two Agents, Every Equilibrium of an Always-EFX Mechanism Is α-MMS for Some α > 2/3Research Paper

Dividing indivisible goods fairly among agents is a basic problem of fair division. Most of the literature assumes that the agents' valuations are known to the algorithm. In practice the algorithm only sees what the agents report, and an agent may misreport to get a better bundle. For allocation without money, truthful mechanisms are very restricted: for…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 4: For Two Agents and Four Goods, Every Equilibrium of an Always-EFX Mechanism Is MMSResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods fairly is a central problem of computational social choice. With additive valuations, the fairness notions of interest are relaxations of envy-freeness, since exact envy-freeness is often impossible with indivisible items. The strongest relaxation in common use is envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) (Caragiannis et al., 2019); a…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 2: Round-Robin Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium in Every Instance with Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods asks how to split a set of items among agents with different values so that nobody has strong grounds to complain. Algorithms with fairness guarantees, such as Round-Robin, which always produces an allocation that is envy-free up to one good (EF1) when agents report their true additive valuations (Caragiannis et al., 2019),…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryGraph TheoryLinear Optimization+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms 1: Some Stationary Equilibrium of Directed Search Attains a Quarter of the First-Best WelfareResearch Paper

Two-sided platforms for dating, freelancing and housing do more than list participants: they decide whom each participant is shown. When search is costly and agents leave the market over time, the platform's choice of assortments (which types of agents meet which, and how often) determines who matches, and agents respond strategically by deciding which…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 1: Random Sampling Vickrey Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a 2(d+1)-Approximation to Welfare for d-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

In an auction with interdependent values, a bidder's value can depend on information held by other bidders. An estimate of a shared resource's usefulness, for example, may improve when another participant reports a stronger signal. The auctioneer must decide whom to serve using reported signals, while each participant has an incentive to report a signal…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? II: With a Single Voter, Voting for the k Candidates Most Likely to Be Honest Is OptimalResearch Paper

Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every token holder take part in consensus. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol. EOS, for instance, elects 21 producers by an up-to-30-vote approval ballot (paper, p. 9, citing EOS voting guide 2018). Byzantine agreement protocols…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 2: Under Local α-Power Envelopes, ε-IC Mechanisms Gain at Most Õ(ε^(α/(2α−1))) RevenueResearch Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents optimize exactly: a buyer facing a menu picks the option that maximizes his utility, however small the advantage over the next-best option. In many settings this is implausible. Agents may face cognitive or computational costs, or the designer may only be able to certify incentives approximately, as in…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 3: Hard/Soft Floor Mechanisms Are Optimal Among Deterministic ε-IC Mechanisms and Gain Θ(ε)Research Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents best-respond exactly: a buyer who gains even an infinitesimal amount by misreporting will misreport. In practice agents face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may ignore a deviation that gains less than some small amount ε\varepsilonε. A seller facing such a buyer only needs to satisfy the incentive…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? I: With a Vote-Probability Gap δ, an Honest Committee Is Elected with Probability at Least 1 − 2m²e^{−δ²n/2}Research Paper

Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every participant produce blocks. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol among itself. EOS, for example, elects 21 producers by approval voting: each token holder approves a set of candidates, and the 21 candidates with the most…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 1: Nisan's Rounding Bounds the Revenue Gain of ε-IC Mechanisms by O(ε^(1/2))Research Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents are perfect optimizers: a mechanism is incentive compatible if no buyer gains anything, however small, by misreporting. In practice buyers face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may not bother to deviate for a gain below some threshold ε\varepsilonε. Balseiro, Besbes and Castro, Mechanism Design…

5 thms3 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions I: Iterative-Pruning Is a Budget-Feasible 4.75-Approximation for Monotone Submodular ValuationsResearch Paper

In a budget-feasible procurement auction a buyer with a hard budget BBB acquires services from strategic sellers. Each seller iii has a private cost cic_ici​, and the buyer values a set SSS of hired sellers at v(S)v(S)v(S). The auction must keep total payments within BBB and make truthful behaviour optimal for every seller, while hiring a set whose value is close to the best…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
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