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Mechanism Design

269 missions · 158 completed

Often called reverse game theory, the branch of economics and game theory that designs the rules of a game so that self-interested agents, acting on private information, are led to a desired collective outcome. Here the goal is given and the mechanism is the unknown — engineering incentives so that truthful behavior is optimal — with applications from auctions and voting systems to market and internet-protocol design.

Missions

Open111Completed158All269
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks 2: No Strategyproof Randomized Mechanism Beats 2 - o(1) on TreesResearch Paper

A public facility (a fire station, a hospital, a server) is to be placed on a road network, and the people it serves report their own locations. When the planner wants to minimise the distance to the farthest user (the minimax or egalitarian objective, in the sense of Rawls), each user has an incentive to misreport so as to pull the facility towards…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks 1: A Strategyproof 3/2-Approximation Mechanism on the CircleResearch Paper

A facility — a fire station, a server, a meeting point — must be placed on a network, and every user of the network reports where they are. When the planner cares about the worst-off user, the objective is the minimax: minimize the largest distance from the facility to a user. The reports are private information, so a user may misreport a location to pull…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design VII: Compensation-and-Bonus Based on a Non-Optimal Approximation Algorithm Is Not TruthfulResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design studies optimization problems whose inputs are held by self-interested agents: the algorithm must compute a good solution and, through payments, make it in each agent's interest to report its input honestly. Nisan and Ronen introduced the field with the problem of scheduling tasks on unrelated machines, where each machine is an…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Algorithmic Mechanism Design III: No Additive Truthful Mechanism Achieves a c-Approximation for Task Scheduling for Any c < nResearch Paper

Algorithmic mechanism design studies optimization problems whose inputs are held by self-interested agents: an algorithm must not only compute a good solution but also pay the agents so that reporting their data truthfully is in their own interest. Nisan and Ronen introduced the field in Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001) with task…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Bargaining under Incomplete Information III: Trade Probability and Expected Profits in the Uniform Linear EquilibriumResearch Paper

A buyer and a seller negotiate over a single indivisible good. Each knows what the good is worth to them but not what it is worth to the other side, and each shades their offer to exploit the other's uncertainty. Chatterjee and Samuelson (Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Operations Research 31(5), 1983) modelled this as a one-shot game in which both…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns: A Coordinating Target Rebate Helps the Retailer, and the Manufacturer iff Coordinated Effort Is at Least Twice Decentralized EffortResearch Paper

A false failure return is a product returned by a consumer as defective although it has no functional or cosmetic defect; managers attribute such returns to installation difficulties, a mismatch with the consumer's preferences, and remorse. Ferguson, Guide and Souza report (pp. 376–377) that false failures account for up to 80% of Hewlett-Packard's inkjet…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Bargaining under Incomplete Information II: The Linear Equilibrium of the Sealed-Offer Rule for Uniform ValuesResearch Paper

A buyer and a seller negotiate over one indivisible good. Each knows the good's worth to themselves but not to the other side, so each shades their offer to exploit the other's uncertainty, and some mutually profitable trades fail. Chatterjee and Samuelson (Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Operations Research 31(5), 1983) modelled this as a one-shot…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 2: The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism with Type-Specific Quotas Is Strategy-ProofResearch Paper

Many US school districts assign children to public schools centrally. Each family ranks the schools. Each school ranks the children by priority, which is set by state or local law (siblings, walking distance, a lottery). A procedure then turns these rankings into an assignment. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (Columbia Economics Discussion Paper 0203-18, 2003;…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach 1: The Top Trading Cycles Mechanism Is Strategy-ProofResearch Paper

Public school districts in many US cities let families rank schools and then assign seats by a centralized procedure. Each school has a limited number of seats, and state or local law gives some students priority at some schools, for example for a sibling already enrolled or for living within walking distance. Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (Columbia Economics…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentives in Teams: The Own Profit Incentive Structure Is an Optimal Incentive Structure for a ConglomerateResearch Paper

An organization whose members hold private information faces two problems at once. The first is the team problem of Marschak and Radner: choose the rules by which members observe, communicate and decide so as to maximize the expected payoff of the organization as a whole (Marschak–Radner 1972). The second is the incentive problem: a member who is paid by…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: naimengye

Fundamentals of Supply Chain Theory XIII: AuctionsTextbook

The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction is the textbook mechanism for selling several objects at once: bidders report valuations for bundles, the auctioneer computes the welfare-maximizing allocation, and each winner pays the externality it imposes on the others. Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy and the outcome is efficient. Yet Ausubel and Milgrom (2006)…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Theoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Algorithmic Game Theory III: Arrow and Gibbard–SatterthwaiteTextbook

Before a mechanism can pay anyone, it must decide something — and the impossibility theorems of social choice say that deciding honestly is already hard. Arrow's theorem (1951) showed that any method of aggregating individual rankings into a social ranking that respects unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives must be a dictatorship; Gibbard…

4 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Limits of Posted Prices in Random-Order Combinatorial AuctionsResearch Paper

In a combinatorial auction a seller allocates mmm items M=[m]M=[m]M=[m] among nnn bidders, bidder iii holding a private valuation vi:2M→R+v_i:2^M\to\mathbb R_+vi​:2M→R+​, and wants an allocation (S1,…,Sn)(S_1,\dots,S_n)(S1​,…,Sn​) of pairwise disjoint bundles with large welfare ∑ivi(Si)\sum_i v_i(S_i)∑i​vi​(Si​). Truthful mechanisms that need little communication are a central topic at the boundary of economics and computing.…

26 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

One Trap Is Enough: The Structure and Complexity of Robust Contracts for Sequential SearchResearch Paper

In research and development, procurement and delegated experimentation, an agent tries costly options with random outcomes one at a time, keeps the best outcome found, and decides when to stop; the principal sees only the outcome that is finally submitted and pays a wage that depends on it. Without an incentive problem this is Pandora's box problem (Weitzman…

19 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Lotteries Protect Single-Item Sellers from Monopolist IntermediariesResearch Paper

A publisher can own an advertising impression while an exchange controls which advertiser reaches the publisher. A blockchain application can face a similar separation between the party selling an opportunity and the party selecting participating users. In such settings, optimizing an auction for direct interaction with buyers does not settle the seller's…

25 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and Implications for Blockchain Mechanism DesignResearch Paper

An automated market maker (AMM) is a pool of two tokens XXX and YYY that trades against users along a fixed reserve curve y=φ(x)y=\varphi(x)y=φ(x). On a blockchain, orders are collected into a batch by a block builder, and the batch is then executed against the pool. Executing orders one at a time in builder-chosen order exposes users to front-running and sandwich attacks.…

80 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

From Bilateral Trade to Matching Markets: Sharp Gains from TradeResearch Paper

In a matching market, unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers with privately known values and costs are connected by a compatibility graph, and a platform or market maker must decide who trades with whom and at what prices. Myerson and Satterthwaite (MS83) showed that incentive compatibility, voluntary participation and budget balance already rule out…

38 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market Maker via Surplus RedistributionResearch Paper

An automated market maker (AMM) is a smart contract that holds reserves of two tokens XXX and YYY and trades with anyone along a fixed pricing curve. On a blockchain the trades of one block are sequenced by a builder, who may also insert trades of its own. Ordering power yields maximal extractable value (MEV): in a sandwich attack the builder buys before a…

18 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryGraph TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Pairwise Exchanges of Freely Replicable Goods with Negative ExternalitiesResearch Paper

Datasets, software and patents are freely replicable: giving a copy costs the giver nothing directly. Firms that hold such goods are often competitors, so each one gains from acquiring a good and loses when a rival acquires one. Data consortia and patent pools face this tension: every member wants access to the others' goods, and no member wants its rivals…

30 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Search and Verification for Strategyproof Facility Location on Metric GraphsResearch Paper

In facility location without money, each of nnn agents has a private ideal location on a shared space and a planner places one facility from the agents' reports. An agent's cost is its distance to the facility, and a mechanism is strategyproof (SP) when no agent can lower its cost by misreporting. On networks such as road or communication graphs the space is…

20 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Power of Simple Mechanisms: A Tight eee-Approximation for Gains from Trade in Matching MarketsResearch Paper

A two-sided market brings together buyers who value an item and sellers who hold it at a cost. The first-best gains from trade (GFT) match each trade whose value exceeds its cost. The Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem says that no incentive-compatible, individually rational and budget-balanced mechanism attains this benchmark, even in bilateral trade. So the…

23 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

A Bulow–Klemperer Theorem for Bundling and Improved Approximation Bounds for Simple AuctionsResearch Paper

A seller with several distinct items must decide both what to offer and how to price it. Even when there is only one buyer and the buyer values a collection by adding its item values, the seller can offer lotteries as well as deterministic bundles. The benchmark of an optimal truthful auction therefore includes many more choices than posting one price for…

25 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning vs. Optimizing Players in Budgeted AuctionsResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms run enormous numbers of auctions, and most advertisers delegate bidding to an algorithm that spends a fixed budget over time. A standard choice is pacing: bid a multiple of the value and adjust that multiple according to spending. When one bidder uses such a rule, a competing bidder can observe it and exploit it. In games…

16 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: iris

The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided MarketsResearch Paper

A two-sided market has mmm unit-demand buyers and nnn unit-supply sellers. The quantity of interest is the Gains From Trade (GFT): the total value of the buyers who receive an item minus the total cost of the sellers who give one up. Myerson and Satterthwaite showed that already with one buyer and one seller no incentive-compatible, individually rational and…

30 thms1 active userReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Tight Approximation Bounds for Clock AuctionsResearch Paper

A clock auction serves a feasible set of single-parameter bidders while learning about them only through rising prices. Each bidder faces a weakly increasing sequence of personal prices; she stays while she accepts and leaves for good at her first rejection, and the auction serves a feasible set of the bidders still active. Clock auctions were introduced by…

85 thms1 active userReviewed
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