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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Inequalities for Independent and Identically Distributed Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution: Without Samples, No Stopping Rule Guarantees More Than 1/e of the Expected MaximumResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares the value obtained by an online decision maker with the largest value in a sequence that could be chosen by someone who sees the entire sequence. The online decision maker observes values one at a time and must decide whether to accept the current value before seeing future values. When the common distribution of the values is…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Correlated Equilibria and Mean Field Games: A Simple Model: Every Limit Point of Symmetric ε_N-Correlated Equilibria in Restricted Strategies Is a Correlated Mean Field Game SolutionResearch Paper

A correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) is a profile of strategies chosen by a mediator: the mediator draws a joint recommendation from a known distribution, tells each player only their own component, and no player can lower their expected cost by systematically deviating from what they are told. Correlated equilibria contain the Nash equilibria, are…

18 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Role of Participation in Innovation Contests: Multiple Rewards Are Optimal Exactly When Entry Is Costly, the Budget Is Large and a Failed Contest Is CostlyResearch Paper

An innovation contest asks people outside a firm to submit solutions and promises payments according to the rank of their submissions. The firm would like a strong best submission, but a potential solver must decide whether entering is worth a fixed cost before knowing who else will enter. Paying only the winner can encourage effort while leaving the…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Rationale for Imperfect Reporting Standards: With a Low Payoff Threshold and a High Prior, a Conservative Report Beats a Perfectly Informative OneResearch Paper

Financial reports help investors value a firm, but a firm can also learn and voluntarily disclose information outside the report. A regulator who makes mandatory reports more precise changes the firm's incentive to acquire that other information. Friedman, Hughes and Michaeli's 2020 preprint, Proposition 1, studies whether a reporting rule that is less…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Beneficial Effects of Ad Blockers: Both Platforms Allowing Ad Blockers Is an Equilibrium That Beats a World Without Ad Blockers for Low β and High γ/βResearch Paper

Ad blockers remove advertising from web pages, and with it the revenue that pays for free content. By the time of this paper a large share of desktop users ran one, and publishers had three responses at hand: tolerate ad blockers, block access to users who run one (an adblock wall), or move behind a paywall. The common view was that ad blockers can only…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Fair Division of a Random Object: The Bottom-Heavy Rule Dominates Every Other Symmetric Almost Prior-Independent Rule for Bads Satisfying Fair ShareResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide an object whose value to the participants is uncertain at the time the division rule is designed: computing time on a shared cluster, a recurring chore, the cost of a service used jointly. If the rule must be fixed before the realizations are known, and must treat everyone fairly in expectation, the designer faces a tradeoff…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Commissions and Subscriptions in Networked Markets: The Convex Relaxation Is Tight and Characterizes All Revenue-Optimal FeesResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Airbnb, Upwork and eBay match buyers and sellers but do not set transaction prices. They earn revenue through commissions (a fraction of the transaction price) and subscription fees (a fixed charge per transaction), and they often differentiate these fees by participant type. Prices then form endogenously, as a competitive…

23 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers III: When the Supplier Prefers to Commit to Cross-Licensing Ex AnteResearch Paper

A component supplier may ask two downstream manufacturers to license their improvements to each other. Sharing raises each product's quality, but it can also reduce a manufacturer's reason to invest in its own improvement. The supplier must choose the licensing rule before those investments and before setting the wholesale price. Wang, Huang, and Lee study…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Decision Making Under Strategic Behavior 2: A Three-Value Instance with Outcome Monotonic Costs Whose Optimal Policies Are All StochasticResearch Paper

Many consequential decisions, such as lending, hiring or admissions, are made by policies that map an individual's features to a probability of a positive decision. When the policy is published, individuals respond to it: they change their features, at a cost, to raise their chance of a positive decision. Tsirtsis, Tabibian, Khajehnejad, Singla, Schölkopf…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes II: Consortium Price, No Cure No Pay: Subsidize Only Patients When the Price Is High, Only the Manufacturer When LowResearch Paper

A rare disease affects few patients, so a drug for it has a small market and its research and development (R&D) cost is spread over few sales. Governments respond with two kinds of subsidy: cost subsidies that pay part of the manufacturer's R&D bill (orphan drug programmes), and price subsidies that pay part of what each patient is charged. At the same time…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Precommitments in Two-Sided Market Competition 2: Commission Precommitment Beats No Commitment When γ ≥ β or γ ≪ β, and Loses to It When γ Is Just Below βResearch Paper

Many service platforms set a price paid by customers and a wage paid to the providers who serve them. A platform may instead announce how much of each transaction's price it will pass to providers, then choose prices after both platforms have announced their shares. These are different games: a price change in the second game changes both customer demand…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Competition and Collaboration on Fundraising for Short-Term Disaster Response: The Impact on Earmarking and Performance III: Partial-Collaboration Equilibria: KKT Utilities and Free-Riding EffortsResearch Paper

After a sudden-onset disaster, humanitarian organizations (HOs) raise most of their response budget from private donors within days. Donors increasingly earmark their gifts, restricting them to a region, a program or a type of expense. Earmarking makes an appeal more attractive to a donor but lowers the share of each dollar that the HO can deploy…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Frontiers in Operations: Battery as a Service: Flexible Electric Vehicle Battery Leasing: Win-Win-Win of Flexible Leasing for a Large High-Capacity Range and Battery Cost near a(1−ρ)/2Research Paper

Electric-vehicle makers such as NIO sell cars without the battery and lease the battery separately, a business model called Battery as a Service (BaaS). The leased battery can be swapped at a station in minutes, so a customer is not tied to one battery size: a driver who leases a small battery for the daily commute can rent a large one for a long holiday…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Personalized Pricing and Distribution Strategies I: With Positively Correlated Valuations and a Uniform Manufacturer Price, Dual Distribution Is Optimal Under Either Retailer Pricing PolicyResearch Paper

A manufacturer that already sells directly to consumers may also supply an independent retailer. Adding the retailer can reach consumers who prefer its service, but the two channels then compete for some of the same buyers. A wholesale price affects both the retailer's ability to serve consumers and its retail pricing. The manufacturer's choice of…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization III: Under O-Learning, No Separating Equilibrium Exists When θH/θL < ΛResearch Paper

When customers request a customized product, their requests can reveal information about what they value. A seller can use that information when setting a price, while a customer can choose a request with the resulting price in mind. The question is whether customers with different preferences can make different requests in equilibrium. Liang Guo's The…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion 2: With Only Low-Need Users, Full Information Is Within a Factor of the Optimal Signaling MechanismResearch Paper

Social services such as public housing, food banks and free clinics are congested: the users who arrive wait in a queue they cannot see, and some of them could do almost as well elsewhere. A provider who sees the queue can decide what to tell arriving users about it. Telling low-need users that the queue is long sends them to their outside option and…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion 1: Every Pareto-Efficient Signaling Mechanism Has a Threshold Structure at or Below the Full-Information ThresholdResearch Paper

Many social services are rationed by waiting rather than by price: public health clinics, food banks, shelters, legal aid. Users who need the service most often have no outside option, while users with less need could be served elsewhere but join the queue anyway and lengthen everyone's wait. The provider usually cannot force anyone to leave, and charging…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 3: The Price of Anarchy Is Locally Lipschitz at Games with Constant Costs or Strictly Increasing C¹ CostsResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game is the ratio of the total cost of a Wardrop equilibrium to the minimum total cost. Worst-case bounds on it over whole classes of cost functions are classical (Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002; Correa, Schulz and Stier-Moses, 2004). In practice the demands and cost functions of a traffic model are…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 2: The Social Optimum Cost, the Wardrop Equilibrium Cost and the Price of Anarchy Are Continuous on the Game SpaceResearch Paper

Traffic users choose routes for themselves, while a planner may choose routes that minimize everyone's combined travel cost. The price of anarchy measures the cost of the users' equilibrium relative to the planner's optimum. Travel demand and arc latency functions are estimated from data and change over time, so a ratio that changes abruptly under a small…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 5: For Two Agents, Every Equilibrium of an Always-EFX Mechanism Is α-MMS for Some α > 2/3Research Paper

Dividing indivisible goods fairly among agents is a basic problem of fair division. Most of the literature assumes that the agents' valuations are known to the algorithm. In practice the algorithm only sees what the agents report, and an agent may misreport to get a better bundle. For allocation without money, truthful mechanisms are very restricted: for…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 4: For Two Agents and Four Goods, Every Equilibrium of an Always-EFX Mechanism Is MMSResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods fairly is a central problem of computational social choice. With additive valuations, the fairness notions of interest are relaxations of envy-freeness, since exact envy-freeness is often impossible with indivisible items. The strongest relaxation in common use is envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) (Caragiannis et al., 2019); a…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 2: Round-Robin Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium in Every Instance with Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods asks how to split a set of items among agents with different values so that nobody has strong grounds to complain. Algorithms with fairness guarantees, such as Round-Robin, which always produces an allocation that is envy-free up to one good (EF1) when agents report their true additive valuations (Caragiannis et al., 2019),…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition II: Unconstrained R&D Race: Best Responses Rise on Accelerable Projects and a Symmetric Equilibrium ExistsResearch Paper

Two firms developing competing innovations face a decision that a single firm does not: a rival's discovery can end the value of continuing the project. If the first discovery wins the payoff, each firm chooses how much to spend per period while knowing that greater spending may change both its payoff on success and its speed of discovery. The investment…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationMechanism Design+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms 1: Some Stationary Equilibrium of Directed Search Attains a Quarter of the First-Best WelfareResearch Paper

Two-sided platforms for dating, freelancing and housing do more than list participants: they decide whom each participant is shown. When search is costly and agents leave the market over time, the platform's choice of assortments (which types of agents meet which, and how often) determines who matches, and agents respond strategically by deciding which…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control 3: Under Topics-Style Category Tracking Both Advertisers Bid on ADX1 Exactly When the Inaccuracy τ Is Below an Explicit Threshold τ̃ > 1Research Paper

Online display advertising is sold through ad exchanges, and much of its value comes from targeting: showing an ad to consumers known to be interested in the advertised product. For two decades the main tracking technology was the third-party cookie, under which an exchange can follow a consumer only after an advertiser agrees to share the data from its own…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
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