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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium I: Calibrated Forecasts with Best Responses Converge to the Set of Correlated EquilibriaResearch Paper

A correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) is a joint distribution over the players' strategy profiles such that no player gains by deviating from the strategy the distribution recommends to them. It is the equilibrium notion that learning dynamics in repeated games most naturally reach, and a basic question in learning in games is which simple rules, played…

15 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Bargaining under Incomplete Information I: Class A Equilibrium Offer Strategies Satisfy the Linked Differential EquationsResearch Paper

A buyer and a seller negotiate over a single indivisible good. Each knows how much the good is worth to them, but not how much it is worth to the other side. Whether the two will trade, and at what price, then depends on how each party shades its offer to exploit the other's uncertainty. Chatterjee and Samuelson (Bargaining under Incomplete Information,…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies I: Subjective Mixed Equilibria of Two-Person Games Have Objective PayoffsResearch Paper

Classical non-cooperative game theory randomizes with objective, independent devices: each player spins a private wheel whose odds everyone agrees on. Aumann's 1974 paper (doi:10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8) asks what changes when the randomizing events are ordinary events of the world, about which players may hold different subjective probabilities and may…

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Markovian Decision Processes with Uncertain Transition Probabilities I: The Max-Min Policy-Iteration Algorithm Terminates at a Max-Min Optimal Pure Stationary PolicyResearch Paper

Howard's finite Markovian decision process (MDP) models a controller who, at each instant, observes the state of a system, chooses a decision, collects a reward and moves to a random next state with known transition probabilities. Howard's policy-iteration algorithm computes an optimal policy, and the model has been applied to inventory control, equipment…

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Orders IX: The PQD and Supermodular OrdersTextbook

The first eight chapters of Shaked and Shanthikumar's Stochastic Orders (Springer, 2007) compare single random variables — location, variability, convexity. Chapter IX turns to a different question: given two coordinates of a random vector, how strongly do they tend to move together? "Large values of X1X_1X1​ go with large values of X2X_2X2​" is a qualitative…

5 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Supermodularity and Complementarity V: Existence of Equilibrium in Supermodular GamesTextbook

Existence of equilibrium is the first question any model of strategic interaction must answer, and the classical answer — Nash's theorem via Kakutani's fixed point theorem — asks for a convex, compact strategy space and continuous payoffs. Many of the models economists actually use do not have that: a firm's technology set can be discrete or irregular, and…

11 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Theoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Algorithmic Game Theory I: Existence of Nash EquilibriumTextbook

The strategic-form game is the basic object of noncooperative game theory, and the Nash equilibrium — a profile of randomized strategies from which no player benefits by deviating unilaterally — is its central solution concept. Nash proved in 1951 that every game with finitely many players and finite strategy sets has such an equilibrium (Nash, Non-cooperati…

10 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: iris

Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism: Every Algorithm Has Ω(T3/5)\Omega(T^{3/5})Ω(T3/5) Regret on Some Independent Regular ValuationsResearch Paper

A broker stands between a seller and a buyer with private valuations. It posts a price ppp to the seller and a price qqq to the buyer; trade happens if the seller accepts ppp and the buyer accepts qqq, and the broker keeps the spread q−pq-pq−p. When such trades repeat, the broker must learn good prices from experience. Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco and Leonardi determine…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Correlated Forest Rounding for Unweighted Nash Social WelfareResearch Paper

In the Nash social welfare (NSW) problem, mmm indivisible items are divided among nnn agents with valuations vi:2M→R≥0v_i:2^M\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}vi​:2M→R≥0​, and the goal is to maximize the geometric mean (∏ivi(Si))1/n\big(\prod_i v_i(S_i)\big)^{1/n}(∏i​vi​(Si​))1/n of the agents' values. The objective sits between utilitarian welfare and max-min fairness and is invariant under rescaling any single valuation,…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Settling the Complexity of Hylland–Zeckhauser EquilibriaResearch Paper

Assigning dormitory rooms to students or shifts to workers is a one-sided matching market: nnn agents must share nnn indivisible goods, each agent receives exactly one good, and money cannot change hands. Randomization restores fairness when several agents want the same good: a random assignment gives each agent a probability of receiving each good, and by the…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Stratifying Markets for Efficient TradeResearch Paper

In bilateral trade a seller owns one item and a buyer wants it; each knows only their own cost or value. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed that no incentive-compatible, individually rational, budget-balanced mechanism trades efficiently whenever the supports of the value and the cost overlap, so the question becomes which simple mechanisms capture a…

30 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Colonel Blotto GamesResearch Paper

The Colonel Blotto game (Borel, 1921) is the basic model of competitive resource allocation: two players divide fixed budgets among several contests, and each contest goes to the larger allocation. It models military and security planning, elections and R&D races. In the continuous version, allocations are arbitrary nonnegative reals, so each player has a…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsComplexity TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning and Optimisation of Rank Ordered Gain Functions and with Modular CostsResearch Paper

A principal choosing a group of workers must compare the group's collective value with the cost of engaging its members. Individual competencies give useful ordering information, but a ranking alone does not describe how participation costs interact with collective performance. Etesami, Liu and Sahitaj study this distinction through augmented rank-ordered…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityOperations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Complexity of Exact Autobidding EquilibriaResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms increasingly bid on behalf of advertisers. An autobidder controls one scalar per advertiser — a pacing multiplier that scales all of its bids, or a participation probability with which it enters auctions — and adjusts it so that an aggregate constraint holds: total payment within a budget, or total payment at most total acquired…

29 thms3 active usersReviewed
Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Truthful-in-Expectation MMS Allocations for ChoresResearch Paper

Allocating household tasks, maintenance duties or other undesirable indivisible jobs requires comparing costs that different people experience differently. A fair allocation rule must also account for the possibility that someone exaggerates a cost to avoid a task. With no monetary transfers, these requirements can conflict. Randomization permits incentive…

28 thms3 active usersReviewed
OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Breaking the One-Player Extension Barrier: History-Aware Repair for Multiplayer Approximate Nash EquilibriaResearch Paper

Every finite game has a Nash equilibrium, but computing one is PPAD-complete already for two players (Chen–Deng–Teng 2009; Daskalakis–Goldberg–Papadimitriou 2009) and FIXP-complete for three or more (Etessami–Yannakakis 2010). For payoffs normalized to [0,1][0,1][0,1] the computational question therefore becomes: how small an error ε\varepsilonε can a polynomial-time…

35 thms3 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Money Burning Mechanism Design: From Welfare to SurplusResearch Paper

Waiting time and effort can screen people for access to a service, but their costs do not become revenue available to someone else. In such settings, the value of the selected outcome alone misses part of the social cost. The relevant objective is residual surplus: the agents' total value minus the payments they incur. A mechanism can improve its allocation…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair Share Allocations for Almost All AgentsResearch Paper

Allocating indivisible goods creates a conflict between an agent's individual fairness benchmark and the requirement that different agents receive disjoint bundles. With divisible goods, a proportional allocation can give each agent her entitlement fraction of every good. Indivisibility removes that option. A benchmark must account for the sizes and values…

31 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuasion by PartsResearch Paper

An information designer may know the distribution of a system's total benefit while each observer sees only one contribution. A supplier can grade its own component; a regional office can evaluate its own market. A receiver combines these reports before deciding whether the total justifies action. The designer can commit to reporting rules in advance, but…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Information in a Forest: Algorithmic AspectsResearch Paper

An informed sender can influence several decision makers by choosing what to reveal about a common unknown state. When some decision makers observe messages addressed to others, an information policy must account for those observations. A policy designed for independent private messages may have a different effect once the messages become visible elsewhere.…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
Combinatorics·Captain: mikedeng1

Improved Impossibility Bounds for Maximin Share AllocationsResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations is a central problem of fair division, and the maximin share (MMS) is its most studied fairness benchmark: an agent's MMS is the value she can guarantee herself by partitioning all goods into nnn bundles and receiving the worst one. Kurokawa, Procaccia and Wang showed that an allocation giving…

21 thms3 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Complexity of Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form GamesResearch Paper

A correlated equilibrium (CE) is a distribution over strategy profiles from which no player gains by applying any swap deviation, a map that replaces each recommended strategy by another one. In normal-form games (finitely many pure strategies) CE are the solutions of a linear program, and in games of polynomial type exact CE can be computed in polynomial…

48 thms3 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: iris

Approximation and Hardness in Optimization GamesResearch Paper

Deciding the winner of a two-player alternating-turn game with perfect information is typically PSPACE-hard, which raises the question of which natural games admit tractable strategies. A classical exception is the Shannon switching game and its matroid generalization: Lehman (1964) characterized the winner and gave polynomial-time winning strategies, and…

48 thms3 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: iris

Learning vs. Optimizing Players in Budgeted GamesResearch Paper

Repeated games between a strategic optimizer and a learning algorithm model settings where one side automates its decisions: an advertiser's bidding agent, for example, faces a platform or a rival that can adapt to it. Without budgets one property settles the matter. Low swap regret guarantees the learner sublinear regret and also caps the optimizer at its…

26 thms3 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Price of Stability in Undirected Network Design: Lower Bounds and Structural GuaranteesResearch Paper

In a network design game with equal cost sharing, players connect their terminals through a shared network and split the cost of every edge equally among its users. An optimal network can be unstable: one player may lower her own share by rerouting while the total cost rises. The price of stability (PoS) measures how much a stable outcome must cost: the…

28 thms3 active usersReviewed
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