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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: iris

Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism: Every Algorithm Has Ω(T3/5)\Omega(T^{3/5})Ω(T3/5) Regret on Some Independent Regular ValuationsResearch Paper

A broker stands between a seller and a buyer with private valuations. It posts a price ppp to the seller and a price qqq to the buyer; trade happens if the seller accepts ppp and the buyer accepts qqq, and the broker keeps the spread q−pq-pq−p. When such trades repeat, the broker must learn good prices from experience. Brüstle, di Gregorio, Fusco and Leonardi determine…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: Shuze Chen

Stratifying Markets for Efficient TradeResearch Paper

In bilateral trade a seller owns one item and a buyer wants it; each knows only their own cost or value. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) showed that no incentive-compatible, individually rational, budget-balanced mechanism trades efficiently whenever the supports of the value and the cost overlap, so the question becomes which simple mechanisms capture a…

30 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuasion by PartsResearch Paper

An information designer may know the distribution of a system's total benefit while each observer sees only one contribution. A supplier can grade its own component; a regional office can evaluate its own market. A receiver combines these reports before deciding whether the total justifies action. The designer can commit to reporting rules in advance, but…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsGraph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: iris

Stability of Procurement Networks: A Network Is Rationalizable as Pairwise Stable with k-Anonymous Preferences If and Only If It Satisfies k-WARPSResearch Paper

Procurement data record who buys from whom: public agencies and their contractors, manufacturers and their tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers. A basic question about such a network is whether it is stable, meaning that no firm would drop an existing relationship and no pair of unlinked firms would jointly gain from forming one. The standard notion is pairwise…

19 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Designing Information to Engage Customers: Under Observable Engagement the Seller-Optimal Signal Reveals Everything, Exaggerates a Low Prior or Downplays a High OneResearch Paper

Firms increasingly let customers take part in designing the product they will buy: configurators, prototypes, trial versions and co-design platforms. Two features of these settings interact. The firm controls what the customer learns about the product's basic value (it can tune a trial, a simulation or a test), and the customer can invest costly engagement t…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

When Nash Meets Stackelberg: The Enumeration Algorithm Returns a Mixed Nash Equilibrium or Correctly Certifies That None ExistsResearch Paper

Many markets are organised as competition among firms that each anticipate the reaction of a group of followers. Electricity producers decide capacities while the system operator and consumers clear the market; carriers set prices while shippers choose routes. Operations research models these settings as equilibrium problems with equilibrium constraints…

23 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Signaling Service Quality Through Queue Disclosure: with uninformed customers, the unique pure perfect sequential equilibrium pools on concealment below λ^\hat\lambdaλ^, on revelation above itResearch Paper

Whether a service provider should show customers its queue is a classical question in the economics of queues. When customers know the quality of service, the answer is a threshold in market size: Hassin (1986) and Chen and Frank (2004) showed that a revenue-maximizing server conceals the queue when the potential arrival rate is small and reveals it when it…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms: No OSP Mechanism for Scheduling Identical Jobs on Related Machines with Three-Value Domains Is Better Than √n-ApproximateResearch Paper

A mechanism is strategyproof when truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every agent. Experimental and theoretical work has found that this guarantee is fragile in practice: agents faced with a sealed-bid second-price auction often misreport, while the same agents bid truthfully in the strategically equivalent ascending clock auction. Li (Obviously…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentive-Compatible Forecasting Competitions: the Independent-Event Lotteries mechanism is strictly incentive compatible under belief independence and limit accurate for independent eventsResearch Paper

Forecasting competitions ask many forecasters to report probabilities for many future binary events and award a single prize to one of them. They are used to identify and reward accurate forecasters: the Good Judgment Project gave "superforecaster" status to the top 2% by quadratic score, and data-science platforms run similar leaderboards. The usual rule…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

“Sherlocking” and Platform Information Policy: The Full-Commitment Outcome Is Implementable by an Information Policy If and Only If the No-Entry Obedience Constraint (OC0) HoldsResearch Paper

Large online marketplaces are hybrid platforms: they host third-party sellers and also sell their own products. Running the marketplace gives the platform access to sellers' sales data, and it can use that data to identify successful products and launch imitations of its own. The practice is colloquially called "Sherlocking". It has drawn regulatory…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Tracking Truth with Liquid Democracy: Upward Delegation Satisfies Probabilistic Do No Harm and Positive GainResearch Paper

Liquid democracy lets each voter either vote directly or delegate the vote to another voter, who may delegate it further. It has been used in practice, for example by the German Pirate Party on the LiquidFeedback platform and in the Google Votes experiment, and has been studied in computational social choice as a way to give more weight to better-informed…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Surge Pricing and Its Spatial Supply Response: Within an Attraction Region, Supply Fills the Congestion Bound Outward from the Sink at Locally Optimal Prices Without Loss of RevenueResearch Paper

Ride-hailing platforms change prices by location in real time, and drivers respond by moving. A price increase at one location changes where drivers go, how congested each location becomes, and therefore what every driver earns everywhere else. Besbes, Castro and Lobel, Surge Pricing and its Spatial Supply Response (SSRN 3124571, version of May 17, 2019;…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias–Variance Trade-offs in Data Acquisition: The Minimax-Optimal Allocation Rule Is Constant Then Inversely Proportional to the Square Root of the Virtual CostResearch Paper

Data marketplaces buy personal data from many individuals to estimate population statistics. Two features set such pricing apart from an ordinary procurement auction. First, each data owner has a private cost of sharing, so the buyer must design a menu of payments that elicits these costs truthfully. Second, data are correlated across people: an individual…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

A Classical Search Game in Discrete Locations: for any optimal hiding strategy, the searcher has an optimal strategy mixing at most n Gittins search sequences that each break all ties by one orderResearch Paper

An object is hidden in one of nnn boxes. Each search of box iii costs time tit_iti​, and if the object is there it is found with probability qiq_iqi​, independently of all earlier searches. When the searcher knows the probabilities pip_ipi​ with which the object was placed, the problem has a classical index solution. Norris (1962), Bram (1963), Blackwell (reported by Matula,…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Regularity of the Value Function of Repeated Games with Switching Costs: The Value Is Continuous, Increasing, Concave, Piecewise Linear and Eventually Constant in the Switching-Cost WeightResearch Paper

Many repeated interactions charge a player not only for what is played at each stage but also for changing what is played: a firm that reconfigures production, a defender that relocates patrols, a server that migrates jobs. Switching costs model this. In a zero-sum repeated game with switching costs, player 2 pays player 1 a stage payoff that depends on the…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Queueing Dynamics and State Space Collapse in Fragmented Limit Order Book Markets: every equilibrium is the lifting of a one-dimensional workload equilibriumResearch Paper

US equities trade on many exchanges at once. Each exchange keeps its own limit order book, and at the national best bid the same price is offered in several queues that differ in the rebate the exchange pays a liquidity provider and in how long a resting order waits to be filled. An investor who posts a limit order chooses an exchange, or decides to cross…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs Converge to the Feasible and Individually Rational Set as Players Become PatientResearch Paper

Repeated games model long-run relationships: the same players meet stage after stage, observe what was played, and can condition today's behavior on the past. The folk theorem describes what such relationships can sustain. When players are patient, every payoff vector that is feasible and gives each player at least what the others can force on them is the…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Technical Note—Global Robust Stability in a General Price and Assortment Competition Model: Robust Best-Response Price Dynamics Contract Geometrically to the Special Equilibrium from Any StartResearch Paper

Retailers that sell many products set prices against one another, and the demand for each product depends on the prices of all of them. Affine demand models, q(p)=a−Rpq(p)=a-Rpq(p)=a−Rp, are the standard starting point for this kind of multi-product price competition in operations management and industrial organization. Two questions follow once an equilibrium is known to…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Network Pricing: How to Induce Optimal Flows Under Strategic Link Operators: Optimal Tolls Bounded by the Marginal Tolls Are (Strong) Cap EquilibriaResearch Paper

Congestion pricing charges road users for the delay they impose on others. The classical theory, going back to Beckmann, McGuire and Winsten (1956), assumes a single benevolent authority that sets every toll: charging each link its marginal toll makes the selfish (Wardrop) traffic pattern socially optimal. Many real networks are different. Roads, bridges…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Existence of Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Characterizing universal pure equilibrium existenceResearch Paper

A system of users sharing resources may have no stable configuration: whenever the users settle on their choices, somebody may prefer to change. Weighted congestion games describe this question when different users place different demands on the resources they choose. Routing and scheduling provide examples, but the mathematical question here does not…

22 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: Shuze Chen

Food Delivery Service and Restaurant: Friend or Foe?: With Convenient Delivery, a Critical Mass of Tech-Savvy Customers Makes the Restaurant Delivery-Only and Cuts Platform Profit and WelfareResearch Paper

Food delivery platforms such as Uber Eats, DoorDash and Meituan let a restaurant serve customers who never enter it, but they also charge those customers a delivery fee and share the restaurant's kitchen with its walk-in trade. Whether the platform helps or hurts the restaurant is a question restaurant owners, platforms and regulators all ask. Chen, Hu and…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Computation of Dynamic Equilibria in Series-Parallel Networks: The Thin-Flow Label Function of a Series-Parallel Network Has at Most 2|A′| − |A*| − |V| + 1 BreakpointsResearch Paper

In the fluid queuing model (Vickrey's model) of flows over time, a continuum of infinitesimal particles travels from a source sss to a sink ttt through a network whose arcs have capacities and transit times. Each particle picks a route that minimizes its own arrival time, and a dynamic equilibrium (a Nash flow over time) is a flow in which no particle can…

17 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Information TheoryOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Simulation of a Random Variable and its Application to Game Theory: With a Leaked Randomness Source, Alice Can Secure J_cav(H(X|Y)) in the n-Stage Repeated Game up to the Error Term (10)Research Paper

A mixed strategy assumes a player can draw from any distribution. A real player may only have a limited or imperfect source of randomness, and an opponent may observe part of it. Repeated games with bounded randomness ask how much a player can guarantee in that situation. Gossner and Vieille (2002, Games Econ. Behav. 41(2), 206–226) studied a repeated…

16 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Implicit Incentives and Delegation in Teams: Delegating the Production Method Can Be Strictly Cheaper than Centralisation in a Collusion-Proof EquilibriumResearch Paper

A principal who cannot observe workers' effort must use payments tied to an observable result. In a team, each worker's effort affects the same result, so an individual bonus must support both workers' incentives. The principal may also choose who controls the production method. Giving that choice to a worker changes the actions the workers can take after a…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Characterizing and Computing the Set of Nash Equilibria via Vector Optimization: Shared Constraint Nash Equilibria Are Exactly the Pareto Optimal Points Under a Non-Convex Ordering ConeResearch Paper

A Nash equilibrium is a feasible choice of strategies at which no player can lower her own cost by changing her strategy alone. A Pareto minimizer is a feasible point that cannot be improved under a specified comparison of vector outcomes. These ideas usually select different points: a change that helps several players at once is relevant to ordinary Pareto…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
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