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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Price/Advertising Menus for Two-Sided Media Platforms: In Duopoly with Multi-Item Menus the Unique Equilibrium Is a Symmetric Two-Item Menu on Which Both Consumer Types Multi-HomeResearch Paper

Ad-supported media and digital services (streaming music and video, news sites, social platforms) sell to two sides at once. Consumers value the content, advertisers value the consumers' attention, and consumers usually regard advertising as a nuisance whose cost differs from one person to the next. Many such platforms answer this with menu pricing: a free…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algebraic TopologyTopology·Captain: mikedeng1

Equipartition of a Segment: Every Continuous Function on Subsegments of [0, 1] Vanishing on Degenerate Segments Takes Equal Values on Some Partition of [0, 1] into m SegmentsResearch Paper

In fair division, a value may be assigned to each interval that a cut produces. If the value is continuous in the interval's endpoints, an equal-value partition is a natural target. Some valuations are nonnegative and additive, but a difference of competing measures or a signed utility need have neither property. Avvakumov and Karasev establish equal-value…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multiregional Oligopoly with Capacity Constraints: The Capacity-Constrained Cournot Game Has a Unique Equilibrium, Implementing the Unique Fixed Point of the Marginal-Profit Best ResponseResearch Paper

Firms that serve several geographic markets must decide both how much to produce and where to sell it. A capacity limit couples those regional decisions: an extra unit sent to one region cannot also be sent to another. Different transport costs and demand curves make a collection of independent single-region Cournot models inadequate. Alsabah, Bernard,…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Adversarial Patrolling in a Uniform: Attacking in the Second Period of the Patroller's Absence and Never Staying at a Location Are Optimal Strategies for Every Attack DurationResearch Paper

A visible patroller gives an attacker information: the attacker can observe when a location is vacant and wait for a favorable moment. This changes the patrolling problem from choosing how often to visit each location to choosing a movement rule that remains effective against an adversary who chooses the attack time. The preprint The Uniformed Patroller Game…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

“Now or Later?” When to Deploy Qualification Screening in Open-Bid Auction for Re-Sourcing: The Incumbent's Optimal Drop-Out Price Is a Compete-or-Fold Threshold RuleResearch Paper

Firms that already buy a service from an incumbent supplier regularly re-source the contract: they invite new suppliers, the entrants, to compete in a descending open-bid auction. Entrants may be cheaper but are unproven: before the contract can be awarded to an entrant, the buyer must pay for qualification screening (visits to the supplier's facility,…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Patrol of a Perimeter: Optimal Randomized Patrol Schedule and Value of the Patrol Game Against an Observing AttackerResearch Paper

Patrolling protects a border or facility perimeter against an intruder who needs uninterrupted time to complete an attack. The defender controls when patrollers pass; the attacker controls when to strike. In a patrol game, the question is how to time patrols when the attacker can observe them (Lin, Optimal Patrol of a Perimeter).

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Bundling for Flexibility and Variety: An Economic Model for Multiproducer Value Aggregation: The Producers' Output Game Has a Unique Equilibrium, Solved in Closed FormResearch Paper

Many digital goods are sold as bundles assembled from the output of many independent producers: a streaming service carries films from many studios, a music subscription carries many labels, a news or software aggregator carries many publishers. One retailer (the aggregator) prices the bundle and keeps a share of the revenue. The producers split the rest in…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Games and Mean-Field Games with Impulse Controls: A Regular Solution of the N-Player Quasi-Variational Inequalities Gives a Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

An impulse control changes a system's state at a chosen instant, rather than continuously adjusting its drift. When several decision makers can intervene in the same state process, an intervention changes both the acting player's future cost and every opponent's. This makes the equilibrium question different from separate single-player control problems.…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly: Under Economies of Scale Every Participating Miner's Equilibrium Market Share Is at Least 1 − (1/α)(c_i/c_j)Research Paper

Proof-of-work mining allocates a fixed reward among miners whose investments determine their chances of receiving it. The resulting distribution of mining power matters for decentralization: if a few miners control most of the investment, the economic mechanism does not support a diffuse set of participants. Arnosti and Weinberg study this question in a…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Disclosure Under Consumer Loss Aversion: In a Duopoly with Costly Disclosure, Stronger Loss Aversion Lowers the Disclosure Threshold and Raises Each Firm's Ex Ante ProfitResearch Paper

A seller can disclose privately known product quality, but credible disclosure costs money. In a market with competing sellers, disclosure changes both what consumers believe about a silent seller and how aggressively the sellers can price. Zhang and Li study this interaction when consumers are loss averse about quality: learning that a product falls below…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Delegating Innovation Projects with Deadline: Committed vs. Flexible Stopping: Commitment Beats Flexibility Exactly When the Evaluation Cost Is Intermediate and p ≥ (c_h − c_l)/(μ_h − μ_l)Research Paper

Firms increasingly delegate the generation of new concepts (product designs, advertising campaigns, engineering prototypes) to outside providers such as design agencies and engineering consultancies. The client cannot dictate how hard the provider works; it can only decide when to stop asking for new solutions. Two practices are common. Under a flexible…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Contract Unobservability and Downstream Competition: Under Unobservable Contracts and Passive Beliefs, Wholesale Prices Beat Two-Part Tariffs for the Manufacturer iff θ ≥ 2√2Research Paper

A manufacturer selling through several retailers rarely publishes the terms it gives each of them. Wholesale prices, slotting fees and rebates are negotiated bilaterally, and a retailer usually sees its own contract but not its rival's. Much of the supply-chain contracting literature nevertheless assumes observable contracts, and under that assumption a…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchPartial Differential EquationsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Finite State Mean Field Games with Wright–Fisher Common Noise as Limits of N-Player Weighted Games: Normalized N-Player Equilibrium Values Converge to the Master Equation at a Polynomial RateResearch Paper

Mean field games describe Nash equilibria of games with very many symmetric players by a single limiting object. Whether, and how fast, the equilibria of the NNN-player game converge to that limit is the convergence problem. For games with common noise, a source of randomness shared by all players, the standard route goes through the master equation, a PDE on…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents: The Trading Post Mechanism with a Small Entrance Fee Has Price of Anarchy at Most 1 + ε for Leontief UtilitiesResearch Paper

Allocating divisible resources among agents with money-like budgets is the setting of Fisher markets. When agents report their preferences, a central planner can compute a market equilibrium, and by the Eisenberg–Gale convex program that equilibrium maximizes the Nash social welfare, the budget-weighted geometric mean of utilities. This objective is a…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Multi-stage Intermediation in Display Advertising: In Symmetric Tree Networks, Bidding the Projected Virtual Value of the Highest Downstream Report Is a Subgame Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

An online display impression often reaches an advertiser through a chain of ad exchanges and networks instead of through a direct sale. Each intermediary runs its own auction among its downstream bidders and decides what to report to the auction above it. Its profit depends on whether it wins upstream and on what it can charge downstream. Even when every…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program Does Not Provide the Right Incentives: Issues and Remedies: Under HRRP-I a Symmetric Equilibrium Exists and Every One Over-Invests in Readmission ReductionResearch Paper

The Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP), created by the US Affordable Care Act and run by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services since 2012, cuts the Medicare payments of hospitals whose 30-day readmission rates exceed a benchmark computed from other hospitals. It is a form of yardstick competition in the sense of Shleifer (1985): a…

14 thms2 active users
Control TheoryOperations ResearchStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Game of Variable Contributions to the Common Good Under Uncertainty: The Symmetric Game Has a Regular Control Markov Perfect EquilibriumResearch Paper

Many shared assets deteriorate unless someone pays to maintain them: a public infrastructure stock, a jointly used ecosystem, a joint venture's capital, a common research base. When several parties benefit from the same stock and each pays for its own contributions, every party is tempted to wait for the others to pay. Kwon (arXiv:1904.00500, published in Op…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Procurement Mechanisms for Assortments of Differentiated Products: In the Hotelling Model, Decentralized Linear Pricing Achieves the Optimal Centralized Consumer SurplusResearch Paper

Public buyers of medicines, school meals, computers and similar goods often run a framework agreement. A central agency selects an assortment of products through an auction and fixes their unit prices. Public offices then buy from that menu as needed, each choosing what suits it. The European Union awarded €80 billion through framework agreements in 2010,…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Customers to Buy Early: The Value of Personalized Information Provisioning: The Personalized Buy/Wait/No Mechanism Is Optimal and Strictly Beats Public SignalingResearch Paper

A seller who sells over two periods, at a full price now and a discount later, loses revenue to strategic customers who wait for the discount. Waiting is costly to the customer only through availability risk: if inventory is scarce, the product may be gone by the second period. Inventory is usually known to the firm and not to its customers, so the firm can…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Signaling to the Crowd: Private Quality Information and Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: A Separating Equilibrium Always Exists, and the High Type Charges v_H and Signals by Raising Its Target to C*(α)Research Paper

Rewards-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo let a creator pre-sell a product before it exists. Most backers cannot judge the product's quality from a campaign page, while some (experts, early adopters, people who have seen a prototype) can. A creator who knows her product is good therefore faces a classical signaling problem: how…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms: In a Single-Unit Setting Some Sequential Posted-Price Mechanism Earns at Least 0.6543 of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller with one item and several buyers whose values are private but drawn from known, independent distributions can maximize expected revenue with Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson, 1981). That auction depends on every distribution through virtual values, asks buyers to report their values, and allocates through a computation that buyers must trust. A se…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisEconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Congestion in Matching Markets: The Unique Mean-Field Equilibrium Has Acceptance Probability min(p̂, p̄) and Explicit Welfare for Both SidesResearch Paper

Online matching platforms (labor platforms such as Upwork or TaskRabbit, dating sites, short-term rental platforms) make it cheap to contact potential partners, but not cheap to find one who is still available. A worker who has already accepted a job, or a listing that is already booked, keeps receiving applications and keeps being screened. Arnosti, Johari…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Decision Making Under Strategic Behavior 3: A Three-Value Instance with General Costs Where No Optimal Policy Is Outcome MonotonicResearch Paper

When a decision rule is announced in advance, people may change the features on which the rule acts. A lender, for example, may offer loans with different probabilities to applicants with different reported characteristics. An applicant then weighs the greater chance of receiving a loan against the cost of changing those characteristics. The decision maker…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Decision Making Under Strategic Behavior 1: Under Additive Outcome Monotonic Costs Some Outcome Monotonic Binary Policy Is OptimalResearch Paper

A lender or other decision maker may publish a rule that assigns a positive decision to an individual with some probability. Once the rule is visible, individuals can change the features on which it acts. The decision maker must therefore evaluate a rule under the distribution it induces after individuals respond, rather than only under the original…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate? II: If Personalized Pricing Is Decided Before Positioning, Neither Firm Adopts It at Any Cost F ≥ 0Research Paper

Firms can use information about individual customers to quote different prices. That ability changes their price competition, but it can also change where they locate their products or services in a market. For a firm deciding whether to invest in personalized pricing (PP), the order of those decisions matters: a positioning choice made after the investment…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
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