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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation: The Logit Transaction Fee Mechanism Is U-BNIC and 1-SCP, and UIR, Budget Feasible and Sybil-Proof for n ≥ λ₀kResearch Paper

A blockchain confirms a limited number of transactions per block. Users attach fees (bids) to their transactions; the block producer (the miner) chooses which transactions to include and collects some of the fees. The rule that maps bids to confirmations, payments and miner revenue is a transaction fee mechanism (TFM). Because the miner is itself a…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: iris

Multi-Agent Online Learning in Time-Varying Games: Mirror Descent Converges Almost Surely to the Nash Equilibrium of a Strictly Monotone Limit GameResearch Paper

Many systems in which several agents repeatedly make continuous decisions are modelled as games whose rules drift over time: bidders in repeated Kelly auctions whose valuations change with traffic, wireless users whose channel gains fluctuate, firms in Cournot markets with shifting demand. In such settings agents rarely know the game they are playing; they…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

S-Convexity and Gross Substitutability: A Usc, Coercive, Continuously Differentiable, Strictly Concave Function with Open Domain Is a Proper GS-Function If and Only If It Is S-ConcaveResearch Paper

Gross substitutability (GS) is the condition under which competitive prices behave well: if the prices of some goods rise and the others stay fixed, demand for the unchanged goods does not fall. Kelso and Crawford (1982) introduced it for job matching, and Gul and Stacchetti (1999) showed that for indivisible goods it is the condition under which a…

26 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations Research·Captain: iris

Ordinary and Prophet Planning under Uncertainty in Bernoulli Congestion Games: The Worst-Case Prophet Price of Anarchy Equals the Optimal (λ,μ,q)(\lambda,\mu,q)(λ,μ,q)-Smoothness Bound γpr(C,q)\gamma_{pr}(C,q)γpr​(C,q)Research Paper

Atomic congestion games model players who share resources, such as links of a network, servers or road segments, and whose cost on a resource grows with the number of its users. The price of anarchy measures how much worse a selfish equilibrium is than the best outcome. The inefficiency of these games is well understood when the set of players is fixed:…

32 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOperations Research·Captain: iris

Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games: with a convex potential, coarse correlated and correlated Wardrop equilibria are the mixtures of Wardrop equilibria, all with equal costsResearch Paper

In large populations of anonymous agents (commuters choosing routes, users choosing servers, customers choosing a bar), each individual has a negligible effect on the others, and the natural equilibrium notion is the Wardrop equilibrium (WE): only cheapest actions carry mass. A mediator such as a navigation app may instead recommend actions at random,…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: iris

Tight Approximation for Unconstrained XOS Maximization: Algorithm 4 Finds a (k−1)(k-1)(k−1)-Maximizer of Every kkk-XOS Function in O(k2n)O(k^2 n)O(k2n) Time, Exactly When k=2k=2k=2Research Paper

Maximizing a set function is a basic task in combinatorial optimization and algorithmic game theory. Computing an agent's demand under prices ppp amounts to maximizing v(X)−∑x∈Xpxv(X)-\sum_{x\in X}p_xv(X)−∑x∈X​px​, which need not be monotone even when the valuation vvv is. XOS functions generalize submodular functions, and they are studied in combinatorial auctions, where they are…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: iris

Satiation in Fisher Markets and Approximation of Nash Social Welfare: Rounding a Market Equilibrium Is a 2e1/(2e)2e^{1/(2e)}2e1/(2e)-Approximation for Budget-Additive Nash Social WelfareResearch Paper

The Nash social welfare of an allocation of indivisible items is the geometric mean of the agents' valuations. Nash proposed it for the bargaining problem as the objective characterized by a set of natural axioms, and it has since become a standard objective in fair division because it balances efficiency against fairness. Maximizing it exactly is NP-hard,…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored Products: The Prior-Independent Competitive Ratio of Truthful Deterministic Mechanisms Is 1/nResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon, Walmart and Alibaba let sellers pay to have their products shown in sponsored slots. The platform decides which assortment of sellers to display to an arriving consumer, and the consumer then chooses among the displayed products. Unlike a standard ad auction, a seller's value from being shown depends on who else is shown:…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Policy Learning with Competing Agents: The Finite-Agent Stochastic Threshold Iteration Reaches a λ-Neighborhood of the Mean-Field Equilibrium Threshold with Probability at Least 1 − δResearch Paper

A decision maker with limited capacity (a college admitting students, a lender approving loans) treats only the 1−q1-q1−q fraction of applicants with the highest score βTX\beta^TXβTX. The applicants know the rule and invest effort to change their covariates XXX, so the score distribution, and hence the admission threshold, depends on the rule itself. When the rule is…

20 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Deals or No Deals: Contract Design for Online Advertising: Auction-Adjusted Greedy Deals Earn a Third of the Optimal Revenue, a Half Under Independent Valuations, at Non-Increasing PricesResearch Paper

Online publishers sell display-ad impressions in two ways: by real-time auction, and by preferred deals, contracts that give a buyer first look at impressions at a fixed price. Google's Preferred Deals service (Google Ad Exchange) is the model: a buyer who joins a deal may buy an impression at the agreed price before it reaches the open auction, and is…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

An Equivalence Between Wagering and Fair-Division Mechanisms: Allocation Mechanisms Are Exactly Weakly Budget-Balanced Wagering Mechanisms, with IC, Proportionality and Pareto Optimality PreservedResearch Paper

Two literatures study how to split a resource among agents who report private information. Fair division of divisible goods asks for allocations that are proportional, efficient and resistant to misreporting (Steinhaus 1948; Cole, Gkatzelis and Goel 2013). Wagering mechanisms let bettors with subjective beliefs about a future event bet against each other,…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities: A Strongly Budget-Balanced, Truthful, Individually Rational 1/3-Approximation for Matroid Double AuctionsResearch Paper

A two-sided market has sellers who hold goods and buyers who want them, each with a private value. A mechanism that reallocates the goods should be truthful (no agent gains by misreporting her value), individually rational (no agent is worse off for participating) and budget-balanced (the mechanism neither injects nor keeps money). Myerson and Satterthwaite…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Better Regularization for Sequential Decision Spaces: The Dilatable Global Entropy Is a (1/MQ)(1/M_Q)(1/MQ​)-Strongly Convex DGF on the Sequence-Form Polytope with Range at Most MQ2max⁡jlog⁡∣Aj∣M_Q^2 \max_j \log|A_j|MQ2​maxj​log∣Aj​∣Research Paper

Two-player zero-sum extensive-form games (poker, negotiation, security games) are solved at scale by first-order methods. Writing each player's strategy in sequence form turns the computation of a Nash equilibrium into a bilinear saddle-point problem min⁡x∈Xmax⁡y∈Yx⊤Ay\min_{x\in\mathcal X}\max_{y\in\mathcal Y}x^\top Ayminx∈X​maxy∈Y​x⊤Ay over two polytopes, and methods such as Nesterov's…

20 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equilibria: In Single-Sink Networks the Makespan and Total-Travel-Time Prices of Anarchy Are O(Uτ)O(U\tau)O(Uτ)Research Paper

Navigation devices let drivers react to the traffic they see now, not to the traffic that will exist when they reach a road. Dynamic traffic models capture this with the instantaneous dynamic equilibrium (IDE): at every node and every moment, a flow particle only enters edges on a currently shortest path to its destination, where length is physical travel…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Algorithms as Mechanisms: The Price of Anarchy of Relax and Round: Oblivious Rounding Turns a (λ,μ)(\lambda, \mu)(λ,μ)-Smooth Exact Relaxation into a (λ/(2α),μ)(\lambda/(2\alpha), \mu)(λ/(2α),μ)-Smooth MechanismResearch Paper

Many welfare-maximization problems in mechanism design are NP-hard: combinatorial auctions, packing integer programs, unsplittable flow, maximum traveling salesman. The standard algorithmic answer is relax-and-round: solve a fractional relaxation exactly, then round the fractional solution to a feasible one. Turning such an algorithm into a mechanism is the…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance: The Rai Algorithm Has O(√(T log T)) Regret with High ProbabilityResearch Paper

In Bayesian persuasion a sender who observes a random state commits to a rule that maps states to recommendations, and a receiver who knows the state distribution follows a recommendation only when it is optimal given what it reveals (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011; Bergemann and Morris 2019). When the distribution is known, the sender's best rule solves a…

33 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

Convergence of a Packet Routing Model to Flows over Time: Packet Arrival Times and Cumulative Flows Converge to Those of the Flow over Time as α→0\alpha \to 0α→0 and β/α→0\beta/\alpha \to 0β/α→0Research Paper

Large-scale traffic simulators such as MATSim move vehicles through a road network in discrete time steps and in discrete units: a link holds a queue of vehicles, a vehicle may leave after a free-flow travel time, and the number of vehicles leaving per step is limited by the link capacity. Dynamic traffic theory, on the other hand, studies flows over time in…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
ProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: iris

A Label-State Formulation of Stochastic Graphon Games and Approximate Equilibria on Large Networks: Graphon Equilibrium Controls Give n-Player ε-Nash Equilibria With Average Error → 0Research Paper

Large games on networks arise whenever many agents interact only with their neighbors: firms in a supply network, banks linked by exposures, users of a congested service, or individuals in an epidemic. A Nash equilibrium of an nnn-player stochastic differential game with heterogeneous interactions is a fixed point over nnn coupled control problems, and…

15 thms2 active usersReviewed
OptimizationProbability·Captain: iris

Adaptive, Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Strongly Monotone and Exp-Concave Games with Gradient Feedback: MA-AdaOGD Converges to the Nash Equilibrium at Last-Iterate Rate O(log⁡3T/T)O(\log^3 T/T)O(log3T/T)Research Paper

When several agents repeatedly choose actions and pay costs that depend on everyone's choices, each agent faces an online learning problem whose environment is the other agents. Online gradient descent (OGD) is the standard learner in this setting. It is doubly optimal under strong convexity: a single agent facing arbitrary strongly convex costs has …

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsDiscrete GeometryOperations Research·Captain: iris

A Stable-Set Bound and Maximal Numbers of Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games: Every Non-Degenerate 5×55 \times 55×5 Bimatrix Game Has at Most 31 Nash EquilibriaResearch Paper

A bimatrix game is a two-player game in strategic form, given by two payoff matrices. Its central solution concept is Nash equilibrium, a pair of randomized strategies that are optimal against each other (Nash 1951). How many Nash equilibria a game can have matters for algorithms that find one or all of them, and for the combinatorics of the polytopes that…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryMarkov ChainOperations Research·Captain: iris

On a Network Centrality Maximization Game: Best Responses Do Not Depend on the Intrinsic Centrality and Link Only Within Incoming Distance did_idi​Research Paper

PageRank centrality (Brin–Page 1998) scores the nodes of a directed graph by the long-run frequency with which a random surfer visits them. In citation networks, the Web and social networks, each node controls where its own out-links point and has an interest in being visible. Earlier work asked how adding a link changes PageRank (Avrachenkov–Litvak 2006)…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchStatistics·Captain: iris

A Theory of Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of School Quality: Strategy-Proofness for Schools Implies the First-Choice Design Extracts a Random AssignmentResearch Paper

Many school districts assign seats through a centralized mechanism that breaks priority ties with lotteries, and a large empirical literature uses that randomness to estimate the effect of attending a school on test scores, college attendance and earnings. The first-choice research design has been applied to data from the Charlotte mechanism and from DA…

36 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Auctions of Auctions: exchanges' double bid-shading lowers both publisher revenue and advertiser profit below the direct benchmarkResearch Paper

Display advertising is sold impression by impression in real-time auctions. A publisher rarely sells to advertisers directly: advertisers delegate bidding to intermediaries, ad exchanges, which collect their clients' bids in an internal auction and then bid on the winner's behalf in the publisher's header auction. Since the industry's move to first-price…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

A Unifying Framework for Submodular Mean Field Games: Abstract Submodular MFGs Have Least and Greatest Equilibria, Reached by Iterating the Best-Response MapResearch Paper

Mean field games (MFGs), introduced by Lasry and Lions and by Huang, Malhamé and Caines in 2006–2007, describe the limit of symmetric stochastic games with many small players. A representative player optimizes against the distribution of the population, and an equilibrium is a distribution that reproduces itself when every player best responds to it.…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: iris

The Basic Core of a Parallel Machines Scheduling Game: The PMS Game Under Job Splitting Is Totally BalancedResearch Paper

Manufacturers who own production capacity and jobs to process can pool their machines. If jobs may be split, meaning processed simultaneously on several machines, a group of manufacturers behaves like a single machine whose speed is the total speed of the group's machines. Pooling then lowers the group's total completion time, and the question is how to…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
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