Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

Open323Completed525All848
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

Second-Best Gains from Trade in Matching MarketsResearch Paper

Two-sided markets match buyers with sellers: labor markets, ride-sharing, advertising exchanges, procurement. If every buyer's value and every seller's cost were public, a designer would choose the feasible set of trades with the largest total surplus, the first best. Values and costs are private, and the Myerson–Satterthwaite theorem (Myerson and…

60 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Sublinear Metric Distortion for MatchingResearch Paper

One-sided matching assigns nnn agents to nnn items, one item each. In many settings the cost an agent incurs from an item is a distance (a commute, a mismatch of skills, a travel time), but a mechanism can only ask agents to rank items, not to report distances. Metric distortion measures the price of this restriction: agents and items lie in an unknown metric…

28 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent ItemsResearch Paper

A seller with mmm heterogeneous items faces nnn bidders. The revenue-optimal mechanism for this multi-item setting is in general randomized, hard to compute, and only Bayesian incentive compatible. Competition complexity measures how much a simple mechanism loses by asking a different question from approximation ratios: how many extra bidders must a simple…

31 thms2 active usersReviewed
Complexity TheoryOptimization·Captain: iris

A Quasipolynomial Algorithm for ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ ContractionsResearch Paper

Many equilibrium and value computations reduce to finding the fixed point of a map that contracts the ℓ∞\ell_\inftyℓ∞​ norm. Shapley's discounted stochastic games [Sha53], Condon's simple stochastic games [Con92], and, through the reductions of Andersson and Miltersen [AM09a], turn-based stochastic parity, mean-payoff and discounted-payoff games are all of this…

49 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOptimization·Captain: iris

Compensation DesignResearch Paper

Platforms that aggregate content or data, such as generative-AI answer engines, recommendation services and data marketplaces, depend on independent contributors who decide for themselves whether to take part. Each contributor bears a private cost of participating, and the platform has a fixed budget to distribute. The platform knows how much value any set…

41 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism with Constant Maximin-Share GuaranteeResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods among agents with private additive valuations is a basic problem of algorithmic game theory: the agents' reports are the only input, so a rule that rewards misreporting cannot be fair with respect to the true values. A randomized mechanism is truthful in expectation (TIE) if no agent can raise her expected true value by…

43 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Stable Voting Rules on the Edge of Optimal Metric DistortionResearch Paper

An election asks a group to choose one candidate from rankings alone. The metric distortion framework of Anshelevich, Bhardwaj and Postl (2015) measures how much those rankings cost: voters and candidates are points of an unknown metric space, each voter ranks closer candidates higher, and a voting rule's distortion is its worst-case ratio between the…

53 thms2 active usersReviewed
Algebraic TopologyCombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: iris

Balanced Fair Division and Generalized Kneser GraphsResearch Paper

Many allocation problems divide indivisible goods between groups rather than individuals: households sharing what they receive, teams, or departments. Every member of a group gets the same bundle, but each member judges it with her own preferences, so a bundle that one member finds fair another may envy. Exact envy-freeness is impossible already for a…

32 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Fair Team ContractsResearch Paper

A firm, a research group or an open-source project often pays a team for a joint outcome it cannot observe in detail: it sees whether the project succeeded, not who worked. Combinatorial contract theory models this as a principal who offers each hired agent a linear contract, a share of the success reward, and lets the agents decide whether to exert costly…

28 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Lipschitz Stable Combinatorial AuctionsResearch Paper

Welfare-maximizing auctions are discontinuous. With two bidders and one item, the values (1+δ,1)(1+\delta,1)(1+δ,1) send the item to the first bidder and the values (1,1+δ)(1,1+\delta)(1,1+δ) send it to the second, however small δ\deltaδ is. Reports are often estimates, and sellers and buyers act on the probabilities of an allocation before it is realized, so such a jump makes plans…

57 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Single-or-Sample: Online Fair Allocation for Combinatorial AgentsResearch Paper

Consider a relief center that hands out indivisible supplies to people arriving over time, each with different needs. Everything handed out is gone, and nothing is known about who comes next. Maximin share (MMS) fairness, introduced by Budish 2011, measures an agent's share using only that agent's own valuation: the value the agent could guarantee by…

32 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

The Price of Anarchy of Draft AuctionsResearch Paper

The draft auction of Devanur, Morgenstern and Syrgkanis (arXiv:1311.2820) sells mmm items in rounds. In each round every bidder names one per-item price and a set of remaining items, and the highest bidder takes her set at her price. It sits between two simple formats: the single-bid auction of Devanur, Morgenstern, Syrgkanis and Weinberg (doi:10.1145/2764468.…

25 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

The Hardness of Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design, RevisitedResearch Paper

In a combinatorial auction, mmm items are allocated among nnn bidders, each holding a private valuation of bundles, and the goal is high welfare ∑ivi(Si)\sum_i v_i(S_i)∑i​vi​(Si​). Two obstacles interact: the bidders must communicate for a good allocation to be found, and they may manipulate the protocol. A mechanism is truthful when following the prescribed strategy is an…

29 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Effective Horizons for Prophet Inequalities with Discounted I.I.D. RewardsResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares a gambler, who sees rewards one at a time and must accept or reject each irrevocably, with a prophet who knows all rewards in advance. For nnn i.i.d. rewards, a threshold rule with per-stage acceptance probability about 1/n1/n1/n guarantees a fraction 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e of the prophet's expected reward, and for independent non-identical rewards the…

47 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningProbability·Captain: iris

Calibeating Bandit AdviceResearch Paper

Many sequential decision systems already run a recommendation algorithm: a pricing heuristic, a statistical model trained on private data, a Q-learning agent. A downstream learner who receives its advice in each round may want two things at once. First, the learner should never regret having followed the advice blindly: whatever consistent re-mapping of the…

33 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningOptimization·Captain: iris

Optimistic Hedge in General-Sum Games: Fundamental Limits and Regret Bounds via Temporal ApproximationResearch Paper

When every player of a game has regret o(T)o(T)o(T), the empirical distribution of play converges to the set of coarse correlated equilibria, at a rate governed by the largest average regret. This link is why the dependence of regret on the horizon TTT has been studied closely. Against an adversary the rate Tlog⁡n\sqrt{T\log n}Tlogn​ cannot be improved, but a player in a game…

22 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningReinforcement Learning·Captain: iris

Near-Optimal K\sqrt{K}K​-Regret for Online Learning in Uninformed Markov GamesResearch Paper

A learner repeatedly plays an episodic two-player Markov game against an opponent it cannot see. It observes its own actions, its losses and the states, but not the opponent's actions, its policy or even its action set. This uninformed setting models online decision making against other agents whose behaviour is hidden, for example a market participant…

24 thms2 active usersReviewed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Sharp Bounds for Truthful-in-Expectation SchedulingResearch Paper

In scheduling on unrelated machines, each of mmm indivisible jobs takes a possibly different processing time on each of nnn machines, and the goal is to minimize the makespan, the largest machine load. When the processing times are known, Lenstra, Shmoys and Tardos give a polynomial-time 2-approximation. Nisan and Ronen (NR01) introduced the strategic version:…

48 thms2 active usersReviewed
EconomicsMechanism Design·Captain: iris

Optimal Auctions for Anchored Bidders under a Rational Revenue GuaranteeResearch Paper

Auctions are increasingly run on behalf of users by automated agents. Some of these agents behave like textbook rational bidders and play a Bayes–Nash equilibrium; others are anchored: they submit their user's value as the bid, whatever the mechanism. A seller facing both populations wants a mechanism that earns as much as possible from anchored bidders…

68 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOptimization·Captain: iris

Optimal Alternating Regret for Online Learning and GamesResearch Paper

In a repeated two-player game, the players can update simultaneously (both see only the past) or alternately (the second player sees the first player's current move before choosing). Alternating updates are known to speed up learning dynamics in zero-sum games (Wibisono, Tao, Piliouras, NeurIPS 2022; Cevher et al., NeurIPS 2023; Katona, Wang, Wibisono, JMLR…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: iris

Planning Against a Prophet: A Graph-Theoretic Framework for Making Sequential Decisions: On a DAG Covered by k Paths with at Most d Labels per Edge, an Online Policy Earns 1/(k(d+2)) of the ProphetResearch Paper

A prophet inequality compares a decision-maker who sees random values one at a time and must commit as they go with a prophet who sees every value in advance. The classic result of Krengel and Sucheston (1978) says that for independent non-negative values X1,…,XnX_1,\dots,X_nX1​,…,Xn​, an online rule that stops once can collect at least half of E[max⁡iXi]\mathbb E[\max_i X_i]E[maxi​Xi​], and…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
Machine LearningMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: iris

Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions: γ-Competitive Buyers in First-Price Auctions Get Liquid Welfare ≥ (LW* − O(n)(Reg+1))/(γ + 1/2 + O(1/γ))Research Paper

Most online advertising is sold through sequential auctions: one impression at a time, millions of times a day, and since 2019 increasingly by first-price rules (Won21). The advertisers who bid are budget-constrained, and they do not compute equilibria; their bids are set by learning algorithms that adjust a shading or pacing multiplier from round to round.…

27 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability+1·Captain: iris

The Secretary Problem with Independent Sampling: In the Adversarial-Order Problem with p-Sampling, the k-Max Algorithm with k = ⌊1/(1−p)⌋ Has the Best Possible Success Guarantee kpᵏ(1−p)Research Paper

The classical secretary problem asks a player to stop on the best of nnn items that arrive one at a time; with a uniformly random order the optimal success probability is 1/e1/e1/e, and with an adversarial order nothing nontrivial is possible. Much recent work in online algorithms and mechanism design asks how much prior information restores good guarantees.…

21 thms2 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: iris

The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing up Your Home?: The Core Respects Improvement, and an Allocation Proving It Is Found in Linear TimeResearch Paper

In a housing market, introduced by Shapley and Scarf (J. Math. Econ. 1974), every agent owns one indivisible good and the agents reallocate the goods among themselves. The model underlies kidney exchange programmes, where a patient–donor pair "owns" its donor and pairs exchange donors along cycles (Roth, Sönmez, Ünver, QJE 2004). A natural design…

23 thms2 active usersReviewed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: iris

Learning to collude in a pricing duopoly: under self-play, Composite SPSA prices converge to the global optimal price and relative regret vanishes at rate T^(-1/5)Research Paper

Firms increasingly delegate pricing to learning algorithms, and regulators ask whether such algorithms can raise prices without any agreement between the firms. Meylahn and den Boer (SSRN:3741385, MSOM, doi:10.1287/msom.2021.1074) answer with a concrete construction: a data-driven policy which, when both duopolists use it, reaches the joint-revenue maximum…

17 thms2 active usersReviewed
PreviousPage 20 of 34Next

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me