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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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Mechanism Design·Captain: iris

Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: deferred acceptance is the only mechanism that is minimal-access stable, strategy-proof and minimal-access monotonicResearch Paper

In many school choice systems a school's priority over applicants has two layers: an absolute priority (an exam score, a grade point average, a lottery number) and a set of minimal-access rights (a sibling at the school, living in its walk zone). The standard practice is to merge the two into adjusted priorities: at each school, every student holding a…

21 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Equilibria and Systemic Risk in Saturated Networks: necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of saturated network equilibria, class by class, when the spectral radius is at most oneResearch Paper

Many models of contagion in networks reduce to the same fixed-point equation: each node receives a linear combination of the states of its in-neighbours plus an exogenous term, and its own state is that inflow clipped to an interval. In the interbank clearing model of Eisenberg and Noe (Management Science, 2001) the states are payments capped by…

17 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Selfishness Need Not Be Bad: In Every Nonatomic Congestion Game with Regularly Varying Cost Functions the Price of Anarchy Tends to 1 Along Every Unbounded Demand SequenceResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) measures how much selfish routing costs compared with a coordinated optimum: it is the ratio of the cost of a Wardrop equilibrium to the minimum social cost. Worst-case bounds on this ratio are classical (Roughgarden and Tardos, JACM 2002; Correa, Schulz and Stier-Moses, Math. Oper. Res. 2004), and for polynomial costs of degree …

17 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentives and Gaming in Collaborative Projects Under Risk-Sharing Partnerships: Exact Conditions Under Which Information Asymmetry Shortens the Project with Time-Dependent Delay PenaltiesResearch Paper

Collaborative projects often assign different tasks to different firms while making each firm bear part of the cost of a late project. A supplier's decision to spend more time on its task can therefore impose delay costs on a manufacturer, and the manufacturer's own schedule can impose costs on the supplier. The incentives differ from those of one firm…

14 thms5 active users
🏆Completed
Functional AnalysisMechanism DesignOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 1: A Value Pacing-Based Symmetric First Price Equilibrium ExistsResearch Paper

Most online advertising is sold by auction, one impression at a time, to advertisers who manage a budget over many auctions rather than a value for a single one. Since 2019 the major ad exchanges have moved from second price to first price auctions, in which the winner pays its own bid. A budget-constrained advertiser in a first price auction must therefore…

20 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 1: The Price of Anarchy Is Hölder Continuous with Exponent 1/2 at Every Game with Costs Lipschitz on [0, T(d)]Research Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game is the ratio of the total cost of a Wardrop equilibrium to the minimum possible total cost. It quantifies how much selfish routing loses compared with central coordination, and it has been studied intensively since Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) and Roughgarden and Tardos (2002), mostly through…

14 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsEconomicsOperations Research+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability II: Banks Take More Risk in the Least Equilibrium of a Complete Network than of a Ring NetworkResearch Paper

Banks lend to one another, and the shape of the resulting network decides how a loss at one bank reaches the others. A long line of work, starting with Allen and Gale (2000) and continued by Acemoglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi (2015), compares the ring network, where each bank is owed money by one neighbour, with the complete network, where every bank…

15 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Imperfect Targeting and Advertising Strategies: With Costless Advertising and A < 1/4, Equilibrium Industry Profit Falls as Targeting Improves, Jumps Up at α̂₂(A), Then Stays ConstantResearch Paper

Online advertising lets a firm aim its messages at the consumers most likely to want its product, but the data behind that aim is noisy: a platform's prediction of who belongs to a demographic or interest segment is right only with some probability. A natural expectation is that sharper targeting raises firms' profits, since fewer messages are wasted. Karle…

10 thms5 active usersReviewed
Control TheoryMarkov ChainStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Strong and Weak Equilibria for Time-Inconsistent Stochastic Control in Continuous Time 1: Weak and Strong Equilibria Exist When the Admissible Generator Rows Form Convex Compact SetsResearch Paper

An agent whose preferences change over time cannot simply optimize. Under non-exponential discounting, for instance hyperbolic or pseudo-exponential discount functions, a plan that is optimal today stops being optimal tomorrow, and a later self deviates from it. Strotz (1955) proposed that a sophisticated agent treat future selves as players in a game and…

17 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization 2: Under Regularized Reinforcement Learning, Every Strict Nash Equilibrium Is Asymptotically StableResearch Paper

In a repeated game, players who do not know the payoff structure can still learn by reinforcement: each player keeps a running score for every action, the cumulative payoff that action would have earned, and plays a mixed strategy that favours actions with high scores. Turning scores into mixed strategies through a regularized best response (maximize score…

12 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationDynamical Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization 3: In 2-Player Zero-Sum Games with an Interior Equilibrium, Time-Averaged Play Converges to the Nash SetResearch Paper

Learning dynamics in games describe how players who repeatedly interact adjust their strategies from observed payoffs. A central question is whether such dynamics lead to Nash equilibrium. For the replicator dynamics, the canonical model of evolutionary game theory, the answer is negative in general: in Matching Pennies and in generic zero-sum games with a…

10 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributed Algorithms for Aggregative Games on Graphs I: Synchronous Aggregate-Tracking Projected Gradients on Time-Varying Graphs Converge to the Unique EquilibriumResearch Paper

In an aggregative game, a player's cost depends on its own decision and on a summary of all players' decisions. An electricity producer, for example, may choose its output while the market price depends on total output. When players communicate only with neighbours, each player must estimate the aggregate before making an update. Koshal, Nedić, and Shanbhag…

14 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games III: In a (λ,µ)-Smooth Cost Game, First-Order Regret Bounds Make the Average Cost at Most λ(1+µ)/(µ(1−µ))·OPT′ + A·n log d/TResearch Paper

When independent players repeatedly choose actions, a low-regret guarantee controls each player's performance against a fixed alternative. It does not directly control the social cost, the sum of all players' costs. For a class of games satisfying smoothness, however, the individual comparisons can imply a bound on the cost of the joint play. This…

8 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Functional AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Graphon Games: I. The Static Case 1: If the State Map b Is Bounded and √c_z‖W‖ < 1, the Graphon Game Has at Least One Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Games with many interacting players appear in economics, epidemiology and network engineering: firms competing in a market, individuals deciding whether to vaccinate, agents in a social network choosing an effort level. When every player interacts with every other player symmetrically, mean field game theory replaces the finite game by a limit with a…

11 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A game-theoretic approach to computation offloading in mobile cloud computing I: The Offloading GNEP Has a SolutionResearch Paper

Mobile devices run applications whose computational load can exceed what the device itself can serve in reasonable time and with reasonable battery drain. Computation offloading sends part of that load elsewhere: to a cloudlet, a small cluster of servers one wireless hop away, or to a distant cloud reached through the wide-area network. The cloudlet is…

9 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 5: Every ϵ-Equilibrium of the Closest Potential Game Is an (ϵ + max_m 2α/√h_m)-Equilibrium of the Game, and ConverselyResearch Paper

Potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) are the finite games whose unilateral payoff differences are all differences of a single function, the potential. They always have a pure Nash equilibrium, and many natural learning dynamics (best response, fictitious play, logit response) converge in them. Most games met in applications are not exactly potential…

19 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear algebraOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games 2: Harmonic Games Generically Have No Pure Nash EquilibriumResearch Paper

Finite games in strategic form are the basic model of interaction between self-interested agents in economics, engineering and computer science. Among them, potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) are the class with the most tractable equilibrium behaviour: every finite potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium, and simple learning dynamics such as…

9 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

How Bad is Selfish Routing? 1: A Nash Flow Costs No More Than Any Flow Feasible for Twice the Rates, for Continuous Nondecreasing LatenciesResearch Paper

In a road or communication network, traffic is routed by many independent users, each choosing a route that is fastest for itself given the congestion caused by everyone else. The resulting Nash flow (also called a Wardrop equilibrium, after Wardrop 1952) need not minimize the total delay experienced by all users: Braess's paradox shows that adding a road…

15 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Worst-Case Equilibria I: On Two Identical Parallel Links Every Mixed Nash Equilibrium Has Expected Makespan at Most 3/2 Times the OptimumResearch Paper

When many users share a network and each routes its own traffic selfishly, the outcome is a Nash equilibrium rather than a centrally optimized assignment. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, in Worst-case equilibria (STACS 1999; journal version 2009), proposed to measure the loss caused by this lack of coordination by the worst-case ratio between the social cost…

11 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
OptimizationTopology·Captain: mikedeng1

On General Minimax Theorems 1: For a Minimal Finite Y with Every f(·, y) Quasi-Concave and u.s.c. on Convex M, One μ₀ ∈ M Has f(μ₀, y) < c for All y ∈ YResearch Paper

A minimax theorem asserts that, for a function f(μ,ν)f(\mu, \nu)f(μ,ν) of two variables,

11 thms5 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationLinear OptimizationMachine Learning+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Introduction to Online Convex Optimization VIII: Solving Zero-Sum Games and Linear Programs via Regret MinimizationTextbook

Two-player zero-sum games and linear programming are, on their surface, unrelated pieces of 20th-century mathematics: von Neumann's minimax theorem for games (1928) was proved with tools from topology, and linear programming duality (Dantzig, 1940s) with convexity and geometry. Yet the two are formally equivalent — Dantzig recounts von Neumann conjecturing…

8 thms5 active users
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsConvex OptimizationMachine Learning·Captain: iris

Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism: One-Bit Feedback Achieves O(T3/5log⁡5T)O(T^{3/5}\log^{5}T)O(T3/5log5T) Regret for Independent Regular ValuationsResearch Paper

A broker stands between a seller and a buyer. It posts a price to each, and the trade happens only if both accept. Posted prices are the standard mechanism when the parties cannot be asked to report their values: they are simple, strategy-proof and individually rational. When the trade repeats, the broker must learn profitable prices while observing only…

27 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsConvex OptimizationMachine Learning·Captain: iris

Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism: One-Bit Feedback Achieves O(Tlog⁡5/2T)O(\sqrt{T}\log^{5/2}T)O(T​log5/2T) Regret for Independent MHR ValuationsResearch Paper

A broker stands between a seller who owns one item and a buyer who may want it. In every round t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T a fresh pair of private valuations (st,bt)∈[0,1]2(s_t,b_t)\in[0,1]^2(st​,bt​)∈[0,1]2 arrives, and the broker posts a price ptp_tpt​ to the seller and a price qtq_tqt​ to the buyer. Trade happens when both accept (st≤pts_t\le p_tst​≤pt​ and qt≤btq_t\le b_tqt​≤bt​), and the broker earns qt−ptq_t-p_tqt​−pt​. The broker sees only…

21 thms4 active usersReviewed
CombinatoricsComputational Complexity·Captain: Shuze Chen

Necklace Splitting with Ten Beads per Colour is PPAD-HardResearch Paper

A necklace is a sequence of beads, each of one of nnn colours, where colour ccc occurs 2bc2b_c2bc​ times. Two thieves want to share it fairly: cut it at some positions, hand the pieces out alternately, and each thief must receive exactly bcb_cbc​ beads of every colour. Goldberg–West and Alon–West proved that nnn cuts always suffice, by a topological argument, and the search…

25 thms4 active usersReviewed
Computational ComplexityOptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: Shuze Chen

On the Role of Geometry in Solving Variational InequalitiesResearch Paper

A variational inequality (VI) asks for a point of a convex set at which an operator points "outward": it unifies constrained optimization, Nash equilibria of continuous games and complementarity problems. For general continuous operators, finding an approximate VI solution is a total search problem in PPAD, the class of fixed-point problems that contains…

35 thms4 active usersReviewed
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