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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Sharing in Competing Supply Chains with Production Cost Reduction: Under Cournot Competition Both Chains Share Below k_N, Both or Neither Between k_N and k_S, and Neither Above k_SResearch Paper

Retailers observe demand signals (point-of-sale data, local forecasts) that their suppliers do not. Whether a retailer should pass such a signal upstream is a central question of the supply chain information-sharing literature. In a single chain, sharing helps the manufacturer plan, but the retailer may lose from it. Competition between chains adds a second…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Contention Resolution Schemes with Applications to Bayesian Selection Problems 4: Intersecting the Families of (b, c₁)- and (b, c₂)-Selectable Greedy OCRSs Is (b, c₁c₂)-SelectableResearch Paper

Online selection problems ask an algorithm to accept or reject elements as they arrive, while keeping the accepted set feasible. The decisions are irrevocable, and the arrival order can be chosen after the random activity of the elements is known. A guarantee for one constraint is therefore useful only if it remains meaningful when several constraints apply…

15 thms2 active users
🏆Completed
Functional AnalysisOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Stochastic Graphon Games: I. The Static Case 2: Under Condition (17) the Unique Nash Equilibrium of a Graphon Game Moves by at Most κ‖W − W′‖ When the Graphon ChangesResearch Paper

Large network games can be described by a graphon, a measurable kernel that assigns an interaction weight to each pair of players in a continuum. This representation is useful when a finite network is viewed as an approximation to a limiting network. A basic question is whether a small change in interaction weights can cause a large change in equilibrium…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs III: Under a Consistent Allocation Rule, (α, β)-Balanced Prices Are Closed Under Maxima of ValuationsResearch Paper

Posted prices turn an offline allocation problem into a sequential choice process: each agent sees a menu of outcomes and prices, then chooses an outcome without revealing its full valuation. The balanced prices framework of Dütting, Feldman, Kesselheim, and Lucier gives welfare guarantees by comparing the revenue collected from an allocation with the…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Disruption and Rerouting in Supply Chain Networks I: Every Supply Chain Network Has a Unique General Equilibrium of Rerouting Prices, Switching Costs and Default CascadesResearch Paper

A failed buyer can leave a supplier with goods it can no longer sell through an existing order. A failed supplier can leave a buyer without inputs for future production. In a network, either loss can weaken another firm and start a sequence of defaults. Birge, Capponi and Chen model these effects together with two responses: suppliers reroute unsold goods…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets 2: Every Competitive Equilibrium Gives Each Agent Her ℓ-out-of-d Maximin Share for Every Rational ℓ/d at Most Her BudgetResearch Paper

Competitive equilibrium is a way to divide goods when each participant has a budget reflecting her entitlement. With divisible goods, proportional value is a natural fairness target. Indivisible goods make that target unavailable in some markets: a single item cannot give two agents positive fractions of its value. The question becomes what fairness a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment III: With a Fixed Cost of Quality, the Encroaching Manufacturer Does Not Differentiate Quality Across ChannelsResearch Paper

A manufacturer that sells through a retailer can also open a direct sales channel. The direct channel lets the manufacturer reach consumers, but it competes with the retailer, whose orders generate wholesale revenue. The manufacturer can further choose whether the two channels carry products of the same quality. These decisions interact because quality…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality in Supply Chain Encroachment IV: Without Quality Commitment in the Direct Channel, Quality Differentiation Across Channels Is Always OptimalResearch Paper

A manufacturer that sells through an independent retailer may also open its own direct channel, an online store or a factory outlet. This is called supply chain encroachment. The operations literature has asked whether encroachment helps or hurts the two firms. The usual approach compares the double-marginalization cost of a pure retail channel with the…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Centralized and Competitive Inventory Models with Demand Substitution 1: The Competitive Substitution Game Has a Nash Equilibrium, Unique and Globally Stable When Substitution Rates Sum Below OneResearch Paper

A retailer that carries several substitutable products, such as brands of the same item or sizes of the same garment, must choose stock levels before demand is known. When a product runs out, some of its customers buy another product instead. Inventory models with this demand substitution go back to McGillivray and Silver (1978, INFOR 16(1)) and Parlar and…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamical SystemsLinear algebra·Captain: mikedeng1

Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium 2: Near Jordan's Three-Player Game Γ₀ of Section III, No Uncoupled Dynamic Is Nash-ConvergentResearch Paper

A central question of the theory of learning in games is whether simple adaptive behavior leads players to a Nash equilibrium. Many natural dynamics — fictitious play, best-reply dynamics, replicator dynamics — fail to converge in some games, and the failures are usually exhibited one dynamic at a time. Hart and Mas-Colell (AER 2003) asked a structural…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 7: Without Gross Substitutes a Market with Two Firms and Three Workers Has No Core AllocationResearch Paper

In a labor market where firms hire sets of workers and salaries are negotiated pair by pair, the natural stability notion is the core: an assignment of workers to firms, with salaries, that no firm and group of workers can improve upon by agreeing among themselves. Kelso and Crawford (Econometrica 50 (1982) 1483–1504) proved that the core is nonempty, and…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 5: An Entering Firm Leaves Every Worker at Least as Well Off, and a Departing Worker Leaves Every Firm No Better OffResearch Paper

Adding a firm changes the offers available to workers; removing a worker changes the pool from which firms hire. In markets with salary bargaining, those changes can alter both assignments and pay. Kelso and Crawford asked whether the direction of the change can nevertheless be predicted at the outcome selected by their salary-adjustment process. Their 1982…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games 4: An Efficient Solution Is the Shapley Value on the Subgames of v If and Only If the Participation Game Γ(ψ, c, v) Is a Potential GameResearch Paper

The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) is the most widely used single-valued solution of cooperative games with transferable utility. It is usually justified axiomatically, from cooperative principles. A recurring question in game theory, sometimes called the Nash program, asks whether cooperative solution concepts can also be recovered from the strategic…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions 3: With Indifference Allowed, a Strategy-Proof Voting Procedure with at Least Three Possible Outcomes Is DictatorialResearch Paper

A committee that chooses one alternative by voting would like a procedure under which nobody gains by misreporting their preferences. Gibbard (Econometrica 41, 1973) and Satterthwaite (J. Econ. Theory 10, 1975) showed that, once at least three outcomes are possible, the only voting procedures with this property are dictatorial. The theorem is the starting…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem II: Every Equilibrium of Every Choice Mechanism Yields an Incentive-Feasible Allocation, F** = F*Research Paper

An arbitrator who must choose among collective options for a group of players usually does not know the players' private characteristics. The arbitrator can only ask, and a player who expects to profit from a false answer may give one. Before designing any procedure, the arbitrator therefore needs to know which expected-payoff allocations can be reached at…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
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AnalysisOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games 2: Oceanic Values Are Limits of Values of Finite Weighted Majority GamesResearch Paper

Weighted voting models assign a coalition a win when its combined vote reaches a quota. The Shapley value measures a player's contribution by averaging the change it makes when added to every possible predecessor coalition. This is straightforward to define for a finite list of voters, but a voting body may contain a few major holders and a very large…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes 6: When Workers Are Alike in Production, Gross Substitutes Is Equivalent to Nonincreasing Returns to WorkersResearch Paper

Kelso and Crawford's 1982 Econometrica paper studies a labor market in which firms hire sets of heterogeneous workers at individually negotiated salaries. Their existence results for the core and for competitive equilibrium, and the convergence of their salary-adjustment process, all rest on one hypothesis about each firm's technology, the gross-substitutes…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Monotone Comparative Statics I: The Argmax Is Monotone Nondecreasing in (t, S) If and Only If f Is Quasisupermodular in x and Has the Single Crossing Property in (x; t)Research Paper

An optimization problem often changes when a parameter changes: a price rises, a constraint expands, or a strategic environment shifts. Comparative statics asks whether the optimal choice moves in a predictable direction. The usual numerical tools, such as derivatives, can be unavailable when choices form a discrete set or the objective is neither smooth…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games 1: A Game Is an Exact Potential Game If and Only If I(γ, u) = 0 on Every Simple Closed Path of Length 4Research Paper

In a strategic game, each player evaluates a change in their own strategy using that player's own payoff. These incentives need not point in a common direction. A potential game is a case in which one real-valued function records every player's payoff change under a unilateral deviation. This common function lets questions about incentives be expressed as…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions 2: Strategy-Proof Voting Procedures Correspond One-to-One to Social Welfare Functions Satisfying CS, NNR and IIAResearch Paper

Two impossibility theorems frame the theory of collective choice. Arrow's theorem (1951) says that a rule aggregating individual preference orderings into a social ordering, subject to a short list of reasonable conditions, must be dictatorial. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975) says that a voting procedure selecting a…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions 4: With Indifference Allowed, a Social Welfare Function Satisfying CS, NNR and IIA Is DictatorialResearch Paper

A social welfare function turns the rankings of the members of a committee into one ranking for the committee. Arrow's general possibility theorem (Arrow, 1951/1963) shows that, once there are at least three alternatives, no such rule satisfies a short list of conditions that each look harmless unless it follows a single member's ranking. The theorem is the…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population: WPO, Anonymity, Scale Invariance, Continuity and Population Monotonicity Characterize the Kalai–Smorodinsky SolutionResearch Paper

Axiomatic bargaining theory asks which rule should divide a set of feasible utility vectors among a group of agents, and answers by listing properties a reasonable rule must have and determining the rules that have them. Nash's solution (Nash 1950) and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975) are the two classical answers for a fixed set…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

An Iterative Method of Solving a Game: For Every Vector System, min U(t)/t and max V(t)/t Converge to the Value of the GameResearch Paper

A finite two-person zero-sum game is given by a real pay-off matrix, and its value can be computed by linear programming. In 1949 George W. Brown proposed a much simpler procedure, now called fictitious play: each player in turn plays a best pure reply to the accumulated play of the opponent so far, and the running averages are read off as estimates of the…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Graphs and Cooperation in Games: The Unique Fair Allocation Rule, the Shapley Value of the Graph-Restricted Game, Is Totally Stable for Superadditive GamesResearch Paper

Classical cooperative game theory assumes that any coalition of players can form and coordinate. In many settings cooperation is mediated by pairwise relationships: communication lines, contracts, alliances, or trade links. Roger Myerson's discussion paper Graphs and Cooperation in Games (Northwestern University, 1976; published in Mathematics of Operations…

18 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Operations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Comparison of Threshold Stop Rules and Maximum for Independent Nonnegative Random Variables I: A Median Threshold Rule Achieves EX* ≤ 2E⁺X_τResearch Paper

In a finite stopping problem, a decision maker observes rewards one at a time and must accept one without seeing the future. A fully informed observer takes the maximum. This comparison is often called a prophet inequality. The abstract bound that an optimal stopping rule can secure at least half the expected maximum does not say how to choose a simple…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
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