Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

Open323Completed525All848
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

How Advance Sales Can Reduce Profits: When to Buy, When to Sell, and What Price to Charge: The Profit-Maximizing Price and Induced Arrival Rates Under High DemandResearch Paper

A seller with scarce stock may offer a product before its main selling period. This gives buyers another chance to obtain it, but it can also alter when they compete for the stock. The seller must choose a price while anticipating that buyers respond to both the price and the chance that the unit will already be gone. Glazer, Hassin, and Nowik study this…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Partial Vertical Ownership, Capacity Investment, and Information Exchange in a Supply Chain II: Truthful Cheap Talk Is an Equilibrium Iff the Ownership Share β Is at Least β̳Research Paper

A supplier who must build capacity before a selling season would like to know how large demand will be, and the retailer downstream often knows better. Under a simple wholesale-price contract, however, the retailer gains from overstating demand: more capacity means more sales for her, and the cost of idle capacity falls on the supplier. Since the retailer's…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Marketplace Leakage 1: With Uniform Switching Costs the Equilibrium Fee Is min{μ, v − c}, Leakage Is Positive but Partial, and the Marketplace's Profit Increases in μResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Airbnb, Amazon, eBay, Preply or Upwork earn most of their revenue from transaction fees: a seller who sells through the marketplace pays a fee on every sale. Many of these sellers also run their own sales channel, and a buyer who discovers a seller on the marketplace can often complete the purchase directly with that seller,…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail I: Under Centralized Dispute Resolution the Equilibrium Ransom Is Not Monotonically Decreasing in Efficiency γδResearch Paper

Online marketplaces depend on consumer reviews, and a single negative review can move a seller's future sales. Review blackmail exploits this: a consumer buys a product, posts a negative review, and offers to remove it in exchange for a payment. Platforms such as Amazon, eBay, Taobao and TripAdvisor respond with dispute resolution mechanisms that let…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Dispute Resolution in Two-Sided Platforms: The Case of Review Blackmail II: Under Semi-Decentralized Dispute Resolution with Penalty b the Equilibrium Ransom Has a Two-Regime Closed FormResearch Paper

Online marketplaces rely on consumer reviews, and a negative review lowers what future buyers believe about a product. Review blackmail exploits this: a consumer buys, posts a negative review, and offers to remove it for a ransom. Platforms counter with dispute-resolution mechanisms. Papanastasiou, Yang and Zhang (Management Science 69(10), 2023) compare…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach I: The Sender's Persuasion Problem Is Solved by a Convex Program over Conv(P_a ∪ {0})Research Paper

Bayesian persuasion studies a sender who observes a state of the world and commits in advance to a randomized disclosure rule, in order to influence the action of a receiver who updates her belief by Bayes' rule. Since Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) the model has been applied to platform design, recommendation systems, queue information and rating systems.…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Ride-Hailing Networks with Strategic Drivers: The Impact of Platform Control Capabilities on Performance: Centralized Control Has a Unique Driver Equilibrium and the Two-Step Solution Is OptimalResearch Paper

Ride-hailing platforms such as Uber and Lyft match riders with self-scheduling drivers who decide for themselves whether to work. Two features make capacity planning on such a platform different from classical fleet management. Demand is spatially imbalanced: more trips start in some locations than end there, so cars accumulate where they are not needed…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption II: A Self-Financing Consumer Access Fee Sustains Full Blockchain Adoption for Large Horizontal DifferentiationResearch Paper

A permissioned blockchain is a shared ledger to which only approved participants may write. In supply chains it is proposed as a way to make product information (origin, quality, which supplier fulfilled an order) verifiable to buyers. Iyengar, Saleh, Sethuraman and Wang (SSRN 3602376; Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4532) ask who gains from…

10 thms2 active users
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions 3: Even with Full Information and v_t ≡ 1, Every Bidding Policy Has Worst-Case Expected Regret at Least c√TResearch Paper

Most online advertising inventory is sold one impression at a time in automated auctions, and since about 2019 the major ad exchanges have moved from second-price to first-price rules: the highest bidder wins and pays its own bid. A bidder in a first-price auction must trade off winning probability against the price paid, and that trade-off depends on the…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions II: Simultaneous-Iterative-Pruning Is a Budget-Feasible 64-Approximation for Non-Monotone Submodular ValuationsResearch Paper

In a budget-feasible procurement auction an auctioneer with a budget BBB buys services from strategic sellers. Each seller knows privately what providing the service costs, and the auctioneer wants a set of services of maximum value without paying more than BBB in total. The model was introduced by Singer (FOCS 2010) and is used to study crowdsourcing, data…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Financing vs. Trade Credit for Lending to Third-Party Sellers II: At Low Uncertainty the Platform Gains by Lending Just Above the Risk-Free Rate at Low Cost and Just Below It at High CostResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon, Alibaba and JD.com host millions of third-party sellers, many of them small firms without the working capital to pay their suppliers upfront. Two sources of credit compete for them. In trade credit the supplier ships the goods and is paid at the end of the season, bearing the risk that the seller cannot repay. In platform…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions 6: If the HOB Law Switches at an Unknown Value Threshold, Every Bidding Policy Has Regret Ω(T)Research Paper

In a first-price auction the highest bidder wins and pays her own bid. Display advertising moved to first-price auctions around 2019, and a bidder who participates in millions of them faces a learning problem: at each round ttt she sees a private value vt∈[0,1]v_t\in[0,1]vt​∈[0,1] for the item, bids bt∈[0,1]b_t\in[0,1]bt​∈[0,1], and wins when btb_tbt​ is at least the highest other bid (HOB) mtm_tmt​,…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design III: Against Exchangeable or Arbitrary Joint Valuations the Minimax Regret Is 1/e for Every nResearch Paper

A seller with one item faces nnn buyers whose valuations she does not know, not even in distribution. Prior-independent mechanism design asks which selling mechanism performs well against every distribution in a given class, rather than against one known prior. Anunrojwong, Balseiro and Besbes (arXiv:2204.10478v5, Operations Research 2025) measure performance…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions IV: No Deterministic Posted-Price Mechanism Beats a √n/2-Approximation for Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

In budget-feasible procurement an auctioneer with a budget BBB wants to buy services from nnn strategic sellers. Each seller iii has a private cost ci≥0c_i\ge0ci​≥0, the auctioneer has a public valuation vvv over sets of sellers, and the mechanism must choose whom to pay and how much, so that sellers have no reason to misreport and the total payment never exceeds BBB. The…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Financing vs. Trade Credit for Lending to Third-Party Sellers I: The Seller's Interest-Rate Threshold Never Exceeds the Supplier's, So Platform Loans Are Win-Win, Lose-Win or Lose-LoseResearch Paper

Small third-party sellers on e-commerce marketplaces (Amazon, JD.com, Alibaba) typically have little capital and limited credit history, so they finance procurement through short-term credit. The traditional source is trade credit: the supplier ships the goods and is paid after the sales. Since about 2011 the platforms themselves lend to their sellers (the…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Flow Allocation Games 2: In Unit-Ranking Games Every Strong Equilibrium Has Total Flow at Least the Optimum Divided by the Min-Max Cycle Length dResearch Paper

Financial networks are webs of liabilities: firm uuu owes firm vvv an amount c(u,v)c_{(u,v)}c(u,v)​, and every firm holds some external assets. When firms cannot pay in full, how much money actually moves through the network depends on how each firm splits its available funds among its creditors. The classical clearing model of Eisenberg and Noe (2001) fixes this split by a…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Risk Exposure and Systemic Instability I: Banks' Risk-Exposure Choices Are Strategic Complements in Every Financial NetworkResearch Paper

Banks lend to each other. When one bank's investments fail, it may be unable to repay its interbank debt, and its creditors then receive less. Since Eisenberg and Noe (2001), the standard way to compute who pays whom after such losses has been a clearing vector: a fixed point of a system in which every bank pays the smaller of what it owes and what it has.…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Endogenous Merger Decisions Among Competitors: Impact of Limited Capacity and Loyal Segments: The Mixed Merger Is the Equilibrium Iff α(1−2α)/(1−3α) < k < 1−2α, Else No MergerResearch Paper

Antitrust authorities review horizontal mergers by asking whether the merged firm will raise prices. A prior question is which mergers firms will choose to form at all. When several firms can merge, the identity of the partner matters: a large firm may absorb a small rival, or two small rivals may combine to face the large one. Wang, Wu, Tang and Dai (Manage…

16 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management IV: With Disjoint Supports, Full Disclosure Is Optimal When 2(b₀ − a₀) ≥ b₁ − a₁, Else No Disclosure at p₀ ≥ p̃ and Partial BelowResearch Paper

A retailer usually knows more about her future demand than the supplier who has to produce for her. If the supplier must commit to a production quantity before the order arrives, the retailer bears the cost of every unit he fails to produce. She cannot pay him or contract on quantities, but she can decide how much of her demand information to share, and she…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria 3: For Submodular Valuations Every α-Approximate Pure Nash Equilibrium of Round-Robin Is α/3-EF1Research Paper

Round-Robin is the simplest allocation rule for indivisible goods: agents take turns, in a fixed order, picking their favourite remaining good. When agents have additive valuations and report them truthfully, the outcome is envy-free up to one good (EF1) — every agent values its own bundle at least as much as any other bundle with one good removed, a notion…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management II: Under Partial Disclosure the Value of Information Is Unimodal in p₀ and Falling in ξ Against No Disclosure, the Reverse Against FullResearch Paper

A retailer often knows more about her own demand than the supplier who produces for her. When the supplier must commit to a production quantity before demand is realized, what the retailer tells him shapes how much he produces, and therefore how much demand she can serve. Information design (Bayesian persuasion, Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) asks how a…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management I: With Nested Uniform Demand Supports, Full, No or Two-Message Partial Disclosure Is Optimal According to Critical-Ratio ThresholdsResearch Paper

A retailer who sees her own demand before her supplier does can decide how much of that knowledge to pass upstream. Sharing everything is not obviously best: the supplier uses the information to set his production quantity for his own benefit, and the retailer bears a cost when he under-produces. Candogan and Gurkan (SSRN 4378997; published in Management…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: LG

Rural Hospitals Theorem (Wikipedia): All Stable Matchings Fill the Same PositionsTextbook

In centralized labour markets such as the US National Resident Matching Program, doctors are assigned to hospital residency positions by a mechanism that produces a stable matching. There are more positions than doctors, so some hospitals end up with empty positions; these are typically rural hospitals, which are less sought after than urban ones. This…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsEconomics·Captain: LG

Stable Matching Problem (Wikipedia) I: The Gale–Shapley AlgorithmTextbook

The stable matching problem asks for a pairing between two equally sized groups in which no two participants would both rather be matched with each other than with their assigned partners. It was posed and solved by Gale and Shapley in 1962 in the context of college admissions and marriage (Gale–Shapley 1962). Their deferred acceptance algorithm underlies…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Operations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 2: Generalized Weighted Shapley Value Rules Yield Generalized Weighted Potential GamesResearch Paper

In a welfare sharing game, several players choose resources and receive shares of each resource's welfare. A rule for splitting welfare is useful only if the resulting players' incentives admit stable choices. The paper by Gopalakrishnan, Marden, and Wierman characterizes the distribution rules that guarantee a pure Nash equilibrium for every game formed…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
PreviousPage 18 of 21Next

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me