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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

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🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Superstar Exclusivity in Two-Sided Markets: Exclusivity Draws Consumers and Complementors to the Favored Platform and Raises Complementors' Total SurplusResearch Paper

Platform markets often feature a Superstar: a single complement whose presence moves consumers, such as a blockbuster game on a console or a star streamer on a video platform. Whether such a Superstar signs an exclusive deal with one platform or stays available on both is a recurring question for competition authorities and for platform managers. Empirical…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 1: A Prize Allocation Rule Satisfies Order Preservation, Endowment Monotonicity and Consistency iff It Is an Interval RuleResearch Paper

Sports leagues, tournaments, esports events and research competitions all end with a ranking of the participants and a sum of prize money to divide among them. How the money is split according to the ranking is a design choice with visible consequences: Winner-Takes-All schemes reward only the top, equal division ignores the ranking, and most real prize…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach II: In Binary Persuasion with a Convex Non-Adoption Region the Convex Program Reduces to a Linear Program over Ω ∪ K₀₁Research Paper

In Bayesian persuasion a sender who observes the state of the world commits to a signaling scheme, a receiver updates her belief by Bayes' rule and acts, and the sender chooses the scheme that maximizes her own expected payoff (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011). The classical theory assumes the receiver maximizes expected utility, so her payoff is linear in her…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets 2: Without Privacy Rights the Monopoly Equilibrium Has Three Breach-Cost Regimes and No Trade Once c ≥ 1 + δμ/(1 + δ)Research Paper

Personal data lets a firm tailor its product to each customer, and the same data exposes the customer to the risk of a breach. The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2018) and the California Consumer Privacy Act give consumers rights over that data. Data collection must be opted into separately from the purchase, and stored data must be erased…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model III: Stronger Interoperability Lowers the Symmetric Equilibrium Net Fee, Except in Duopoly Without an Outside OptionResearch Paper

A recurring proposal in the policy debate on dominant digital platforms is to make competing platforms interoperable, so that users of one service can interact with users of another; the EU Digital Markets Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, Article 7) imposes such an obligation on gatekeepers' messaging services. The economic case is that users then enjoy…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions 2: The ML-IS-UCB Bidding Policy Achieves Expected Regret at Most C√T log³ T for Every Oblivious Private-Value SequenceResearch Paper

Display advertising has been moving from second-price to first-price auctions: several exchanges began rolling them out in 2017, and Google Ad Manager completed its move at the end of 2019 (Davies 2019). In a second-price auction bidding one's value is a dominant strategy; in a first-price auction the optimal bid depends on the distribution of the competing…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions I: Iterative-Pruning Is a Budget-Feasible 4.75-Approximation for Monotone Submodular ValuationsResearch Paper

In a budget-feasible procurement auction a buyer with a hard budget BBB acquires services from strategic sellers. Each seller iii has a private cost cic_ici​, and the buyer values a set SSS of hired sellers at v(S)v(S)v(S). The auction must keep total payments within BBB and make truthful behaviour optimal for every seller, while hiring a set whose value is close to the best…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design II: Against Exchangeable Affiliated Valuations the Minimax Regret Equals the I.I.D. ValueResearch Paper

A seller offers one indivisible item to nnn buyers but does not know the joint distribution of their valuations. The seller knows only that every valuation lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1]. Prior-independent mechanism design asks for a selling mechanism that performs well against every distribution in a class. One measure of performance is the regret: the expected gap between…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal No-regret Learning in Repeated First-price Auctions 1: With IID Private Values a Bidding Policy Achieves Expected Regret at Most C√T log^2.5 TResearch Paper

Most display advertising is sold in first-price auctions: the highest bidder wins and pays its own bid. Since the industry's move away from second-price formats around 2019, a bidder can no longer bid its value and must instead learn how much to shade its bid, from data about how the other bidders behave. A demand-side platform faces this problem millions…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions III: A Deterministic Clock Auction Achieves an O(log n / log log n)-Approximation for Subadditive ValuationsResearch Paper

A budget-feasible procurement auction buys services from strategic sellers under a hard budget. Each of nnn bidders can provide a service at a private cost; the auctioneer values each set of acquired services through a set function vvv and must keep total payments within a budget BBB. The question, introduced by Singer (FOCS 2010), is how much of the optimal…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 2: With Nash Bargaining and Poaching After a Failed Bid, the Acquirer Hires Directly Above v̄_a, Acquihires Between v̲_a and v̄_a, and Does Not Hire Below v̲_aResearch Paper

Large technology firms often buy small startups less for their products than for their staff: the product is shut down and the employees move to the acquirer. This practice, called acquihiring, has drawn the attention of competition authorities because it can be a way to buy labour-market power rather than to create value. Bar-Isaac, Johnson and Nocke (CRC…

9 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design I: For I.I.D. Valuations a Second-Price Auction with Random Reserve Φ*ₙ Is Minimax-Regret Optimal over DSIC MechanismsResearch Paper

Optimal auction theory in the tradition of Myerson (1981) assumes that the seller knows the distribution of the buyers' valuations. In practice that distribution is estimated, misspecified, or simply unknown. Prior-independent mechanism design asks for a mechanism that performs well across a whole class of distributions, without being tuned to any one of…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Retailer-Led Marketplaces 1: Below a Capacity Threshold the Monopolist Competes Only in the Top Marketplace Products (Mode I); Above It He Also Monopolizes Unsupplied Products (Mode II)Research Paper

Large online retailers such as Amazon run two businesses on one storefront. They sell products themselves, and they host a marketplace on which third-party sellers sell, paying the platform a percentage of their revenue. A retailer that also runs the marketplace can decide which products to sell itself, and it controls which offer most consumers see.…

16 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
Operations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Telehealth in Acute Care: Pay Parity and Patient Access: Under Pay Parity, for Duplicate-Visit Probability q in (q†, q*), Telehealth Maximizes Provider Revenue but Office-Only Maximizes AccessResearch Paper

During the COVID-19 pandemic most U.S. payers began reimbursing a telehealth consultation at the same rate as the corresponding office visit, a policy called pay parity. Many states have since made it permanent, on the stated ground that it improves patients' access to care. In acute care (primary and urgent care) a telehealth visit sometimes cannot resolve…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 3: With a Uniform Private Benefit on [0, B], the Acquirer Acquihires Exactly When v_a > v_s + (7 − 3√5)B/2 and Otherwise Hires DirectlyResearch Paper

Large technology firms often buy small startups mainly to hire their staff, a practice known as acquihiring. Antitrust authorities review acquisitions that may reduce competition in product markets, but an acquihire can instead reduce competition in the labour market: a firm that buys the employer of a scarce worker no longer has to outbid that employer for…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Acquihiring for Monopsony Power 1: In the Baseline Model the Acquirer Hires the Employee Only Through Acquihiring, Exactly When v_a > v_s, and the Employee Prefers Direct HiringResearch Paper

Technology firms often buy small startups mainly to obtain their staff, a practice known as acquihiring; Chatterji and Patro (2014) identify 98 such deals between 2009 and 2013. Bar-Isaac, Johnson and Nocke (CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper No. 500, 2024, www.crctr224.de; published in Management Science, 2025, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.04604) study the labour-market…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Coopetition in Platform-Based Retailing: On the Platform’s Entry II: In the Protective Regime the Seller Underinvests to Deter Entry for Intermediate Product Base ValuesResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as Amazon are both the storefront of third-party sellers and a retailer in their own right. A platform that observes how well a seller's product sells can later launch a competing product in the same space, and empirical work finds that it does so selectively: Zhu and Liu (2018, Strategic Management Journal) report that Amazon is…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Platform Financing vs. Trade Credit for Lending to Third-Party Sellers III: At Low Uncertainty the Platform's Optimal Loan Rate Is Below the Risk-Free Rate Exactly When Production Cost Is HighResearch Paper

Small third-party sellers on e-commerce marketplaces often lack working capital to buy inventory. Two financing channels compete for them. Under trade credit, the supplier ships now and is paid after sales, bearing the seller's default risk. Under platform financing, the marketplace itself (Amazon Lending, Alibaba's microloans, JD's supply-chain finance)…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
Graph TheoryOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Flow Allocation Games 1: Every Unit-Ranking Game Has a Strong Equilibrium That Maximizes the Total FlowResearch Paper

Financial firms owe each other money. When some firms cannot meet their obligations, the payments that actually clear in the network are a fixed point: what a firm can pay depends on what it receives, which depends on what others can pay. Eisenberg and Noe (Management Science, 2001) introduced this clearing model under a fixed pro-rata payment rule. Later…

18 thms3 active users
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms II: The Core of the Streaming Game Is the Set of Allocations Splitting Each User's Payment Among the Artists That User PlayedResearch Paper

Music streaming platforms collect a subscription fee from each user and have to pass the revenue on to the artists whose content was played. The two rules used in practice are pro-rata (each artist is paid in proportion to their total number of streams, over all users) and user-centric (each user's fee is split among the artists that user played, in…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Coopetition in Platform-Based Retailing: On the Platform’s Entry I: The Seller Prefers Entry Exactly Above Thresholds in Spillover and Referral Rate and Outside a Band of Competition IntensityResearch Paper

Large online marketplaces such as Amazon, JD.com and Walmart.com act both as a sales channel for third-party sellers and as a retailer of their own. A platform watches which third-party products sell well and may start selling the same product itself, a move called platform entry. Over ten months of 2013–2014, Amazon entered about 3% of the products first…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria 2: For Submodular Valuations the Bluff Profile Is a Tight 1/2-Approximate Pure Nash Equilibrium of Round-RobinResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods among agents without money is a basic problem of fair division. The most widely used procedure is Round-Robin: the agents take turns, in a fixed order, picking their favourite remaining good. For agents with additive valuations, Round-Robin run on the agents' true preferences produces an allocation that is envy-free up to one good…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Value of Information Design in Supply Chain Management III: With Overlapping Supports, the Optimal Policy Goes from Partial to No to Full Disclosure as the Critical Ratio RisesResearch Paper

A retailer often knows more about her own demand than the supplier who must produce for her. In a decentralized supply chain the supplier sets a production quantity before demand is realized, and an under-informed supplier produces too little or too much. The retailer can shape what the supplier believes by committing in advance to a disclosure policy, a…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Sharing at Music Streaming Platforms I: Homogeneity and Additivity Characterize Weighted Indices; Adding Equal Individual or Global Impact of Users Gives Pro-Rata or User-CentricResearch Paper

Music streaming platforms collect a subscription fee from each user and pay part of the revenue to the artists whose content was played. The industry standard is the pro-rata method: the revenue pool is divided in proportion to each artist's total number of streams across all users. A competing method, the user-centric method, divides each user's own…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Retention or Acquisition? Behavior-Based Quality Disclosure I: Retention-Focused Disclosure Thresholds and Higher Second-Period Profits under Behavior-Based DisclosureResearch Paper

Firms that hold purchase-history data can treat past customers and a rival's customers differently. The economics of behavior-based pricing (BBP), charging different prices to the two groups, is well developed: in a symmetric duopoly, poaching the rival's customers with discounts intensifies competition and usually lowers profits (Fudenberg and Tirole 2000; …

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
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