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Algorithmic Game Theory

848 missions · 525 completed

Missions

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EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion 4: Signaling Achieves the First-Best Admission Policy for All Welfare Weights Above a ThresholdResearch Paper

Social services such as public health clinics, legal aid offices and food banks are congested: users wait in a queue whose length they cannot see. Some users have no alternative (high need) and others have an outside option (low need). A provider cannot price access, but can decide what to tell arriving users about the queue. Anunrojwong, Iyer and Manshadi…

15 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion 1: Every Pareto-Efficient Signaling Mechanism Has a Threshold Structure at or Below the Full-Information ThresholdResearch Paper

Many social services are rationed by waiting rather than by price: public health clinics, food banks, shelters, legal aid. Users who need the service most often have no outside option, while users with less need could be served elsewhere but join the queue anyway and lengthen everyone's wait. The provider usually cannot force anyone to leave, and charging…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 3: The Price of Anarchy Is Locally Lipschitz at Games with Constant Costs or Strictly Increasing C¹ CostsResearch Paper

The price of anarchy (PoA) of a nonatomic congestion game is the ratio of the total cost of a Wardrop equilibrium to the minimum total cost. Worst-case bounds on it over whole classes of cost functions are classical (Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002; Correa, Schulz and Stier-Moses, 2004). In practice the demands and cost functions of a traffic model are…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisOperations ResearchOptimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A Sensitivity Analysis of the Price of Anarchy in Nonatomic Congestion Games 2: The Social Optimum Cost, the Wardrop Equilibrium Cost and the Price of Anarchy Are Continuous on the Game SpaceResearch Paper

Traffic users choose routes for themselves, while a planner may choose routes that minimize everyone's combined travel cost. The price of anarchy measures the cost of the users' equilibrium relative to the planner's optimum. Travel demand and arc latency functions are estimated from data and change over time, so a ratio that changes abruptly under a small…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 5: For Two Agents, Every Equilibrium of an Always-EFX Mechanism Is α-MMS for Some α > 2/3Research Paper

Dividing indivisible goods fairly among agents is a basic problem of fair division. Most of the literature assumes that the agents' valuations are known to the algorithm. In practice the algorithm only sees what the agents report, and an agent may misreport to get a better bundle. For allocation without money, truthful mechanisms are very restricted: for…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 4: For Two Agents and Four Goods, Every Equilibrium of an Always-EFX Mechanism Is MMSResearch Paper

Dividing indivisible goods fairly is a central problem of computational social choice. With additive valuations, the fairness notions of interest are relaxations of envy-freeness, since exact envy-freeness is often impossible with indivisible items. The strongest relaxation in common use is envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) (Caragiannis et al., 2019); a…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness 2: Round-Robin Has a Pure Nash Equilibrium in Every Instance with Additive ValuationsResearch Paper

Fair division of indivisible goods asks how to split a set of items among agents with different values so that nobody has strong grounds to complain. Algorithms with fairness guarantees, such as Round-Robin, which always produces an allocation that is envy-free up to one good (EF1) when agents report their true additive valuations (Caragiannis et al., 2019),…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Accelerability vs. Scalability: R&D Investment Under Financial Constraints and Competition II: Unconstrained R&D Race: Best Responses Rise on Accelerable Projects and a Symmetric Equilibrium ExistsResearch Paper

Two firms developing competing innovations face a decision that a single firm does not: a rival's discovery can end the value of continuing the project. If the first discovery wins the payoff, each firm chooses how much to spend per period while knowing that greater spending may change both its payoff on success and its speed of discovery. The investment…

6 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationMechanism Design+2·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms 1: Some Stationary Equilibrium of Directed Search Attains a Quarter of the First-Best WelfareResearch Paper

Two-sided platforms for dating, freelancing and housing do more than list participants: they decide whom each participant is shown. When search is costly and agents leave the market over time, the platform's choice of assortments (which types of agents meet which, and how often) determines who matches, and agents respond strategically by deciding which…

14 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control 3: Under Topics-Style Category Tracking Both Advertisers Bid on ADX1 Exactly When the Inaccuracy τ Is Below an Explicit Threshold τ̃ > 1Research Paper

Online display advertising is sold through ad exchanges, and much of its value comes from targeting: showing an ad to consumers known to be interested in the advertised product. For two decades the main tracking technology was the third-party cookie, under which an exchange can follow a consumer only after an advertiser agrees to share the data from its own…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 3: The Midpoint Fixed-Fraction Rule Is the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of the Liability GameResearch Paper

When one breached contract forces the next party to breach its own contract, a single failure travels down a loss chain: agent 1 (the initiator) causes a loss ℓ1\ell_1ℓ1​ to agent 2, which can then no longer honour its agreement with agent 3 and causes it a loss ℓ2\ell_2ℓ2​, and so on until agent nnn causes a loss ℓn\ell_nℓn​ to a final victim. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (…

13 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 4: The Threshold Equilibrium Investment in New Mining Hardware, with Entry Decreasing in the Fixed CostResearch Paper

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin pay a block reward to the miner that first solves a computational puzzle. The chance of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total computing power (hash rate), so mining is a contest in which every miner pays for hash rate and the reward is split in proportion to it. Over time mining moved from…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 1: Random Sampling Vickrey Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a 2(d+1)-Approximation to Welfare for d-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

In an auction with interdependent values, a bidder's value can depend on information held by other bidders. An estimate of a shared resource's usefulness, for example, may improve when another participant reports a stronger signal. The auctioneer must decide whom to serve using reported signals, while each participant has an incentive to report a signal…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Climate Impact Investing 1: With an Average-Emissions Interaction Effect the Unique Equilibrium Emission Schedule Is ψ* − ε/(2n+ε)·(ψ* + 2n²ψ̄*/(2n+(n+1)ε)), Below the Schedule Without InteractionResearch Paper

Green investors hold a growing share of financial wealth, and the stated purpose of much of this capital is to change how companies behave, not only to avoid exposure to climate risk. Whether exclusionary or impact-oriented portfolios actually move corporate emissions is an equilibrium question: investors' preferences shift the cost of capital, and…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
Linear OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Quantum Algorithms for Zero-Sum Games 1: With Step ε/4, Grigoriadis–Khachiyan Sampling Play Yields ε-Optimal Strategies After ⌈16 ln(nm/δ)/ε²⌉ Iterations with Probability ≥ 1 − δResearch Paper

Two-player zero-sum matrix games are the simplest model of strict competition, and computing their value is equivalent to linear programming. Many algorithms in optimization and learning (boosting, online learning with experts, approximate LP and SDP solvers) are, at their core, procedures that approximately solve such a game. For large games the cost of…

10 thms3 active usersReviewed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control 1: The Ad Exchange Allows Cross-Targeting Exactly When (No Leave) and (No Leave & Snipe) Hold, and Both Advertisers Always Share Data With ItResearch Paper

Display advertising on the open web runs through ad exchanges, intermediaries that sell ad impressions on third-party publisher sites to advertisers. A large share of these ads is retargeting: an advertiser shows ads to consumers who recently visited its own website and so revealed purchase intent. Retargeting needs tracking data (a cookie or pixel placed…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
Economics·Captain: mikedeng1

Sharing Sequentially Triggered Losses: Automated Conflict Resolution Through Smart Contracts 4: On Loss Trees the Same Four Axioms Characterize the Fixed-Fraction RulesResearch Paper

When one agent breaches a contract, the breach often forces its counterparty to breach its own contracts in turn, and the losses propagate. Supply chains are the standard example: a supplier that fails to deliver makes its customer fail to deliver to its own customers. Gudmundsson, Hougaard and Ko (Management Science 70(3), 2024) ask how the total loss of…

11 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisMechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 2: Under Local α-Power Envelopes, ε-IC Mechanisms Gain at Most Õ(ε^(α/(2α−1))) RevenueResearch Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents optimize exactly: a buyer facing a menu picks the option that maximizes his utility, however small the advantage over the next-best option. In many settings this is implausible. Agents may face cognitive or computational costs, or the designer may only be able to certify incentives approximately, as in…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 1: The Mining Game Has a Unique Equilibrium Whose Number of Active Miners Is Fixed by an Explicit Cost ConditionResearch Paper

Proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin keep their ledger secure by a contest: miners spend computing power ("hash rate") to solve a cryptographic puzzle, and the miner who solves it first earns the block reward. The probability of winning is proportional to a miner's share of the total hash rate, so mining is a rent-seeking contest in the sense of…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations ResearchOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Proof-of-Work Cryptocurrencies: Does Mining Technology Undermine Decentralization? 2: Signs of the Sensitivities of Equilibrium Hash Rates and Hash Rate Shares to Mining CostsResearch Paper

In a proof-of-work cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, miners spend computing power (hash rate) to win the right to add the next block and collect a reward. Whether this competition stays decentralized depends on how individual hash rates react to differences in mining costs: if a cost advantage translates into an ever larger share of the total hash rate,…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 3: Hard/Soft Floor Mechanisms Are Optimal Among Deterministic ε-IC Mechanisms and Gain Θ(ε)Research Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents best-respond exactly: a buyer who gains even an infinitesimal amount by misreporting will misreport. In practice agents face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may ignore a deviation that gains less than some small amount ε\varepsilonε. A seller facing such a buyer only needs to satisfy the incentive…

7 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations ResearchProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help? I: With a Vote-Probability Gap δ, an Honest Committee Is Elected with Probability at Least 1 − 2m²e^{−δ²n/2}Research Paper

Many proof-of-stake blockchains do not let every participant produce blocks. Instead, token holders elect a small committee of block producers, and the committee runs a Byzantine agreement protocol among itself. EOS, for example, elects 21 producers by approval voting: each token holder approves a set of candidates, and the 21 candidates with the most…

8 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility 1: Nisan's Rounding Bounds the Revenue Gain of ε-IC Mechanisms by O(ε^(1/2))Research Paper

Classical mechanism design assumes that agents are perfect optimizers: a mechanism is incentive compatible if no buyer gains anything, however small, by misreporting. In practice buyers face cognitive and computational costs, and a buyer may not bother to deviate for a gain below some threshold ε\varepsilonε. Balseiro, Besbes and Castro, Mechanism Design…

5 thms3 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 2: Anonymity, Order Preservation, Winner Strict Endowment Monotonicity and Local Consistency Characterize Single-Parametric RulesResearch Paper

Tournaments, races, poker finals and sports leagues end with a ranking of the participants and a sum of prize money to be split among them. The split is usually fixed by a published schedule, and different events use very different schedules: some pay almost everything to the winner, some pay many places, some decay geometrically from one place to the next.…

12 thms3 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsOperations Research·Captain: mikedeng1

Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions 3: Anonymity, Order Preservation, Winner Strict Endowment Monotonicity and Top Consistency Characterize Parametric RulesResearch Paper

Rank-order competitions — sports tournaments, poker final tables, golf tours, crowdsourcing contests, sales leagues — end with a ranking of the participants and a pot of prize money that has to be split according to that ranking. Organisers publish prize tables that change with the number of entrants and with the size of the purse, and these tables are…

9 thms3 active usersReviewed
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