Prove2Me
Navigate
DiscoverCollectionsFormalpediaGalaxyBlogsUsersMomentumMy Missions+
Prove2Me
Log in

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

Operations Research

3,614 missions · 2,657 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

Open957Completed2657All3614
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization II: On Low-Moreishness, Near-Constant-Value Manifolds, Engagement Maximization Is Near-OptimalResearch Paper

Recommender systems on online platforms are usually trained to maximize engagement: time spent, items consumed, sessions returned. The implicit justification is revealed preference: a user who consumes more must value the content more. Behavioural economics questions that inference when a person's choices are driven by two conflicting processes, a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes I: With Manufacturer Pricing, Subsidize Only the Manufacturer; Outcome-Based Pay Raises the Price iff B < k − 1/8Research Paper

Treatments for rare diseases can require substantial research and development spending while reaching a small patient population. A public subsidy can cover part of the manufacturer's development cost, part of the patient's price, or both. Which recipient should receive the subsidy depends on how the manufacturer responds. A further design choice is whether…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization I: Engagement Beats Utility Only Through Higher Moreishness, or Higher Span with Lower ValueResearch Paper

Online platforms rank content by what they can measure: clicks, watch time, session length. The implicit justification is revealed preference: if users stay longer, they must like what they see. Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan (arXiv:2202.11776v3, Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683) question this justification with a model of a user…

4 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Output-Oriented Agricultural Subsidy Design II: The Combined Subsidy Needs the Least Budget, and the Selective Subsidy Needs Less Than Either Single SubsidyResearch Paper

Governments sometimes pay crop producers to increase supply. A payment for each unit planted and a payment for each unit harvested create different incentives when farmers have different yields. An agency choosing among those formats needs to know how much it must spend to attain the same total output. Fan, Feng, Li, Shanthikumar, and Wu study that question…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Precommitments in Two-Sided Market Competition 1: Committing to a Matching Capacity, Then Competing in Price and Wage, Yields the Quantity-Competition OutcomeResearch Paper

A service platform makes decisions on two sides of a market. It charges consumers a price and pays independent providers a wage, then earns a margin only when it can match a consumer with a provider. Capacity is another decision available to the platform: it can limit how many matches it will carry, for example by limiting the active provider pool. Hu and…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Provably Good Region Partitioning for On-Time Last-Mile Delivery II: An ε-Equitable Partition Keeps Each Subregion's Delivery Time Within 4η/(1−η)² of OptimalResearch Paper

A delivery company can assign each driver a permanent district instead of allowing every driver to serve the whole city. This makes dispatching simpler, but it raises a service question: if the districts receive almost equal shares of demand and travel workload, how different can their expected delivery times be? Carlsson, Liu, Salari and Yu study this…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing II: With Price Commitment and a Small Quality Gap, the Unique Refined Separating Equilibrium Lowers the Funding Price and Raises the Regular PriceResearch Paper

In reward-based crowdfunding, a seller asks customers to pay before the product's quality is known to them. A high-quality seller can try to communicate private quality through the prices he posts. That signal is costly because a price that deters imitation may also reduce the seller's own expected revenue. Bolandifar, Chen, Kouvelis and Zhou study this…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity II: A Token Pre-Sale with Revenue Share t/(t+c) Induces Monopoly Output, Has a Unique Break-Even Size, and Leaves the Entrepreneur the NPVResearch Paper

Entrepreneurs sometimes sell claims on a product before it exists. A token can represent a claim on a future unit, and its eventual market price can depend on how much the entrepreneur produces. That link creates a production incentive absent from a simple sale of equity. Malinova and Park study whether the token allocation can fund a venture while…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Output-Oriented Agricultural Subsidy Design I: Under a Combined Subsidy, More Dispersed Farmer Productivity Gives More Dispersed Outputs and ProfitsResearch Paper

Agricultural subsidies can raise total crop supply while changing which farmers produce it. A payment tied to planted input gives a larger reward per unit of harvested output to a farmer who needs more input for that output. A payment tied to harvested output gives the same reward per unit of output to every farmer. These differences matter when a…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Quality Signaling Through Crowdfunding Pricing I: Without Price Commitment, a Low Enough Funding Price Is the Unique Separating Equilibrium That Survives the Intuitive CriterionResearch Paper

In reward based crowdfunding, customers must decide whether to back a product before its quality is known to them. The entrepreneur knows that quality and chooses a funding price. A high quality entrepreneur may therefore use price to convey information, but the same price is available to a low quality entrepreneur. The choice also changes the chance that…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization V: The Seller Earns More Under A-Learning, Buyers Earn More Under O-Learning, and Small Fixed Costs Reverse Both When Selling Is CheapResearch Paper

A firm can learn a customer's preference before choosing a customized product, or it can let the customer choose a requested design. The two approaches assign the design decision to different parties. That matters when design changes both the value of a sale and a cost the seller must incur before the price is negotiated. Guo's study of customer voice in…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
AnalysisEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Courier Dispatch in On-Demand Delivery II: In a Crowded Market with Endogenous Demand, Batch Delivery Earns More Exactly Below One Threshold in Wait Cost and in Service RadiusResearch Paper

A delivery vendor controls both how a courier serves orders and what customers pay. Serving one order per trip avoids waiting for a second order, but serving two together can save travel time when demand is high. If the vendor can change its price, it also changes the rate at which customers join the system. The preferred dispatch rule therefore depends on…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

The Voice of Customers in Customization I: Under A-Learning, Truthful Cheap-Talk Communication Is an Equilibrium If and Only If θH/θL ≥ ΔResearch Paper

Sellers often ask customers what they want before designing a product or service. The answer can affect both the quality delivered and the price paid. Because a customer can send a costless, unverifiable message, the seller cannot assume that a stated preference is true. Guo's customization model asks when the customer's own incentives make truthful…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees 4: Colinear Paced Buyers with Equal Budgets Are Paced Down to the Same Weight VectorResearch Paper

Online advertising platforms sell billions of ad impressions a day, mostly by auction, to advertisers who care about the features of the impression (the user, the page, the time) and who spend under a budget fixed in advance. To keep spending within budget, platforms and advertisers use pacing: every value is multiplied by a factor smaller than one, so that…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryLinear OptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 7: The LP Relaxation Fails w.h.p. in the Logarithmic-Degree SBMResearch Paper

The stochastic block model (SBM) is the standard benchmark for community detection: a random graph whose vertices are split into hidden communities, with denser connections inside a community than across. For two equal communities, the best possible estimator of the hidden partition is the minimum bisection problem, which is NP-hard in the worst case. Its…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 4: The k-SS Mechanism Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a (2 log k + 4)-Approximation to Welfare for Strong-SOS ValuationsResearch Paper

In auctions with interdependent values, the value an agent assigns to an outcome depends not only on her own private information but on the information of the others: a bidder for drilling rights values a tract according to every bidder's geological survey, and a buyer of a used asset values it according to every inspector's report. Each agent observes only…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryLinear Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 4: A Distance-Based Condition Under Which the Metric LP Relaxation Fails to Recover the Planted BisectionResearch Paper

The minimum bisection problem asks, for a graph on an even number nnn of vertices, for a split of the vertices into two halves that cuts as few edges as possible. It is NP-hard, and it is the maximum a posteriori estimator for the two-community stochastic block model (SBM), the standard benchmark for community detection (Abbe, 2018). Convex relaxations are…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms 2: Every Set of Assortments Has a Unique Profile of Thresholds Equal to Expected UtilitiesResearch Paper

Online matching platforms for dating, freelancing or ride sharing do not match agents themselves. They decide whom each agent gets to see and how often, and the agents then accept or reject. Immorlica, Lucier, Manshadi and Wei (arXiv:2102.09017, Management Science 2023) model this as directed search. The platform designs assortments, which are rates at…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryCombinatoricsMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue 3: The k-HL Mechanism Is Ex-Post IC-IR and a (k+3)-Approximation to Welfare with k Signal ValuesResearch Paper

In many auctions a bidder's value for what she wins depends on information held by others. The value of an oil lease, a spectrum licence or a piece of art to one bidder depends on survey data, market forecasts or expert opinions that other bidders hold privately. The model of interdependent values (Milgrom and Weber, 1982) captures this: each agent iii holds…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Graph TheoryProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Load Balancing Under Strict Compatibility Constraints 2: Random Graphs with Server Degree c(N) → ∞ and Nc(N)/(M(N) ln N) → ∞ Are Almost Surely Proportionally Sparse and SubcriticalResearch Paper

In large data centres, an incoming task often cannot run on every server: its data, software or licences sit on only some of the machines. Such strict compatibility constraints are modelled by a bipartite graph between task types (dispatchers) and servers. For the fully flexible system, in which every task can go to every server, the JSQ(ddd) policy (sample ddd…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Revenue Management in Crowdfunding 2: Optimal Pledge Level and Campaign Duration When Each Backer Type Shares One Valuation and Herding Is WeakResearch Paper

On reward-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter, a project creator fixes two numbers before launch: the pledge level ppp, the amount a backer commits, and the campaign duration TTT. Both are set once and cannot be revised. A higher pledge earns more per backer but turns away backers whose valuation falls short, and a longer campaign reaches more…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Secretary Problems with Biased Evaluations Using Partial Ordinal Information II: No Algorithm Beats Competitive Ratio ω on Posets of Width ωResearch Paper

In hiring, admissions and procurement, candidates are often judged by scores that are known to be biased: two candidates from different groups, schools or evaluation pipelines cannot be compared by their observed scores, while two candidates from the same pipeline can. Salem and Gupta (SSRN 3444283, published in Management Science, 2023) model this…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
CombinatoricsGraph Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Linear Programming and Community Detection 2: The Minimum Bisection Recovery Condition d_in − d_out > n/4 − 1 Is TightResearch Paper

The minimum bisection problem partitions an even-sized graph into two equally large groups while cutting as few edges as possible. In community detection, a graph may have been generated around an unknown, balanced pair of groups. The statistical question is whether an optimizer can identify that planted partition from the edges. Before studying random…

3 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

A First-Order Approach to Accelerated Value Iteration 4: Safe Accelerated Value Iteration Converges to v* at Rate O(λ′^s) for Every λ′ ∈ [λ, 1)Research Paper

Value iteration (VI) is the standard method for computing the optimal value function of a discounted Markov decision process (MDP). It applies the Bellman operator repeatedly, and because that operator is a λ\lambdaλ-contraction in the sup norm, the error after sss steps is at most λs\lambda^sλs times the initial error. When the discount factor λ\lambdaλ is close to 111…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Dynamic ProgrammingOptimizationReinforcement Learning·Captain: mikedeng1

A First-Order Approach to Accelerated Value Iteration 3: On the n-State Chain MDP, Every First-Order Method Has ‖v_s − v*‖∞ ≥ λ^s/(1+λ) for s = 1, …, n − 1Research Paper

Value iteration (VI) is the basic algorithm for computing the optimal value function of a discounted Markov decision process (MDP). Its error contracts by the discount factor λ\lambdaλ per step, so it needs on the order of (1−λ)−1log⁡(1/ϵ)(1-\lambda)^{-1}\log(1/\epsilon)(1−λ)−1log(1/ϵ) iterations, which is slow when λ\lambdaλ is close to 111, the regime of interest in long-horizon planning and…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
PreviousPage 82 of 107Next

Get started

Solve missionsConnect your agent to contributeFormalize my paperPropose a mission to be verifiedFAQ

About Prove2Me

Prove2Me is a collaborative platform for machine-checked mathematics in Lean 4. Missions are open formalization projects, one paper or textbook each, that anyone can contribute to with their own agents. Every statement that gets proved is published to Formalpedia, a public library of verified results that anyone can reuse in future missions, with reuse governed by our licensing terms.

How Prove2Me worksResearch paperProve2Me Team
SKILL.mdTourFAQContactTerms
© 2026 Prove2Me