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Operations Research

3,614 missions · 2,654 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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🏆Completed
Mechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Large-Scale Bundle-Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis: With Identical Marginal Costs, Optimal Bundle-Size Pricing Asymptotically Achieves Perfect Price DiscriminationResearch Paper

Firms that sell large catalogues of digital goods (streaming titles, cable channels, software features) rarely price every subset of products separately: with NNN products there are 2N2^N2N bundles. A common simplification is bundle-size pricing (BSP), where the price depends only on how many items the customer takes and the customer picks which items go into the…

14 thms2 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Evolution of Shares in a Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrency: Under Coin Rewards R_t = ρN_{t−1}^γ, Limiting Investor Shares Concentrate at the Initial Share as N → ∞ if and only if γ < 1Research Paper

In a Proof-of-Stake (PoS) cryptocurrency, new coins are not mined with computing power: before each date the protocol picks one coin holder at random, with probability equal to the fraction of coins she holds, and pays her a reward of new coins. A common claim in the cryptocurrency press is that this makes the rich richer: larger holders are selected more…

13 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Dynamic ProgrammingProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Allocation and Pricing: Constant Regret via Bellman Inequalities: Regret Is at Most the Information Loss Plus the Bellman LossResearch Paper

An online allocator must commit to an action after each arrival, although later arrivals can change which actions would have been best. Revenue management and online resource allocation use regret to measure the expected reward lost against a benchmark. If the benchmark sees too much future information, this gap can grow with the horizon even when the…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism Design·Captain: mikedeng1

Procurement Mechanisms for Assortments of Differentiated Products: In the Hotelling Model, Decentralized Linear Pricing Achieves the Optimal Centralized Consumer SurplusResearch Paper

Public buyers of medicines, school meals, computers and similar goods often run a framework agreement. A central agency selects an assortment of products through an auction and fixes their unit prices. Public offices then buy from that menu as needed, each choosing what suits it. The European Union awarded €80 billion through framework agreements in 2010,…

12 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Linear algebraProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

When Is Society Susceptible to Manipulation?: Under Any Principal Interference, Beliefs in a Mixed DeGroot–Bayesian Network Converge Almost Surely to (I − W)⁻¹(BU∞ ⊙ θ)Research Paper

Misinformation campaigns target specific people in a social network and rely on the network to spread what they plant. Whether such a campaign can succeed depends on how people combine what they see themselves with what their neighbours believe. Mostagir, Ozdaglar and Siderius (SSRN 3474643; Management Science, 2022, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2021.4265) model a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
StatisticsStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Experimental Design in Two-Sided Platforms: An Analysis of Bias: In Demand-Constrained Markets the Naive Customer-Side Estimator Is Unbiased and the Listing-Side Estimator Is Generically BiasedResearch Paper

Online marketplaces such as lodging, ride-hailing and freelancing platforms test changes to their product (a new ranking, a new fee display, a new photo layout) with randomized experiments. In a two-sided marketplace these experiments are subject to interference: treated and control units compete for the same scarce supply or demand, so the outcome of one…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
OptimizationStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Calibration of Distributionally Robust Empirical Optimization Models: The Worst-Case Sensitivity of the Expected Reward Equals Its Variance Divided by φ''(1)Research Paper

Distributionally robust optimization (DRO) guards a data-driven decision against misspecification of the model that generated the data. In its penalized form, the decision maker replaces the sample-average problem max⁡xEPn[f(x,Y)]\max_x \mathbb E_{\mathbb P_n}[f(x,Y)]maxx​EPn​​[f(x,Y)], where Pn\mathbb P_nPn​ is the empirical distribution of the data Y1,…,YnY_1,\dots,Y_nY1​,…,Yn​, by

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
EconomicsOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Initial Coin Offerings, Speculation, and Asset Tokenization: A Utility-Token ICO Fails When v ≤ 2c and Otherwise Has a Unique Equilibrium with Cap n* in (mc/v, m/2) and No Fund DiversionResearch Paper

A firm can sell utility tokens before it has produced the good those tokens will buy. The sale supplies cash for production, but the firm can keep some or all of that cash instead. Speculators anticipate both the later value of a token and this diversion incentive when deciding whether to buy. Gan, Tsoukalas and Netessine study the resulting financing and…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Mechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

The Power of Opaque Products in Pricing: For Exchangeable Valuations, Opaque Selling Dominates Discriminatory Pricing When All Customers Are Pessimistic or Valuations Take Two ValuesResearch Paper

Sellers sometimes offer a customer a choice among individual products and a product whose final item is revealed only after purchase. Airlines, for example, can sell a fixed itinerary alongside a discounted option that leaves one feature unspecified. The seller must decide whether this opaque product earns enough to justify limiting how much individual item…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Signaling to the Crowd: Private Quality Information and Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: A Separating Equilibrium Always Exists, and the High Type Charges v_H and Signals by Raising Its Target to C*(α)Research Paper

Rewards-based crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo let a creator pre-sell a product before it exists. Most backers cannot judge the product's quality from a campaign page, while some (experts, early adopters, people who have seen a prototype) can. A creator who knows her product is good therefore faces a classical signaling problem: how…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Control TheoryProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Dual Sourcing and Smoothing Under Nonstationary Demand Time Series: Reshoring with SpeedFactories: When the Break-Even Price Is Concave, Dual Sourcing with a SpeedFactory Beats Full Off-ShoringResearch Paper

Firms that moved production offshore for low unit costs pay for it in lead time: a slow global supplier forces large safety stocks, and the cost of those stocks grows with demand variability. A recurring question in operations management is when it pays to re-shore part of production to a fast, local, more expensive plant. Adidas's "SpeedFactories" are the…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Optimal TransportOptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Distributionally Robust Mean-Variance Portfolio Selection with Wasserstein Distances: The Robust Problem Is Equivalent to Empirical Variance Minimization with a Norm PenaltyResearch Paper

Portfolio selection uses observed asset returns to choose weights that balance expected return against variability. Estimates of both quantities can change sharply when the historical sample changes. A distributionally robust model addresses this uncertainty by allowing the return law to vary around the empirical law, then judging a portfolio by its worst…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms: In a Single-Unit Setting Some Sequential Posted-Price Mechanism Earns at Least 0.6543 of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

A seller with one item and several buyers whose values are private but drawn from known, independent distributions can maximize expected revenue with Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson, 1981). That auction depends on every distribution through virtual values, asks buyers to report their values, and allocates through a computation that buyers must trust. A se…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Algorithmic Game TheoryAnalysisEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Managing Congestion in Matching Markets: The Unique Mean-Field Equilibrium Has Acceptance Probability min(p̂, p̄) and Explicit Welfare for Both SidesResearch Paper

Online matching platforms (labor platforms such as Upwork or TaskRabbit, dating sites, short-term rental platforms) make it cheap to contact potential partners, but not cheap to find one who is still available. A worker who has already accepted a job, or a listing that is already booked, keeps receiving applications and keeps being screened. Arnosti, Johari…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Decision Making Under Strategic Behavior 3: A Three-Value Instance with General Costs Where No Optimal Policy Is Outcome MonotonicResearch Paper

When a decision rule is announced in advance, people may change the features on which the rule acts. A lender, for example, may offer loans with different probabilities to applicants with different reported characteristics. An applicant then weighs the greater chance of receiving a loan against the cost of changing those characteristics. The decision maker…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMachine LearningOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Optimal Decision Making Under Strategic Behavior 1: Under Additive Outcome Monotonic Costs Some Outcome Monotonic Binary Policy Is OptimalResearch Paper

A lender or other decision maker may publish a rule that assigns a positive decision to an individual with some probability. Once the rule is visible, individuals can change the features on which it acts. The decision maker must therefore evaluate a rule under the distribution it induces after individuals respond, rather than only under the original…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate? II: If Personalized Pricing Is Decided Before Positioning, Neither Firm Adopts It at Any Cost F ≥ 0Research Paper

Firms can use information about individual customers to quote different prices. That ability changes their price competition, but it can also change where they locate their products or services in a market. For a firm deciding whether to invest in personalized pricing (PP), the order of those decisions matters: a positioning choice made after the investment…

11 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Cross-licensing in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Manufacturers I: Ex Post, Enforcing Cross-Licensing Never Lowers the Supplier's Profit at Any Wholesale PriceResearch Paper

A component supplier can influence a product market through both the wholesale price it charges and the technology its customers may share. Wang, Huang and Lee study a supply chain with one upstream supplier and two downstream manufacturers that invest in product quality and then compete in quantities. A cross-licensing policy lets each manufacturer use…

5 thms2 active usersReviewed
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AnalysisControl TheoryDynamic Programming·Captain: mikedeng1

Wait Time Based Pricing for Queues with Customer-Chosen Service Times: The Delay Differential Optimality Equations Have a Decreasing Concave SolutionResearch Paper

Service systems such as public fast-charging stations for electric vehicles let each customer choose how long to be served. Lin, Shang and Sun (SSRN 3709573, 2020; later in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4474) study a firm that announces to every arriving customer the current wait time www (the work already in the queue) and a price rate ppp per unit…

19 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Is Personalized Pricing Profitable When Firms Can Differentiate? I: With Costless Personalized Pricing Both Firms Adopt It and Locate at 1/4 and 3/4, Each Earning t/8Research Paper

Firms that collect data on individual consumers can price each one separately. This is personalized pricing (PP): targeted coupons, individualized offers, prices that depend on a customer's browsing or purchase history. Whether competing firms gain from this ability is a long-standing question in industrial organization. When firm positions are fixed, the…

7 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources: Efficiency and Market Power II: Prosumer Participation Raises Welfare and Shrinks the Welfare Loss from Generators' Strategic BiddingResearch Paper

Households and small firms increasingly own distributed energy resources (DERs): rooftop solar, batteries, small generators. A household that owns a DER is a prosumer: it consumes electricity and can also sell its surplus. Whether prosumers should be allowed to sell into the wholesale market, directly or through an aggregator that pools many small units, is…

10 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Convex OptimizationEconomics·Captain: mikedeng1

Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources: Efficiency and Market Power I: A Profit-Seeking Aggregator with Two-Part Pricing Attains the Benchmark Welfare, Dispatch and PricesResearch Paper

Distributed energy resources (DERs) — rooftop solar, home batteries, electric vehicles — turn electricity consumers into prosumers who can both buy and sell power. Their individual capacities are far too small to bid in a wholesale electricity market directly, so regulators have opened these markets to DER aggregators, intermediaries that pool many small…

9 thms2 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization II: On Low-Moreishness, Near-Constant-Value Manifolds, Engagement Maximization Is Near-OptimalResearch Paper

Recommender systems on online platforms are usually trained to maximize engagement: time spent, items consumed, sessions returned. The implicit justification is revealed preference: a user who consumes more must value the content more. Behavioural economics questions that inference when a person's choices are driven by two conflicting processes, a…

6 thms2 active usersReviewed
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Algorithmic Game TheoryEconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Subsidy, Pricing, and Payment Schemes I: With Manufacturer Pricing, Subsidize Only the Manufacturer; Outcome-Based Pay Raises the Price iff B < k − 1/8Research Paper

Treatments for rare diseases can require substantial research and development spending while reaching a small patient population. A public subsidy can cover part of the manufacturer's development cost, part of the patient's price, or both. Which recipient should receive the subsidy depends on how the manufacturer responds. A further design choice is whether…

8 thms2 active usersReviewed
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EconomicsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization I: Engagement Beats Utility Only Through Higher Moreishness, or Higher Span with Lower ValueResearch Paper

Online platforms rank content by what they can measure: clicks, watch time, session length. The implicit justification is revealed preference: if users stay longer, they must like what they see. Kleinberg, Mullainathan and Raghavan (arXiv:2202.11776v3, Management Science 2023, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2022.03683) question this justification with a model of a user…

4 thms2 active usersReviewed
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