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Operations Research

1,703 missions · 841 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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Control TheoryDynamical SystemsProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Stabilization of Hybrid Systems by Feedback Control Based on Discrete-Time State Observations I: Almost Sure Asymptotic StabilityResearch Paper

Motivation

Many engineered systems switch between a finite number of operating modes at random times: a power grid after a line failure, a networked controller whose links drop, a manufacturing plant whose machines break down and are repaired. A standard model for such systems is a hybrid stochastic differential equation, also called an SDE with Markovian switching: the state follows an Itô equation whose coefficients depend on a mode that evolves as a continuous-time Markov chain. The monograph of Mao and Yuan (Stochastic Differential Equations with Markovian Switching, 2006) develops the stability theory of these equations.

A controller that stabilizes such a system usually needs the current state. In practice the state is sampled: it is observed at times 0,τ,2τ,…0,\tau,2\tau,\dots0,τ,2τ,… and the control is held between observations. Mao (Automatica 49, 2013) showed that, under a global Lipschitz condition on the drift and diffusion, a feedback control based on discrete-time observations stabilizes a hybrid SDE in the sense of mean-square exponential stability when τ\tauτ is small enough. You, Liu, Lu, Mao and Qiu (SIAM J. Control Optim. 53(2), 2015) replaced that condition by local Lipschitz continuity plus linear growth, gave an explicit bound (3.5) on the admissible observation interval τ\tauτ, and proved H∞H_\inftyH∞​-stability, mean-square asymptotic stability, almost sure asymptotic stability and exponential stability of the controlled system. This mission formalizes the almost sure asymptotic stability result, Theorem 3.4, and the results it is built on.

Setting

Let (Ω,F,{Ft}t≥0,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,\{\mathcal F_t\}_{t\ge0},\mathbb P)(Ω,F,{Ft​}t≥0​,P) be a probability space with a filtration satisfying the usual conditions (increasing, right-continuous, F0\mathcal F_0F0​ contains the null sets). On it live an mmm-dimensional {Ft}\{\mathcal F_t\}{Ft​}-Brownian motion www and a right-continuous {Ft}\{\mathcal F_t\}{Ft​}-Markov chain rrr on S={1,…,N}S=\{1,\dots,N\}S={1,…,N} with generator Γ=(γij)\Gamma=(\gamma_{ij})Γ=(γij​) (γij≥0\gamma_{ij}\ge0γij​≥0 for i≠ji\ne ji=j, zero row sums), independent of www. Fix τ>0\tau>0τ>0 and the sampling time δt=[t/τ]τ\delta_t=[t/\tau]\tauδt​=[t/τ]τ, the last observation time up to ttt. The controlled system is

dx(t)=(f(x(t),r(t),t)+u(x(δt),r(t),t))dt+g(x(t),r(t),t) dw(t),x(0)=x0, r(0)=r0,(2.1)dx(t)=\big(f(x(t),r(t),t)+u(x(\delta_t),r(t),t)\big)dt+g(x(t),r(t),t)\,dw(t),\qquad x(0)=x_0,\ r(0)=r_0,\tag{2.1}dx(t)=(f(x(t),r(t),t)+u(x(δt​),r(t),t))dt+g(x(t),r(t),t)dw(t),x(0)=x0​, r(0)=r0​,(2.1)

with f,u:Rn×S×R+→Rnf,u:\mathbb R^n\times S\times\mathbb R_+\to\mathbb R^nf,u:Rn×S×R+​→Rn and g:Rn×S×R+→Rn×mg:\mathbb R^n\times S\times\mathbb R_+\to\mathbb R^{n\times m}g:Rn×S×R+​→Rn×m. The feedback uuu sees the state only at the observation times.

The hypotheses are:

  • Assumption 2.1: f,gf,gf,g locally Lipschitz in xxx, and ∣f(x,i,t)∣≤K1∣x∣|f(x,i,t)|\le K_1|x|∣f(x,i,t)∣≤K1​∣x∣, ∣g(x,i,t)∣≤K2∣x∣|g(x,i,t)|\le K_2|x|∣g(x,i,t)∣≤K2​∣x∣ (∣g∣|g|∣g∣ the trace norm).
  • Assumption 2.2: ∣u(x,i,t)−u(y,i,t)∣≤K3∣x−y∣|u(x,i,t)-u(y,i,t)|\le K_3|x-y|∣u(x,i,t)−u(y,i,t)∣≤K3​∣x−y∣ and u(0,i,t)=0u(0,i,t)=0u(0,i,t)=0.
  • Assumption 3.1: there are U∈C2,1(Rn×S×R+;R+)U\in C^{2,1}(\mathbb R^n\times S\times\mathbb R_+;\mathbb R_+)U∈C2,1(Rn×S×R+​;R+​) and λ1,λ2>0\lambda_1,\lambda_2>0λ1​,λ2​>0 with LU(x,i,t)+λ1∣Ux(x,i,t)∣2≤−λ2∣x∣2\mathcal LU(x,i,t)+\lambda_1|U_x(x,i,t)|^2\le-\lambda_2|x|^2LU(x,i,t)+λ1​∣Ux​(x,i,t)∣2≤−λ2​∣x∣2, where
LU=Ut+Ux[f+u]+12trace⁡[gTUxxg]+∑jγijU(x,j,t).\mathcal LU=U_t+U_x[f+u]+\tfrac12\operatorname{trace}[g^TU_{xx}g]+\sum_j\gamma_{ij}U(x,j,t).LU=Ut​+Ux​[f+u]+21​trace[gTUxx​g]+j∑​γij​U(x,j,t).
  • Condition (3.5): λ2>τK32λ1[2τ(K12+2K32)+K22]\lambda_2>\frac{\tau K_3^2}{\lambda_1}\big[2\tau(K_1^2+2K_3^2)+K_2^2\big]λ2​>λ1​τK32​​[2τ(K12​+2K32​)+K22​] and τ≤14K3\tau\le\frac1{4K_3}τ≤4K3​1​.

In Lean these are Assumption21, Assumption22, C21, LU, Assumption31, Condition35, in the namespace You2015.Asymp; the basis is HybridSetup, the Itô integral IsItoIntegral, the sampling time delta, and solutions SolvesSampledHybridSDE, in the namespace You2015.Shared shared with the companion mission.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3.4 (almost sure asymptotic stability)

Under the hypotheses above, every solution of (2.1) satisfies

lim⁡t→∞x(t)=0a.s.\lim_{t\to\infty}x(t)=0\quad\text{a.s.}t→∞lim​x(t)=0a.s.

for all x0∈Rnx_0\in\mathbb R^nx0​∈Rn and r0∈Sr_0\in Sr0​∈S. No rate is claimed; the statement is the qualitative convergence of almost every path.

Milestones, in the order the proof uses them

  1. (3.15) E∣x(t)−x(δt)∣2≤2E∫δtt[τ∣f+u(x(δs),⋅)∣2+∣g∣2]ds\mathbb E|x(t)-x(\delta_t)|^2\le2\mathbb E\int_{\delta_t}^t[\tau|f+u(x(\delta_s),\cdot)|^2+|g|^2]dsE∣x(t)−x(δt​)∣2≤2E∫δt​t​[τ∣f+u(x(δs​),⋅)∣2+∣g∣2]ds.
  2. Theorem 3.2 (H∞H_\inftyH∞​-stability): ∫0∞E∣x(s)∣2ds<∞\int_0^\infty\mathbb E|x(s)|^2ds<\infty∫0∞​E∣x(s)∣2ds<∞.
  3. (3.21) E∣x(s)−x(δs)∣2≤3(τK12+K22)1−6τ2K32∫δssE∣x(z)∣2dz+6τ2K321−6τ2K32E∣x(s)∣2\mathbb E|x(s)-x(\delta_s)|^2\le\frac{3(\tau K_1^2+K_2^2)}{1-6\tau^2K_3^2}\int_{\delta_s}^s\mathbb E|x(z)|^2dz+\frac{6\tau^2K_3^2}{1-6\tau^2K_3^2}\mathbb E|x(s)|^2E∣x(s)−x(δs​)∣2≤1−6τ2K32​3(τK12​+K22​)​∫δs​s​E∣x(z)∣2dz+1−6τ2K32​6τ2K32​​E∣x(s)∣2.
  4. (3.23) sup⁡t≥0E∣x(t)∣2<∞\sup_{t\ge0}\mathbb E|x(t)|^2<\inftysupt≥0​E∣x(t)∣2<∞.
  5. ∣E∣x(t2)∣2−E∣x(t1)∣2∣≤C(t2−t1)|\mathbb E|x(t_2)|^2-\mathbb E|x(t_1)|^2|\le C(t_2-t_1)∣E∣x(t2​)∣2−E∣x(t1​)∣2∣≤C(t2​−t1​).
  6. Theorem 3.3: lim⁡t→∞E∣x(t)∣2=0\lim_{t\to\infty}\mathbb E|x(t)|^2=0limt→∞​E∣x(t)∣2=0.
  7. (3.24)–(3.25): E∫0∞∣x(t)∣2dt<∞\mathbb E\int_0^\infty|x(t)|^2dt<\inftyE∫0∞​∣x(t)∣2dt<∞ and lim inf⁡t→∞∣x(t)∣=0\liminf_{t\to\infty}|x(t)|=0liminft→∞​∣x(t)∣=0 a.s.
  8. (3.28): P(∃t:∣x(t)∣≥h)≤C/h2\mathbb P(\exists t:|x(t)|\ge h)\le C/h^2P(∃t:∣x(t)∣≥h)≤C/h2 for h>∣x0∣h>|x_0|h>∣x0​∣.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3.4 says that a controller sampling the state at rate 1/τ1/\tau1/τ makes almost every trajectory of the switching system converge to the equilibrium, with an explicit, checkable bound (3.5) on τ\tauτ. Mean-square convergence (Theorem 3.3) does not imply almost sure convergence in general, and a single trajectory is what an operator observes, so the pathwise statement is the one relevant to a deployed system. Condition (3.5) is stated in terms of the constants of Assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 3.1, so for a concrete system (Section 6 of the paper) it gives a numerical bound on the observation interval.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none of them is machine-checked. Mathlib has real Brownian motion but no Itô integral, no stochastic differential equations and no continuous-time Markov chains. The mission therefore also produces a reusable definition layer: a filtration under the usual conditions, a multidimensional {Ft}\{\mathcal F_t\}{Ft​}-Brownian motion, an {Ft}\{\mathcal F_t\}{Ft​}-Markov chain with a given generator, the L2L^2L2 Itô integral of vector-valued integrands, and the solution notion of an SDE with Markovian switching and a sampled-state delay. A related but different layer exists on Prove2Me for Ethier–Kurtz (EthierKurtz_IsStandardBrownian, EthierKurtz_HasBrownianItoIntegral, EthierKurtz_SolvesBrownianSDE); it has no mode switching and no sampled state, so it cannot express (2.1).

Difficulty

Equation (2.1) is a stochastic differential delay equation with the delay t−δtt-\delta_tt−δt​, which is bounded but jumps at every observation time and has derivative 111 in between. The stability theorems for hybrid delay equations in the literature require a differentiable delay with derivative less than one (Mao–Yuan, p. 285), so they do not apply. Applying LU\mathcal LULU directly to U(x(t),r(t),t)U(x(t),r(t),t)U(x(t),r(t),t) leaves the term Ux[u(x(t))−u(x(δt))]U_x[u(x(t))-u(x(\delta_t))]Ux​[u(x(t))−u(x(δt​))], which has no sign and depends on the path over a whole observation interval, so a Lyapunov function of the current state alone does not close the argument.

For the goal, the natural first idea, deducing almost sure convergence from E∣x(t)∣2→0\mathbb E|x(t)|^2\to0E∣x(t)∣2→0 or from ∫0∞∣x(t)∣2dt<∞\int_0^\infty|x(t)|^2dt<\infty∫0∞​∣x(t)∣2dt<∞ a.s., fails: both are compatible with paths that make ever shorter excursions away from 000. The obstacle is to exclude infinitely many excursions of a fixed size, which neither moment statement controls.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in Lean:

  • The state space is EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin n), so ∣x∣|x|∣x∣ is the Euclidean norm; the explicit constants in (3.5) and (3.21) depend on it. The diffusion ggg is given by its mmm columns and ∣g∣2=∑k∣gk∣2|g|^2=\sum_k|g_k|^2∣g∣2=∑k​∣gk​∣2 (trace norm). Modes are Fin N (0-based). Time is ℝ≥0; time integrals are over subsets of R\mathbb RR at s.toNNReal.
  • Every expectation E∣⋅∣2\mathbb E|\cdot|^2E∣⋅∣2 and every time integral of a nonnegative quantity is a lower Lebesgue integral in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞], so a non-integrable process cannot produce a junk value 000.
  • "The solution of (2.1)" is read as every process satisfying the solution definition: progressively measurable, almost surely continuous paths, E∣x(t)∣2<∞\mathbb E|x(t)|^2<\inftyE∣x(t)∣2<∞ for each ttt, and for each ttt, almost surely, the integral equation with Itô integrals in the L2L^2L2 sense. Existence and uniqueness (cited from Mao–Yuan on p. 908) are not asserted.
  • "An mmm-dimensional Brownian motion" and "a Markov chain with generator Γ\GammaΓ" are read in the Mao–Yuan framework the paper cites: an {Ft}\{\mathcal F_t\}{Ft​}-Brownian motion with independent coordinates and increments independent of the past, and an {Ft}\{\mathcal F_t\}{Ft​}-Markov chain with transition matrix etΓe^{t\Gamma}etΓ. The usual conditions are kept as hypotheses.
  • "Locally Lipschitz" is uniform in the mode and time on each ball. C2,1C^{2,1}C2,1 carries its derivatives Ut,Ux,UxxU_t,U_x,U_{xx}Ut​,Ux​,Uxx​ as witnesses tied to UUU by derivative relations and joint continuity.
  • "τ>0\tau>0τ>0 sufficiently small for (3.5)" means every τ>0\tau>0τ>0 satisfying both inequalities of (3.5). U,λ1,λ2,τU,\lambda_1,\lambda_2,\tauU,λ1​,λ2​,τ are data of each statement. The paper's "CCC denotes a positive constant" is an existential chosen after x0x_0x0​, r0r_0r0​ and the solution, and before the time variables and hhh.
  • (3.15) and (3.21) are stated under fewer hypotheses than the surrounding proof has (Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, τ>0\tau>0τ>0, and for (3.21) τ≤1/(4K3)\tau\le1/(4K_3)τ≤1/(4K3​)), because their derivations use no more. Misprints on the page (for example g(x,i,s)=f(x,i,0)g(x,i,s)=f(x,i,0)g(x,i,s)=f(x,i,0) on p. 909 and the swapped definitions of ∨,∧\vee,\wedge∨,∧ on p. 907) are not formalized.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the expectations are not Bochner integrals (which vanish for non-integrable integrands), the solution notion admits the true solution and requires path continuity, the derivative witnesses of UUU are tied to UUU, and a sorry-free check shows that the data hypotheses (Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, C2,1C^{2,1}C2,1, (3.5)) are satisfiable, for example by n=m=N=1n=m=N=1n=m=N=1, f=g=0f=g=0f=g=0, u(x)=−xu(x)=-xu(x)=−x, U=∣x∣2U=|x|^2U=∣x∣2, λ1=1/4\lambda_1=1/4λ1​=1/4, λ2=1\lambda_2=1λ2​=1, τ=1/10\tau=1/10τ=1/10.

Welcome contributions: the Itô isometry and Itô's formula for the L2L^2L2 integral defined here, a generalized Itô formula for functions of a Markov-modulated Itô process, and Doob's maximal inequality in continuous time. These are reusable far beyond this mission. Section 4 of the paper (exponential stability) is a separate mission of the same series.

Selected references

  • S. You, W. Liu, J. Lu, X. Mao, Q. Qiu, Stabilization of Hybrid Systems by Feedback Control Based on Discrete-Time State Observations, SIAM J. Control Optim. 53(2), 905–925, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1137/140985779
  • X. Mao, C. Yuan, Stochastic Differential Equations with Markovian Switching, Imperial College Press, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1142/p473
  • X. Mao, Stabilization of continuous-time hybrid stochastic differential equations by discrete-time feedback control, Automatica 49(12), 3677–3681, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2013.09.005
13 thms1 active userReviewed
Control TheoryOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

A General Stochastic Maximum Principle for Optimal Control Problems: The Maximum Principle with First- and Second-Order Adjoint ProcessesResearch Paper

Motivation

Pontryagin's maximum principle gives necessary conditions for optimality in deterministic optimal control: along an optimal trajectory, the optimal control maximizes (or minimizes) a Hamiltonian built from an adjoint process. For a system driven by Brownian noise the analogous statement was open in full generality for two decades. The difficulty appears exactly when the diffusion coefficient depends on the control and the control domain is not convex, the situation of controlled volatility in finance, of controlled noise intensity in engineering, and of any problem whose admissible actions form a discrete or otherwise nonconvex set.

Shige Peng's 1990 paper (SIAM J. Control Optim. 28(4)) closed that case. It introduced the second-order adjoint process and a second-order variational inequality, and it is the starting point of the modern theory of stochastic Hamiltonian systems and of backward stochastic differential equations as a tool in control.

Timeline.

  • 1972: Kushner obtains necessary conditions for diffusions whose diffusion coefficient does not depend on the control (SIAM J. Control 10).
  • 1973–1978: Bismut introduces the adjoint equation as a linear backward stochastic differential equation and develops duality methods (SIAM Review 20).
  • Early 1980s: Bensoussan and Haussmann prove maximum principles for convex control domains or control-independent diffusion, using the first-order adjoint equation only.
  • 1990: Peng proves the general principle, with control-dependent diffusion and an arbitrary nonempty control domain (this mission). In the same year Pardoux and Peng prove existence and uniqueness for nonlinear backward SDEs (Systems Control Lett. 14).
  • 1999: Yong and Zhou give a textbook account of the theory (Springer).

Setting

Let (Ω,F,P)(\Omega,\mathcal F,P)(Ω,F,P) be a probability space carrying a standard ddd-dimensional Wiener process B=(B1,…,Bd)B=(B^1,\dots,B^d)B=(B1,…,Bd), and let Ft=σ{B(s);0≤s≤t}\mathcal F^t=\sigma\{B(s);0\le s\le t\}Ft=σ{B(s);0≤s≤t} be its natural filtration. Fix a horizon T>0T>0T>0, an initial state x0∈Rnx_0\in\mathbb R^nx0​∈Rn and a nonempty control domain U⊆RkU\subseteq\mathbb R^kU⊆Rk. The data are

g:Rn×Rk→Rn,σ=(σ1,…,σd), σj:Rn×Rk→Rn,l:Rn×Rk→R,h:Rn→R.g:\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^k\to\mathbb R^n,\quad \sigma=(\sigma^1,\dots,\sigma^d),\ \sigma^j:\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^k\to\mathbb R^n,\quad l:\mathbb R^n\times\mathbb R^k\to\mathbb R,\quad h:\mathbb R^n\to\mathbb R .g:Rn×Rk→Rn,σ=(σ1,…,σd), σj:Rn×Rk→Rn,l:Rn×Rk→R,h:Rn→R.

An admissible control vvv is a progressively measurable UUU-valued process with sup⁡t≤TE∣v(t)∣m<∞\sup_{t\le T}E|v(t)|^m<\inftysupt≤T​E∣v(t)∣m<∞ for every m≥1m\ge1m≥1. Its trajectory solves the state equation

dx(t)=g(x(t),v(t)) dt+∑j=1dσj(x(t),v(t)) dBj(t),x(0)=x0,dx(t)=g(x(t),v(t))\,dt+\sum_{j=1}^d\sigma^j(x(t),v(t))\,dB^j(t),\qquad x(0)=x_0,dx(t)=g(x(t),v(t))dt+j=1∑d​σj(x(t),v(t))dBj(t),x(0)=x0​,

and its cost is J(v)=E∫0Tl(x(t),v(t)) dt+E h(x(T))J(v)=E\int_0^Tl(x(t),v(t))\,dt+E\,h(x(T))J(v)=E∫0T​l(x(t),v(t))dt+Eh(x(T)). A pair (y,u)(y,u)(y,u) is optimal when J(u)≤J(v)J(u)\le J(v)J(u)≤J(v) for every admissible vvv.

Assumption (3): g,σ,l,hg,\sigma,l,hg,σ,l,h are C2C^2C2 in xxx, jointly continuous in (x,v)(x,v)(x,v) together with their first and second xxx-derivatives; gx,gxx,σx,σxx,lxx,hxxg_x,g_{xx},\sigma_x,\sigma_{xx},l_{xx},h_{xx}gx​,gxx​,σx​,σxx​,lxx​,hxx​ are bounded; and g,σ,lx,hxg,\sigma,l_x,h_xg,σ,lx​,hx​ grow at most like C(1+∣x∣+∣v∣)C(1+|x|+|v|)C(1+∣x∣+∣v∣).

The Hamiltonian is H(x,v,p,K)=l(x,v)+(p,g(x,v))+∑j(Kj,σj(x,v))H(x,v,p,K)=l(x,v)+(p,g(x,v))+\sum_j(K_j,\sigma^j(x,v))H(x,v,p,K)=l(x,v)+(p,g(x,v))+∑j​(Kj​,σj(x,v)). The first-order adjoint process (p,K)(p,K)(p,K) solves the backward equation

−dp=[gx∗p+∑jσxj∗Kj+lx]dt−∑jKj dBj,p(T)=hx(y(T)),-dp=\Big[g_x^*p+\sum_j\sigma_x^{j*}K_j+l_x\Big]dt-\sum_jK_j\,dB^j,\qquad p(T)=h_x(y(T)),−dp=[gx∗​p+j∑​σxj∗​Kj​+lx​]dt−j∑​Kj​dBj,p(T)=hx​(y(T)),

and the second-order adjoint process (P,Q)(P,Q)(P,Q), symmetric-matrix valued, solves

−dP=[gx∗P+Pgx+∑jσxj∗Pσxj+∑jσxj∗Qj+∑jQjσxj+Hxx]dt−∑jQj dBj,P(T)=hxx(y(T)),-dP=\Big[g_x^*P+Pg_x+\sum_j\sigma_x^{j*}P\sigma_x^j+\sum_j\sigma_x^{j*}Q_j+\sum_jQ_j\sigma_x^j+H_{xx}\Big]dt-\sum_jQ_j\,dB^j,\qquad P(T)=h_{xx}(y(T)),−dP=[gx∗​P+Pgx​+j∑​σxj∗​Pσxj​+j∑​σxj∗​Qj​+j∑​Qj​σxj​+Hxx​]dt−j∑​Qj​dBj,P(T)=hxx​(y(T)),

with all coefficients evaluated along (y(t),u(t))(y(t),u(t))(y(t),u(t)) and both solutions adapted to Ft\mathcal F^tFt.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 975)

If (y,u)(y,u)(y,u) is optimal, then adjoint processes (p,K)(p,K)(p,K) and (P,Q)(P,Q)(P,Q) exist in LF2L^2_{\mathcal F}LF2​, solving the two equations above, such that for every v∈Uv\in Uv∈U, for almost every τ∈[0,T]\tau\in[0,T]τ∈[0,T], almost surely,

H(y,v,p,K−Pσ(y,u))+12tr⁡(σσ∗(y,v)P) ≥ H(y,u,p,K−Pσ(y,u))+12tr⁡(σσ∗(y,u)P),H\big(y,v,p,K-P\sigma(y,u)\big)+\tfrac12\operatorname{tr}\big(\sigma\sigma^*(y,v)P\big)\ \ge\ H\big(y,u,p,K-P\sigma(y,u)\big)+\tfrac12\operatorname{tr}\big(\sigma\sigma^*(y,u)P\big),H(y,v,p,K−Pσ(y,u))+21​tr(σσ∗(y,v)P) ≥ H(y,u,p,K−Pσ(y,u))+21​tr(σσ∗(y,u)P),

all evaluated at time τ\tauτ.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: the spike-perturbed state equals y+y1+y2y+y_1+y_2y+y1​+y2​ up to o(ε2)o(\varepsilon^2)o(ε2) in mean square, where y1,y2y_1,y_2y1​,y2​ solve the first- and second-order variational equations (5), (6).
  2. Lemma 2: the cost expansion (11) is ≥o(ε)\ge o(\varepsilon)≥o(ε) at an optimal control.
  3. Eq. (13): existence and uniqueness of (p,K)(p,K)(p,K) as a Riesz representer.
  4. Eq. (14): the cost expansion in Hamiltonian form is ≥o(ε)\ge o(\varepsilon)≥o(ε).
  5. Eq. (17): existence and uniqueness of (P,Q)(P,Q)(P,Q) as a Riesz representer.
  6. Eq. (18): the variational inequality for these representers.
  7. Eq. (19): (p,K)(p,K)(p,K) is the unique solution of the first-order adjoint equation.
  8. Eq. (20): (P,Q)(P,Q)(P,Q) solves the second-order adjoint equation.

Significance

The result. Theorem 3 is the necessary condition for optimal control of diffusions in its general form. When σ\sigmaσ does not depend on the control the trace terms cancel and it reduces to the classical first-order principle. When the control enters the diffusion, the first-order condition is false in general, and the second-order adjoint PPP is the correction. The theorem underlies stochastic linear-quadratic theory, the verification of optimal portfolio and volatility-control policies, and the relation between the maximum principle and the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation.

Formalizing it. The theorem is classical and proved; none of it is machine-checked. Mathlib has real Brownian motion but no stochastic integral, no SDE and no backward SDE. This mission produces the first formal statements on the platform of a controlled SDE, of a backward SDE and of the maximum principle, together with a precise definition layer (Itô integral, Itô process, BSDE solution) that later missions can reuse, e.g. for Peng's endpoint-constrained principle (§6 of the paper) or for the existence theory of BSDEs. A formal proof would also pin down the approximation arguments the paper leaves to the reader.

Difficulty

The obvious route perturbs the optimal control convexly, u+ε(v−u)u+\varepsilon(v-u)u+ε(v−u), and differentiates the cost. That needs UUU convex. For nonconvex UUU one uses a spike variation on a time interval of length ε\varepsilonε. For deterministic systems the state then moves by O(ε)O(\varepsilon)O(ε) and a first-order expansion suffices. With control-dependent diffusion the stochastic integral over the spike interval moves the state by order ε\sqrt\varepsilonε​ in L2L^2L2, so the first-order variational equation leaves an error of the same order as the effect being measured. Second-order terms in the state enter the cost at order ε\varepsilonε, and they are quadratic, so they cannot be handled by a single linear adjoint. The second-order expansion, the matrix-valued adjoint that represents the quadratic term, and the identification of both adjoints with backward SDEs are where the work lies. On the formal side, none of the stochastic calculus exists in Mathlib: the Itô isometry, Itô's formula for matrix-valued processes, moment estimates for linear SDEs and the martingale representation behind the backward equations all have to be built.

Formalization scope

Conventions committed to in Lean:

  • States, controls and noise are Fin n → ℝ, Fin k → ℝ, Fin d → ℝ with the sup norm; matrices are Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ. Time is ℝ≥0, and time integrals are over [0, t] ⊂ ℝ.
  • The Wiener process is Rd\mathbb R^dRd-valued: the paper's "RnR^nRn-valued standard Wiener process" (p. 967) is a misprint, since σ(x,v)∈L(Rd,Rn)\sigma(x,v)\in\mathcal L(R^d,R^n)σ(x,v)∈L(Rd,Rn). Coordinates are independent real Brownian motions (Mathlib's IsBrownianReal).
  • The filtration is the natural filtration of BBB, not completed, as on p. 967.
  • "Adapted", for processes integrated in dtdtdt, is read as progressively measurable.
  • The Itô integral is a relation (an L2L^2L2 limit of elementary integrals, as in Ikeda–Watanabe), not an operator. SDE and BSDE solutions hold "for every ttt, almost surely", with sup⁡tE∣x(t)∣2<∞\sup_tE|x(t)|^2<\inftysupt​E∣x(t)∣2<∞ for forward solutions and LF2L^2_{\mathcal F}LF2​ membership for backward ones.
  • Optimality is among admissible controls of finite cost, and the optimal cost is finite; the paper never states finiteness, and a cost can be +∞+\infty+∞ under (3).
  • Lemma 1 is stated with o(ε2)o(\varepsilon^2)o(ε2) where the page prints "≤Cε2\le C\varepsilon^2≤Cε2" in (4). The proof (via (10)) establishes o(ε2)o(\varepsilon^2)o(ε2), and Lemma 2 needs it. Lemma 1, (13), (17), (19) and (20) are stated for any admissible pair, since their proofs do not use optimality.
  • "≥o(ε)\ge o(\varepsilon)≥o(ε)" means: some r(ε)=o(ε)r(\varepsilon)=o(\varepsilon)r(ε)=o(ε) as ε→0+\varepsilon\to0^+ε→0+ bounds the left side from below for small ε\varepsilonε. "∀v∈U\forall v\in U∀v∈U, a.e., a.s." quantifies vvv first, then τ\tauτ, then ω\omegaω.
  • PPP and QjQ_jQj​ are symmetric-valued (Rn,nR^{n,n}Rn,n is the space of symmetric matrices, p. 973). Stochastic integrals against the matrix σ\sigmaσ or QQQ are sums over the columns, ∑j(⋅)j dBj\sum_j(\cdot)_j\,dB^j∑j​(⋅)j​dBj.

Trivializing formalizations ruled out. Without adaptedness the backward equations have pathwise solutions with K=0K=0K=0 and the goal would be free; every adjoint and every solution is required to be progressive for the natural filtration of BBB. The hypotheses are satisfiable: a sorry-free check shows that the zero problem has an optimal pair and that the Itô relation holds for the zero integrand.

Infrastructure needed, and reusable. The Itô integral and isometry, Itô's formula (vector and matrix forms), existence, uniqueness and moment estimates for linear SDEs with bounded coefficients, Riesz representation in LF2L^2_{\mathcal F}LF2​, and existence and uniqueness for linear BSDEs (via martingale representation for the Brownian filtration). All of these are reusable well beyond this mission; contributions of any of them, as separate theorems, are welcome. Related platform definitions: the Ethier–Kurtz series (EthierKurtz_HasBrownianItoIntegral, EthierKurtz_SolvesBrownianSDE) formalizes an Itô integral by dyadic step approximation and uncontrolled SDEs over a completed filtration. The deterministic Pontryagin principle appears in Vector Space Methods XII and Dynamic Programming and Optimal Control III.

Selected references

  • S. Peng, A General Stochastic Maximum Principle for Optimal Control Problems, SIAM J. Control Optim. 28(4), 966–979, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1137/0328054
  • H. J. Kushner, Necessary Conditions for Continuous Parameter Stochastic Optimization Problems, SIAM J. Control 10(3), 550–565, 1972. https://doi.org/10.1137/0310041
  • J.-M. Bismut, An Introductory Approach to Duality in Optimal Stochastic Control, SIAM Review 20(1), 62–78, 1978. https://doi.org/10.1137/1020004
  • E. Pardoux and S. Peng, Adapted Solution of a Backward Stochastic Differential Equation, Systems & Control Letters 14(1), 55–61, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6911(90)90082-6
  • J. Yong and X. Y. Zhou, Stochastic Controls: Hamiltonian Systems and HJB Equations, Springer, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-1466-3
12 thms1 active userReviewed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Online Network Revenue Management Using Thompson Sampling: Bayesian Regret of TS-fixedResearch Paper

Motivation

A retailer who sells several products from shared, non-replenishable inventory over a finite season must set prices without knowing how demand responds to them. Every price posted is both a sale and an experiment. This is the network revenue management problem with demand learning, and it sits between two literatures: dynamic pricing with inventory, where demand is known and the fluid linear program of Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) is the standard benchmark, and multi-armed bandits, where learning is the whole problem but there are no resource constraints.

Ferreira, Simchi-Levi and Wang (Oper. Res. 2018) combine Thompson sampling with a linear-programming step: sample a demand model from the posterior, solve the fluid LP for that model, and randomize prices according to its solution. The same paper extends the scheme to continuous price sets, contextual pricing and bandits with knapsacks.

Timeline of the relevant results:

  • 1997: Gallego and van Ryzin introduce the fluid LP upper bound for network revenue management with known demand.
  • 2012: Besbes and Zeevi give a non-Bayesian network pricing algorithm with worst-case regret O(K5/3T2/3log⁡T)O(K^{5/3}T^{2/3}\sqrt{\log T})O(K5/3T2/3logT​).
  • 2013: Badanidiyuru, Kleinberg and Slivkins (bandits with knapsacks) give worst-case regret O(KTlog⁡T)O(\sqrt{KT\log T})O(KTlogT​).
  • 2013–2014: Bubeck and Liu and Russo and Van Roy give prior-free Bayesian regret bounds for Thompson sampling in unconstrained bandits.
  • 2018: Ferreira, Simchi-Levi and Wang prove the O(TKlog⁡K)O(\sqrt{TK\log K})O(TKlogK​) Bayesian regret bound for TS-fixed (Theorem 1), the target of this mission.

Setting

There are NNN products and MMM resources. One unit of product iii consumes aij≥0a_{ij}\ge0aij​≥0 units of resource jjj, and resource jjj starts with inventory Ij≥0I_j\ge0Ij​≥0 that is never replenished. The season has TTT periods. In each period the retailer posts one of KKK price vectors pk=(p1k,…,pNk)p_k=(p_{1k},\dots,p_{Nk})pk​=(p1k​,…,pNk​) or a shut-off price p∞p_\inftyp∞​ under which demand is zero.

Given the posted price pkp_kpk​, the demand vector D(t)∈R+ND(t)\in\mathbb R^N_+D(t)∈R+N​ has law F(⋅ ;pk,θ)F(\cdot\,;p_k,\theta)F(⋅;pk​,θ), where θ∈Θ\theta\in\Thetaθ∈Θ is unknown and drawn from a known, arbitrary prior μ0\mu_0μ0​. Demand is independent of the past given the posted price and θ\thetaθ, and is bounded: Di(t)∈[0,dˉi]D_i(t)\in[0,\bar d_i]Di​(t)∈[0,dˉi​]. Write dik(ρ)d_{ik}(\rho)dik​(ρ) for the mean demand of product iii under pkp_kpk​ and parameter ρ\rhoρ, and d=d(θ)d=d(\theta)d=d(θ).

When inventory covers all demand, all demand is sold. Otherwise the satisfied demand D~(t)\tilde D(t)D~(t) satisfies 0≤D~i(t)≤Di(t)0\le\tilde D_i(t)\le D_i(t)0≤D~i​(t)≤Di​(t), leaves every inventory nonnegative, and leaves at least one resource at zero; no other rule is imposed. Revenue is Rev(T)=∑t∑iD~i(t)Pi(t)\mathrm{Rev}(T)=\sum_t\sum_i\tilde D_i(t)P_i(t)Rev(T)=∑t​∑i​D~i​(t)Pi​(t).

For a mean-demand matrix ddd and capacities cj=Ij/Tc_j=I_j/Tcj​=Ij​/T, the linear program LP(d)\mathrm{LP}(d)LP(d) is

max⁡x≥0 ∑k=1K(∑i=1Npikdik)xks.t.∑k=1K(∑i=1Naijdik)xk≤cj  ∀j,∑k=1Kxk≤1,\max_{x\ge0}\ \sum_{k=1}^K\Bigl(\sum_{i=1}^N p_{ik}d_{ik}\Bigr)x_k\quad\text{s.t.}\quad\sum_{k=1}^K\Bigl(\sum_{i=1}^N a_{ij}d_{ik}\Bigr)x_k\le c_j\ \ \forall j,\qquad\sum_{k=1}^K x_k\le1,x≥0max​ k=1∑K​(i=1∑N​pik​dik​)xk​s.t.k=1∑K​(i=1∑N​aij​dik​)xk​≤cj​  ∀j,k=1∑K​xk​≤1,

with optimal value OPT(d)\mathrm{OPT}(d)OPT(d).

TS-fixed (Algorithm 1): in each period, sample θ(t)\theta(t)θ(t) from the posterior of θ\thetaθ given the history of posted prices and observed demands; let x(t)x(t)x(t) be an optimal solution of LP(d(θ(t)))\mathrm{LP}(d(\theta(t)))LP(d(θ(t))); post pkp_kpk​ with probability xk(t)x_k(t)xk​(t) and p∞p_\inftyp∞​ with the remaining probability; observe demand and update the posterior.

Finally pmax⁡=max⁡k∑ipikdˉip_{\max}=\max_k\sum_ip_{ik}\bar d_ipmax​=maxk​∑i​pik​dˉi​ and pmax⁡j=max⁡i:aij≠0, kpik/aijp^j_{\max}=\max_{i:a_{ij}\neq0,\,k}p_{ik}/a_{ij}pmaxj​=maxi:aij​=0,k​pik​/aij​.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 against the LP benchmark

For K≥2K\ge2K≥2, T≥1T\ge1T≥1, every prior, every bounded demand family, every admissible fulfilment rule and every run of TS-fixed,

E[OPT(d)]⋅T−E[Rev(T)] ≤ (18 pmax⁡+37∑i=1N∑j=1Mpmax⁡jaijdˉi)TKlog⁡K.\mathbb E\bigl[\mathrm{OPT}(d)\bigr]\cdot T-\mathbb E\bigl[\mathrm{Rev}(T)\bigr]\ \le\ \Bigl(18\,p_{\max}+37\sum_{i=1}^N\sum_{j=1}^M p^j_{\max}a_{ij}\bar d_i\Bigr)\sqrt{TK\log K}.E[OPT(d)]⋅T−E[Rev(T)] ≤ (18pmax​+37i=1∑N​j=1∑M​pmaxj​aij​dˉi​)TKlogK​.

The paper prints this bound for BayesRegret(T)=E[Rev∗(T)]−E[Rev(T)]\mathrm{BayesRegret}(T)=\mathbb E[\mathrm{Rev}^*(T)]-\mathbb E[\mathrm{Rev}(T)]BayesRegret(T)=E[Rev∗(T)]−E[Rev(T)], where Rev∗\mathrm{Rev}^*Rev∗ is the revenue of the optimal policy that knows θ\thetaθ; see Formalization scope for why the LP benchmark is stated instead.

Milestones

The article states Theorem 1 and says that its proof is in the online appendix (Supplemental Material at the DOI). The article itself contains no numbered lemma. The milestone list is therefore empty; the appendix's lemmas will be added as milestones once the appendix is held.

Significance

The bound is prior-free and has explicit constants that depend only on prices, consumption rates and demand bounds. Its dependence on TTT matches the Ω(KT)\Omega(\sqrt{KT})Ω(KT​) lower bound for Bayesian regret in unconstrained bandits with rewards in [0,1][0,1][0,1], a special case of the model with no inventory constraints (Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi 2012, Theorem 3.5). It shows that the posterior-sampling principle survives the addition of resource constraints, lost sales and randomized LP-based pricing, and it is the template for the paper's later results (TS-update, contextual pricing, bandits with knapsacks).

The theorem is proved on paper but, as far as a platform search shows, not formalized anywhere. The platform has a formal proof of the unconstrained Bayesian Thompson sampling bound knlog⁡k/2\sqrt{kn\log k/2}knlogk/2​ (BanditAlgorithm.thompson_sampling_bayesian_regret, Lattimore–Szepesvári Theorem 36.5) and an open single-product deterministic upper bound in revenue management (RevenueManagement.deterministic_upper_bound). Neither has inventory, an LP subroutine, or lost sales. A formal proof here would supply the first machine-checked analysis of Thompson sampling under resource constraints and would check the paper's constants.

Difficulty

In an unconstrained bandit, Thompson sampling's regret reduces to a sum of per-period gaps between an upper confidence bound and the sampled reward, because the sampled optimal arm and the true optimal arm are identically distributed given the history. Here the action is a randomized mixture x(t)x(t)x(t) from an LP, the reward is not additive in the prices chosen, and revenue is lost when inventory runs out. Two quantities must be controlled: the revenue the algorithm would collect if all demand could be served, and the revenue lost to stock-outs. The second depends on the random time at which each resource is exhausted under a pricing rule that was optimized for a sampled, not the true, demand, and on an arbitrary fulfilment rule once some resource is empty. Standard bandit arguments do not bound such lost sales, which are a nonlinear function of the whole trajectory.

Formalization scope

Lean representation. Products, resources and price vectors are indexed by Fin N, Fin M, Fin K; the posted price is an Option (Fin K) with none the shut-off price. Periods are 0-based (t=0,…,T−1t=0,\dots,T-1t=0,…,T−1 stands for the paper's 1,…,T1,\dots,T1,…,T). Θ\ThetaΘ is a standard Borel space with a probability measure μ0\mu_0μ0​; demand is a Markov kernel FFF from Θ×\Theta\timesΘ×Fin K to RN\mathbb R^NRN, bounded in [0,dˉi][0,\bar d_i][0,dˉi​] for every parameter. A run of TS-fixed is a family of random variables on a probability space satisfying, almost surely and via conditional expectations: θ∼μ0\theta\sim\mu_0θ∼μ0​; the posterior-sampling property of θ(t)\theta(t)θ(t) given everything before period ttt; the price draw with probabilities x(θ(t))x(\theta(t))x(θ(t)) for a measurable optimal LP selection xxx; the demand law given the past, θ(t)\theta(t)θ(t) and the posted price; and fulfilment rules (a)/(b). The logarithm is natural. Prices, consumption and inventory are nonnegative (implicit in the paper). OPT(d)\mathrm{OPT}(d)OPT(d) is a supremum over a nonempty bounded feasible set, so it has no junk value.

Corrections to the printed statement.

  1. K≥2K\ge2K≥2 is added. At K=1K=1K=1 the printed right-hand side is 000, yet on a one-price instance with Bernoulli(0.8)(0.8)(0.8) demand, I=T/2I=T/2I=T/2 and a point-mass prior, TS-fixed loses about 0.2pT0.2p\sqrt T0.2pT​ in expectation.
  2. The LP benchmark replaces E[Rev∗(T)]\mathbb E[\mathrm{Rev}^*(T)]E[Rev∗(T)]. Section 3.1.1 bounds E[Rev∗(T)∣d]\mathbb E[\mathrm{Rev}^*(T)\mid d]E[Rev∗(T)∣d] by OPT(d)⋅T\mathrm{OPT}(d)\cdot TOPT(d)⋅T, citing Gallego–van Ryzin. Under the paper's fulfilment rule this fails when products use disjoint resources: with two products, I=(T,1)I=(T,1)I=(T,1), p1=(1,0)p_1=(1,0)p1​=(1,0), p2=(1/2,0)p_2=(1/2,0)p2​=(1/2,0) and deterministic demand (1,1)(1,1)(1,1), the known-θ\thetaθ policy earns at least TTT while OPT(d)⋅T=1\mathrm{OPT}(d)\cdot T=1OPT(d)⋅T=1. The paper states that its proof bounds the gap to "the LP benchmark defined in Section 3.1.1" (p. 1594), and the last display of Section 3.1.1 bounds BayesRegret(T)\mathrm{BayesRegret}(T)BayesRegret(T) by exactly E[OPT(d)]⋅T−E[Rev(T)]\mathbb E[\mathrm{OPT}(d)]\cdot T-\mathbb E[\mathrm{Rev}(T)]E[OPT(d)]⋅T−E[Rev(T)]. Wherever the Gallego–van Ryzin bound holds, the corrected goal implies the printed one.

Ruled out. A bound for the "ideal" revenue ∑iDi(t)Pi(t)\sum_iD_i(t)P_i(t)∑i​Di​(t)Pi​(t) instead of the satisfied revenue, or for an arbitrary policy whose prices are merely close to the LP solution, is not Theorem 1; the goal carries the full TS-fixed run and the lost-sales accounting.

Infrastructure needed. Posterior-sampling identities for general (standard Borel) priors, a Hoeffding/Azuma-type concentration for bounded demand along the price-selection process, LP sensitivity with respect to the mean-demand matrix, and a pathwise bound on lost sales under an arbitrary fulfilment rule. The LP and fluid-benchmark definitions are reusable for later missions on TS-update (Theorem 2), contextual pricing (Theorem 4) and bandits with knapsacks (Theorem 5). Contributions welcome: proofs of the goal, and formal statements of the online appendix's lemmas.

Selected references

  • K. J. Ferreira, D. Simchi-Levi, H. Wang, Online Network Revenue Management Using Thompson Sampling, Operations Research 66(6):1586–1602, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1755
  • G. Gallego, G. van Ryzin, A Multiproduct Dynamic Pricing Problem and Its Applications to Network Yield Management, Operations Research 45(1):24–41, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.45.1.24
  • O. Besbes, A. Zeevi, Blind Network Revenue Management, Operations Research 60(6):1537–1550, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1120.1057
  • A. Badanidiyuru, R. Kleinberg, A. Slivkins, Bandits with Knapsacks, FOCS 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.2545
  • S. Bubeck, C.-Y. Liu, Prior-free and Prior-dependent Regret Bounds for Thompson Sampling, NeurIPS 2013. https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.0466
  • D. Russo, B. Van Roy, Learning to Optimize via Posterior Sampling, Mathematics of Operations Research 39(4):1221–1243, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2014.0650
  • S. Bubeck, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 5(1), 2012. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.5721
  • T. Lattimore, C. Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2020, Chapter 36. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108571401
3 thms1 active userReviewed
OptimizationProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

An Optimal On-Line Algorithm for Metrical Task System 2: The Randomized Competitive Ratio of the Uniform Task System Lies Between H(n) and 2H(n)Research Paper

Motivation

Metrical task systems, introduced by Borodin, Linial and Saks (J. ACM 39(4), 1992), are a common abstraction of on-line problems in which a server occupies one of finitely many states, pays a cost for each task depending on its current state, and may pay a transition cost to change state first. Paging, list update and the kkk-server problem all fit into this framework. The paper's first main result is that every deterministic on-line algorithm on an nnn-state metrical task system has competitive ratio at least 2n−12n-12n−1, and that 2n−12n-12n−1 is attained. The lower bound comes from an adversary that always charges the state the algorithm currently occupies. That adversary needs to know the algorithm's state, which suggests that randomization can help.

Section 7 of the paper makes this precise for the simplest system, the uniform task system, in which all transitions cost 111. There the randomized competitive ratio against an oblivious adversary is between H(n)H(n)H(n) and 2H(n)2H(n)2H(n), where H(n)=1+12+⋯+1nH(n)=1+\tfrac12+\cdots+\tfrac1nH(n)=1+21​+⋯+n1​ is between ln⁡n\ln nlnn and 1+ln⁡n1+\ln n1+lnn. This was the first logarithmic bound for a task system.

Timeline:

  • 1985: Sleator and Tarjan introduce competitive analysis for list update and paging (CACM 28(2)).
  • 1987/1992: Borodin, Linial and Saks define metrical task systems, prove the deterministic ratio 2n−12n-12n−1, and prove H(n)≤wˉ≤2H(n)H(n)\le\bar w\le 2H(n)H(n)≤wˉ≤2H(n) for the uniform system (conference version STOC 1987; journal version cited above).
  • 1991: Fiat, Karp, Luby, McGeoch, Sleator and Young prove the analogous 2Hk2H_k2Hk​ upper bound for randomized paging (J. Algorithms 12(4)).

Setting

A task system (S,d)(S,d)(S,d) is a finite set SSS of nnn states with a transition-cost matrix ddd: d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0d(i,i)=0, d(i,j)>0d(i,j)>0d(i,j)>0 for i≠ji\ne ji=j, and d(i,k)≤d(i,j)+d(j,k)d(i,k)\le d(i,j)+d(j,k)d(i,k)≤d(i,j)+d(j,k). In the uniform task system, d(i,j)=1d(i,j)=1d(i,j)=1 for all i≠ji\neq ji=j. A task is a vector T∈R≥0ST\in\mathbb R_{\ge0}^ST∈R≥0S​ of processing costs. Given an initial state s0s_0s0​ and tasks T=T1⋯Tm\mathbf T=T^1\cdots T^mT=T1⋯Tm, a schedule is σ:{0,…,m}→S\sigma:\{0,\dots,m\}\to Sσ:{0,…,m}→S with σ(0)=s0\sigma(0)=s_0σ(0)=s0​, of cost

c(T;σ)=∑i=1md(σ(i−1),σ(i))+∑i=1mTi(σ(i)).c(\mathbf T;\sigma)=\sum_{i=1}^m d(\sigma(i-1),\sigma(i))+\sum_{i=1}^m T^i(\sigma(i)).c(T;σ)=i=1∑m​d(σ(i−1),σ(i))+i=1∑m​Ti(σ(i)).

The off-line optimum c0(T)c_0(\mathbf T)c0​(T) is the least cost over all schedules.

A deterministic on-line algorithm chooses σ(i)\sigma(i)σ(i) from s0s_0s0​ and T1,…,TiT^1,\dots,T^iT1,…,Ti. A randomized on-line algorithm RRR chooses σ(i)\sigma(i)σ(i) at random, with a distribution that depends on s0s_0s0​, on T1,…,TiT^1,\dots,T^iT1,…,Ti and on the states σ(0),…,σ(i−1)\sigma(0),\dots,\sigma(i-1)σ(0),…,σ(i−1) already visited. The task sequence is fixed before any random choice is made (an oblivious adversary). With pr(σ∣T)\mathrm{pr}(\sigma\mid\mathbf T)pr(σ∣T) the probability that RRR follows σ\sigmaσ, the expected cost is cˉR(T)=∑σc(T;σ) pr(σ∣T)\bar c_R(\mathbf T)=\sum_\sigma c(\mathbf T;\sigma)\,\mathrm{pr}(\sigma\mid\mathbf T)cˉR​(T)=∑σ​c(T;σ)pr(σ∣T). For w>0w>0w>0, RRR is expected www-competitive if there is a constant KKK with

cˉR(T)≤w c0(T)+K\bar c_R(\mathbf T)\le w\,c_0(\mathbf T)+KcˉR​(T)≤wc0​(T)+K

for every finite task sequence and every initial state. The randomized competitive ratio wˉ(S,d)\bar w(S,d)wˉ(S,d) is the infimum of all such www over all RRR.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 7.1

For the uniform task system on n≥1n\ge1n≥1 states,

H(n)  ≤  wˉ(S,d)  ≤  2H(n).H(n)\;\le\;\bar w(S,d)\;\le\;2H(n).H(n)≤wˉ(S,d)≤2H(n).

Milestones

  1. Upper bound (p. 759). Some randomized on-line algorithm is expected 2H(n)2H(n)2H(n)-competitive on the uniform task system.
  2. Lemma 7.2 (p. 759). Let DDD be a distribution on infinite task sequences over a finite task alphabet, with E(c0(Tj))→∞E(c_0(\mathbf T^j))\to\inftyE(c0​(Tj))→∞, and let mj=inf⁡AE(cA(Tj))m_j=\inf_A E(c_A(\mathbf T^j))mj​=infA​E(cA​(Tj)) over deterministic on-line algorithms. Then every achievable www satisfies
lim sup⁡j→∞mjE(c0(Tj))≤w.\limsup_{j\to\infty}\frac{m_j}{E(c_0(\mathbf T^j))}\le w .j→∞limsup​E(c0​(Tj))mj​​≤w.
  1. mj≥j/nm_j\ge j/nmj​≥j/n (p. 760) when the tasks are independent uniformly random unit elementary tasks UsU_sUs​ (cost 111 in sss, 000 elsewhere).
  2. Coupon collector (p. 760). For i.i.d. uniform states on SSS, the expected number of draws until every state has appeared is nH(n)nH(n)nH(n).
  3. Off-line cost (p. 760). Under the same distribution, E(c0(Tj))≤j/(nH(n))+CE(c_0(\mathbf T^j))\le j/(nH(n))+CE(c0​(Tj))≤j/(nH(n))+C for a constant CCC independent of jjj.

Significance

The theorem shows that randomization reduces the competitive ratio of the uniform task system from 2n−12n-12n−1 to Θ(log⁡n)\Theta(\log n)Θ(logn). That is an exponential improvement, and it identifies the adversary's knowledge of the algorithm's state as the source of the deterministic lower bound. Lemma 7.2 is a form of Yao's principle adapted to the additive-constant definition of competitiveness. It is the standard tool for randomized lower bounds in on-line computation, and the same argument shape reappears for paging and kkk-server lower bounds.

On the formalization side, the result is proved but, as far as is known, has not been machine-checked. A complete development yields a reusable model of randomized on-line algorithms with oblivious adversaries, a Yao-type lemma usable for other on-line problems, and a coupon-collector expectation in the product-measure setting. The upper half additionally needs the continuous-time reduction of the paper's Lemma 3.1 in randomized form, or a direct discrete-time algorithm.

Difficulty

For the upper bound, the natural algorithm is continuous-time. It proceeds in phases, and inside a phase it stays in a state until that state has accumulated cost 111. A discrete task can saturate several states at once and straddle a phase boundary. So a discrete algorithm must either simulate the continuous one or be analyzed directly, and the expected transition count per phase must be controlled with the first phase starting in a deterministic state.

For the lower bound, the first obstacle is that the natural statement "wˉ≥lim sup⁡mj/E(c0)\bar w\ge\limsup m_j/E(c_0)wˉ≥limsupmj​/E(c0​)" silently assumes that a randomized algorithm's expected cost, averaged over random inputs, is at least that of the best deterministic algorithm. With the behavioural (kernel) definition used here, this requires converting a kernel into a mixture of deterministic algorithms, which is Kuhn's theorem on each finite horizon. The second obstacle is that the paper's claim E(c0(Tj))≤j/(nH(n))+O(1)E(c_0(\mathbf T^j))\le j/(nH(n))+O(1)E(c0​(Tj))≤j/(nH(n))+O(1) is supported only by the elementary renewal theorem, which gives a limit of ratios; the additive bound needs a sharper renewal estimate. Mathlib has no renewal theory. The hypothesis E(c0(Tj))→∞E(c_0(\mathbf T^j))\to\inftyE(c0​(Tj))→∞ of Lemma 7.2 must also be established for the uniform distribution; the paper does not prove it separately.

Formalization scope

  • States form a finite nonempty type S, and nnn = Fintype.card S; no n≥2n\ge2n≥2 assumption is made (at n=1n=1n=1 the goal reads 1≤wˉ≤21\le\bar w\le21≤wˉ≤2, and wˉ=1\bar w=1wˉ=1). H(n)H(n)H(n) is Mathlib's harmonic n, cast to R\mathbb RR. The uniform system has unit transition cost.
  • Tasks are finite and nonnegative. The paper also allows +∞+\infty+∞ entries; these are excluded. Task sequences are Fin m → S → ℝ and schedules are Fin (m+1) → S with σ 0 = s₀. c0c_0c0​ is a finite minimum.
  • A randomized algorithm is a kernel S → List (S → ℝ) → List S → PMF S. This is the paper's scheduler–taskmaster description (p. 758), equivalent to a distribution over deterministic algorithms on every finite task sequence. pr(σ∣T)\mathrm{pr}(\sigma\mid\mathbf T)pr(σ∣T) is the product of kernel probabilities, and cˉR\bar c_RcˉR​ is a finite sum. That pr(⋅∣T)\mathrm{pr}(\cdot\mid\mathbf T)pr(⋅∣T) sums to 111 has been checked locally.
  • wˉ(S,d)\bar w(S,d)wˉ(S,d) is the real sInf of {w:∃R, R expected w-competitive}\{w : \exists R,\ R \text{ expected } w\text{-competitive}\}{w:∃R, R expected w-competitive}. On the empty set this would be 000, so the upper bound is stated as the existence of an expected 2H(n)2H(n)2H(n)-competitive algorithm, and Lemma 7.2 is stated for every achievable www. The goal's lower half forces the set to be nonempty. Statements of the form "wˉ≤c\bar w\le cwˉ≤c" alone are therefore not acceptable substitutes for milestones 1 and 2.
  • Lemma 7.2 is restricted to task sequences over a finite alphabet, with the product σ\sigmaσ-algebra and measurable singletons. This makes every E(cA(Tj))E(c_A(\mathbf T^j))E(cA​(Tj)) a genuine integral for every deterministic AAA, and it covers the paper's application. The lim sup⁡\limsuplimsup of Lemma 7.2 is taken in EReal.
  • The coupon-collector time takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞] and its expectation is a lower Lebesgue integral. Milestone 5 renders the paper's O(1)O(1)O(1) as an explicit constant CCC chosen before jjj.

Contributions welcome: proofs of any milestone; a discrete-time randomized phase algorithm; a general Kuhn-type conversion from kernels to mixtures of deterministic algorithms; renewal-theoretic lemmas.

Selected references

  • A. Borodin, N. Linial, M. Saks, An Optimal On-Line Algorithm for Metrical Task System, J. ACM 39(4):745–763, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1145/146585.146588
  • D. D. Sleator, R. E. Tarjan, Amortized Efficiency of List Update and Paging Rules, Commun. ACM 28(2):202–208, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1145/2786.2793
  • A. Fiat, R. M. Karp, M. Luby, L. A. McGeoch, D. D. Sleator, N. E. Young, Competitive Paging Algorithms, J. Algorithms 12(4):685–699, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-6774(91)90041-V
  • A. C.-C. Yao, Probabilistic Computations: Toward a Unified Measure of Complexity, FOCS 1977, 222–227. https://doi.org/10.1109/SFCS.1977.24
  • S. M. Ross, Applied Probability Models with Optimization Applications, Holden-Day, 1970 (the elementary renewal theorem cited as [20] in the paper).
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Active InferenceBehaviorDynamical Systems+4·Captain: ActiveInference

Free Energy Principle I: the variational free-energy boundResearch Paper

Motivation

The free energy principle (FEP) proposes that a self-organizing system — a brain, an organism, an agent — persists by minimizing one quantity: the variational free energy of its sensory states under an internal generative model. Introduced by Karl Friston as a principle of brain function [Friston 2006] and stated in its unified form [Friston 2010], the principle makes a precise mathematical claim at its core: whatever internal state estimate the system holds, the free energy of incoming data is never below the data's surprisal (negative log marginal likelihood), and the excess is exactly the Kullback–Leibler divergence between the system's recognition density and the Bayesian posterior implied by the model. Active inference extends the same functional from perception to action and planning [Friston et al. 2017], and the same bound is known in machine learning as the evidence lower bound (ELBO) of variational inference [Parr et al. 2022].

Timeline of the mathematical content this mission formalizes:

  • 2006 — Friston, A free energy principle for the brain (J. Physiol. Paris 100): the bound stated for perception as variational inference on a generative model.
  • 2010 — Friston, The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? (Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 11, 127–138): free energy as an upper bound on surprisal, presented as the core of a unified account.
  • 2017 — Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, Pezzulo, Active inference: a process theory (Neural Comput. 29(1), 1–49): the same functional drives policy selection through expected free energy.
  • 2022 — Parr, Pezzulo, Friston, Active Inference (MIT Press): textbook treatment; the posterior-form identity F=DKL(Q ∥ P(s∣o))−log⁡P(o)F = D_{\mathrm{KL}}(Q\,\|\,P(s|o)) - \log P(o)F=DKL​(Q∥P(s∣o))−logP(o) as the central equation.
  • 2026 — fep_formal (Active Inference Institute): a machine-checked Lean 4 catalogue of 155 Free Energy Principle topics, compiled with zero proof holes against a pinned Mathlib. This mission transcribes the catalogue's core-free-energy chain — topic fep-002 and the foundation module active_inference — onto the platform, turning the first link of the FEP development into solvable community infrastructure.

Setting

Everything is finite, and laws are normalized real mass functions.

A finite law on a finite type α\alphaα is a function p:α→Rp : \alpha \to \mathbb{R}p:α→R with p(x)≥0p(x) \ge 0p(x)≥0 for every xxx and ∑xp(x)=1\sum_x p(x) = 1∑x​p(x)=1. A finite kernel from α\alphaα to β\betaβ assigns to each x∈αx \in \alphax∈α a normalized row over β\betaβ. The mission's definitions Def_fep_finite_laws and Def_fep_finite_information package these carriers with entropy, cross-entropy, and the KL divergence

DKL(p ∥ q)  =  ∑xq(x)⋅klFun ⁣(p(x)q(x)),klFun(x)=xlog⁡x+1−x,D_{\mathrm{KL}}(p\,\|\,q) \;=\; \sum_{x} q(x)\cdot \mathrm{klFun}\!\left(\frac{p(x)}{q(x)}\right), \qquad \mathrm{klFun}(x) = x\log x + 1 - x,DKL​(p∥q)=x∑​q(x)⋅klFun(q(x)p(x)​),klFun(x)=xlogx+1−x,

a totalized real-valued divergence that is finite even at zero-mass atoms (the convention 0⋅log⁡0=00 \cdot \log 0 = 00⋅log0=0 via Real.negMulLog) and nonnegative on normalized laws.

A finite generative model for active inference (definition Def_fep_generative_model) over finite types Policy,State,Outcome\mathsf{Policy}, \mathsf{State}, \mathsf{Outcome}Policy,State,Outcome consists of: an initial state law P(s)P(s)P(s); a policy-conditioned transition kernel; a state-to-outcome likelihood kernel; a preference law over outcomes; and a policy prior. Under a policy π\piπ the model predicts the state law P(s∣π)P(s \mid \pi)P(s∣π) and the outcome law P(o∣π)P(o \mid \pi)P(o∣π). A recognition density is any finite law QQQ over states — the system's internal estimate. At an outcome ooo with positive predicted mass, the Bayesian posterior P(⋅∣o,π)P(\cdot \mid o, \pi)P(⋅∣o,π) is the exact finite Bayes rule. The outcome surprisal is −log⁡P(o∣π)-\log P(o \mid \pi)−logP(o∣π), and the posterior-form variational free energy of a recognition density QQQ is

F[Q,o,π]  =  DKL(Q ∥ P(⋅∣o,π))  −  log⁡P(o∣π).F[Q, o, \pi] \;=\; D_{\mathrm{KL}}\big(Q \,\|\, P(\cdot \mid o, \pi)\big) \;-\; \log P(o \mid \pi).F[Q,o,π]=DKL​(Q∥P(⋅∣o,π))−logP(o∣π).

Formalization targets

Goal: the variational free-energy bound

For every generative model, every policy π\piπ, every outcome ooo with P(o∣π)>0P(o\mid\pi) > 0P(o∣π)>0, and every recognition density QQQ:

−log⁡P(o∣π)  ≤  F[Q,o,π].-\log P(o \mid \pi) \;\le\; F[Q, o, \pi].−logP(o∣π)≤F[Q,o,π].

The recognition density QQQ is universally quantified — the bound holds for whatever state estimate the system happens to carry.

Exactness, uniqueness, and the ELBO form

Three companions pin down the equality case, ordered weakest to strongest alongside the milestone list:

  • Exactness — the Bayesian posterior attains the bound:
F[P(⋅∣o,π), o, π]=−log⁡P(o∣π).F\big[P(\cdot \mid o, \pi),\, o,\, \pi\big] = -\log P(o \mid \pi).F[P(⋅∣o,π),o,π]=−logP(o∣π).
  • Uniqueness — equality characterizes the posterior, with no full-support assumption:
F[Q,o,π]=−log⁡P(o∣π)  ⟺  Q=P(⋅∣o,π).F[Q, o, \pi] = -\log P(o \mid \pi) \iff Q = P(\cdot \mid o, \pi).F[Q,o,π]=−logP(o∣π)⟺Q=P(⋅∣o,π).
  • ELBO form — negating both sides:
−F[Q,o,π]  ≤  log⁡P(o∣π).-F[Q, o, \pi] \;\le\; \log P(o \mid \pi).−F[Q,o,π]≤logP(o∣π).

Measure-theoretic core

Independently of the finite model, in Mathlib's nonnegative extended reals R≥0∪{∞}\mathbb{R}_{\ge0} \cup \{\infty\}R≥0​∪{∞}, with qqq, ppp measures on any measurable space and s∈R≥0∪{∞}s \in \mathbb{R}_{\ge0} \cup \{\infty\}s∈R≥0​∪{∞}:

s  ≤  s+DKL(q ∥ p),s \;\le\; s + D_{\mathrm{KL}}(q \,\|\, p),s≤s+DKL​(q∥p),

the unconditional shape of the bound (topic fep-002 of the source catalogue), with the divergence taken as ∞\infty∞ when the log-likelihood ratio is not integrable.

Significance

The result itself. This inequality is the load-bearing step of the FEP: it converts "minimize free energy" into "move recognition toward the posterior," and it is the exact statement whose continuous, dynamic, and policy-selecting extensions (expected free energy, Markov blankets, non-equilibrium thermodynamics) form the rest of the FEP literature. Without it, the principle's variational step has no mathematical content.

Formalizing it. The mathematics here is classical — Gibbs' inequality — and the source development already proves every row with no proof holes. What the mission adds is faithful, reusable infrastructure: the definitions are published as platform nodes in the shared namespace FreeEnergyPrinciple, so later missions in this programme (expected free energy and policy selection, Markov blankets, Gaussian and continuous-time variants, already proved in the source repository) can import them instead of re-deriving the substrate. Status honesty: all eight items below are formalized and machine-checked locally against the platform environment; each is an open problem on the platform only in the sense that no proof has yet been submitted to it.

Difficulty

The bound itself is a one-line consequence of KL nonnegativity — the naive idea "prove it by simp on the KL sum" is essentially right, and the source proofs are correspondingly short. The actual difficulty is boundary precision, where plausible renderings go silently wrong:

  • The positivity premise P(o∣π)>0P(o \mid \pi) > 0P(o∣π)>0 is not decoration: the Bayesian posterior is defined only where the evidence has positive mass, and hiding that in a totalized division would change the statement.
  • The uniqueness characterization is not a formality: at zero-mass reference atoms the logarithmic cross-entropy identity degenerates, and the proof needs the normalization lemma DKL(p ∥ q)=0↔p=qD_{\mathrm{KL}}(p\,\|\,q) = 0 \leftrightarrow p = qDKL​(p∥q)=0↔p=q, which forces the recognition law's mass to zero wherever the posterior's is zero. A solver who proves the bound but states equality with a full-support hypothesis has proved something different from the source.
  • The measure-theoretic core is deliberately unconditional; adding finiteness side conditions to it would weaken the source's point that R≥0∪{∞}\mathbb{R}_{\ge0} \cup \{\infty\}R≥0​∪{∞} absorbs the degenerate cases.

A vacuous formalization — quantifying over a single distinguished recognition law, or taking "posterior" as an arbitrary variable — would trivialize the goal; the targets below rule this out by fixing the exact finite Bayes rule and universally quantifying QQQ.

Formalization scope

Committed conventions of this mission's Lean development:

  • All model carriers are finite types (Fintype); laws are R\mathbb{R}R-valued normalized mass functions; kernels are normalized rows. No measure-theoretic machinery below the finite substrate except for the measure-theoretic core milestone.
  • KL is the totalized real-valued finite divergence DKL(p ∥ q)=∑xq(x)⋅klFun(p(x)/q(x))D_{\mathrm{KL}}(p\,\|\,q) = \sum_x q(x)\cdot \mathrm{klFun}(p(x)/q(x))DKL​(p∥q)=∑x​q(x)⋅klFun(p(x)/q(x)); entropy uses Real.negMulLog, so 0⋅log⁡0=00 \cdot \log 0 = 00⋅log0=0 exactly, not by exception-handling.
  • The posterior is the exact finite Bayes rule FiniteKernel.posterior, taken at the explicit hypothesis 0<P(o∣π)0 < P(o \mid \pi)0<P(o∣π).
  • One mission-wide namespace FreeEnergyPrinciple; definitions live in the published definition files Def_fep_finite_laws, Def_fep_finite_information, Def_fep_generative_model, and every theorem item imports them. A Free Energy Principle II mission (expected free energy) is expected to reuse the same namespace and definitions.
  • The measure-theoretic core uses Mathlib's InformationTheory.klDiv in ℝ≥0∞ with no finiteness hypotheses.
  • Contributions welcome: alternative measure-theoretic renderings of the core bound, the Gaussian instantiation of the same identity, and ports of the source repository's subsequent rows (Bayesian model reduction, expected free energy) onto these definitions.

Selected references

  • K. Friston, A free energy principle for the brain, Journal of Physiology (Paris) 100 (2006) 70–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jphysparis.2006.10.001
  • K. Friston, The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?, Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11 (2010) 127–138. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2787
  • K. Friston, T. FitzGerald, F. Rigoli, P. Schwartenbeck, G. Pezzulo, Active inference: a process theory, Neural Computation 29 (2017) 1–49. https://doi.org/10.1162/neco_a_00912
  • T. Parr, G. Pezzulo, K. J. Friston, Active Inference: The Free Energy Principle in Mind, Brain, and Behavior, MIT Press (2022). https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262045354/active-inference/
  • D. A. Friedman, fep_formal: Towards Lean 4 Formalization of the Free Energy Principle (v1.2.0), Active Inference Institute (2026), the formal source of truth for this mission. https://github.com/ActiveInferenceInstitute/fep_formal
  • D. A. Friedman, Towards Lean 4 Formalization of the Free Energy Principle: AI-Driven Theorem Sketching and Verification for Active Inference and Bayesian Mechanics, Active Inference Journal (2026). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19699233
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OptimizationProbability·Captain: StellaXin

Capped Base-Stock Policies: A 2.33-ApproximationResearch Paper

A performance guarantee for a simple replenishment rule

When replenishment takes several periods, an inventory decision commits stock before the demand that will consume it is known. Too much stock incurs holding costs; too little loses sales. An optimal decision can depend on the entire pipeline of outstanding orders. A rule with only two adjustable parameters is easier to implement, but its simplicity alone gives no guarantee on the cost it can incur.

Capped base-stock policies combine an inventory-position target with a maximum order quantity. The class was introduced and analyzed by Xin (2021). The present target is the finite-lead-time guarantee in Linwei Xin's Capped Base-Stock Policies: A 2.33-Approximation, specifically the author-supplied manuscript with source label thm-main. A public listing of the paper identifies the July 17, 2026 working paper; the supplied text is the authoritative version for this formalization.

Demand, stock, and delayed orders

Periods are discrete. Demand is a sequence of independent, identically distributed nonnegative real random variables DtD_tDt​ with finite, strictly positive mean μ\muμ. The deterministic lead time is an integer L≥1L\ge1L≥1. Holding and lost-sales rates are h>0h>0h>0 and p>0p>0p>0.

At the beginning of period ttt, ItI_tIt​ is on-hand inventory and x1,t,…,xL,tx_{1,t},\ldots,x_{L,t}x1,t​,…,xL,t​ are outstanding orders, with x1,tx_{1,t}x1,t​ due immediately. That arrival is received, an order qt≥0q_t\ge0qt​≥0 is placed, demand is realized, and costs are charged. The new order arrives LLL periods later. The equations are

It+1=(It+x1,t−Dt)+,xi,t+1=xi+1,t (i<L),xL,t+1=qt.I_{t+1}=(I_t+x_{1,t}-D_t)^+,\qquad x_{i,t+1}=x_{i+1,t}\ (i<L),\qquad x_{L,t+1}=q_t.It+1​=(It​+x1,t​−Dt​)+,xi,t+1​=xi+1,t​ (i<L),xL,t+1​=qt​.

Here u+=max⁡{u,0}u^+=\max\{u,0\}u+=max{u,0}. Unfilled demand is lost rather than backlogged. With ℓt=(Dt−It−x1,t)+\ell_t=(D_t-I_t-x_{1,t})^+ℓt​=(Dt​−It​−x1,t​)+, the period cost is hIt+1+pℓthI_{t+1}+p\ell_thIt+1​+pℓt​. Initial inventory and every pipeline coordinate are zero. A nonanticipative policy chooses orders using only information available before the current demand; policies may depend on the entire observed past and on independent private randomization.

For a policy π\piπ, its long-run expected average cost is

C(π)=lim sup⁡T→∞1T∑t=1TE[hIt+1π+pℓtπ],OPT=inf⁡π∈ΠC(π).C(\pi)=\limsup_{T\to\infty}\frac1T\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb E[hI_{t+1}^\pi+p\ell_t^\pi],\qquad \mathrm{OPT}=\inf_{\pi\in\Pi}C(\pi).C(π)=T→∞limsup​T1​t=1∑T​E[hIt+1π​+pℓtπ​],OPT=π∈Πinf​C(π).

The capped rule is qt=min⁡{(S−It−∑i=1Lxi,t)+,r}q_t=\min\{(S-I_t-\sum_{i=1}^Lx_{i,t})^+,r\}qt​=min{(S−It​−∑i=1L​xi,t​)+,r} for finite S,r≥0S,r\ge0S,r≥0. Write CCBS∗=inf⁡S,r≥0C(πS,r)C^*_{\rm CBS}=\inf_{S,r\ge0}C(\pi_{S,r})CCBS∗​=infS,r≥0​C(πS,r​). Ordinary base stock is already included by taking r=Sr=Sr=S; no infinite order cap is required.

Formalization targets

For 0≤r≤μ0\le r\le\mu0≤r≤μ and m≥1m\ge1m≥1, set

Irm=max⁡0≤k≤m∑i=1k(r−Di),Gm(r,z)=E[(Irm+∑i=1m(Di−r)−z)+].I_r^m=\max_{0\le k\le m}\sum_{i=1}^k(r-D_i),\qquad G_m(r,z)=\mathbb E\left[\left(I_r^m+\sum_{i=1}^m(D_i-r)-z\right)^+\right].Irm​=0≤k≤mmax​i=1∑k​(r−Di​),Gm​(r,z)=E[(Irm​+i=1∑m​(Di​−r)−z)+].

Empty sums are zero. The lower certificate is

C‾=inf⁡{hz+p(μ−r):0≤r≤μ, z≥0, GL(r,z)≤L(μ−r), GL+1(r,z)≤(L+1)(μ−r)}.\underline C=\inf\{hz+p(\mu-r):0\le r\le\mu,\ z\ge0,\ G_L(r,z)\le L(\mu-r),\ G_{L+1}(r,z)\le(L+1)(\mu-r)\}.C​=inf{hz+p(μ−r):0≤r≤μ, z≥0, GL​(r,z)≤L(μ−r), GL+1​(r,z)≤(L+1)(μ−r)}.

The pair (0,0)(0,0)(0,0) is feasible. Both horizon constraints are retained. With

κL=1+4L2(L+1)(3L−1),\kappa_L=1+\frac{4L^2}{(L+1)(3L-1)},κL​=1+(L+1)(3L−1)4L2​,

the goal is Theorem 1's complete assertion:

CCBS∗≤κLC‾,CCBS∗≤κLOPT≤73OPT.C^*_{\rm CBS}\le\kappa_L\underline C,\qquad C^*_{\rm CBS}\le\kappa_L\mathrm{OPT}\le\frac73\mathrm{OPT}.CCBS∗​≤κL​C​,CCBS∗​≤κL​OPT≤37​OPT.

The exact rational constant is used; the title's 2.33 is a rounded description. Multiplicative inequalities also make sense when the optimal cost is zero.

Five supporting targets reproduce selected source statements: Proposition 1's lower-certificate bound; Proposition 2's finite-cap cost conclusion; Lemma 2's bound on a consecutive block in the greedy recursion; Proposition 3's ordinary-base-stock cost bound; and Proposition 4's two-branch inequality. The finite-cap and ordinary-base-stock parameters remain exactly (S,r)=((L+1)r+z,r)(S,r)=((L+1)r+z,r)(S,r)=((L+1)r+z,r) and S=(L+1)r+2zS=(L+1)r+2zS=(L+1)r+2z, respectively. Labels accompany the printed numbering so the supplied source is unambiguous.

What completing the mission establishes

The result gives a uniform cost guarantee for this policy class across all positive holding and penalty rates, every positive integer lead time, and arbitrary nonnegative demand laws with finite positive mean. It bounds the infimum of costs over the policy parameters; it does not by itself provide an algorithm for selecting parameters or assert that the infimum is attained. At L=1L=1L=1 the displayed coefficient is 2, while its uniform upper bound is 7/37/37/3.

The manuscript supplies mathematical proofs. This mission asks for checked proofs of their formal statements. Compiling the declarations confirms that they are well formed, not that the claims are proved. A completed development would provide reusable delayed-inventory dynamics, measurable history policies, average-cost optimization objects, finite-horizon demand envelopes, and policy-comparison results.

Where the formal work lies

The pipeline carries consequences of past decisions across multiple demand periods. Nonanticipativity and independence must be stated precisely before expectation and convexity arguments can be used. Also, existence of a stationary distribution alone does not identify its expected cost with a long-run cost from an empty initial system. The manuscript invokes stationary results from prior inventory work, including Xin and Goldberg (2016), and uses stationary CBS quantities in intermediate arguments. Their needed hypotheses and connections to the original objective require proof within a complete development.

The two cost bounds depend on both coordinates of a feasible lower-certificate pair. Losing either horizon constraint changes that certificate. Replacing it with an arbitrary scalar lower bound or assuming the policy comparisons would remove substantive parts of the result.

Formalization scope and conventions

Stock, orders, and demand take arbitrary nonnegative real values. Time is represented from zero in the operational model, corresponding to period one in the manuscript. The formal representation uses a canonical probability model with independent demand coordinates and an independent uniform private seed; measurable time-dependent decision functions use only preceding demands and that seed. Connecting arbitrary standard-Borel randomized controls to this canonical realization is a representation obligation. The zero-start optimum ranges over these general history policies, not only stationary or capped policies.

Expected nonnegative costs, their upper limits, and cost infima are represented in the extended nonnegative reals. Thus a policy with infinite expected cost does not acquire a fictitious zero value through a totalized real integral. The finite-horizon envelope expectations use the original integrable demand law. The greedy lemma uses integer-indexed sequences so subtraction of earlier times has no natural-number truncation; its blocks are nonempty, as required to define their maximum.

Definitions contain no unproved facts. In particular, stationarity, convergence from the empty initial state, lower bounds, and upper policy comparisons are not fields assumed by the model. Contributions to these intermediate obligations and to any of the five source targets support the central theorem.

Selected references

  • Linwei Xin, Capped Base-Stock Policies: A 2.33-Approximation, working paper, 2026. SSRN listing. Author-supplied LaTeX is authoritative: Theorem 1 (thm-main), Proposition 1 (lemma-lb), Proposition 2 (prop-finite-cap-bound), Lemma 2 (lem-greedy-window), Proposition 3 (prop-base-stock-bound), Proposition 4 (lem-two-branch). Source SHA-256: f353793c255e1ebed5f3ec541037284bd926183e3e5b71941f13e79c2d67cb7a.
  • Linwei Xin, Technical Note—Understanding the Performance of Capped Base-Stock Policies in Lost-Sales Inventory Models, Operations Research 69(1), 61–70, 2021. DOI.
  • Linwei Xin and David A. Goldberg, Optimality Gap of Constant-Order Policies Decays Exponentially in the Lead Time for Lost Sales Models, Operations Research 64(6), 1556–1565, 2016. DOI.
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Probability·Captain: viratkota

Coherent Measures of Risk: the axioms, and why Value-at-Risk fails themResearch Paper

Motivation

In 1999 Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath asked what a risk measure ought to satisfy, wrote down four axioms, and observed that the industry standard of the day -- Value-at-Risk -- fails one of them. The failing axiom is subadditivity: merging two positions should never require more capital than holding them apart. VaR can violate it, so under VaR a diversified book can appear riskier than its parts.

That observation did not stay academic. It is the reason the Basel framework moved its market-risk capital standard from Value-at-Risk to Expected Shortfall. Few results in mathematical finance have had a more direct regulatory consequence, and the mathematics is elementary enough to state completely.

Setting

A position is a payoff X : Fin (n+1) -> R across finitely many equally-weighted states, and a risk measure rho sends it to the capital that must be added to make it acceptable. Following Definition 2.4 of the paper, rho is coherent when it is translation-invariant, subadditive, positively homogeneous and monotone. Nonemptiness of the state space is carried in the index type so the worst case is always attained; no probability measure is needed for these four axioms, which is faithful to the paper -- Artzner et al. state T, S, PH and M without reference to one.

Value-at-Risk is defined here at an integer tolerance k rather than a probability level, which keeps the quantile unambiguous on a finite space: VaR X k is the least capital leaving at most k states in loss, corresponding to level k/(n+1).

The goal

The mission's goal theorem is the negative result: Value-at-Risk is not subadditive. A witness is 25 equiprobable states with X losing 100 in state 0 alone and Y losing 100 in state 1 alone. Each has one losing state in twenty-five, so at tolerance k = 1 both have VaR = 0; their sum loses in two states, exceeding the tolerance, so VaR (X+Y) 1 = 100 > 0 + 0. The witness was checked numerically before this mission was drafted; what is open is the Lean proof.

The milestones establish the positive contrast on the same footing: worst-case risk, the most conservative measure, satisfies all four axioms, so the failure is specific to VaR rather than inherent to risk measurement.

Source

P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J.-M. Eber and D. Heath, Coherent Measures of Risk, Mathematical Finance 9 (1999) 203-228. Axioms T, S, PH and M are Definition 2.4; the failure of subadditivity for VaR and the diversification consequence are discussed in Section 3.

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The 4/3 Conjecture for Metric TSPOpen Problem

Motivation

The traveling salesman problem — visit nnn cities by the cheapest round trip — is the most widely known problem in combinatorial optimization, and its central open question concerns a linear program. The subtour-elimination relaxation (the Held–Karp bound) replaces tours by fractional edge weights, and both in theory and in practice (it powers the lower bounds inside the Concorde solver) it is remarkably close to the true optimum. How close, in the worst case, is the integrality gap of the relaxation: the supremum of OPT/LP\mathrm{OPT}/\mathrm{LP}OPT/LP over metric instances. Explicit instance families push the gap up to 4/34/34/3; the best proven upper bound sits just barely below 3/23/23/2. The 4/3 conjecture — the gap is exactly 4/34/34/3 — has been the benchmark question of approximation algorithms for four decades.

Timeline

  • 1954. Dantzig, Fulkerson, and Johnson solve a 49-city instance by hand with the cutting planes that become the subtour-elimination LP.
  • 1970–1971. Held and Karp introduce the 1-tree/Lagrangian bound and show it equals the subtour LP value — since then, "the Held–Karp bound".
  • 1976/1978. Christofides, and independently Serdyukov, give the 3/23/23/2-approximation: minimum spanning tree plus a matching on odd-degree vertices.
  • 1980. Wolsey (Math. Prog. Study 13) shows Christofides' analysis goes through against the LP: OPT≤32 LP\mathrm{OPT} \le \frac{3}{2}\,\mathrm{LP}OPT≤23​LP, so the integrality gap is at most 3/23/23/2. Shmoys and Williamson (IPL 1990) rediscover this via a monotonicity property.
  • 1995. Goemans (Math. Programming 69) analyzes the worst-case ratios of TSP relaxations and states the 4/34/34/3 conjecture explicitly; the 4/34/34/3 lower-bound families (three parallel paths) are by then folklore.
  • 2011–2014. For graph metrics (shortest-path metrics of unweighted graphs) the barrier breaks: Oveis Gharan–Saberi–Singh and Mömke–Svensson beat 3/23/23/2, and Sebő–Vygen (Combinatorica 2014) reach 7/57/57/5 — the conjectured-optimal shape of progress, but only for a special class.
  • 2020–2022. Karlin, Klein, and Oveis Gharan prove a 3/2−ε3/2 - \varepsilon3/2−ε approximation for general metric TSP (STOC 2021) and then an integrality-gap bound γ≤3/2−ε\gamma \le 3/2 - \varepsilonγ≤3/2−ε with ε>10−36\varepsilon > 10^{-36}ε>10−36 (FOCS 2022), via max-entropy sampling of spanning trees and strongly Rayleigh distributions — the first general improvement over Wolsey in forty years, by an astronomically small margin.
  • Today. The gap between the 4/34/34/3 lower bound and the 3/2−10−363/2 - 10^{-36}3/2−10−36 upper bound is the conjecture. For half-integral LP solutions — where the conjectured extremal instances live — the bound has been pushed to 1.49831.49831.4983 (Gupta, Lee, Li, Mucha, Newman, and Sarkar, via matroid-based rounding).

Setting

An instance on n≥3n \ge 3n≥3 cities is a cost function ccc assigning to each ordered pair of cities u,vu, vu,v a real cost c(u,v)c(u,v)c(u,v), required to be a metric cost: symmetric (c(u,v)=c(v,u)c(u,v) = c(v,u)c(u,v)=c(v,u)), zero on the diagonal (c(v,v)=0c(v,v) = 0c(v,v)=0), and satisfying the triangle inequality c(u,w)≤c(u,v)+c(v,w)c(u,w) \le c(u,v) + c(v,w)c(u,w)≤c(u,v)+c(v,w). Nonnegativity follows; distinct cities at distance zero are allowed, as usual for metric TSP.

A tour visits every city exactly once and returns to its start. Formally a tour is given by an ordering: a permutation π\piπ of the cities, traversed as π(0),π(1),…,π(n−1)\pi(0), \pi(1), \dots, \pi(n-1)π(0),π(1),…,π(n−1) and back to π(0)\pi(0)π(0); its cost tourCost(c,π)\mathrm{tourCost}(c, \pi)tourCost(c,π) is the sum of the costs of consecutive steps, and OPT(c)\mathrm{OPT}(c)OPT(c) — written tspOpt c — is the minimum over all orderings.

The subtour-elimination (Held–Karp) relaxation replaces the tour by a fractional edge weight x(u,v)x(u,v)x(u,v) for each pair of cities. A weight vector xxx is feasible (IsHeldKarp x) when it is symmetric with zero diagonal, has entries in [0,1][0,1][0,1], gives every city fractional degree two (∑ux(v,u)=2\sum_u x(v,u) = 2∑u​x(v,u)=2), and crosses every nontrivial cut at least twice: for every set SSS of cities other than ∅\emptyset∅ and all cities, ∑u∈S∑v∉Sx(u,v)≥2\sum_{u \in S} \sum_{v \notin S} x(u,v) \ge 2∑u∈S​∑v∈/S​x(u,v)≥2. The Held–Karp bound hkValue c is the infimum of 12∑u∑vc(u,v) x(u,v)\frac{1}{2}\sum_u \sum_v c(u,v)\,x(u,v)21​∑u​∑v​c(u,v)x(u,v) over feasible xxx (the double sum counts each edge twice, hence the 12\frac1221​). The incidence vector of any tour is feasible, so LP≤OPT\mathrm{LP} \le \mathrm{OPT}LP≤OPT always.

Formalization targets

Goal — the 4/3 conjecture

OPT(c)  ≤  43 LP(c)for every n≥3 and every metric cost c.\mathrm{OPT}(c) \;\le\; \tfrac{4}{3}\,\mathrm{LP}(c) \qquad \text{for every } n \ge 3 \text{ and every metric cost } c.OPT(c)≤34​LP(c)for every n≥3 and every metric cost c.

Together with the known lower-bound families this says the integrality gap is exactly 4/34/34/3. The goal carries no algorithm and no constant to improve: it is the terminal statement of the ladder, open in both directions (a proof or a counterexample instance would each settle it).

Milestones — the known ladder

Five results over the same definitions: the relaxation is valid (LP≤OPT\mathrm{LP} \le \mathrm{OPT}LP≤OPT); instance families force the gap arbitrarily close to 4/34/34/3; tree doubling gives OPT≤2 LP\mathrm{OPT} \le 2\,\mathrm{LP}OPT≤2LP; Wolsey's theorem gives OPT≤32 LP\mathrm{OPT} \le \frac{3}{2}\,\mathrm{LP}OPT≤23​LP, the classical upper bound; and the Karlin–Klein–Oveis Gharan record OPT≤(32−ε) LP\mathrm{OPT} \le (\frac{3}{2} - \varepsilon)\,\mathrm{LP}OPT≤(23​−ε)LP for some ε>10−36\varepsilon > 10^{-36}ε>10−36 (FOCS 2022). The last milestone is a statement-level target: its known proof (max-entropy sampling, strongly Rayleigh polynomials) is far beyond current formalization practice, so the mission's usable proving frontier remains Wolsey — the milestone records the state of the art as a formal statement.

Significance

The 4/3 conjecture is the reference open problem of approximation algorithms: the quality of the subtour LP calibrates every algorithmic advance on TSP, and the conjectured extremal instances guide the search for better rounding schemes. The bound is also what practical solvers actually compute — branch-and-cut on this LP solves instances with tens of thousands of cities — so the conjecture is a statement about the observed tightness of the world's most-used combinatorial lower bound.

Nothing in this circle exists in any proof assistant: Mathlib has no TSP, no LP relaxations, no polyhedral combinatorics of tours. The mission's milestones force the base layer into existence — tours over Equiv.Perm, cut constraints over Finset, and, for the upper bounds, the parity and tree arguments (spanning trees against the LP, T-joins for the 3/23/23/2 bound) whose infrastructure is reusable for matching theory and network design far beyond TSP.

Difficulty

The naive plan — round the LP solution to a tour — has no known analysis losing less than 3/23/23/2 in general, and the half-integral extremal instances show the hard cases are structured and simple-looking at once. Christofides' matching argument is provably stuck at 3/23/23/2 against the LP; forty years of work moved the constant by 10−3610^{-36}10−36, and that advance needed an entirely new probabilistic toolkit. On the other side, no instance family with ratio above 4/34/34/3 has ever been found despite extensive computational search over small instances (Benoit–Boyd and successors). Both directions of the goal are genuinely open territory.

Formalization scope

The Lean model commits to: cities Fin n; costs c : Fin n → Fin n → ℝ with IsMetricCost (symmetry, zero diagonal, triangle inequality — nonnegativity is derived, and semimetrics are included as in the standard statement of the conjecture); tours as orderings π : Equiv.Perm (Fin n) traversed cyclically via finRotate, so every permutation denotes a Hamiltonian cycle and every Hamiltonian cycle is denoted; both optimal values as sInf over nonempty, bounded-below sets of reals, so they are genuine minima for n ≥ 3. The hypothesis 3 ≤ n is load-bearing: for n ≤ 2 the degree-2 constraints are infeasible, sInf ∅ = 0 by convention, and the bounds would be false — every theorem therefore carries it.

Welcome contributions: the milestones in any order — held_karp_le_opt is the natural entry point (the tour's incidence vector crosses every cut at least twice); integrality_gap_lower_bound needs the three-path instance family and a case analysis on its tours; tree_doubling_bound needs spanning trees against the LP; wolsey_bound adds the T-join/parity argument and is the summit. Reusable infrastructure — spanning tree polytopes, T-joins, Eulerian traversals, cut lemmas — is welcome as platform theorems. Graph-TSP (7/57/57/5), path TSP, and asymmetric TSP are deliberately left to future missions; the Karlin–Klein–Oveis Gharan bound is stated as a milestone, but its sampling machinery is expected to arrive, if ever, as shared infrastructure built over many contributions.

Selected references

  • G. Dantzig, R. Fulkerson, S. Johnson, Solution of a large-scale traveling-salesman problem, Oper. Res. 2 (1954).
  • M. Held, R. Karp, The traveling-salesman problem and minimum spanning trees, Oper. Res. 18 (1970); Part II, Math. Programming 1 (1971).
  • N. Christofides, Worst-case analysis of a new heuristic for the travelling salesman problem, CMU report (1976); A. Serdyukov, Upravlyaemye Sistemy 17 (1978).
  • L. Wolsey, Heuristic analysis, linear programming and branch and bound, Math. Prog. Study 13 (1980). doi:10.1007/BFb0120913
  • D. Shmoys, D. Williamson, Analyzing the Held-Karp TSP bound: a monotonicity property with application, Inf. Process. Lett. 35 (1990). doi:10.1016/0020-0190(90)90028-V
  • M. Goemans, Worst-case comparison of valid inequalities for the TSP, Math. Programming 69 (1995). doi:10.1007/BF01585563
  • A. Sebő, J. Vygen, Shorter tours by nicer ears, Combinatorica 34 (2014). arXiv:1201.1870
  • A. Karlin, N. Klein, S. Oveis Gharan, A (slightly) improved approximation algorithm for metric TSP, STOC 2021. arXiv:2007.01409
  • A. Karlin, N. Klein, S. Oveis Gharan, A (slightly) improved bound on the integrality gap of the subtour LP for TSP, FOCS 2022. arXiv:2105.10043
  • V. Traub, J. Vygen, Approximation Algorithms for Traveling Salesman Problems, Cambridge University Press, 2024. book page
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Functional AnalysisOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

Vector Space Methods II: Gauss–Markov EstimationTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 4 of Luenberger's Optimization by Vector Space Methods (Wiley, 1969) develops linear least-squares estimation as an application of the Hilbert space projection theorem formalized in Mission I of this series. The chapter's centerpiece is the classical Gauss–Markov theorem: among all linear unbiased estimators of an unknown parameter vector from noisy linear measurements, the estimator (W⊤Q−1W)−1W⊤Q−1y(W^\top Q^{-1} W)^{-1} W^\top Q^{-1} y(W⊤Q−1W)−1W⊤Q−1y has minimum variance — componentwise, not merely in trace. This result is foundational for statistics and econometrics, and its Hilbert-space derivation is the cleanest known.

Setting

Measurements are modeled as y=Wβ+εy = W\beta + \varepsilony=Wβ+ε, where yyy is an mmm-dimensional data vector, WWW a known m×nm \times nm×n matrix (n<mn < mn<m) with linearly independent columns, β\betaβ an unknown nnn-dimensional parameter vector, and ε\varepsilonε a random mmm-vector of measurement errors with Eε=0E\varepsilon = 0Eε=0 and covariance E[εε⊤]=QE[\varepsilon\varepsilon^\top] = QE[εε⊤]=Q, positive definite. A linear estimate is β^=Ky\hat\beta = Kyβ^​=Ky for a constant n×mn \times mn×m matrix KKK; it is unbiased when Eβ^=βE\hat\beta = \betaEβ^​=β for every β\betaβ, which holds iff KW=IKW = IKW=I. The optimality criterion is the error second moment E∥β^−β∥2E\|\hat\beta - \beta\|^2E∥β^​−β∥2, and the book's key observation (p. 85) is that the problem splits into nnn independent minimum norm problems, one per component, each solvable by the dual approximation theorem of Mission I.

Formally, randomness is carried by an abstract probability space: a measure space (Ω,μ)(\Omega, \mu)(Ω,μ) with μ\muμ a probability measure, random vectors as functions Ω→Rm\Omega \to \mathbb{R}^mΩ→Rm with explicit integrability hypotheses for all first and second moments, and E[⋅]=∫⋅ dμE[\cdot] = \int \cdot \, d\muE[⋅]=∫⋅dμ.

Formalization targets

The goal is §4.4 Theorem 1 (Gauss–Markov): with K0=(W⊤Q−1W)−1W⊤Q−1K_0 = (W^\top Q^{-1} W)^{-1} W^\top Q^{-1}K0​=(W⊤Q−1W)−1W⊤Q−1,

K0W=I,E[(K0y−β)i2]≤E[(Ky−β)i2]for every i and every K with KW=I,K_0 W = I, \qquad E\big[(K_0 y - \beta)_i^2\big] \le E\big[(K y - \beta)_i^2\big] \quad \text{for every } i \text{ and every } K \text{ with } KW = I,K0​W=I,E[(K0​y−β)i2​]≤E[(Ky−β)i2​]for every i and every K with KW=I,

with error covariance

E[(K0y−β)(K0y−β)⊤]=(W⊤Q−1W)−1.E\big[(K_0 y - \beta)(K_0 y - \beta)^\top\big] = (W^\top Q^{-1} W)^{-1}.E[(K0​y−β)(K0​y−β)⊤]=(W⊤Q−1W)−1.

Milestones: the deterministic least-squares estimate β^=(W⊤W)−1W⊤y\hat\beta = (W^\top W)^{-1} W^\top yβ^​=(W⊤W)−1W⊤y (§4.3 Theorem 1); the book's deterministic reduction — minimize the diagonal entries of KQK⊤KQK^\topKQK⊤ subject to KW=IKW = IKW=I (p. 85); the minimum-variance estimate β^=E[βy⊤](E[yy⊤])−1y\hat\beta = E[\beta y^\top] (E[y y^\top])^{-1} yβ^​=E[βy⊤](E[yy⊤])−1y for random β\betaβ (§4.5 Theorem 1); and the information-form identities RW⊤(WRW⊤+Q)−1=(W⊤Q−1W+R−1)−1W⊤Q−1RW^\top(WRW^\top + Q)^{-1} = (W^\top Q^{-1}W + R^{-1})^{-1}W^\top Q^{-1}RW⊤(WRW⊤+Q)−1=(W⊤Q−1W+R−1)−1W⊤Q−1 and R−RW⊤(WRW⊤+Q)−1WR=(W⊤Q−1W+R−1)−1R - RW^\top(WRW^\top+Q)^{-1}WR = (W^\top Q^{-1}W + R^{-1})^{-1}R−RW⊤(WRW⊤+Q)−1WR=(W⊤Q−1W+R−1)−1 (§4.5 Corollary 2).

Significance

The Gauss–Markov theorem justifies weighted least squares as the optimal linear unbiased procedure and is the standard benchmark against which biased and nonlinear estimators are measured. The minimum-variance estimate of §4.5 is the Bayesian counterpart with prior covariance RRR; the information-form identities connect the two and exhibit Gauss–Markov as the limit R−1→0R^{-1} \to 0R−1→0. Mission III builds the recursive (Kalman) estimator directly on these results.

All results are classical and proved in the source. Mathlib has mature measure-theoretic integration but, to date, no Gauss–Markov theorem and no linear estimation theory; the matrix milestones (trace reduction, information form) are also absent as stated. The probabilistic statements here are deliberately phrased with elementary integrals of products of real-valued components — no Bochner integration of vector-valued maps — so they are approachable with MeasureTheory.integral alone.

Difficulty

The subtlety is bookkeeping, not depth. Unbiasedness must be encoded as the algebraic constraint KW=IKW = IKW=I (the book proves the equivalence with Eβ^=βE\hat\beta = \betaEβ^​=β for all β\betaβ); the componentwise variance claim is strictly stronger than the trace claim and requires the per-component minimum norm argument, not a single matrix inequality. Positive definiteness of QQQ enters through invertibility of W⊤Q−1WW^\top Q^{-1} WW⊤Q−1W, which itself needs the linear independence of the columns of WWW — dropping either hypothesis makes the goal false. In the probabilistic statements every integral needs an integrability hypothesis; the drafts supply integrability of all pairwise products of components, from which integrability of every derived expression follows.

Formalization scope

Random vectors are plain functions Ω → Fin m → ℝ on a MeasurableSpace Ω with a probability measure μ; second moments are hypotheses of the form ∫ ω, ε ω i * ε ω j ∂μ = Q i j with explicit Integrable assumptions; no independence, Gaussianity, or distributional assumptions are used anywhere. Matrices are Matrix (Fin m) (Fin n) ℝ with Mathlib's Matrix.PosDef, nonconstructive inverse ⁻¹, and mulVec. Norms on parameter space are written as explicit finite sums of squares, avoiding any ambiguity between Euclidean and supremum norms on pi types. The estimators under comparison are strictly linear (β^=Ky\hat\beta = Kyβ^​=Ky, no affine offset), exactly as in the source; §4.5's affine extension (its Problem 6) is out of scope.

Selected references

  • David G. Luenberger, Optimization by Vector Space Methods, John Wiley & Sons, 1969. Chapter 4, pp. 78–102. ISBN 0-471-55359-X.
  • A. C. Aitken, On least squares and linear combination of observations, Proc. Roy. Soc. Edinburgh 55 (1935), 42–48 (the weighted-least-squares form of Gauss–Markov).
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Functional AnalysisOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Vector Space Methods I: Minimum Norm Problems in Hilbert SpaceTextbook

Motivation

Luenberger's Optimization by Vector Space Methods (Wiley, 1969) organizes a large part of optimization theory around a single geometric idea: minimum norm problems in inner product spaces, solved by orthogonal projection. Chapter 3 is the technical heart of that program. Its projection theorem and normal equations underlie least-squares data fitting, Fourier approximation, minimum-energy control, and the whole statistical estimation theory of Chapter 4 — which Missions II and III of this series formalize on top of the present one.

Setting

Throughout, spaces are real. A pre-Hilbert space is a real vector space XXX with an inner product ⟨⋅,⋅⟩\langle\cdot,\cdot\rangle⟨⋅,⋅⟩ inducing the norm ∥x∥=⟨x,x⟩1/2\|x\| = \langle x,x\rangle^{1/2}∥x∥=⟨x,x⟩1/2; a Hilbert space HHH is a complete pre-Hilbert space. Vectors x,yx, yx,y are orthogonal when ⟨x,y⟩=0\langle x, y\rangle = 0⟨x,y⟩=0; for a subset SSS, the orthogonal complement S⊥S^\perpS⊥ is the set of vectors orthogonal to every element of SSS. Given y1,…,yn∈Hy_1,\dots,y_n \in Hy1​,…,yn​∈H, their Gram matrix is G(y1,…,yn)ij=⟨yi,yj⟩G(y_1,\dots,y_n)_{ij} = \langle y_i, y_j\rangleG(y1​,…,yn​)ij​=⟨yi​,yj​⟩ and its determinant g(y1,…,yn)g(y_1,\dots,y_n)g(y1​,…,yn​) is the Gram determinant. A linear variety is a translate x+Mx + Mx+M of a subspace MMM.

Formalization targets

The goal is §3.10 Theorem 2, the dual approximation problem: for linearly independent y1,…,yn∈Hy_1,\dots,y_n \in Hy1​,…,yn​∈H and constants c1,…,cnc_1,\dots,c_nc1​,…,cn​, among all x∈Hx \in Hx∈H satisfying the constraints

⟨x,yi⟩=ci,i=1,…,n,\langle x, y_i\rangle = c_i, \qquad i = 1,\dots,n,⟨x,yi​⟩=ci​,i=1,…,n,

there is a unique vector of minimum norm, and it has the form

x0=∑i=1nβi yi,where∑j=1nβj⟨yj,yi⟩=ci.x_0 = \sum_{i=1}^n \beta_i\, y_i, \qquad \text{where} \qquad \sum_{j=1}^n \beta_j \langle y_j, y_i\rangle = c_i .x0​=i=1∑n​βi​yi​,wherej=1∑n​βj​⟨yj​,yi​⟩=ci​.

The milestone list follows the chapter's own development: the projection theorem in its pre-Hilbert form (§3.3 Theorem 1) and classical form (§3.3 Theorem 2), the orthogonal decomposition H=M⊕M⊥H = M \oplus M^\perpH=M⊕M⊥ with M⊥⊥=MM^{\perp\perp} = MM⊥⊥=M (§3.4 Theorem 1), the normal equations and Gram matrices (§3.6), the Gram determinant formula δ2=g(y1,…,yn,x)/g(y1,…,yn)\delta^2 = g(y_1,\dots,y_n,x)/g(y_1,\dots,y_n)δ2=g(y1​,…,yn​,x)/g(y1​,…,yn​) for the minimum distance (§3.6 Theorem 1), best approximation by Fourier sums over orthonormal families (§3.7, §3.9), minimum norm over a linear variety (§3.10 Theorem 1), and the extension from subspaces to closed convex sets with its variational inequality characterization (§3.12 Theorem 1).

Significance

The dual approximation theorem converts an infinite-dimensional constrained minimum norm problem into an n×nn \times nn×n linear system — the book's model example of finite reduction, applied there to minimum-energy control of a motor (§3.11) and, in Chapter 4, to every linear estimation problem: least squares, Gauss–Markov, and recursive (Kalman) estimation are all instances of these results in a Hilbert space of random variables.

All results here are classical and proved in the source; the mission's product is a faithful machine-checked development with reusable statements. Mathlib already contains close relatives of several milestones (orthogonal projection onto complete subspaces, Submodule.orthogonal), so part of the work is connecting the book's formulations to that library; the Gram determinant distance formula and the dual approximation theorem itself have no direct Mathlib counterpart.

Difficulty

The individual milestones are standard Hilbert space theory. The care is in the statements, not tricks: the pre-Hilbert version of the projection theorem asserts uniqueness and the orthogonality characterization without existence, while existence requires completeness and closedness — conflating the two versions produces unprovable or vacuous statements. The Gram determinant formula requires the (n+1)×(n+1)(n+1) \times (n+1)(n+1)×(n+1) Gram matrix of the extended family (y1,…,yn,x)(y_1,\dots,y_n,x)(y1​,…,yn​,x), where index bookkeeping (Fin.snoc) is easy to get wrong. In §3.12 the variational inequality ⟨x−k0,k−k0⟩≤0\langle x - k_0, k - k_0\rangle \le 0⟨x−k0​,k−k0​⟩≤0 replaces the equality characterization valid for subspaces; the inequality direction is a known trap.

Formalization scope

The development commits to: real scalars (the book allows complex; this series does not), an abstract space H : Type with [NormedAddCommGroup H] [InnerProductSpace ℝ H] and [CompleteSpace H] exactly where the source assumes a Hilbert space; subspaces as Submodule ℝ H with explicit IsClosed hypotheses; finite families as Fin n → H; Gram matrices as Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ via Matrix.of; minimum distances as infima (⨅) over coerced submodules. Best approximation statements are phrased as explicit inequalities ‖x - m₀‖ ≤ ‖x - m‖ rather than through any projection operator, so they are usable without choosing Mathlib's orthogonalProjection API. Statements deliberately carry no more hypotheses than the source: §3.3 Theorem 1 and the normal equations hold in any real inner product space; completeness appears only where existence is claimed.

Proofs are expected to lean on Mathlib's inner product space library; contributions of reusable bridging lemmas (e.g. between ⨅-formulations and orthogonalProjection) are welcome as child lemmas via proof sketches.

Selected references

  • David G. Luenberger, Optimization by Vector Space Methods, John Wiley & Sons, 1969. Chapter 3, pp. 46–77. ISBN 0-471-55359-X.
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OptimizationTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Joint Assortment Optimization and Customization under a Mixture of Multinomial Logit Models 1: Augmented Greedy Earns a (1 − 1/e) Fraction of the Optimal Revenue from the Complete Customer TypesResearch Paper

Motivation

Retailers that carry a limited range of products often know something about a customer before choosing which of those products to display. The customized assortment problem asks which products to carry when the displayed assortment may be tailored to the arriving customer's type. This separates the first-stage capacity decision from the later offer decision. El Housni and Topaloglu study the problem under a mixture of multinomial logit choice models and develop an approximation framework for it in their SSRN paper. This mission isolates their structural guarantee for Augmented Greedy, Theorem 4.2 of the PDF version dated 7 December 2021. The theorem identifies the revenue recovered from customer types whose optimal personalized offers agree with a chosen product subset.

The paper contrasts this setting with ordinary assortment optimization, where every type sees the same products. Its later approximation results use the structural guarantee here as a component. The classical comparison is the cardinality-constrained greedy bound for monotone submodular functions, associated with Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher (1978). The paper's Appendix B gives an instance in which the customized revenue function lacks global submodularity, so that classical result does not apply directly. El Housni and Topaloglu, §§4 and App. B.

Setting

Let N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\ldots,n\}N={1,…,n} be a finite product set. Product iii has positive revenue rir_iri​, and products are indexed with r1≥⋯≥rn>0r_1\ge\cdots\ge r_n>0r1​≥⋯≥rn​>0. Let M={1,…,m}M=\{1,\ldots,m\}M={1,…,m} be customer types. A type-jjj customer arrives with probability θj≥0\theta_j\ge0θj​≥0, with ∑j∈Mθj=1\sum_{j\in M}\theta_j=1∑j∈M​θj​=1, and assigns each product iii a nonnegative preference weight vijv_{ij}vij​. The no-purchase option has weight one. Offering an assortment T⊆NT\subseteq NT⊆N to that customer gives MNL expected revenue

Rev⁡j(T)=∑i∈Trivij1+∑i∈Tvij.\operatorname{Rev}_j(T)= \frac{\sum_{i\in T}r_i v_{ij}}{1+\sum_{i\in T}v_{ij}}.Revj​(T)=1+∑i∈T​vij​∑i∈T​ri​vij​​.

If the retailer initially carries only S⊆NS\subseteq NS⊆N, it can still choose the best offer to each customer type. Thus fj(S)=max⁡T⊆SRev⁡j(T)f_j(S)=\max_{T\subseteq S}\operatorname{Rev}_j(T)fj​(S)=maxT⊆S​Revj​(T). For C⊆MC\subseteq MC⊆M, write fC(S)=∑j∈Cθjfj(S)f^C(S)=\sum_{j\in C}\theta_j f_j(S)fC(S)=∑j∈C​θj​fj​(S), and abbreviate f=fMf=f^Mf=fM. The first-stage capacity is KKK; an optimal solution S∗S^*S∗ of CAP maximizes f(S)f(S)f(S) among sets with at most KKK products. These definitions and the standing data assumptions are stated in §2 and §4 of the paper.

For each product iii, the prefix Vi={1,…,i}V_i=\{1,\ldots,i\}Vi​={1,…,i} contains products at least as early in the revenue ordering. Greedy starts at the empty set, repeatedly adds an available product that maximizes the new objective value, and stops at cardinality kkk or when the prefix is exhausted. Augmented Greedy runs Greedy on ViV_iVi​ for each iii, using S↦∑j∈Cθjmin⁡(fj(S),ri)S\mapsto\sum_{j\in C}\theta_j\min(f_j(S),r_i)S↦∑j∈C​θj​min(fj​(S),ri​), and returns whichever candidate has the greatest fCf^CfC value. Both stages may break ties arbitrarily. El Housni and Topaloglu, §4.1.

For type jjj, use the optimal personalized assortment Sj∗={i∈S∗:ri≥fj(S∗)}S_j^*=\{i\in S^*:r_i\ge f_j(S^*)\}Sj∗​={i∈S∗:ri​≥fj​(S∗)}, characterized by Lemma E.1. A type j∈Cj\in Cj∈C is complete with respect to P⊆NP\subseteq NP⊆N when P∩Sj∗=P∩S∗P\cap S_j^*=P\cap S^*P∩Sj∗​=P∩S∗; let CPC_PCP​ collect these types. The threshold choice matters because zero-weight products can be present in other optimal offers without helping a customer. El Housni and Topaloglu, Definition 4.1 and App. E.

Formalization targets

Theorem 4.2: complete-type revenue

For every C⊆MC\subseteq MC⊆M, P⊆NP\subseteq NP⊆N, kkk with ∣P∩S∗∣≤k|P\cap S^*|\le k∣P∩S∗∣≤k, and every output Δ\DeltaΔ of Augmented Greedy on C,kC,kC,k,

fC(Δ)≥(1−1/e) fCP(P∩S∗).f^C(\Delta)\ge(1-1/e)\,f^{C_P}(P\cap S^*).fC(Δ)≥(1−1/e)fCP​(P∩S∗).

This is the mission goal, the structural performance statement of Theorem 4.2, p. 11. It does not assert a constant-factor approximation to all of CAP: it identifies the contribution from complete customer types.

Supporting targets

The milestone list follows the results used with this bound: monotonicity of fjf_jfj​ from Appendix C; the MNL threshold assortment of Lemma E.1; submodularity of S↦min⁡(fj(S),ri)S\mapsto\min(f_j(S),r_i)S↦min(fj​(S),ri​) on ViV_iVi​ from Lemma 4.3; and the cited 1−1/e1-1/e1−1/e Greedy guarantee for a nonnegative monotone submodular objective. The greedy milestone compares its output against every feasible set of cardinality at most kkk.

Significance

The theorem says that one algorithmic output captures a fixed fraction of the benchmark supplied by complete types, despite the absence of global submodularity of fff. It connects the local behavior of truncated type revenues to the full customized assortment objective. The paper uses this result in the development of later algorithms; without it, the standard submodular greedy theorem gives no immediate conclusion for CAP. El Housni and Topaloglu, §§4–5.

The mathematical results are proved in the 2021 paper. The formalization work here is to give machine-checkable statements for the objective, the algorithm with all its legal tie choices, and the four supporting targets, then supply proofs. The MNL revenue formula is already available as a published platform definition; the local CAP and algorithm definitions specify the extra model needed by this theorem. A completed development could also support later CAP missions that use the same threshold and submodularity properties.

Difficulty

The tempting argument applies the classical greedy guarantee directly to fff, since fff increases when more products are carried. Appendix B of the paper shows that this fails: even for one customer type, fff need not be submodular. Restricting the ground set to a revenue prefix and truncating each fjf_jfj​ at that prefix's revenue level changes the submodularity question, but the final guarantee must still concern the untruncated fCf^CfC objective. The threshold condition in the definition of CPC_PCP​ is what makes that comparison meaningful. El Housni and Topaloglu, App. B, Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.2.

Formalization scope

Products and types are Fin n and Fin m; their zero-based Lean indices correspond to the paper's indices plus one. Assortments and type groups are finite sets. The model assumes ri>0r_i>0ri​>0, vij≥0v_{ij}\ge0vij​≥0, θj≥0\theta_j\ge0θj​≥0, ∑jθj=1\sum_j\theta_j=1∑j​θj​=1, and decreasing revenue order. The no-purchase weight is exactly one. CAP and personalized revenue use maxima over nonempty finite powersets, so empty input sets have their intended value rather than an arbitrary real supremum. The theorem keeps the source's optimality assumption on S∗S^*S∗, even though its particular inequality uses less.

The Greedy predicate describes each successive maximizer and the exact stopping rule. Augmented Greedy requires a Greedy output at every prefix and an fCf^CfC-maximizing choice among them. Thus the output is constrained by the printed algorithm, and the statement covers every tie-break. The type-jjj assortment is defined from S∗S^*S∗ by the Lemma E.1 threshold, rather than supplied as a free set. These choices rule out a size-only output condition, an arbitrarily chosen Sj∗S_j^*Sj∗​, a vacuous run predicate, and real supremum defaults. The target includes the corner cases k=0k=0k=0, C=∅C=\varnothingC=∅, and P∩S∗=∅P\cap S^*=\varnothingP∩S∗=∅, where its right side is zero. Arrival probabilities summing to one force m≥1m\ge1m≥1; Augmented Greedy has an output only when at least one product exists.

The reusable parts are the MNL threshold characterization, finite-set submodularity and the general Greedy bound. Contributions toward those lemmas, the paper's case analysis for Lemma 4.3, and the final structural theorem are in scope. Runtime claims, the paper's later logarithmic approximation theorems and its computational experiments are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Omar El Housni and Huseyin Topaloglu, Joint Assortment Optimization and Customization under a Mixture of Multinomial Logit Models: Value of Personalized Assortments, SSRN 3830082, version of 7 December 2021; published as Operations Research 71(4), 2023. SSRN preprint. The mission's numbering and page citations use the pinned 2021 PDF.
  • George L. Nemhauser, Laurence A. Wolsey and Marshall L. Fisher, An Analysis of Approximations for Maximizing Submodular Set Functions—I, Mathematical Programming 14, 265–294, 1978. DOI.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy III: For Every Set of Cost Functions, Congestion Games Are Tight — the Worst-Case Pure Price of Anarchy Equals the Best Smoothness BoundResearch Paper

Motivation

In a congestion game, each player chooses resources and pays a cost that depends on how many players use each chosen resource. Such games model shared facilities and network use, where independently chosen strategies can cost more in total than a coordinated choice. The price of anarchy measures this inefficiency by comparing the social cost of an equilibrium with the minimum social cost. A familiar way to bound it is to prove a smoothness inequality that applies to every pair of strategy profiles. That inequality has a useful reach: once established, it bounds not only pure Nash equilibria but also broader equilibrium notions. The question in this mission is how much that reach costs in sharpness. Roughgarden (2015) proves that for congestion games it costs nothing at the level of the worst case over any fixed collection of allowed resource cost functions.

For affine resource costs, earlier analyses had already identified a worst-case value of 5/25/25/2, attained by a finite congestion game and matched by a smoothness bound. The 2015 paper asks whether this agreement reflects affine costs or a general property of congestion games. Its Theorem 5.8 gives the latter answer, even when the collection of allowed functions is infinite and has no prescribed formula. The mission treats the theorem at that generality, while giving the finite positive case and the boundary case their own supporting targets. Roughgarden (2015), §§2.3 and 5.

Setting

A finite congestion game has a finite player set, a finite resource set EEE, and for each player iii a nonempty set SiS_iSi​ of subsets of EEE called strategies. Each resource eee has a cost function ce:N→Rc_e:\mathbb N\to\mathbb Rce​:N→R. For a strategy profile A=(Ai)iA=(A_i)_iA=(Ai​)i​, its load xe(A)x_e(A)xe​(A) is the number of players whose selected strategy contains eee. Player iii pays Ci(A)=∑e∈Aice(xe(A))C_i(A)=\sum_{e\in A_i}c_e(x_e(A))Ci​(A)=∑e∈Ai​​ce​(xe​(A)), and the social cost is C(A)=∑iCi(A)C(A)=\sum_i C_i(A)C(A)=∑i​Ci​(A). A profile is a pure Nash equilibrium when no player can lower its own cost by changing its strategy alone. These are the objects of Example 2.5 in Roughgarden (2015).

Fix a nonempty set C\mathcal CC of resource cost functions, each nonnegative, nondecreasing, and not identically zero on positive loads. The class G(C)\mathcal G(\mathcal C)G(C) contains every finite congestion game whose resource functions belong to C\mathcal CC. It permits any finite number of players and resources and any nonempty strategy families. The pure price of anarchy ρpure(G)\rho_{\mathrm{pure}}(G)ρpure​(G) is the largest equilibrium-to-optimum cost ratio in one game, allowing +∞+\infty+∞ when an equilibrium costs more than zero but the optimum costs zero.

A game is (λ,μ)(\lambda,\mu)(λ,μ)-smooth if, for every two feasible profiles A,A∗A,A^*A,A∗, the sum of the player costs after each player individually switches from AiA_iAi​ to Ai∗A_i^*Ai∗​ is at most λC(A∗)+μC(A)\lambda C(A^*)+\mu C(A)λC(A∗)+μC(A). The set A(G(C))\mathcal A(\mathcal G(\mathcal C))A(G(C)) consists of pairs with μ<1\mu<1μ<1 that satisfy this inequality for every game in the class. A related resourcewise set A(C)\mathcal A(\mathcal C)A(C) asks, for every c∈Cc\in\mathcal Cc∈C, current load x≥0x\ge0x≥0, and comparison load x∗≥1x^*\ge1x∗≥1, that

c(x+1)x∗≤λc(x∗)x∗+μc(x)x.c(x+1)x^*\le\lambda c(x^*)x^*+\mu c(x)x.c(x+1)x∗≤λc(x∗)x∗+μc(x)x.

Its best ratio is γ(C)=inf⁡(λ,μ)∈A(C)λ/(1−μ)\gamma(\mathcal C)=\inf_{(\lambda,\mu)\in\mathcal A(\mathcal C)}\lambda/(1-\mu)γ(C)=inf(λ,μ)∈A(C)​λ/(1−μ), with value +∞+\infty+∞ if there is no admissible pair. The bounded-load versions A(C,n)\mathcal A(\mathcal C,n)A(C,n) and γ(C,n)\gamma(\mathcal C,n)γ(C,n) use 0≤x≤n0\le x\le n0≤x≤n and 1≤x∗≤n1\le x^*\le n1≤x∗≤n. Roughgarden (2015), equations (34)–(36) and (41).

Formalization targets

Tightness of the congestion-game class

Theorem 5.8, in the form of equation (34), is the goal:

sup⁡G∈G(C)ρpure(G)=inf⁡(λ,μ)∈A(G(C))λ1−μ.\sup_{G\in\mathcal G(\mathcal C)}\rho_{\mathrm{pure}}(G) =\inf_{(\lambda,\mu)\in\mathcal A(\mathcal G(\mathcal C))}\frac{\lambda}{1-\mu}.G∈G(C)sup​ρpure​(G)=(λ,μ)∈A(G(C))inf​1−μλ​.

It applies to every nonempty set C\mathcal CC satisfying the standing cost-function conditions, whether finite, countable, or uncountable. Neither the number of players nor the number of resources is fixed. The equality is stronger than the routine upper bound from smoothness: it says that the best upper bound available from a uniform smoothness argument matches actual worst-case pure-equilibrium inefficiency. Roughgarden (2015), Theorem 5.8 and (34).

Resourcewise characterization

The paper also identifies the common value with γ(C)\gamma(\mathcal C)γ(C):

sup⁡G∈G(C)ρpure(G)=γ(C).\sup_{G\in\mathcal G(\mathcal C)}\rho_{\mathrm{pure}}(G)=\gamma(\mathcal C).G∈G(C)sup​ρpure​(G)=γ(C).

The milestone list follows the paper's statements: the general upper bound; nonnegativity of μ\muμ; passage from resource constraints to game smoothness; the bound for one game; the two finite optimization lemmas; the finite lower-bound theorem; the infinite-price boundary case; the countable case; and the characterization by γ(C)\gamma(\mathcal C)γ(C). The finite lower-bound target uses the one-sided conclusion established in the proof of Theorem 5.6. Roughgarden (2015), §§5.1–5.5.

Significance

The equality rules out a uniform improvement of the worst-case pure price-of-anarchy bound by using features of pure Nash equilibrium that a smoothness argument ignores. In this domain the broader applicability of smoothness does not force a worse class-wide bound. For a chosen cost-function family, the resourcewise characterization expresses that bound through explicit inequalities rather than a search over every possible finite game. Roughgarden (2015), §§2.4 and 5.5.

The result is proved in the paper. The remaining work here is a machine-checked proof of its formal statement and supporting theorems. The published congestion-game model supplies loads, player costs, feasible profiles, and pure Nash equilibria. The definitions of smoothness parameters and prices of anarchy built for this mission can also support later work on other cost-function classes and equilibrium bounds. The goal statement itself is a proof target, not an already verified result.

Difficulty

The smoothness inequality immediately gives an upper bound on equilibrium costs, but it does not by itself show that a game attains or approaches that bound. The difficult direction relates a small family of resourcewise constraints to actual games with inefficient equilibria. For finite positive cost-function sets, the optimum parameter value may be attained or may be approached only at infinity in parameter space; the two cases have different statements in Lemmas 5.3 and 5.5. The general theorem must also cover functions that vanish at a positive load, unbounded worst-case ratios, and sets of functions of arbitrary cardinality. Simply optimizing a bound for one fixed game would miss the supremum over the entire class. Roughgarden (2015), §§5.2–5.4.

Formalization scope

Lean represents players and resources by Fin k and Fin m and quantifies over every k,m∈Nk,m\in\mathbb Nk,m∈N. A strategy is a finite resource subset, a strategy family is finite and nonempty, and all costs are real-valued at each load. The value c(0)c(0)c(0) is unrestricted because it is unused in a player's cost and is multiplied by zero in (35). The all-zero function is excluded as in §5.1. Nonemptiness of C\mathcal CC, stated at the start of that section, is carried into the finite optimization lemmas because their conclusions select functions from C\mathcal CC. Zero-player and zero-resource games are allowed and do not raise the worst-case supremum.

Prices of anarchy and the values γ\gammaγ are extended nonnegative reals. Thus an empty smoothness-parameter set has infimum +∞+\infty+∞; a positive equilibrium cost over zero optimum gives +∞+\infty+∞; and a game with no equilibrium contributes zero to the supremum. The paper's finite congestion games with nonempty strategy sets do have pure equilibria. The conversion of a real ratio λ/(1−μ)\lambda/(1-\mu)λ/(1−μ) into this type does not truncate admissible class-wide ratios: if some cost function has c(1)>0c(1)>0c(1)>0, a one-resource game forces the ratio to be at least one; if none does, the parameter set is empty. Smoothness and optimum quantify over feasible profiles only. These choices prevent the equality from becoming vacuous through an empty real infimum, total division by zero, or a supremum over a fixed small game size.

The complete development needs finite-set sums, function updates, extended nonnegative infima and suprema, and the published congestion-game definitions. Reusable contributions include lemmas about the resourcewise parameter sets and their relation to game smoothness. The paper's uncountable approximation paragraph has a gap for flat cost functions; the theorem remains the stated target, and a formal proof may use a different argument at that stage. Roughgarden (2015), pp. 31–32.

Selected references

  • Tim Roughgarden, Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy, Journal of the ACM 62(5), Article 32, 2015. DOI. The source used here is the author's final version dated July 14, 2015; the cited page numbers are its printed pages.
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Dynamic ProgrammingOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Dynamic Type Matching: Under the Modified Monge Condition There Is an Optimal Matching Policy That Respects the Priority Relation ≻MsResearch Paper

Motivation

Many platforms match two sides of a market over time: ride-hailing platforms match riders with drivers, blood banks match donated units with patients, organ allocation matches donors with recipients, and retailers pool inventory across fulfilment centres to serve orders from several regions. Demand and supply arrive in several types (locations, blood groups, quality grades), the reward of a match depends on both types, and whatever is not matched today partly waits for tomorrow. A central operational question is which pairs to match first. Static versions of this question go back to the transportation problem and to Monge sequences: Hoffman (1963) characterized the cost matrices for which a fixed greedy order of the arcs solves a transportation problem.

Hu and Zhou (arXiv:1811.07048, published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 24(1), 2022) extend this to a stochastic, multi-period setting. They identify conditions on the rewards, the (weak) modified Monge conditions, under which an optimal dynamic policy matches a dominant pair before the neighbouring pairs it dominates. This mission formalizes their main structural result, Theorem 1, and the chain of results it rests on.

Setting

There are mmm demand types D={1,…,m}\mathcal D=\{1,\dots,m\}D={1,…,m}, nnn supply types S={1,…,n}\mathcal S=\{1,\dots,n\}S={1,…,n}, and TTT periods t=1,…,Tt=1,\dots,Tt=1,…,T. In period ttt the state is a pair of vectors (x,y)∈R+m×R+n(\mathbf x,\mathbf y)\in\mathbb R^m_+\times\mathbb R^n_+(x,y)∈R+m​×R+n​ of available demand and supply. The firm chooses a matching decision Q=(qij)∈Rm×n\mathbf Q=(q_{ij})\in\mathbb R^{m\times n}Q=(qij​)∈Rm×n, collecting the reward

Rt∘Q=∑i=1m∑j=1nrijtqij,\mathbf R^t\circ\mathbf Q=\sum_{i=1}^m\sum_{j=1}^n r^t_{ij}q_{ij},Rt∘Q=i=1∑m​j=1∑n​rijt​qij​,

where the rewards rijtr^t_{ij}rijt​ are arbitrary real numbers. The post-matching levels are ui=xi−∑jqiju_i=x_i-\sum_j q_{ij}ui​=xi​−∑j​qij​ and vj=yj−∑iqijv_j=y_j-\sum_i q_{ij}vj​=yj​−∑i​qij​, and Q\mathbf QQ is feasible if Q≥0\mathbf Q\ge0Q≥0, u≥0\mathbf u\ge0u≥0 and v≥0\mathbf v\ge0v≥0. A fraction α∈[0,1]\alpha\in[0,1]α∈[0,1] of unmatched demand and β∈[0,1]\beta\in[0,1]β∈[0,1] of unmatched supply carries over, and new random quantities (Dt+1,St+1)≥0(\mathbf D^{t+1},\mathbf S^{t+1})\ge0(Dt+1,St+1)≥0 arrive. The value function VtV_tVt​ is defined by the dynamic program

Vt(x,y)=max⁡Q feasibleHt(Q,x,y),Ht(Q,x,y)=Rt∘Q+E Vt+1(αu+Dt+1,βv+St+1),V_t(\mathbf x,\mathbf y)=\max_{\mathbf Q\ \text{feasible}}H_t(\mathbf Q,\mathbf x,\mathbf y),\qquad H_t(\mathbf Q,\mathbf x,\mathbf y)=\mathbf R^t\circ\mathbf Q+\mathbb E\,V_{t+1}(\alpha\mathbf u+\mathbf D^{t+1},\beta\mathbf v+\mathbf S^{t+1}),Vt​(x,y)=Q feasiblemax​Ht​(Q,x,y),Ht​(Q,x,y)=Rt∘Q+EVt+1​(αu+Dt+1,βv+St+1),

with VT+1≡0V_{T+1}\equiv0VT+1​≡0. A matching policy assigns a feasible decision Qt(x,y)\mathbf Q^t(\mathbf x,\mathbf y)Qt(x,y) to every period and state; it is optimal if each of these decisions maximizes HtH_tHt​.

Two neighbouring pairs are compared by the relation ≻M\succ_{\mathcal M}≻M​. For i′≠ii'\ne ii′=i, (i,j)≻M(i′,j)(i,j)\succ_{\mathcal M}(i',j)(i,j)≻M​(i′,j) means rijt>ri′jtr^t_{ij}>r^t_{i'j}rijt​>ri′jt​ for all ttt, and rijt−ri′jt≥α(rij′′t+1−ri′j′′t+1)r^t_{ij}-r^t_{i'j}\ge\alpha(r^{t+1}_{ij''}-r^{t+1}_{i'j''})rijt​−ri′jt​≥α(rij′′t+1​−ri′j′′t+1​) for all t≤T−1t\le T-1t≤T−1 and all j′′j''j′′; the relation (i,j)≻M(i,j′)(i,j)\succ_{\mathcal M}(i,j')(i,j)≻M​(i,j′) is defined symmetrically with β\betaβ. The modified Monge condition requires rijt+ri′j′t≥rij′t+ri′jtr^t_{ij}+r^t_{i'j'}\ge r^t_{ij'}+r^t_{i'j}rijt​+ri′j′t​≥rij′t​+ri′jt​ whenever (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) dominates both (i′,j)(i',j)(i′,j) and (i,j′)(i,j')(i,j′); the paper then writes ≻Ms\succ_{\mathcal M_s}≻Ms​​. For a pair (i,j)(i,j)(i,j), let aia_iai​ be the type-iii demand left after matching iii through all pairs that (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) does not dominate, and bjb_jbj​ the analogous supply residual. A decision respects ≻Ms\succ_{\mathcal M_s}≻Ms​​ if (i,j)≻(i′,j)(i,j)\succ(i',j)(i,j)≻(i′,j) implies qi′j=0q_{i'j}=0qi′j​=0 or ai=0a_i=0ai​=0, and (i,j)≻(i,j′)(i,j)\succ(i,j')(i,j)≻(i,j′) implies qij′=0q_{ij'}=0qij′​=0 or bj=0b_j=0bj​=0.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (p. 12)

Under the modified Monge condition there is a single policy PPP such that, for all 1≤t≤T1\le t\le T1≤t≤T and all x,y≥0\mathbf x,\mathbf y\ge0x,y≥0,

Pt(x,y) is optimalandPt(x,y) respects ≻Ms.P_t(\mathbf x,\mathbf y)\ \text{is optimal}\quad\text{and}\quad P_t(\mathbf x,\mathbf y)\ \text{respects}\ \succ_{\mathcal M_s}.Pt​(x,y) is optimalandPt​(x,y) respects ≻Ms​​.

Milestones

  • Proposition 1 (p. 10): VtV_tVt​ and HtH_tHt​ are continuous and concave, and an optimal policy exists.
  • Lemma A.1 (Online Appendix A, p. 1): shifting ε\varepsilonε units of demand from type iii to type i′i'i′ (or of supply from jjj to j′j'j′) changes VtV_tVt​ by at least −∑τ∑j′λj′τ(rij′τ−ri′j′τ)-\sum_\tau\sum_{j'}\lambda^\tau_{j'}(r^\tau_{ij'}-r^\tau_{i'j'})−∑τ​∑j′​λj′τ​(rij′τ​−ri′j′τ​) for some nonnegative multipliers with ∑τα−(τ−t)∑j′λj′τ≤ε\sum_\tau\alpha^{-(\tau-t)}\sum_{j'}\lambda^\tau_{j'}\le\varepsilon∑τ​α−(τ−t)∑j′​λj′τ​≤ε.
  • Lemma A.2 (p. 3): transferring matching quantity from a dominated pair to a dominant one weakly increases HtH_tHt​.
  • Theorem 2 (p. 28): without the Monge condition, some optimal policy weakly respects ≻M\succ_{\mathcal M}≻M​: qi′j=0q_{i'j}=0qi′j​=0 or ui=0u_i=0ui​=0, and qij′=0q_{ij'}=0qij′​=0 or vj=0v_j=0vj​=0.
  • Monge exchange (proof of Theorem 1, p. 4): the transfer Q+ε(eij+ei′j′−ei′j−eij′)\mathbf Q+\varepsilon(\mathbf e_{ij}+\mathbf e_{i'j'}-\mathbf e_{i'j}-\mathbf e_{ij'})Q+ε(eij​+ei′j′​−ei′j​−eij′​) stays feasible and weakly increases HtH_tHt​.
  • Properties (i)–(iii) imply compatibility (proof of Theorem 1, p. 5).

Significance

Theorem 1 replaces the search over all optimal policies, which are state-dependent and generally complex, by a priority structure: whenever (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) dominates a neighbour, the neighbour is matched only once the residual capacity of (i,j)(i,j)(i,j) is exhausted. The paper derives from it the optimality of greedy matching for "perfect" pairs (Proposition 2), the priority order for horizontal (distance-based) and vertical (quality-based) reward structures, and the match-down-to threshold structure of the optimal policy in those models. These results generalize inventory rationing and capacity allocation with upgrading.

The result is proved in the paper, but not completely: the limit argument in the printed proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 ("the quantity transferred converges to zero") is not justified, and Proposition 1 has no printed proof in this version. A machine-checked development would close these gaps and would provide a reusable finite-horizon model with continuous states, concave value functions and an exchange-argument toolkit. No part of this mission is known to be formalized.

Difficulty

The obvious argument starts from an optimal decision and repeatedly applies the transfers of Lemma A.2 and the Monge exchange. Each transfer preserves optimality, but nothing in the printed argument guarantees that the procedure terminates or that its limit has the required property: transfers of different kinds can undo each other's progress, and with equal rewards they can cycle forever. A complete proof has to select the right optimal decision without relying on such an iteration. Before that, the dynamic program itself needs care: the value function is a supremum of an expectation of the next value function, so continuity, concavity, measurability and integrability have to be established together by backward induction, and attainment of the maximum is needed for any optimal policy to exist. Lemma A.1 is a further backward induction in which the multipliers become random and must be averaged.

Formalization scope

The Lean development lives in the namespace DynTypeMatching.Priority. Types are Fin m and Fin n; states are Fin m → ℝ, Fin n → ℝ; decisions are Fin m → Fin n → ℝ. Periods are natural numbers with the paper's 1-based indexing, and Vt=0V_t=0Vt​=0 for t>Tt>Tt>T. A model Model m n carries TTT, the rewards, α\alphaα, β\betaβ and one arrival law per period on Rm×Rn\mathbb R^m\times\mathbb R^nRm×Rn. The paper permits exogenous correlation between periods; its recursion (1) uses per-period laws and does not specify a joint arrival process. The expectation in HtH_tHt​ is over the law of the arrivals entering period t+1t+1t+1.

Every result assumes Model.WellPosed: each arrival law is a probability measure, supported on the nonnegative orthant and integrable, and 0≤α,β≤10\le\alpha,\beta\le10≤α,β≤1. Integrability is not stated in the paper, but without it the expectation in (1) is undefined. The value function is a real supremum and the expectation a Bochner integral, so outside the nonnegative orthant, or for non-integrable integrands, Lean returns the junk value 0. All statements therefore quantify over nonnegative states and feasible decisions.

The following hypotheses are added relative to the page, and each is disclosed in the item where it occurs:

  • Definition 1(i) is strict, rijt>ri′jtr^t_{ij}>r^t_{i'j}rijt​>ri′jt​, and the neighbours are distinct. With the printed weak inequality, Theorems 1 and 2 are false. Take m=3m=3m=3, n=1n=1n=1, T=1T=1T=1, all rewards equal to 2, x=(0,1,1)\mathbf x=(0,1,1)x=(0,1,1), y=(1)\mathbf y=(1)y=(1). Then types 2 and 3 dominate each other, every optimal decision matches one unit, and no such decision respects the relation.
  • Definition 1(ii) is required only for t+1≤Tt+1\le Tt+1≤T, because rT+1r^{T+1}rT+1 is not part of the model.
  • Lemma A.1 assumes α>0\alpha>0α>0 in part (i) and β>0\beta>0β>0 in part (ii), because α−(τ−t)\alpha^{-(\tau-t)}α−(τ−t) is undefined at α=0\alpha=0α=0.
  • Lemma A.2 assumes that Q\mathbf QQ itself is feasible.

Several printed index slips are corrected: the doubled εeij\varepsilon\mathbf e_{ij}εeij​ in the Monge exchange, the index ranges in Lemma A.1, and "and" for "or" in the compatibility step.

An optimal decision is defined as a feasible maximizer of HtH_tHt​ over feasible decisions, not through the equation Vt=HtV_t=H_tVt​=Ht​. This rules out a trivializing reading of the goal: a decision that respects the relation but is not optimal (for instance Q=0\mathbf Q=0Q=0) does not satisfy it. The goal asserts one policy that is optimal and compatible at the same time.

A complete development needs measurable-function and Bochner-integral calculus on finite-dimensional spaces, concavity and continuity of parametric suprema over polytopes, and compactness arguments for attainment. The model and the exchange lemmas are reusable for later missions on this paper (greedy matching, horizontal and vertical models). Proofs of any milestone are welcome, and so are alternative proofs of the goal.

Selected references

  • Ming Hu, Yun Zhou, Dynamic Type Matching, arXiv:1811.07048v1, 2018; Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 24(1), 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/1811.07048 · https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2020.0952
  • Alan J. Hoffman, On simple linear programming problems, Convexity, Proc. Symposia in Pure Mathematics 7, AMS, 1963, 317–327. https://doi.org/10.1090/pspum/007/0157783
  • Rainer E. Burkard, Bettina Klinz, Rüdiger Rudolf, Perspectives of Monge properties in optimization, Discrete Applied Mathematics 70(2), 1996, 95–161. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(95)00103-X
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Linear OptimizationProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Greed Works – Online Algorithms For Unrelated Machine Stochastic Scheduling 2: Greedy Assignment With Nominal Start Times Is (7.216 + 3.608Δ)h(Δ)-Competitive in the Online-Time ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

Scheduling jobs on parallel machines to minimize the total weighted completion time ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_jC_j∑j​wj​Cj​ is a basic model of service and computing systems. Two features of practice are hard to combine with performance guarantees: jobs are not known in advance but arrive over time, and their processing times are random, with only their distributions known when they arrive. Machines are moreover often unrelated: a job's processing time distribution depends arbitrarily on the machine, and some jobs cannot run on some machines at all.

Gupta, Moseley, Uetz and Xie (arXiv:1703.01634, Math. Oper. Res. 2020) give the first performance guarantee for this combination: a simple greedy policy whose expected cost is within a factor depending only on the variability of the processing times of the best nonanticipatory policy, which knows all jobs in advance.

Timeline. For deterministic jobs arriving over time, Hall, Schulz, Shmoys and Wein (1997) gave an 8-competitive algorithm on unrelated machines. Megow, Uetz and Vredeveld (2006) introduced the stochastic online model and analysed greedy policies on identical machines with modified release dates. Skutella, Sviridenko and Uetz (2016) gave LP-based approximation algorithms for offline stochastic scheduling on unrelated machines, with guarantees linear in the squared coefficient of variation. The present paper (conference version IPCO 2017) treats the online, stochastic, unrelated case with release dates.

Setting

There is a finite set MMM of machines and jobs j=1,…,nj=1,\dots,nj=1,…,n. Job jjj is released at an integer time rj≥0r_j\ge0rj​≥0, jobs are indexed so that r1≤⋯≤rnr_1\le\dots\le r_nr1​≤⋯≤rn​, and job jjj has weight wj≥0w_j\ge0wj​≥0. If job jjj runs on machine iii its processing time is a random variable PijP_{ij}Pij​ with values in {0,1,2,… }\{0,1,2,\dots\}{0,1,2,…}; on forbidden pairs the page writes E[Pij]=∞\mathbb E[P_{ij}]=\inftyE[Pij​]=∞, and every job has an allowed machine. On allowed pairs E[Pij]≥1\mathbb E[P_{ij}]\ge1E[Pij​]≥1 and the variance is finite. Different jobs are independent; one job's times on different machines need not be. The squared coefficient of variation is CV[Pij]2=Var⁡[Pij]/E[Pij]2\mathbb{CV}[P_{ij}]^2=\operatorname{Var}[P_{ij}]/\mathbb E[P_{ij}]^2CV[Pij​]2=Var[Pij​]/E[Pij​]2, and Δ\DeltaΔ bounds it on every allowed pair.

A policy decides, for each job, a machine and a start time; jobs are nonpreemptive and a machine runs one job at a time. It is nonanticipatory if its decisions up to time ttt use only what is known at ttt: the processing time of a job is learned when the job completes. OPT\mathsf{OPT}OPT is the least expected cost E[∑jwjCj]\mathbb E[\sum_jw_jC_j]E[∑j​wj​Cj​] of a nonanticipatory policy that knows all jobs, release dates and distributions in advance.

The greedy algorithm (§6.1) is first defined for deterministic times pijp_{ij}pij​. On machine iii job jjj gets the modified release date rij=max⁡{rj,c pij}r_{ij}=\max\{r_j,c\,p_{ij}\}rij​=max{rj​,cpij​}. On arrival, job jjj is assigned to a machine m(j)m(j)m(j) minimizing an explicit upper bound cost⁡(j→i)\operatorname{cost}(j\to i)cost(j→i) on the increase of the objective (Definition 4), and each machine runs WSPT (largest wk/pikw_k/p_{ik}wk​/pik​ first) among its jobs whose modified release dates have passed. Run on pij=E[Pij]p_{ij}=\mathbb E[P_{ij}]pij​=E[Pij​] with c=23c=\frac23c=32​ it yields the nominal schedule (m,s)(m,s)(m,s). The stochastic greedy policy (§6.3) keeps mmm and the nominal order on each machine, and starts the ℓ\ellℓth job on machine iii at Si,ℓ=max⁡{si,ℓ,Si,ℓ−1+Pi,ℓ−1}S_{i,\ell}=\max\{s_{i,\ell},S_{i,\ell-1}+P_{i,\ell-1}\}Si,ℓ​=max{si,ℓ​,Si,ℓ−1​+Pi,ℓ−1​}, never before its nominal start. Its expected cost is ALG\mathsf{ALG}ALG, and

h(Δ)=1+Δ2 (Δ≤1),h(Δ)=1+ΔΔ+1 (Δ≥1).h(\Delta)=1+\tfrac{\sqrt\Delta}2\ (\Delta\le1),\qquad h(\Delta)=1+\tfrac{\Delta}{\Delta+1}\ (\Delta\ge1).h(Δ)=1+2Δ​​ (Δ≤1),h(Δ)=1+Δ+1Δ​ (Δ≥1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4

ALG  ≤  (7.216+3.608 Δ) h(Δ) OPT.\mathsf{ALG}\;\le\;(7.216+3.608\,\Delta)\,h(\Delta)\,\mathsf{OPT}.ALG≤(7.216+3.608Δ)h(Δ)OPT.

The goal is stated against every admissible nonanticipatory policy, for every tie-breaking of the greedy algorithm.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 6: the deterministic greedy schedule has ALG≤∑jcost⁡(j→m(j))\mathsf{ALG}\le\sum_j\operatorname{cost}(j\to m(j))ALG≤∑j​cost(j→m(j)).
  2. Lemma 7, feasibility: with αj=cost⁡(j→m(j))\alpha_j=\operatorname{cost}(j\to m(j))αj​=cost(j→m(j)), βi,t\beta_{i,t}βi,t​ the weight of jobs on machine iii released by ttt and unfinished at ttt, and the speed-scaled values (12), (αf/a,βf/b)(\alpha^f/a,\beta^f/b)(αf/a,βf/b) is feasible for the dual (Dr)(\mathrm D_r)(Dr​) when af≥2(2+c)af\ge2(2+c)af≥2(2+c), 1/c≤f(a−1)1/c\le f(a-1)1/c≤f(a−1), af≥baf\ge baf≥b.
  3. (13): zPr≤(1+Δ2)zSr≤(1+Δ2)OPTz^{P_r}\le(1+\frac\Delta2)z^{S_r}\le(1+\frac\Delta2)\mathsf{OPT}zPr​≤(1+2Δ​)zSr​≤(1+2Δ​)OPT for the time-indexed relaxations with release dates.
  4. Lemma 10: E[(X−μ)+]≤μΔ/2\mathbb E[(X-\mu)^+]\le\mu\sqrt\Delta/2E[(X−μ)+]≤μΔ​/2 for Δ≤1\Delta\le1Δ≤1 and ≤μΔ/(Δ+1)\le\mu\Delta/(\Delta+1)≤μΔ/(Δ+1) for Δ≥1\Delta\ge1Δ≥1.
  5. Lemma 8: E[Sj]≤h(Δ) sj\mathbb E[S_j]\le h(\Delta)\,s_jE[Sj​]≤h(Δ)sj​ for every job.

Significance

The result. Theorem 4 is the first constant-factor guarantee, for fixed Δ\DeltaΔ, for stochastic online scheduling on unrelated machines with release dates, and it is achieved by a combinatorial policy that needs no LP solution. For deterministic jobs (Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0, h=1h=1h=1) it gives a deterministic 7.216-competitive algorithm (Theorem 3), improving the ratio 8 of Hall et al.; for exponential processing times (Δ=1\Delta=1Δ=1) the factor is (7.216+3.608)⋅32(7.216+3.608)\cdot\frac32(7.216+3.608)⋅23​. The order O(Δ)O(\Delta)O(Δ) matches earlier offline results on unrelated machines and online results on identical machines.

Formalizing it. The result is proved on paper and has no machine-checked proof. A formalization needs nonanticipatory policies with machine choice, a time-indexed LP relaxation with countably many variables and its weak duality, and a dual-fitting argument. It also exposes a gap: the second sentence of Lemma 7, the bound zDr(αf/a,βf/b)≥ALG/(7+1151)z^{D_r}(\alpha^f/a,\beta^f/b)\ge\mathsf{ALG}/(7+\frac{11}{51})zDr​(αf/a,βf/b)≥ALG/(7+5111​), fails as printed. On one machine with jobs r=(0,0,0,5)r=(0,0,0,5)r=(0,0,0,5), p=(54,54,1,3)p=(\frac54,\frac54,1,3)p=(45​,45​,1,3), w=(2,1,11000,1100)w=(2,1,\frac1{1000},\frac1{100})w=(2,1,10001​,1001​) the greedy schedule has ALG=6049600\mathsf{ALG}=\frac{6049}{600}ALG=6006049​ while zDr=88796400<ALG/(7+1151)=44713200z^{D_r}=\frac{8879}{6400}<\mathsf{ALG}/(7+\frac{11}{51})=\frac{4471}{3200}zDr​=64008879​<ALG/(7+5111​)=32004471​. The step ∑i,sβisf=ALG/f\sum_{i,s}\beta^f_{is}=\mathsf{ALG}/f∑i,s​βisf​=ALG/f counts a job at ⌊Ck/f⌋−⌈rk/f⌉+1\lfloor C_k/f\rfloor-\lceil r_k/f\rceil+1⌊Ck​/f⌋−⌈rk​/f⌉+1 integer slots, up to one more than Ck/fC_k/fCk​/f. A complete proof of the goal has to close this gap.

Difficulty

Three parts are hard. First, the comparison is with an optimal adaptive policy, so the lower bound has to come from a relaxation that every nonanticipatory policy satisfies in expectation. Writing the time-indexed LP for policies that choose machines at start time, idle deliberately and start at real times, and showing it is a relaxation, requires nonanticipation and job independence to decouple a job's machine from its own processing time. Second, the dual fitting runs through a speed-scaled instance with a non-integer speed f=236f=\frac{23}6f=623​, so the dual's integer slots and the schedule's real times do not align; this is where the printed objective bound breaks. Third, the obvious stochastic policy, WSEPT list scheduling without forced idleness, fails: Remark 2 of the paper gives an instance where it has E[C]=Ω(n)\mathbb E[C]=\Omega(n)E[C]=Ω(n) against O(1)O(1)O(1). The analysis therefore has to work with deliberately delayed starts.

Formalization scope

Machines are a Fintype, Nonempty type; jobs are Fin n in release order. Processing times are ℕ-valued measurable functions on a probability space, with finite second moment and mean at least one on eligible pairs, and with jobs independent (iIndepFun over jobs of the machine-indexed vectors). Forbidden pairs are an eligibility relation, never a zero or junk mean. Release dates are natural numbers: the relaxation of §6.2 has integer slots s≥rjs\ge r_js≥rj​, and (13) is false for a fractional release date. Weights are nonnegative; Δ\DeltaΔ is any upper bound on the squared coefficients of variation, which is at least as strong as the page's maximum.

OPT\mathsf{OPT}OPT is never written as an infimum. The goal and (13) quantify over every admissible policy: a map from realizations to machines and real start times that is feasible (eligible machine, start at or after release, disjoint half-open processing intervals per machine), nonanticipatory, and has integrable completion times. A non-integrable comparator would have Bochner integral 000 and would make the bound trivial or false; the integrability requirement rules this out. The greedy algorithm is a predicate on an outcome (assignment and start times): cost-minimal assignment, no start before the modified release date, no unnecessary idleness, and the WSPT priority. Every tie-breaking is covered, and the goal fixes c=23c=\frac23c=32​. The stochastic policy is the recursion Si,ℓ=max⁡{si,ℓ,Si,ℓ−1+Pi,ℓ−1}S_{i,\ell}=\max\{s_{i,\ell},S_{i,\ell-1}+P_{i,\ell-1}\}Si,ℓ​=max{si,ℓ​,Si,ℓ−1​+Pi,ℓ−1​} itself. LP feasibility includes summability of every series, and LP optima appear only through "for every feasible point there is a feasible point" statements.

A complete development needs: weak duality for (Pr)(\mathrm P_r)(Pr​)/(Dr)(\mathrm D_r)(Dr​) with countably many variables; the identity E[Cj]=CjS\mathbb E[C_j]=C^S_jE[Cj​]=CjS​ for the expected occupation variables of a nonanticipatory policy (reusable for any time-indexed stochastic scheduling relaxation); Lemma 10, a self-contained probability inequality; and the dual fitting. Contributions are welcome on each milestone and on a repaired objective bound for Lemma 7.

Selected references

  • V. Gupta, B. Moseley, M. Uetz, Q. Xie, Greed Works – Online Algorithms For Unrelated Machine Stochastic Scheduling, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020; arXiv:1703.01634v4. https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.01634, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.0999
  • L. A. Hall, A. S. Schulz, D. B. Shmoys, J. Wein, Scheduling to minimize average completion time: off-line and on-line approximation algorithms, Mathematics of Operations Research 22:513–544, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.3.513
  • N. Megow, M. Uetz, T. Vredeveld, Models and algorithms for stochastic online scheduling, Mathematics of Operations Research 31(3):513–525, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0201
  • M. Skutella, M. Sviridenko, M. Uetz, Unrelated machine scheduling with stochastic processing times, Mathematics of Operations Research 41(3):851–864, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2015.0757
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems V: Symmetric Monotonic Strategies Draw the Suboptimal Arms Collectively a Linear Number of TimesResearch Paper

Motivation

In a stochastic multi-armed bandit, a player repeatedly chooses one of KKK arms and receives a random reward drawn from the chosen arm's unknown distribution. The classical lower bounds of Lai and Robbins (1985) and Burnetas and Katehakis (1996) describe the regret of good strategies when the horizon TTT tends to infinity: it grows like ln⁡T\ln TlnT, with a constant determined by Kullback–Leibler divergences. They say nothing about small horizons.

Garivier, Ménard and Stoltz (Math. Oper. Res., 2019; arXiv:1602.07182v3) show that the regret has a definite shape over the whole range of TTT: it is almost linear at first ("explore first"), and only afterwards logarithmic ("exploit next"). Their §3 gives three non-asymptotic lower bounds for the initial phase, each for a natural class of strategies. This mission is the third of them, Theorem 4 (p. 13): a collective lower bound on the total number of pulls of all suboptimal arms. It is the bound that remains informative when many arms are suboptimal, and it is the one illustrated for large KKK in the paper's §3.4.

Setting

A bandit problem ν‾=(νa)a=1,…,K\underline\nu=(\nu_a)_{a=1,\dots,K}ν​=(νa​)a=1,…,K​ is a family of probability distributions on R\mathbb RR, each with an expectation μa=E(νa)\mu_a=E(\nu_a)μa​=E(νa​). A model D\mathcal DD is a set of such distributions, and ν‾\underline\nuν​ is in D\mathcal DD when every νa∈D\nu_a\in\mathcal Dνa​∈D. Put μ⋆=max⁡aμa\mu^\star=\max_a\mu_aμ⋆=maxa​μa​.

At each round t≥1t\ge1t≥1 a strategy ψ\psiψ chooses an arm AtA_tAt​ from the past rewards (possibly with auxiliary randomization) and observes a reward Yt∼νAtY_t\sim\nu_{A_t}Yt​∼νAt​​. The number of pulls of arm aaa up to round TTT is Nψ,a(T)=∑t=1T1{At=a}N_{\psi,a}(T)=\sum_{t=1}^T\mathbb 1\{A_t=a\}Nψ,a​(T)=∑t=1T​1{At​=a}, and Eν‾\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}Eν​​ is the expectation when ψ\psiψ interacts with ν‾\underline\nuν​.

The set of optimal arms is A⋆(ν‾)={a:μa=μ⋆}\mathcal A^\star(\underline\nu)=\{a:\mu_a=\mu^\star\}A⋆(ν​)={a:μa​=μ⋆}, of cardinality Aν‾⋆A^\star_{\underline\nu}Aν​⋆​, and the set of worst arms is W(ν‾)\mathcal W(\underline\nu)W(ν​), the arms of smallest mean. The paper defines a partial order: ν‾′≼ν‾\underline\nu'\preccurlyeq\underline\nuν​′≼ν​ when νa′=νa\nu'_a=\nu_aνa′​=νa​ for every optimal arm aaa of ν‾\underline\nuν​ and E(νa′)≤E(νa)E(\nu'_a)\le E(\nu_a)E(νa′​)≤E(νa​) for every other arm. Two classes of strategies enter the theorem.

  1. ψ\psiψ is pairwise symmetric for optimal arms on D\mathcal DD (Definition 3, p. 11) if, for every ν‾\underline\nuν​ in D\mathcal DD and every pair of optimal arms a⋆,a⋆a^\star,a_\stara⋆,a⋆​ with νa⋆=νa⋆\nu_{a^\star}=\nu_{a_\star}νa⋆​=νa⋆​​, for all T≥1T\ge1T≥1, the pairs (Nψ,a⋆(T),Nψ,a⋆(T))(N_{\psi,a^\star}(T),N_{\psi,a_\star}(T))(Nψ,a⋆​(T),Nψ,a⋆​​(T)) and (Nψ,a⋆(T),Nψ,a⋆(T))(N_{\psi,a_\star}(T),N_{\psi,a^\star}(T))(Nψ,a⋆​​(T),Nψ,a⋆​(T)) have the same distribution.
  2. ψ\psiψ is monotonic on D\mathcal DD (Definition 4, p. 13) if for all ν‾′≼ν‾\underline\nu'\preccurlyeq\underline\nuν​′≼ν​ in D\mathcal DD, ∑a⋆∈A⋆(ν‾′)Eν‾′[Nψ,a⋆(T)]≥∑a⋆∈A⋆(ν‾)Eν‾[Nψ,a⋆(T)]\sum_{a^\star\in\mathcal A^\star(\underline\nu')}\mathbb E_{\underline\nu'}[N_{\psi,a^\star}(T)]\ge\sum_{a^\star\in\mathcal A^\star(\underline\nu)}\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}[N_{\psi,a^\star}(T)]∑a⋆∈A⋆(ν​′)​Eν​′​[Nψ,a⋆​(T)]≥∑a⋆∈A⋆(ν​)​Eν​​[Nψ,a⋆​(T)]: on an easier problem the optimal arms are pulled at least as often.

With KL\mathrm{KL}KL the Kullback–Leibler divergence, the constant of the theorem is

Kν‾max⁡=min⁡w∈W(ν‾) max⁡a⋆∈A⋆(ν‾)KL(νw,νa⋆).\mathcal K^{\max}_{\underline\nu}=\min_{w\in\mathcal W(\underline\nu)}\ \max_{a^\star\in\mathcal A^\star(\underline\nu)}\mathrm{KL}(\nu_w,\nu_{a^\star}).Kν​max​=w∈W(ν​)min​ a⋆∈A⋆(ν​)max​KL(νw​,νa⋆​).

The Bernoulli divergence is kl(p,q)=pln⁡pq+(1−p)ln⁡1−p1−q\mathrm{kl}(p,q)=p\ln\frac pq+(1-p)\ln\frac{1-p}{1-q}kl(p,q)=plnqp​+(1−p)ln1−q1−p​, (5).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4 (main display), p. 13

For every model D\mathcal DD, every strategy ψ\psiψ pairwise symmetric for optimal arms and monotonic on D\mathcal DD, every bandit problem ν‾\underline\nuν​ in D\mathcal DD and every T≥1T\ge1T≥1,

∑a∉A⋆(ν‾)Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)] ≥ T(1−Aν‾⋆K−Aν‾⋆2TKν‾max⁡K−2Aν‾⋆TKν‾max⁡K).\sum_{a\notin\mathcal A^\star(\underline\nu)}\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}\big[N_{\psi,a}(T)\big]\ \ge\ T\left(1-\frac{A^\star_{\underline\nu}}K-\frac{A^\star_{\underline\nu}\sqrt{2T\mathcal K^{\max}_{\underline\nu}}}K-\frac{2A^\star_{\underline\nu}T\mathcal K^{\max}_{\underline\nu}}K\right).a∈/A⋆(ν​)∑​Eν​​[Nψ,a​(T)] ≥ T(1−KAν​⋆​​−KAν​⋆​2TKν​max​​​−K2Aν​⋆​TKν​max​​).

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. Lemma 2 (p. 14): if (x−α)2≤βx(x-\alpha)^2\le\beta x(x−α)2≤βx with α,β≥0\alpha,\beta\ge0α,β≥0, then x≤α+β+αβx\le\alpha+\beta+\sqrt{\alpha\beta}x≤α+β+αβ​.
  2. Lemma 6 (p. 20): for 0≤p<q≤10\le p<q\le10≤p<q≤1, kl(p,q)≥(p−q)2/(2max⁡x∈[p,q]x(1−x))≥(p−q)2/(2q)\mathrm{kl}(p,q)\ge(p-q)^2/(2\max_{x\in[p,q]}x(1-x))\ge(p-q)^2/(2q)kl(p,q)≥(p−q)2/(2maxx∈[p,q]​x(1−x))≥(p−q)2/(2q).
  3. Monotonicity reduction (p. 13): with w~\tilde ww~ a worst arm and ν‾‾\underline{\underline\nu}ν​​ equal to ν‾\underline\nuν​ on the optimal arms and to νw~\nu_{\tilde w}νw~​ elsewhere, ∑a∉A⋆(ν‾)Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)]≥∑a∉A⋆(ν‾‾)Eν‾‾[Nψ,a(T)]\sum_{a\notin\mathcal A^\star(\underline\nu)}\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}[N_{\psi,a}(T)]\ge\sum_{a\notin\mathcal A^\star(\underline{\underline\nu})}\mathbb E_{\underline{\underline\nu}}[N_{\psi,a}(T)]∑a∈/A⋆(ν​)​Eν​​[Nψ,a​(T)]≥∑a∈/A⋆(ν​​)​Eν​​​[Nψ,a​(T)].
  4. Uniform split (p. 13): if all arms of ν~‾\underline{\tilde\nu}ν~​ carry the same distribution, Eν~‾[Nψ,a(T)]=T/K\mathbb E_{\underline{\tilde\nu}}[N_{\psi,a}(T)]=T/KEν~​​[Nψ,a​(T)]=T/K for every arm.
  5. The kl display (p. 14): TAν‾⋆Kν‾max⁡/K≥kl(Aν‾⋆/K,x)T A^\star_{\underline\nu}\mathcal K^{\max}_{\underline\nu}/K\ge\mathrm{kl}(A^\star_{\underline\nu}/K,x)TAν​⋆​Kν​max​/K≥kl(Aν​⋆​/K,x) with x=1T∑a⋆∈A⋆(ν‾)Eν‾‾[Nψ,a⋆(T)]x=\frac1T\sum_{a^\star\in\mathcal A^\star(\underline\nu)}\mathbb E_{\underline{\underline\nu}}[N_{\psi,a^\star}(T)]x=T1​∑a⋆∈A⋆(ν​)​Eν​​​[Nψ,a⋆​(T)].
  6. Equation (14) (p. 14): x≤Aν‾⋆K(1+2TKν‾max⁡+2TKν‾max⁡)x\le\frac{A^\star_{\underline\nu}}K\big(1+2T\mathcal K^{\max}_{\underline\nu}+\sqrt{2T\mathcal K^{\max}_{\underline\nu}}\big)x≤KAν​⋆​​(1+2TKν​max​+2TKν​max​​).

Significance

Theorem 4 bounds the regret from below through Rψ,ν‾,T≥(min⁡a∉A⋆Δa)∑a∉A⋆Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)]R_{\psi,\underline\nu,T}\ge(\min_{a\notin\mathcal A^\star}\Delta_a)\sum_{a\notin\mathcal A^\star}\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}[N_{\psi,a}(T)]Rψ,ν​,T​≥(mina∈/A⋆​Δa​)∑a∈/A⋆​Eν​​[Nψ,a​(T)], (13). While TTT is small compared with K/(Aν‾⋆Kν‾max⁡)K/(A^\star_{\underline\nu}\mathcal K^{\max}_{\underline\nu})K/(Aν​⋆​Kν​max​), the right-hand side of the theorem is of order T(1−A⋆/K)T(1-A^\star/K)T(1−A⋆/K), so the regret is linear: a reasonable strategy cannot avoid spending a constant fraction of the first rounds on the suboptimal arms. Unlike the per-arm bounds of Theorems 2 and 3, the bound concerns all suboptimal arms at once and does not degrade as KKK grows; §3.4 of the paper shows numerically that it gives the stronger regret bound for many arms.

The theorem is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no part of it has been machine-checked. A formal proof would exercise the published canonical bandit model of the platform (StochasticBandit, BanditPolicy, banditMeasure) on a genuine lower-bound argument with two auxiliary bandit problems, together with a local Pinsker inequality for Bernoulli divergences in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞] that is reusable in other bandit lower bounds.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt applies the fundamental inequality (6) to ν‾\underline\nuν​ and an alternative in which one suboptimal arm becomes optimal, as in Theorem 2. That gives a bound arm by arm, which deteriorates with KKK and does not see the number A⋆A^\starA⋆ of optimal arms; it also needs a hypothesis of the type "smarter than uniform", which is not assumed here. Nothing is known about how a general ψ\psiψ behaves on ν‾\underline\nuν​ itself, so the two hypotheses on ψ\psiψ must carry all the information, and both are weak: Definition 3 only constrains pairs of optimal arms with equal laws, and only through the joint distribution of their pull counts under the canonical bandit measure; Definition 4 only compares problems ordered by ≼\preccurlyeq≼. On the analytic side, the classical Pinsker inequality kl(p,q)≥2(p−q)2\mathrm{kl}(p,q)\ge2(p-q)^2kl(p,q)≥2(p−q)2 loses the factor A⋆/KA^\star/KA⋆/K and gives a weaker theorem, so a local refinement is required, and every divergence is valued in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞].

Formalization scope

Arms are indexed by Fin K (the paper's arm aaa is index a−1a-1a−1), with K≥1K\ge1K≥1 assumed in the goal. A bandit problem is the published BanditAlgorithm.StochasticBandit K, a strategy is a published BanditPolicy K (a family of Markov kernels from histories to arms; every strategy of the paper with auxiliary uniform randomization induces one with the same law of arms and rewards), and Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)]\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}[N_{\psi,a}(T)]Eν​​[Nψ,a​(T)] is the integral of the pull count against banditMeasure. A model is a Set (Measure ℝ) whose members are probability measures with an integrable identity, the standing assumption of §1.1–§1.2. Definitions 3 and 4 leave TTT implicit and are read "for all T≥1T\ge1T≥1"; in Definition 3 equality of distributions is equality of the image measures of the pair of counts, not of their expectations. KL\mathrm{KL}KL, kl\mathrm{kl}kl and Kmax⁡\mathcal K^{\max}Kmax take values in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞]; the goal assumes Kν‾max⁡<+∞\mathcal K^{\max}_{\underline\nu}<+\inftyKν​max​<+∞, since otherwise the printed bound is −∞-\infty−∞ and a real-valued conversion would silently replace +∞+\infty+∞ by 000. The Bernoulli divergence is defined as the divergence between two Bernoulli laws on R\mathbb RR, so it is +∞+\infty+∞ where (5) is, rather than a finite junk value. The auxiliary problems of the proof are not constructed; the milestones quantify over them with their defining properties.

The paper's "In particular" clause, ∑a∉A⋆E[Nψ,a(T)]≥T2(1−A⋆/K)\sum_{a\notin\mathcal A^\star}\mathbb E[N_{\psi,a}(T)]\ge\frac T2(1-A^\star/K)∑a∈/A⋆​E[Nψ,a​(T)]≥2T​(1−A⋆/K) for T≤K/(8A⋆Kmax⁡)T\le K/(8A^\star\mathcal K^{\max})T≤K/(8A⋆Kmax), is not stated: it follows from the main display only when A⋆/K+A⋆/K≤1/2A^\star/K+\sqrt{A^\star/K}\le1/2A⋆/K+A⋆/K​≤1/2 (at A⋆/K=1/2A^\star/K=1/2A⋆/K=1/2 the main bound is negative), and whether it holds in general is not known here.

A formalization that weakens the strategy classes (full permutation symmetry, or equality of expected counts in Definition 3), drops the requirement that the problems lie in the model, or uses a real Bernoulli divergence with finite values at q∈{0,1}q\in\{0,1\}q∈{0,1} does not count.

A complete development needs the fundamental inequality (6) on the canonical bandit model (the subject of mission I of this series; the chain rule for the divergence of bandit measures is already proved on the platform), the symmetry argument on the canonical measure, Lemma 6 and Lemma 2. Contributions of any of these, and of the identity ∑aNψ,a(T)=T\sum_a N_{\psi,a}(T)=T∑a​Nψ,a​(T)=T integrated against banditMeasure, are welcome; Lemma 6 and the symmetry lemma are reusable beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • A. Garivier, P. Ménard, G. Stoltz, Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2019; arXiv:1602.07182v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1602.07182, https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2017.0928
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules, Advances in Applied Mathematics, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
  • A. N. Burnetas, M. N. Katehakis, Optimal adaptive policies for sequential allocation problems, Advances in Applied Mathematics, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1006/aama.1996.0007
  • T. Lattimore, Cs. Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108571401
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CombinatoricsOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Closing the Gap for Makespan Scheduling via Sparsification Techniques: A Feasible Configuration IP Has a Thin Solution, Support at Most 4(d+1)log(4(d+1)T), Complex Configurations Used at Most OnceResearch Paper

Motivation

Makespan minimization on identical parallel machines, P∥Cmax⁡P\|C_{\max}P∥Cmax​, asks to assign nnn jobs with processing times to mmm machines so that the largest machine load is as small as possible. It is strongly NP-hard, and the question has long been how fast a (1+ε)(1+\varepsilon)(1+ε)-approximate schedule can be found. After rounding and scaling, a guess TTT of the optimal makespan becomes a constant, the job sizes take only d=O((1/ε)log⁡(1/ε))d = O((1/\varepsilon)\log(1/\varepsilon))d=O((1/ε)log(1/ε)) distinct values, and the problem becomes an integer program over machine packings: the configuration IP.

A short history of the running times for this problem:

  • Hochbaum and Shmoys (1987) gave the first PTAS, with running time (n/ε)O(1/ε2)(n/\varepsilon)^{O(1/\varepsilon^2)}(n/ε)O(1/ε2).
  • Alon, Azar, Woeginger and Yadid (1997/1998), and Hochbaum and Shmoys, obtained an EPTAS with running time 2(1/ε)poly(1/ε)+O(nlog⁡n)2^{(1/\varepsilon)^{\mathrm{poly}(1/\varepsilon)}} + O(n\log n)2(1/ε)poly(1/ε)+O(nlogn).
  • Jansen (2010) used the support bound of Eisenbrand and Shmonin (2006) to reach 2O((1/ε)2log⁡3(1/ε))+O(nlog⁡n)2^{O((1/\varepsilon)^2\log^3(1/\varepsilon))} + O(n\log n)2O((1/ε)2log3(1/ε))+O(nlogn).
  • Chen, Jansen and Zhang (2014) showed that, under the Exponential Time Hypothesis, no PTAS runs in time 2(1/ε)1−δpoly(n)2^{(1/\varepsilon)^{1-\delta}}\mathrm{poly}(n)2(1/ε)1−δpoly(n).
  • Jansen, Klein and Verschae (arXiv 2016; Mathematics of Operations Research 2020) reached 2O((1/ε)log⁡4(1/ε))+O(nlog⁡n)2^{O((1/\varepsilon)\log^4(1/\varepsilon))} + O(n\log n)2O((1/ε)log4(1/ε))+O(nlogn), matching that lower bound up to polylogarithmic factors in the exponent. Their key ingredient is a structural theorem on the configuration IP, which this mission formalizes.

Setting

Fix d∈Nd \in \mathbb{N}d∈N, a vector of job sizes π∈Z>0d\pi \in \mathbb{Z}^d_{>0}π∈Z>0d​ and a capacity T∈Z>0T \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}T∈Z>0​. The knapsack polytope is P={c∈R≥0d:π⋅c≤T}\mathcal{P} = \{c \in \mathbb{R}^d_{\ge 0} : \pi\cdot c \le T\}P={c∈R≥0d​:π⋅c≤T}, and a configuration is an integral point of it:

Q=Zd∩P,c∈Q  ⟺  c∈Z≥0d,  ∑kπkck≤T.Q = \mathbb{Z}^d \cap \mathcal{P}, \qquad c \in Q \iff c \in \mathbb{Z}^d_{\ge 0},\ \ \sum_{k} \pi_k c_k \le T.Q=Zd∩P,c∈Q⟺c∈Z≥0d​,  k∑​πk​ck​≤T.

A configuration describes one machine: ckc_kck​ jobs of size πk\pi_kπk​, of total load at most TTT. The support of a vector is the set of its nonzero coordinates, supp⁡(c)={k:ck≠0}\operatorname{supp}(c) = \{k : c_k \ne 0\}supp(c)={k:ck​=0}. Throughout, log⁡=log⁡2\log = \log_2log=log2​. A configuration is simple if ∣supp⁡(c)∣≤log⁡(T+1)|\operatorname{supp}(c)| \le \log(T+1)∣supp(c)∣≤log(T+1) and complex otherwise; QcQ_cQc​ is the set of complex configurations.

Given the number bkb_kbk​ of jobs of each size and the number mmm of machines, the configuration IP [conf-IP] asks for multiplicities xc∈Z≥0x_c \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ge 0}xc​∈Z≥0​, one per configuration, with

∑c∈Qc xc=b,∑c∈Qxc=m.\sum_{c\in Q} c\, x_c = b, \qquad \sum_{c \in Q} x_c = m.c∈Q∑​cxc​=b,c∈Q∑​xc​=m.

Its LP relaxation [conf-LP] replaces xc∈Z≥0x_c \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ge 0}xc​∈Z≥0​ by xc≥0x_c \ge 0xc​≥0. The support of a solution is supp⁡(x)={c∈Q:xc≠0}\operatorname{supp}(x) = \{c \in Q : x_c \neq 0\}supp(x)={c∈Q:xc​=0}.

Formalization targets

Goal: thin solutions (Theorem 1)

If [conf-IP] is feasible, it has a feasible solution xxx with

xc>1⇒c simple,∣supp⁡(x)∣≤4(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T),∑c∈Qcxc≤2(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T).x_c > 1 \Rightarrow c \text{ simple}, \qquad |\operatorname{supp}(x)| \le 4(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T), \qquad \sum_{c\in Q_c} x_c \le 2(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T).xc​>1⇒c simple,∣supp(x)∣≤4(d+1)log(4(d+1)T),c∈Qc​∑​xc​≤2(d+1)log(4(d+1)T).

A solution with these three properties is called thin.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 2 (Eisenbrand–Shmonin): if ∣supp⁡(x)∣>2(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T)|\operatorname{supp}(x)| > 2(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T)∣supp(x)∣>2(d+1)log(4(d+1)T) for a nonnegative integer vector xxx on QQQ, there are disjoint nonempty A,B⊆supp⁡(x)A, B \subseteq \operatorname{supp}(x)A,B⊆supp(x) with ∑c∈Ac=∑c∈Bc\sum_{c \in A} c = \sum_{c\in B} c∑c∈A​c=∑c∈B​c and ∣A∣=∣B∣|A| = |B|∣A∣=∣B∣.
  2. Lemma 3 (Eisenbrand–Shmonin): a feasible [conf-IP] has a solution with ∣supp⁡(x)∣≤2(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T)|\operatorname{supp}(x)| \le 2(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T)∣supp(x)∣≤2(d+1)log(4(d+1)T).
  3. Lemma 4 (Sparsification Lemma): every complex c∈Qc \in Qc∈Q satisfies 2c=c1+c22c = c_1 + c_22c=c1​+c2​ for configurations c1,c2c_1, c_2c1​,c2​ with π⋅c1=π⋅c2=π⋅c\pi\cdot c_1 = \pi\cdot c_2 = \pi\cdot cπ⋅c1​=π⋅c2​=π⋅c and supp⁡(ci)⊊supp⁡(c)\operatorname{supp}(c_i) \subsetneq \operatorname{supp}(c)supp(ci​)⊊supp(c).
  4. P1: a feasible solution minimizing the potential Φ(x)=∑c complexxc∣supp⁡(c)∣\Phi(x) = \sum_{c \text{ complex}} x_c|\operatorname{supp}(c)|Φ(x)=∑c complex​xc​∣supp(c)∣ uses each complex configuration at most once.
  5. P2: such a solution has at most 2(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T)2(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T)2(d+1)log(4(d+1)T) complex configurations in its support.

Companion results

  • Corollary 5: every vertex of conv.hull⁡(Q)\operatorname{conv.hull}(Q)conv.hull(Q) is a simple configuration; and, from its proof, the number of simple configurations is at most (L+1)dL(T+1)L(L+1)d^{L}(T+1)^{L}(L+1)dL(T+1)L with L=log⁡(T+1)L = \log(T+1)L=log(T+1), for d≥1d \ge 1d≥1.
  • Corollary 6: a feasible [conf-LP] has a solution supported on simple configurations only.

Significance

The result. Theorem 1 says that, up to O(dlog⁡(dT))O(d\log(dT))O(dlog(dT)) machines, every feasible configuration IP can be solved using simple configurations only. There are 2O(log⁡2d+log⁡2T)2^{O(\log^2 d + \log^2 T)}2O(log2d+log2T) simple configurations, far fewer than configurations in general, so an algorithm can guess the support of a solution among a much smaller family. This is what yields the 2O((1/ε)log⁡4(1/ε))+O(nlog⁡n)2^{O((1/\varepsilon)\log^4(1/\varepsilon))} + O(n\log n)2O((1/ε)log4(1/ε))+O(nlogn) EPTAS for P∥Cmax⁡P\|C_{\max}P∥Cmax​, and through the same structure PTASs for Q∥Cmax⁡Q\|C_{\max}Q∥Cmax​ and for LpL_pLp​-norm and max–min objectives. Corollaries 5 and 6 are structural facts about knapsack polytopes in their own right: the integer hull has only simple vertices, and the configuration LP can be restricted to simple configurations.

Formalizing it. The results are proved in the paper; none of them has a machine-checked proof that this mission knows of. The development produces a reusable formal model of configurations and of the configuration IP and LP, a formal Eisenbrand–Shmonin support bound for this IP (a Carathéodory-type statement for integer cones that recurs across integer programming), and the sparsification lemma with its potential-function argument. The constants 4(d+1)4(d+1)4(d+1) and 2(d+1)2(d+1)2(d+1) are the paper's and are stated exactly.

Difficulty

The obvious argument applies the sparsification lemma repeatedly, replacing any complex configuration used twice by two configurations of smaller support, and then shrinks the support with the Eisenbrand–Shmonin exchange. The second step can undo the first: the exchange moves weight between configurations and may raise the multiplicity of a complex configuration above one again, so alternating the two steps has no evident termination measure. A proof has to control both properties at once. The counting behind the support bound needs the explicit inequality (sT+1)d+1<2s(sT+1)^{d+1} < 2^s(sT+1)d+1<2s for every s>2(d+1)log⁡(4(d+1)T)s > 2(d+1)\log(4(d+1)T)s>2(d+1)log(4(d+1)T), which must be carried out with the exact constants rather than up to O(⋅)O(\cdot)O(⋅).

Formalization scope

  • Configurations are functions Fin d → ℕ with ∑kπkck≤T\sum_k \pi_k c_k \le T∑k​πk​ck​≤T; solutions of [conf-IP] are finitely supported functions (Fin d → ℕ) →₀ ℕ vanishing outside QQQ, and solutions of [conf-LP] are finitely supported real-valued functions, nonnegative and vanishing outside QQQ.
  • The standing assumptions of §2 are binders of every statement: πk>0\pi_k > 0πk​>0 for all kkk and T>0T > 0T>0. Lemma 4 does not need T>0T > 0T>0 and omits it.
  • The paper writes b∈Rdb \in \mathbb{R}^db∈Rd for [conf-IP]; feasibility forces b∈Ndb \in \mathbb{N}^db∈Nd, so bbb and mmm are natural numbers. For [conf-LP] they are real.
  • log⁡\loglog is Real.logb 2 and every bound is a real inequality; no floor is taken.
  • In Lemma 2, MxA=MxBMx^A = Mx^BMxA=MxB is stated row by row: the sum of the configurations in AAA equals that in BBB, and ∣A∣=∣B∣|A| = |B|∣A∣=∣B∣.
  • "Minimum potential" in P1 and P2 means Φ(x)≤Φ(y)\Phi(x) \le \Phi(y)Φ(x)≤Φ(y) for every feasible solution yyy of the same instance.
  • A vertex of conv.hull⁡(Q)\operatorname{conv.hull}(Q)conv.hull(Q) is an extreme point (Mathlib's Set.extremePoints). The asymptotic count of Corollary 5 is replaced by the explicit bound of its proof, with the added hypothesis d≥1d \ge 1d≥1 (at d=0d = 0d=0 the explicit bound is 000 while Q={0}Q = \{0\}Q={0}).

The goal theorem refers only to [conf-IP], its solutions, supports and the simple/complex split; it does not mention the potential, the matrix MMM or a minimality assumption, so it cannot be discharged by choosing a special solution in the hypotheses.

Needed infrastructure: finite sums over Finsupp, the pigeonhole principle on finsets, elementary bounds on Real.logb, and, for Corollaries 5 and 6, convex hulls and extreme points of finite sets in Rd\mathbb{R}^dRd. The definitions of configurations and of the configuration IP/LP are reusable for other configuration-IP papers (bin packing, cutting stock, scheduling). Contributions of auxiliary lemmas on supports of integer conic combinations are welcome.

Selected references

  • K. Jansen, K.-M. Klein, J. Verschae, Closing the Gap for Makespan Scheduling via Sparsification Techniques, ICALP 2016; Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020. https://arxiv.org/abs/1604.07153 (version v1, the basis of every citation in this mission)
  • F. Eisenbrand, G. Shmonin, Carathéodory bounds for integer cones, Operations Research Letters 34, 564–568, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2005.09.008
  • K. Jansen, An EPTAS for scheduling jobs on uniform processors: using an MILP relaxation with a constant number of integral variables, SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 24, 457–485, 2010.
  • N. Alon, Y. Azar, G. J. Woeginger, T. Yadid, Approximation schemes for scheduling on parallel machines, Journal of Scheduling 1, 55–66, 1998.
  • D. S. Hochbaum, D. B. Shmoys, Using dual approximation algorithms for scheduling problems: theoretical and practical results, Journal of the ACM 34, 144–162, 1987. https://doi.org/10.1145/7531.7535
  • L. Chen, K. Jansen, G. Zhang, On the optimality of approximation schemes for the classical scheduling problem, Proceedings of the 25th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 657–668, 2014.
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Linear OptimizationProbabilityTheoretical Computer Science·Captain: mikedeng1

Greed Works – Online Algorithms For Unrelated Machine Stochastic Scheduling 1: Greedy Assignment With WSEPT Sequencing Is (4 + 2Δ)-Competitive in the Online-List ModelResearch Paper

Motivation

Online scheduling asks for decisions before the full job set is known. In the online-list model, jobs are revealed one at a time and each must be assigned to a machine before the next job is revealed; the scheduler may choose the processing order after the list is complete. When processing durations are random and machines are unrelated, the same job may have different duration distributions on different machines. An assignment decision therefore affects both its own completion time and the waiting time of other jobs. Gupta, Moseley, Uetz and Xie study a greedy assignment rule for this setting and prove a bound against a scheduler that knows all distributions and all jobs in advance but cannot see future processing-time realizations (arXiv:1703.01634v4, §§2–5). This comparison is relevant to systems that must commit work to heterogeneous servers as requests arrive, while service times remain uncertain.

Setting

Let MMM be a nonempty finite set of machines and J={0,…,n−1}J=\{0,\ldots,n-1\}J={0,…,n−1} a finite set of jobs indexed by their presentation order. Job jjj has a nonnegative weight wjw_jwj​. An eligibility relation E⊆M×JE\subseteq M\times JE⊆M×J records which machines can process each job; every job has at least one eligible machine. For an eligible pair (i,j)(i,j)(i,j), PijP_{ij}Pij​ is a nonnegative integer-valued random processing time with mean μij=E[Pij]≥1\mu_{ij}=\mathbb E[P_{ij}]\ge1μij​=E[Pij​]≥1 and a finite second moment. The vector (Pij)i∈M(P_{ij})_{i\in M}(Pij​)i∈M​ for one job may have dependence across machines, but the vectors for different jobs are independent. A parameter Δ≥0\Delta\ge0Δ≥0 bounds Var⁡(Pij)/μij2\operatorname{Var}(P_{ij})/\mu_{ij}^{2}Var(Pij​)/μij2​ for all eligible pairs. These conventions follow the standing model and coefficient-of-variation bound in the paper (§2, pp. 4–6 and Definition 3, p. 7).

The greedy assignment sends each newly presented job to an eligible machine that minimizes the instantaneous increase in expected total weighted completion time. For a fixed machine, jobs are sequenced by decreasing ratio wj/μijw_j/\mu_{ij}wj​/μij​, with job index breaking equal-ratio ties. This is the weighted shortest expected processing time, or WSEPT, order. The algorithm runs each machine continuously from time zero in that order. Its expected objective, ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG, is the expectation of ∑jwjCj\sum_j w_j C_j∑j​wj​Cj​ for the resulting realized completion times, not a value assigned by a closed formula (§4, pp. 8–9).

A comparator policy can choose machines and start times as earlier jobs finish. It must schedule nonpreemptively, use only information available when a decision is made, and have integrable completion times. It may know the full job set and every processing-time distribution before time zero, but not the future realizations. Write CjΠC_j^\PiCjΠ​ for its realized completion time and OPT\mathrm{OPT}OPT for the least expected weighted completion cost among such policies when an optimum exists (§2.1, pp. 5–6).

Formalization targets

The goal is the paper's Theorem 1 (p. 11). It compares every eligible-minimum greedy assignment, including every tie choice, with every admissible nonanticipatory comparator Π\PiΠ:

ALG≤(4+2Δ) E ⁣[∑j∈JwjCjΠ].\mathrm{ALG}\le(4+2\Delta)\,\mathbb E\!\left[\sum_{j\in J}w_j C_j^\Pi\right].ALG≤(4+2Δ)E​j∈J∑​wj​CjΠ​​.

This universal comparison expresses ALG≤(4+2Δ)OPT\mathrm{ALG}\le(4+2\Delta)\mathrm{OPT}ALG≤(4+2Δ)OPT without requiring an optimizer to exist. The milestone list contains the paper's integer tail identities (Lemma 1), the completion-time expression for one job (Lemma 9), the comparison of two time-indexed relaxations and its policy consequence (Lemma 2 and Corollary 1), and the three dual-variable claims used around the greedy algorithm (Lemmas 3–5). Their printed indices and formulas are attached to the proposal in proof order.

Significance

The result supplies a performance guarantee for a combinatorial online algorithm on heterogeneous machines with random durations. The factor varies explicitly with the processing-time variability: for deterministic eligible processing times, Δ=0\Delta=0Δ=0 and the bound is 444; greater permitted variability increases it linearly. Forbidden machine-job pairs are included, so the claim applies when some jobs have a restricted set of possible servers. The comparator may postpone machine selection until processing begins and adapt to completed work, so the bound is not limited to fixed-assignment schedules (Theorem 1 and §2.1).

The theorem is proved in the cited paper. In this proposal, the Lean statements and definitions have compiled, while the theorem modules still contain sorry; the remaining formalization work is to supply machine-checked proofs. A completed development would contribute reusable definitions for nonanticipatory unrelated-machine policies, time-indexed stochastic scheduling relaxations, and comparisons with countably many LP variables. Those interfaces can support later scheduling results that use the same information structure.

Difficulty

The most immediate comparison treats the greedy assignment costs as dual variables. For this paper's linear program, the direct halved dual point is feasible, but the resulting dual objective is zero, so feasibility alone gives no useful upper bound on ALG\mathrm{ALG}ALG (Lemmas 3–4 and the beginning of §5). The random processing times also require care when translating occupancy probabilities into completion costs: the time-indexed expression uses both first and second moments, and a policy's start decision must not depend on the job's unobserved duration. The proof must reconcile the greedy order, those probability identities, and a comparison with policies that may change machines and start times adaptively.

Formalization scope

The Lean model uses Fin n in arrival order and permits n=0n=0n=0; the empty instance gives a trivial inequality. The machine type is finite and nonempty. Processing times are natural-valued random variables, while policy start times are real. Processing intervals are half-open, so a zero-duration job occupies no machine time. An ineligible pair is represented by the eligibility relation, never by a zero mean. Each eligible processing time has finite second moment and mean at least one; Δ\DeltaΔ is any nonnegative upper bound on squared coefficients of variation. The paper leaves wj≥0w_j\ge0wj​≥0 implicit; it is included because negative weights invalidate the comparison. Dependence across machines for the same job is allowed, and the entire time vector is independent across jobs.

Nonanticipation is stated by comparing two realizations that agree on the durations observed by time ttt and on the fact that running jobs have not yet completed. Admissible comparator policies must work for every realization and have integrable completion times, preventing a default zero value for a nonintegrable integral. The goal quantifies over all such policies, so it cannot be made true by choosing a restricted benchmark. The greedy predicate reads only earlier assignments and admits every eligible minimizing machine; it does not fix a favorable tie choice.

The LP variables yijsy_{ijs}yijs​ are real and nonnegative, supported on eligible pairs, and their countable sums and time-weighted sums must converge. LP comparisons use feasible witnesses instead of a real infimum, whose value would be misleading for an empty feasible set. A source-level discretization issue is isolated in Lemma 4: ∑sβis\sum_s\beta_{is}∑s​βis​ counts whole slots up to a nominal completion time, so the printed second equality requires integer means. Its first equality and the goal do not take that condition. A complete proof needs measurable-policy reasoning, tail-sum identities, summability arguments, WSEPT order properties and dual weak duality. Definitions and lemmas that isolate those components are welcome.

Selected references

  • V. Gupta, B. Moseley, M. Uetz and Q. Xie, Greed Works – Online Algorithms For Unrelated Machine Stochastic Scheduling, accepted version of Mathematics of Operations Research, 2020. arXiv:1703.01634v4; DOI:10.1287/moor.2019.0999.
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Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems III: A Strategy Smarter Than Uniform Draws Every Arm at Least (T/K)(1 − √(2T K_inf)) TimesResearch Paper

Why early exploration needs a lower bound

A stochastic multi-armed bandit learner repeatedly selects one of finitely many arms and sees only the reward from the selected arm. The learner must gather information about uncertain rewards while trying to select high-mean arms. Expected regret summarizes the lost reward relative to always selecting an optimal arm, but regret alone does not explain how much sampling each particular arm must receive. Garivier, Ménard, and Stoltz study this allocation question directly in Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems. Their Section 3 gives lower bounds for small horizons, before the longer-run logarithmic behavior becomes dominant.

The paper's first small-horizon result concerns strategies that allocate at least a uniform share to every optimal arm, on every problem in a specified model. This requirement excludes a strategy that always selects one fixed label and succeeds only when that label happens to be best. Such a requirement still permits many adaptive policies; it constrains their performance on optimal arms rather than prescribing their decisions round by round. The result establishes a compulsory initial allocation to every arm, including one whose mean is below the best mean. It is Theorem 2 on page 10 of the pinned arXiv:1602.07182v3.

Bandit problems, models, and strategies

A bandit problem ν‾=(νa)a=1K\underline\nu=(\nu_a)_{a=1}^Kν​=(νa​)a=1K​ consists of KKK probability laws on R\mathbb RR. At each round, a strategy ψ\psiψ chooses an arm using the observed past and randomization, then receives an independent reward drawn from that arm's law. The mean reward of arm aaa is μa=Eνa[X]\mu_a=\mathbb E_{\nu_a}[X]μa​=Eνa​​[X]. Write μ∗=max⁡aμa\mu^*=\max_a\mu_aμ∗=maxa​μa​, and call an arm optimal when μa=μ∗\mu_a=\mu^*μa​=μ∗. The count Nψ,a(T)N_{\psi,a}(T)Nψ,a​(T) is the number of times arm aaa is chosen during the first TTT rounds. These objects and the information available to a strategy are specified in Section 1.1, pages 2–3.

A model D\mathcal DD is a collection of possible arm laws, each a probability measure with an expectation. The notation ν‾∈D\underline\nu\in\mathcal Dν​∈D means that every arm law νa\nu_aνa​ belongs to D\mathcal DD. A strategy is smarter than uniform on D\mathcal DD when, for every bandit problem in the model, every optimal arm a∗a^*a∗, and every integer T≥1T\ge1T≥1, it satisfies

Eν‾[Nψ,a∗(T)]≥TK.\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}[N_{\psi,a^*}(T)]\ge\frac{T}{K}.Eν​​[Nψ,a∗​(T)]≥KT​.

This is Definition 2 on page 10. It imposes a lower bound on each optimal arm, even when several arms tie. The requirement is evaluated across the whole model, so a strategy cannot be declared smarter based only on its behavior on the one problem used in the theorem.

For a law PPP, a real threshold xxx, and the model D\mathcal DD, the information number Kinf⁡(P,x,D)\mathcal K_{\inf}(P,x,\mathcal D)Kinf​(P,x,D) is the infimum of KL(P,Q)\mathrm{KL}(P,Q)KL(P,Q) over those Q∈DQ\in\mathcal DQ∈D whose mean exceeds xxx. The infimum is +∞+\infty+∞ if there is no such QQQ. This is the definition on page 4. It measures how close an arm law is, in Kullback–Leibler divergence, to another admissible law that would give it a mean above the present optimum.

Formalization targets

The main target is Theorem 2. For a model D\mathcal DD, a strategy ψ\psiψ smarter than uniform on it, a bandit problem ν‾∈D\underline\nu\in\mathcal Dν​∈D, every arm aaa, and every integer T≥1T\ge1T≥1, the finite-Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ case states

Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)]≥TK(1−2TKinf⁡(νa,μ∗,D)).\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}[N_{\psi,a}(T)]\ge \frac{T}{K}\left(1-\sqrt{2T\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^*,\mathcal D)}\right).Eν​​[Nψ,a​(T)]≥KT​(1−2TKinf​(νa​,μ∗,D)​).

The theorem includes optimal and suboptimal arms. Its printed companion says that when T≤1/(8Kinf⁡)T\le 1/(8\mathcal K_{\inf})T≤1/(8Kinf​), the arm receives at least T/(2K)T/(2K)T/(2K) expected selections. In the formal statement this threshold is 8TKinf⁡≤18T\mathcal K_{\inf}\le18TKinf​≤1, which also expresses the intended case Kinf⁡=0\mathcal K_{\inf}=0Kinf​=0. Both claims come from Theorem 2, page 10.

The milestone list follows the source's intermediate claims. Lemma 6, page 20 bounds Bernoulli relative entropy using the maximum of x(1−x)x(1-x)x(1−x) over an interval. The proof of Theorem 2 on page 11 states that Bernoulli relative entropy increases in its second argument on the interval starting at its first argument. The same page applies the paper's fundamental inequality (6) to the fraction of rounds spent on one arm, then states a lower bound against a single alternative arm law. These are the four curated milestones for the main theorem.

What the result supplies

The theorem turns a model-relative performance condition into a numerical constraint on early sampling. If an arm's law is close in divergence to a law that would make it best, then the bound keeps its expected pull count near the uniform allocation until the horizon is large enough for the term under the square root to matter. It identifies the divergence scale 1/Kinf⁡1/\mathcal K_{\inf}1/Kinf​ at which this particular guarantee becomes weak. The paper contrasts this absolute bound with later relative and collective bounds that capture different dependencies on the number of arms in Section 3, pages 10–14.

The mathematical result is proved in the paper. The remaining work in this mission is a machine-checked development of the statement and its source-backed intermediate inequalities in the canonical stochastic-bandit model. The published bandit structure, policy kernels, and information number provide reusable foundations. Shared definitions supply the Bernoulli divergence, model predicate, and expected pull counts; the local strategy class makes the hypothesis of this particular theorem explicit. The Bernoulli inequalities and the pull-count change-of-measure statement can be reused in other lower-bound results.

Where the difficulty lies

A performance condition about optimal arms does not directly constrain an arm that is suboptimal in the problem of interest. The small-horizon bound must remain valid even though the strategy may adapt to observed rewards, and the relevant alternative arm laws can have divergences approaching an infimum without attaining it. The paper's lower bound is therefore sensitive to the exact orientation of the two bandit problems, the expected count multiplying their divergence, and the boundary conventions for Bernoulli relative entropy. Replacing the infimum with a chosen alternative or changing a divergence to an ordinary real with an arbitrary boundary value would alter the statement.

Formalization scope

Lean uses arms Fin K, indexed from zero; the paper indexes them from one. The horizon is a natural number, and counts are integrated against the probability measure on TTT-round histories generated by a stochastic kernel policy. Such kernels represent the arm-and-reward histories induced by the paper's strategies with auxiliary randomization. The model is a set of probability measures on R\mathbb RR whose identity function is integrable. The published StochasticBandit, BanditPolicy, and ConsistentBanditPolicy definitions supply the basic problem, history measure, pull count, means, and Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​.

Bernoulli divergence and Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ take values in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞]. The real square-root formula assumes Kinf⁡<+∞\mathcal K_{\inf}<+\inftyKinf​<+∞: when it is infinite, the paper's right-hand side is −∞-\infty−∞, while converting infinity directly to Lean's real value would produce a false numerical bound. The starting bandit problem is explicitly in D\mathcal DD, a condition needed for the proof's use of Definition 2 on a one-arm modification, although the printed quantifier on page 10 omits it. The arm parameter guarantees K≥1K\ge1K≥1; every target assumes T≥1T\ge1T≥1, so its real divisions by KKK and TTT have the stated meaning.

A faithful development must retain Definition 2's quantification over all model problems and each optimal arm, rather than only over the bandit problem used in the conclusion. It must use the full Bernoulli relative entropy, including infinite endpoint values, and the infimum over precisely those model laws with mean greater than μ∗\mu^*μ∗. The local instance of (6) also assumes integrable arm rewards in both bandit problems, as Section 1.1 requires. Contributions that establish the four milestones, the companion threshold claim, or reusable count-integrability and divergence facts are in scope.

Selected references

  • Aurélien Garivier, Pierre Ménard, and Gilles Stoltz, Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2019; arXiv:1602.07182v3.
  • Tor Lattimore and Csaba Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2020; DOI:10.1017/9781108571401. The published bandit definitions used here follow its canonical framework.
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Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems VI: Uniformly Super-Fast Convergent Strategies Draw Each Suboptimal Arm ln T / K_inf Times up to Explicit Lower-Order TermsResearch Paper

Why the large-horizon bound matters

In a stochastic multi-armed bandit, a decision maker repeatedly chooses one of several unknown reward sources. Sampling an arm reveals its reward but uses a round that could have been spent on a better arm. A good strategy must therefore reduce sampling of inferior arms, yet it cannot stop sampling them too early: it must still distinguish the current problem from a nearby one in which an apparently inferior arm is best. This tension produces the logarithmic lower bounds that benchmark bandit algorithms.

Garivier, Ménard and Stoltz revisit that benchmark in Explore First, Exploit Next. Their Theorem 5 gives a finite-horizon lower bound with explicit terms beyond the leading logarithm. It concerns every uniformly super-fast convergent strategy on a well-behaved model, not a particular algorithm. The distinction matters when comparing an algorithm's upper bound to what any strategy with that uniform performance guarantee must pay. The theorem is proved in the paper; this mission asks for a machine-checked statement and proof of that established result.

Bandit model and information cost

There are KKK arms. Arm aaa has an unknown probability distribution νa\nu_aνa​ over real rewards, with finite mean μa\mu_aμa​. The vector ν‾=(νa)a=1K\underline\nu=(\nu_a)_{a=1}^Kν​=(νa​)a=1K​ is a bandit problem. Its best mean is μ∗=max⁡aμa\mu^*=\max_a\mu_aμ∗=maxa​μa​, and the gap of arm aaa is Δa=μ∗−μa\Delta_a=\mu^*-\mu_aΔa​=μ∗−μa​. An arm with Δa>0\Delta_a>0Δa​>0 is suboptimal. A strategy ψ\psiψ selects an arm each round using the previous arms and rewards, possibly with randomization. Write Nψ,a(T)N_{\psi,a}(T)Nψ,a​(T) for the number of times it selects arm aaa by round TTT, and Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)]\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}[N_{\psi,a}(T)]Eν​​[Nψ,a​(T)] for the expected count under the problem ν‾\underline\nuν​.

A model D\mathcal DD specifies the probability distributions that an arm may have. All its laws have a finite first moment, and a bandit problem is in D\mathcal DD when every arm law belongs to it. For a law PPP and a target mean xxx, the paper's minimal information cost is

Kinf⁡(P,x,D)=inf⁡{KL(P,Q):Q∈D, E(Q)>x},\mathcal K_{\inf}(P,x,\mathcal D) =\inf\{\mathrm{KL}(P,Q):Q\in\mathcal D,\ \mathrm E(Q)>x\},Kinf​(P,x,D)=inf{KL(P,Q):Q∈D, E(Q)>x},

where an empty infimum is +∞+\infty+∞. This measures how much the law of an arm must change to make its mean exceed xxx. The Bernoulli divergence kl(p,q)\mathrm{kl}(p,q)kl(p,q) used in the intermediate change-of-measure bound keeps its infinite values at the boundary.

Let E(D)E(\mathcal D)E(D) be the interior of the set of expectations of laws in D\mathcal DD. A model is well behaved when positive functions εD\varepsilon_{\mathcal D}εD​ and ωD\omega_{\mathcal D}ωD​ satisfy, whenever P∈DP\in\mathcal DP∈D, x∈E(D)x\in E(\mathcal D)x∈E(D), E(P)<x\mathrm E(P)<xE(P)<x, and 0<ε<εD(x)0<\varepsilon<\varepsilon_{\mathcal D}(x)0<ε<εD​(x),

Kinf⁡(P,x+ε,D)≤Kinf⁡(P,x,D)+εωD(P,x).\mathcal K_{\inf}(P,x+\varepsilon,\mathcal D) \le \mathcal K_{\inf}(P,x,\mathcal D)+\varepsilon\omega_{\mathcal D}(P,x).Kinf​(P,x+ε,D)≤Kinf​(P,x,D)+εωD​(P,x).

A strategy is uniformly super-fast convergent with constant Cψ,DC_{\psi,\mathcal D}Cψ,D​ when Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)]≤Cψ,Dln⁡T/Δa2\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}[N_{\psi,a}(T)]\le C_{\psi,\mathcal D}\ln T/\Delta_a^2Eν​​[Nψ,a​(T)]≤Cψ,D​lnT/Δa2​ for every problem in D\mathcal DD, every suboptimal arm, and every T≥2T\ge2T≥2. The same constant applies throughout. Finally, H(ν‾)=∑a:Δa>0Δa−2H(\underline\nu)=\sum_{a:\Delta_a>0}\Delta_a^{-2}H(ν​)=∑a:Δa​>0​Δa−2​ records the inverse-squared gaps of all suboptimal arms.

Formalization targets

For each suboptimal arm let K=Kinf⁡(νa,μ∗,D)\mathcal K=\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^*,\mathcal D)K=Kinf​(νa​,μ∗,D). The goal is Theorem 5, with εT=(ln⁡T)−4\varepsilon_T=(\ln T)^{-4}εT​=(lnT)−4 and

aT=ωD(νa,μ∗)KεT,bT=Cψ,DH(ν‾)ln⁡TT,cT=ln⁡(KCψ,D(ln⁡T)9)ln⁡T.a_T=\frac{\omega_{\mathcal D}(\nu_a,\mu^*)}{\mathcal K}\varepsilon_T, \qquad b_T=C_{\psi,\mathcal D}H(\underline\nu)\frac{\ln T}{T}, \qquad c_T=\frac{\ln(KC_{\psi,\mathcal D}(\ln T)^9)}{\ln T}.aT​=KωD​(νa​,μ∗)​εT​,bT​=Cψ,D​H(ν​)TlnT​,cT​=lnTln(KCψ,D​(lnT)9)​.

For every T≥2T\ge2T≥2 satisfying εT<εD(μ∗)\varepsilon_T<\varepsilon_{\mathcal D}(\mu^*)εT​<εD​(μ∗), aT<1a_T<1aT​<1, bT<1b_T<1bT​<1, and 0≤cT<10\le c_T<10≤cT​<1, the target is

Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)]≥ln⁡TK(1−(aT+bT+cT))−ln⁡2K.\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}[N_{\psi,a}(T)] \ge \frac{\ln T}{\mathcal K}\bigl(1-(a_T+b_T+c_T)\bigr) -\frac{\ln 2}{\mathcal K}.Eν​​[Nψ,a​(T)]≥KlnT​(1−(aT​+bT​+cT​))−Kln2​.

The milestones follow the paper's displayed bounds: the one-alternative inequality (15), the optimized inequality (17), the inverse-information-cost bound after (17), and the product inequality quoted immediately before Theorem 5. They preserve the same constants and the same H(ν‾)H(\underline\nu)H(ν​).

What the result supplies

The leading term ln⁡T/K\ln T/\mathcal KlnT/K is the familiar distribution-dependent sampling barrier. The explicit aTa_TaT​, bTb_TbT​, and cTc_TcT​ quantify the correction at a finite horizon; the paper observes that their combined contribution has order ln⁡ln⁡T\ln\ln TlnlnT under its conditions. This makes the result useful when an algorithm's upper bound includes a second-order term and one wants to know the scale that a lower bound permits. It also identifies precisely which model regularity and uniform strategy guarantee support that comparison.

Formalizing Theorem 5 would add a reusable finite-horizon lower bound to the bandit library. The published definitions of stochastic bandits, policies, pull counts, and Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ supply the base model; this mission adds the paper's well-behavedness and super-fast convergence predicates and states the intermediate inequalities as separate targets. The paper's proof is established mathematically, while these mission statements remain open Lean theorems until solvers supply machine-checked proofs.

Main difficulty

The information cost is an infimum over alternative reward laws, so the finite-horizon bound must remain meaningful when the feasible set is empty or its divergence is infinite. The displayed formulas also divide by that information cost and use logarithms of quantities involving the strategy's uniform constant. For Theorem 5, the explicit correction factors must all lie in the range where the paper's final product inequality applies. A purely asymptotic statement would discard exactly the constants and horizon conditions that distinguish this theorem.

Formalization scope

Arms are Fin K, so the paper's arm a∈{1,…,K}a\in\{1,\ldots,K\}a∈{1,…,K} has Lean index a−1a-1a−1. A strategy is represented by Markov kernels on observed arm-reward histories; its expected pull count is an integral of a bounded count. The model consists of probability measures on R\mathbb RR with integrable identity. The information cost and Bernoulli divergence live in [0,+∞][0,+\infty][0,+∞]; a finite positive cost is converted to a real number only where a displayed reciprocal requires it. The goal contains a suboptimal arm, which rules out the empty-arm and single-arm cases. The model's witness functions are total in Lean, with requirements only on their paper-defined domains.

The theorem explicitly assumes μ∗∈E(D)\mu^*\in E(\mathcal D)μ∗∈E(D) and 0<K<+∞0<\mathcal K<+\infty0<K<+∞, which are implicit in the paper's use of εD(μ∗)\varepsilon_{\mathcal D}(\mu^*)εD​(μ∗) and 1/K1/\mathcal K1/K. It also assumes cT≥0c_T\ge0cT​≥0: the printed proof invokes a product inequality requiring that sign, although the theorem prints only cT<1c_T<1cT​<1. The version of (17) in the milestone list assumes bT≤1b_T\le1bT​≤1 in the case of a negative logarithm. These conditions and the model's integrability prevent vacuous or totalized-value readings of the lower bound. Contributions toward the four displayed milestones, the required measure-theoretic change of measure, and the finite-horizon arithmetic are in scope.

Selected references

  • Aurélien Garivier, Pierre Ménard, and Gilles Stoltz, Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 44 (2019); arXiv:1602.07182v3, DOI:10.1287/moor.2017.0928.
  • Tor Lattimore and Csaba Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press (2020), Chapters 4 and 16; DOI:10.1017/9781108571401.
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Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems IV: Under Pairwise Symmetry a Suboptimal Arm Is Drawn T/K Times or Almost as Often as an Optimal ArmResearch Paper

Motivation

Lower bounds for stochastic multi-armed bandits are usually stated for a large horizon: Lai and Robbins (1985) and Burnetas and Katehakis (1996) show that a consistent strategy pulls a suboptimal arm at least about ln⁡T/Kinf⁡\ln T / \mathcal{K}_{\inf}lnT/Kinf​ times. These bounds say nothing about the small-horizon regime, the first rounds in which a strategy has not yet had time to separate the arms. Garivier, Ménard and Stoltz (arXiv:1602.07182v3, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2019) describe that regime through one information-theoretic inequality, their (6), and derive several lower bounds from it. This mission formalizes their relative lower bound, Theorem 3 (p. 11): under a mild symmetry assumption on the strategy, a suboptimal arm is either pulled at the uniform rate T/KT/KT/K or, on average, almost as often as an optimal arm. It is the statement behind the title's claim that bandit strategies must first explore.

Setting

There are KKK arms. A bandit problem ν‾=(ν1,…,νK)\underline{\nu} = (\nu_1, \dots, \nu_K)ν​=(ν1​,…,νK​) assigns to each arm aaa a probability distribution νa\nu_aνa​ on R\mathbb{R}R with expectation μa\mu_aμa​. The optimal mean is μ⋆=max⁡aμa\mu^\star = \max_a \mu_aμ⋆=maxa​μa​, the gap of arm aaa is Δa=μ⋆−μa\Delta_a = \mu^\star - \mu_aΔa​=μ⋆−μa​; arm aaa is optimal if Δa=0\Delta_a = 0Δa​=0 and suboptimal if Δa>0\Delta_a > 0Δa​>0.

A model D\mathcal{D}D is a set of distributions on R\mathbb{R}R, each with an expectation; a bandit problem is in D\mathcal{D}D when every νa\nu_aνa​ belongs to D\mathcal{D}D.

At each round ttt a strategy ψ\psiψ picks an arm AtA_tAt​, possibly at random, as a function of the past arms and rewards, and receives a reward YtY_tYt​ drawn from νAt\nu_{A_t}νAt​​. The number of pulls of arm aaa in the first TTT rounds is

Nψ,a(T)=∑t=1T1{At=a},N_{\psi,a}(T) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathbb{1}\{A_t = a\},Nψ,a​(T)=t=1∑T​1{At​=a},

and Eν‾\mathbb{E}_{\underline{\nu}}Eν​​ denotes expectation when ψ\psiψ plays against ν‾\underline{\nu}ν​. Write Nψ,a+(T)=max⁡{Nψ,a(T),1}N^+_{\psi,a}(T) = \max\{N_{\psi,a}(T), 1\}Nψ,a+​(T)=max{Nψ,a​(T),1}.

Kullback–Leibler divergence. KL(P,Q)∈[0,+∞]\mathrm{KL}(P, Q) \in [0, +\infty]KL(P,Q)∈[0,+∞] is the Kullback–Leibler divergence between distributions, and kl(p,q)\mathrm{kl}(p, q)kl(p,q) the divergence between Bernoulli laws of parameters ppp and qqq.

Pairwise symmetry (Definition 3, p. 11). A strategy ψ\psiψ is pairwise symmetric for optimal arms on D\mathcal{D}D if for every bandit problem ν‾\underline{\nu}ν​ in D\mathcal{D}D, every pair of optimal arms a⋆,a⋆a^\star, a_\stara⋆,a⋆​ with νa⋆=νa⋆\nu_{a^\star} = \nu_{a_\star}νa⋆​=νa⋆​​ and every T≥1T \ge 1T≥1, the pairs (Nψ,a⋆(T),Nψ,a⋆(T))(N_{\psi,a^\star}(T), N_{\psi,a_\star}(T))(Nψ,a⋆​(T),Nψ,a⋆​​(T)) and (Nψ,a⋆(T),Nψ,a⋆(T))(N_{\psi,a_\star}(T), N_{\psi,a^\star}(T))(Nψ,a⋆​​(T),Nψ,a⋆​(T)) have the same distribution. A strategy that uses only the observed payoffs, and not the labels of the arms, has this property.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 3 (p. 11)

For every model D\mathcal{D}D, every strategy ψ\psiψ pairwise symmetric for optimal arms on D\mathcal{D}D, every bandit problem ν‾\underline{\nu}ν​ in D\mathcal{D}D, every suboptimal arm aaa, every optimal arm a⋆a^\stara⋆ with KL(νa,νa⋆)<∞\mathrm{KL}(\nu_a, \nu_{a^\star}) < \inftyKL(νa​,νa⋆​)<∞ and every T≥1T \ge 1T≥1,

Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)]≥TKorEν‾[Nψ,a+(T)Nψ,a⋆+(T)]≥1−22T KL(νa,νa⋆)K.\mathbb{E}_{\underline{\nu}}\big[N_{\psi,a}(T)\big] \ge \frac{T}{K} \quad\text{or}\quad \mathbb{E}_{\underline{\nu}}\left[\frac{N^+_{\psi,a}(T)}{N^+_{\psi,a^\star}(T)}\right] \ge 1 - 2\sqrt{\frac{2T\,\mathrm{KL}(\nu_a, \nu_{a^\star})}{K}} .Eν​​[Nψ,a​(T)]≥KT​orEν​​[Nψ,a⋆+​(T)Nψ,a+​(T)​]≥1−2K2TKL(νa​,νa⋆​)​​.

Companion: the "in particular" clause

For T≤K/(32 KL(νa,νa⋆))T \le K / (32\,\mathrm{KL}(\nu_a, \nu_{a^\star}))T≤K/(32KL(νa​,νa⋆​)) the second alternative becomes Eν‾[Nψ,a+(T)/Nψ,a⋆+(T)]≥1/2\mathbb{E}_{\underline{\nu}}[N^+_{\psi,a}(T)/N^+_{\psi,a^\star}(T)] \ge 1/2Eν​​[Nψ,a+​(T)/Nψ,a⋆+​(T)]≥1/2.

Milestones (p. 12)

  1. The symmetry identity: for the alternative problem ν‾′\underline{\nu}'ν​′ obtained by replacing νa\nu_aνa​ by νa⋆\nu_{a^\star}νa⋆​, Eν‾′[Nψ,a+/(Nψ,a++Nψ,a⋆+)]=1/2\mathbb{E}_{\underline{\nu}'}[N^+_{\psi,a}/(N^+_{\psi,a} + N^+_{\psi,a^\star})] = 1/2Eν​′​[Nψ,a+​/(Nψ,a+​+Nψ,a⋆+​)]=1/2.
  2. Inequality (12): Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)] KL(νa,νa′)≥kl(Eν‾[Nψ,a+/(Nψ,a++Nψ,a⋆+)],1/2)\mathbb{E}_{\underline{\nu}}[N_{\psi,a}(T)]\,\mathrm{KL}(\nu_a, \nu'_a) \ge \mathrm{kl}\big(\mathbb{E}_{\underline{\nu}}[N^+_{\psi,a}/(N^+_{\psi,a} + N^+_{\psi,a^\star})], 1/2\big)Eν​​[Nψ,a​(T)]KL(νa​,νa′​)≥kl(Eν​​[Nψ,a+​/(Nψ,a+​+Nψ,a⋆+​)],1/2).
  3. The Jensen display: Eν‾[Nψ,a+/(Nψ,a++Nψ,a⋆+)]≤r/(1+r)\mathbb{E}_{\underline{\nu}}[N^+_{\psi,a}/(N^+_{\psi,a} + N^+_{\psi,a^\star})] \le r/(1+r)Eν​​[Nψ,a+​/(Nψ,a+​+Nψ,a⋆+​)]≤r/(1+r) with r=Eν‾[Nψ,a+/Nψ,a⋆+]r = \mathbb{E}_{\underline{\nu}}[N^+_{\psi,a}/N^+_{\psi,a^\star}]r=Eν​​[Nψ,a+​/Nψ,a⋆+​].
  4. The bound r/(1+r)≥1/2−T KL(νa,νa′)/(2K)r/(1+r) \ge 1/2 - \sqrt{T\,\mathrm{KL}(\nu_a,\nu'_a)/(2K)}r/(1+r)≥1/2−TKL(νa​,νa′​)/(2K)​ in the case Eν‾[Nψ,a(T)]≤T/K\mathbb{E}_{\underline{\nu}}[N_{\psi,a}(T)] \le T/KEν​​[Nψ,a​(T)]≤T/K, r≤1r \le 1r≤1.

Significance

The theorem shows that in the initial phase a symmetric strategy cannot discard a suboptimal arm quickly: unless the arm is already sampled at the uniform rate, it is sampled, in ratio, nearly as often as an optimal arm, as long as TTT is small compared with K/KL(νa,νa⋆)K / \mathrm{KL}(\nu_a, \nu_{a^\star})K/KL(νa​,νa⋆​). Together with Theorem 2 (absolute lower bound) and Theorem 4 (collective lower bound) it describes the regret curve before the logarithmic regime: roughly linear growth, then a transition. It requires no assumption on the model beyond the existence of expectations, and it involves the divergence between the two arms themselves rather than the model-dependent quantity Kinf⁡\mathcal{K}_{\inf}Kinf​.

The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge it has no machine-checked proof. The mission produces a Lean statement of Theorem 3 on the canonical bandit model already used on the platform (StochasticBandit, BanditPolicy), a formal version of the symmetry assumption that sibling missions reuse (mission V, the collective lower bound, uses the same Definition 3), and the four intermediate steps of the proof as separate targets.

Difficulty

The proof compares ν‾\underline{\nu}ν​ with an alternative problem ν‾′\underline{\nu}'ν​′ that differs from it only in arm aaa, and transfers information between them through the fundamental inequality (6) of §2, a data-processing argument on the law of the whole history. The step specific to Theorem 3 is the choice of the test variable: the expectation of Nψ,a+/(Nψ,a++Nψ,a⋆+)N^+_{\psi,a}/(N^+_{\psi,a} + N^+_{\psi,a^\star})Nψ,a+​/(Nψ,a+​+Nψ,a⋆+​) is known exactly under ν‾′\underline{\nu}'ν​′ only because the strategy is pairwise symmetric, and the symmetry is a statement about joint laws of pull counts, not about their expectations. A version of the assumption that only equates expected pull counts does not determine the expectation of this ratio. The ratio expectation then has to be extracted from a bound on E[x/(1+x)]\mathbb{E}[x/(1+x)]E[x/(1+x)], which needs Jensen's inequality in the right direction and a case split on whether r≤1r \le 1r≤1.

Formalization scope

Arms are Fin K (0-based). The horizon TTT is a natural number. A strategy is a published BanditPolicy: a family of Markov kernels from the observed history of (arm, reward) pairs to the next arm. Every strategy of the paper, which may use auxiliary uniform random variables, induces such a kernel with the same law of arms and rewards. The law of the history is the published banditMeasure, and Nψ,a(T)N_{\psi,a}(T)Nψ,a​(T) is the published armPullCount. The model is a set of measures on R\mathbb{R}R, and every statement assumes the paper's standing hypothesis (§1.1, p. 3) that each member is a probability measure with an integrable identity, together with ν‾\underline{\nu}ν​ in D\mathcal{D}D.

Committed conventions:

  • KL\mathrm{KL}KL and kl\mathrm{kl}kl take values in [0,+∞][0, +\infty][0,+∞]; the Bernoulli divergence is the Kullback–Leibler divergence of two Bernoulli laws on R\mathbb{R}R, not a real formula with finite values at q∈{0,1}q \in \{0, 1\}q∈{0,1}.
  • Theorem 3 adds the hypothesis KL(νa,νa⋆)<∞\mathrm{KL}(\nu_a, \nu_{a^\star}) < \inftyKL(νa​,νa⋆​)<∞. When the divergence is infinite the paper's bound reads ≥−∞\ge -\infty≥−∞ and is empty; reading +∞+\infty+∞ as the real number 000 would make the statement false.
  • The "in particular" clause is stated as 32 T KL(νa,νa⋆)≤K32\,T\,\mathrm{KL}(\nu_a,\nu_{a^\star}) \le K32TKL(νa​,νa⋆​)≤K in [0,+∞][0, +\infty][0,+∞], which needs no finiteness assumption.
  • Definition 3 is an equality of joint laws (push-forwards of the history law), for every T≥1T \ge 1T≥1, only for optimal arms of problems in D\mathcal{D}D with equal distributions. Invariance under all permutations of the arms would strengthen the hypothesis and weaken the theorem.
  • Ratios use max⁡{N,1}\max\{N, 1\}max{N,1} as real numbers, so no division by zero occurs; all integrands are bounded by TTT.

A formalization in which the symmetry assumption equates only expected pull counts, in which the divergence is a real number with junk value 000 at +∞+\infty+∞, or in which the disjunction is replaced by its second alternative, is not this theorem.

The mission builds on the published definitions StochasticBandit and BanditPolicy. A complete development needs the fundamental inequality (6) for kernel policies (the divergence decomposition, published as BanditAlgorithm.bandit_divergence_decomposition, plus data processing for the Bernoulli test), Pinsker's inequality for Bernoulli laws (proved on the platform as BanditAlgorithm.bernoulli_relative_entropy_pinsker), Jensen's inequality for concave functions (Mathlib), and a lemma that the law of the history is unchanged in distribution when two identically distributed optimal arms are relabelled. The measurability of pull counts and the relation between the extended-real and real Bernoulli divergences are reusable beyond this mission. Proofs of any milestone, and of the general fundamental inequality, are welcome.

Selected references

  • A. Garivier, P. Ménard, G. Stoltz, Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems, Mathematics of Operations Research 44(2), 2019. arXiv:1602.07182v3, doi:10.1287/moor.2017.0928
  • T. L. Lai, H. Robbins, Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules, Advances in Applied Mathematics 6(1), 1985. doi:10.1016/0196-8858(85)90002-8
  • A. N. Burnetas, M. N. Katehakis, Optimal adaptive policies for sequential allocation problems, Advances in Applied Mathematics 17(2), 1996. doi:10.1006/aama.1996.0007
  • T. Lattimore, C. Szepesvári, Bandit Algorithms, Cambridge University Press, 2020. doi:10.1017/9781108571401
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 4: Bundling k ≥ 2 I.I.D. Goods Guarantees a Fraction c/log k of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller with several goods and a single buyer is the smallest setting in which multi-dimensional mechanism design differs from the one-good theory. For one good, Myerson's theorem (Myerson 1981) says the optimal mechanism posts a price. For two or more goods the optimal mechanism may use lotteries, may be non-monotone in the buyer's values, and is in general not known in closed form. Practitioners nevertheless use simple mechanisms, and the question that Hart and Nisan (arXiv:1204.1846v3) ask is quantitative: what fraction of the optimal revenue does a simple mechanism guarantee?

This mission concerns the simplest mechanism of all, bundling: one posted price for the set of all goods. When the goods are independent and identically distributed, bundling is known to become nearly optimal as the number of goods grows for a fixed distribution (Armstrong 1999; Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999). That limit is not uniform over distributions. Theorem D of Hart and Nisan gives the uniform guarantee: for every k≥2k\ge2k≥2 and every distribution, bundling kkk i.i.d. goods earns at least c/log⁡kc/\log kc/logk of the optimal revenue.

Timeline. Armstrong (1999) and Bakos–Brynjolfsson (1999) proved the asymptotic optimality of bundling for a fixed distribution. Hart and Nisan circulated the first version of this paper in 2012 (EC 2012), proving Theorems A–D; the version formalized here is arXiv:1204.1846v3 (2017), published in J. Econ. Theory 172 (2017). Li and Yao (2013) later improved separate selling for i.i.d. goods to Θ(1/log⁡k)\Theta(1/\log k)Θ(1/logk), and Babaioff, Immorlica, Lucier and Weinberg (2014) showed that the better of separate selling and bundling is a constant-factor approximation for independent goods.

Setting

There are kkk goods and one buyer with additive valuation x=(x1,…,xk)∈R+kx=(x_1,\dots,x_k)\in\mathbb R_+^kx=(x1​,…,xk​)∈R+k​, drawn from a known distribution. A mechanism μ=(q,s)\mu=(q,s)μ=(q,s) assigns to every reported valuation xxx an allocation vector q(x)∈[0,1]kq(x)\in[0,1]^kq(x)∈[0,1]k (the probabilities of receiving each good) and a payment s(x)∈Rs(x)\in\mathbb Rs(x)∈R. The buyer's payoff is b(x)=q(x)⋅x−s(x)b(x)=q(x)\cdot x-s(x)b(x)=q(x)⋅x−s(x). The mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if b(x)≥q(x~)⋅x−s(x~)b(x)\ge q(\tilde x)\cdot x-s(\tilde x)b(x)≥q(x~)⋅x−s(x~) for all x,x~x,\tilde xx,x~, and individually rational (IR) if b(x)≥0b(x)\ge0b(x)≥0 for all xxx. For a random valuation XXX, the expected revenue is R(μ;X)=E[s(X)]R(\mu;X)=\mathbb E[s(X)]R(μ;X)=E[s(X)] and the optimal revenue is

Rev(X)=sup⁡{R(μ;X): μ IC and IR}∈[0,∞].\mathrm{Rev}(X)=\sup\{R(\mu;X):\ \mu\text{ IC and IR}\}\in[0,\infty].Rev(X)=sup{R(μ;X): μ IC and IR}∈[0,∞].

For one good, Rev(X)=sup⁡p≥0p⋅P[X≥p]\mathrm{Rev}(X)=\sup_{p\ge0}p\cdot\mathbb P[X\ge p]Rev(X)=supp≥0​p⋅P[X≥p]. The bundled revenue is the one-good revenue of the total value, BRev(X)=Rev(X1+⋯+Xk)\mathrm{BRev}(X)=\mathrm{Rev}(X_1+\dots+X_k)BRev(X)=Rev(X1​+⋯+Xk​), and the separate revenue is SRev(X)=∑iRev(Xi)\mathrm{SRev}(X)=\sum_i\mathrm{Rev}(X_i)SRev(X)=∑i​Rev(Xi​).

"kkk i.i.d. goods" means that X1,…,XkX_1,\dots,X_kX1​,…,Xk​ are independent with a common law ν\nuν on R+\mathbb R_+R+​. Write Rk=Rev(X1,…,Xk)R_k=\mathrm{Rev}(X_1,\dots,X_k)Rk​=Rev(X1​,…,Xk​) and Bk=BRev(X1,…,Xk)B_k=\mathrm{BRev}(X_1,\dots,X_k)Bk​=BRev(X1​,…,Xk​).

Two auxiliary objects appear in the milestones. A real random variable XXX is stochastically dominated by YYY if P[X≥p]≤P[Y≥p]\mathbb P[X\ge p]\le\mathbb P[Y\ge p]P[X≥p]≤P[Y≥p] for every ppp. The equal-revenue (ER) law is that of V≥1V\ge1V≥1 with P[V≥p]=1/p\mathbb P[V\ge p]=1/pP[V≥p]=1/p for p≥1p\ge1p≥1. The constant w≈0.278w\approx0.278w≈0.278 is the unique real solution of w ew+1=1w\,e^{w+1}=1wew+1=1.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem D (p. 7)

∃ c>0  ∀k≥2  ∀ν:clog⁡k Rk≤Bk.\exists\,c>0\ \ \forall k\ge2\ \ \forall\nu:\qquad \frac{c}{\log k}\,R_k\le B_k .∃c>0  ∀k≥2  ∀ν:logkc​Rk​≤Bk​.

The constant is absolute: it is chosen before kkk and before the distribution. This is the statement as printed; it fixes neither the constant nor the base of the logarithm.

Explicit form (proof of Theorem D, p. 27)

Rk≤8(w+1)(log⁡2k+2) Bk(k≥2).R_k\le 8(w+1)(\log_2k+2)\,B_k\qquad(k\ge2).Rk​≤8(w+1)(log2​k+2)Bk​(k≥2).

Milestones

The milestones follow the paper's proof: Myerson's formula (1); monotonicity of one-good revenue under domination (Proposition 11); the ER characterization (Lemma 20) and the tail of a weighted sum of two ER goods (Lemma 21); BRev(V1,V2)=2(w+1)\mathrm{BRev}(V_1,V_2)=2(w+1)BRev(V1​,V2​)=2(w+1) (Proposition 24); SRev≥BRev/(w+1)\mathrm{SRev}\ge\mathrm{BRev}/(w+1)SRev≥BRev/(w+1) for two independent goods (Proposition 13 (i)); BRev≥SRev/4\mathrm{BRev}\ge\mathrm{SRev}/4BRev≥SRev/4 for i.i.d. goods (Proposition 14 (ii)); the decomposition Theorem 7; the power-of-two bound Rk≤4(log⁡2k+1)BkR_k\le4(\log_2k+1)B_kRk​≤4(log2​k+1)Bk​; monotonicity of RkR_kRk​ and BkB_kBk​ in kkk; and the explicit bound above.

Significance

Theorem D says that for identically distributed goods the gap between the simplest mechanism and the optimal one grows at most logarithmically in the number of goods, uniformly over all distributions, including heavy-tailed ones with infinite mean. The i.i.d. hypothesis is essential: for independent goods with different distributions bundling can recover only a 1/k1/k1/k fraction (Example 27 of the paper). Together with Theorem C (separate selling, c/log⁡2kc/\log^2kc/log2k) it places the two simple mechanisms on a common scale, and the decomposition Theorem 7 it rests on is a general tool for independent groups of goods.

The result is proved in the paper; no machine-checked version is known to exist. A formalization adds: a Lean model of multi-good mechanisms with IC, IR and expected revenue in the extended reals; a checked version of Myerson's one-good formula for arbitrary laws on R+\mathbb R_+R+​; the equal-revenue law and its two-good convolution; and a checked reduction from the decomposition theorem to the logarithmic bundling guarantee. Shorter arguments or a better constant are also welcome.

Difficulty

The obvious argument fails at the first step: revenue is not monotone in the valuation for two or more goods (Hart and Reny 2015), so one cannot bound RkR_kRk​ by replacing each good by a dominating ER good. Every comparison therefore has to pass through one-dimensional quantities, and the multi-good step (Theorem 7) is a statement about expectations of a mechanism's payments conditioned on an independent block of goods. Proposition 14 (ii) must handle distributions where no optimal one-good price exists and Rev(Xi)\mathrm{Rev}(X_i)Rev(Xi​) may be infinite (the paper's proof speaks of "an optimal price"). Proposition 24 is an exact evaluation whose answer is defined only implicitly, through w ew+1=1w\,e^{w+1}=1wew+1=1. The induction itself must track how block sums of i.i.d. goods are again i.i.d.

Formalization scope

Valuations are laws: a kkk-good random valuation is a probability measure on Fin k → ℝ≥0, and kkk i.i.d. goods with law ν\nuν form Measure.pi (fun _ : Fin k => ν). Two independent groups Y,ZY,ZY,Z have the product law on the disjoint union of their index types (jointLaw); the two-good statement Proposition 13 (i) uses this encoding on Unit ⊕ Unit. A mechanism is a pair of functions; the admissible class requires q∈[0,1]kq\in[0,1]^kq∈[0,1]k, IC, IR, and a measurable payment rule, the last being the without-loss-of-generality pin of the paper's footnote 12. The expected revenue of one mechanism is an EReal difference of two lower integrals, never a Bochner integral (which would be 000 for non-integrable payments). Rev\mathrm{Rev}Rev is a supremum in ℝ≥0∞, so infinite revenues are represented. www is a real parameter with the hypothesis w ew+1=1w\,e^{w+1}=1wew+1=1, not a Lambert-WWW value. Logarithms are natural in Theorem D and base 2 (Real.logb 2) in the proof's explicit bounds, as printed; every statement with a logarithm keeps k≥2k\ge2k≥2.

The paper states Theorem D as a lower bound on an infimum of ratios BRev/Rev\mathrm{BRev}/\mathrm{Rev}BRev/Rev; the formal goal is the multiplicative inequality, which agrees with it wherever the ratio is defined and requires BRev=∞\mathrm{BRev}=\inftyBRev=∞ when Rev=∞\mathrm{Rev}=\inftyRev=∞. A formalization in which ccc may depend on kkk or on the distribution, or in which Rev\mathrm{Rev}Rev is computed with a Bochner integral, would trivialize the statement and is ruled out by the binder order and the definitions above.

The definitions are a mission-local copy of the model shared by this series (missions 1–5), so they can be merged later. Not posed here: Theorem C, Proposition 25, Corollary 23, Lemma 22, Example 32, the GFOR notation, and the asymptotic optimality of bundling (Appendix A.5). Proofs of any milestone are welcome, as are reusable lemmas on posted prices, stochastic domination of sums of independent variables, and binomial medians.

Selected references

  • S. Hart and N. Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, J. Econ. Theory 172 (2017); preprint arXiv:1204.1846v3. https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.1846
  • R. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • M. Armstrong, Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 151–168. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00083
  • Y. Bakos and E. Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency, Management Sci. 45 (1999) 1613–1630. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.45.12.1613
  • S. Hart and P. Reny, Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations, Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 893–922. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1517
  • X. Li and A. C.-C. Yao, On Revenue Maximization for Selling Multiple Independently Distributed Items, PNAS 110 (2013) 11232–11237. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1309533110
  • M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, B. Lucier and S. M. Weinberg, A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer, FOCS 2014. https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.6146
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 2: Selling Two I.I.D. Goods Separately Guarantees at Least e/(e + 1) ≈ 73% of the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller with several goods can sell them one at a time or offer a mechanism that links allocation and payment across goods. Separate selling asks the seller to solve a one-good pricing problem for each item. A general mechanism can offer lotteries and menus whose outcomes depend on the buyer's whole valuation vector. The difference matters because the buyer's private information covers several values at once, and an optimal multidimensional mechanism need not resemble an ordinary posted price. Hart and Nisan ask how much revenue is guaranteed by simple selling rules when the joint valuation distribution is unrestricted apart from the stated independence assumptions (Hart and Nisan, arXiv:1204.1846v3).

This mission isolates their two-good, identically distributed result, Theorem B. The paper first gives a one-half guarantee for two independent goods with potentially different distributions, then improves the guarantee to e/(e+1)e/(e+1)e/(e+1) when their distributions agree. The improvement is a claim about every probability law on nonnegative values. It assumes neither a density nor a regularity condition on the tail of that law. The paper proves the result in Appendix A.1 after stating it in the introduction (Hart and Nisan, pp. 6 and 31–35).

Setting

There is one risk-neutral buyer and one seller. For two goods, the buyer's private valuation is a vector (Y,Z)(Y,Z)(Y,Z) with Y,Z≥0Y,Z\ge0Y,Z≥0. Values are additive: receiving both goods is worth Y+ZY+ZY+Z. The seller knows the distribution of the vector but not the realized values. In this mission, YYY and ZZZ are independent and have the same arbitrary probability law ν\nuν on R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge0}R≥0​. A law, rather than a named pair of random variables on a probability space, carries all the data needed by the revenue quantities.

A direct mechanism μ=(q,s)\mu=(q,s)μ=(q,s) takes a reported pair x=(y,z)x=(y,z)x=(y,z) and returns an allocation probability qi(x)∈[0,1]q_i(x)\in[0,1]qi​(x)∈[0,1] for each good and a real payment s(x)s(x)s(x) to the seller. The buyer's payoff from reporting truthfully is b(x)=q(x)⋅x−s(x)b(x)=q(x)\cdot x-s(x)b(x)=q(x)⋅x−s(x). The mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if truthful reporting is at least as good as any other report for every possible valuation, and individually rational (IR) if truthful payoff is nonnegative everywhere. These requirements hold on the whole nonnegative orthant, as in Section 2.1 of the paper (Hart and Nisan, pp. 11–14).

Write R(μ;X)R(\mu;X)R(μ;X) for the expected payment under a valuation law XXX and Rev⁡(X)\operatorname{Rev}(X)Rev(X) for the supremum of R(μ;X)R(\mu;X)R(μ;X) over feasible, IC, IR mechanisms. For one good, write Rev⁡1(ν)\operatorname{Rev}_1(\nu)Rev1​(ν). The separate-selling revenue for two identically distributed goods is SRev⁡(Y,Z)=2Rev⁡1(ν)\operatorname{SRev}(Y,Z)=2\operatorname{Rev}_1(\nu)SRev(Y,Z)=2Rev1​(ν). Equation (1) of the paper identifies the one-good value with the supremum of posted-price revenue pPr⁡[Y≥p]p\Pr[Y\ge p]pPr[Y≥p]; the supremum formulation covers laws for which no maximizing price exists (Hart and Nisan, p. 12; Myerson, 1981).

Formalization targets

Theorem B: the guarantee for two i.i.d. goods

The goal is the exact upper bound written at the start of the paper's proof:

Rev⁡(Y,Z)≤e+1e(Rev⁡(Y)+Rev⁡(Z))=e+1eSRev⁡(Y,Z).\operatorname{Rev}(Y,Z)\le\frac{e+1}{e}\bigl(\operatorname{Rev}(Y)+\operatorname{Rev}(Z)\bigr)=\frac{e+1}{e}\operatorname{SRev}(Y,Z).Rev(Y,Z)≤ee+1​(Rev(Y)+Rev(Z))=ee+1​SRev(Y,Z).

Equivalently, separate selling guarantees at least e/(e+1)e/(e+1)e/(e+1) of optimal revenue whenever the ratio has an ordinary meaning. The inequality itself is the stable formulation at zero and infinite revenues. The formal goal uses the exact constant (e+1)/e(e+1)/e(e+1)/e, not the rounded percentage in the theorem's prose (Hart and Nisan, Theorem B, p. 6; proof, p. 31).

Supporting targets

The milestones include the one-good posted-price identity, the fact that nonnegative payments suffice when optimizing, symmetrization for identical independent goods, Lemma 19's lower-valuation revenue bound, equation (12), and the two expectation estimates and final numerical bound used after it. Proposition 5's IC characterization is also a draft theorem, though it is not a milestone. Each statement retains its source's domain and the constant 1/e1/e1/e. The final inequality for the right side of (12) is stated for every nondecreasing allocation function into [0,1][0,1][0,1], as required by the paper's argument on pp. 33–35.

Significance

Theorem B gives a distribution-free quantitative guarantee for an easy-to-describe selling rule in a setting where the optimal rule may depend on the buyer's entire two-dimensional private type. Its e/(e+1)e/(e+1)e/(e+1) guarantee is stronger than the one-half guarantee for merely independent goods stated as Theorem A. The conclusion concerns the best revenue available from all feasible IC and IR mechanisms, so the benchmark includes randomized allocations and payments depending on both reported values (Hart and Nisan, pp. 6 and 11–13).

The formalization target is a machine-checked version of a proved result, not a new conjecture. The proposal currently contains compiled Lean statements with unproved theorem bodies. A completed development would prove the stated inequality and its selected supporting results. It would also supply reusable definitions for direct mechanisms with additive nonnegative values, extended-real revenue, optimal revenue as a supremum, and symmetry of two-good mechanisms. No machine-checked proof of these proposed Hart–Nisan statements is claimed here.

Difficulty

The one-good posted-price formula does not directly control an arbitrary two-good mechanism: allocation of either good and the payment can depend on both reported values. Applying a one-good bound separately to the two coordinates therefore leaves terms that depend on the other coordinate. In particular, a direct comparison between each marginal posted-price optimum and the total payment loses the improved constant. The proof has to control the dependence created by a joint mechanism while retaining the exact 1/e1/e1/e numerical estimate. A second formal difficulty is that an admissible mechanism can have a negative expected payment even though optimal revenue is nonnegative, while an unrestricted law can give infinite optimal revenue. Replacing every expectation by an ordinary real integral or clipping each mechanism's revenue would change Lemma 19 and the intermediate inequalities (Hart and Nisan, pp. 31–35).

Formalization scope

Valuations are finite vectors ι→R≥0\iota\to\mathbb R_{\ge0}ι→R≥0​; the main theorem fixes ι=Fin⁡(2)\iota=\operatorname{Fin}(2)ι=Fin(2). The two-good law is the product of the same one-good probability measure in both coordinates, so independence and identical distribution are built into the data. The model represents allocation probabilities as real numbers with explicit bounds 0≤qi≤10\le q_i\le10≤qi​≤1. It requires IC and IR pointwise on all reports. No positive transfer (NPT) means s(x)≥0s(x)\ge0s(x)≥0 and is imposed only on supporting statements where the paper uses it. Following the paper's footnote 12, admissibility also requires the payment function to be measurable.

An individual expected payment is an extended real difference of positive and negative Lebesgue integrals. For IC mechanisms, the negative part is finite because the payment is bounded below by its value at zero. Optimal revenue is the supremum of the nonnegative clips of admissible mechanisms' expected payments; the zero mechanism makes this the same supremum as in the paper. Lemma 19 and equation (12) keep individual revenue in the extended reals. Supporting inequalities that write r=Rev⁡1(ν)r=\operatorname{Rev}_1(\nu)r=Rev1​(ν) as a real number explicitly assume r<∞r<\inftyr<∞; Theorem B does not. Integrals of bounded threshold functions use ordinary real expectation, while the nonnegative term WWW uses a nonnegative Lebesgue integral. The goal cannot be satisfied by a correlated joint law, a bounded-support special case, a vacuous assumption on ν\nuν, or a rounded constant.

The reusable work includes one-good posted-price revenue for arbitrary laws, a nonnegative-transfer reduction, a faithful single-mechanism revenue type, and probability identities for two independent coordinates. Theorem A, Theorem 7, Theorem 16, and a full formalization of the paper's other selling rules are outside this mission.

Selected references

  • Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, Journal of Economic Theory, 2017. Source used here: arXiv:1204.1846v3.
  • Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1), 1981. DOI:10.1287/moor.6.1.58.
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Algorithmic Game TheoryMechanism DesignProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items 6: With n Buyers and Dominant-Strategy Implementation, Selling Two Independent Goods Separately Earns at Least Half the Optimal RevenueResearch Paper

Motivation

A seller who owns several goods and faces buyers with private values must decide how to sell them. The revenue-maximizing mechanism is known in closed form only for one good: for a single buyer it is a posted price, and for several buyers it is Myerson's optimal auction (Myerson 1981). With two or more goods the optimal mechanism may use lotteries, may be impossible to describe compactly, and may behave non-monotonically in the value distribution. This makes simple mechanisms with provable revenue guarantees the practical question: how much of the optimal revenue does a seller lose by selling each good separately with its own optimal one-good mechanism?

Hart and Nisan (arXiv:1204.1846v3) answer this for one buyer and two independent goods (their Theorem A): selling separately earns at least half of the optimal revenue. Their Theorem 18 (p. 29), proved in Appendix A.7 as Theorems 33 and 34, extends the factor 12\tfrac1221​ to any number nnn of buyers. This mission formalizes the dominant-strategy half, Theorem 33, in which the buyers may be arbitrarily correlated with one another, as long as the two goods are independent.

Setting

One seller sells kkk goods to n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 buyers. Buyer jjj's value for good iii is a number xij≥0x^j_i \ge 0xij​≥0; a valuation profile is x=(xij)∈R+knx = (x^j_i) \in \mathbb R^{kn}_+x=(xij​)∈R+kn​, and xj=(xij)ix^j = (x^j_i)_ixj=(xij​)i​ is buyer jjj's valuation vector. The profile is random, XXX, with a commonly known joint law.

A mechanism μ=(qj,sj)j=1,…,n\mu = (q^j, s^j)_{j=1,\dots,n}μ=(qj,sj)j=1,…,n​ gives each buyer jjj an allocation qj(x)∈[0,1]kq^j(x) \in [0,1]^kqj(x)∈[0,1]k (the probability that jjj receives each good) and a payment sj(x)∈Rs^j(x) \in \mathbb Rsj(x)∈R, as functions of the reported profile, subject to feasibility: ∑jqij(x)≤1\sum_j q^j_i(x) \le 1∑j​qij​(x)≤1 for every good iii. Buyer jjj's payoff is bj(x)=qj(x)⋅xj−sj(x)b^j(x) = q^j(x)\cdot x^j - s^j(x)bj(x)=qj(x)⋅xj−sj(x), and the seller's revenue is S(x)=∑jsj(x)S(x) = \sum_j s^j(x)S(x)=∑j​sj(x).

  • IC-DS (dominant-strategy incentive compatibility): bj(x)≥qj(x~j,x−j)⋅xj−sj(x~j,x−j)b^j(x) \ge q^j(\tilde x^j, x^{-j})\cdot x^j - s^j(\tilde x^j, x^{-j})bj(x)≥qj(x~j,x−j)⋅xj−sj(x~j,x−j) for every buyer jjj, every profile xxx and every report x~j\tilde x^jx~j, where (x~j,x−j)(\tilde x^j, x^{-j})(x~j,x−j) replaces jjj's vector in xxx by x~j\tilde x^jx~j.
  • IR-DS: bj(x)≥0b^j(x) \ge 0bj(x)≥0 for every jjj and xxx.
  • NPT (no positive transfer): sj≥0s^j \ge 0sj≥0.

The expected revenue is R(μ;X)=E[S(X)]R(\mu; X) = \mathbb E[S(X)]R(μ;X)=E[S(X)], and

RevDS(X)=sup⁡{R(μ;X):μ feasible, IC-DS and IR-DS}∈[0,∞].\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X) = \sup\{R(\mu;X) : \mu \text{ feasible, IC-DS and IR-DS}\} \in [0, \infty].RevDS(X)=sup{R(μ;X):μ feasible, IC-DS and IR-DS}∈[0,∞].

For two goods write Y=X1=(X1j)jY = X_1 = (X^j_1)_jY=X1​=(X1j​)j​ and Z=X2=(X2j)jZ = X_2 = (X^j_2)_jZ=X2​=(X2j​)j​ for the vectors of the buyers' values for good 1 and good 2, so X=(Y,Z)X = (Y, Z)X=(Y,Z). RevDS(Y)\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(Y)RevDS(Y) is the optimal dominant-strategy revenue from good 1 alone, sold to the same nnn buyers. Finally a(1)=max⁡jaja^{(1)} = \max_j a^ja(1)=maxj​aj.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 33 (p. 49)

If YYY and ZZZ are independent, then

RevDS(X1)+RevDS(X2)≥12 RevDS(X1,X2).\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X_1) + \mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X_2) \ge \tfrac12\,\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X_1, X_2).RevDS(X1​)+RevDS(X2​)≥21​RevDS(X1​,X2​).

No independence among buyers is assumed: the values Xi1,…,XinX^1_i, \dots, X^n_iXi1​,…,Xin​ for the same good may have any joint law.

Milestones (the steps of the paper's proof)

  1. Remark (b) of A.7 (p. 48): an IC-DS, IR-DS mechanism is NPT iff sj(0,x−j)=0s^j(0, x^{-j}) = 0sj(0,x−j)=0 for all jjj, x−jx^{-j}x−j, and NPT is without loss of generality for RevDS\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}RevDS.
  2. Remark (b), subdomain property (p. 48): E[∑jsj(X)1X∈A]≤RevDS(X1X∈A)≤RevDS(X)\mathbb E[\sum_j s^j(X)\mathbf 1_{X\in A}] \le \mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X\mathbf 1_{X\in A}) \le \mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(X)E[∑j​sj(X)1X∈A​]≤RevDS(X1X∈A​)≤RevDS(X).
  3. Display (21) (p. 50): z(1) P[Y(1)≥z(1)]≤RevDS(Y)z^{(1)}\,\mathbb P[Y^{(1)} \ge z^{(1)}] \le \mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(Y)z(1)P[Y(1)≥z(1)]≤RevDS(Y).
  4. The marginal mechanism (p. 50): for fixed second-good values zzz, q^j(y)=q1j(y,z)\hat q^j(y) = q^j_1(y,z)q^​j(y)=q1j​(y,z), s^j(y)=sj(y,z)−q2j(y,z)zj\hat s^j(y) = s^j(y,z) - q^j_2(y,z)z^js^j(y)=sj(y,z)−q2j​(y,z)zj is feasible, IC-DS and IR-DS.
  5. Display (19) (p. 49): E[S(Y,Z)1Y(1)≥Z(1)]≤2 RevDS(Y)\mathbb E[S(Y,Z)\mathbf 1_{Y^{(1)} \ge Z^{(1)}}] \le 2\,\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}(Y)E[S(Y,Z)1Y(1)≥Z(1)​]≤2RevDS(Y) for an NPT, IC-DS, IR-DS mechanism.

Companion: Theorem 34 (p. 49)

With nnn independent buyers and two independent goods, so that all 2n2n2n values are independent (footnote 27), the same inequality holds for Bayesian Nash implementation: RevBN(X1)+RevBN(X2)≥12RevBN(X1,X2)\mathrm{Rev}^{BN}(X_1) + \mathrm{Rev}^{BN}(X_2) \ge \tfrac12\mathrm{Rev}^{BN}(X_1, X_2)RevBN(X1​)+RevBN(X2​)≥21​RevBN(X1​,X2​).

Significance

The result. Theorem 33 shows that the factor-12\tfrac1221​ guarantee of separate selling does not depend on there being a single buyer, nor on the buyers being independent, provided incentive compatibility is required in dominant strategies. It reduces a two-good, nnn-buyer design problem, whose optimum is not characterized, to two one-good problems, each of which can be handled by known single-good auction theory. Remark (a) on p. 29 records that the dominant-strategy statement holds for correlated buyers, while Remark (b) there explains, via Crémer and McLean (1988), why the Bayesian Nash analogue cannot be extended to correlated buyers.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; to our knowledge no machine-checked version exists. A formal proof requires multi-agent mechanisms on R+kn\mathbb R^{kn}_+R+kn​, the Lebesgue integral of a possibly non-integrable revenue, conditioning on an independent coordinate of a product law, and the subdomain property of Remark (b). The definitions here (feasible multi-buyer mechanisms, IC-DS, IR-DS, RevDS\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}RevDS, and the Bayesian Nash counterparts) are reusable for any multi-buyer revenue-maximization result.

Difficulty

The obvious first idea is to apply the one-buyer Theorem A buyer by buyer. It fails: the feasibility constraint ∑jqij≤1\sum_j q^j_i \le 1∑j​qij​≤1 couples the buyers, so a multi-buyer mechanism does not decompose into single-buyer mechanisms, and the revenue extracted from one buyer depends on the reports of all the others. Any reduction to one-good problems must produce, from a two-good mechanism, one-good mechanisms that remain feasible and dominant-strategy incentive compatible for every buyer at once. On the measure-theoretic side, payments of an incentive compatible mechanism may be negative and non-integrable, so expectations must be handled in the extended reals, and the passage from bounds that hold for each fixed value of one good to a bound in expectation needs the product structure of the law of (Y,Z)(Y, Z)(Y,Z).

Formalization scope

  • A profile is x : Fin n → ι → ℝ≥0 (x j i =xij= x^j_i=xij​); a random profile is given by its law, a probability measure on that space. One good is ι = Unit, two goods are ι = Fin 2 (good 1 is index 0). The law of two independent goods is twoGoodsN μY μZ, the image of the product law μY⊗μZ\mu_Y\otimes\mu_ZμY​⊗μZ​; μY and μZ are arbitrary probability laws on R+n\mathbb R^n_+R+n​, so correlation among buyers is allowed.
  • (x~j,x−j)(\tilde x^j, x^{-j})(x~j,x−j) is Function.update x j x'. Feasibility ∑jqij≤1\sum_j q^j_i \le 1∑j​qij​≤1 is part of admissibility; without it a mechanism could sell each good to every buyer.
  • Payments are required measurable (the paper's footnote 12). R(μ;X)R(\mu;X)R(μ;X) is the EReal difference of the integrals of S+S^+S+ and S−S^-S−, never a Bochner integral, which would vanish on non-integrable revenues. RevDS\mathrm{Rev}^{DS}RevDS takes values in [0,∞][0,\infty][0,∞].
  • The subdomain property requires the set AAA to be measurable, so that the law of X1X∈AX\mathbf 1_{X\in A}X1X∈A​ is defined. It also requires the signed expectation on AAA to be defined: at least one of its positive and negative part integrals must be finite. The hypothesis n≥1n \ge 1n≥1 is the paper's.
  • For Theorem 34, buyers are independent with laws ρj\rho_jρj​; interim payoffs integrate over the others' product law, and allocations as well as payments are required measurable.
  • The constant 12\tfrac1221​ is stated exactly as printed. A statement over an arbitrary joint law with given marginals, or with the feasibility constraint dropped, would be a different (and false, or trivial) theorem.

Contributions of every kind are welcome: proofs of the milestones, of Theorem 34, and general lemmas on multi-buyer mechanisms.

Selected references

  • S. Hart and N. Nisan, Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items, arXiv:1204.1846v3, 2017; J. Economic Theory 172 (2017). https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.1846
  • R. B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1981), 58–73. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58
  • J. Crémer and R. P. McLean, Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988), 1247–1257. https://doi.org/10.2307/1913096
  • S. Hart and P. J. Reny, Maximal Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations, Theoretical Economics 10 (2015), 893–922. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1517
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games 2: Generalized Weighted Shapley Value Rules Yield Generalized Weighted Potential GamesResearch Paper

Motivation

In a welfare sharing game, several players choose resources and receive shares of each resource's welfare. A rule for splitting welfare is useful only if the resulting players' incentives admit stable choices. The paper by Gopalakrishnan, Marden, and Wierman characterizes the distribution rules that guarantee a pure Nash equilibrium for every game formed from a specified class of local welfare functions. Its Appendix C supplies a complementary structural result: generalized weighted Shapley rules give the game a vector-valued potential. That structure provides a way to analyze equilibrium existence and dynamics without enumerating all possible unilateral deviations individually.

The scalar weighted-potential case was known for weighted Shapley values in the work of Hart and Mas-Colell, as Appendix C recounts. The 2014 paper extends the setting to an ordered system of priority blocks. A single scalar component cannot generally express the priority structure, so Appendix C uses a finite vector whose components are compared in order. This mission isolates that explicit potential theorem from the paper's separate characterization theorem.

Setting

Let N={1,…,n}N=\{1,\ldots,n\}N={1,…,n} be the players and R={r1,…,rm}R=\{r_1,\ldots,r_m\}R={r1​,…,rm​} the resources, with n,m>1n,m>1n,m>1. Player iii chooses an action ai∈Ai⊆2Ra_i\in\mathcal A_i\subseteq 2^Rai​∈Ai​⊆2R, possibly containing several resources. For a profile aaa, let {a}r={i∈N:r∈ai}\{a\}_r=\{i\in N:r\in a_i\}{a}r​={i∈N:r∈ai​} be the users of resource rrr. Each resource has a local welfare function Wr:2N→RW_r:2^N\to\mathbb RWr​:2N→R and a distribution rule fr(i,S)f^r(i,S)fr(i,S), giving player iii's share when the resource is used by coalition SSS. The game's utilities are separable:

Ui(a)=∑r∈aifr(i,{a}r).U_i(a)=\sum_{r\in a_i}f^r(i,\{a\}_r).Ui​(a)=r∈ai​∑​fr(i,{a}r​).

A weight system ω=(λ,Σ)\omega=(\lambda,\Sigma)ω=(λ,Σ) specifies positive weights λi\lambda_iλi​ and an ordered partition Σ=(S1,…,SK)\Sigma=(S_1,\ldots,S_K)Σ=(S1​,…,SK​) of the players. For a nonempty coalition TTT, let Tˉ\bar TTˉ be its members in the earliest block meeting TTT. The Möbius coefficient of a welfare function is

qTW=∑B⊆T(−1)∣T∣−∣B∣W(B).q_T^W=\sum_{B\subseteq T}(-1)^{|T|-|B|}W(B).qTW​=B⊆T∑​(−1)∣T∣−∣B∣W(B).

The generalized weighted Shapley value distributes the contribution of TTT among players in Tˉ\bar TTˉ in proportion to their weights. The generalized weighted marginal contribution rule instead evaluates the difference in a welfare function when a player is removed from the part of a coalition in that player's block and later blocks. These are the two formulas in Tables 1–2 of the source paper. The ground welfare functions used by the two rules, Wr′W'_rWr′​ and Wr′′W''_rWr′′​, may differ. Their coefficients are related by (12): qTWr′=(∑j∈Tˉλj)qTWr′′q_T^{W'_r}=(\sum_{j\in\bar T}\lambda_j)q_T^{W''_r}qTWr′​​=(∑j∈Tˉ​λj​)qTWr′′​​ for every nonempty TTT.

A generalized weighted potential is a vector Φ(a)∈RK\Phi(a)\in\mathbb R^KΦ(a)∈RK with a fixed component assigned to each player. For any unilateral change by that player, all earlier components stay equal, and the player's utility change equals a positive multiple of the change in the assigned component. This is the precise potential identity used in this mission.

Formalization targets

The local target is equation (83): local resource potentials whose changes agree with each player's utility share combine into a game-level potential. The coefficient target is the equality between the Table 1 marginal-contribution rule and its Table 2 Möbius-basis expansion. The closed-form target identifies exactly which vector component each player can change.

The goal is Theorem 3, using its closed form (85). Write Sˉb=S∖⋃ℓ<bSℓ\bar S_b=S\setminus\bigcup_{\ell<b}S_\ellSˉb​=S∖⋃ℓ<b​Sℓ​. If each frf^rfr is simultaneously the generalized weighted Shapley rule for Wr′W'_rWr′​ and the generalized weighted marginal contribution rule for Wr′′W''_rWr′′​, with their coefficients related by (12), then

Φ(a)=∑r∈Rϕr({a}r),(ϕr(S))k=Wr′′(SˉK−k+1)(1≤k≤K)\Phi(a)=\sum_{r\in R}\phi_r(\{a\}_r),\qquad (\phi_r(S))_k=W''_r(\bar S_{K-k+1})\quad(1\le k\le K)Φ(a)=r∈R∑​ϕr​({a}r​),(ϕr​(S))k​=Wr′′​(SˉK−k+1​)(1≤k≤K)

is a generalized weighted potential with player weights λ\lambdaλ. The goal specifies this potential itself, rather than merely asserting that some potential exists.

Significance

The theorem gives an explicit structural certificate for all games built from these sharing rules. A maximum of a vector potential in lexicographic order is stable against improving deviations, so the identity supports the equilibrium guarantee in the main characterization result. Its formula also gives a concrete object for studying changes in allocations or comparing priority systems; these are uses of the result, not additional claims of this mission. The closed form is particularly useful because each component is an evaluation of a ground welfare function on a specified suffix of the priority partition, as the paper explains on p. 11.

The mathematical result was proved in 2014. The remaining formalization work is to construct a machine-checked proof of the exact vector identity, including the coalition basis calculation and the passage from local resource changes to whole-game utility changes. The local platform index contains related scalar and ordinal potential theorems, but no declaration with this paper's priority-block model and closed-form vector potential.

Difficulty

The obvious scalar-potential analogy does not by itself track ordered priority classes. Adding a player in one class can leave some vector components unchanged while affecting a later component. The proof obligation therefore includes the exact component order and a player-specific change identity, uniformly over coalitions and actions. A second difficulty is reconciling two descriptions of the same distribution rule: Table 1 uses a welfare difference, while Table 2 expands welfare in Möbius coefficients over coalitions. The equality must hold even when the welfare at the empty coalition is arbitrary.

There is also a printed inconsistency. Definition 1 and (83) call the assigned component the “first nonzero” component, but the proof only establishes that earlier components are unchanged. The assigned component can also be unchanged on a particular deviation, while a later one changes. Formula (84) disagrees with the closed form (85) in a two-block example. The mission follows the fixed per-player component supported by the proof and states (85); the precise counterexample is in the moderation notes.

Formalization scope

Players and resources are represented by Fin n and Fin m, coalitions and actions by Finset, and real-valued welfare and utility functions by functions into R\mathbb RR. The standing model has n,m>1n,m>1n,m>1 and strictly positive player weights. The potential predicate requires K>0K>0K>0, matching Definition 1's positive vector dimension. The ordered partition is a map from players into KKK blocks; empty blocks are allowed, and Fin K provides zero-based indices. A vector component is indexed in reverse block order, so component 1 sees only the final block and component KKK sees the whole coalition. For a nonempty TTT, Tˉ\bar TTˉ is its earliest occupied block; its empty-case value is empty and is never used in (12).

Rules are compared only for players belonging to the coalition in which they are evaluated. The named Shapley and marginal rules return zero off that coalition; arbitrary input rules may have other unused values there. No budget-balance or W(∅)=0W(\varnothing)=0W(∅)=0 hypothesis is added; the empty-coalition value cancels in marginal differences. Action sets may be empty because this mission proves a potential identity for feasible deviations, without asserting that a feasible profile or equilibrium exists. The formalization does not replace the goal by a vacuous existence claim: it fixes the potential to the explicit closed form (85) and requires the full change identity at every feasible unilateral deviation.

The development needs finite-set sums, powersets, ordered finite indices, real arithmetic, and the paper-specific welfare rules. The local-to-global separability statement and finite coalition-basis calculation can be reused in related sharing games. Contributions proving the stated milestones, or strengthening the result under correctly stated extra assumptions, are in scope.

Selected references

  • R. Gopalakrishnan, J. R. Marden, and A. Wierman, Potential Games are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games, arXiv:1402.3610v1, 2014; published in Mathematics of Operations Research 39(4), 2014. Preprint; DOI.
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems II: Uniformly Fast Convergent Strategies Draw Every Suboptimal Arm at Least ln T / K_inf Times AsymptoticallyResearch Paper

Why this lower bound matters

In a stochastic multi-armed bandit, a player repeatedly chooses one of finitely many arms and sees only the reward from the chosen arm. To earn a high reward, the player must favor arms that appear best. Yet an arm that currently appears inferior might be best under another plausible reward law. That uncertainty forces any strategy with uniformly strong long-run performance to keep testing apparently inferior arms. The asymptotic number of tests is a basic benchmark for comparing bandit algorithms: an algorithm that matches the bound uses no more exploration than the information in the model demands. Garivier, Ménard, and Stoltz restate this general benchmark as Theorem 1 and derive it within their analysis of the shape of regret Garivier–Ménard–Stoltz, §2.2.

The quantity controlling the benchmark comes from Burnetas and Katehakis. It measures the least information needed to replace one suboptimal arm by a plausible arm that is strictly better than the current best. The paper cites their quantity on page 4, and its Theorem 1 applies it to every suboptimal arm separately Garivier–Ménard–Stoltz, pp. 4, 9. This per-arm form matters when different arms have different reward laws and different amounts of information are needed to rule them out.

Bandit setting and notation

A bandit problem ν‾=(νa)a=1K\underline\nu=(\nu_a)_{a=1}^Kν​=(νa​)a=1K​ has KKK arms. Each νa\nu_aνa​ is a probability distribution on real rewards with a finite expectation μa=EνaX\mu_a=\mathbb E_{\nu_a}Xμa​=Eνa​​X. A strategy ψ\psiψ chooses an arm at each round using the preceding chosen arms and observed rewards, and it may randomize. Let Nψ,a(T)N_{\psi,a}(T)Nψ,a​(T) be the number of times arm aaa is chosen in the first TTT rounds. The optimal mean is μ⋆=max⁡aμa\mu^\star=\max_a\mu_aμ⋆=maxa​μa​, and the gap of arm aaa is Δa=μ⋆−μa\Delta_a=\mu^\star-\mu_aΔa​=μ⋆−μa​. An arm is suboptimal when Δa>0\Delta_a>0Δa​>0. These are the objects of §1.1 of the paper Garivier–Ménard–Stoltz, pp. 2–3.

A model D\mathcal DD is a collection of possible real-valued reward distributions, each with a finite expectation. A bandit problem belongs to D\mathcal DD when every one of its arm laws does. The Kullback–Leibler divergence KL(P,Q)\mathrm{KL}(P,Q)KL(P,Q) measures the information discrepancy from one reward law PPP to another QQQ; it may be infinite. For an arm law PPP and a real threshold xxx, define the minimal information cost

Kinf⁡(P,x,D)=inf⁡{KL(P,Q):Q∈D, EQX>x}.\mathcal K_{\inf}(P,x,\mathcal D) =\inf\{\mathrm{KL}(P,Q):Q\in\mathcal D,\ \mathbb E_QX>x\}.Kinf​(P,x,D)=inf{KL(P,Q):Q∈D, EQ​X>x}.

The infimum is +∞+\infty+∞ if there is no qualifying alternative. The strict inequality in the set matters: the replacement law must make the arm better than the original optimal mean, not merely tied with it Garivier–Ménard–Stoltz, p. 4.

Definition 1 calls ψ\psiψ uniformly fast convergent on D\mathcal DD when, on every bandit problem in the model, the expected draw count of every suboptimal arm grows more slowly than TαT^\alphaTα for each 0<α≤10<\alpha\le10<α≤1:

Eν‾Nψ,a(T)=o(Tα).\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}N_{\psi,a}(T)=o(T^\alpha).Eν​​Nψ,a​(T)=o(Tα).

Here TTT tends to infinity through integer horizons. This condition is uniform in which problem and suboptimal arm are considered; it does not mean one numerical convergence rate is shared by all problems Garivier–Ménard–Stoltz, p. 9, Definition 1.

Formalization target

The goal is the paper's Theorem 1: for every model D\mathcal DD, every uniformly fast convergent strategy ψ\psiψ, every bandit problem ν‾\underline\nuν​ in the model, and every suboptimal arm aaa,

lim inf⁡T→∞Eν‾Nψ,a(T)ln⁡T≥1Kinf⁡(νa,μ⋆,D).\liminf_{T\to\infty} \frac{\mathbb E_{\underline\nu}N_{\psi,a}(T)}{\ln T} \ge\frac1{\mathcal K_{\inf}(\nu_a,\mu^\star,\mathcal D)}.T→∞liminf​lnTEν​​Nψ,a​(T)​≥Kinf​(νa​,μ⋆,D)1​.

The bound states the minimum logarithmic exploration of each arm. It leaves the model and strategy arbitrary within the stated class. The milestones follow four statements from the proof on page 9: the Bernoulli entropy estimate in (11), the one-arm divergence chain in (10), the eventual bound on draws of the alternative's other arms, and the bound for one alternative law before taking the infimum. Their source text is recorded beside the local drafts Garivier–Ménard–Stoltz, p. 9.

What the result gives

If Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ is finite and positive, the theorem gives a concrete coefficient of ln⁡T\ln TlnT that any uniformly fast convergent strategy must spend on arm aaa. A small information cost means that the arm is hard to distinguish from a better alternative and must be sampled more often. If the cost is infinite because the model contains no better replacement, the reciprocal is zero and the bound makes no positive demand. If the cost is zero, the reciprocal is infinite: the normalized expected draw count must diverge. The extended-value convention is part of the target, not a choice of a finite stand-in Garivier–Ménard–Stoltz, pp. 4, 9.

The theorem is proved in the paper, while the Lean statements in this proposal are proof targets. A completed development would supply a machine-checked bridge from the canonical stochastic-bandit policy model through Bernoulli relative entropy and change of measure to the per-arm asymptotic claim. Its model and divergence definitions can also support lower bounds for other bandit classes. The existing Prove2Me StochasticBandit, BanditPolicy, and ConsistentBanditPolicy definitions provide the bandit law, policy, draw count, means, and Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ used here; Definition 1's exact strategy class is supplied locally.

Difficulty

The central issue is the quantification over every alternative law in an arbitrary model. A suboptimal arm may become uniquely optimal after changing only its law, while the strategy must remain uniformly fast on that new problem. The information cost is an infimum over such changes, including an empty set or costs arbitrarily close to zero. A statement that reasons about just one convenient alternative does not yield the coefficient in Theorem 1. The proof also passes from finite-horizon information inequalities to a liminf as TTT grows, so endpoint values of Bernoulli divergence and the extended-value arithmetic must agree with the source Garivier–Ménard–Stoltz, pp. 6, 9.

Formalization scope

Lean indexes the paper's arms 1,…,K1,\ldots,K1,…,K by Fin K, starting at zero, and uses natural-number horizons. A strategy is a history-dependent Markov kernel, whose generated probability measure describes the sequence of chosen arms and rewards. The pull count is bounded by TTT, so its expectation is a genuine Bochner integral. The model explicitly requires probability laws with integrable identity; this ensures that each mean in Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ is genuine. Bernoulli relative entropy and arm-law KL take values in extended nonnegative reals. The goal's liminf is also in extended nonnegative reals, avoiding a default real liminf for an unbounded sequence. The first two horizons, where ln⁡T≤0\ln T\le0lnT≤0, cannot affect an asymptotic liminf.

The theorem sentence on page 9 says “all bandit problems” without restricting the original problem to D\mathcal DD. Its proof applies Definition 1 to that problem, so the proposal states that its arms belong to D\mathcal DD. Without this condition a strategy can behave arbitrarily outside the model. The source's other standing conventions are kept: every reward law has an expectation, the improvement condition in Kinf⁡\mathcal K_{\inf}Kinf​ is strict, and uniform fast convergence ranges over all model problems, all suboptimal arms, and all 0<α≤10<\alpha\le10<α≤1. These choices rule out an empty strategy class or a special hard-coded bandit as a trivial route to the target.

Useful contributions include the finite-horizon change-of-measure inequality, endpoint-correct Bernoulli KL estimates, identities for sums of expected pull counts, and asymptotic lemmas for reciprocal infima. The milestone drafts identify the paper statements those contributions must support.

Selected references

  • Aurélien Garivier, Pierre Ménard, and Gilles Stoltz, Explore First, Exploit Next: The True Shape of Regret in Bandit Problems, Mathematics of Operations Research, 2019; cited here from arXiv:1602.07182v3, §§1–2.
  • Apostolos N. Burnetas and Michael N. Katehakis, Optimal Adaptive Policies for Sequential Allocation Problems, Advances in Applied Mathematics, 1996. DOI:10.1006/aama.1996.0007.
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