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Operations Research

889 missions · 488 completed

The discipline of applying mathematical analysis to complex decision problems in operations: allocating scarce resources, scheduling, routing, inventory, and the design of service and production systems. Drawing on mathematical programming, stochastic modeling, queueing, simulation, and game-theoretic reasoning, it seeks policies that perform provably well in systems shaped by constraints, congestion, and uncertainty.

Missions

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🏆Completed
Experimental DesignProbabilityReinforcement Learning+1·Captain: Shuze Chen

Treatment Locality in A/B TestingResearch Paper

Modern A/B tests must infer lifetime treatment effects — e.g. customer lifetime value under a new feature — from short-horizon experiment data. Chen, Simchi-Levi and Wang (arXiv:2407.19618) model the experiment as a Markov decision process and exploit a structural fact of many practical interventions: the treatment is local, modifying the system at a single crucial state only. This mission formalizes the core asymptotic theory of the paper: for any differentiable estimator built from the experiment's transition and reward statistics, information sharing — pooling across test arms the samples collected away from the treated state — keeps the estimator asymptotically normal with the same asymptotic bias and never increases its asymptotic variance (Theorem 9), and is asymptotically efficient among unbiased estimators (Theorem 5). The route runs through a Markov chain central limit theorem with the asymptotic variance identified as the autocovariance series, and the linearization/delta method for functionals of chain statistics.

42 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Convex Optimization V: Newton's MethodTextbook

The classical convergence theory of smooth convex minimization. For a function that is mmm-strongly convex and MMM-smooth (mI⪯∇2f(x)⪯MImI \preceq \nabla^2 f(x) \preceq MImI⪯∇2f(x)⪯MI), gradient descent converges linearly, while Newton's method exhibits its famous two phases: a damped phase in which every backtracking step decreases the objective by a fixed amount γ\gammaγ, and a quadratically convergent phase in which the scaled gradient norm squares at each step, L2m2∥∇f(x+)∥2≤(L2m2∥∇f(x)∥2)2\tfrac{L}{2m^2}\lVert \nabla f(x^{+})\rVert_2 \le \bigl(\tfrac{L}{2m^2}\lVert \nabla f(x)\rVert_2\bigr)^22m2L​∥∇f(x+)∥2​≤(2m2L​∥∇f(x)∥2​)2. Together they give the iteration count of B&V (9.36),

#iterations  ≤  f(x(0))−p⋆γ  +  log⁡2log⁡2(ε0/ε),γ=αβη2mM2,ε0=2m3L2,\#\text{iterations} \;\le\; \frac{f(x^{(0)}) - p^{\star}}{\gamma} \;+\; \log_2\log_2(\varepsilon_0/\varepsilon), \qquad \gamma = \frac{\alpha\beta\eta^2 m}{M^2}, \quad \varepsilon_0 = \frac{2m^3}{L^2},#iterations≤γf(x(0))−p⋆​+log2​log2​(ε0​/ε),γ=M2αβη2m​,ε0​=L22m3​,

with LLL the Lipschitz constant of the Hessian and α,β\alpha,\betaα,β the backtracking parameters. This mission formalizes Chapters 9–10 of Boyd & Vandenberghe with every constant exactly as printed — a quantitative theory entirely absent from Mathlib.

12 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Convex Optimization II: KKT ConditionsTextbook

The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions are the central result of convex optimization: for a convex differentiable problem satisfying Slater's condition, a point is optimal exactly when primal feasibility, dual feasibility, complementary slackness and Lagrangian stationarity hold. This mission formalizes Chapters 4–5 of Boyd & Vandenberghe end to end — the first-order optimality criterion, concavity of the Lagrange dual, weak duality, Slater's strong-duality theorem with dual attainment (via the separating-hyperplane argument of §5.3.2), the saddle-point characterization, sensitivity bounds and Pareto scalarization — culminating in the full KKT characterization.

15 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Introduction to Linear Optimization XIII: Lagrangean Duality and Integer ProgrammingTextbook

Linear programming has a complete duality theory; integer programming does not — and the Lagrangean dual measures exactly how far duality reaches. This mission formalizes the duality theory of integer programming from Section 11.4 of Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis, built on the general linear programming duality of Section 4.10. For the integer program

ZIP=min⁡{c′x:Ax≥b, Dx≥d, x integer}Z_{IP} = \min\{c'x : Ax \ge b,\ Dx \ge d,\ x \text{ integer}\}ZIP​=min{c′x:Ax≥b, Dx≥d, x integer}

with integer data, the complicating constraints Ax≥bAx \ge bAx≥b are dualized with multipliers p≥0p \ge 0p≥0 over the tractable set X={x integer∣Dx≥d}X = \{x \text{ integer} \mid Dx \ge d\}X={x integer∣Dx≥d}: the dual function is

Z(p)=min⁡x∈X(c′x+p′(b−Ax))Z(p) = \min_{x \in X}\big(c'x + p'(b - Ax)\big)Z(p)=x∈Xmin​(c′x+p′(b−Ax))

and the Lagrangean dual is ZD=max⁡p≥0Z(p)Z_D = \max_{p \ge 0} Z(p)ZD​=maxp≥0​Z(p). Weak duality ZD≤ZIPZ_D \le Z_{IP}ZD​≤ZIP​ (Theorem 11.2) always holds, but strong duality can fail. The convex hull CH(X)CH(X)CH(X) of the integer points of a polyhedron with integer data is itself a polyhedron (Theorem 11.3, Meyer's theorem), and the capstone — Theorem 11.4, the central result of Section 11.4 — identifies the Lagrangean dual exactly: ZDZ_DZD​ equals the optimal cost of the linear program

min⁡{c′x:Ax≥b, x∈CH(X)}\min\{c'x : Ax \ge b,\ x \in CH(X)\}min{c′x:Ax≥b, x∈CH(X)}

. This is the geometric explanation of the strength of Lagrangean relaxation, yields the bound ordering ZLP≤ZD≤ZIPZ_{LP} \le Z_D \le Z_{IP}ZLP​≤ZD​≤ZIP​, and Corollary 11.1 characterizes exactly when the bounds collapse. The polyhedral engine is the general weak/strong duality pair (Theorems 4.17/4.18) over a primal min⁡c′x\min c'xminc′x s.t. Ax≥bAx \ge bAx≥b, x∈P={x∣Dx≥d}x \in P = \{x \mid Dx \ge d\}x∈P={x∣Dx≥d}, and the formulation-strength comparison Psub⊆PcutP_{sub} \subseteq P_{cut}Psub​⊆Pcut​ of Theorem 10.1 supplies the motivating principle that tighter relaxations of the same integer set give sharper bounds.

18 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Linear OptimizationOptimization·Captain: Shuze Chen

Introduction to Linear Optimization VII: Cones, Extreme Rays, and the Resolution TheoremTextbook

How can an unbounded polyhedron be described by finitely many geometric objects? Sections 4.8-4.9 of Bertsimas-Tsitsiklis build the cone machinery: recession cones {d∣Ad≥0}\{d \mid Ad \ge 0\}{d∣Ad≥0} and their rays, extreme rays (defined, like basic solutions, by n−1n-1n−1 linearly independent active constraints), the pointedness criterion (Theorem 4.12: 000 is an extreme point of a polyhedral cone iff the cone contains no line iff nnn of the constraint vectors are linearly independent), and the characterization of unbounded linear programs (Theorems 4.13-4.14: over a pointed polyhedral cone, and then over any polyhedron with an extreme point, the optimal cost is −∞-\infty−∞ iff some extreme ray ddd has c′d<0c'd < 0c′d<0). The capstone is the resolution theorem (Theorem 4.15): a nonempty polyhedron PPP with at least one extreme point equals Q={∑iλixi+∑jθjwj∣λi≥0,θj≥0,∑iλi=1}Q = \{\sum_i \lambda_i x^i + \sum_j \theta_j w^j \mid \lambda_i \ge 0, \theta_j \ge 0, \sum_i \lambda_i = 1\}Q={∑i​λi​xi+∑j​θj​wj∣λi​≥0,θj​≥0,∑i​λi​=1} — the convex hull of its extreme points plus the cone generated by a complete set of its extreme rays. It specializes to Theorem 2.9 / Corollary 4.4 (a nonempty bounded polyhedron is the convex hull of its extreme points) and Corollary 4.5 (a pointed polyhedral cone is generated by its extreme rays). The converse, Theorem 4.16, states that every finitely generated set is a polyhedron — in particular the convex hull of finitely many vectors is a polyhedron. Together these form the Minkowski-Weyl equivalence of the two representations of polyhedra, verified absent from Mathlib and the genuine content of this mission.

21 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Machine LearningOptimizationStatistics·Captain: Shuze Chen

Matrix Completion has No Spurious Local MinimumResearch Paper

Matrix completion — recovering a low-rank matrix M=ZZ⊤M = ZZ^\topM=ZZ⊤ from a small random subset of its entries — powers recommender systems and collaborative filtering. In practice it is solved by running (stochastic) gradient descent on the non-convex objective

f(X)=min⁡X12∥PΩ(M−XX⊤)∥F2+λR(X)f(X)=\min_X\frac12\|P_\Omega(M-XX^\top)\|_F^2+\lambda R(X)f(X)=Xmin​21​∥PΩ​(M−XX⊤)∥F2​+λR(X)

where Ω={(i,j)∣Mi,j is observed}\Omega=\{(i,j)|M_{i,j} \text{ is observed}\}Ω={(i,j)∣Mi,j​ is observed} and R(X)R(X)R(X) is a certain regularizer. from a random starting point, and it just works.

Ge, Lee and Ma (NeurIPS 2016 Best student paper award) explained why: the regularized objective has no spurious local minima — every local minimum is global and exactly recovers MMM. This mission formalizes that landmark theorem in Lean 4, in its strongest known form and along its simplest known proof: the unified landscape analysis of Ge–Jin–Zheng (ICML 2017) and an improved sampling bound in Chen–Li (JMLR 2019). Conditional on an explicit good-sample predicate (which holds with high probability under Bernoulli sampling), every local minimum XXX of fff satisfies XX⊤=ZZ⊤XX^\top = ZZ^\topXX⊤=ZZ⊤.

14 thms4 active users
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Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: Shuze Chen

Bandit Algorithms XV: Partial MonitoringTextbook

Bandit feedback is only one point on a spectrum: a learner might see more than its own loss (full information) or less (a spam filter never learns what happened to mail it deleted). Chapter 37 of Lattimore–Szepesvári studies finite adversarial games G=(L,Φ)G = (\mathcal{L}, \Phi)G=(L,Φ) where the loss matrix and the feedback matrix are decoupled. The goal theorem is the celebrated classification theorem: every finite partial-monitoring game has minimax regret exactly 000, Θ(n)\Theta(\sqrt{n})Θ(n​), Θ(n2/3)\Theta(n^{2/3})Θ(n2/3) or Ω(n)\Omega(n)Ω(n) — determined by two purely combinatorial conditions, global and local observability, on the game's neighbourhood structure. A single geometric dichotomy thus governs the price of information in every online decision problem with finite actions and feedback.

16 thms4 active users
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: Shuze Chen

Bandit Algorithms X: Stochastic Linear Bandits and LinUCBTextbook

When actions are feature vectors and the mean reward is linear — Xt=⟨θ∗,At⟩+ηtX_t = \langle \theta_*, A_t\rangle + \eta_tXt​=⟨θ∗​,At​⟩+ηt​ — a bandit can generalize across arms: pulling one arm reveals information about all of them. Chapter 19 of Lattimore–Szepesvári carries the optimism principle into this setting: LinUCB (a.k.a. OFUL) plays the action maximizing max⁡θ∈Ct⟨θ,a⟩\max_{\theta\in\mathcal{C}_t}\langle\theta, a\ranglemaxθ∈Ct​​⟨θ,a⟩ over the confidence ellipsoid Ct\mathcal{C}_tCt​ of Mission IX. The goal theorem: with probability 1−δ1-\delta1−δ, R^n≤8nβnlog⁡det⁡Vndet⁡V0≤8dnβnlog⁡dλ+nL2dλ\hat R_n \le \sqrt{8n\beta_n \log\frac{\det V_n}{\det V_0}} \le \sqrt{8dn\beta_n\log\frac{d\lambda + nL^2}{d\lambda}}R^n​≤8nβn​logdetV0​detVn​​​≤8dnβn​logdλdλ+nL2​​ — regret O~(dn)\tilde O(d\sqrt{n})O~(dn​) independent of the number of actions. The combinatorial engine is the elliptical potential lemma, bounding how many times adaptively chosen directions can be surprising. Chapter 22's phased elimination with G-optimal design (Mission IX) sharpens this to O~(dnlog⁡k)\tilde O(\sqrt{dn\log k})O~(dnlogk​) for finite action sets.

7 thms4 active usersReviewed
🏆Completed
Bandit AlgorithmsMachine Learning·Captain: Shuze Chen

Bandit Algorithms IX: Self-Normalized Concentration and Optimal DesignTextbook

Least-squares estimation from adaptively collected data is the statistical heart of linear bandits: the actions AtA_tAt​ depend on past noise, so classical fixed-design theory does not apply. Chapter 20 of Lattimore–Szepesvári resolves this with the method of mixtures: the process Mt(x)=exp⁡(⟨x,St⟩−12∥x∥Vt(λ)2)M_t(x) = \exp(\langle x, S_t\rangle - \frac{1}{2}\|x\|^2_{V_t(\lambda)})Mt​(x)=exp(⟨x,St​⟩−21​∥x∥Vt​(λ)2​) is a supermartingale, and integrating over a Gaussian mixture yields the self-normalized bound — the goal theorem — P(∃t:∥St∥Vt(λ)−12≥2log⁡1δ+log⁡det⁡Vt(λ)λd)≤δ\mathbb{P}\big(\exists t : \|S_t\|^2_{V_t(\lambda)^{-1}} \ge 2\log\frac{1}{\delta} + \log\frac{\det V_t(\lambda)}{\lambda^d}\big) \le \deltaP(∃t:∥St​∥Vt​(λ)−12​≥2logδ1​+logλddetVt​(λ)​)≤δ, valid uniformly over all times. The resulting confidence ellipsoids for the regularized least-squares estimator (Abbasi-Yadkori et al.) calibrate every algorithm of Mission X. The mission also formalizes the Kiefer–Wolfowitz theorem of Chapter 21: G-optimal and D-optimal experimental designs coincide, with optimal value exactly ddd — the classical equivalence theorem of optimal design theory.

9 thms4 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationOptimization·Captain: mikedeng1

Convex Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity II: For t ≥ 2n² log(R/r) the Ellipsoid Method Satisfies f(x_t) − min f ≤ (2BR/r)·exp(−t/(2n²))Textbook

Motivation

The ellipsoid method is the cutting-plane algorithm that settled the polynomial-time solvability of linear programming and, more generally, of convex optimization over any set that comes with an efficient separation oracle. It was introduced for convex minimization by Shor and by Yudin and Nemirovski in the 1970s, and Khachiyan used it in 1979 to give the first polynomial-time algorithm for linear programming. Grötschel, Lovász and Schrijver later turned it into the general equivalence between separation and optimization that underlies much of combinatorial optimization.

This mission is the second of a series formalizing S. Bubeck, Convex Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity (Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 8(3–4), 2015; arXiv:1405.4980v2). Its goal is the convergence guarantee of the ellipsoid method, Theorem 2.4 (p. 250), together with the geometric lemma and the steps of the proof on which it rests.

Timeline:

  • 1976–1977: Yudin–Nemirovski and Shor introduce the method for convex minimization.
  • 1979: Khachiyan applies it to linear programming and obtains polynomial time.
  • 1981: Grötschel, Lovász and Schrijver derive the equivalence of separation and optimization.

Setting

Write Rn\mathbb R^nRn for the space of real nnn-vectors, with the dot product x⊤yx^\top yx⊤y. An ellipsoid is a set

E={x∈Rn:(x−c)⊤H−1(x−c)≤1},\mathcal E=\{x\in\mathbb R^n:(x-c)^\top H^{-1}(x-c)\le 1\},E={x∈Rn:(x−c)⊤H−1(x−c)≤1},

where c∈Rnc\in\mathbb R^nc∈Rn is its center and HHH is a symmetric positive definite matrix.

A convex body X⊂Rn\mathcal X\subset\mathbb R^nX⊂Rn is a compact convex set with non-empty interior. The objective fff is continuous and convex on X\mathcal XX with values in [−B,B][-B,B][−B,B], and r,R>0r,R>0r,R>0 are such that X\mathcal XX lies in the Euclidean ball E0\mathcal E_0E0​ of center c0c_0c0​ and radius RRR and contains some Euclidean ball of radius rrr. A subgradient of fff at x∈Xx\in\mathcal Xx∈X is a vector ggg with f(x)+g⊤(y−x)≤f(y)f(x)+g^\top(y-x)\le f(y)f(x)+g⊤(y−x)≤f(y) for all y∈Xy\in\mathcal Xy∈X.

The method starts from E0\mathcal E_0E0​, H0=R2InH_0=R^2\mathrm I_nH0​=R2In​. At step t≥0t\ge0t≥0 it asks for a vector wtw_twt​:

  • if ct∉Xc_t\notin\mathcal Xct​∈/X, a separating vector, with X⊂{x:(x−ct)⊤wt≤0}\mathcal X\subset\{x:(x-c_t)^\top w_t\le0\}X⊂{x:(x−ct​)⊤wt​≤0};
  • otherwise a subgradient of fff at ctc_tct​.

It then replaces Et\mathcal E_tEt​ by the ellipsoid Et+1\mathcal E_{t+1}Et+1​ given by

ct+1=ct−1n+1Htwtwt⊤Htwt,Ht+1=n2n2−1(Ht−2n+1Htwtwt⊤Htwt⊤Htwt).c_{t+1}=c_t-\frac1{n+1}\frac{H_tw_t}{\sqrt{w_t^\top H_tw_t}},\qquad H_{t+1}=\frac{n^2}{n^2-1}\Big(H_t-\frac2{n+1}\frac{H_tw_tw_t^\top H_t}{w_t^\top H_tw_t}\Big).ct+1​=ct​−n+11​wt⊤​Ht​wt​​Ht​wt​​,Ht+1​=n2−1n2​(Ht​−n+12​wt⊤​Ht​wt​Ht​wt​wt⊤​Ht​​).

After ttt iterations the output xtx_txt​ is the best of the queried centers that lie in X\mathcal XX.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2.4

For n≥2n\ge2n≥2 and every t≥2n2log⁡(R/r)t\ge 2n^2\log(R/r)t≥2n2log(R/r), t≥1t\ge1t≥1, some queried center lies in X\mathcal XX, and every output satisfies

f(xt)−min⁡x∈Xf(x)≤2BRrexp⁡(−t2n2).f(x_t)-\min_{x\in\mathcal X}f(x)\le\frac{2BR}{r}\exp\Big(-\frac{t}{2n^2}\Big).f(xt​)−x∈Xmin​f(x)≤r2BR​exp(−2n2t​).

Milestones

  1. The scalar inequality (1+1/n)2(1−1/n2)n−1≥exp⁡(1/n)(1+1/n)^2(1-1/n^2)^{n-1}\ge\exp(1/n)(1+1/n)2(1−1/n2)n−1≥exp(1/n) for n≥2n\ge2n≥2 (proof of Lemma 2.3, pp. 248–249).
  2. Lemma 2.3 (p. 247): for w≠0w\ne0w=0 the half-ellipsoid {x∈E0:w⊤(x−c0)≤0}\{x\in\mathcal E_0:w^\top(x-c_0)\le0\}{x∈E0​:w⊤(x−c0​)≤0} lies in an ellipsoid E\mathcal EE with
vol(E)≤exp⁡(−12n)vol(E0),\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal E)\le\exp\Big(-\frac1{2n}\Big)\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal E_0),vol(E)≤exp(−2n1​)vol(E0​),

and for n≥2n\ge2n≥2 the explicit ellipsoid (2.5)–(2.6) works. 3. The remark before Theorem 2.4 (p. 250): a point of X\mathcal XX can leave the current ellipsoid only at a step with ct∈Xc_t\in\mathcal Xct​∈X, and then its value exceeds f(ct)f(c_t)f(ct​). 4. Two steps reused from Theorem 2.1 (pp. 246–247): vol(Xε)=εnvol(X)\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal X_\varepsilon)=\varepsilon^n\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal X)vol(Xε​)=εnvol(X) for Xε=(1−ε)x∗+εX\mathcal X_\varepsilon=(1-\varepsilon)x^*+\varepsilon\mathcal XXε​=(1−ε)x∗+εX, and f≤f(x∗)+2εBf\le f(x^*)+2\varepsilon Bf≤f(x∗)+2εB on Xε\mathcal X_\varepsilonXε​.

Significance

Theorem 2.4 bounds the oracle complexity of the ellipsoid method: accuracy ε\varepsilonε needs O(n2log⁡(1/ε))O(n^2\log(1/\varepsilon))O(n2log(1/ε)) oracle calls. Each step costs O(n2)O(n^2)O(n2) arithmetic operations plus one oracle call. With the separation oracles of linear and semidefinite programs this gives polynomial overall complexity (p. 250). The rate depends on the instance only through log⁡(R/r)\log(R/r)log(R/r) and BBB, so the method needs no smoothness and no strong convexity. Lemma 2.3 is also the geometric step of the ellipsoid method for linear feasibility.

The result has a textbook proof. The work of this mission is to formalize it. The same update is published on the platform from Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis's Introduction to Linear Optimization (Theorem 8.1), with a proved volume factor of exp⁡(−1/(2(n+1)))\exp(-1/(2(n+1)))exp(−1/(2(n+1))). That factor is weaker than (2.4)'s exp⁡(−1/(2n))\exp(-1/(2n))exp(−1/(2n)) and does not give Theorem 2.4's constant. The sharper factor and the optimization version of the method (subgradient cuts, the output rule and the value bound) are not formalized on the platform.

Difficulty

There are two difficulties: Lemma 2.3 with the sharp constant, and the bookkeeping that turns per-step volume decrease into a value bound.

For the lemma, the volume of the explicit ellipsoid is (n/n2−1)n(n−1)/(n+1)\big(n/\sqrt{n^2-1}\big)^n\sqrt{(n-1)/(n+1)}(n/n2−1​)n(n−1)/(n+1)​ times that of E0\mathcal E_0E0​. Bounding it by exp⁡(−1/(2n))\exp(-1/(2n))exp(−1/(2n)) rather than by the cruder exp⁡(−1/(2(n+1)))\exp(-1/(2(n+1)))exp(−1/(2(n+1))) needs the scalar inequality of milestone 1 for every n≥2n\ge2n≥2. The reduction from a general ellipsoid to the unit ball also needs determinants under an affine map.

For the theorem, the obvious argument compares vol(Xε)\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal X_\varepsilon)vol(Xε​) with vol(Et)\mathrm{vol}(\mathcal E_t)vol(Et​). This only works if no cut removes an optimal point and if every removed point of X\mathcal XX is worse than a queried center. At the threshold t=2n2log⁡(R/r)t=2n^2\log(R/r)t=2n2log(R/r) the admissible ε\varepsilonε is exactly 111, so a non-strict volume bound alone does not close the argument there.

Formalization scope

  • Rn\mathbb R^nRn is Fin n → ℝ with Lebesgue measure, as in the reused Bertsimas–Tsitsiklis ellipsoid definitions (LinearOptimization.ellipsoid, ellipsoidUpdateCenter, ellipsoidUpdateMatrix, IsSubgradientOn).
  • Euclidean balls are written with the dot product, because Mathlib's norm on Fin n → ℝ is the sup norm.
  • The method is a run predicate, IsEllipsoidRun. Every theorem holds for every admissible oracle answer. The update is the published one with a=−wta=-w_ta=−wt​.
  • If an oracle answer is wt=0w_t=0wt​=0 (possible only at a minimizer ct∈Xc_t\in\mathcal Xct​∈X), the run stops. The page's update would divide by zero there.

Conventions and hypotheses added to the page:

  1. n≥2n\ge2n≥2, because the update (2.6) is defined only for n≥2n\ge2n≥2.
  2. A minimizer x∗x^*x∗ exists (the book's standing assumption, p. 242).
  3. The output ranges over the queried centers c0,…,ct−1c_0,\dots,c_{t-1}c0​,…,ct−1​. The page writes {c1,…,ct}\{c_1,\dots,c_t\}{c1​,…,ct​}, but ctc_tct​ has not been cut yet and c0c_0c0​ has.
  4. t≥1t\ge1t≥1, because at R=rR=rR=r and t=0t=0t=0 no center has been queried.

A run predicate whose separation branch does not require X⊂{x:(x−ct)⊤wt≤0}\mathcal X\subset\{x:(x-c_t)^\top w_t\le0\}X⊂{x:(x−ct​)⊤wt​≤0}, or that accepts wt=0w_t=0wt​=0 with an update, would make the statements false or vacuous. Both are excluded.

Lemma 2.3's volume factor is exp⁡(−1/(2n))\exp(-1/(2n))exp(−1/(2n)). The weaker published factor does not prove that milestone. The published theorem LinearOptimization.ellipsoid_update_halfspace_volume is included as a reference: it supplies the containment (2.3) and positive definiteness. Contributions are welcome on every milestone. A determinant formula for the volume of an ellipsoid would be reusable well beyond this mission.

Selected references

  • S. Bubeck, Convex Optimization: Algorithms and Complexity, Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 8(3–4):231–358, 2015. arXiv:1405.4980v2
  • N. Z. Shor, Cut-off method with space extension in convex programming problems, Cybernetics 13:94–96, 1977. doi:10.1007/BF01071394
  • D. B. Yudin and A. S. Nemirovski, Informational complexity and efficient methods for the solution of convex extremal problems, Matekon 13(2):22–45, 1976.
  • L. G. Khachiyan, A polynomial algorithm in linear programming, Soviet Mathematics Doklady 20:191–194, 1979.
  • M. Grötschel, L. Lovász and A. Schrijver, The ellipsoid method and its consequences in combinatorial optimization, Combinatorica 1:169–197, 1981. doi:10.1007/BF02579273
  • D. Bertsimas and J. N. Tsitsiklis, Introduction to Linear Optimization, Athena Scientific, 1997 (Theorem 8.1).
11 thms3 active usersReviewed
Convex OptimizationProbability·Captain: mikedeng1

Data-Driven Robust Optimization I: An Uncertainty Set Whose Support Function Dominates Value at Risk Implies a Probabilistic Guarantee for Every Concave ConstraintResearch Paper

Motivation

Robust optimization replaces an uncertain constraint f(u~,x)≤0f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x)\le 0f(u~,x)≤0, whose parameter u~∈Rd\tilde{\mathbf u}\in\mathbb R^du~∈Rd is random, by the requirement that the constraint hold for every u\mathbf uu in a chosen uncertainty set U\mathcal UU:

f(u,x)≤0∀ u∈U.f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x)\le 0\qquad\forall\,\mathbf u\in\mathcal U .f(u,x)≤0∀u∈U.

The resulting problem is deterministic and, for many shapes of U\mathcal UU, tractable (Ben-Tal, El Ghaoui and Nemirovski, Robust Optimization, 2009). The modelling question it leaves open is how to choose U\mathcal UU. A set that is too large makes every solution conservative; a set that is too small gives no protection. The practitioner's real requirement is usually probabilistic: a robust feasible x\mathbf xx should violate the uncertain constraint with probability at most ϵ\epsilonϵ.

Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus (Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; Math. Program. 167, 2018) build uncertainty sets directly from data so that this requirement holds with high confidence. Their whole construction rests on one characterization, Theorem 1 of the paper, of when a set carries such a guarantee. This mission formalizes that characterization and the two results (Theorems 2 and 3) that turn it into a data-driven recipe.

Earlier work used the "if" direction of the characterization for bi-affine constraints when designing sets for specific distributional assumptions (Ben-Tal et al., 2009; Chen, Sim and Sun, Oper. Res. 55, 2007). The extension to every constraint concave in u\mathbf uu is due to Bertsimas, Gupta and Kallus.

Setting

Let P\mathbb PP be a probability measure on Rd\mathbb R^dRd, the law of u~\tilde{\mathbf u}u~, and fix a level 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1. Throughout, f(u,x)f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x)f(u,x) is concave in u\mathbf uu for every value of the decision variable x∈Rk\mathbf x\in\mathbb R^kx∈Rk.

The support function of a set U⊆Rd\mathcal U\subseteq\mathbb R^dU⊆Rd is

δ∗(v∣U)=sup⁡u∈UvTu,v∈Rd.\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)=\sup_{\mathbf u\in\mathcal U}\mathbf v^T\mathbf u,\qquad\mathbf v\in\mathbb R^d .δ∗(v∣U)=u∈Usup​vTu,v∈Rd.

The Value at Risk of the linear loss u~Tv\tilde{\mathbf u}^T\mathbf vu~Tv at level ϵ\epsilonϵ is

VaRϵP(v)=inf⁡{t: P(u~Tv≤t)≥1−ϵ}.\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)=\inf\{t:\ \mathbb P(\tilde{\mathbf u}^T\mathbf v\le t)\ge 1-\epsilon\}.VaRϵP​(v)=inf{t: P(u~Tv≤t)≥1−ϵ}.

A set U\mathcal UU implies a probabilistic guarantee at level ϵ\epsilonϵ for P\mathbb PP (property (P2) of the paper) if for every kkk, every f(u,x)f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x)f(u,x) concave in u\mathbf uu for each x∈Rk\mathbf x\in\mathbb R^kx∈Rk, and every x∗∈Rk\mathbf x^*\in\mathbb R^kx∗∈Rk,

f(u,x∗)≤0  ∀u∈U⟹P(f(u~,x∗)≤0)≥1−ϵ.(2)f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x^*)\le0\ \ \forall\mathbf u\in\mathcal U\quad\Longrightarrow\quad\mathbb P\big(f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x^*)\le0\big)\ge1-\epsilon. \tag{2}f(u,x∗)≤0  ∀u∈U⟹P(f(u~,x∗)≤0)≥1−ϵ.(2)

A function is bi-affine if it has the form f(u,x)=uTFx+fuTu+fxTx+f0f(\mathbf u,\mathbf x)=\mathbf u^TF\mathbf x+\mathbf f_u^T\mathbf u+\mathbf f_x^T\mathbf x+f_0f(u,x)=uTFx+fuT​u+fxT​x+f0​.

In the data-driven setting, P∗\mathbb P^*P∗ is unknown and a sample S=(u^1,…,u^N)\mathcal S=(\hat{\mathbf u}^1,\dots,\hat{\mathbf u}^N)S=(u^1,…,u^N) is drawn i.i.d. from it. The paper's schema fixes 0<α<10<\alpha<10<α<1, takes the confidence region P(S)\mathcal P(\mathcal S)P(S) of a hypothesis test at level α\alphaα, and builds a closed convex set U(S)\mathcal U(\mathcal S)U(S) whose support function bounds VaRϵP(v)\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)VaRϵP​(v) for every P∈P(S)\mathbb P\in\mathcal P(\mathcal S)P∈P(S) and every v\mathbf vv.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

(a) If U\mathcal UU is nonempty, convex and compact and

δ∗(v∣U)≥VaRϵP(v)∀ v∈Rd,\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)\ge\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)\qquad\forall\,\mathbf v\in\mathbb R^d,δ∗(v∣U)≥VaRϵP​(v)∀v∈Rd,

then U\mathcal UU implies a probabilistic guarantee at level ϵ\epsilonϵ for P\mathbb PP.

(b) If U\mathcal UU is nonempty and δ∗(v∣U)<VaRϵP(v)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)<\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v)δ∗(v∣U)<VaRϵP​(v) for some v\mathbf vv at which δ∗(v∣U)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)δ∗(v∣U) is finite, then some bi-affine fff violates (2).

Milestones toward the goal

The proof in the electronic companion (EC.1.1) is a short chain, and its steps are the milestones: the attainment property of VaR, P(u~Tv>VaRϵP(v))≤ϵ\mathbb P(\tilde{\mathbf u}^T\mathbf v>\mathrm{VaR}^{\mathbb P}_\epsilon(\mathbf v))\le\epsilonP(u~Tv>VaRϵP​(v))≤ϵ (already proved on the platform); a strict separating hyperplane between U\mathcal UU and the superlevel set {f(⋅,x∗)≥t}\{f(\cdot,\mathbf x^*)\ge t\}{f(⋅,x∗)≥t}; the bound P(f(u~,x∗)≥t)≤ϵ\mathbb P(f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x^*)\ge t)\le\epsilonP(f(u~,x∗)≥t)≤ϵ for t>0t>0t>0; its limit P(f(u~,x∗)>0)≤ϵ\mathbb P(f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x^*)>0)\le\epsilonP(f(u~,x∗)>0)≤ϵ; and, for part (b), the witness f(u,x)=vTu−xf(\mathbf u,x)=\mathbf v^T\mathbf u-xf(u,x)=vTu−x at x∗=δ∗(v∣U)x^*=\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)x∗=δ∗(v∣U).

Companions: Theorems 2 and 3

Theorem 2: with probability at least 1−α1-\alpha1−α over the sample, U(S)\mathcal U(\mathcal S)U(S) implies a probabilistic guarantee at level ϵ\epsilonϵ for P∗\mathbb P^*P∗. Theorem 3: if the region does not depend on ϵ\epsilonϵ, then with probability at least 1−α1-\alpha1−α the whole family {U(S,ϵ):0<ϵ<1}\{\mathcal U(\mathcal S,\epsilon):0<\epsilon<1\}{U(S,ϵ):0<ϵ<1} implies the guarantee simultaneously (a), and every x\mathbf xx satisfying the level-optimized constraints (9) satisfies the joint chance constraint

P∗(max⁡j=1,…,mfj(u~,x)≤0)≥1−ϵˉ(7)\mathbb P^*\Big(\max_{j=1,\dots,m}f_j(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x)\le0\Big)\ge1-\bar\epsilon \tag{7}P∗(j=1,…,mmax​fj​(u~,x)≤0)≥1−ϵˉ(7)

(b).

Significance

Theorem 1(a) is what certifies every uncertainty set in the paper: the χ2\chi^2χ2 and GGG sets for discrete distributions, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov and forward–backward sets for independent marginals, the marginal-sample box and the moment sets. Each construction reduces to proving one inequality between a support function and a Value at Risk, which is a statement about a single linear functional, and Theorem 1(a) lifts it to every concave constraint at once. Part (b) shows the condition cannot be dropped even for bi-affine constraints. Theorems 2 and 3 separate the statistical input (coverage of a confidence region) from the convex-analytic input (the support-function bound), and Theorem 3(b) is what allows the levels ϵj\epsilon_jϵj​ of a system of constraints to be optimized after seeing the data.

The results are proved in the paper. None of them has a machine-checked proof; the only formalized ingredient is the attainment property of VaR, which is on the platform as a proved theorem. The formalization provides a checked bridge from support-function bounds to probabilistic guarantees that the other missions of this series (II–VI) use to state their own results in the criterion form VaR≤δ∗\mathrm{VaR}\le\delta^*VaR≤δ∗.

Difficulty

The informal argument is short; the difficulty is in the infinite-dimensional bookkeeping that the page leaves implicit. The superlevel set {f(⋅,x∗)≥t}\{f(\cdot,\mathbf x^*)\ge t\}{f(⋅,x∗)≥t} need not be bounded, so the strict separation must use compactness of U\mathcal UU alone. Closedness of this set and measurability of {f(u~,x∗)≤0}\{f(\tilde{\mathbf u},\mathbf x^*)\le0\}{f(u~,x∗)≤0} depend on concave functions on Rd\mathbb R^dRd being continuous. The passage t↓0t\downarrow0t↓0 is continuity of a measure along an increasing union. The attainment of the infimum in the definition of VaR requires right-continuity of distribution functions. A naive attempt to separate U\mathcal UU from the zero superlevel set {f≥0}\{f\ge0\}{f≥0} directly fails, because the two sets may touch.

Formalization scope

Rd\mathbb R^dRd is Fin d → ℝ; u~\tilde{\mathbf u}u~ is the identity map; vTu\mathbf v^T\mathbf uvTu is the dot product u ⬝ᵥ v. The Value at Risk is the published MultistageStochastic.valueAtRisk at level 1−ϵ1-\epsilon1−ϵ, and the support function is the published RobustMDP.Shared.supportFunction. Both are real-valued sInf/sSup, which return 000 on empty or unbounded sets, so every statement assumes 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<10<ϵ<1, a probability measure, and an uncertainty set that is nonempty and compact (Theorem 1(a), Theorems 2–3) or nonempty with {vTu:u∈U}\{\mathbf v^T\mathbf u:\mathbf u\in\mathcal U\}{vTu:u∈U} bounded above in the direction considered (Theorem 1(b)). In Theorem 1(b) and its witness this is the paper's own requirement that δ∗(v∣U)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)δ∗(v∣U) be finite, which its strict inequality with a real VaR forces and its proof uses by treating δ∗(v∣U)\delta^*(\mathbf v\mid\mathcal U)δ∗(v∣U) as a real number. Part (b) is printed with U∗\mathcal U^*U∗, a slip for U\mathcal UU; the proof's separation step prints both inequalities in the same direction, a slip corrected in the strict separation milestone.

Property (P2) quantifies over the dimension kkk of the decision variable, every function concave in u\mathbf uu for each x\mathbf xx, and every x∗\mathbf x^*x∗. Restricting it to affine fff or to k=0k=0k=0 would trivialize part (a) and falsify part (b), and is ruled out by the definition.

In Theorems 2 and 3 the sample is Fin N → (Fin d → ℝ) with the product law Measure.pi; the confidence region and the uncertainty set are arbitrary maps of the sample, and the coverage PS∗(P∗∈P(S))≥1−α\mathbb P^*_{\mathcal S}(\mathbb P^*\in\mathcal P(\mathcal S))\ge1-\alphaPS∗​(P∗∈P(S))≥1−α is a hypothesis, never the conclusion's event. Step 2 of the schema is stated with g=δ∗(⋅∣U(S))g=\delta^*(\cdot\mid\mathcal U(\mathcal S))g=δ∗(⋅∣U(S)) directly. The sets are assumed nonempty and compact (Step 3 says closed and convex; a finite support function that bounds VaR forces nonemptiness and boundedness). Theorem 3(b) reads the levels ϵj\epsilon_jϵj​ in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), where the family is defined. Probabilities of events in the sample space are outer measures, so no measurability hypotheses are needed.

A complete development needs strict separation of a compact convex set from a closed convex set (Mathlib's geometric_hahn_banach_compact_closed), continuity of concave functions on finite-dimensional spaces, and the attainment property of VaR. Contributions are welcome on all milestones; the separation and limit steps are reusable for any chance-constraint argument based on support functions.

Selected references

  • D. Bertsimas, V. Gupta, N. Kallus, Data-Driven Robust Optimization, arXiv:1401.0212v2, 2014; Mathematical Programming 167:235–292, 2018. https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.0212
  • A. Ben-Tal, L. El Ghaoui, A. Nemirovski, Robust Optimization, Princeton University Press, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831050
  • X. Chen, M. Sim, P. Sun, A Robust Optimization Perspective on Stochastic Programming, Operations Research 55(6):1058–1071, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0441
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Machine LearningStatistics·Captain: mikedeng1

The Big Data Newsvendor: Practical Insights from Machine Learning: The L2-Regularized Feature-Based Newsvendor Rule Generalizes with a Bound Free of the Number of FeaturesResearch Paper

Motivation

The newsvendor problem is the basic model of inventory under uncertain demand. A decision maker orders qqq units before demand DDD is observed, and pays a unit backordering cost bbb for each unit of unmet demand and a unit holding cost hhh for each unit left over. When the demand distribution is known, the optimal order is a quantile of it. In practice the distribution is unknown and the decision maker holds historical data, often including features: observable covariates such as the day of the week, the weather or a recent sales trend, recorded alongside each past demand.

Rudin and Vahn (MIT Sloan Working Paper 5036-13, version of February 6, 2014, from MIT DSpace; published as Ban and Rudin, Operations Research 67(1), 2019, doi:10.1287/opre.2018.1757) propose to learn the order quantity directly as a linear function of the features, by minimizing the empirical newsvendor cost over the training data, with or without a regularization penalty. Their question is the one any data-driven decision rule must answer: how much worse can the learned rule do on new data than it did on the data it was fitted to? When the number of features ppp is comparable to the sample size nnn ("big data"), a bound that grows with ppp says nothing, and the paper's Theorem 2 gives one for the regularized rule that does not depend on ppp.

This mission formalizes that bound, Theorem 2 of the working paper, together with the results its proof is assembled from. All page and result numbers refer to the 2014 working paper, not to the published article.

Setting

Cost. For an order qqq and a demand ddd, the newsvendor cost is

C(q;d)=b (d−q)++h (q−d)+,b,h>0.C(q;d)=b\,(d-q)^+ + h\,(q-d)^+ ,\qquad b,h>0 .C(q;d)=b(d−q)++h(q−d)+,b,h>0.

Write b∨h=max⁡(b,h)b\vee h=\max(b,h)b∨h=max(b,h).

Data. A data point is a pair z=(x,d)z=(x,d)z=(x,d) of a feature vector x∈Rpx\in\mathbb R^px∈Rp and a demand d∈Rd\in\mathbb Rd∈R. Features lie in a domain X\mathcal XX inside the ball ∥x∥22≤Xmax⁡2\|x\|_2^2\le X_{\max}^2∥x∥22​≤Xmax2​, and demands lie in D=[0,Dˉ]\mathcal D=[0,\bar D]D=[0,Dˉ]. A sample Sn={(xi,di)}i=1nS_n=\{(x_i,d_i)\}_{i=1}^nSn​={(xi​,di​)}i=1n​ consists of nnn independent draws from an unknown probability distribution μ\muμ concentrated on X×D\mathcal X\times\mathcal DX×D.

Rules and risks. A vector q∈Rpq\in\mathbb R^pq∈Rp defines the linear decision rule q(x)=q⊤xq(x)=q^\top xq(x)=q⊤x. Its true risk and empirical risk are

Rtrue(q)=E(x,d)∼μ[C(q⊤x;d)],R^(q;Sn)=1n∑i=1nC(q⊤xi;di).R_{true}(q)=\mathbb E_{(x,d)\sim\mu}\bigl[C(q^\top x;d)\bigr],\qquad \hat R(q;S_n)=\frac1n\sum_{i=1}^n C(q^\top x_i;d_i).Rtrue​(q)=E(x,d)∼μ​[C(q⊤x;d)],R^(q;Sn​)=n1​i=1∑n​C(q⊤xi​;di​).

The regularized algorithm (NV-reg). For a parameter λ>0\lambda>0λ>0, the rule q^=q^(Sn)\hat q=\hat q(S_n)q^​=q^​(Sn​) minimizes

R^(q;Sn)+λ∥q∥22over q∈Rp.\hat R(q;S_n)+\lambda\|q\|_2^2\qquad\text{over } q\in\mathbb R^p .R^(q;Sn​)+λ∥q∥22​over q∈Rp.

The objective is strictly convex, so the minimizer is unique. Following Appendix B of the paper, the rules the algorithm outputs on samples from X×D\mathcal X\times\mathcal DX×D are assumed to map X\mathcal XX into D\mathcal DD (the paper's Q⊂DX\mathcal Q\subset\mathcal D^{\mathcal X}Q⊂DX): the learned order quantity is never negative and never exceeds the demand cap.

Uniform stability. An algorithm is uniformly stable with parameter αn\alpha_nαn​ if removing one observation from any sample changes the loss of its output at any test point by at most αn\alpha_nαn​ (Bousquet and Elisseeff's Definition 6, the paper's Definition 1).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2 (p. 9)

For every δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1) and n≥1n\ge1n≥1, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ over SnS_nSn​,

∣Rtrue(q^)−R^(q^;Sn)∣≤(b∨h)2Xmax⁡2nλ+(2(b∨h)2Xmax⁡2λ+(b∨h)Dˉ)ln⁡(2/δ)2n.|R_{true}(\hat q)-\hat R(\hat q;S_n)|\le\frac{(b\vee h)^2X_{\max}^2}{n\lambda}+\Bigl(\frac{2(b\vee h)^2X_{\max}^2}{\lambda}+(b\vee h)\bar D\Bigr)\sqrt{\frac{\ln(2/\delta)}{2n}} .∣Rtrue​(q^​)−R^(q^​;Sn​)∣≤nλ(b∨h)2Xmax2​​+(λ2(b∨h)2Xmax2​​+(b∨h)Dˉ)2nln(2/δ)​​.

The dimension ppp appears nowhere in the bound.

Milestones, in the order of the proof (p. 32)

  1. Lemma 5 (p. 28). For q,d∈[0,Dˉ]q,d\in[0,\bar D]q,d∈[0,Dˉ], ∣C(q;d)∣≤(b∨h)Dˉ|C(q;d)|\le(b\vee h)\bar D∣C(q;d)∣≤(b∨h)Dˉ, and the bound is attained.
  2. Display (31) (p. 31). CCC is convex in its first argument and (b∨h)(b\vee h)(b∨h)-Lipschitz in it, i.e. (b∨h)(b\vee h)(b∨h)-admissible in the sense of Definition 2.
  3. Theorem 5 (p. 31), Bousquet and Elisseeff's Theorem 22: regularization in a reproducing kernel Hilbert space with a σ\sigmaσ-admissible loss and kernel bound κ2\kappa^2κ2 has uniform stability σ2κ2/(2λn)\sigma^2\kappa^2/(2\lambda n)σ2κ2/(2λn). This is an existing platform statement, referenced rather than restated.
  4. Theorem 4 (p. 30). (NV-reg) is uniformly stable with parameter αnr=(b∨h)2Xmax⁡2/(2nλ)\alpha_n^r=(b\vee h)^2X_{\max}^2/(2n\lambda)αnr​=(b∨h)2Xmax2​/(2nλ).
  5. Theorem 6 (p. 31). Any algorithm with uniform stability αn\alpha_nαn​ and loss in [0,M][0,M][0,M] satisfies, with probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ,
∣Rtrue(A,Sn)−R^(A,Sn)∣≤2αn+(4nαn+M)ln⁡(2/δ)2n.|R_{true}(A,S_n)-\hat R(A,S_n)|\le2\alpha_n+(4n\alpha_n+M)\sqrt{\frac{\ln(2/\delta)}{2n}} .∣Rtrue​(A,Sn​)−R^(A,Sn​)∣≤2αn​+(4nαn​+M)2nln(2/δ)​​.

Significance

The result. Theorem 2 bounds the generalization gap of the regularized feature-based newsvendor rule at rate O(1/n)O(1/\sqrt n)O(1/n​) with constants that depend on the costs, the demand cap, the feature radius and λ\lambdaλ, but not on the number of features. It gives a theoretical basis for regularizing when p/np/np/n is not small, and it indicates how to scale λ\lambdaλ with the feature radius. The companion bound for the unregularized rule (Theorem 1) grows linearly in ppp.

Formalizing it. The theorem is proved in the paper, but its proof is short and relies on cited results: Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 are stated with references to Bousquet and Elisseeff and no proof of their own, and the paper's Theorem 6 is a two-sided variant of Bousquet and Elisseeff's Theorem 12 that is only sketched. None of these results has a machine-checked proof. A formalization produces a checked two-sided stability-to-generalization theorem for general algorithms (reusable for any stable learner), a checked stability bound for a regularized piecewise-linear loss, and the newsvendor bound itself, with the constants the proof actually supports.

Difficulty

The bound is not a uniform-convergence argument: the class of linear rules on Rp\mathbb R^pRp has complexity growing with ppp, so any bound that holds simultaneously for all rules in the class depends on ppp. The bound must exploit the specific rule produced by the algorithm. The two analytic steps that carry this are the stability of the regularized minimizer, which needs a strong-convexity comparison between the full and the leave-one-out objective, and a concentration inequality of bounded-differences type for a function of the whole sample whose differences are controlled only through stability.

The leave-one-out comparison is a known pitfall. If the leave-one-out problem is run literally on n−1n-1n−1 points it carries the weight 1/(n−1)1/(n-1)1/(n−1), and the comparison argument then gives twice the constant of Theorem 4. The stated constant holds for the leave-one-out objective that keeps the weight 1/n1/n1/n, which is the form of Theorem 5.

Formalization scope

Representation. Features are EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p), rules are vectors acting by the inner product, and data points live in EuclideanSpace ℝ (Fin p) × ℝ. The cost is the published newsboy loss with overage cost hhh and underage cost bbb; the empirical and true risks are the published empirical and generalization errors, and the (NV-reg) objective and its 1/n1/n1/n-weighted leave-one-out version are the published regularized objectives of Bousquet and Elisseeff. The regularizer is λ∥q∥22\lambda\|q\|_2^2λ∥q∥22​ (the display prints both λ∥q∥22\lambda\|q\|_2^2λ∥q∥22​ and λ∥q∥2\lambda\|q\|_2λ∥q∥2​; the text calls the problem a quadratic program). "With probability at least 1−δ1-\delta1−δ" is stated as: the event on which the gap exceeds the bound has measure at most δ\deltaδ under the product measure μn\mu^nμn.

Standing assumptions and pinned hypotheses.

  1. b,h,λ>0b,h,\lambda>0b,h,λ>0, Xmax⁡,Dˉ≥0X_{\max},\bar D\ge0Xmax​,Dˉ≥0, n≥1n\ge1n≥1, δ∈(0,1)\delta\in(0,1)δ∈(0,1).
  2. μ\muμ is a probability measure giving full mass to X×[0,Dˉ]\mathcal X\times[0,\bar D]X×[0,Dˉ], with ∥x∥22≤Xmax⁡2\|x\|_2^2\le X_{\max}^2∥x∥22​≤Xmax2​ on X\mathcal XX (§3, p. 9; the page writes the ball as ∥x∥22≤Xmax⁡\|x\|_2^2\le X_{\max}∥x∥22​≤Xmax​, while Theorem 2's "Xmax⁡2X_{\max}^2Xmax2​ as the largest possible value of ∥x∥22\|x\|_2^2∥x∥22​" and Theorem 5's note fix the reading).
  3. The algorithm is any map Sn↦q^(Sn)S_n\mapsto\hat q(S_n)Sn​↦q^​(Sn​) whose value minimizes the (NV-reg) objective, measurable in SnS_nSn​ (Appendix B: "all functions are measurable").
  4. The range assumption of Appendix B: for samples from X×D\mathcal X\times\mathcal DX×D, q^⊤x∈[0,Dˉ]\hat q^\top x\in[0,\bar D]q^​⊤x∈[0,Dˉ] for x∈Xx\in\mathcal Xx∈X.
  5. The last constant is (b∨h)Dˉ(b\vee h)\bar D(b∨h)Dˉ, the loss bound MMM from Lemma 5 that the proof feeds into Theorem 6; display (6) prints Dˉ\bar DDˉ there.
  6. The convention that all sets are countable, and the intercept convention x1=1x^1=1x1=1, are not imposed.

Trivializing formalization ruled out. The range assumption is quantified only over feature vectors in X\mathcal XX and over samples drawn from X×D\mathcal X\times\mathcal DX×D; stated over the whole ball ∥x∥2≤Xmax⁡\|x\|_2\le X_{\max}∥x∥2​≤Xmax​, it would force q^=0\hat q=0q^​=0 (both q^⊤x\hat q^\top xq^​⊤x and q^⊤(−x)\hat q^\top(-x)q^​⊤(−x) would lie in [0,Dˉ][0,\bar D][0,Dˉ]) and the goal would be nearly empty.

What is needed and reusable. McDiarmid's two-sided bounded-differences inequality under product measures; integrability of bounded measurable losses; existence and properties of minimizers of strongly convex objectives on Rp\mathbb R^pRp; the comparison argument behind Theorem 5. Theorem 6 is stated for an arbitrary data space and hypothesis space and is reusable for any uniformly stable algorithm. Contributions to the Theorem 5 reference and to McDiarmid's inequality benefit other missions as well.

Selected references

  • C. Rudin and G.-Y. Vahn, The Big Data Newsvendor: Practical Insights from Machine Learning, MIT Sloan School Working Paper 5036-13, version of February 6, 2014 (MIT DSpace). The version formalized here.
  • G.-Y. Ban and C. Rudin, The Big Data Newsvendor: Practical Insights from Machine Learning, Operations Research 67(1):90–108, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2018.1757
  • O. Bousquet and A. Elisseeff, Stability and Generalization, Journal of Machine Learning Research 2:499–526, 2002. https://jmlr.org/papers/v2/bousquet02a.html
  • C. McDiarmid, On the method of bounded differences, Surveys in Combinatorics, London Math. Soc. Lecture Note Series 141, 148–188, 1989. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107359949.008
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks VII: Clustering Processes — Poisson Product-Form Equilibrium of the Open Clustering ProcessTextbook

Motivation

Many systems consist of units that form themselves into clusters: individuals at a gathering forming conversational groups, monomers forming polymers, particles coagulating and fragmenting. Chapter 8 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979) treats such clustering processes as Markov processes whose state counts the clusters of each type, and shows that when the process is reversible its equilibrium distribution has an explicit product form. The chapter opens with a model of social grouping (§8.1), develops a general basic model (§8.2) and later applies it to polymerization (§8.4).

The basic model sits in the same family as the migration processes and queueing networks of the earlier chapters: the method is to guess reversibility, solve the detailed balance equations, and normalize. Its specific feature is that the transitions are unions and break-ups of clusters, with rates quadratic in the cluster counts, rather than movements of single individuals.

Setting

There is a countable collection of cluster types rrr. A state is a vector m=(mr)m = (m_r)m=(mr​) of non-negative integers, mrm_rmr​ being the number of rrr-clusters present, with only finitely many mrm_rmr​ non-zero. For cluster types r,s,ur, s, ur,s,u let ere_rer​ be the rrr-th unit vector and

Rursm=m−er−es+eu,Rrsum=m+er+es−eu,R^{rs}_u m = m - e_r - e_s + e_u, \qquad R^u_{rs} m = m + e_r + e_s - e_u,Rurs​m=m−er​−es​+eu​,Rrsu​m=m+er​+es​−eu​,

the union of an rrr-cluster with an sss-cluster into a uuu-cluster, and the break-up of a uuu-cluster into an rrr-cluster and an sss-cluster. Given non-negative parameters λrsu=λsru\lambda_{rsu} = \lambda_{sru}λrsu​=λsru​ and μrsu=μsru\mu_{rsu} = \mu_{sru}μrsu​=μsru​, the clustering process has transition rates

q(m,Rursm)=λrsumrms (r≠s),q(m,Rurrm)=λrrumr(mr−1),q(m,Rrsum)=μrsumu.(8.3)q(m, R^{rs}_u m) = \lambda_{rsu} m_r m_s \ (r \ne s), \qquad q(m, R^{rr}_u m) = \lambda_{rru} m_r(m_r - 1), \qquad q(m, R^u_{rs} m) = \mu_{rsu} m_u. \qquad (8.3)q(m,Rurs​m)=λrsu​mr​ms​ (r=s),q(m,Rurr​m)=λrru​mr​(mr​−1),q(m,Rrsu​m)=μrsu​mu​.(8.3)

A closed clustering process lives on a finite irreducible state space S\mathcal SS. The open clustering process additionally lets one-clusters enter at rate ν\nuν and leave at rate μm1\mu m_1μm1​,

q(m,m+e1)=ν,q(m,m−e1)=μm1,(8.7)q(m, m + e_1) = \nu, \qquad q(m, m - e_1) = \mu m_1, \qquad (8.7)q(m,m+e1​)=ν,q(m,m−e1​)=μm1​,(8.7)

and its state space is the countable set of all mmm with ∑rmr\sum_r m_r∑r​mr​ finite, every state being reachable from every other.

An equilibrium distribution is a collection of positive numbers π(m)\pi(m)π(m) summing to one that satisfies the equilibrium equations π(m)∑m′q(m,m′)=∑m′π(m′)q(m′,m)\pi(m)\sum_{m'} q(m, m') = \sum_{m'} \pi(m') q(m', m)π(m)∑m′​q(m,m′)=∑m′​π(m′)q(m′,m); the process is reversible in equilibrium exactly when π\piπ satisfies the detailed balance conditions π(m)q(m,m′)=π(m′)q(m′,m)\pi(m) q(m, m') = \pi(m') q(m', m)π(m)q(m,m′)=π(m′)q(m′,m).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 8.2 (p. 164)

If there are positive numbers crc_rcr​ with

ν=c1μ,λrsucrcs=cuμrsu,(8.8)∑rcr<∞,(8.9)\nu = c_1 \mu, \qquad \lambda_{rsu} c_r c_s = c_u \mu_{rsu}, \qquad (8.8) \qquad \sum_r c_r < \infty, \qquad (8.9)ν=c1​μ,λrsu​cr​cs​=cu​μrsu​,(8.8)r∑​cr​<∞,(8.9)

then the open clustering process has equilibrium distribution

π(m)=∏re−crcrmrmr!,(8.10)\pi(m) = \prod_{r} e^{-c_r} \frac{c_r^{m_r}}{m_r!}, \qquad (8.10)π(m)=r∏​e−cr​mr​!crmr​​​,(8.10)

it is reversible, and the counts m1,m2,…m_1, m_2, \dotsm1​,m2​,… are independent, mrm_rmr​ being Poisson with mean crc_rcr​.

Milestones

  • Eq. (8.6): under (8.4), crcsλrsu=cuμrsuc_r c_s \lambda_{rsu} = c_u \mu_{rsu}cr​cs​λrsu​=cu​μrsu​, the weights ∏rcrmr/mr!\prod_r c_r^{m_r}/m_r!∏r​crmr​​/mr​! satisfy the detailed balance conditions for the rates (8.3) on the whole state space.
  • Theorem 8.1 (p. 163): under (8.4) the closed clustering process is reversible with equilibrium distribution π(m)=B∏rcrmr/mr!\pi(m) = B\prod_r c_r^{m_r}/m_r!π(m)=B∏r​crmr​​/mr​! on S\mathcal SS.
  • Eq. (8.2) (p. 161): the social grouping model with MMM individuals has equilibrium π(m)=B∏i1mi!(βα i!)mi\pi(m) = B \prod_{i} \frac{1}{m_i!}\bigl(\frac{\beta}{\alpha\, i!}\bigr)^{m_i}π(m)=B∏i​mi​!1​(αi!β​)mi​ on {m:∑iimi=M}\{m : \sum_i i m_i = M\}{m:∑i​imi​=M}.
  • Eq. (8.9) (p. 164): the product-form weights are summable over the finitely supported states if and only if ∑rcr<∞\sum_r c_r < \infty∑r​cr​<∞, and then (8.10) sums to one.

Significance

Theorem 8.2 gives the equilibrium of a whole class of coagulation–fragmentation dynamics in closed form: the cluster counts are independent Poisson variables, and the equation system (8.8) is the only thing to solve. Quantities such as the expected number of clusters of each type, or the proportion of units in clusters of a given size, are then read off directly. Theorem 8.1 gives the corresponding result for a closed system, where the normalizing constant couples the types; opening the system removes that coupling. The results are the base of the polymerization models of §8.4 and of the later literature on reversible coagulation–fragmentation processes.

The results are proved in the book, with short proofs that state the detailed balance computation is "readily verified". To our knowledge they have no machine-checked proof. The work this mission asks for is the formal verification of that computation for the aggregated rate function, including unions in which two clusters of the same type meet, and the normalization of an infinite product over a countable set of types, which the book takes for granted.

Difficulty

The book calls the detailed balance computation readily verified; the bookkeeping is where a formal check can fail. Two different unions, or a break-up and the entry of a one-cluster, can lead from the same state to the same state when a cluster type is reproduced by the transition, so the rate between two states is a sum over transitions, and the identity has to be checked for the sums, not for single transitions. The same-type case r=sr = sr=s carries the falling factorial mr(mr−1)m_r(m_r - 1)mr​(mr​−1) rather than mr2m_r^2mr2​.

The normalization is the second difficulty. The state space of the open process is countably infinite, the product (8.10) runs over infinitely many types, and the interchange ∑m∏r=∏r∑n\sum_m \prod_r = \prod_r \sum_{n}∑m​∏r​=∏r​∑n​ that makes it sum to one requires (8.9). Without (8.9) the weights are not summable; this is the content of the book's remark that (8.9) is necessary.

Formalization scope

Cluster types are an arbitrary countable type R carrying a linear order, used only to count each unordered pair of types once. States are finitely supported vectors R →₀ ℕ. The rate q(m,m′)q(m, m')q(m,m′) is the sum of the rates (8.3) of all unions and break-ups taking mmm to m′m'm′, plus, for the open process, the rates (8.7); a transition is present only when the clusters it consumes exist, and q(m,m)=0q(m, m) = 0q(m,m)=0 holds because every transition changes the number of clusters. The one-cluster type is a distinguished element one. The closed state space is a finite non-empty set closed under positive-rate transitions and irreducible. The open process carries the book's assumptions that every state is reachable from every other and that the total rate out of each state is finite.

The statements are at the level of rates: reversibility is detailed balance for a positive, normalized π\piπ, the equivalence with reversibility of the stationary process being Kelly's Theorem 1.3. That π\piπ is the law of a stationary Markov process with these rates is not formalized. Independence and the Poisson laws are stated as the joint law of every finite set of counts. A formalization in which crc_rcr​ may vanish, in which detailed balance is imposed only for a degenerate choice of rates, or in which (8.10) is not normalized does not meet the goal: the crc_rcr​ are positive, the rates are arbitrary non-negative symmetric parameters, and both detailed balance and total mass one are required.

The development uses the published definitions KellyStochasticNetworks_Balance (detailed balance and the equilibrium equations) and the proved implication from detailed balance to the equilibrium equations. Lemmas on summing products over finitely supported vectors, and on infinite products of exponentials, are reusable beyond this mission. Lemma 8.3, a partial converse to Theorem 8.1, is not part of this mission; a faithful statement of it, with the units structure of the clusters, is a welcome addition.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley, Chichester, 1979, Chapter 8. Reissued by Cambridge University Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511564246 (author's copy: http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html)
  • P. Whittle, Systems in Stochastic Equilibrium, Wiley, 1986 (reversible models of association and polymerization). ISBN 978-0-471-90887-0.
  • F. P. Kelly and E. Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014 (detailed balance and the equilibrium equations used here). https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139565363
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Markov ChainOptimizationProbability+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks V: Optimal Capacity Allocation in a Network of QueuesTextbook

Motivation

Chapter 4 of F. P. Kelly's Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979) applies the product-form theory of Chapter 3 to concrete systems. Two of its results have numbered statements, and they answer two practical questions.

The first comes from the design of store-and-forward communication networks (telegraph and packet-switched data networks). Messages queue at channels; the designer chooses each channel's capacity subject to a budget, and wants to minimize the delay messages suffer. Because the equilibrium law at every channel is geometric under several different modelling assumptions (§4.1, pp. 95–96), the mean delay has a closed form, and the budget allocation problem becomes a small convex program with an explicit solution. This square-root capacity assignment goes back to L. Kleinrock's work on communication nets (Communication Nets, McGraw-Hill, 1964) and remains the textbook example of optimal design for a network of queues.

The second comes from compartmental models in biology, birth–illness–death processes and manpower planning (§4.5, pp. 113–115). Individuals enter a system as a Poisson stream and move through it independently. Equilibrium results follow from Chapter 3; Theorem 4.2 describes the transient behaviour exactly, starting from an empty system.

Setting

Capacity allocation (§4.1). A network has J≥1J \ge 1J≥1 channels. Channel jjj receives traffic at average rate aj>0a_j > 0aj​>0 and is given capacity ϕj\phi_jϕj​. In equilibrium the number njn_jnj​ of messages at channel jjj has the geometric law (4.1),

P(nj=n)=(1−ajϕj)(ajϕj)n,n=0,1,2,…,P(n_j = n) = \Big(1 - \frac{a_j}{\phi_j}\Big)\Big(\frac{a_j}{\phi_j}\Big)^n, \qquad n = 0, 1, 2, \dots,P(nj​=n)=(1−ϕj​aj​​)(ϕj​aj​​)n,n=0,1,2,…,

which requires ϕj>aj\phi_j > a_jϕj​>aj​. Its mean is aj/(ϕj−aj)a_j/(\phi_j - a_j)aj​/(ϕj​−aj​). Capacity on channel jjj costs fj>0f_j > 0fj​>0 per unit and the total budget is FFF, giving the cost constraint (4.2)

∑jfjϕj=F.\sum_j f_j\phi_j = F.j∑​fj​ϕj​=F.

The mean number of customers in the network is

N(ϕ)=∑jajϕj−aj,N(\phi) = \sum_j \frac{a_j}{\phi_j - a_j},N(ϕ)=j∑​ϕj​−aj​aj​​,

and the feasible set is the set of ϕ∈RJ\phi \in \mathbb{R}^Jϕ∈RJ with ϕj>aj\phi_j > a_jϕj​>aj​ for every jjj that satisfy (4.2). In Lean these are meanNumberInNetwork a φ and FeasibleCapacities a f F. The proof works with the Lagrangian lagrangian a f F y φ =N(ϕ)+y(∑jfjϕj−F)= N(\phi) + y(\sum_j f_j\phi_j - F)=N(ϕ)+y(∑j​fj​ϕj​−F).

Compartmental model (§4.5). Individuals arrive in a Poisson stream of rate ν>0\nu > 0ν>0 at a system of JJJ compartments that is empty at time 000. Let pj(s)p_j(s)pj​(s) be the probability that an individual is in compartment jjj a time sss after its arrival; pj(s)≥0p_j(s) \ge 0pj​(s)≥0 and ∑jpj(s)≤1\sum_j p_j(s) \le 1∑j​pj​(s)≤1, since individuals may leave. Let nj(t)n_j(t)nj​(t) be the number of individuals in compartment jjj at time t>0t > 0t>0, and

αj(t)=∫0tpj(u) du.\alpha_j(t) = \int_0^t p_j(u)\,du.αj​(t)=∫0t​pj​(u)du.

In Lean the model is the predicate IsCompartmentModel P ν t p M T Loc, the counts are compartmentCount M Loc j, and αj(t)\alpha_j(t)αj​(t) is alpha p j t.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 4.1 (p. 97)

If J≥1J \ge 1J≥1, aj>0a_j > 0aj​>0, fj>0f_j > 0fj​>0 and F>∑kakfkF > \sum_k a_k f_kF>∑k​ak​fk​, then

ϕj∗=aj+ajfj∑kakfk⋅F−∑kakfkfj\phi^*_j = a_j + \frac{\sqrt{a_j f_j}}{\sum_k \sqrt{a_k f_k}}\cdot\frac{F - \sum_k a_k f_k}{f_j}ϕj∗​=aj​+∑k​ak​fk​​aj​fj​​​⋅fj​F−∑k​ak​fk​​

is feasible and minimizes NNN over the feasible set, and every other feasible ϕ\phiϕ has N(ϕ)>N(ϕ∗)N(\phi) > N(\phi^*)N(ϕ)>N(ϕ∗).

Milestones toward the goal

  1. The mean of the geometric law (4.1) is aj/(ϕj−aj)a_j/(\phi_j - a_j)aj​/(ϕj​−aj​) (p. 97).
  2. For y>0y > 0y>0 the Lagrangian is minimized over {ϕj>aj}\{\phi_j > a_j\}{ϕj​>aj​} by ϕj=aj+aj/(yfj)\phi_j = a_j + \sqrt{a_j/(y f_j)}ϕj​=aj​+aj​/(yfj​)​ (proof of Theorem 4.1).
  3. The choice 1/y=(F−∑kakfk)/∑kakfk1/\sqrt y = (F - \sum_k a_k f_k)/\sum_k\sqrt{a_k f_k}1/y​=(F−∑k​ak​fk​)/∑k​ak​fk​​ makes that minimizer equal to ϕ∗\phi^*ϕ∗ and feasible for (4.2).

Second result: Theorem 4.2 (pp. 114–115)

The proof's generating-function identity, for zj∈[0,1]z_j \in [0,1]zj​∈[0,1],

E(z1n1(t)⋯zJnJ(t))=∏j=1Jexp⁡[−(1−zj)ναj(t)],E\big(z_1^{n_1(t)}\cdots z_J^{n_J(t)}\big) = \prod_{j=1}^J \exp\big[-(1 - z_j)\nu\alpha_j(t)\big],E(z1n1​(t)​⋯zJnJ​(t)​)=j=1∏J​exp[−(1−zj​)ναj​(t)],

and the theorem itself: n1(t),…,nJ(t)n_1(t), \dots, n_J(t)n1​(t),…,nJ​(t) are independent and nj(t)n_j(t)nj​(t) is Poisson with mean ναj(t)\nu\alpha_j(t)ναj​(t).

Significance

Theorem 4.1 is a closed-form design rule. Every channel first receives the capacity aja_jaj​ needed to carry its traffic; the remaining budget is shared in proportion to ajfj\sqrt{a_j f_j}aj​fj​​, not to the traffic aja_jaj​. Sizing capacity in proportion to the load, which is the obvious rule, is therefore not optimal. The same calculation applies to any network whose stations have the geometric law (4.1), for example a manufacturing job shop (p. 97). The mean number in the network and the mean time a customer spends in it are minimized together.

Theorem 4.2 is the exact transient law of a network of infinite-server queues started empty. It holds however complicated the motion of an individual is, provided individuals move independently, and letting t→∞t \to \inftyt→∞ it recovers the equilibrium Poisson law of §4.5.

Both results are classical and proved in the book. Neither is formalized on Prove2Me. The platform has the geometric equilibrium law of the M/M/1 queue (KellyStochasticNetworks.mm1_equilibrium) but not its mean, and no result on Poisson thinning or marking by independent random locations. The formal work for Theorem 4.1 is a strict-convexity and Lagrangian-sufficiency argument in RJ\mathbb{R}^JRJ. For Theorem 4.2 it is a Poisson marking theorem in measure-theoretic probability. Both pieces are reusable.

Difficulty

For Theorem 4.1, the book's proof sets the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian to zero. A stationary point is not a global minimizer in general, so the formal proof must show that LLL is (strictly) convex on the open region ϕj>aj\phi_j > a_jϕj​>aj​, and it must use Lagrangian sufficiency, not first-order conditions alone. The region is open and the objective is unbounded near its boundary. Feasibility of ϕ∗\phi^*ϕ∗ needs F>∑kakfkF > \sum_k a_k f_kF>∑k​ak​fk​, which the book leaves implicit.

For Theorem 4.2, the steps of the proof that read "conditional on MMM" have to be carried out with measure-theoretic independence. One step averages a product over MMM independent uniform instants. Another sums the Poisson mixture into an exponential. The last turns a factorized generating function into mutual independence of JJJ counts with Poisson marginals. Mathlib has the Poisson distribution (ProbabilityTheory.poissonMeasure) but no marking or thinning theorem, and no uniqueness theorem for multivariate probability generating functions.

Formalization scope

Channels and compartments are indexed by Fin J; all rates, costs and capacities are real numbers.

Theorem 4.1. The statement carries the book's implicit hypotheses explicitly: J≥1J \ge 1J≥1, aj>0a_j > 0aj​>0, fj>0f_j > 0fj​>0, F>∑kakfkF > \sum_k a_k f_kF>∑k​ak​fk​. Stability ϕj>aj\phi_j > a_jϕj​>aj​ is part of the feasible set. The conclusion is global optimality over the feasible set (IsMinOn) together with feasibility of ϕ∗\phi^*ϕ∗, plus strict optimality against every other feasible point. Uniqueness is a slight strengthening of the book's "the optimal allocation is", and it holds by strict convexity. A statement that ϕ∗\phi^*ϕ∗ satisfies (4.2), or that it is a stationary point of the Lagrangian, is not the theorem: those are one-line computations or the proof method, and the goal is stated as global optimality to rule them out.

Theorem 4.2. The model is pinned down as in the proof on p. 115:

  • the number MMM of arrivals in (0,t)(0,t)(0,t) is Poisson with mean νt\nu tνt;
  • an i.i.d. sequence of (arrival instant, location at time ttt) pairs is independent of MMM, and only its first MMM entries are used;
  • each instant is uniform on (0,t)(0,t)(0,t), and an individual arriving at uuu is in compartment jjj at time ttt with probability pj(t−u)p_j(t-u)pj​(t−u), or has left.

"Individuals move independently" is formalized as this conditional independence. The pjp_jpj​ are measurable sub-probabilities, not assumed to sum to one. The conclusion is mutual independence of the JJJ counts (iIndepFun) together with the Poisson probability mass function of each. Infinite time horizons and the point-process description of the system are out of scope.

Useful contributions: a reusable Lagrangian-sufficiency lemma for separable convex objectives under one linear constraint; a Poisson marking (colouring) theorem for finitely many colours; the multivariate generating-function uniqueness lemma for NJ\mathbb{N}^JNJ-valued random vectors.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, John Wiley & Sons, 1979, Chapter 4 (§4.1, pp. 95–97; §4.5, pp. 113–115).
  • L. Kleinrock, Communication Nets: Stochastic Message Flow and Delay, McGraw-Hill, 1964 (reprinted Dover, 1972).
  • J. F. C. Kingman, Poisson Processes, Oxford University Press, 1993 (colouring and marking theorems).
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Markov ChainProbabilityStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

Reversibility and Stochastic Networks II: Migration Processes with Blocking — Reversibility and Product-Form EquilibriumTextbook

Motivation

A migration process is a continuous-time Markov model of a population spread over JJJ sites, called colonies, in which individuals move one at a time: between colonies, out of the system, or into it from outside. The model was introduced by Whittle (1967) and Kingman (1969) and is the framework of Chapter 2 of F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks (Wiley, 1979). It covers closed and open networks of queues (Jackson networks), linear population models and the movement of particles between cells. Its central fact is that the equilibrium distribution is a product form: the joint law of the colony sizes factorizes into one term per colony, and for open processes the colony sizes are independent in equilibrium.

In the migration processes of Chapter 2 the rate at which an individual leaves colony jjj depends on the number njn_jnj​ there, but not on the number already present in the colony it joins. Chapter 6 (§6.1) lifts this restriction. The rate of a move into colony kkk is multiplied by a function ψk(nk)\psi_k(n_k)ψk​(nk​) of the receiving colony's occupancy, which can model blocking (a crowded colony slows arrivals) or attraction (as in the models of social grouping of §6.2). The price is that product form survives only under a reversibility condition on the routing parameters. This mission formalizes the two theorems of §6.1 on top of the already-formalized results of Chapter 2.

Timeline. Whittle (1967) and Kingman (1969) introduced migration processes and their product-form equilibria; Kelly (1976) treated networks of queues with general routes; Kelly (1979, Ch. 2) states the closed and open product forms (Theorems 2.3, 2.4) and the time reversal of an open process (Theorem 2.5); Kelly (1979, §6.1) states the reversible versions with receiving-colony dependence (Theorems 6.1, 6.2).

Setting

There are JJJ colonies. The state is n=(n1,…,nJ)∈NJn = (n_1,\dots,n_J) \in \mathbb{N}^Jn=(n1​,…,nJ​)∈NJ, with njn_jnj​ the number of individuals in colony jjj. Three operators change the state by one individual: TjknT_{jk}nTjk​n moves one individual from colony jjj to colony kkk, Tj⋅nT_{j\cdot}nTj⋅​n removes one from colony jjj, and T⋅knT_{\cdot k}nT⋅k​n adds one to colony kkk.

The model is given by non-negative constants λjk\lambda_{jk}λjk​ (with λjj=0\lambda_{jj} = 0λjj​=0), μj\mu_jμj​, νk\nu_kνk​, and functions φj,ψj:N→R\varphi_j,\psi_j : \mathbb{N}\to\mathbb{R}φj​,ψj​:N→R with φj(0)=0\varphi_j(0) = 0φj​(0)=0, φj(n)>0\varphi_j(n) > 0φj​(n)>0 for n>0n > 0n>0, and ψj(n)>0\psi_j(n) > 0ψj​(n)>0 for all n≥0n \ge 0n≥0. A closed reversible migration process with NNN individuals has state space S={n:∑jnj=N}\mathcal{S} = \{n : \sum_j n_j = N\}S={n:∑j​nj​=N} and transition rates

q(n,Tjkn)=λjk φj(nj) ψk(nk).(6.2)q(n, T_{jk}n) = \lambda_{jk}\,\varphi_j(n_j)\,\psi_k(n_k). \qquad (6.2)q(n,Tjk​n)=λjk​φj​(nj​)ψk​(nk​).(6.2)

An open reversible migration process has state space NJ\mathbb{N}^JNJ and, in addition to (6.2), the rates

q(n,Tj⋅n)=μj φj(nj)(6.5),q(n,T⋅kn)=νk ψk(nk)(6.6).q(n, T_{j\cdot}n) = \mu_j\,\varphi_j(n_j) \quad (6.5), \qquad q(n, T_{\cdot k}n) = \nu_k\,\psi_k(n_k) \quad (6.6).q(n,Tj⋅​n)=μj​φj​(nj​)(6.5),q(n,T⋅k​n)=νk​ψk​(nk​)(6.6).

The parameters are required to make the process irreducible: in the closed case an individual can pass between any two colonies along pairs with λab>0\lambda_{ab} > 0λab​>0; in the open case it can reach every colony from outside and leave from every colony. Setting ψj≡1\psi_j \equiv 1ψj​≡1 recovers the migration processes of Chapter 2.

Given positive constants α1,…,αJ\alpha_1,\dots,\alpha_Jα1​,…,αJ​, the candidate equilibrium is

π(n)=B∏j=1J{αjnj∏r=1njψj(r−1)φj(r)},(6.3)\pi(n) = B\prod_{j=1}^{J}\Bigl\{\alpha_j^{n_j}\prod_{r=1}^{n_j}\frac{\psi_j(r-1)}{\varphi_j(r)}\Bigr\}, \qquad (6.3)π(n)=Bj=1∏J​{αjnj​​r=1∏nj​​φj​(r)ψj​(r−1)​},(6.3)

with BBB chosen so that π\piπ sums to one over the state space.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 6.2 (open process)

If positive αj\alpha_jαj​ satisfy

αjλjk=αkλkj(6.4),αjμj=νj(6.7),\alpha_j\lambda_{jk} = \alpha_k\lambda_{kj} \quad (6.4), \qquad \alpha_j\mu_j = \nu_j \quad (6.7),αj​λjk​=αk​λkj​(6.4),αj​μj​=νj​(6.7),

and every colony series gj=∑m≥0αjm∏r=1mψj(r−1)/φj(r)g_j = \sum_{m\ge 0}\alpha_j^m\prod_{r=1}^m \psi_j(r-1)/\varphi_j(r)gj​=∑m≥0​αjm​∏r=1m​ψj​(r−1)/φj​(r) converges, then (6.3) with B=∏jgj−1B = \prod_j g_j^{-1}B=∏j​gj−1​ is in detailed balance with the rates (6.2), (6.5), (6.6), satisfies the equilibrium equations, is positive and sums to one, and under it n1,…,nJn_1,\dots,n_Jn1​,…,nJ​ are independent with marginals πj(m)=gj−1αjm∏r=1mψj(r−1)/φj(r)\pi_j(m) = g_j^{-1}\alpha_j^m\prod_{r=1}^m\psi_j(r-1)/\varphi_j(r)πj​(m)=gj−1​αjm​∏r=1m​ψj​(r−1)/φj​(r).

Milestones

  • Theorem 2.3: the closed migration process (ψ≡1\psi\equiv 1ψ≡1) has equilibrium of the form (2.3).
  • Theorem 2.4: the open migration process has independent colonies with marginals bjαjnj/∏r=1njφj(r)b_j\alpha_j^{n_j}/\prod_{r=1}^{n_j}\varphi_j(r)bj​αjnj​​/∏r=1nj​​φj​(r).
  • Theorem 2.5: the reversal of a stationary open migration process is an open migration process.
  • Theorem 6.1: the closed process with rates (6.2) is reversible under (6.4), with equilibrium (6.3) on S\mathcal{S}S.

Theorems 2.3–2.5 are already proved on the platform and enter as references.

Significance

The result. Theorem 6.2 shows that product form and independence of colony sizes are not tied to routing that ignores the destination's occupancy. Any positive ψk\psi_kψk​ is allowed, provided the routing is reversible in the sense of (6.4) and (6.7). This is what makes the social-grouping models of §6.2 and the clustering models of Chapter 8 tractable, and it identifies (6.4) as the structural condition: Exercise 6.1.1 shows that without it the process cannot be reversible. Through Theorem 1.3 of the book, detailed balance also gives that the stationary process looks the same run backwards in time.

Formalization. The Chapter 2 results (Theorems 2.3–2.5) are formalized and proved on the platform, at the level of transition rates, in the KellyStochasticNetworks series. Theorems 6.1 and 6.2 are not formalized anywhere to our knowledge. The new work is the detailed-balance verification with the receiving-colony factor, the normalization over the finite set S\mathcal{S}S in the closed case, and the summation over the countable space NJ\mathbb{N}^JNJ with the marginal computation that expresses independence in the open case.

Difficulty

The equilibrium equations of a migration process with blocking have no simple solution in general (p. 135); a direct attack on the full balance equations does not close. Detailed balance is a local condition, but the formal statement has to be careful with transitions that do not exist: a move out of an empty colony, a departure that would make a count negative, and the coincidences between operators at the boundary (Tjkn=T⋅knT_{jk}n = T_{\cdot k}nTjk​n=T⋅k​n when nj=0n_j = 0nj​=0). In the open case the bookkeeping is in infinite sums: positivity and normalization need convergence of each colony series, and independence needs the marginal of π\piπ on one colony to be computed as a sum over the remaining J−1J-1J−1 coordinates.

Formalization scope

Colonies are Fin J; states are Fin J → ℕ; rates are real-valued functions of two states, assembled as sums of indicator terms over the possible transitions, reusing the operators Tjk, Tout, Tin and the predicates DetailedBalance, FullBalance of the published definitions KellyStochasticNetworks_Migration and KellyStochasticNetworks_Balance. Transitions out of an empty colony carry the factor φj(0)=0\varphi_j(0) = 0φj​(0)=0 and so vanish. The hypotheses λjj=0\lambda_{jj} = 0λjj​=0, non-negativity of the rates, positivity of φj(n)\varphi_j(n)φj​(n) (n>0n>0n>0), ψj(n)\psi_j(n)ψj​(n) (n≥0n\ge0n≥0) and αj\alpha_jαj​, and the book's irreducibility requirements are binders of each theorem.

The statements are at the level of transition rates: "reversible" is read as detailed balance of the equilibrium distribution, and "equilibrium distribution" as positive, summing to one, and satisfying the equilibrium equations. The stochastic process itself is not constructed. In the closed case the distribution lives on NJ\mathbb{N}^JNJ and vanishes off S\mathcal{S}S, which is equivalent because every transition preserves ∑jnj\sum_j n_j∑j​nj​; J≥1J \ge 1J≥1 is assumed so that S\mathcal{S}S is nonempty. In the open case stationarity is the convergence of each colony series, carried as HasSum hypotheses with sums gjg_jgj​.

The normalizing constant is never free: π≡0\pi \equiv 0π≡0 satisfies detailed balance, so a statement that leaves BBB unconstrained, or omits the factor ψk(nk)\psi_k(n_k)ψk​(nk​) from (6.2), (6.6) and (6.3), is not this theorem. Contributions welcome: proofs of Theorem 6.1 and 6.2, reusable lemmas on detailed balance for indicator-sum rates, and on products of summable families over Fin J → ℕ.

Selected references

  • F. P. Kelly, Reversibility and Stochastic Networks, Wiley, 1979; reprinted Cambridge University Press, 2011. Chapters 2 and 6. http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/BOOKS/kelly_book.html
  • J. F. C. Kingman, Markov population processes, Journal of Applied Probability 6 (1969), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.2307/3212273
  • F. P. Kelly, Networks of queues, Advances in Applied Probability 8 (1976), 416–432. https://doi.org/10.2307/1426136
  • P. Whittle, Nonlinear migration processes, Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute 42 (1967).
  • F. P. Kelly and E. Yudovina, Stochastic Networks, Cambridge University Press, 2014, Chapter 2. http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~frank/STOCHNET/
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Optimization·Captain: mikedeng1

One-Machine Sequencing to Minimize Certain Functions of Job Tardiness II: EDD Order Minimizes Any Sum of Convex Nondecreasing Tardiness Penalties When No Job Starts After Its Due DateResearch Paper

Motivation

A single machine must process a set of jobs, each with a processing time and a due date, and the cost of a schedule depends on how late the jobs finish. Total tardiness is the classical criterion, but in many applications lateness is penalised more than proportionally: a job one week late costs more than twice a job half a week late, and a quadratic or other convex penalty describes this better. Hamilton Emmons's 1969 paper in Operations Research (DOI 10.1287/opre.17.4.701) derives dominance rules for total tardiness and then asks which of them survive when total tardiness is replaced by ∑Jg(Ti)\sum_J g(T_i)∑J​g(Ti​) for an arbitrary convex nondecreasing loss ggg.

Timeline of the relevant results:

  • 1955 — Jackson shows that ordering jobs by earliest due date (EDD) minimises the maximum lateness, and hence produces a schedule without late jobs whenever one exists.
  • 1956 — Smith gives the ratio rule for weighted completion time and an adjacent-interchange criterion for pairs of jobs.
  • 1969 — Emmons proves the precedence theorems for total tardiness that underlie later branch-and-bound and dynamic programming algorithms for 1 ∣∣ ∑Tj1\,||\,\sum T_j1∣∣∑Tj​, and shows (p. 713) that Theorems 2 and 3 and part of Theorem 1 extend to any sum of identical convex nondecreasing tardiness penalties.
  • 1977 — Lawler's pseudo-polynomial algorithm for total tardiness builds on Emmons's conditions; the problem is later shown NP-hard (Du and Leung, 1990).

Setting

A finite set JJJ of jobs is to be sequenced on one machine. Job JiJ_iJi​ has a processing time pi≥0p_i\ge 0pi​≥0 and a due date did_idi​. All jobs are available at time 000, and the machine processes them one after another without idle time. A schedule is an ordering lll of the jobs of JJJ. The completion time CiC_iCi​ of JiJ_iJi​ in lll is the sum of the processing times of JiJ_iJi​ and of every job before it; its waiting (starting) time is Wi=Ci−piW_i=C_i-p_iWi​=Ci​−pi​, and its tardiness is

Ti=max⁡(0, Ci−di).T_i=\max(0,\,C_i-d_i).Ti​=max(0,Ci​−di​).

A loss function g:R→Rg:\mathbb R\to\mathbb Rg:R→R, convex and nondecreasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), is fixed, the same for every job. The objective is ∑i∈Jg(Ti)\sum_{i\in J} g(T_i)∑i∈J​g(Ti​), and a schedule is optimal if no schedule of JJJ has a smaller objective. With g(T)=Tg(T)=Tg(T)=T this is total tardiness.

Where the paper uses job indices, the jobs are indexed in SPT order: j<kj<kj<k implies pj<pkp_j<p_kpj​<pk​, or pj=pkp_j=p_kpj​=pk​ and dj≤dkd_j\le d_kdj​≤dk​. The notation j←kj\leftarrow kj←k means that some optimal schedule has JjJ_jJj​ before JkJ_kJk​; for a set AkA_kAk​ of jobs, k←Akk\leftarrow A_kk←Ak​ means that some optimal schedule has JkJ_kJk​ before every job of AkA_kAk​, and Ak′A_k'Ak′​ is the set of jobs of JJJ not in AkA_kAk​. An EDD schedule sequences the jobs in nondecreasing order of due dates.

Formalization targets

Goal: Corollary 2.2* (p. 713)

If an EDD schedule lll of JJJ satisfies

Wi≤difor every i∈J,W_i\le d_i\qquad\text{for every } i\in J,Wi​≤di​for every i∈J,

then lll minimises ∑Jg(Ti)\sum_J g(T_i)∑J​g(Ti​) over all schedules of JJJ, for every ggg convex and nondecreasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞).

The goal fixes no constant and no particular ggg: it is a statement about the whole class of convex nondecreasing penalties.

Milestones (in attack order)

  1. Convex exchange condition (p. 713): if Tja≤TjbT_{ja}\le T_{jb}Tja​≤Tjb​, Tkb≤TkaT_{kb}\le T_{ka}Tkb​≤Tka​ (all nonnegative), Tka−Tkb≤Tjb−TjaT_{ka}-T_{kb}\le T_{jb}-T_{ja}Tka​−Tkb​≤Tjb​−Tja​ and Tjb≥TkaT_{jb}\ge T_{ka}Tjb​≥Tka​, then g(Tka)−g(Tkb)≤g(Tjb)−g(Tja)g(T_{ka})-g(T_{kb})\le g(T_{jb})-g(T_{ja})g(Tka​)−g(Tkb​)≤g(Tjb​)−g(Tja​).
  2. Theorem 1* (p. 713): for j<kj<kj<k, if dj≤dkd_j\le d_kdj​≤dk​ then j←kj\leftarrow kj←k.
  3. Theorem 2* (p. 713): for j<kj<kj<k, if k←Akk\leftarrow A_kk←Ak​, dj>dkd_j>d_kdj​>dk​ and dj+pj≥∑Ak′pid_j+p_j\ge\sum_{A_k'}p_idj​+pj​≥∑Ak′​​pi​, then k←jk\leftarrow jk←j.
  4. Corollary 2.1* (p. 713): if dj=max⁡idid_j=\max_i d_idj​=maxi​di​ and dj+pj≥∑Jpid_j+p_j\ge\sum_J p_idj​+pj​≥∑J​pi​, then some optimal schedule ends with JjJ_jJj​.
  5. Last-job reduction (proof of Corollary 2.2, p. 706): if some optimal schedule ends with JjJ_jJj​, any optimal schedule of J∖{Jj}J\setminus\{J_j\}J∖{Jj​} followed by JjJ_jJj​ is optimal for JJJ.

Two further statements of the same section are included as items: Corollary 1.3* (the SPT schedule is optimal if it coincides with the EDD schedule) and Theorem 3 for the generalised objective.

Significance

The goal says that EDD is optimal for every convex nondecreasing tardiness penalty as long as no job starts after its due date. The classical sufficient condition, that at most one job is tardy, follows from Jackson's rule; Emmons's condition allows any or all jobs to be tardy, provided each is tardy by at most its own processing time. Because the conclusion holds for the whole class of penalties at once, an instance satisfying it needs no knowledge of ggg: total tardiness, total squared tardiness, and any other convex nondecreasing cost are minimised by the same sequence. Theorems 1* and 2* are the dominance rules that the paper's ordering procedure applies pairwise; they reduce the search space of branch-and-bound methods for convex tardiness objectives.

The results are proved in the paper (for ∑g(Ti)\sum g(T_i)∑g(Ti​) the proofs are said to be "easily established" and omitted). None of them has, to our knowledge, a machine-checked proof. The mission produces formal statements and proofs of the generalised results, including the omitted ones, on top of a reusable single-machine model.

Difficulty

The total-tardiness proofs compare changes in tardiness additively: an interchange is good if the decrease in one job's tardiness is at least the increase in another's. For a convex ggg this comparison is not enough, because a unit of tardiness costs more at higher tardiness levels; the changes must also occur at the right height on the curve, and part (b) of the proof of Theorem 1 fails for this reason. Each generalised argument therefore has to check, for every job whose tardiness changes, both the size and the location of the change, including jobs whose tardiness changes from zero to positive. Ties for the latest due date are a further obstacle: the printed proof of Corollary 2.1 cites Theorem 2, whose hypothesis dj>dkd_j>d_kdj​>dk​ is strict, so a job sharing the maximum due date is not covered by the argument as written, although the corollary is stated without excluding ties.

Formalization scope

Jobs are elements of a type ι\iotaι; the job set is a Finset JJJ, processing times and due dates are real functions p,d:ι→Rp,d:\iota\to\mathbb Rp,d:ι→R. Where the paper's index matters, ι\iotaι is linearly ordered and its order is the job index, together with the SPT-indexing hypothesis. A schedule is a duplicate-free list whose elements are exactly JJJ, and completion times are the published single-machine definition MooreLateJobs.Shared.completionTime (Moore 1968), which starts the machine at time 000 with no idle time. Optimality is against every schedule of JJJ. The relation j←kj\leftarrow kj←k is formalised as the existence of an optimal schedule with JjJ_jJj​ before JkJ_kJk​ (keeping the premise k←Akk\leftarrow A_kk←Ak​ in the conclusion where the theorem has one); the paper's cumulative reading of the notation is not formalised.

Standing assumptions and deviations:

  • ggg is convex and nondecreasing on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞) only; the page's "increasing" is read as nondecreasing, as in the abstract. No smoothness, strict monotonicity or g(0)=0g(0)=0g(0)=0 is assumed.
  • Processing times are assumed nonnegative; this is added (they are durations).
  • The reduction di<∑Jpid_i<\sum_J p_idi​<∑J​pi​ of p. 703 is not assumed, which makes the statements apply to more instances.
  • "The EDD schedule" is any schedule with nondecreasing due dates; ties are arbitrary.

A trivializing formalization is ruled out: the goal requires optimality of the given EDD list against every schedule of JJJ, not of some EDD list, and a sorry-free check shows its hypotheses hold on a two-job instance in which both jobs are tardy.

A complete development needs list lemmas for moving one job to a later position, the effect of such moves on completion times, and slope inequalities for convex functions on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞). The schedule-manipulation lemmas are reusable for other single-machine sequencing results. Proofs of any milestone, of the two further items, and of general interchange lemmas are welcome.

Selected references

  • H. Emmons, One-Machine Sequencing to Minimize Certain Functions of Job Tardiness, Operations Research 17(4):701–715, 1969. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.17.4.701
  • J. R. Jackson, Scheduling a Production Line to Minimize Maximum Tardiness, Research Report 43, Management Science Research Project, UCLA, 1955.
  • W. E. Smith, Various Optimizers for Single-Stage Production, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 3:59–66, 1956. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800030106
  • E. L. Lawler, A "Pseudopolynomial" Algorithm for Sequencing Jobs to Minimize Total Tardiness, Annals of Discrete Mathematics 1:331–342, 1977. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-5060(08)70742-8
  • J. M. Moore, An n Job, One Machine Sequencing Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Late Jobs, Management Science 15(1):102–109, 1968. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.15.1.102
  • J. Du and J. Y.-T. Leung, Minimizing Total Tardiness on One Machine is NP-Hard, Mathematics of Operations Research 15(3):483–495, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.15.3.483
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Algorithmic Game TheoryComplexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium 3: Trimming an Approximate Nash Equilibrium Yields a Well-Supported OneResearch Paper

Motivation

The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium is usually studied for an approximate equilibrium, because an exact equilibrium of a game with three or more players can require irrational probabilities. Two approximation notions are in use, and results proved for one do not automatically transfer to the other. Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou (SIAM J. Comput. 39(1), 2009) prove their PPAD-hardness results for the stronger notion, the ε-approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium, and then show in their §4.7 (Lemma 4.28, announced as Lemma 2.1) that any ε-approximate Nash equilibrium can be turned, by an explicit and cheap transformation, into an approximately well-supported one with a polynomially worse accuracy. This is what lets their hardness results hold for both notions. A weaker version of the relation had been pointed out by Chen, Deng and Teng (FOCS 2006, reference [9] of the paper).

This mission formalizes Lemma 4.28 together with the steps of its proof: the best-response inequality (28), Claims 5 and 6, and the Lipschitz estimate of Lemma 4.26 (used in the proof as Lemma 4.29).

Setting

A game in normal form has r≥2r\ge2r≥2 players. Player ppp has a finite set SpS_pSp​ of pure strategies; S=∏pSpS=\prod_p S_pS=∏p​Sp​ is the set of pure strategy profiles and S−pS_{-p}S−p​ the set of profiles of the players other than ppp. For each player ppp and profile s∈Ss\in Ss∈S there is a payoff usp≥0u^p_s\ge0usp​≥0; for j∈Spj\in S_pj∈Sp​ and s∈S−ps\in S_{-p}s∈S−p​ the payoff to ppp at the profile (j,s)(j,s)(j,s) is written ujspu^p_{js}ujsp​. The number max⁡{u}\max\{u\}max{u} is the largest entry uspu^p_susp​ over all players and all profiles.

A mixed profile x={xjp}x=\{x^p_j\}x={xjp​} assigns to each player ppp a probability distribution xpx^pxp on SpS_pSp​; the players randomize independently, and for s∈S−ps\in S_{-p}s∈S−p​ we write xs=∏q≠pxsqqx_s=\prod_{q\ne p}x^q_{s_q}xs​=∏q=p​xsq​q​. The expected payoff of player ppp for playing the pure strategy jjj against the others is

Ujp=∑s∈S−pujsp xs,Umax⁡p=max⁡j∈SpUjp.\mathcal U^p_j=\sum_{s\in S_{-p}}u^p_{js}\,x_s,\qquad \mathcal U^p_{\max}=\max_{j\in S_p}\mathcal U^p_j .Ujp​=s∈S−p​∑​ujsp​xs​,Umaxp​=j∈Sp​max​Ujp​.
  • xxx is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than ϵ\epsilonϵ by deviating to any mixed strategy ypy^pyp:
∑j∈SpUjp xjp ≥ ∑j∈SpUjp yjp−ϵfor all p and all mixed yp.\sum_{j\in S_p}\mathcal U^p_j\,x^p_j\ \ge\ \sum_{j\in S_p}\mathcal U^p_j\,y^p_j-\epsilon\quad\text{for all }p\text{ and all mixed }y^p .j∈Sp​∑​Ujp​xjp​ ≥ j∈Sp​∑​Ujp​yjp​−ϵfor all p and all mixed yp.
  • xxx is an ε-approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium if every strategy played with positive probability is within ϵ\epsilonϵ of the best:
Ujp>Uj′p+ϵ ⟹ xj′p=0for all p and j,j′∈Sp.\mathcal U^p_j>\mathcal U^p_{j'}+\epsilon\ \Longrightarrow\ x^p_{j'}=0\quad\text{for all }p\text{ and }j,j'\in S_p .Ujp​>Uj′p​+ϵ ⟹ xj′p​=0for all p and j,j′∈Sp​.

The trimmed profile x^\hat xx^ of xxx with parameter kkk deletes the strategies whose expected payoff is more than ϵk\epsilon kϵk below Umax⁡p\mathcal U^p_{\max}Umaxp​ and renormalizes:

zp=∑j∈Spxjp X{Ujp<Umax⁡p−ϵk},x^jp={xjp/(1−zp),Ujp≥Umax⁡p−ϵk,0,otherwise.z^p=\sum_{j\in S_p}x^p_j\,\mathcal X_{\{\mathcal U^p_j<\mathcal U^p_{\max}-\epsilon k\}},\qquad \hat x^p_j=\begin{cases}x^p_j/(1-z^p), & \mathcal U^p_j\ge\mathcal U^p_{\max}-\epsilon k,\\ 0, & \text{otherwise.}\end{cases}zp=j∈Sp​∑​xjp​X{Ujp​<Umaxp​−ϵk}​,x^jp​={xjp​/(1−zp),0,​Ujp​≥Umaxp​−ϵk,otherwise.​

In the Lean development these are purePayoff u x p j, maxPurePayoff u x p, maxPayoff u, IsEpsApproxNash u x ε, IsEpsWellSupportedNash u x ε, trimMass u x ε k p and trim u x ε k, all in the namespace DGPNash.WellSupported.

Formalization targets

Goal: Lemma 4.28

For ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0 and an ϵ\epsilonϵ-approximate Nash equilibrium xxx, the trimmed profile x^\hat xx^ with k=1+1/ϵk=1+1/\sqrt\epsilonk=1+1/ϵ​ is a mixed profile and a

ϵ⋅(ϵ+1+4(r−1)max⁡{u})-approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium.\sqrt\epsilon\cdot\bigl(\sqrt\epsilon+1+4(r-1)\max\{u\}\bigr)\text{-approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium.}ϵ​⋅(ϵ​+1+4(r−1)max{u})-approximately well-supported Nash equilibrium.

The constant is the paper's. The statement is about the specific profile x^\hat xx^ built from xxx, not about the existence of some well-supported equilibrium.

Milestones, in proof order

  • Eq. (28): ∑jUjpxjp≥Umax⁡p−ϵ\sum_j\mathcal U^p_j x^p_j\ge\mathcal U^p_{\max}-\epsilon∑j​Ujp​xjp​≥Umaxp​−ϵ for every player ppp.
  • Claim 5: for every k>0k>0k>0, zp≤1/kz^p\le 1/kzp≤1/k.
  • Claim 6: for every k>1k>1k>1, ∑j∈Sp∣xjp−x^jp∣≤2/(k−1)\sum_{j\in S_p}|x^p_j-\hat x^p_j|\le 2/(k-1)∑j∈Sp​​∣xjp​−x^jp​∣≤2/(k−1).
  • Lemma 4.26 (Lemma 4.29): for mixed profiles x,yx,yx,y,
∣∑s∈S−pujspxs−∑s∈S−pujspys∣≤max⁡s∈S−p{ujsp}∑q≠p∑i∈Sq∣xiq−yiq∣.\Bigl|\sum_{s\in S_{-p}}u^p_{js}x_s-\sum_{s\in S_{-p}}u^p_{js}y_s\Bigr|\le\max_{s\in S_{-p}}\{u^p_{js}\}\sum_{q\ne p}\sum_{i\in S_q}|x^q_i-y^q_i| .​s∈S−p​∑​ujsp​xs​−s∈S−p​∑​ujsp​ys​​≤s∈S−p​max​{ujsp​}q=p∑​i∈Sq​∑​∣xiq​−yiq​∣.

Significance

The result. Lemma 4.28 makes the two approximation notions polynomially equivalent for computation: every well-supported equilibrium is approximate with the same ϵ\epsilonϵ, and conversely an approximate equilibrium yields a well-supported one at accuracy O(ϵ)O(\sqrt\epsilon)O(ϵ​) for fixed rrr and payoff range. Hardness results proved for well-supported equilibria, including the PPAD-completeness of 3-player Nash in the paper and the two-player result of Chen, Deng and Teng, therefore apply to approximate equilibria as well, and algorithms for one notion give algorithms for the other. Lemma 4.26, the Lipschitz dependence of expected payoffs on the opponents' strategies in L1L_1L1​, is a general tool for perturbation and rounding arguments in finite games.

Formalizing it. The result is proved in the paper; as far as we know there is no machine-checked version, and the platform has neither approximation notion. The mission produces both definitions, on top of the published game vocabulary agt_games, and the quantitative chain from an approximate equilibrium to a well-supported one. These definitions are what any later formalization of approximate-equilibrium algorithms or hardness results would need.

Difficulty

The obvious attempt, to show that xxx itself is approximately well-supported, fails: an approximate equilibrium may put small positive probability on a strategy that is far from optimal, which a well-supported equilibrium forbids for any accuracy. Removing those strategies changes the opponents' expected payoffs, so the well-supported condition must be checked for U^\hat{\mathcal U}U^, computed from x^\hat xx^, not for U\mathcal UU. The accuracy of the result therefore depends on how far all r−1r-1r−1 opponents' strategies move, which is why the bound carries the factor (r−1)max⁡{u}(r-1)\max\{u\}(r−1)max{u}. Lemma 4.26 is a statement about product distributions: the change in a multilinear expected payoff is controlled by the sum of the per-player L1L_1L1​ distances, not by their product.

Formalization scope

  • Players form a finite type ι with decidable equality; player p has a finite strategy type S p; payoffs are u : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ with the standing hypothesis ∀ p s, 0 ≤ u p s of §2.1. The number of players is r=r=r= Fintype.card ι, and 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι is assumed in every statement, as in §2.1. Strategy sets may differ between players.
  • Mixed profiles and lotteries are AGT.IsMixedProfile and AGT.IsLottery from agt_games; both equilibrium notions include the requirement that the profile be mixed. Ujp\mathcal U^p_jUjp​ is AGT.expectedPayoff after player ppp alone switches to the pure strategy jjj, and the approximate-Nash condition compares AGT.expectedPayoff before and after player ppp alone switches to a lottery yyy, which is the paper's inequality (27).
  • Umax⁡p\mathcal U^p_{\max}Umaxp​ and max⁡{u}\max\{u\}max{u} are suprema over finite types; they are the maxima, since a mixed profile forces each SpS_pSp​ to be nonempty. In Lemma 4.26 the maximum over s∈S−ps\in S_{-p}s∈S−p​ is the supremum of upu^pup over full profiles whose ppp-th coordinate is jjj.
  • The strict and non-strict inequalities are the paper's: the trim keeps Ujp≥Umax⁡p−ϵk\mathcal U^p_j\ge\mathcal U^p_{\max}-\epsilon kUjp​≥Umaxp​−ϵk, zpz^pzp counts Ujp<Umax⁡p−ϵk\mathcal U^p_j<\mathcal U^p_{\max}-\epsilon kUjp​<Umaxp​−ϵk, and the well-supported condition uses >>>. The goal assumes ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0, as the paper's 1/ϵ1/\sqrt\epsilon1/ϵ​ requires; Claim 5 is stated for k>0k>0k>0 and Claim 6 for k>1k>1k>1.
  • The clause "can be computed in polynomial time" of Lemma 4.28 is not formalized; the goal states the property of the profile the proof computes. A complexity statement would need the PPAD machinery, which is outside this series.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: by Nash's theorem (on the platform as AGT.nash_existence) a δ-well-supported equilibrium exists for every δ ≥ 0, so the goal is stated for x^\hat xx^, defined from xxx, and not as an existence claim.

Contributions welcome: proofs of the milestones, in particular the decomposition ∑sxsusp=∑jxjp Ujp\sum_s x_s u^p_s=\sum_j x^p_j\,\mathcal U^p_j∑s​xs​usp​=∑j​xjp​Ujp​ of the expected payoff, which Eq. (28) and the goal both need, and Lemma 4.26, which is reusable in any perturbation argument for finite games.

Selected references

  • C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg, C. H. Papadimitriou, The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium, SIAM Journal on Computing 39(1):195–259, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1137/070699652
  • X. Chen, X. Deng, S.-H. Teng, Computing Nash Equilibria: Approximation and Smoothed Complexity, FOCS 2006. https://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0602043
  • X. Chen, X. Deng, S.-H. Teng, Settling the Complexity of Computing Two-Player Nash Equilibria, Journal of the ACM 56(3), 2009. https://doi.org/10.1145/1516512.1516516
  • J. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics 54(2):286–295, 1951. https://doi.org/10.2307/1969529
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The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games V: The Mixed Price of Anarchy of the Average Social Cost Is at Most (3+sqrt 5)/2Research Paper

Motivation

When many self-interested users share resources whose cost grows with use (links of a network, servers, machines), each user picks the option that is cheapest for them given what the others do, and the resulting equilibrium can be worse for the group than a centrally planned allocation. The price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (STACS 1999), measures this loss as the worst ratio between the social cost of an equilibrium and the optimal social cost. Congestion games (Rosenthal 1973) are the standard finite model of such resource sharing: they always have pure Nash equilibria, and they cover atomic routing, load balancing and many network design questions.

Timeline of the linear-latency case:

  • 2002: Roughgarden and Tardos (J. ACM) bound the price of anarchy of nonatomic selfish routing with linear latencies by 4/34/34/3.
  • 2005: Awerbuch, Azar and Epstein (STOC 2005) and, independently, Christodoulou and Koutsoupias (STOC 2005) show that for atomic (finite) congestion games with linear latencies the pure price of anarchy of the total cost is 5/25/25/2. Awerbuch, Azar and Epstein also obtain (3+5)/2≈2.618(3+\sqrt5)/2 \approx 2.618(3+5​)/2≈2.618 for weighted players.
  • 2005: Christodoulou and Koutsoupias observe that their argument for 5/25/25/2 extends to mixed Nash equilibria, at the price of the larger constant (3+5)/2(3+\sqrt5)/2(3+5​)/2 (their Theorem 14, the goal of this mission).

Setting

A congestion game consists of a finite set NNN of players, a finite set EEE of facilities, for each player iii a collection Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ of pure strategies, each a subset of EEE, and for each facility eee a latency function fe:N→Rf_e : \mathbb N \to \mathbb Rfe​:N→R. In a pure profile A=(A1,…,An)A = (A_1, \dots, A_n)A=(A1​,…,An​), Ai∈ΣiA_i \in \Sigma_iAi​∈Σi​, the load ne(A)n_e(A)ne​(A) is the number of players whose set contains eee, and player iii pays

ci(A)=∑e∈Aife(ne(A)).c_i(A) = \sum_{e \in A_i} f_e\bigl(n_e(A)\bigr).ci​(A)=e∈Ai​∑​fe​(ne​(A)).

The social cost of a pure profile is SUM(A)=∑i∈Nci(A)\mathrm{SUM}(A) = \sum_{i\in N} c_i(A)SUM(A)=∑i∈N​ci​(A) (NNN times the average cost). Latencies are linear: fe(k)=aek+bef_e(k) = a_e k + b_efe​(k)=ae​k+be​ with ae,be≥0a_e, b_e \ge 0ae​,be​≥0.

A mixed strategy pip_ipi​ of player iii is a probability distribution on Σi\Sigma_iΣi​. The players randomize independently, so the pure profile sss occurs with probability Pr⁡(s)=∏jpj(sj)\Pr(s) = \prod_j p_j(s_j)Pr(s)=∏j​pj​(sj​). Player iii's expected cost is E[ci]=∑sPr⁡(s) ci(s)\mathbb E[c_i] = \sum_s \Pr(s)\, c_i(s)E[ci​]=∑s​Pr(s)ci​(s), and the expected load of eee is E[ne]=∑sPr⁡(s) ne(s)\mathbb E[n_e] = \sum_s \Pr(s)\, n_e(s)E[ne​]=∑s​Pr(s)ne​(s). A mixed profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium if no player can lower their expected cost by switching unilaterally to another distribution on their strategies. The social cost of a mixed profile is the sum of the expected costs, SUM(p)=∑iE[ci]\mathrm{SUM}(p) = \sum_i \mathbb E[c_i]SUM(p)=∑i​E[ci​].

In Lean: CongestionGame ι E with fields strategies and latency, load, cost, IsProfile, sumCost, IsLinear, expCost, expLoad, mixedSumCost and IsMixedNash, all in the namespace CongestionPoA.Mixed; lotteries and independent randomization come from the platform definition agt_games (AGT.IsLottery, AGT.profileProb, AGT.IsMixedNash).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 14

For every congestion game with linear latencies, every mixed Nash equilibrium ppp and every pure profile PPP with Pi∈ΣiP_i \in \Sigma_iPi​∈Σi​,

∑i∈NE[ci]  ≤  3+52 SUM(P).\sum_{i\in N} \mathbb E[c_i] \;\le\; \frac{3+\sqrt5}{2}\,\mathrm{SUM}(P).i∈N∑​E[ci​]≤23+5​​SUM(P).

Taking PPP optimal, the mixed price of anarchy of the average social cost is at most (3+5)/2(3+\sqrt5)/2(3+5​)/2.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 3 (corrected). For real x≥0x \ge 0x≥0 and integer y≥0y \ge 0y≥0, y(x+1)≤5−14x2+5+54y2y(x+1) \le \frac{\sqrt5-1}{4}x^2 + \frac{\sqrt5+5}{4}y^2y(x+1)≤45​−1​x2+45​+5​y2.
  2. Deviation inequality (Theorem 1's proof, mixed). At a mixed Nash equilibrium, for every player iii,
E[ci]≤∑e∈Pi(ae(E[ne]+1)+be).\mathbb E[c_i] \le \sum_{e\in P_i}\bigl(a_e(\mathbb E[n_e]+1) + b_e\bigr).E[ci​]≤e∈Pi​∑​(ae​(E[ne​]+1)+be​).
  1. Summing step (Theorem 1's proof, mixed).
∑iE[ci]≤∑e∈Ene(P)(ae(E[ne]+1)+be).\sum_i \mathbb E[c_i] \le \sum_{e\in E} n_e(P)\bigl(a_e(\mathbb E[n_e]+1) + b_e\bigr).i∑​E[ci​]≤e∈E∑​ne​(P)(ae​(E[ne​]+1)+be​).

Significance

The bound says that randomization by the players cannot make linear congestion games much worse than pure play: the loss stays within a constant factor independent of the number of players and facilities. Mixed equilibria matter because they always exist in every finite game and because they model populations of users whose individual choices are not known in advance. The same authors report (PDF p. 2) extending these bounds to correlated equilibria with the same values, which places the mixed bound in a hierarchy of equilibrium notions whose worst cases coincide.

The result is proved in the paper, in one sentence that defers to the proof of Theorem 1. The work here is a complete machine-checked version: the expected-cost layer for congestion games on top of agt_games, the deviation and summing inequalities under product distributions, and the corrected Lemma 3. The paper prints Lemma 3 for all nonnegative reals x,yx, yx,y, where it is false (at x=0x = 0x=0, y=1/10y = 1/10y=1/10 the left side is 0.10.10.1 and the right side about 0.0180.0180.018); the formal statement keeps yyy an integer, which is how the lemma is used. No formalization of congestion-game price-of-anarchy bounds was on the platform when this mission was drafted.

Difficulty

The pure proof compares ne(P)(ne(A)+1)n_e(P)(n_e(A)+1)ne​(P)(ne​(A)+1) with ne(A)2n_e(A)^2ne​(A)2 and ne(P)2n_e(P)^2ne​(P)2 through an integer inequality (Lemma 1). Under a mixed equilibrium the equilibrium side is an expectation, so the cost of a facility is no longer a function of one integer load, and Lemma 1's constant 1/31/31/3 is not available for real arguments: a real-variable version is needed, and the constant degrades from 5/25/25/2 to (3+5)/2(3+\sqrt5)/2(3+5​)/2. A second obstacle is bookkeeping: the deviating player's load changes only on their own deviation, while the other players' randomization stays independent, and the expected cost of a player has to be related to expected facility loads, which uses linearity of the latencies in an essential way. The naive idea of applying Theorem 1 to each pure profile in the support of the equilibrium fails, because those profiles are not themselves Nash equilibria.

Formalization scope

Players and facilities are finite types ι and E; profiles are functions ι → Finset E, with feasibility IsProfile a separate predicate. Latencies are real-valued on natural-number loads, and "linear" means affine with nonnegative coefficients, fe(k)=aek+bef_e(k) = a_e k + b_efe​(k)=ae​k+be​; the paper displays only the identity latency fe(k)=kf_e(k)=kfe​(k)=k and states that its proofs extend. Mixed strategies are real weight functions on the finite strategy type Σi\Sigma_iΣi​; independence is built into AGT.profileProb; Nash deviations range over all lotteries, which is equivalent to pure deviations. agt_games maximizes payoffs, so the game is passed to it with payoff −ci-c_i−ci​. The goal is stated against every feasible pure profile rather than as a ratio, so no division by an optimum that may be 000 occurs. The social cost is the expected sum of the players' costs; the paper's second option, ∑eE[ne2]\sum_e \mathbb E[n_e^2]∑e​E[ne2​], is not part of this mission. A version with correlated distributions on profiles, or one that bounds the cost of an "averaged" profile instead of the expected cost, is a different statement and does not discharge the goal.

A complete development needs elementary finite-sum manipulation of product distributions (marginals of AGT.profileProb, expectations of loads), and a Jensen-type inequality (E[ne])2≤E[ne2](\mathbb E[n_e])^2 \le \mathbb E[n_e^2](E[ne​])2≤E[ne2​] for finite distributions. The expectation lemmas for congestion games are reusable for the other mixed results of the literature (weighted games, polynomial latencies). Proofs of the milestones, of the expectation layer, and alternative arguments are all welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Christodoulou, E. Koutsoupias, The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games, STOC 2005, pp. 67–73. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060600
  • B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, A. Epstein, The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow, STOC 2005, pp. 57–66. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060599
  • E. Koutsoupias, C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case Equilibria, STACS 1999, LNCS 1563, pp. 404–413. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49116-3_38
  • R. W. Rosenthal, A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory 2 (1973), pp. 65–67. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
  • T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, How Bad Is Selfish Routing?, Journal of the ACM 49 (2002), pp. 236–259. https://doi.org/10.1145/506147.506153
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Maximal Flow Through a Network I: The Minimal Cut Theorem — the Maximal Flow Value Equals the Minimum Value of a Disconnecting SetResearch Paper

Motivation

The question behind this mission was posed by T. E. Harris to L. R. Ford, Jr. and D. R. Fulkerson at RAND, in the setting of rail transport: given a rail network linking two cities, with a capacity on every link, find the largest steady flow from one city to the other. Ford and Fulkerson's answer, the minimal cut theorem, published in the Canadian Journal of Mathematics in 1956 (DOI 10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5), says that the obvious upper bound, the total capacity of a set of links whose removal separates the two cities, is always achieved by some flow.

The theorem became the starting point of network flow theory, and through it of a large part of combinatorial optimization and operations research: transportation, assignment, scheduling and network reliability problems are routinely reduced to it.

Timeline.

  • 1927: K. Menger proves that the minimum number of vertices separating two vertex sets of a graph equals the maximum number of disjoint paths joining them (Fund. Math. 10), the unit-capacity ancestor of the theorem.
  • 1955: Harris and Ross study the Soviet rail network as a capacity problem in a RAND report; Harris formulates the maximal flow problem (Schrijver's historical account: Math. Program. 91, 2002).
  • 1956: Ford and Fulkerson publish the minimal cut theorem for undirected networks, with a non-constructive proof based on maximal flows (this paper). Independently, Elias, Feinstein and Shannon state and prove the max-flow min-cut theorem for directed networks (IRE Trans. Inf. Theory 2, 1956), and Dantzig and Fulkerson obtain it from linear programming duality.
  • 1956–1962: Ford and Fulkerson's labelling (augmenting path) algorithm, collected in Flows in Networks (Princeton, 1962).
  • 1972: Edmonds and Karp give polynomial bounds for augmenting-path methods (J. ACM 19).

Setting

A network NNN consists of a finite set of vertices VVV, a finite set of arcs EEE, two distinct vertices, the source aaa and the sink bbb, and a positive capacity c(e)>0c(e)>0c(e)>0 on every arc. Each arc eee has two distinct end vertices; arcs are undirected, and several arcs may join the same pair of vertices.

A chain joining uuu and www is a set of distinct arcs that can be arranged as α1(v0v1),α2(v1v2),…,αm(vm−1vm)\alpha_1(v_0v_1),\alpha_2(v_1v_2),\dots,\alpha_m(v_{m-1}v_m)α1​(v0​v1​),α2​(v1​v2​),…,αm​(vm−1​vm​) with v0=uv_0=uv0​=u, vm=wv_m=wvm​=w and the vertices v0,…,vmv_0,\dots,v_mv0​,…,vm​ pairwise distinct; each arc may be traversed in either direction. The null chain (m=0m=0m=0) joins uuu to itself.

A flow fff assigns a number f(C)≥0f(C)\ge 0f(C)≥0 to each chain CCC joining aaa and bbb (and 000 to every other set of arcs) such that the load ℓf(e)=∑C∋ef(C)\ell_f(e)=\sum_{C\ni e}f(C)ℓf​(e)=∑C∋e​f(C) satisfies ℓf(e)≤c(e)\ell_f(e)\le c(e)ℓf​(e)≤c(e) for every arc. Its value is val(f)=∑Cf(C)\mathrm{val}(f)=\sum_C f(C)val(f)=∑C​f(C). An arc is saturated by fff if ℓf(e)=c(e)\ell_f(e)=c(e)ℓf​(e)=c(e). A maximal flow is a flow of largest value.

A set DDD of arcs is a disconnecting set if every chain joining aaa and bbb contains an arc of DDD; its value is v(D)=∑e∈Dc(e)v(D)=\sum_{e\in D}c(e)v(D)=∑e∈D​c(e). A cut is a disconnecting set no proper subset of which is disconnecting.

The proof introduces two further objects: the set SSS of arcs saturated by every maximal flow, and the set L⊆SL\subseteq SL⊆S of left arcs, those arcs of SSS whose left vertex (the end vertex met first by a positive chain flow of a maximal flow, travelling from aaa) can be reached from aaa by a chain with no arc saturated by some maximal flow.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1 (Minimal cut theorem), p. 400

∃ m∈R:m=max⁡f flowval(f)=min⁡D disconnectingv(D),\exists\, m\in\mathbb R:\quad m=\max_{f\ \text{flow}}\mathrm{val}(f)=\min_{D\ \text{disconnecting}}v(D),∃m∈R:m=f flowmax​val(f)=D disconnectingmin​v(D),

with both the maximum and the minimum attained. The statement mentions only flows and disconnecting sets, not the proof objects SSS and LLL.

Milestones, in the order of the paper's proof

  1. A maximal flow exists, and the set of maximal flows is convex (p. 400).
  2. Lemma 1: SSS is a disconnecting set (p. 400).
  3. Every arc of SSS receives the same orientation from all positive chain flows of all maximal flows: its left vertex is unique (pp. 400–401).
  4. Lemma 2: LLL is a disconnecting set (p. 401).
  5. Lemma 3: no positive chain flow of a maximal flow contains more than one arc of LLL (p. 401).
  6. val(f)≤v(D)\mathrm{val}(f)\le v(D)val(f)≤v(D) for every flow fff and every disconnecting set DDD (p. 402).
  7. LLL is a cut of minimal value, and every maximal flow has value v(L)v(L)v(L) (p. 402).

Two further statements of the paper are included as items without being milestones: the remark that a disconnecting set of minimal value is a cut (p. 400), and the Corollary (p. 402): if a set AAA of arcs meets every cut in exactly one arc, adding kkk to the capacity of each arc of AAA raises the maximal flow value by kkk.

Significance

The minimal cut theorem turns a maximization over flows into a minimization over finite sets of arcs, so an optimal flow comes with a short certificate of optimality. It implies Menger's theorem (unit capacities), and through it König's theorem on bipartite matchings and Hall's marriage theorem. The Corollary is the tool behind the paper's own computing procedure for source–sink planar networks (§2, formalized in a companion mission).

The theorem is classical and proved. What this mission adds is a machine-checked proof of the paper's own formulation: undirected arcs, parallel arcs, flows decomposed along chains (path flows, with no circulations), and the minimum taken over arc sets meeting every chain, together with the proof's intermediate claims. Max-flow min-cut theorems already on the platform (Applied Combinatorics VIII, AppliedComb.Flows.max_flow_min_cut; Introduction to Linear Optimization X, LinearOptimization.max_flow_min_cut) concern directed networks with edge flows obeying conservation and cuts given by vertex sets. They are related results, not this statement, and connecting the two models is itself welcome work.

Difficulty

Weak duality (milestone 6) is immediate; the content is the reverse inequality. The obvious first step, taking a maximal flow and observing that its saturated arcs separate aaa from bbb, does not finish the proof: a positive chain flow may pass through several saturated arcs, so the total capacity of the saturated arcs can exceed the flow value. One has to single out a disconnecting subset that every positive chain flow crosses exactly once, and there is no canonical choice from a single flow. The paper's sets SSS and LLL are defined from all maximal flows at once, and the work consists in showing that these sets are well behaved. The orientation claim in particular needs an exchange argument on two chains that cross at an arc, where the recombined arc sequences may revisit vertices and must be reduced to chains. In a formal development this "a walk contains a chain" step and the averaging of maximal flows over finitely many chains are the main bookkeeping costs.

Formalization scope

  • A network is a structure on a vertex type V and an arc type E, both Fintype with decidable equality, with end-vertex maps tail, head (labels only, no direction), tail e ≠ head e, a source and a sink with source ≠ sink, and capacities cap : E → ℝ with 0 < cap e. These are the paper's standing assumptions; there are no others in §1. In particular, no planarity is assumed and an arc may join aaa and bbb directly.
  • A chain is a Finset E that is the arc set of some arrangement (list of arcs, list of pairwise distinct vertices, each arc joining consecutive vertices in either order).
  • A flow is a function f : Finset E → ℝ, non-negative, zero off the chains joining source and sink, with every arc load at most the capacity. A collection of chain flows that lists a chain twice merges into this form without changing the value or any load.
  • "Maximal" means of maximum value. The goal is stated with IsGreatest and IsLeast on the sets of flow values and of values of disconnecting sets, so no supremum of a real set appears and both extrema must be attained.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: chains must be self-avoiding and must join the source and the sink, the disconnecting condition quantifies over exactly these chains, and the minimum ranges over all disconnecting sets rather than over a family chosen to match a given flow.
  • Needed infrastructure: finite sums over Finset (Finset E), convexity in Finset E → ℝ, compactness of the flow polytope (for existence), and lemmas on lists (extracting a chain from a walk). The walk-to-chain lemma and weak duality are reusable for the companion mission and for any path-flow model.

Selected references

  • L. R. Ford, Jr. and D. R. Fulkerson, Maximal Flow Through a Network, Canadian Journal of Mathematics 8 (1956), 399–404. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1956-045-5
  • P. Elias, A. Feinstein and C. E. Shannon, A note on the maximum flow through a network, IRE Transactions on Information Theory 2 (1956), 117–119. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.1956.1056816
  • K. Menger, Zur allgemeinen Kurventheorie, Fundamenta Mathematicae 10 (1927), 96–115. https://doi.org/10.4064/fm-10-1-96-115
  • L. R. Ford, Jr. and D. R. Fulkerson, Flows in Networks, Princeton University Press, 1962.
  • J. Edmonds and R. M. Karp, Theoretical improvements in algorithmic efficiency for network flow problems, Journal of the ACM 19 (1972), 248–264. https://doi.org/10.1145/321694.321699
  • A. Schrijver, On the history of the transportation and maximum flow problems, Mathematical Programming 91 (2002), 437–445. https://doi.org/10.1007/s101070100259
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CombinatoricsGraph TheoryLinear Optimization+1·Captain: mikedeng1

Maximum Matching and a Polyhedron With 0,1-Vertices: The Vertices of the Matching Polyhedron Are Exactly the Matching VectorsResearch Paper

Motivation

A matching in a graph is a set of edges no two of which share a node. Given a real weight on every edge, the maximum-weight matching problem asks for a matching of largest total weight. It is one of the basic problems of combinatorial optimization: assignment, pairing and scheduling problems reduce to it, and it is the standard example of a combinatorial problem that is solvable in polynomial time although it is not obviously a linear program.

For bipartite graphs the problem is a linear program in disguise: the polytope cut out by nonnegativity and the node-degree inequalities has only 0–1 vertices (the Birkhoff–von Neumann theorem in the square case; Mathlib has it as extremePoints_doublyStochastic). For general graphs this fails already on a triangle, where the vector with every coordinate 1/21/21/2 satisfies all degree inequalities but is not a combination of matchings. Edmonds' 1965 paper (DOI 10.6028/jres.069b.013) adds one family of inequalities, one for each odd set of nodes, and proves that the resulting polyhedron has exactly the matching vectors as its vertices. The companion paper Paths, trees, and flowers gives the cardinality algorithm on which the weighted algorithm of §7 is built.

Timeline:

  • 1931: König and Egerváry prove the min–max theorems for bipartite matching; 1946: Birkhoff shows that the doubly stochastic matrices are the convex hull of the permutation matrices (the bipartite perfect-matching polytope).
  • 1947: Tutte characterizes graphs with a perfect matching.
  • 1965: Edmonds, Paths, trees, and flowers: the blossom algorithm for maximum-cardinality matching.
  • 1965: Edmonds, this paper: Theorem (P) (the matching polyhedron) and Theorem (M) (blossom-shrinking optimality certificates), with a weighted matching algorithm.

Setting

Let GGG be a finite graph with node set VVV and edge set EEE; each edge meets two different nodes, its ends. Real variables xex_exe​ correspond to the edges e∈Ee\in Ee∈E. The polyhedron C⊆REC\subseteq\mathbb R^EC⊆RE is the set of vectors xxx satisfying

  1. xe≥0x_e\ge 0xe​≥0 for every edge eee;
  2. ∑e meets vxe≤1\sum_{e \text{ meets } v} x_e\le 1∑e meets v​xe​≤1 for every node vvv;
  3. ∑e has both ends in Sxe≤r\sum_{e \text{ has both ends in } S} x_e\le r∑e has both ends in S​xe​≤r for every set SSS of 2r+12r+12r+1 nodes, rrr a strictly positive integer.

The matching vectors PPP are the vectors with every component 000 or 111 that satisfy (2); they are the incidence vectors of matchings. For edge weights c∈REc\in\mathbb R^Ec∈RE, the linear form (4) is W(c,x)=∑ecexeW(c,x)=\sum_e c_e x_eW(c,x)=∑e​ce​xe​.

The dual program has a variable yvy_vyv​ for each node and zSz_SzS​ for each odd set SSS (∣S∣=2rS+1|S|=2r_S+1∣S∣=2rS​+1, rS≥1r_S\ge1rS​≥1). Its objective is (5) U(y,z)=∑vyv+∑SrSzSU(y,z)=\sum_v y_v+\sum_S r_S z_SU(y,z)=∑v​yv​+∑S​rS​zS​, subject to (6) y,z≥0y,z\ge0y,z≥0 and (7) yv1+yv2+∑S∋v1,v2zS≥cey_{v_1}+y_{v_2}+\sum_{S\ni v_1,v_2}z_S\ge c_eyv1​​+yv2​​+∑S∋v1​,v2​​zS​≥ce​ for every edge eee with ends v1,v2v_1,v_2v1​,v2​. For a matching MMM, conditions (8)–(10) are the complementary slackness conditions: yv=0y_v=0yv​=0 at nodes not covered by MMM, equality in (7) on MMM, and every odd set with zS>0z_S>0zS​>0 contains exactly rSr_SrS​ edges of MMM.

A blossom sequence {Gi}i=0n\{G_i\}_{i=0}^n{Gi​}i=0n​ (Theorem (M)) starts from G0=GG_0=GG0​=G with matching M0=MM_0=MM0​=M and repeatedly shrinks an odd circuit BiB_iBi​ (a blossom, 2ai+12a_i+12ai​+1 edges of which aia_iai​ are matched) to a single node, carrying node weights w(vi)w(v^i)w(vi) and edge weights w(ei)w(e^i)w(ei) that obey conditions (a)–(k) of p. 127.

In the Lean development these are Graph, IsMatching, incidence, matchingPolyhedron (CCC), matchingVectors (PPP), W, U, DualFeasible ((6)–(7)), CompSlack ((8)–(10)) and BlossomSequence, all in the namespace EdmondsMatching65.Polyhedron.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem (P)

ext⁡(C)=P.\operatorname{ext}(C)=P.ext(C)=P.

The vertices (extreme points) of CCC are exactly the matching vectors of GGG. Hence the maximum weight of a matching equals max⁡{W(c,x):x∈C}\max\{W(c,x):x\in C\}max{W(c,x):x∈C} for every ccc.

Milestones

  1. P⊆ext⁡(C)P\subseteq\operatorname{ext}(C)P⊆ext(C) (§2, p. 126).
  2. If for every ccc some 0–1 point of CCC maximizes W(c,⋅)W(c,\cdot)W(c,⋅) over CCC, then ext⁡(C)=P\operatorname{ext}(C)=Pext(C)=P (§2, p. 126).
  3. Weak duality: W(c,x)≤U(y,z)W(c,x)\le U(y,z)W(c,x)≤U(y,z) for x∈Cx\in Cx∈C and ⟨y,z⟩\langle y,z\rangle⟨y,z⟩ satisfying (6)–(7) (§3, p. 126).
  4. If MMM is a matching and ⟨y,z⟩\langle y,z\rangle⟨y,z⟩ satisfies (6)–(10), then W(c,χM)=U(y,z)W(c,\chi^M)=U(y,z)W(c,χM)=U(y,z) (§3, p. 127).
  5. A blossom sequence for MMM yields ⟨y,z⟩\langle y,z\rangle⟨y,z⟩ satisfying (6)–(10) (§5, pp. 127–128).
  6. For every ccc some maximum matching has a blossom sequence (§6, p. 128).
  7. Theorem (M): a matching is maximum if and only if a blossom sequence for it exists (§4, p. 127).
  8. For every ccc there are a matching MMM and ⟨y,z⟩\langle y,z\rangle⟨y,z⟩ satisfying (6)–(10) (§3, p. 127).

Significance

The result. Theorem (P) turns maximum-weight matching in general graphs into a linear program over an explicitly described polyhedron, and Theorem (M) with the §5 translation gives a short certificate of optimality for every maximum matching. Together they established the template of polyhedral combinatorics: describe the convex hull of the combinatorial objects by inequalities, and prove the description through linear programming duality and an algorithm. The matching polytope underlies the analysis of the weighted blossom algorithm, separation over odd-set inequalities (Padberg–Rao), and many later integrality results; Edmonds' own §8 states the extension to degree-constrained subgraphs.

Formalizing it. The theorem has been proved since 1965 and appears in every text on combinatorial optimization; this mission asks for a machine-checked proof of the polytope statement for general finite graphs, including parallel edges, together with the duality certificate and the blossom-sequence characterization. The prove2me platform has a proved form of Edmonds' perfect matching polytope theorem on complete graphs in convex-decomposition form (MetricTSP.pm_polytope_decomposition), a different polytope with a different conclusion; nothing states Theorem (P) or Theorem (M).

Difficulty

The inclusion P⊆ext⁡(C)P\subseteq\operatorname{ext}(C)P⊆ext(C) and weak duality are routine. The difficulty is the reverse inclusion: showing that no fractional point of CCC is a vertex. The bipartite argument (a fractional point has a cycle of fractional edges along which it can be perturbed both ways) breaks on odd cycles: perturbing along an odd circuit violates a degree inequality, and the odd-set inequalities that cut off the half-integral points are exponentially many and overlap. The paper's route needs, for every weight vector, an optimal matching together with a dual solution satisfying (6)–(10), and the existence of that certificate is the substance of the weighted matching algorithm: the blossom sequence of Theorem (M) must be constructed, and the translation (11)–(16) from node and edge weights of the contracted graphs to ⟨y,z⟩\langle y,z\rangle⟨y,z⟩ must be verified through the whole shrinking history.

Formalization scope

  • The graph is a finite node type V, a finite edge type E and an end map ends : E → Sym2 V with no loops. Parallel edges are allowed: the contracted graphs of Theorem (M) have them, and Theorem (P) holds for multigraphs; simple graphs are the case of an injective end map.
  • Vectors are E → ℝ, one coordinate per edge. Vertices are Mathlib's Set.extremePoints ℝ. Odd sets carry an explicit r : ℕ with 1 ≤ r and |S| = 2r + 1; even sets and singletons carry no inequality.
  • Edge weights are arbitrary reals; matchings need not be perfect and may be empty. No connectivity, no parity of |V|.
  • The dual variable z is a function on all node sets of which only odd sets are read.
  • A contracted graph Gᵢ is a partition of V into blocks; an edge of G is an edge of Gᵢ when its ends lie in different blocks. Each Mᵢ must be a matching of Gᵢ, and all of (a)–(k) appear as fields of BlossomSequence; a sequence missing any of them would make milestone 6 trivial or milestone 5 false.
  • A trivializing formalization is ruled out: coordinates indexed by node pairs (Sym2 V → ℝ) leave non-edge coordinates free and give a polyhedron with no extreme points, and the goal is stated as equality of extreme points, not as a convex-hull identity or as the existence of a dual certificate.
  • Needed infrastructure: extreme points of polyhedra as unique maximizers of linear forms, finite LP weak duality over these index sets, and the weighted blossom algorithm (or another proof of milestone 8). The polyhedral lemmas are reusable for other integrality results; contributions on any milestone are welcome.

Selected references

  • J. Edmonds, Maximum Matching and a Polyhedron With 0,1-Vertices, J. Res. Nat. Bur. Standards Sect. B 69B (1965), 125–130. https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.069b.013
  • J. Edmonds, Paths, Trees, and Flowers, Canad. J. Math. 17 (1965), 449–467. https://doi.org/10.4153/CJM-1965-045-4
  • W. T. Tutte, The Factorization of Linear Graphs, J. London Math. Soc. 22 (1947), 107–111. https://doi.org/10.1112/jlms/s1-22.2.107
  • M. W. Padberg, M. R. Rao, Odd Minimum Cut-Sets and b-Matchings, Math. Oper. Res. 7 (1982), 67–80. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.1.67
  • A. Schrijver, Combinatorial Optimization: Polyhedra and Efficiency, Springer, 2003, Chapter 25.
13 thms3 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingLinear OptimizationMarkov Chain·Captain: mikedeng1

On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains 2: Under Irreducibility, an Optimal Solution of a Linear Program over State-Action Frequencies Yields an Optimal Stationary ProcedureResearch Paper

Linear programming for Markov decision problems

A Markov decision problem asks how to control a system that moves at random between finitely many states, where each decision changes the probabilities of the next move and incurs a cost. Cyrus Derman's 1962 paper On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains (Management Science 9(1):16–24) treats two criteria: the long-run average cost per period, and the total cost of driving the system into an absorbing state. Its Theorem 2 shows that, once attention is restricted to stationary procedures, each problem can be solved as a linear program over the state-action frequencies of the procedure. This mission formalizes that theorem, its supporting displays (3)–(10) and its Lemma on linear-fractional programs.

The linear programming formulation is now the standard computational and theoretical tool for constrained Markov decision processes, and its variables, the occupation measures, are the objects of most later work on that topic. Derman's paper is among the first to state it for the average-cost criterion. Manne (Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions, Management Science, 1960) gave an earlier average-cost formulation for an inventory model. The reduction of a ratio of linear functions to a linear program in Derman's Lemma is the transformation published in the same year by Charnes and Cooper (Programming with Linear Fractional Functionals, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1962).

Setting

There are finitely many states 0,…,L0, \dots, L0,…,L and decisions d1,…,dKd_1, \dots, d_Kd1​,…,dK​, all available in every state. Making decision dkd_kdk​ in state iii sends the system to state jjj with probability qij(k)≥0q_{ij}(k) \ge 0qij​(k)≥0, where ∑jqij(k)=1\sum_j q_{ij}(k) = 1∑j​qij​(k)=1, and costs wikw_{ik}wik​.

A procedure of class C′C'C′ is stationary randomized: in state iii it makes decision dkd_kdk​ with probability DikD_{ik}Dik​, where Dik≥0D_{ik} \ge 0Dik​≥0 and ∑kDik=1\sum_k D_{ik} = 1∑k​Dik​=1, independently of the past and of the time. Under such a procedure the states form a Markov chain with transition probabilities pij=∑kqij(k)Dikp_{ij} = \sum_k q_{ij}(k) D_{ik}pij​=∑k​qij​(k)Dik​. Write WtW_tWt​ for the expected cost at time ttt when X0=iX_0 = iX0​=i.

  • Problem 1 (average cost): minimize QR(i)=lim sup⁡T→∞1T∑t=0TWtQ_R(i) = \limsup_{T\to\infty} \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=0}^{T} W_tQR​(i)=limsupT→∞​T1​∑t=0T​Wt​. Here wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0, and Assumption A says that under every procedure of C′C'C′ all states belong to one class.
  • Problem 2 (total cost): the state LLL is absorbing under every decision and wLk=0w_{Lk} = 0wLk​=0. Minimize SR(i)=∑t=0∞WtS_R(i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} W_tSR​(i)=∑t=0∞​Wt​, the expected cost of reaching LLL. Assumption B says that under every procedure of C′C'C′, LLL is reached from every state with probability one.

The state-action frequencies of a procedure D∈C′D \in C'D∈C′ with stationary distribution π\piπ are xjk=πjDjkx_{jk} = \pi_j D_{jk}xjk​=πj​Djk​. They satisfy the linear constraints

(10)xjk≥0,∑kxjk−∑i∑kxik qij(k)=0  (j),∑j∑kxjk=1.\text{(10)}\qquad x_{jk} \ge 0,\qquad \sum_k x_{jk} - \sum_{i}\sum_k x_{ik}\, q_{ij}(k) = 0 \ \ (j),\qquad \sum_j\sum_k x_{jk} = 1 .(10)xjk​≥0,k∑​xjk​−i∑​k∑​xik​qij​(k)=0  (j),j∑​k∑​xjk​=1.

For Problem 2, Derman adjoins a state −1-1−1 that restarts the chain uniformly on 0,…,L0, \dots, L0,…,L and is entered from LLL. The expected total cost then becomes a ratio of two linear functions of the frequencies of this augmented chain, (9).

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, pinned-down reading

The printed statement, "If Assumption A (B) holds, then problem 1 (2) can be formulated as a linear programming problem", is not a mathematical statement as it stands. The goal is the reading established by its proof (pp. 20–23).

Under Assumption A with w>0w > 0w>0, the program

min⁡ ∑j,kxjkwjksubject to (10)\min \ \sum_{j,k} x_{jk} w_{jk} \quad \text{subject to (10)}min j,k∑​xjk​wjk​subject to (10)

has an optimal solution. For every optimal x∗x^*x∗, every row sum ∑kxjk∗\sum_k x^*_{jk}∑k​xjk∗​ is positive, and Djk∗=xjk∗/∑kxjk∗D^*_{jk} = x^*_{jk}/\sum_k x^*_{jk}Djk∗​=xjk∗​/∑k​xjk∗​ satisfies QD∗(i)≤QD(i)Q_{D^*}(i) \le Q_D(i)QD∗​(i)≤QD​(i) for all D∈C′D \in C'D∈C′ and all iii.

Under Assumption B with the Problem 2 costs, the linear program obtained from (9) by the Lemma's transformation, min⁡∑wjkzjk\min \sum w_{jk} z_{jk}min∑wjk​zjk​ subject to (12), has an optimal solution. For every optimal (z∗,zn+1∗)(z^*, z^*_{n+1})(z∗,zn+1∗​) one has zn+1∗>0z^*_{n+1} > 0zn+1∗​>0, and the procedure decoded from x∗=z∗/zn+1∗x^* = z^*/z^*_{n+1}x∗=z∗/zn+1∗​ satisfies SD∗(i)≤SD(i)S_{D^*}(i) \le S_D(i)SD∗​(i)≤SD​(i) for all D∈C′D \in C'D∈C′ and all iii.

Milestones

In the order the proof uses them: the Cesàro limit and the unique positive stationary distribution of a one-class chain ((3), (5)); the taboo-probability identity (4); the formula (6) for QRQ_RQR​; the cycle formula (7) for the averaged total cost; the remark that minimizing the average of the SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) minimizes each one; the correspondence between C′C'C′ and the solutions of (10); and the Lemma reducing a linear-fractional program under conditions (i) and (ii) to the linear program (12).

Significance

The theorem replaces a search over infinitely many randomized procedures by a single finite linear program. It also yields the structural fact that an optimal stationary procedure can be read off from any optimal solution. The variables xjkx_{jk}xjk​ make constraints on long-run frequencies of actions expressible as linear constraints. That is the origin of the theory of constrained Markov decision processes, and of the dual linear programs whose variables are value functions. The Lemma is the classical linear-fractional reduction, used well beyond this setting.

All of these results are proved in the paper and in later textbooks (for example Puterman, Markov Decision Processes, 1994, §8.8 and §9.5). None of them has been formalized: Mathlib has Perron–Frobenius-type facts for irreducible matrices but no linear programming theory, no taboo probabilities and no Markov decision model. The mission produces machine-checked versions of the proof's chain of equalities and of the decoding step, written so that they can be reused for occupation-measure arguments.

Difficulty

Several steps fail in the naive argument. The correspondence between procedures and solutions of (10) needs every row sum ∑kxjk\sum_k x_{jk}∑k​xjk​ to be positive. That uses Assumption A for a procedure obtained by completing the decoded rows arbitrarily, together with the uniqueness and positivity of the stationary distribution. Positivity of the stationary vector of an irreducible but possibly periodic chain, and the Cesàro (not ordinary) convergence of PtP^tPt, have no ready-made form in Mathlib. The total-cost identity (7) needs the regenerative identity (4), whose sums must first be shown to converge, and needs the augmented chain to be irreducible, which follows from Assumption B but is not assumed. Problem 2 needs one more step: a minimizer of the averaged total cost is optimal from every starting state, which uses the finiteness of all SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i).

Formalization scope

States and decisions are finite Lean types S and Act. Probabilities and costs are real numbers, a procedure of C′C'C′ is a nonnegative real matrix with unit row sums, and the chain is chainMatrix q D. Assumption A is irreducibility (Matrix.IsIrreducible) of every such chain matrix. Assumption B is reachability of LLL from every state; for a finite chain in which LLL is absorbing, this is equivalent to absorption with probability one. QR(i)Q_R(i)QR​(i) is a real limsup of a bounded sequence, with the paper's sum over t=0,…,Tt = 0, \dots, Tt=0,…,T. SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) takes values in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]. The paper requires wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0 on p. 17 and wLk=0w_{Lk} = 0wLk​=0 in Problem 2. The formalization uses wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0 for i≠Li \ne Li=L in Problem 2, and keeps the two problems as separate implications. The adjoined state −1-1−1 is none : Option S, with the transition law that produces Derman's p−1,i=1/(L+1)p_{-1,i} = 1/(L+1)p−1,i​=1/(L+1), pL,−1=1p_{L,-1} = 1pL,−1​=1 for every procedure. The published JewellMRP.InfiniteStep definitions of an ergodic matrix and of a stationary vector are reused.

The goal states optimality of the decoded procedure against every competitor in C′C'C′, for every optimal solution of the linear program, with existence of an optimal solution as a separate clause. A statement that only identifies feasible sets, or that only asserts that some optimal procedure exists, does not count as Theorem 2. Optimality over all history-dependent procedures is Theorem 1, a separate mission of this series.

Welcome contributions: the stationary-distribution facts for irreducible finite stochastic matrices (reusable across Markov chain work), a small linear-programming existence lemma (a linear function attains its minimum on a nonempty compact polytope), and the Lemma's transformation, which is self-contained.

Selected references

  • C. Derman, On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains, Management Science 9(1):16–24, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.1.16
  • A. S. Manne, Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions, Management Science 6(3):259–267, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.3.259
  • A. Charnes and W. W. Cooper, Programming with Linear Fractional Functionals, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 9(3–4):181–186, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800090303
  • K. L. Chung, Markov Chains with Stationary Transition Probabilities, Springer, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-49686-8
  • M. L. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, Wiley, 1994. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316887
11 thms3 active usersReviewed
Dynamic ProgrammingMarkov Chain·Captain: mikedeng1

On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains 1: Deterministic Stationary Procedures Are Optimal for the Long-Run Average Cost and for the Total Cost to AbsorptionResearch Paper

Why restrict to stationary procedures

A Markov decision process with finitely many states and decisions is the basic model of sequential decision making under uncertainty: inventory replacement, machine maintenance, queue control and pursuit problems all fit it. Its computational methods (Howard's policy iteration, 1960; Manne's linear programming formulation, 1960) search only over stationary procedures, which use the same decision every time the system is in the same state. A controller, however, may also remember the whole past and randomize. Whether such procedures can do better is a genuine question: as Derman puts it, "a proof is required before a procedure optimal over C′C'C′ can be considered as the optimal procedure."

Cyrus Derman's 1962 paper On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains (Management Science 9(1):16–24) answers it for two criteria, the long-run average cost and the total cost until absorption, by showing that a deterministic stationary procedure is optimal against all procedures. This mission formalizes that theorem, Theorem 1, together with the steps of its proof.

Timeline. Karlin (1955) gives the existence of a discount-optimal procedure used here; Howard (1960) and Manne (1960) solve the average-cost problem over stationary procedures; Wagner (1960) shows by linear programming that an optimal average-cost procedure can be taken deterministic and stationary; Derman (1962) proves the reduction for both criteria by the functional equation approach; Blackwell (1962) strengthens the discounted side to procedures optimal for all discount factors close to 111.

Setting

The system is observed at times t=0,1,…t = 0, 1, \dotst=0,1,… in one of finitely many states 0,…,L0, \dots, L0,…,L. After each observation one of KKK decisions d1,…,dKd_1, \dots, d_Kd1​,…,dK​ is made; every decision is available in every state. If the system is in state iii and decision dkd_kdk​ is made, it moves to state jjj with probability qij(k)≥0q_{ij}(k) \ge 0qij​(k)≥0, where ∑jqij(k)=1\sum_j q_{ij}(k) = 1∑j​qij​(k)=1, and a cost wikw_{ik}wik​ is incurred.

A procedure RRR chooses decision dkd_kdk​ at time ttt with probability Dk(X0,Δ0,…,Xt)D_k(X_0, \Delta_0, \dots, X_t)Dk​(X0​,Δ0​,…,Xt​), which may depend on the whole history of states XsX_sXs​ and decisions Δs\Delta_sΔs​. The class of all procedures is CCC. The class C′C'C′ consists of the stationary randomized procedures, for which this probability is a number DikD_{ik}Dik​ depending only on the current state iii. The class C′′C''C′′ consists of the deterministic stationary procedures, those of C′C'C′ with Dik∈{0,1}D_{ik} \in \{0, 1\}Dik​∈{0,1}, that is, maps fff from states to decisions; C′′C''C′′ is finite.

Started from X0=iX_0 = iX0​=i, a procedure RRR incurs the expected cost WtW_tWt​ at time ttt. The criteria are

QR(i)=lim sup⁡T→∞1T∑t=0TWt(Problem 1),SR(i)=∑t=0∞Wt∈[0,∞](Problem 2),Q_R(i) = \limsup_{T \to \infty} \frac1T \sum_{t=0}^{T} W_t \quad\text{(Problem 1)}, \qquad S_R(i) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} W_t \in [0, \infty] \quad\text{(Problem 2)},QR​(i)=T→∞limsup​T1​t=0∑T​Wt​(Problem 1),SR​(i)=t=0∑∞​Wt​∈[0,∞](Problem 2),

and, for a discount factor 0<α<10 < \alpha < 10<α<1, the auxiliary discounted cost VR(i,α)=∑t≥0αtWtV_R(i, \alpha) = \sum_{t \ge 0} \alpha^t W_tVR​(i,α)=∑t≥0​αtWt​. Problem 1 assumes wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0. Problem 2 assumes that state LLL is absorbing under every decision and that wLk=0w_{Lk} = 0wLk​=0, so SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) is the expected cost of driving the system from iii into LLL.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 1

There are procedures R1,R2∈C′′R_1, R_2 \in C''R1​,R2​∈C′′ such that, for every state iii,

QR1(i)=min⁡R∈CQR(i)(Problem 1),SR2(i)=min⁡R∈CSR(i)  (possibly ∞)(Problem 2).Q_{R_1}(i) = \min_{R \in C} Q_R(i) \quad\text{(Problem 1)}, \qquad S_{R_2}(i) = \min_{R \in C} S_R(i) \ \ (\text{possibly } \infty) \quad\text{(Problem 2)}.QR1​​(i)=R∈Cmin​QR​(i)(Problem 1),SR2​​(i)=R∈Cmin​SR​(i)  (possibly ∞)(Problem 2).

One procedure serves every initial state, and the minimum is over all of CCC.

Milestones, in the order of the proof

  1. The functional equation: Vi=min⁡R∈CVR(i,α)V_i = \min_{R \in C} V_R(i, \alpha)Vi​=minR∈C​VR​(i,α) satisfies Vi=min⁡Di∑kDik (wik+α∑jqij(k)Vj)V_i = \min_{D_i} \sum_k D_{ik}\,(w_{ik} + \alpha \sum_j q_{ij}(k) V_j)Vi​=minDi​​∑k​Dik​(wik​+α∑j​qij​(k)Vj​), the minimum over randomizations DiD_iDi​ being attained.
  2. For each α∈(0,1)\alpha \in (0,1)α∈(0,1) some Rα∈C′′R_\alpha \in C''Rα​∈C′′ minimizes VR(i,α)V_R(i, \alpha)VR​(i,α) over CCC.
  3. One R∗∈C′′R^* \in C''R∗∈C′′ is αv\alpha_vαv​-discount optimal along a sequence αv→1\alpha_v \to 1αv​→1.
  4. lim⁡v(1−αv)VR∗(i,αv)=QR∗(i)\lim_{v} (1 - \alpha_v) V_{R^*}(i, \alpha_v) = Q_{R^*}(i)limv​(1−αv​)VR∗​(i,αv​)=QR∗​(i) for a stationary R∗R^*R∗ (published).
  5. The Abelian inequality QR(i)≥lim sup⁡α→1−(1−α)VR(i,α)Q_R(i) \ge \limsup_{\alpha \to 1^-} (1 - \alpha) V_R(i, \alpha)QR​(i)≥limsupα→1−​(1−α)VR​(i,α) for every R∈CR \in CR∈C (published).
  6. Theorem 1 (1) itself (published, as part of Sennott's Proposition 6.2.3).
  7. SR(i)=lim⁡α→1−VR(i,α)S_R(i) = \lim_{\alpha \to 1^-} V_R(i, \alpha)SR​(i)=limα→1−​VR​(i,α) for every R∈CR \in CR∈C, finite or not.

Significance

Theorem 1 is what makes finite optimization possible for these problems: once C′′C''C′′ is known to contain an optimal procedure, the search runs over finitely many maps, and the linear programs of the paper's §3 (the next mission of this series) and of Manne describe the whole problem rather than a restriction of it. Part (2) is a total-cost result without any assumption that the absorbing state is reached; it holds even when every procedure has infinite cost from some state, which separates it from the stochastic shortest path theory that assumes properness.

Part (1) is available on the platform as part of Sennott's Proposition 6.2.3 (stated there, not yet proved), and it is referenced here rather than restated. Part (2), the functional equation for history-dependent procedures and the Abel-limit identity for the total cost have no statement on the platform; to our knowledge none has a machine-checked proof.

Difficulty

The obvious argument compares an arbitrary procedure with stationary ones state by state, but a history-dependent randomized procedure does not induce a Markov chain, so no transition matrix is available for it. The comparison has to pass through the discounted problem, where an optimal stationary procedure exists for each α\alphaα, and then let α→1\alpha \to 1α→1. Two limit exchanges are needed: for the average cost, an Abelian inequality valid for every procedure plus a Markov chain limit theorem for the stationary one; for the total cost, monotone convergence in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞], which must work when the limit is infinite. The discount-optimal procedure depends on α\alphaα, and the finiteness of C′′C''C′′ is what yields a single procedure along a sequence αv→1\alpha_v \to 1αv​→1.

Formalization scope

The model is the published SennottDP.AvgFinite.Model (a Markov decision chain with finite action sets, nonnegative costs in R≥0\mathbb R_{\ge 0}R≥0​ and transition probabilities in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]) with finite nonempty types of states and decisions and every action set equal to the whole decision type. Derman's class CCC is its Policy (history-dependent, randomized); C′′C''C′′ is StationaryPolicy. WtW_tWt​ is expCost, VR(i,α)V_R(i, \alpha)VR​(i,α) is discCost, and QR(i)Q_R(i)QR​(i) is avgCost =lim sup⁡n1n∑t<nWt= \limsup_n \frac1n \sum_{t<n} W_t=limsupn​n1​∑t<n​Wt​, which has the same value as Derman's normalization because WtW_tWt​ is bounded. SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) is a new definition, a sum in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞]. Every discount factor is restricted to (0,1)(0, 1)(0,1) explicitly. "Minimum over CCC" is stated as an inequality against every policy, with the optimal procedure chosen before the initial state.

Problems 1 and 2 enter as separate implications with their own cost hypotheses; the page's "wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0" is read as wik>0w_{ik} > 0wik​>0 for i≠Li \ne Li=L in Problem 2, since wLk=0w_{Lk} = 0wLk​=0 there. A formalization that compares only against stationary procedures, or that states the total cost as a real series (whose divergent values default to 000), is ruled out: the competitors are all policies and SR(i)S_R(i)SR​(i) lives in [0,∞][0, \infty][0,∞].

A complete development needs the discounted Bellman equation for history-dependent policies, the selection of a deterministic minimizer, and Abelian theorems for nonnegative series. These are reusable across the platform's dynamic programming missions, and proofs of the referenced Sennott propositions are welcome contributions in their own right.

Selected references

  • C. Derman, On Sequential Decisions and Markov Chains, Management Science 9(1):16–24, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.1.16
  • S. Karlin, The Structure of Dynamic Programming Models, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 2(4):285–294, 1955. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800020408
  • A. S. Manne, Linear Programming and Sequential Decisions, Management Science 6(3):259–267, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.3.259
  • R. A. Howard, Dynamic Programming and Markov Processes, MIT Press, 1960.
  • H. M. Wagner, On the Optimality of Pure Strategies, Management Science 6(3):268–269, 1960. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.6.3.268
  • D. Blackwell, Discrete Dynamic Programming, Annals of Mathematical Statistics 33(2):719–726, 1962. https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177704593
  • L. I. Sennott, Stochastic Dynamic Programming and the Control of Queueing Systems, Wiley, 1999, Propositions 6.1.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470317037
11 thms3 active usersReviewed
Algorithmic Game TheoryComplexity Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium 1: Approximate Fixed Points of Nash's Map Are Approximate Nash EquilibriaResearch Paper

Motivation

A finite game describes several decision makers whose payoffs depend on everyone's choices. A Nash equilibrium is a collection of choices at which no single player can improve their expected payoff by changing strategy alone. Equilibrium existence is a classical result, but a computational argument needs to connect an object that can be approximated numerically to a strategically meaningful outcome. Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou make that connection using Nash's map on mixed-strategy profiles in their study of equilibrium computation (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou 2009, §3.2). This mission isolates their quantitative connection: a profile close to a fixed point of that particular map is close to a Nash equilibrium, with the paper's explicit error bound.

The result is a known lemma from the published paper, not an open conjecture. It belongs to the paper's route from finite games to approximate equilibrium computation. The present mission treats the analytic statements about the map and finite payoffs; it does not state the paper's PPAD completeness theorem or encode computational reductions.

Setting

A normal-form game has r≥2r\ge2r≥2 players. In the Nash-map section each player has the same nonempty set [n][n][n] of nnn pure strategies. A pure profile sss chooses one strategy for each player, and player ppp receives a nonnegative real payoff uspu^p_susp​. The largest entry among all these payoff tables is Umax⁡U_{\max}Umax​. A mixed profile xxx assigns each player ppp probabilities xjp≥0x^p_j\ge0xjp​≥0 that sum to one over j∈[n]j\in[n]j∈[n]; different players randomize independently. The expected payoff when everyone uses xxx is Up(x)U^p(x)Up(x). If player ppp instead uses the pure strategy jjj while the others keep their mixed strategies, the expected payoff is Ujp(x)U^p_j(x)Ujp​(x).

Write Bjp(x)=max⁡{0,Ujp(x)−Up(x)}B^p_j(x)=\max\{0,U^p_j(x)-U^p(x)\}Bjp​(x)=max{0,Ujp​(x)−Up(x)} for the positive part of this unilateral payoff gain. Nash's map fff assigns to each coordinate of a mixed profile the normalized value

f(x)jp=xjp+Bjp(x)1+∑k∈[n]Bkp(x).f(x)^p_j=\frac{x^p_j+B^p_j(x)}{1+\sum_{k\in[n]}B^p_k(x)}.f(x)jp​=1+∑k∈[n]​Bkp​(x)xjp​+Bjp​(x)​.

The numerator raises the weight of a strategy whose pure payoff exceeds the current expected payoff. The common denominator ensures that the new weights for a player sum to one. These are exactly the quantities and normalization displayed on page 205 of the paper (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou 2009).

An ε\varepsilonε-approximate Nash equilibrium here means a mixed profile at which no player can increase expected payoff by more than ε\varepsilonε through any mixed-strategy deviation. This is the alternative approximation notion identified on page 199 and written as Eq. (27) on page 243. It is weaker than the paper's ε\varepsilonε-approximately well-supported condition; the two notions must remain distinct.

Formalization targets

The goal is Lemma 3.8 (p. 207). For any mixed profile xxx with ∥f(x)−x∥∞≤ε′\|f(x)-x\|_\infty\le\varepsilon'∥f(x)−x∥∞​≤ε′, where ε′≥0\varepsilon'\ge0ε′≥0, its approximate-equilibrium error is bounded by the paper's exact quantity:

εNash=nε′(1+nUmax⁡)(1+ε′(1+nUmax⁡))max⁡{Umax⁡,1}.\varepsilon_{\mathrm{Nash}}= n\sqrt{\varepsilon'(1+nU_{\max})} \left(1+\sqrt{\varepsilon'(1+nU_{\max})}\right) \max\{U_{\max},1\}.εNash​=nε′(1+nUmax​)​(1+ε′(1+nUmax​)​)max{Umax​,1}.

No numerical constant is left free or replaced by an unspecified asymptotic bound. The goal is universal over games and profiles satisfying the stated conditions; it does not merely assert the existence of one favorable profile.

The milestone list also includes Lemma 3.5, bounding the variation of a pure-strategy payoff when opponents change their distributions; Lemma 3.6, an inequality for normalized nonnegative sums; and Lemma 3.4, the explicit Lipschitz bound

∥f(x)−f(x′)∥∞≤[1+2Umax⁡rn(n+1)] δwhen∥x−x′∥∞≤δ.\|f(x)-f(x')\|_\infty\le[1+2U_{\max}rn(n+1)]\,\delta \quad\text{when}\quad \|x-x'\|_\infty\le\delta.∥f(x)−f(x′)∥∞​≤[1+2Umax​rn(n+1)]δwhen∥x−x′∥∞​≤δ.

Equation (3) on page 208 is a further milestone: it bounds each coordinate's share of the total positive gain under approximate fixedness. Lemma 3.4 has a separate role in the paper's grid analysis; it is not claimed as a prerequisite of Lemma 3.8.

Significance

The goal gives a quantitative translation between two kinds of approximation. An error measured in the coordinates of a fixed-point map becomes an upper bound on a player's incentive to deviate. The dependence on nnn, Umax⁡U_{\max}Umax​ and ε′\varepsilon'ε′ matters because the later computational construction chooses its grid scale using an explicit threshold, not simply a convergence claim. Lemma 3.4 provides the separate sensitivity estimate for that map, also with its exact constant (Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou 2009, pp. 205–207).

Formalizing these known statements supplies a reusable bridge between finite-game payoffs, mixed profiles and a concrete fixed-point map. The shared finite-game representation already exists in the published agt_games definition bundle. What remains here is a machine-checked proof of each quantitative statement and of the payoff identities needed to relate pure and mixed deviations. The local Lean statements compile as open theorem targets; the mission does not claim that their proofs are already formalized.

Difficulty

A coordinatewise small value of f(x)−xf(x)-xf(x)−x does not by itself bound the largest payoff advantage by the same number. The map normalizes by a sum of all positive advantages, and a strategy with a large advantage might have little probability under xxx. Conversely, controlling a player's current expected payoff requires information about the entire probability vector, including strategies that are worse than the current mix. The explicit square-root dependence in Lemma 3.8 captures this mismatch. A direct substitution of the fixed-point error for the equilibrium error would lose both the dimension and payoff-scale factors in the published bound.

Formalization scope

Lean represents players by Fin r, strategies by Fin n, payoffs by a real function on pure profiles, and mixed strategies by real-valued weight functions satisfying AGT.IsMixedProfile. The paper numbers players and strategies from one; Fin uses zero-based indices without changing the mathematical sets. AGT.expectedPayoff and AGT.profileProb implement the independent product distribution. Pure-strategy expected payoff is the same expectation after replacing just one player's lottery by a point mass. The maximum payoff is computed from the game's actual finite table; the statements require r≥2r\ge2r≥2 and n>0n>0n>0, so this maximum exists. Nonnegative payoff entries, the standing convention from §2.1, are hypotheses.

The formula for fff is defined on all real coordinate arrays, exactly as an algebraic expression. Every theorem about an equilibrium supplies mixed-profile membership. This explicit condition rules out interpreting Lemma 3.8 on arbitrary vectors, for which “approximate Nash equilibrium” has no strategic meaning and the paper's argument does not apply. The infinity norm is written as a bound for every player-strategy pair, avoiding any dependence on a chosen norm instance. All error parameters appearing in the statements are nonnegative, and the denominator of fff is positive on mixed profiles because each Bjp(x)B^p_j(x)Bjp​(x) is nonnegative.

The development needs finite products and sums, real inequalities, the game bundle, and elementary facts about lotteries and unilateral deviations. Results about how expectations vary under a changed product distribution are reusable for other finite-game formalizations. Contributions proving the milestone inequalities, the payoff identities, and the goal's exact bound are welcome.

Selected references

  • C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg and C. H. Papadimitriou, The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium, SIAM Journal on Computing 39(1):195–259, 2009. DOI: 10.1137/070699652.
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OptimizationStochastic Systems·Captain: mikedeng1

A Characterization of Waiting Time Performance Realizable by Single-Server Queues: The Conservation-Law Polytope Is the Convex Hull of the Preemptive Priority VectorsResearch Paper

Motivation

A single server shared by several classes of jobs must decide, at every moment, which class to serve. Different scheduling rules give different mean response times to the classes, and a system designer often starts from the other end: a target vector of mean response times, one per class, and the question whether any rule can meet it. Coffman and Mitrani answered this question for the multiclass M/M/1 queue in A Characterization of Waiting Time Performance Realizable by Single-Server Queues (Operations Research 28 (1980), 810–821). Their answer is a polytope with an explicit description: the response-time vectors that can be realized are exactly the convex combinations of the vectors of the preemptive priority rules, and these are exactly the vectors satisfying one equation and 2M−22^M-22M−2 inequalities.

The starting point is Kleinrock's conservation law (Kleinrock, Naval Res. Logist. Quart. 12 (1965)): a weighted sum of the response times does not depend on the rule. The characterization is the first instance of what was later called the achievable region method, developed for general multiclass systems by Federgruen and Groenevelt (Oper. Res. 36 (1988)), Shanthikumar and Yao (Oper. Res. 40 (1992)) and Bertsimas and Niño-Mora (Math. Oper. Res. 21 (1996)), and used to derive priority-index policies such as the cμc\mucμ rule and Gittins indices.

Setting

There are M≥1M\ge1M≥1 job classes. Jobs of class iii arrive in a Poisson stream at rate λi>0\lambda_i>0λi​>0 and have exponential service times with parameter μi>0\mu_i>0μi​>0. The traffic intensity of class iii is ρi=λi/μi\rho_i=\lambda_i/\mu_iρi​=λi​/μi​, and the system is stable: ρ=ρ1+⋯+ρM<1\rho=\rho_1+\cdots+\rho_M<1ρ=ρ1​+⋯+ρM​<1. A performance vector W=(W1,…,WM)W=(W_1,\dots,W_M)W=(W1​,…,WM​) lists the mean response times of the classes. Write ai=ρi/μia_i=\rho_i/\mu_iai​=ρi​/μi​, V=∑iλi/μi2V=\sum_i\lambda_i/\mu_i^2V=∑i​λi​/μi2​, and for a set ggg of classes

f(g)=∑i∈gai1−∑i∈gρi,f(∅)=0.f(g)=\frac{\sum_{i\in g}a_i}{1-\sum_{i\in g}\rho_i},\qquad f(\emptyset)=0 .f(g)=1−∑i∈g​ρi​∑i∈g​ai​​,f(∅)=0.
  • The conservation law (1): ∑i=1MρiWi=V/(1−ρ)\sum_{i=1}^M\rho_iW_i=V/(1-\rho)∑i=1M​ρi​Wi​=V/(1−ρ), which equals f({1,…,M})f(\{1,\dots,M\})f({1,…,M}).
  • The inequalities (4): ∑i∈gρiWi≥f(g)\sum_{i\in g}\rho_iW_i\ge f(g)∑i∈g​ρi​Wi​≥f(g) for each proper nonempty set ggg of classes.
  • H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ is the set of WWW satisfying (1) and (4).
  • A priority order lists the classes as i1,…,iMi_1,\dots,i_Mi1​,…,iM​, i1i_1i1​ highest. The preemptive priority vector P(i1,…,iM)P(i_1,\dots,i_M)P(i1​,…,iM​) is the vector with ∑i∈SkρiWi=f(Sk)\sum_{i\in S_k}\rho_iW_i=f(S_k)∑i∈Sk​​ρi​Wi​=f(Sk​) for the top sets Sk={i1,…,ik}S_k=\{i_1,\dots,i_k\}Sk​={i1​,…,ik​}, k=1,…,Mk=1,\dots,Mk=1,…,M; explicitly Pik=(f(Sk)−f(Sk−1))/ρikP_{i_k}=(f(S_k)-f(S_{k-1}))/\rho_{i_k}Pik​​=(f(Sk​)−f(Sk−1​))/ρik​​. For M=2M=2M=2, P(1,2)1=1/(μ1−λ1)P(1,2)_1=1/(\mu_1-\lambda_1)P(1,2)1​=1/(μ1​−λ1​), the M/M/1 response time of class 1 alone.
  • HHH, (3), is the set of convex combinations ∑k=1MαkPk\sum_{k=1}^M\alpha_kP_k∑k=1M​αk​Pk​ of MMM preemptive priority vectors.

In Lean the data are a structure Params M carrying λ,μ\lambda,\muλ,μ and the three standing assumptions; Params.f, Params.Hss (H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗), Params.prioVec, topSet and Params.H are the objects above.

Formalization targets

Goal: Theorem 2, analytical form

H∗∗=H.H^{**}=H .H∗∗=H.

The paper's Theorem 2 says a vector is achievable by a scheduling strategy iff it lies in HHH; its proof is the chain H⊆H∗⊆H∗∗⊆HH\subseteq H^*\subseteq H^{**}\subseteq HH⊆H∗⊆H∗∗⊆H, where H∗H^*H∗ is the achievable set. The goal is the part of the chain that involves no strategies.

Milestones

  1. The priority vector is the unique solution of the equations (5) for its chain of top sets.
  2. The first inequality of the proof of Lemma 2: (1−ρ(g1))(1−ρ(g2))>(1−ρ(g1∪g2))(1−ρ(g1∩g2))(1-\rho(g_1))(1-\rho(g_2))>(1-\rho(g_1\cup g_2))(1-\rho(g_1\cap g_2))(1−ρ(g1​))(1−ρ(g2​))>(1−ρ(g1​∪g2​))(1−ρ(g1​∩g2​)) for crossing g1,g2g_1,g_2g1​,g2​.
  3. The second inequality of that proof, in the coefficients aia_iai​.
  4. Lemma 1 at the priority vectors: every P(i1,…,iM)P(i_1,\dots,i_M)P(i1​,…,iM​) lies in H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗.
  5. Two sets on which a point of H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ satisfies (4) with equality are nested.
  6. Lemma 2: every vertex of H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ is a preemptive priority vector.

A further item states the paper's final remark (§4): every linear cost ∑iciWi\sum_ic_iW_i∑i​ci​Wi​ is minimized over H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ at some preemptive priority vector.

Significance

The theorem turns a question about all scheduling rules into a finite check: a target vector is realizable iff it satisfies (1) and the inequalities (4), and every realizable vector is realized by randomly mixing at most MMM priority rules. Linear costs over the realizable vectors are minimized by a priority rule, the fact behind the optimality of priority-index rules in multiclass queues. The paper also gives a linear program for finding the mixture.

The result has been proved since 1980. No machine-checked proof of it is known. The Prove2Me library holds the abstract generalized conservation law theorem of Gittins, Glazebrook and Weber (AllocationIndices.achievable_region_theorem, included as a reference item), which assumes the inequalities (4) for every policy and whose polytope also imposes nonnegativity; it does not compute the right-hand sides for the M/M/1 queue, does not prove that the priority vectors satisfy (4), and uses equality on the lowest-priority sets rather than the highest. This mission supplies the concrete polytope, the closed form of the priority vectors and the strict supermodularity of fff.

Difficulty

That the priority vectors lie in H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ is a family of inequalities between ratios f(Sk)f(S_k)f(Sk​), one for each pair of a priority order and a set ggg, and the order and ggg need not interact in any simple way. The reverse inclusion is a statement about vertices: a vertex is determined by MMM tight constraints, and one has to show that they form a chain. This needs strict inequalities with the right direction for every crossing pair of sets, which is where the positivity of every λi,μi\lambda_i,\mu_iλi​,μi​ is used. If some λi=0\lambda_i=0λi​=0, then WiW_iWi​ appears in no constraint, H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗ is unbounded and the goal is false. Finally, HHH uses only MMM points, not all M!M!M!, so the goal contains a Carathéodory-type bound for the hyperplane of (1).

Formalization scope

Classes are Fin M, numbered from 000. A priority order is π : Equiv.Perm (Fin M) with π r the class of rank r, rank 000 highest. "Vertex" is an element of Set.extremePoints ℝ. The points of (3) are prioVec (σ k) for an arbitrary σ : Fin M → Equiv.Perm (Fin M), so repetitions are allowed. The priority vectors are given by their closed form, not as solutions of a system. The goal assumes M≥1M\ge1M≥1; for M=0M=0M=0 the set HHH is empty.

The paper's notion "achievable by some scheduling strategy" is replaced by its analytical characterization H∗∗H^{**}H∗∗: the strategy class of the paper (Assumptions 1–3, p. 812) is described only in prose and the steady-state means are assumed to exist, so the queueing half of the proof (Theorem 1, Lemma 1 for arbitrary strategies, the conservation law itself) is not stated. The goal is not to be stated on an abstract set satisfying hypotheses that encode Lemma 1 and (1); that form is already proved and drops the content of milestone 4. The conservation law is an equality, never the inequality (4) at the full set.

A complete development needs finite-set sums, the extreme points of a polyhedron and a Carathéodory argument in an affine hyperplane; the inequalities of milestones 2 and 3 and the vertex-chain argument are reusable for any strictly supermodular set function. Proofs of any milestone, and alternative proofs of the goal through polymatroid theory, are welcome.

Selected references

  • E. G. Coffman, Jr. and I. Mitrani, A Characterization of Waiting Time Performance Realizable by Single-Server Queues, Operations Research 28(3, Part II), 810–821, 1980. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.28.3.810
  • L. Kleinrock, A Conservation Law for a Wide Class of Queueing Disciplines, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 12, 181–192, 1965. https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800120206
  • A. Federgruen and H. Groenevelt, Characterization and Optimization of Achievable Performance in General Queueing Systems, Operations Research 36(5), 733–741, 1988. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.36.5.733
  • J. G. Shanthikumar and D. D. Yao, Multiclass Queueing Systems: Polymatroidal Structure and Optimal Scheduling Control, Operations Research 40(3-supplement-2), S293–S299, 1992. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.40.3.S293
  • D. Bertsimas and J. Niño-Mora, Conservation Laws, Extended Polymatroids and Multiarmed Bandit Problems; A Polyhedral Approach to Indexable Systems, Mathematics of Operations Research 21(2), 257–306, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.21.2.257
  • J. Gittins, K. Glazebrook and R. Weber, Multi-armed Bandit Allocation Indices, 2nd ed., Wiley, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470980033
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Algorithmic Game Theory·Captain: mikedeng1

The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games I: The Pure Price of Anarchy of the Average Social Cost Is 5/2Research Paper

Motivation

When many independent users share a resource whose cost grows with use (links of a network, servers, machines), each user chooses for itself, and the outcome is a Nash equilibrium rather than a socially optimal allocation. The price of anarchy, introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (STACS 1999), measures the cost of this decentralisation: the worst ratio between the social cost of an equilibrium and the optimal social cost. It has become a standard yardstick in algorithmic game theory, network routing and the design of distributed protocols.

Christodoulou and Koutsoupias (STOC 2005) determined the price of anarchy of finite congestion games with linear latencies, the atomic, unweighted counterpart of selfish routing. This mission formalizes the central entry of their table: pure equilibria, general (asymmetric) strategy sets, and the average social cost.

Timeline:

  • 1973. Rosenthal defines congestion games and shows that they always have pure Nash equilibria (IJGT 2).
  • 1999. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou define the price of anarchy, for load balancing on parallel links (STACS 1999).
  • 2002. Roughgarden and Tardos prove that the price of anarchy of non-atomic selfish routing with linear latencies is 4/34/34/3 (J. ACM 49).
  • 2005. Christodoulou and Koutsoupias prove that for finite (atomic) congestion games with linear latencies the pure price of anarchy of the average social cost is exactly 5/25/25/2; independently, Awerbuch, Azar and Epstein obtain 2.52.52.5 for unweighted and (3+5)/2≈2.618(3+\sqrt5)/2\approx2.618(3+5​)/2≈2.618 for weighted games (STOC 2005).
  • 2009. Roughgarden shows that this type of bound extends to mixed, correlated and coarse correlated equilibria (STOC 2009).

Setting

A congestion game has a finite set NNN of players, a finite set EEE of facilities, for every player iii a set Σi⊆2E\Sigma_i\subseteq 2^EΣi​⊆2E of pure strategies (each a set of facilities), and for every facility eee a latency function fef_efe​ giving the cost of eee to each of its users as a function of how many users it has. A pure strategy profile A=(A1,…,An)A=(A_1,\dots,A_n)A=(A1​,…,An​) picks Ai∈ΣiA_i\in\Sigma_iAi​∈Σi​ for each player. The load ne(A)n_e(A)ne​(A) is the number of players iii with e∈Aie\in A_ie∈Ai​, and player iii pays

ci(A)=∑e∈Aife(ne(A)).c_i(A)=\sum_{e\in A_i}f_e\bigl(n_e(A)\bigr).ci​(A)=e∈Ai​∑​fe​(ne​(A)).

The profile AAA is a pure Nash equilibrium if no player can lower its cost by switching alone: ci(A)≤ci(A−i,S)c_i(A)\le c_i(A_{-i},S)ci​(A)≤ci​(A−i​,S) for all iii and all S∈ΣiS\in\Sigma_iS∈Σi​, where (A−i,S)(A_{-i},S)(A−i​,S) replaces AiA_iAi​ by SSS. The social cost is SUM(A)=∑i∈Nci(A)\mathrm{SUM}(A)=\sum_{i\in N}c_i(A)SUM(A)=∑i∈N​ci​(A), which is ∣N∣|N|∣N∣ times the average cost of a player. Latencies are linear: fe(k)=aek+bef_e(k)=a_ek+b_efe​(k)=ae​k+be​ with ae,be≥0a_e,b_e\ge0ae​,be​≥0. The game is asymmetric in the sense that each player has its own strategy set (symmetric games, where all Σi\Sigma_iΣi​ coincide, are a special case).

The pure price of anarchy of the average social cost is

PA=sup⁡A NashSUM(A)opt,opt=min⁡PSUM(P),PA=\sup_{A\text{ Nash}}\frac{\mathrm{SUM}(A)}{\mathrm{opt}},\qquad \mathrm{opt}=\min_{P}\mathrm{SUM}(P),PA=A Nashsup​optSUM(A)​,opt=Pmin​SUM(P),

the minimum taken over pure strategy profiles. In Lean these objects are CongestionGame, load, cost, IsProfile, IsPureNash, sumCost and IsLinear in the namespace CongestionPoA.AsymSum.

Formalization targets

Goal: the pure price of anarchy is exactly 5/2

The goal theorem pure_poa_sum_eq_five_halves is the conjunction of Theorems 1 and 2 of the paper:

for every linear game, Nash A and profile P:SUM(A)≤52 SUM(P),\text{for every linear game, Nash } A \text{ and profile } P:\quad \mathrm{SUM}(A)\le\tfrac52\,\mathrm{SUM}(P),for every linear game, Nash A and profile P:SUM(A)≤25​SUM(P), for every N≥3 there are a linear game with N players, Nash A and profile P:SUM(A)=52 SUM(P).\text{for every } N\ge3 \text{ there are a linear game with } N \text{ players, Nash } A \text{ and profile } P:\quad \mathrm{SUM}(A)=\tfrac52\,\mathrm{SUM}(P).for every N≥3 there are a linear game with N players, Nash A and profile P:SUM(A)=25​SUM(P).

The first part is the upper bound; the second shows that it is attained for every number of players from three on.

Milestones

  1. Lemma 1: β(α+1)≤13α2+53β2\beta(\alpha+1)\le\frac13\alpha^2+\frac53\beta^2β(α+1)≤31​α2+35​β2 for nonnegative integers α,β\alpha,\betaα,β.
  2. Deviation inequality (proof of Theorem 1): at a Nash equilibrium AAA, ci(A)≤ci(A−i,Pi)≤∑e∈Pife(ne(A)+1)c_i(A)\le c_i(A_{-i},P_i)\le\sum_{e\in P_i}f_e(n_e(A)+1)ci​(A)≤ci​(A−i​,Pi​)≤∑e∈Pi​​fe​(ne​(A)+1).
  3. Summing over players (proof of Theorem 1): SUM(A)≤∑e∈Ene(P) fe(ne(A)+1)\mathrm{SUM}(A)\le\sum_{e\in E}n_e(P)\,f_e(n_e(A)+1)SUM(A)≤∑e∈E​ne​(P)fe​(ne​(A)+1).
  4. Theorem 1: the upper bound SUM(A)≤52SUM(P)\mathrm{SUM}(A)\le\frac52\mathrm{SUM}(P)SUM(A)≤25​SUM(P).
  5. Theorem 2: the matching instances for every N≥3N\ge3N≥3.

Significance

The value 5/25/25/2 is the benchmark for atomic congestion with affine costs. It is the reference point for the later results of the paper (the symmetric case (5N−2)/(2N+1)(5N-2)/(2N+1)(5N−2)/(2N+1), the maximum social cost Θ(N)\Theta(\sqrt N)Θ(N​), mixed equilibria (3+5)/2(3+\sqrt5)/2(3+5​)/2) and for a large literature on coordination mechanisms, taxes and the price of stability, which compare their guarantees against it. The bound is also the standard example of what later became the smoothness framework, through which the same constant governs mixed and coarse correlated equilibria and hence no-regret learning outcomes.

Both theorems are proved in the paper; nothing here is open. The proofs for affine latencies, however, are only indicated: the paper displays the identity case fe(k)=kf_e(k)=kfe​(k)=k and states that the arguments extend. The mission states the affine case and asks for complete machine-checked proofs, including the lower-bound construction, which the paper describes and declares "not hard to verify". No machine-checked proof of these results is on the platform.

Difficulty

The Nash conditions give one inequality per player, each mixing the equilibrium loads ne(A)n_e(A)ne​(A) with the strategies PiP_iPi​ of the comparison profile. Bounding the loads crudely, for instance by the number of players, gives a ratio that grows with NNN; the constant 5/25/25/2 requires comparing the cross term ∑ene(P) ne(A)\sum_e n_e(P)\,n_e(A)∑e​ne​(P)ne​(A) with both social costs simultaneously and with the right weights. The integrality of the loads matters at that point: the natural pointwise inequality is false for real arguments, so a proof that treats loads as real numbers cannot reach 5/25/25/2.

For the lower bound, a Nash equilibrium must be verified against every unilateral deviation of every player, for all N≥3N\ge3N≥3 at once, in a construction with cyclic indices. The case N=2N=2N=2 is genuinely different (the paper states that its price of anarchy is 222), so the argument has to use N≥3N\ge3N≥3.

Formalization scope

Players and facilities are finite types; a profile is a map from players to finite sets of facilities, and feasibility (Ai∈ΣiA_i\in\Sigma_iAi​∈Σi​) is a separate predicate. Latencies are real-valued functions of the natural-number load, and "linear" means affine with nonnegative coefficients. The upper bound is stated multiplicatively, for every Nash AAA and every feasible PPP, which is equivalent to PA≤5/2PA\le5/2PA≤5/2 and avoids dividing by opt\mathrm{opt}opt. The lower bound quantifies over players Fin N, N≥3N\ge3N≥3, and existentially over a finite facility type, a linear game, a Nash equilibrium and an optimal feasible profile of positive social cost. The positivity rules out the trivializing witness: in the all-zero latency game every profile is a Nash equilibrium and 0=52⋅00=\frac52\cdot00=25​⋅0. The Nash condition is the paper's cost form; it agrees with the payoff-form AGT.IsPureNash of agt_games for payoffs −ci-c_i−ci​.

Trivializing formalizations are ruled out: the comparison profile PPP must be feasible (otherwise SUM(P)\mathrm{SUM}(P)SUM(P) could be 000 by letting players use no facility), the upper bound covers all affine latencies rather than only fe(k)=kf_e(k)=kfe​(k)=k, and the lower-bound instance must have linear latencies with nonnegative coefficients.

A complete development needs finite double counting (regrouping ∑i∑e∈Pi\sum_i\sum_{e\in P_i}∑i​∑e∈Pi​​ by facilities), monotonicity of affine latencies, and a decidable or explicit check of the lower-bound game. The congestion-game layer is reused by the other missions of this series. Proofs of individual milestones, and alternative proofs of the upper bound, are welcome.

Selected references

  • G. Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias, The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games, Proc. 37th ACM STOC, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060600
  • B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar and A. Epstein, The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow, Proc. 37th ACM STOC, 2005. https://doi.org/10.1145/1060590.1060599
  • E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case Equilibria, STACS 1999, LNCS 1563. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-49116-3_38
  • R. W. Rosenthal, A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory 2, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737559
  • T. Roughgarden and É. Tardos, How Bad Is Selfish Routing?, Journal of the ACM 49(2), 2002. https://doi.org/10.1145/506147.506153
  • T. Roughgarden, Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy, Proc. 41st ACM STOC, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1145/1536414.1536485
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