Linear Programming and Finite Markovian Control Problems VIII: Single-Controller Stochastic Games — a Dual Pair of Linear Programs Gives the Value and Stationary Optimal PoliciesTextbook
Motivation
A two-person zero-sum stochastic game (also called a Markov game) is a Markov decision problem with two decision makers who pull in opposite directions: at every time point both players choose an action simultaneously, one player pays the other, and the system moves to a random next state whose law depends on the current state and both actions. Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley (Shapley 1953) and are the standard model for adversarial sequential decisions in operations research, economics and computer science (pursuit–evasion, inspection, robust control against an adversarial environment).
Shapley proved that a discounted stochastic game has a value and that both players have stationary optimal policies. The value, however, is in general not computable by linear programming: it need not lie in the field generated by the data. Kallenberg's Example 6.2.1 (after Parthasarathy and Raghavan) has rational data and an irrational value in one state. When only one player controls the transition probabilities, the situation changes: the value and stationary optimal policies are the optimal solutions of one pair of dual linear programs (Parthasarathy & Raghavan, as cited in Kallenberg 1983, pp. 192 and 196; Kallenberg 1983, Chapter 6).
Timeline.
- 1953: Shapley proves existence of the value and of stationary optimal policies for the discounted game.
- 1977–1978: Parthasarathy and Raghavan study games in which one player controls the transitions and identify an order-field property for the value and optimal decision rules (cited in Kallenberg 1983, pp. 192, 196).
- 1983: Kallenberg presents the dual pair (6.2.1)/(6.2.2), with the controlling player's policy read off the dual and the opponent's from the primal, and a constructive existence proof (Remark 6.2.2).
Setting
The state space is with . In state player I chooses an action from a finite nonempty set and player II an action from a finite nonempty set . Player I then receives from player II, and the next state is with probability , where .
A history at time is . A policy of player I chooses, at each time and history, a probability distribution on ; policies of player II are defined likewise. A policy is stationary, written or , if the distribution depends only on the current state. With the expected reward in period from initial state , the total reward is .
A pair is optimal if, componentwise,
and then is the value of the game.
Assumption 6.2.1 (contraction). There are and with for all , , . The discounted game is the case .
Assumption 6.2.2 (single controller). does not depend on ; it is written .
For a stationary write and . A vector is TMG-superharmonic if some stationary of player II satisfies for all , . For weights the two linear programs are
Formalization targets
Goal: Theorem 6.2.3
Under Assumptions 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, let and be optimal solutions of (6.2.1) and (6.2.2), and . Then
The goal fixes no constants; it states that the LP pair produces the value and optimal stationary policies.
Milestones
- Theorem 6.2.1 (Shapley): under Assumption 6.2.1 both players have stationary optimal policies.
- Theorem 6.2.2: under Assumption 6.2.1, is the smallest TMG-superharmonic vector.
- Theorem 6.2.4 (i): for a stationary of player I, and give a feasible point of (6.2.2) with .
- Theorem 6.2.4 (ii): every feasible of (6.2.2) has and for .
Theorems 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 hold for the general contracting game. Assumption 6.2.2 enters only from (6.2.1) on.
Significance
The result. Theorem 6.2.3 turns a single-controller game into a finite computation, Algorithm XXVII: solve one LP pair and read off the value and optimal stationary policies of both players. A consequence (Remark 6.2.1) is that the value and the optimal decision rules lie in the field generated by the rewards and transition probabilities. Example 6.2.1 shows this fails without Assumption 6.2.2. Theorem 6.2.4 matches the feasible points of the dual program with the stationary policies of the controlling player. This is the game version of the correspondence between state-action frequencies and policies in Markov decision problems.
Formalizing it. All results are proved in the book, and Theorem 6.2.1 is classical. None of them is formalized: the platform has turn-based stochastic games with positional strategies (TBSGStrategyIteration), which do not cover simultaneous moves or history-dependent randomized policies. The mission adds a reusable model of simultaneous-move stochastic games with history-dependent policies, together with machine-checked optimality of the LP solution against every such policy.
Difficulty
There are two difficulties. First, optimality in (6.1.1) is against every history-dependent randomized policy of the opponent, while the LP produces only stationary policies. Fixing one player's stationary policy reduces the game to a Markov decision problem for the other player (Remark 6.1.1), and the facts needed from that problem (stationary policies suffice, and the value is the smallest superharmonic vector) are theorems about contracting MDPs, not consequences of the LP. Second, Theorem 6.2.2 rests on Shapley's existence theorem, which is not a linear-programming fact: its usual proof is a fixed-point argument for the Shapley operator built from one-stage matrix games. Remark 6.2.2 indicates a route that avoids it, through the bounded polytope of state-action frequencies of a contracting MDP. Either way, LP duality alone does not give optimality against non-stationary opponents.
Formalization scope
- Model. is
Fin Nwith . Actions live in finite typesα,β, and , are nonemptyFinsets. Rows are substochastic. - Policies. A history in is a record of states and actions of each player. A policy is a family of distributions indexed by time and history, supported on the current action set. Stationary policies are the image of state-dependent decision rules.
- Probabilities and reward. History probabilities are explicit finite products, with no measure theory. The total reward is the
tsumof the period rewards, which converges absolutely under Assumption 6.2.1, and every theorem assumes it. - Linear programs. Their variables are functions on all actions that vanish off (resp. ). Optimality means feasible and attaining the min/max over the feasible set. The common is for a fixed , and Assumption 6.2.2 makes the choice irrelevant. is a hypothesis, as on p. 194.
- The minimum in Theorem 6.2.4 (i) is over stationary policies of player II and is stated with attainment.
Restricting either player's policy class to stationary policies would make the optimality claims of Theorems 6.2.1 and 6.2.3 a statement about a finite family and is ruled out: the comparison class is all history-dependent randomized policies.
Lemma 6.1.1 is Mathlib's isSaddlePointOn_value (Mathlib/Order/SaddlePoint.lean) and is not restated. The LP duality theorems of Chapter 1 are proved on the platform (LinearOptimization.lp_strong_duality, lp_complementary_slackness) and may be used. Useful contributions include: the reduction of Remark 6.1.1 (a fixed stationary opponent gives an MDP), the contracting-MDP facts it needs, and a proof of Theorem 6.2.1. The model definitions are reusable for any finite stochastic game.
Selected references
- L. C. M. Kallenberg, Linear Programming and Finite Markovian Control Problems, Mathematical Centre Tracts 148, Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam, 1983, Chapter 6. https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/13008
- L. S. Shapley, Stochastic games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 39 (1953) 1095–1100. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.39.10.1095
- T. Parthasarathy and T. E. S. Raghavan, Finite algorithms for stochastic games, International Conference on Dynamic Programming, Vancouver, 1977; cited in Kallenberg 1983, p. 232. https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/13008
- T. Parthasarathy and T. E. S. Raghavan, An order field property for stochastic games when one player controls the transition probabilities, Game Theory Conference, Cornell, 1978; cited in Kallenberg 1983, p. 233. https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/13008